47757 UNDP-World Bank Trade Expansion Program Occasional Paper 11 Technology Transfer, Competition, and Trade Liberalization for Low-Risk Pest Management David Gisselquist and Charles Benbrook This occasional paper is a product of the joint UNDPNVorld Bank Trade Expansion Program which provides technical and policy advice to countries intending to reform their trade regimes. The views contained herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Development Program or the World Bank. Technology Transfer, Competition, and Trade Liberalization for Low-Risk Pest Management David Gisselquist and Charles Ben brook November 1996 International Trade Division T h e World Bank Washington, D.C. Note This report was prepared under the Trade Expansion Program of the United Nations Development Program and T h e World Bank. Support and advice by John Nash is gratefully acknowledged. Tjaart Schillhorn-Van Veen, Suzanne Vaupel, John McCarthy, Polly Hoppin, Louis Falcon, Gerd Fleisher, Phil Hutton, Ann Sorenson, Larry Elworth, Jeff Waage, Monty Yudelman, and many others contributed to the preparation of the report through advice and discussions. Hans Herren assisted in arrangements for an earlier draft to be presented in a seminar at the International Center of Insect Physiology and Ecology in Nairobi, Kenya. Jeff Hayden prepared the report for publication. T h e views and recommendations of the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Development Program or of the World Bank. The Authors Charles Benbrook has been a leading and influential advocate for biointensive integrated pest management in the United States. During 1984-90, Dr Benbrook was Executive Director, Board on Agriculture, of the U.S. National Research CouncilINational Academy of Sciences. Currently he heads Benbrook Consulting Services in Washington, D.C. Among recent activities, Dr Benbrook has written Pest Management at the Crossroads (New York: Consumers Policy InstituteIConsumers Union, 1996), presenting an articulated strategy for expanding biointensive IPM in the United States. David Gisselquist has studied regulation of agricultural inputs imports and trade in many developing countries and has advised and assisted regulatory reforms in Bangladesh, Ghana, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. He is currently studying the impact of inputs regulations and reforms through a research project at the World Bank. c o n tents 1. Introduction 1 General strategy for low-risk pest management in developing countries I 2. Global Trends Toward Low-Risk Pest Management 5 Dual strategy: target and replace high-risk pesticides 6 Alternate technologies 8 OECD regulatory reforms for low-risk pesticides 11 3. Recommendations for Developing Countries 15 Low-risk pesticides: reduce barriers to entry I5 High-risk pesticides: cut incentives 19 Bring consumers into pesticide policy debates 22 4. Implications for Organizations Promoting Low-Risk Pest Management in Developing Countries 23 Multiple channels for research and dissemination 23 Impact on government research and extension 24 Implication for donors 25 List of Tables Table 1. Policies and programs to cut externalities from pesticide use in developing countries 2 Table 2. Pesticide sales in small, medium, and large national markets 17 Table 3. Pesticide regulation and trade 26 Table 4. Regulating pesticides: reasons, practices, and reform options 34 Acronyms and Abbreviations ADB Asian Development Bank ai active ingredient APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bt bacillus thuringiensis CGIAR Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research CRISP Collaborative Research Support Program DDT dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane EPA Environmental Protection Agency FA0 Food and Agriculture Organization GIFAP International Group of National Associations of Manufacturers of Agrochemical Products I PM integrated pest management NARS national agricultural research system NGO non-government organization PAN Pesticide Action Network PANIC Planned Action for New Insect Controls USDA United States Department of Agriculture USAID United States Agency for International Development WHO World Health Organization Introduction T h e purpose of this paper is to suggest ways in developing countries toward trade liberalization, which pestkidel regulations in developing coun- proponents of low-risk pest management in devel- tries can be redesigned t o promote low-risk pest oping countries increasingly run into a classic and management systems. T h e term "low-risk p e s t common problem: government regulations t h a t management7' encompasses use of pesticides or interfere with trade and technology transfer. T h i s other pest-management strategies that have zero paper, a product of t h e UNDP-World Bank T r a d e to low externalities, causing little or no damage to Expansion Program, addresses problems with trade the environment or public health. and technology transfer for low-risk pest manage- Since many pesticides threaten externalities, ment inputs. virtually all governments regulate pesticide trade In focusing on regulatory reforms to improve and use. While the razion d'etre for regulation is to farmer access to inputs for low-risk pest manage- limit externalities, regulatory systems in place in m e n t , t h e paper does not address many o t h e r many developing countries are far from optimal, research, regulatory, and extension issues crucial protecting profitable oligopolies that sell primarily to limit environmental and public health damage high-risk pesticides while blocking farmer access from pesticides. Hence, this paper does not pre- to products with fewer risks. tend to be a stand-alone guide to everything that Responding to evidence of serious efficacy and should be done for safe, sustainable, and effective safety problems with conventional pesticides, pest management. Instead, the paper is intended many developing countries have been strengthen- to complement existing advice and assistance from ing p e s t i c i d e regulatory systems. While t h e s e donors, governments, non-government organiza- reforms have achieved significant progress i n tions (NGOs), and t h e pesticide industry (notably improving choice, handling, and use of convention- GIFAP, t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l G r o u p of N a t i o n a l al pesticides, ironically more comprehensive regu- Associations of M a n u f a c t u r e r s of P e s t i c i d e latory requirements are emerging in many coun- Products). Table 1 schematically illustrates t h e tries as major barriers against the introduction of focus of this paper in t h e context of other advice safer new technologies. and assistance on pest management in developing H e n c e , d e s p i t e t h e general t r e n d i n m a n y countries. Table 1. Policies and programs to cut externalities from pesticide use in developing countries Objectives Regulatory policies Research and extension programs - - - - - -- Promote low-risk technologies This paper recommends that gov- Donors, governments, and NGOs ernments ease regulatory barriers manage and support research and for low-risk pesticides (while main- extension programs to identify and taining or increasing regulatory extend technologies for low-risk controls for high-risk pesticides) pest management (for example, integrated pest management [IPM], organic agriculture, etc.) Reduce damage from conventional Donors, non-governmental organi- Donors, government, and industry synthetic chemical pesticides. zations (NGOs),and private indus- support extension and training to try advise governments to strength- improve pesticide handling and use en regulations governing pesticide (for example, cut risks to applica- production, trade, and use-for tors, limit residues on food crops, example, the Food and Agriculture etc.) Organization's (FAO's) Guidelines for Registration and Control of Pesticides. Also, donors and NGOs advise governments to ban selected pesticides (for example, the Pesticide Action Network's Dirty Dozen Campaign) General strategy for low-risk pest manage- and extension for low-risk pest manage- ment in developing countries ment. Compared to conventional pesti- Regulatory reforms proposed in this paper can cides, effectiveness of low-risk technolo- be seen as part of an overall regulatory, research, gies often depends more on site-specific and extension strategy to promote low-risk pest conditions such as weather a n d farm management, with the following inter-linked com- management. Hence, success with low- ponents: risk pest management depends crucially o n farmer participation in developing Regui'ations. Revise regulatory systems so a n d t e s t i n g new technologies. While that barriers to entry for new pesticides central research and extension agencies vary according to the severity of their can be reorganized and decentralized to externalities. At one extreme, pesticides fit this model, even more can be accom- without any externalities can be deregu- plished if governments also allow and lated. Tests and costs to introduce new empower others to work with farmers to pesticides should increase with toxicity test, introduce, and extend low-risk pest and expected externalities. At t h e other management technologies. extreme, pesticides with unacceptable externalities should be banned. T h e above two reforms are mutually support- Research and Extension Programs. ive. Lowering barriers to entry for low-risk pesti- Encourage multiple public and private cides empowers multiple public and private orga- organizations to take independent ini- nizations to take independent initiatives to devel- tiatives for technology transfer, research, op and promote new inputs. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND TRADE COMPET~TION, FOR LOW-RISK LIBERALIDTION PESTMANAGEMENT 3 Jumping to biopesticides and related low-risk industrial countries. (World Bank 1993, section B, technologies p 2) Pesticide use in most developing countries is Pesticide use in developing countries is often significantly less t h a n in O r g a n i z a t i o n for highly concentrated on a few cash crops, notably Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) cotton, and risk consequences are likewise concen- countries, and many farmers continue to rely heav- trated in regions growing input-intensive crops. In ily on traditional non-chemical pest management India, for example, half of all pesticides by value technologies. For agricultural development to pro- are applied on cotton, a crop accounting for less ceed, farmers must gain access to improved mod- than 5 percent of gross cropped area. In Thailand, ern technologies for pest control as well as new roughly 30 percent of pesticides by value goes for pest-resistant plant varieties. Focusing only on plantation fruit crops covering 2 percent of n e t controlling use of high-risk pesticides does nor cropped area. Bananas account for the lion's share address the demand for modern and more effec- of pesticide use in Ecuador, and most are grown in tive pest management. Both agricultural produc- two coastal regions. High concentration of pesti- tivity and farm income can advance while pesti- cide use on certain crops in specific regions within cide risks are reduced as farmers gain access to- developing countries accounts for the severity of and confidence in-the latest low-risk pest man- localized environmental and public health prob- agement technologies and systems. lems. In most developing countries, pesticide use by Relative to the industrial world, the variety of weight per unit area is much less than in Western active ingredients in pesticide is more limited in Europe and North America (see table 3). In t h e developing countries. Often only a few products period 1982-84, most developing countries used end up being used on many crops, including ones less than 1.0 kilograms (kgs) of active ingredients on which they may be unsafe and for which they per hectare of harvested cropland, and many (for are not registered. Excessive reliance on a limited example, Bangladesh, Burundi, Ethiopia, a n d number of active ingredients exacerbates t h e Pakistan) used less t h a n 0.1 kgs per hectare. emergence of genetic resistance and secondary Farmers in a small minority of developing coun- pest problems. tries used 2 to 8 kgs of active ingredients per O n e pattern for "modernizing" pest manage- hectare (for example, 7.6 in Egypt, 6.0 in South m e n t in developing countries is for farmers to Korea, 3.9 in El Salvador, and 2.7 in Guatemala), increase use of dangerous conventional pesticides rates of use which are comparable by weight to use that industrial countries have been moving away in O E C D countries such as the United States, from after years of controversy. This pattern of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. development is neither desirable nor inevitable; T h e s e weight comparisons mask differences. developing countries do not have to follow in t h e N e w e r chemicals m o r e c o m m o n in W e s t e r n footsteps of industrialized countries. Regulatory Europe and the United States are applied at much reforms proposed in this paper could help farmers lower rates than older, less expensive chemicals in developing countries go directly to t h e most more common in developing countries. T h e s e modern, biologically-based, low-risk pest manage- older chemicals t e n d t o b e more toxic, broad- ment technologies, avoiding (and in some cases spectrum, and persistent in the environment. A reducing) heavy dependence on some of the more recent World Bank study of pesticide use in Asian dangerous conventional pesticides. developing countries reports "abandonment of t h e old-style molecules in favor of the newer ones has Biointensive integrated pest management (IPM) b e e n slowest i n t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . " Biointensive IPM systems coordinate multiple (Jackson 1992, section 2.1) A 1993 World Bank natural biological processes and ecological interac- study of pesticide use in Latin America found tions. I n managing specific pests, such systems "massive usage" of products unacceptable in most rely on prevention and beneficial organisms to keep pest populations below economic thresholds. botanical biopesticides (for example, rotenone) Along with many pest management experts, t h e have externalities comparable to those for high- World B a n k h a s e n d o r s e d b i o i n t e n s i v e I P M risk synthetic chemical poisons, so that identifica- through individual loans and through t h e newly tion of inputs to include in biointensive IPM sys- e s t a b l i s h e d I P M Facility. Biointensive I P M tems is not always straightforward. promises to b e more reliable, less costly, and much Regulatory strategies proposed in this paper are less hazardous than pest control through routine c o m p a t i b l e w i t h b i o i n t e n s i v e I P M , however applications of conventional pesticides. defined. But t h e proposals are also compatible While biointensive IPM has been gaining sup- with other general strategies or philosophies to port among pest management experts, controver- reduce externalities from pest management activi- sies remain. Experts disagree over t h e realistic ties. Recommendations could be fine-tuned to speed of any shift away from conventional pesti- support a very narrow range of very low or zero-risk cides. Among those who promote biointensive pesticides or some other wider class of favored IPM there are disagreements over whether or how pesticides including low-and medium-risk pesti- much to use conventional pesticides (for example, cides (for example, newer and safer conventional never, or w h e n o t h e r options fail). Also, some pesticides, biopesticides). Global Trends Toward Low-Risk Pest Management F o r t h o u s a n d s of years, f a r m e r s managed (by weight) applied in most countries, and have tillage, crop rotations, date of planting, disposal of since t h e mid-1960s (AGROSTAT, various coun- crop residues, and many other a s p e c t s of farm tries). Six or less herbicide families and about operations with an eye to limit crop damage from eight active ingredients (2,4-D and related phe- weeds, insects, and other organisms. T o a limited noxy herbicides; paraquat; atrazine and other tri- e x t e n t , before 1940, farmers also used chemicals a z i n e s ; glyphosate a n d related p r o d u c t s ; a n d a n d botanicals s u c h as p y r e t h r u m (from East alachlor, metolachlor, b u t a c h l o r , a n d r e l a t e d African chyrsanthemums), nicotine (from tobac- acetanilide products) have dominated global herbi- co), sulfur, copper, and Paris green (with arsenic) cide use for four decades. to limit pest damage. Insecticide use has not been so nearly dominat- Conventional pesticides (synthetic chemical ed by a few products, largely because of the emer- poisons) began t o d o m i n a t e pest management gence of resistance, which has undermined t h e with t h e introduction of D D T during and after efficacy of nearly every insecticide widely used on World War 11. From the 1940s through the 1960s, major crops in t h e industrial world. Most insecti- c o m p a n i e s introduced multiple n e w synthetic cides used since t h e 1940s fall into o n e of four chemical poisons for pest control. Applying these classes: organochlorines ( D D T , aldrinldieldrin, chemicals, farmers were able to relax or abandon chlordane/heptachlor, toxaphene, lindane, endo- other, often land and labor-intensive practices for- sulfan, methoxychlor, dicofol); organophosphates merly designed at least in part to control pests (for ( m a l a t h i o n , parathion, chlorpyrifos, azinphos- example, crop rotations, tillage, or weeding). m e t h y l , carbaryl, m e t h o m y l , terbufos, D D T and three dozen other widely used con- methamidiphos, etc); carbamates (aldicarb, carbo- ventional pesticide active ingredients have domi- furan); and synthetic pyrethroids (permethrin, nated world pesticide markets since t h e 1940s. cypermethrin, fenvalerate, deltamethrin). Most Among fungicides, only four active ingredients are broad spectrum poisons, disrupting biochemi- (captan, benomyl, t h e EBDC family of products cal processes widely shared among insects, mam- [maneb, zineb, mancozeb, ziram, and thiram], and mals, plants, and fish; "most of them are properly chlorthalonil) account for more than 80 percent considered to be 'biocides"' (Horn 1988, p. 134). Many of these insecticides are relatively stable and poor diet and chronic illness exacerbate the impact hence persistent in t h e environment, which is an of pesticides on the immune system. advantage to farmers seeking longer-lasting control While the relative importance of exposures to from each application. conventional pesticides versus exposures to other In t h e 1960s, heavy reliance on conventional industrial chemicals, natural toxicants, and other pesticides triggered increasing public opposition in synthetic and natural compounds will be vigorous- industrial countries based on concerns about nega- ly debated for years, it is clear that conventional tive environmental and public health externalities. pesticides have an impact across populations on Ironically, traits sought in the 1940s through the the biological processes that lead to disease and 1960s by pesticide chemists to increase the effec- developmental deficiencies. In recent years, pres- tiveness and market potential for pesticides-toxi- sure to alter pest management systems in industri- city, widespread effectiveness through a common al countries has mounted with the recognition that mode of action, persistence, systemic movement the danger of pesticides-a major source of daily through plant tissues--often also heightened pub- exposure to dangerous chemicals-can be lessened lic health and environmental risks. Most older pes- markedly and quickly without imposing significant ticides have the potential to move beyond individ- costs or inconvenience on society as a whole. ual farms into harvested food, food-chains, wildlife, Along with environmental damage and public and ground and surface water. Though measures health risks, conventional pesticides have other can be devised to handle and to use pesticides so problems as well. Applications kill not only target a s t o l i m i t n e g a t i v e i m p a c t s on applicators, pests but also predatory insects that limit popula- wildlife, and consumers (for example, low expo- tions of otherwise innocuous plant-eating insects, sure application technologies, rules about re-entry allowing them to emerge as secondary pests. Also, into sprayed fields, rules about spraying before har- use of conventional pesticides promotes selection vest, and pesticide residue limits for foods), these in pest populations for ability to survive, which measures restrain but do not eliminate pesticide results in resistant pests. Each time a conventional damage beyond target organisms. pesticide is used, some of its ability to control tar- In addition to toxic or short-term damage to get pests erodes. Farmers applying more poisons to humans and a wide range of other non-target kill secondary pests accelerate breeding for pest species, many conventional pesticides and their resistance. metabolites inflict chronic damage on humans and other non-target species from long-term, low-level Dual strategy: target and replace high-risk exposure. There is clear evidence now from both pesticides industrial and developing countries that low-level, Throughout t h e world, public health profes- long-term exposure t o conventional pesticides sionals, wildlife ecologists, environmentalists, and increases t h e incidence of a variety of cancers, consumer advocates lead efforts to reduce the use birth defects, and immunological deficiencies, and of conventional pesticides, often meeting opposi- damages reproduction and other functions mediat- tion from chemical and food industries and from ed by the endocrine system. farmers who do not want to lose access to easy to Some three dozen major pesticides are known use, affordable pesticides. Such conflicts are com- to impair t h e development of the human immune mon for products with negative externalities. system and its ability t o respond to threats. A Limiting use to socially optimum levels requires recent study by World Resources Institute reports action by society to restrain producers and con- evidence of damaged immune "among occupation- sumers of the products in question, who would ally exposed farmers" in developing countries in like to make decisions on the basis of partial (pri- the form of "elevated rates of infectious diseases" vate) accounting of costs and benefits. However, of many organ systems (Repetto and Baliga 1996, farmers have also been increasingly skeptical of pp. 59-63). For farmers in developing countries, conventional pesticides. Farmers know from expe- rience that pesticides can be dangerous to them- United States peaked in 1962-63, though the U.S. selves and to their families and that resistance and government did not completely ban use until the secondary pests cut farm profits and sometimes early 1970s. Even before the government restrict- cause major crop losses. ed D D T and most other organochlorines, use had With policymakers caught between critics and declined precipitously because of widespread advocates of conventional pesticides, government resistance, especially in major insect pests of cot- action to reduce pesticide damage often depends ton. on the ability of critics to reach agreements with U.S. and O E C D pesticide use by tons of active others on a limited agenda. Some of the most ingredients increased into the 1980s. Since then, widely endorsed and hence successful efforts use by weight has declined in some OECD coun- against pesticide damage have included the follow- tries and increased in others. However, aggregate ing two elements: data on use by weight or value mask shifts among active ingredients. Compared to the active ingre- targeting action against those pesticides dients they replace, many new ones are effective that are most damaging, and at much lower rates of application, less threatening to the environment and public health, and more providing alternate pest management expensive. In most industrial countries and for inputs and strategies so that farmers do most crops, farmers use a larger number of active not face increases in pest damage. ingredients, apply pesticides to a larger share of cropped area, and spend more on pesticides, both Two milestones in public awareness and action in both absolute terms and as a percent of total against pesticide damage illustrate these two ele- cash variable costs. ments. Rachel Carson's 1962 book, Silmt Spring, In 1995, the OECD and Food and Agriculture drew attention to environmental damage from Organization (FAO) sponsored the Pesticide Risk D D T and other broad spectrum poisons in t h e Reduction Workshop to discuss progress and to United States. T h e ensuing public debate led to debate strategies for the future. In a paper pre- limits on nearly a dozen major organochlorine sented to the workshop, the World Wide Fund for insecticides and triggered an increase in fedzral Nature states that for OECD countries, "reduc- funding for research on insect pests. Two decades tions in volume of use to date have been largely later, on Earth Day 1985, the Pesticide Action achieved through product substitution and more Network (PAN), working with more than 300 non- efficient application methods," with only "modest government organizations (NGOs), initiated an change in reliance on chemicals as the principle international campaign targeting 12 of the most method for pest control." Looking to the future, hazardous and common conventional pesticides. the paper recommends that, (World Wide Fund for PAN'S Dirty Dozen campaign, (Gipps 1987, p. 6) Nature 1995, pp. 11-12) called for t h e elimination of these pesti- policy-makers need to realistically appraise cides from production, sale and use unless how the next increment of reduction in use protection of public health and the environ- and risk c a n most cost-effectively b e ment can be guaranteed. It also advocated achieved. Evidence in the US strongly sup- that they be replaced by safe, viable alter- ports the conclusion that the best way to native pest control systems. significantly reduce risks is to target regula- tory restrictions toward the approximately In industrial countries, efforts to limit external- three dozen widely used "high risk" prod- ities from conventional pesticides have had partial ucts, coupled with reducing reliance, and success. During t h e 1970s, many governments hence use, by accelerating adoption of bio- banned or restricted use of the most hazardous intensive IPM systems. pesticides. For example, D D T production in the Similarly, the World Bank's formal pesticide pesticides use IPM to describe chemical-intensive policy encourages developing countries to ban systems in which applications are managed so as to selected pesticides and to design registration limit problems of pest resistance and secondary processes t o accelerate introduction of alternate pests (for example, by alternating active ingredi- low-risk products:z ents or by spraying according to need rather than schedule). Insofar as chemical-intensive I P M Removing certain pesticides from the mar- strategies defer emergence of pest resistance, they ket b e c a u s e of their e f f e c t s on human preserve markets for conventional pesticides. health and the environment may stimulate Many of those involved in pesticide policy t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and a d o p t i o n of I P M debates want a stronger and less ambiguous agen- alternatives ... T o encourage the introduc- da than what IPM has come to mean. In the paper tion of new and less harmful pesticides, leg- quoted above, t h e World Wide Fund for Nature islation should establish a pesticide regis- recommends "biointensive IPM" to allow farmers tration process t h a t is streamlined and "to reduce reliance on [conventional] pesticides" accessible and that does not impose heavy (World Wide Fund for Nature 1995, p. 3). Others costs. advocate organic farming, with complete avoidance of synthetic chemical pesticides. Although bioin- Suppressing use of dangerous conventional tensive IPM and organic or natural pesticides are pesticides can be much easier when alternate low- p r o m o t e d t o c u t externalities, s o m e s u c h as risk technologies, including bio-intensive IPM sys- rotenone, pyrethrin, and arsenicals can be more tems, are available. T h e next two sub-sections list damaging t h a n t h e s y n t h e t i c chemicals t h e y alternate technologies and describe OECD regula- replace (Kovach and others 1992). tory reforms to facilitate their introduction. T h e U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses the term "reduced-risk" to describe Alternate technologies alternate pesticides that are less damaging. OECD Early practice with conventional pesticides and F A 0 endorse "risk reduction" strategies for emphasized scheduled or prophylactic applications pest management. These terms indicate an intent t o ensure t h a t pests would not damage crops, to limit pesticide damage, which does not neces- whether or not target pests were present in signifi- sarily coincide with strict commitment to any par- cant numbers. In t h e 1950s, scientists working ticular class of inputs, such as biopesticides or with farmers developed procedures to limit pesti- botanicals permitted for organic crop production. cide use to times when pests threatened crops, Farmers may be able to maintain yields and with decisions to spray based on measurement of profits while reducing use of high-risk convention- pest populations in the field and determination of al pesticides by shifting to one or more of the fol- thresholds for pest populations above which spray- lowing inputs and practices. Some of t h e inputs ing is profitable and below which it is not. These and practices discussed in following paragraphs are procedures came to be known as integrated pest in widespread use for many crops, while others management (IPM). have more limited applications or are just coming Over time, the definition of IPM has expanded into commercial use. T h e list is not intended to be to cover a wide range of pest management sys- complete; even if it were, it would soon require tems. In many circles, including t h e World Bank revisions because of the rapid development and and FAO, IPM describes use of multiple pest man- introduction of new inputs and techniques. agement inputs and strategies (for example, cul- tural practices, resistant plants, and insect preda- Alternate conventional pesticides tors), with an overall intent to limit environmental M u c h of t h e success in reducing pesticide and public health risks from pesticides as well as damage to date has come through replacing dam- crop damage. However, advocates for conventional aging conventional pesticides with less dangerous versions. This process continues. Shifting to less against many insects ( H o r n 1988, pp158-159). damaging conventional pesticides may be consid- Microbial insecticides, which characteristically ered a temporary compromise-or a series of tem- attack specific pest species, have minimal impact porary compromises-that gives way as alternate on environment, public health, and non-target and safer conventional pesticides and bio-intensive insects; also, pest resistance generally develops IPM systems become available. more slowly to microbial than to conventional pes- ticides. Insect growth regulators Developing countries have some of the most T h e s e are natural chemicals (or synthetic ana- advanced programs in the world for microbial pes- logues) that govern insect growth and develop- ticides and biocontrol through the release of bene- ment. Insect growth regulators do not kill insects ficial organisms (see below). Countries with low outright but rather interfere with biochemical labor costs have a natural advantage in the labor- processes controlling development and reproduc- intensive task of raising parasitoids and predators tion. For example, diflubenzuron interferes with and in preparing viruses and bacteria (from infect- molting by inhibiting chitin production. Insect e d wild or captive pest populations). For example, growth regulators tend to possess fewer externali- farmers in Brazil use a virus to control velvetbean ties than conventional pesticides. caterpillars on nearly one million hectares of soy- beans; t h e program was initially developed by Plant growth regulators Embrapa, the government's agricultural research T h e s e are natural chemicals (or synthetic ana- institute, then handed over t o private coopera- logues) that operate as plant hormones or other- tives. Due in part to an extreme shortage of for- eign exchange, the Cuban government has aggres- . t wise influence ~ l a n ~hvsioloeical . 2 s Drocesses. Some are used to promote healthy growth of crop plants sively and successfully promoted production of such as cotton and to influence time of matura- microbial pesticides in several hundred local facili- tion. Others are used in vine and tree-fruit produc- t i e s throughout t h e country. Peru has been a tion to alter growth processes so as to lessen pest leader in developing ecological methods of pest pressure and increase crop quality. Some are used control, including on-farm rearing and release of to control weeds. parasitoids and predators for biological control. Many other developing countries have had notable Pheromones success with microbial pesticides and biocontrol programs. Pheromones are natural chemicals produced by insects to attract the opposite sex, mark trails, etc. lnnoculants T h e s e chemicals are specific to each species, or they would not work, b u t this also limits their Bacteria can be applied to seeds or otherwise potential market. Farmers are already distributing introduced into fields t o trigger or enhance a sex pheromones in fields to manage several impor- plant's immune system or to stimulate soil micro- tant insects pests through "pheromone confusion" bial activity favorable t o crops (for example, or "mating disruption." Externalities associated a t t a c k i n g damaging soil-borne p a t h o g e n s or with pheromones are essentially nil. increasing the availability of plant nutrients, espe- cially nitrogen and phosphorous). Some bacterial Microbial pesticides-viruses, bacteria, and innoculants have been widely used for many years, fungi s u c h as those t o increase nitrogen fixation in Some viruses, bacteria, and fungi attack plant legumes, while others are new or promising. pests. Examples include: Baculovirus B Orcytes, which controls 0 rhinoceros beetles on coconut Biological control agents palms in the South Pacific; (Hansen 1987) and B Most current interest in non-microbial biologi- thuringiensis ( B t ) , strains of which are useful cal control agents focuses on predatory and para- sitic arthropods and nematodes to control insect several countries to control the screw-worm, an pests. Other biological control agents include fish, external livestock parasite. birds, and other higher organisms. Biological con- trol agents may be indigenous or introduced. Plant resistance When an indigenous insect species is managed Plants have natural resistance to diseases and as a biological control agent, farmers release large o t h e r pests. By selecting for resistance, plant numbers of predatory or parasitic insects at critical breeders have been able to reduce losses. Diseases times in the cropping season. In many industrial and pests, however, are able to evolve to overcome and developing countries, especially in L a t i n plant resistance, so that breeders must remain vig- America, there is a small but growing industry for ilant. Over the past several decades, advances in multiplying and supplying indigenous insects for understanding plant resistance mechanisms have pest control. Control of sugarcane insect pests led to new breeding strategies to achieve more sta- through periodic release of trichogamma wasps in ble resistance3 and to identify and introduce resis- Columbia's CalcaValley is among the world's most tant genes more rapidly. Breeding can also select impressive achievements in biological control. for plants that are competitive with weeds. Classic biological control operates on the prin- ciple that introduced pests can be controlled by Plant pesticides introduced natural enemies. For example, the cas- Over the last several decades, bio-engineering sava mealy bug in Africa came from Paraguay, fol- techniques have developed to allow inter-species lowing cassava, w h i c h also c a m e from S o u t h gene transfers. Among t h e first applications for America. After tracing t h e cassava mealy bug to field crops, plant breeders have transferred genes South America, biological control experts identi- for producing a biological pesticide from a bacteria, fied and introduced some of its South American Bt, to potatoes, maize, and cotton. Many compa- enemies into Africa. Islands and other regions with nies are involved, and several have released vari- distinctive ecosystems based on separate evolution eties for commercial production in Europe and the for thousands of years tend to be susceptible to United States. T h e U.S. EPA defines "plant pesti- introduced pests; in turn, classic biological control cides" as the pesticidal substances that plants pro- can also be dramatically effective in regions with duce d u e to g e n e transfer. T h e EPA registers distinctive ecosystems. Reflecting the threat of these substances for each crop, but does not regu- introduced pests for historically isolated ecosys- late varieties. tems, the Hawaiian state government has estab- Experts caution that transgenic plants produc- lished a standing committee, Planned Action for ing Bt toxins and other biological pesticides will New Insect Controls (PANIC). Much of PANIC'S increase pest exposure to those pesticides, which work focuses on biological controls. While higher could accelerate emergence of pest resistance. organisms introduced into new regions for biologi- T h e EPA has asked companies releasing maize cal control have sometimes turned out to be pests varieties with Bt genes to prepare plans to manage themselves, insect predators and parasitoids are resistance, and such plans are receiving intensive highly specific in attacking target pest species, so scientific and public policy scrutiny. Despite the that environmental risk is minimal. risk of resistance, many experts believe that inter- Another technology for biological control is the species gene transfer will be a cheap and environ- sterile-male technique, in which large numbers of mentally benign strategy for pest control, and one pest males are sterilized (often through radiation) that will be particularly suitable and beneficial for t h e n released to breed. T h i s technique can be farmers in developing countries. used to eradicate introduced insects; in other situ- ations, expense and slow impact on pest popula- Cultural practices tions are serious draw-backs. This technique has Cultural practices controlling pests include: been t h e basis of highly effective campaigns in cropping patterns t h a t break pest and disease TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND TRADE COMPETITION, FOR LOW-RISK LIBERALIZATION PEST MANAGEMENT 11 cycles; planting patterns and timings that discour- In many countries, registering agencies ask also age w e e d s and o t h e r p e s t s a n d e n h a n c e crop for efficacy data, to show t h a t a product works growth; destruction of plant residues and removal against target pests. T h e U.S. EPA d o e s not of weeds that harbor insects and plant diseases require efficacy data for registering new agricultur- from one season to another; e t ~ . ~ al pesticides; this policy assumes "that farmers are knowledgeable consumers a n d that ineffective OECD regulatory reforms for low-risk pesti- pesticides would soon be detected in the market- cides place" (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993, p. Governments regulate many aspects of pesti- 70). However, for active ingredients already on the cide production, trade, and use. Registration, that market, federal law requires t h e EPA to balance is, t h e compilation of positive lists of pesticide risks against benefits (based on efficacy data) as a p r o d u c t s allowed for sale, is o n e of t h e most basis for decisions about whether or not to restrict important aspects of pesticide regulation in most use. countries. T o register a product with a new active ingre- dient in the United States and other major indus- Registration: compiling lists of allowed products trial countries, preparing test data for registration Pesticides not registered (not listed) cannot be is a major expense and may take several years. sold for use, though they may in some cases be Companies and registration agencies treat data produced and sold for export. Approval of product submitted by a company as t h e property of t h e labels is generally part of t h e registration process. company for some period (for example, five to ten In most countries, pesticides may only be used years). During that time, if t h e active ingredient is according to product labels, which identify crops not protected by patent, o t h e r companies could that may b e treated, acceptable (and sometimes copy it, but since registration is by brand name, prohibited) application methods and rates, and any other company would have to submit their safety precautions. new product for registration before sales would be Each pesticide product contains one or more allowed. Within the period that the first company active ingredients. Companies mix one or more owns test data required for registration, other com- active ingredients with inerts to create formula- panies must either receive permission from t h e tions that are suitable for sale. A pesticide product first company t o use i t s d a t a (commonly t h e can b e described as a formulation with a brand results are sold) or redo tests. After the period for name. exclusive use of data expires, data enters the pub- G o v e r n m e n t s register (approve) pesticide lic domain, and if the active ingredient is not pro- products by brand name; in other words, products tected by a patent, other companies may register with t h e same active ingredient or formulation but new brands with the same active ingredient based with different brand names must b e separately on now public data. registered. Companies are asked by the regulating For companies seeking t o register t h e first agency to submit an application with information product with a new active ingredient, there may from m u l t i p l e tests on active ingredients and b e uncertainty as to whether or not the registering inerts to provide a scientific basis for projecting agency will consider risks too great for approval. possible environmental and public health risks. In T h e risk assessment process and underlying scien- O E C D countries, if a pesticide product with new tific methods and models are not standardized, so active ingredient or inert is to be used on food or that bureaucrats must exercise a degree of judg- feed crops, the registering agency, as part of the m e n t regarding how m u c h d a t a is necessary to registration process, will e i t h e r set maximum prove safety and how particular studies and find- residue limits for the new chemical(s) (if poiso- ings should be interpreted. In the United States, nous or otherwise dangerous) or explicitly waive risk assessment tends to b e more standardized limits (if not). (according to written guidelines and rules) and also more transparent (regulatory decisions with protocols and decision-criteria designed for con- explanations are published in the Federal Register) ventional pesticides is like trying to fit a square than in other industrial countries (U.S. GAO 1993, peg in a round hole. pp. 58-59). Also, in t h e United States, companies For some biopesticides from natural sources, that want to register competing brands of t h e simply identifying the active ingredient or active same formulation are legally assured equal treat- ingredients for testing is difficult since little is ment with the original registrant. U.S. pesticide known about the functions of their multiple con- law has a provision that prohibits the EPA from s t i t u e n t chemicals. Most regulatory programs using a "lack of essentiality7' as a reason to deny a require tests on a product's active ingredients, but registration (for example, for a third or sixth brand when a manufacturer cannot identify them, tests name product for t h e same active ingredient or must be carried out on the formulated product. formulation). Sorting out what to do in such cases has led to long Since there is substantial duplication of data delays in registration in several countries despite requirements across countries, companies are able the fact that products in question are typically to use one set of tests to produce data for multiple non-toxic and already part of nature. countries. Differences in data requirements force Also, when efficacy is a condition for registra- companies to carry out some additional tests in tion, biopesticides are at a disadvantage compared most countries, usually focusing on the formulated to conventional pesticides. Standard efficacy tests end-use product (for example, safety properties, have been designed for conventional pesticides, quality control, or adequacy of label precautions). which typically work through a toxic m o d e of Among industrial countries, initiatives are under- action. Efficacy is equated simply with capacity to way to further harmonize registration processes. kill. Such tests are not appropriate to evaluate Complete harmonization would mean that prod- biopesticides, since most such products are not ucts approved in any one country would be auto- designed to kill but rather to alter pest behavior, matically allowed i n t o others. With differences physiology, and life-cycles in ways that reduce pest among industrial countries in climate, crops, and damage. Moreover, the efficacy of biopesticides is public sensitivity to environmental and public inherently dependent on farming systems in which health risks, such an outcome is not likely. Still, they are used. governments and international organizations are S o m e O E C D g o v e r n m e n t s have b e g u n t o working toward agreement on a core set of data design pesticide registration processes for biopes- requirements and on steps to improve communica- ticides. Reforms have been supported by environ- tion and coordination in risk assessment, leaving mentalists, public health advocates, pest manage- countries free to ask for additional data and to ment professionals interested in new tools, organic carry out independent risk assessment processes. farmers, and portions of the pesticide industry that T h e agro-chemical industry endorses harmoniza- produce biopesticides. tion as a way to reduce obstacles for product entry into multiple national markets. OECD countries ease regulations for low-risk pesticides Square pegs into round holes T h e O E C D Pesticide Forum arranged a 1994- P e s t i c i d e registration systems have b e e n 95 survey of eighteen governments to find out designed to measure the environmental and public what steps had been taken to reduce pesticide use health risks of dumping large quantities of conven- and risks. Survey results were presented at a 1995 tional pesticides (most of which are biocides) into O E C D I F A O w o r k s h o p o n P e s t i c i d e Risk t h e environment. Biopesticides neither present Reduction. Noting that registration programs are the same sorts of risks nor have the same perfor- often "resource intensive for both registrants and mance characteristics as conventional pesticides. government regulators," and that this "delays the Trying to regulate alternate pesticides with study registration of new, safer products," t h e survey reports that a number of O E C D countries have are invited to provide a written rationale on taken "measures t o encourage development and why their pesticide may qualify for special registration of safer products"(0ECD Pesticide consideration because it presents t h e Forum 1995, p. 9 ) . Q u o t i n g from t h e survey opportunity for risk reduction ... EPA will report, these measures include:(OECD Pesticide use this as a factor in determining applica- Forum 1995, p. 9 ) tion review priority. Many countries have reduced their data T h e EPA intends to process reduced-risk pes- requirements for biopesticides, or estab- ticides within one year--compared to t h e three or lished entirely new data requirements, to four years typically required to gain a new registra- make registration faster and easier and tion for a food-use pesticide active ingredient. therefore have t h e products on the market In 1994, t h e EPA established the Biopesticides more quickly. S o m e countries have also and Pollution Prevention Division ( B P P D ) and taken s t e p s to facilitate the data review assigned responsibility for the evaluation and reg- process for biopesticides. istration of reduced risk biopesticides to this new fully staffed division. T h e EPA defines biopesti- Sweden and Nonvay have created a product cides to include microbial pesticides (viruses, bac- substitution programme that allows safer teria, fungi, a n d algae), biochemical pesticides new products t o replace older products, (defined by non-toxic mode of action and natural registered for t h e same purpose, that occurrence), and plant pesticides (pesticide sub- exceed set levels of hazard to health or the stances such as Bt toxins when they are produced environment ... by transgenic plants). T h e Canadian province of British Columbia Most important, "EPA has taken t h e initiative is working to develop a pesticide classifica- to encourage t h e development of biological pesti- tion system to serve as a basis for reducing cides by developing tiered data requirements ..." or eliminating the most hazardous products that significantly reduce data requirements and and selecting "green" pesticides for use on costs for applicants with biopesticides (Rose 1995, public lands (especially forests). p. 2). Only if results from Tier I tests show a possi- ble environmental or public h e a l t h t h r e a t are I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e E P A and applicants asked to present data from T i e r I1 or I11 Department of Agriculture (USDA) have intro- tests. For the biopesticides EPA has registered so duced multiple regulatory and procedural changes far, Tier I testing is usually sufficient, since most t o favor low-risk a n d biological pesticides. In "have been found to be of relatively low human 1993, the EPA introduced a "Voluntary Reduced- and environmental risk" (Rose 1995, p. 1) Risk Pesticides Initiative" entailing changes in T h e EPA h a s a d j u s t e d o t h e r r e g i s t r a t i o n EPA registration processes(Environmental requirements for various classes of biopesticides Protection Agency [EPA] 1993, p. 2): considering their low threat to t h e environment and public health. For example, for microbial pes- 1) to provide incentives to encourage t h e ticides approved to date, the EPA has not required development, registration and use of pesti- setting of tolerances and maximum residue limits cides or pest control practices that present for food or feed. Since 1986, the EPA has exempt- lower risks t o public health and t h e envi- ed many pheromones from long-term tests for tox- ronment, and 2) to encourage the replace- icity to mammals. In 1991, t h e EPA exempted ment of higher risk pesticides in t h e mar- arthropod pheromones used in traps from regula- ketplace ... tion. In 1994, t h e EPA increased from 1 0 to 250 acres the area over which pheromones can be test- As part of this initiative, prospective registrants e d without a n EPA Experimental U s e Permit (EPA 1993, p. l ) , (EUP). T h e EPA has also exempted from regula- Reforms stimulate research and registration tion "a subset of biochemical pesticides which are In OECD countries, public pressure to reduce naturally occurring food components or are used as pesticide damage has brought regulatory changes food additives7' such as garlic and vegetable oil that are raising the cost of registering conventional (McClintock 1995, p 14). pesticides while lowering the costs and reducing During the mid-1990s, the Animal and Plant the time required to move biological and other Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of USDA has low-risk pesticides through the regulatory process. been drafting new rules governing distribution of In the United States, for example, registering a biological control agents, including indigenous new biopesticide costs an estimated $1 million and organisms (spiders, n e m a t o d e s , e t c ) . I n takes about one year once a complete data package September 1995, representatives from industry is submitted; in contrast, it cost $50 million or (for example, the Association of Natural Biocontrol more and takes three to four years or longer to reg- Producers), growers, and other interested parties ister a new conventional pesticide (synthetic petitioned APHIS to consider new rules that chemical broad spectrum poison) (Falcon 1990, p. would reduce regulatory expenses for companies 112). d i s t r i b u t i n g indigenous organisms for pest T h e significantly lower costs and shortened control.5 waiting period involved in the registration of low- T h e USDA has established a Biopesticide risk pesticides create strong incentives for research Research Program providing grants for tests and and product development to focus on biopesti- trials required for biopesticide registration for cides and other low-risk products. These incen- minor crops (crops grown on a limited area).6 T h e tives have had notable results. In the United program is a part of USDA's IR-4 Project, initiated States, for example, just over half of the forty new in 1963, which pays for research to support the active ingredients the EPA registered in FY 1995 registration of pesticides for use on minor crops. were biopesticides. Further, overall numbers of Pesticide manufacturers often bypass such crops new registrations are up from an annual average of because prospective sales d o n o t justify t h e less than fifteen new active ingredients during expense of developing required data. 1967-1992. Dozens of new products and technolo- T h e biopesticide and biological control indus- gies are in various stages of development. Over the try in the United States, as in other countries, next decade the range of pest management tools includes many small and new companies along accessible to farmers in industrial countries can be with major pesticide and seed companies. USDA's expected to expand greatly, which will help to IR-4 Project and the EPA cooperated to organize accelerate progress toward bio-intensive IPM. t h e Minor Use Biopesticide Workshop in While much of this new low-risk technology November 1995 to brief companies on revised reg- will be suitable for developing as well as industrial istration requirements for biopesticides and gov- countries, farmers from developing countries may ernment support for registration tests. not have access to it if current pesticide regulatory systems continue without reform. Recommendations for Developing Countries In many developing countries, farmer access to developing countries generally accept data from alternate pest control inputs is hampered by time tests for prior registration in industrial countries. and expense to register new products (new active From a company's point of view, supplying such ingredients or formulations). data is not costly or difficult. But most developing countries insist that someone (for example, the Low-risk pesticides: reduce barriers to entry company or government research agency) generate A major constraint for companies introducing new data on efficacy from multi-year, in-country low-risk pesticides, including inputs for biointen- trials in each of the crops for which registration is sive IPM, is that such inputs characteristically sought. Hence, even though most new products focus on specific target pests and consequently (new active ingredients or formulations) seeking have lower potential sales compared to broad spec- registration in a developing country have already trum poisons. In developing countries with rela- passed rigorous registration processes in industrial tively small markets to begin with, potential sales countries, registration in any one developing coun- for biopesticides such as insect growth regulators try may take many more years. In Bangladesh, for and pheromones may be too small to justify a com- example, registration takes as long as five years pany or trader spending more than a nominal because of required efficacy tests (Jackson 1992, amount of time and money to obtain required reg- section 4.1.4.1). istrations. When companies judge that costs and Only a small minority of pesticide tests in uncertainty make registration not worth the effort, developing countries address environmental and farmers have no chance to buy products. health risks rather than efficacy (for example, Another major obstacle for low-risk pesticides Indonesia and Bangladesh, with extensive areas of seeking registration in developing countries is the flooded rice fields, ask for tests on fish toxicity) common demand for data from multi-year, in- (Asian Development Bank 1987, pp 72-75). T h e country efficacy tests (either by companies or gov- emphasis on efficacy continues throughout t h e ernments). As part of t h e registration process, registration process. In the Asia-Pacific region, for companies submit data from a variety of tests. For example, most countries "have technical advisory data on environmental and public health risks, committees whose expertise is concentrated on FOR DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS COUNTRIES efficacy evaluation."(Asian Development Bank encompass specific regulatory changes such as: (a) [ADB], 1987, p. 29). As already discussed, basing doing away with compulsory plant variety registra- registration decisions on efficacy tests favor con- tion, so that seed companies can introduce new ventional pesticides with their more dramatic and resistant varieties without waiting for government easily documented impact on pest populations. variety performance tests and approval; (b) de-reg- Besides t h e time and expense to meet formal ulating pheromones and other virtually non-toxic requirements for registration, the process itself is pest control inputs such as pepper, soaps, and veg- o f t e n o p a q u e a n d unpredictable, which also etable oils; and (c) agreeing to accept registration inhibits registration. Bureaucrats in registration decisions by any OECD country, or by a neighbor- agencies may lack the skills, time, and access to ing country for non-toxic agricultural biopesticides, information required to evaluate safety and health including pheromones and plant and insect growth data. Gratuities, trips, various incentives, and out- regulators. right bribes are often used to influence the process Some developing countries have pursued initia- in some countries. Few countries provide appli- tives along t h e lines of Recommendations l and 2. cants effective legal channels to force review of Chile offers provisional three-year registration adverse registration decisions, which may be based allowing import and commercial sale for products on misunderstanding about how to present infor- "which have not been t e s t e d in Chile b u t for mation rather than concern over health or environ- which evidence of use in other countries is provid- mental hazards. ed." (World Bank 1993). Initiatives for regional harmonization of pesticide registration processes Recommendation I: For chsses of zero or very are underway in Latin America and Asia-Pacific. low-riskpesticides, either exemptfrom regstration T h e Asia-Pacific initiative puts more emphasis "on or m a h t e automatic registrations (based on cri- toxicology, residues, soil persistence and environ- teria such as low acute and chronic mammalian mental impact and less on bioefficiency." AS a toxici~ and little or no risk ro non-target organ- member of t h e Asia-Pacific group, Indonesia ism, or registration in specified other countries). accepts efficacy data from other member coun- Sufficient information to identify products tries. (Jackson 1992). Malaysia, which does not having zero or very low risk is generated as require local efficacy tests, "depends strongly on part of registration processes i n major registration in developed countries." (ADB 1987, industrial countries and is available from pp. 172-1 75). companies, governments, and international T h e s e recommendations to relax registration organizations. requirements for specific classes of pesticides dif- fer somewhat from some current NGO and donor Recommendation 2: For biopesticldes and other advice to comprehensively tighten registration low-risk pesticides used in crop production, base processes applicable to all classes of pesticides. For registration decisions exclusively on rid, leaving example, FAO, the leading donor agency offering &icacy to the market to decide. However,for pes- assistance in setting up pesticide registration pro- ticides used in public healrh programs, efficacy grams, advises that "registration authorities have data should be sought and reviewed to ensure that to assess t h e efficacy ... of new pesticides in order products work as intmded to evaluate the benefits ... from their use." ( F A 0 1985, p. 2 4 ) . Even for provisional registration T h e s e reforms would give private companies, allowing limited commercial sale, the F A 0 recom- NGOs, and autonomous public organizations a mends that registering agencies consider data on realistic expectation that registration decisions will efficacy. ( F A 0 1985, p. 20). T h e FA0 also advises be reached more quickly and will markedly lower that "the registration authority should participate barriers to entry for key classes of biopesticides, in at least a portion of t h e trials" and that tests such as pheromones. Recommendations 1 and 2 should compare the candidate for registration with a "standard pesticide ... included in t h e trials tions), a strong case can be made for careful alongside the material under test."(FAO 1985, pp screening in each country, with attention to spe- 24-25). F A 0 does encourage registering authori- cial environmental or public health risks (associat- ties to accept "relevant efficacy evaluation data ed with climate, farming systems, etc). Since risks [from] other countries or regions."(FAO 1985, p depend on patterns of use and t h e likelihood of 24) exposure to people, livestock, and wildlife, regis- A 1992 World Bank paper, however, comment- tering agencies may also want information from ed favorably on a proposal for Pakistan to allow sale efficacy trials in-country or in another country with of new products without in-country efficacy tests comparable conditions. Recommendation 6, below, "if they are registered and used in the country of proposes pesticide taxes based on risk to give origin" (Jackson 1992, sections 4.9.4.1 and 4.9.4.2). farmers incentives and information to make better cost-benefit and risk-benefit trade-offs. T h i s procedure would have t h e effect of allowing new, safer and more effective Special regulatory needs of small countries products to be imported into Pakistan with- For relatively small developing countries like out delay ... There is some risk in allowing many in sub-Saharan Africa and Central America, such products to be used without official pesticide registration processes that are suitable in field trials t o confirm effectiveness and industrial countries or even large developing coun- safety to the crop under local conditions. tries with their much larger markets may present However it must be admitted that such risk insurmountable barriers to entry for new low-risk is not very high, since no one will import pest management products. For example, pesti- valuable, high-tech products if they do not cide imports into small and poor developing coun- work well or might cause crop damage. tries such as Nepal ($1.2 million) and Malawi ($5 - . . t ~esti- million) are onlv a fraction of one ~ e r c e n of Recommendations to relax registration process- cide sales in developing countries with large mar- es apply to zero and low-risk pesticides. For high- kets such as Brazil ($1 billion) and China ($530 risk pesticides (new active ingredients or formula- million). Table 2. Pesticide sales in small, medium, and large national markets (U.S. dollars) Small markets Medium markets Large markets (for example, (for example, (for example, Haiti, Malawi, Kenya, Nicaragua, Brazil, China, Nepal) Sri Lanka) Indonesia) All pesticides (actual imports or sales) $1.2 to 5 million $1 8 to 45 million $120 to 1,000 billion Hypothetical conventional pesticide product; sales are calculated a s 5 percent of the pesticides market $60,000 to $1.1 to 2.3 million $6 to 50 million 250,000 Hypothetical low-risk biopesticide product (for example, plant growth regulator or pheromone); sales are calculated a s 0.01 percent of the pesticides market $1 20 to 500 $1,800 to 4,500 $12,000 to 100,000 Sources: Data on actual values of pesticide imports for 1993 (Haiti, Malawi, Nepal, and Kenya) or sales for 1988 (Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Brazil, China, and Indonesia) are from: FAO, Trade Yearbook 1993 (Rome: FA0 1993); and G J Jackson, Agrochemical Usage in Asia Region: A Reference Compendium (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992). Table 2 calculates hypothetical annual sales for ern fruit production and other high-value agricul- various pesticide products in developing countries tural activities. Inputs are often highly specific to a with small, medium, and large pesticides markets. particular crop, so that volumes and values in trade For conventional pesticides, the table calculates may be small. However, many are so important for annual sales for a hypothetical product with 5 per- yield, size of fruit, preservation of products in tran- cent of the total pesticides market; conventional sit, or other aspects of high-value fruit and veg- pesticide products for major crops can reach or etable production that farmers without access to exceed this market share. For a hypothetical these inputs operate a t a severe disadvantage and biopesricide product, the table calculates annual may not be able to compete in international mar- sales of 0.01 percent of the aggregate pesticides kets. market; sales for many biopesticide products will Chilean fruit exports illustrate the importance not reach even 0.01 percent of the market. of these chemicals for production of high value As shown in Table 2, annual sales of conven- crops. With wholesale import of new technology tional pesticide products are large enough even in from the United States, including varieties and small markets ($60,000-250,000) to provide suffi- agro-chemicals, Chilean fruit exports grew from cient incentives for pesticide companies to spend $40 million in 1974 t o $1.0 billion in 1991. A t h e time and money to get their products through r e c e n t paper n o t e s t h e contribution of plant registration systems. But in small and even medi- growth regulators (Jarvis, forthcoming, p 8): um developing countries, annual potential sales of a low-risk biopesticide product ($120-4,500) can ...a major problem with seedless varieties be too small to provide incentives for companies to [of grapes] is the irregularity of the bunch, spend money and time t o deal with registration including small, round grapes, compared to processes. the regular bunches of longer, larger grapes preferred by the US consumer. Chile adapt- Recommenhtion 3: In small and poor dmeloping e d technologies developed in California countries in partim'ar, eae registration processes such as the timely application of chemical sufficient4 to allow traders to import and intro- growth regulators ...t o achieve t h e desired duce low-& pesticides wifhpotential annual sales bunch shape and grape size, shape and no more than several hundred dollars. Special color. efforts are both needed and warranted to fully implement Recommendarions 1 and 2 Plant growth regulators often have little or in smaller and poorer countries. nothing to do with insect pests and disease organ- isms, though some are used as herbicides ro man- Harmonization age weeds. However, they are applied to plants in Recommendations 1-3 are consistent with ini- many of the same ways thar conventional pesti- tiatives towards regulatory harmonization, which cides are applied, and residues may remain o n implies that governments cooperate to establish food. Since some of these products threaten the similar data requirements or even shared lists of environment or public health, governments regu- approved products. However, harmonization may late them along with pest control chemicals, and take time. Recommendarions propose thar coun- they are included in standard legal definitions of tries claim the same benefits by acting alone, uni- pesticides. laterally recognizing or accepting data and registra- Available evidence suggests that farmers in tions in specified other countries without waiting many developing countries have access to few if for reciprocal action. any plant growth regulators. Recommendations 1- 3, above, apply also to plant growth regulators, A note on plant growth regulators many of which are low-risk products for which reg- Plant growth regulators are important for mod- istration and entry barriers could be relaxed with- TECHNOLWY T R A N S F E R , COMPETITION, AND TRADE FOR LOW-RISK LIBERAL~~ATION PEST MANAGEMENT 19 out damage to the environment and public health. reduce oligopoly profits for products that are off- Some plant growth regulators, however, do not fall patent and sold in competitive markets in O E C D i n t o t h e category of low-risk pesticides, and for countries and in world trade. Pesticides sold in these continued high-entry barriers are appropri- non-competitive markets in developing countries ate. include high-risk pesticides restricted or banned in Any country that intends to compete in high- many industrial countries. Profits from non-com- value international markets for horticultural crops petitive markets provide s t r o n g incentives for (for example, cut flowers, fresh fruits and vegeta- companies to stick with "cash cows" rather than to bles) can be well advised t o take a good look a t make t h e effort and investment needed t o intro- registration processes for pesticides, including duce and promote newer and safer products. p l a n t g r o w t h regulators. If, as i n t h e case of In many countries, current regulatory practices Bangladesh, registration takes 3-5 years, successful present barriers to entry for competing brands. In development of high-value horticultural exports is Z i m b a b w e companies s u b m i t t i n g c o m p e t i n g all but impossible no matter how much credit and brands for registration are required to pay and wait technical advice is made available to the industry. for three years of efficacy tests, even for old formu- Aside from plant growth regulators, low-risk pesti- lations that have been sold by one or more compa- cides can also be crucial for horticultural exports. nies in Zimbabwe for many years. W ~ t h these reg- O E C D i m p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s t e s t for p e s t i c i d e istration practices, only o n e new company has residues and ban many high-risk conventional pes- been able in recent years t o register a competing ticides common in developing countries. brand and t o enter the oligopolistic pesticide mar- ket. Similarly in Bangladesh, registering a compet- High-risk pesticides: cut incentives ing brand of an approved formulation requires a If governments are to favor low-risk pesticides, year of efficacy tests, t h o u g h laboratory t e s t s then another challenge for regulatory reform is to should be sufficient to establish equivalence. c u t existing incentives for farmers, companies, and T h e government of Indonesia, through Decree regulators to stick with older and more dangerous No 944 of 1984, restricts t h e number of registra- conventional pesticides. Since many products con- t i o n h o l d e r s t o t h r e e for e a c h a c t i v e taining old off-patent active ingredients are cheap- ingredient. (Jackson 1992, section 4.4.4). During er to produce than ones with newer and patented the late 1980s, the Philippines listed 330 formula- active ingredients, companies can sell t h e m for tions r e g i s t e r e d , b u t o n l y 4 0 0 brands, w h i c h less, even with high mark-ups for profits. In turn, implies t h a t pesticide companies almost always farmers may be hesitant to shift to newer and safer enjoyed monopolistic or oligopolistic products if they are significantly more expensive. markets.(Jackson 1992, section 4.6.4.1). Also, developing c o u n t r i e s h a v e considerable industrial capacity dedicated to t h e manufacture Recommendation 4: For all formulations and formulation of older pesticides. Finally, large approved for sale in a country and which are off- markets and profits with conventional pesticides patent and sold in competitive markets in OECD generate co-dependence between pesticide com- countries and in world trade, estabLish a clear pol- panies and regulating agencies; companies have icy for quick regstration of competing products income to pay for tests, regulatory activities, and (brands), subject oonly to laboratory tests to show sales efforts that draw researchers and extension that new brands meet objective quality standards. agents t o focus attention o n conventional pesti- cides. O n e common a r g u m e n t against registering competing brands is that they may have impurities Oligopolies with serious externalities (for example, dioxin An important part of any strategy to cut incen- shows u p as an impurity in the herbicide 2,4-D). tives favoring older conventional pesticides is t o Since dangers from impurities vary according t o FOR DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS COIJNTRIES formulation, and since doubts about quality can be lending institutions or government finance min- addressed through relatively quick and cheap labo- istries target growth in t h e pesticide manufactur- ratory tests, this argument has limited validity as a ing sector as a way to promote economic develop- reason to block or delay registration of competing ment and self-sufficiency in food production, pres- brands. sure can build for policies and programs that con- Another argument against registering compet- tribute to over-use and inappropriate use of prod- ing brands is that new companies may not be as ucts manufactured or formulated in-country. diligent as old ones in promoting safe handling and When such government policies promote manufac- use of dangerous pesticides. However, competing ture and use of older and more dangerous conven- brands do not necessarily come through new com- tional pesticides, the transition to safer products panies. As allowed, old companies can also b e and to bio-intensive IPM systems may be delayed, expected to challenge each others' markets by reg- if not derailed altogether. istering new brands from international markets. If behavior and reliability of new companies is an Recommendation 5: Maintain liberal pesticide issue, this can be addressed through regulatory trade poL&s, avoiding any bias for domesticaly attention, including laboratory audits, repeat test- produced active ingredients. Since markets for ing of samples, site inspection, posting of bonds, many low-risk biopesticides are low volume, and other measures. much of the new technology is only avail- Some developing countries have taken steps to able through imported inputs. Policies to foster competition in supply of old formulations. protect domestic producers typically result In 1989 Pakistan established commodity registra- in heightened dependence and prolonged tion for four common cotton insecticides, approv- use of often obsolete and dangerous con- ing formulations (rather than brands) and t h e n ventional pesticides. allowing any and all new brands based on chemical tests alone. Malaysia's Pesticide Board has pro- In India, for example, government policies posed commodity registration for pesticides that encourage local industry and hence "the introduc- have been internationally traded for fifteen years tion of new pesticides, developed elsewhere, is and registered in Malaysia for six years. As intro- made difficult," leaving farmers with "the older duced in Pakistan and proposed in Malaysia, com- generation of pesticides which t h e Indian industry modity registration is equivalent to: (a) accepting is mainly producing." (Jackson 1992, section foreign data for registration; or (b) expiration of 4.3.5.3). T h e government has also encouraged pri- the period of exclusive use of data. vate industry t o expand production capacity. T o the extent that developing countries imple- United Phosphorous, a major Indian agrochemical ment Recommendation 4, major O E C D pesticide producer, bought a chlor-alkali plant from a multinationals will lose export sales to competing Norwegian pulp and paper company. T h e new lower-cost producers, such as Asian-based compa- plant will b e used to manufacture WHO Class Ia nies. Since pesticide companies from OECD coun- and I b insecticides, including phosphamidon, tries have a comparative advantage in research and dichlorvos, and endosulfan. hence in new and low-risk pesticides, including Mexico is another country where policies have biopesticides, suggested reforms may encourage favored d o m e s t i c production of pesticides. A companies to shift their sales emphasis in develop- recent World Bank d o c u m e n t c o m m e n t s t h a t ing countries toward newer and safer products. (World Bank 1991, pp 17): Biases for domestic production regulation of t h e [pesticides] market by Public or private in-country production of pes- enforcing entry barriers - without impos- ticides sometimes limits a country's choices and ing in-factory quality controls - favors can perpetuate use of dangerous products. When dominant firms ... Barriers t o entry result COMPETITION, TRANSFER, TLCHNOLOCY FOR LOW-RISK LIBERALIZATION AND TRADE ~ P E MANAGEMENT 21 from registration procedures, import and Recommendation 6: Tax pesticides, with rates export license requirements, price controls, varyzng across fomukztions as a function of risk and protracted government response. for example, according to u.710 toxicity class), so that market prices tofanners more c/ose/y approx- More generally, maintenance of liberal trade imate total socia/ costs (inc/udng mterna/ities and policies implies as well that governments generally go vernment r egukztory expenses). stay out of all aspects of domestic pesticide trade. Some of the gravest episodes of pesticide abuse In 1985, Robert Repetto documented and criti- and misuse in developing countries have come cized subsidies on pesticides in developing coun- with government involvement in pesticides pro- tries. Over t h e last decade, pesticide subsidies curement, distribution, and application. From the have fallen b u t not disappeared in t h e face of 1950s through t h e 1970s, t h e g o v e r n m e n t of withering criticism. Several recent studies have Pakistan sprayed pesticides from airplanes and dis- moved the debate a step further, advocating pesti- tributed others to farmers with subsidies. In 1980 cide taxes. For example, J u m a n a h Farah, in a t h e government stopped its spraying program, recent World Bank Discussion Paper, encourages ended most subsidies, and registered more formu- governments t o tax pesticides, noting that low lations to promote competition. Pesticide use prices create "an unfavorable environment for dropped by more than 70 percent from 1979 to directing technological progress into non-chemical 1982 w i t h n o n o t a b l e i n c r e a s e i n p e s t methods of pest control."(Farah 1994, p. 11). A damage.(Repetto 1985, pp. 25-26). recent study of pesticide use in t h e Philippines In many African countries, government agen- proposes that "governments tax the highly toxic cies, including commodity marketing boards, buy Category [WHO Class] I and I1 chemicals heavily and allocate pesticides. In Togo, for example, the enough" to encourage farmers to "switch to the parastatal for cotton, S O T O C O , decides a t the less hazardous Category [WHO Class] 111 and IV beginning of each season when and how much pes- chemicals."(Rola and Pingali 1993, p 56). A recent ticide to apply, supplies farmers with t h e recom- simulation of policy options for cotton in India rec- mended amount, then subtracts the assessed cost ommends promoting IPM and taxing pesticides to of pesticides when paying farmers for their cotton. improve efficiency. (Kishor 1992, pp 90-9 1). (Meerman 1991, pp 57-58). W ~ t h farmers having Differential registration fees and taxes could no say in t h e m a t t e r , pesticide use is constant be assessed on products according to toxicity. One across fields, irrespective of pest pressure and way to proceed, for example, would be to use the damage. Such centrally planned programs acceler- WHO classification scheme, with taxes running ate the emergence of resistance, are much more from zero on Class I V products to perhaps 100 per- likely to trigger secondary pests, and are costly and cent on Class Ia products that are not banned. A damaging to the environment. comparable scale of graduated registration fees could be imposed sufficient t o make regulatory Pesticide prices programs self-sustaining. Taken alone, Recommendations 4 and 5 will cut the market price of broad spectrum pesticides Harmonization by fostering competition. Since the private cost of Regional harmonization can be an important conventional pesticides does not reflect total element of government efforts to discourage dan- social costs, which include externalities, further gerous conventional pesticides through taxes and policy interventions are needed to preclude an bans. Without harmonization, smuggling among unwarranted increase in pesticide use. Taxing pes- regional countries may undermine taxes and bans. ticides to reflect social costs gives farmers incen- tives to shift to safer products. Bring consumers into pesticide policy 524). In turn, HCH,D D T , and their metabolites, debates were the most common residues, present in most If developing countries are to generate suffi- dairy products, meat, and fish tested. Milk and cient political will to push companies, farmers, and b u t t e r were t h e most seriously contaminated: governments from current high-to low-risk pest "DDT residues e x c e e d e d t h e C o d e x M R L management technologies, then consumers may be [Maximum Residue Limit, or safety tolerance] in an essential part of t h e equation. In industrial about 10% of the cereals, 60% of the bovine milk, countries, consumers who are aware and concerned and 66% of the butter samples." In terms of total about impact of pesticide residues on health have dietary intake of organochlorine pesticide residues, played an influential and progressive role in chang- t h e report found t h a t average daily intake of ing pesticide policy. aldrinldieldrin e x c e e d e d t h e FAOjWHO daily intake limit by more than a factor of three, with Recommendation 7: Set maximum reshe limits, most of the exposure coming from dairy products testfood andfeed in domestic marlets, andpublish and meat. Total exposures to all organochlorine results. pesticides approach-and for some people and diets exceed-acceptable daily intakes. Overall, An essential step toward bringing consumers in consumers in India are exposed to residues sever- developing countries into public policy debates al-fold those in Europe, t h e United States, or about pesticides is t o provide them with more Japan. information about pesticide residues in their food Even in countries where most food is home- supply and possible health consequences associat- grown or traded through local markets, residue e d with p e s t i c i d e e x p o s u r e . Information o n testing can provide t h e public with information residues also allows consumers to protect their they need to improve t h e safety of their food sup- health by changing diets and sources for particular ply. For example, a government could test samples food items. Currently, most developing countries of fresh vegetables from a town market (without have little or no residue testing. Characteristically, trying to link samples to a particular farmer or residues become a concern in developing countries trader), then publicly announce results to create only when farmers and traders are trying to export community pressure for safe pesticide use. vegetables or fruit to industrial countries, where As already discussed, current efforts for risk residue limits are more rigorously enforced. reduction in developing countries tend to focus on T h e limited information that is available on pesticide trade and farm use. However, these ini- pesticide residues in developing countries sug- tiatives alone will n o t protect consumers from gests that residues may b e a serious problem in dietary exposure and risk. Even with aggressive many countries, at least for some products, mar- programs to restrict and ban high-risk conventional kets, and regions. For example, although pesticide pesticides, many of these products will continue to use in India in terms of kgs per hectare is far below be approved for non-food crops and public health t h e average for O E C D countries and less than for applications (for example, mosquito eradication). many developing countries, a recent report shows Without aggressive residue testing, there is a con- alarming levels of residues. In India, "organochlo- tinuing and realistic risk that farmers will divert rines ... account for two-thirds of the total con- some of these more dangerous pesticides for use sumption in the country because of their low cost on food crops. and versatility" (Kannan and others 1992, pp 518- Implications for Organizations Promoting Low-Risk Pest Managmen t in Developing Countries Recommendations for regulatory reform in the and industry could be expected to oppose taxes. previous section have been designed to gain the Without taxes, however, environmentalists could support of multiple factions involved with pesti- be expected to oppose Recommendations 4 and 5, cides in developing countries: to liberalize trade in conventional pesticides that are off-patent. Farmer opposition may be weak- For environmentalists, reforms promise ened by coupling liberalization with taxes, which to speed the shift to biointensive IPM would have off-setting impacts on farm-level pesti- and related low-risk pest management cide prices. strategies. Recommendations proposed in the previous section are not intended to be a complete agenda For farmers, reforms will lower risks for any group. Certainly, these recornmendations from pesticide exposure and boost are not a complete agenda for risk reduction. incomes through more effective and However, focusing on areas of agreement may lower cost pest control. allow alliances to achieve significant reforms that could not be achieved by any group working alone. For companies dealing with low-risk alternate pesticides, reforms will make Multiple channels for research and dissemi- introduction of high-tech, low-risk, and nation low-volume products a viable commer- Donors, governments, and NGOs fund and cial proposition. organize research and extension activities to pro- mote low-risk pest management in many if not For consumers, reforms offer safer food most developing countries. In an area such as pest and also a greater role in public debates management, where technologies differ across about pesticide policy. crops and pests, and where farmer knowledge and commitment are crucial to success, progress is Recommendation 6, for differential taxes on favored when more people are able to take inde- conventional pesticides, could be divisive. Farmers pendent initiative. Recommendations 1 and 2 in 24 FOR ORGANIZATIONS IMPLICATIONS LOW-RISK PROMOTING PESTMANAGEMENT the previous section encourage reforms that would find their efforts to promote low-risk pest manage- allow autonomous public organizations (for exam- ment blocked by national regulations. For exam- ple, universities), NGOs, and private companies to ple, some African countries blocked distribution of introduce new technologies for low-risk pest man- parasitic wasps to control cassava mealy bug for as agement. long as eight to nine years, even though t h e tech- Despite general enthusiasm for IPM programs, nology had been approved and promoted by inter- donors, governments, and NGOs have often over- national organizations and widely adopted by other looked t h e fact that farmers may need access to countries in the region. Similarly, arguably unrea- specific new inputs to move toward biointensive sonable national regulations are threatening to I P M , a n d t h a t such i n p u t s must b e approved block use of a new microbial pesticide against through a government agency and t h e n sold a t desert locusts in North Africa. affordable prices. If government regulators want to test new technologies for several years to see if Impact on government research and exten- they work even when externalities are not a con- sion sideration, progress toward biointensive IPM sys- Advocating a larger role for private and NGO tems can b e severely curtailed. In individual cases, research and extension does not imply rejection of NGO or donor project personnel may be able per- government research and extension programs. sonally to intervene with government officials to Progress will be maximized when both are able to approve specific inputs expeditiously by circum- play their appropriate roles. This is not a situation venting normal regulatory processes. However, if where o n e must choose between public and pri- low-risk pest management systems and inputs are vate organizations. going to be more generally accessible, then regula- Since p e s t management technologies often tory and commercial practices must be revised to involve large positive or negative externalities, both encourage development and hasten the regis- public research and extension can improve social tration of dozens of new active ingredients and welfare by promoting selected technologies. For products every year. example, classic biological control can achieve Revising regulations to facilitate private tech- effectively permanent control of some pests at no nology transfer reinforces efforts of many groups cost to farmers. Strong arguments can be made for working for low-risk pest management. For exam- more public research for low-risk pest manage- ple, NGOs may find it easier to promote organic ment through specialized international institutes agriculture for high-value export crops if farmers such as International Instute of Biological Control are able to buy inputs imported from other coun- ( I I B C ) a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l C e n t r e of I n s e c t tries where organic agriculture is more advanced Physiology and Ecology as well as through interna- (for example, Central American countries could tional agricultural research centers (IARCs) associ- import inputs from California). As demand grows, ated with t h e Consultative Group for International some companies will choose to establish joint ven- Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and national agri- tures with local partners and to locate manufactur- cultural research systems (NARS). ing facilities in developing countries. USAID's Recommendations 1 and 2 challenge govern- Collaborative Research Support Program (CRISP) ment regulatory agencies to focus on risks, leaving for IPM builds international linkages between U.S. farmers and companies to make their own deci- universities and universities and other public and sions about efficacy. T h i s takes some testing busi- private institutions in developing countries. T h e s e ness away from government research agencies. linkages can be more effective channels for tech- While governments may do fewer efficacy tests, nology transfer if local institutions are able to take there are ample challenges that warrant additional initiatives t o introduce foreign technologies that scientific effort, such as research on biological con- depend on imported inputs. trol and biointensive IPM systems as well as test- Even multinational official organizations can ing food and feed products for residues. Finally, if regulatory reforms d o lead to more private sector While public sector research and extension pro- technology transfer, farmers and others may want grams have important contributions to make, and more advice from public research and extension there is much more that donors and government agencies about the longer menu of available tech- agencies could do if more funds were available, nologies. public sector institutions and initiatives alone are not sufficient. Donors can help not only by fund- Implications for donors ing and offering advice for public sector research Stories of successful efforts by World Bank, and extension programs, but also by policy advice NARS, or extension agencies to introduce low-risk for governments to ease regulatory obstacles to pri- IPM for a specific country and crop are encourag- vate technology transfer. ing. While important, widely heralded successes Policy changes that facilitate independent ini- can mask t h e enormous scope of t h e challenges tiatives by a wide range of autonomous public and ahead. Even long lists of successful projects do not private i n s t i t u t i o n s can b e e x p e c t e d t o vastly get to the heart of t h e challenge. If every specific improve farmer access to low-risk pesticides and crop-country success with biointensive IPM advice for biointensive IPM systems. Donors can d e p e n d e d on international d e b a t e and support also help by channeling some of their aid resources from Washington, Rome, or other donor capital, through university consortia, NGOs, etc, directly then low-risk pest management would have a dim supporting multiple channels for initiative a n d future in developing countries. technology transfer. Table 3: P e s t i c i d e Regulation and Trade region use per ha number o f r e g i s t e r e d p e s t f d e steps t o comnents: and cropland .................... imports ease product country ---------- formu- p r o - 1993 (US3 e n t r y and US% kgs a i l s l a t f n s ducts millions) competfn? ------------- ---- ---- ---- ------ ------ - - - - - - - - - -----.--- ........................................................................ Africa Ango 1a na na 2.7 DINAMA ( D i s t r i b u i d o r a Nacional de M a t e r i a i s A g r i c o l a s ) procures and d i s t r i b u t e s i n s e c t i c i d e s and o t h e r inputs. Burkina Faso na na 8.0 Various decrees ( z a t u o r k i t i ) from 1986 govern p e s t i c i d e r e g u l a t i o n i n B u r k i n a Faso. R e g u l a t i o n extends t o a l l agrochemicals except f e r t i l i z e r s , whether o r n o t e x t e r n a l i t i e s o r p u b l i c h e a l t h impacts a r e involved. I n Valee d u Kou, an important r i c e - g r o w i n g area, t h e c o o p e r a t i v e system makes d e c i s i o n s and a l l o c a t e s p e s t i c i d e s f o r which farmers a r e charged (Frans Meerman, I1Rational Pest C o n t r o l i n R i c e i n b u r k i n a Faso,I1 i n Agnes K i s s and Frans Meerman, I n t e g r a t e d Pest Management i n A f r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r e , W B t e c h n i c a l paper no 142, A f r i c a Technical Department Series, 1991, p p 77-88. Burundi na 0.04 Cameroon L o i No 90/013, 1990, p r o v i d e s t h e b a s i s f o r government t o r e g u l a t e p e s t i c i d e trade. Chad na na Cote D f I v o i r e Ethiopia na 0.07 Ghana na na Gu inea na na Kenya na 0.5 Madagascar na 0.5 P e s t i c i d e s a r e r e g u l a t e d according t o M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e decrees issued i n 1992 and 1993. Decree No 92-473 e s t a b l i s h e s a system f o r r e g i s t e r i n g pesticides. Malawi na na Ma1i na 0.3 Mozambique na na Niger na 0.4 Nigeria na 0.1 Rwanda na na Most p e s t i c i d e s a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e except through s p e c i f i c a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o j e c t s . Some move through comnercial channels from import t o consumer (WE, Rwanda: A g r i c u l t u r a l S t r a t e g y Review, r e p o r t no 8704-Rw, 1990, pp 33-34). Senegal na na Somalia na na South A f r i c a na 0.8 Sudan 4.0 na Government o r g a n i z a t i o n s procure and a p p l y p e s t i c i d e s on tenant-occupied l a n d i n v a s t goverrment farms. Tenants "have l i t t l e say i n pest management decisions ... do n o t know what p e s t i c i d e s a r e b e i n g applied.. . The c o s t s a r e s i m p l y deducted f r o m t h e i r accounts...ll (Agnes Kiss, "The C o t t o n I n t e g r a t e d Pest Management Program i n Sudan," i n K i s s and Meerman, I n t e g r a t e d Pest Management and A f r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r e , w o r l d Bank t e c h n i c a l paper no 142, A f r i c a Technical Department series, 1991, p 73). Donors (US, West Germany, World Bank, e t a l l f i n a n c e as much as 100 percent o f annual p e s t i c i d e procurement by Government o f Sudan. Data on p e s t i c i d e use i s f o r 1987/88 ( i b i d , p 67). Table 3 (cont'd): Pesticide Regulation and Trade region use per ha number of r e g i s t e r e d pestlde steps t o comnent s : and cropland .................... imports ease product country ---------- formu- pro- 1993 (US$ e n t r y and US$ kgs a i l s Lat1ns ducts mi 11ions) compet n? ------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + A f r i c a (contld) Tanzania 2.9 0.9 Before recent reforms, tlAgrochemicals were chosen by the Crop A u t h o r i t i e s - - and then by the Marketing Boards - - and passed on through without any choice f o r the farmersb1(WE, PR: Tanzania: A g r i c u l t u r a l Adjustment Program, r e p o r t no P-5200-TA, 1990, p 31). I n the e a r l y 1990s, p e s t i c i d e trade has been s h i f t i n g from Cotton and Coffee Boards toward p r i v a t e companies. Problems remain: i n 1992, p r i v a t e importers faced d i f f i c u l t i e s gaining access t o f o r e i g n exchange under the O GL system ( M J Hebblethwaite, IbMarkets and Supply Systems f o r A g r i c u l t u r a l Inputs,Ib d r a f t paper [Kent: Natural Resources I n s t i t u t e , 19931, p 14). A 1979 Act of Parliament delegates t o the Tropical Pesticides Research I n s t i t u t e (TPRI) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o llsupervise and regulate the manufacture, importation, d i s t r i b u t i o n , sale and use o f pesticides i n the United Republic o f Tanzaniat1 ( J Aklhabuhaya and M Lodenius, Pesticides i n Tanzania, publ i c a t i o n of the Department o f Environmental Conservation a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f Helsinki no 10 [Helsinki: University o f Helsinki, 19881, p 112). I n 1986, TPRI allowed 370 products ( w i t h 167 a c t i v e ingredients) w i t h p r o v i s i o n a l (two year), r e s t r i c t e d , or experimental r e g i s t r a t i o n , but none w i t h f u l l r e g i s t r a t i o n ( i b i d , p 112). I n the e a r l y 1990s, 11 products ( f i v e insecticides, three fungicides, two herbicides and one p l a n t growth regulator) have f u l l r e g i s t r a t i o n good f o r f i v e years, w h i l e many others have provisional, r e s t r i c t e d , or experimental r e g i s t r a t i o n (Hebblethwaite, p 18). P e s t i c i d e use f i g u r e s are f o r 1986 (Aklhabuhaya and Lodenius, pp 34-35). Uganda na 0.003 For many years, import of pesticides was governed by The Pharmacy and Poisons Act o f 1954, which from the language o f the a c t would seem t o have l i m i t e d government r e g u l a t i o n t o those pesticides which are poisons. The Control o f A g r i c u l t u r a l Chemicals Statute, 1989, extends r e g u l a t i o n beyond poisons t o include " f e r t i l i s e r , growth regulator o r any other chemical o r material used f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l purposest1 (The Control o f A g r i c u l t u r a l Chemicals Statute, 1989, s e c t i o n 1). Under t h i s act, "No person s h a l l import i n t o o r s e l l i n Uganda any a g r i c u l t u r a l chemical unless t h a t chemical has been registered Zaire na na Zambia na na Zimbabwe na 0.07 ---------------------------- Middle East and North A f r i c a Algeria na 2.9 Egypt na 7.6 Most p e s t i c i d e s are used on cotton. Government plays a large r o l e . Iran na na 1raq na na Morocco na 0.7 Table 3 ( c o n t ' d ) : P e s t i c i d e R e g u l a t i o n and Trade region use per ha number o f r e g i s t e r e d pest'de steps t o comnent s : and cropland .................... imports ease product country ---------- formu- p r o - 1993 (USS e n t r y and _____________ ____ ____ US$ kgs ails l a t t n s ducts millions) _--- -___-- ------ --------- --------- compettn? ........................................................................ Middle East and North A f r i c a (contidl Syria na 0.9 Tunisia na 0.3 14.4 Yemen na 1.2 5.5 ........................................................... South Asia Afghanistan na 0.08 0.1 Bangladesh 1.3 0.03 ? 157 ? 15.0 I n a d d i t i o n t o standard data, t h e r e g i s t e r i n g agency asks f o r data from l o c a l e f f i c a c y and f i s h t o x i c i t y t e s t s . R e g i s t e r i n g new products takes as long as f i v e years. The P e s t i c i d e s Ordinance passed i n 1971. Data on value o f p e s t i c i d e s a p p l i e d i s f o r 1985. About t w o - t h i r d s o f a l l p e s t i c i d e s b y v a l u e a r e a p p l i e d t o r i c e . Bangladesh produces and imports s i g n i f i c a n t q u a n t i t i e s o f DDT and o t h e r p e s t i c i d e s n o t e l i g b l e f o r W B funds. India 2.8 0.3 125 ? I n a d d i t i o n t o standard data, t h e r e g i s t e r i n g agency asks f o r data from l o c a l e f f i c a c y , t o x i c o l o g y , and residue t e s t s . The I n s e c t i c i d e s Act, 1968, and subsequent r u l e s and amendments govern p e s t i c i d e r e g u l a t i o n . R e g i s t r a t i o n i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e C e n t r a l I n s e c t i c i d e s Board; 125 a i l s were r e g i s t e r e d as o f 1992. About h a l f o f a l l p e s t i c i d e s by v a l u e a r e a p p l i e d t o c o t t o n . Data on v a l u e o f p e s t i c i d e s a p p l i e d i s f o r 1988. Nepa l na na As o f 1987, Nepal had no p e s t i c i d e r e g i s t r a t i o n scheme (ADB, Handbook, p 29). Pakistan 5.7 0.09 150 300 Yes I n a d d i t i o n t o standard data, t h e r e g i s t e r i n g agency asks f o r l o c a l e f f i c a c y data. One proposal c i r c u l a t i n g i n 1992 would llallow t h e i m p o r t a t i o n o f products w i t h o u t a P a k i s t a n r e g i s t r a t i o n i f t h e y a r e a l r e a d y r e g i s t e r e d and used i n t h e c o u n t r y o f o r i g i n l 1 (Jackson, Aarochemical Usage i n Asia Region, s e c t i o n 4.9.4.1). Government from 1989 a l l o w s "me tool1 r e g i s t r a t i o n w i t h i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a "generic products schemeI1; under t h i s scheme, o n l y l a b o r a t o r y t e s t s t o check q u a l i t y a r e r e q u i r e d f o r d i f f e r e n t brands o f s p e c i f i c chemicals t o be registered; as o f 1992, t h i s scheme a p p l i e d t o f o u r F generic (comnodity) c o t t o n i n s e c t i c i d e s . Aside from these e f f o r t s t o ease rn e n t r y f o r new products, r e g i s t r a t i o n n o r m a l l y takes 3 - 4 years. The ? A g r i c u l t u r a l P e s t i c i d e s Ordinance, 1971, w i t h amendments and r u l e s governs tl p e s t i c i d e r e g u l a t i o n . Government from 1980 s h i f t e d p e s t i c i d e t r a d e t o t h e p r i v a t e sector. Roughly 80 percent o f p e s t i c i d e s a r e used on c o t t o n . A06 9 3 S r i Lanka 9.5 0.4 94 415 ? 9.6 Handbook r e p o r t s 148 a i l s and 314 f o r m u l a t i o n s r e g i s t e r e d b e f o r e 1987. I n a d d i t i o n t o standard data, t h e r e g i s t e r i n g agency asks f o r l o c a l e f f i c a c y : data. C o n t r o l o f P e s t i c i d e s Act, 1980, governs r e g i s t r a t i o n . The t a b l e P shows a i l s and f o r m u l a t i o n s r e g i s t e r e d b e f o r e 1987, from ADB, Handbook. ........................................................... .................................................................................... 5 2 n J Table 3 (cont'd) : P e s t i c i d e Regulation and Trade z 0 region use per ha number o f r e g i s t e r e d p e s t r d e .................... steps t o comnent s : 5 and cropland ---------- imports ease product 9 country ------------- US$ ---- kgs formu- p r o - a i l s l a t l n s ducts 1993 (US$ millions) ---- ---- ------ ------ --------- --------- e n t r y and competln? ........................................................................ ! i E East Asia and the Pacific Cambodia na 0.3 V China 5.5 1.7 130 300 ? 282.0 China's r e g i s t e r i n g agency ask f o r Local e f f i c a c y t e s t s and accepts p u b l i s h e d 3 d a t a f o r t o x i c i t y and residues. China's Regulations f o r P e s t i c i d e R e g i s t r a t i o n , 1982, e x i s t as g u i d e l i n e s r a t h e r than Law. I n s t i t u t e f o r t h e 4 r! C o n t r o l o f P e s t i c i d e s (ICAMA) i s v e r y f l e x i b l e i n g r a n t i n g r e g i s t r a t i o n s t o domestic manufacturers though p e s t i c i d e imports a r e more s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l l e d "g (Jackson, 1988). M u l t i p l e independent f i r m s owned b y s u b - n a t i o n a l 5 0 governments operate and compete l i k e p r i v a t e sector f i r m s . Indonesia 5.4 0.8 298 654 Indonesia works w i t h RENFAP, an agreement among Asian P a c i f i c n a t i o n s t o share d a t a and harmonize r e g i s t r a t i o n procedures; RENFAP p u t s more emphasis 2 X on environmental and p u b l i c h e a l t h concerns ( t o x i c o l o g y , s o i l residues, and s o i l p e r s i s t e n c e ) and Less on e f f i c a c y . I n a d d i t i o n t o standard data, t h e r e g i s t e r i n g agency asks f o r d a t a from l o c a l e f f i c a c y and f i s h t o x i c i t y t e s t s . F R e g u l a t i o n o f p e s t i c i d e s i s based on 1973 Government Decree No 7. I n 1984, ? Decree No 944 reduced c o m p e t i t i o n by l i m i t i n g t o t h r e e t h e number o f r e g i s t r a t i o n h o l d e r s allowed f o r each a i . Government promotes and p r o t e c t s k r! domestic p e s t i c i d e producers; Jackson r e p o r t s 43 percent t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n o f o r l o c a l a i producers. D u r i n g t h e 19805, Indonesia dismantled major z programs f o r government d i s t r i b u t i o n o f subsidized p e s t i c i d e s , n o t a b l y f o r rice. Number o f r e g i s t e r e d a i l s and f o r m u l a t i o n s from: UB, paper on $ environment f o r proposed Indonesian i n t e g r a t e d pest management p r o j e c t , June 6 1992, p 17. $ Korea Rep I n a d d i t i o n t o standard data, t h e l o c a l r e g i s t e r i n g agency asks f o r d a t a on 3d m X l o c a l e f f i c a c y and more t o x i c i t y and r e s i d u e data. The Agrochemicals Management Law o f 1957 and other Laws p r o v i d e t h e l e g a l b a s i s f o r p e s t i c i d e r e g u l a t i o n . Number o f r e g i s t e r e d a i l s and formulations i s from b e f o r e 1987, from ADB, Handbook. BK Malaysia 19 2.0 247 ? 2,772 43.0 yes R e g i s t e r i n g agency does n o t r e q u i r e l o c a l e f f i c a c y data; r e g i s t r a t i o n 2 .! "depends s t r o n g l y on r e g i s t r a t i o n i n developed c o u n t r i e s u u(ADB, Handbook! p p X 172-175). P e s t i c i d e s l e g i s l a t i o n dates from 1974. From 1988, Malaysia's P e s t i c i d e Board has proposed comnodity p e s t i c i d e r e g i s t r a t i o n , which would 4 ease e n t r y ( r e g i s t r a t i o n ) f o r new brands o f o l d p e s t i c i d e s ( i e , p e s t i c i d e s 9 -1 which have been i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t r a d e d f o r 15 years and r e g i s t e r e d i n Malaysia f o r s i x years); as o f 1992, t h e proposal i s s t i l l under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Value o f 1988 p e s t i c i d e s a l e s from Jackson, s e c t i o n 4.5. Myanmar 1.5 5.2 Philippines 11 0.6 160 330 400 40.4 Yes The r e g i s t e r i n g agency may wave e f f i c a c y data. P e s t i c i d e r e g u l a t i o n dates from a p r e s i d e n t i a l decree i n 1977. Jackson ( s e c t i o n 4.6.4.1) reports l u r e g i s t r a t i o no f comnodity products i s encouraged by g r e a t l y s i m p l i f y i n g t h e \D requirement^.^^ Value o f p e s t i c i d e s a l e s f o r 1988 from Jackson, s e c t i o n 4.6. Table 3 (cont'd): Pesticide Regulation and Trade region use per ha number of r e g i s t e r e d pestlde steps t o comnents: and .................... imports ease product country ---------- formu- pro- 1993 (US$ e n t r y and US$ kgs a i l s Lat1ns ducts m i l l i o n s ) competln? _____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -- - - - - - - - - --------- ........................................................................ East Asia and the P a c i f i c (contld) Thai land 8.0 1.0 153 214 P e s t i c i d e r e g i s t r a t i o n i n Thailand began w i t h the 1967 Poisonous A r t i c l e s Act, which f o r many years meant t h a t non-poisonous chemicals t o c o n t r o l pests d i d not have t o be registered. From 1989, "the government announced t h a t ... a l l p e s t i c i d e products, i n c l u d i n g p l a n t growth regulators, would be regarded as poisonous a r t i c l e s and would need t o be r e g i s t e r e d before being imported i n t o t h e countryM; as of 1992, the r e g i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t i e s have a Long L i s t of products layet t o be approved ... which are now a v a i l a b l e i n the marketa1 (Jackson, section 4.8.4.1). The t a b l e shows a i r s and formulations r e g i s t e r e d before 1987 from ADB Handbook; however, many products could be imported and s o l d without r e g i s t r a t i o n . Value of p e s t i c i d e s sales f o r 1988 from Jackson, s e c t i o n 4.8. Current Legislation, The Dangerous Substances Act, 1993, gives the M i n i s t e r of I n d u s t r i e s a u t h o r i t y t o L i s t dangerous substances (chapter 3, a r t i c l e 57). Viet Nam V i e t Nam i n 1993 passed a National Law on Plant P r o t e c t i o n and Quarantine, "banning the more dangerous a c t i v e ingredients and c l o s e l y r e g u l a t i n g the import and use of hazardous chemical^^^ (UB, SAR: V i e t Nam: A g r i c u l t u r a l R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Project, report no 12065-VN, 1993, p 6). FA0 reported i n 1988 that M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e and Food I n d u s t r i e s was responsible f o r p e s t i c i d e imports, and t h a t imports t o t a l l e d about 3 20 m i l l i o n (FAO, Viet Nam: A g r i c u l t u r a l And Food Production Sector Review, mission report, dd:dp/vi e/88/033, 1988, p 55). ......................................................................... L a t i n America and the Caribbean Argentina 0.4 Bolivia Brazi 1 13 0.2 0.6 290 800 M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e and Peasant A f f a i r s (MACA) L i s t s approved pesticides. Law 7802 of J u l y 1989 governs p e s t i c i d e r e g i s t r a t i o n , replacing previous rules. New product approvals have been slow (averaging one per year d u r i n g a G most of t h e 1980s, increasing t o n i n e i n 1988/89). "This i s a very important ? development because the new products can have s i g n i f i c a n t impacts on y i e l d . Furthermore they of ten a1 low a reduction i n the use of o l d products which may have harmful e f f e c t s on human h e a l t h o r the environment. seen how well the new system w i l l a l l o w the r e g i s t r a t i o n of new products" I t remains t o be ! 0 i CUB, P e s t i c i d e Usage i n t h e L a t i n America and Caribbean Region, s e c t i o n g D.1.4.1). B r a z i l l s import s u b s t i t u t i o n p o l i c i e s d u r i n g the 1970s and 1980s m brought increasing domestic product i o n of p e s t i c i d e s and stagnating imports. 8 c Lately, B r a z i l has cut d u t i e s t o 0-20 percent. Government research agencies have a c t i v e l y promoted IPM f o r many years, notably f o r c o t t o n and soybeans. 8 a Data on 1990 p e s t i c i d e sales and other information from UB, P e s t i c i d e Usage, 2 s e c t i o n D.l % u 5.0 se~npuo~ eu !a!e~ L'Z e 1emaaeng 6's Jopehles 13 ' ( 5 - 0 pue 2 - 7 - 0 suo!a3as 'p!q!) .JeaA q3ea l ~ o d u ! oa qs!n Aaql ap!3!asad j o AaLauenb pa!j!~ads e ~ o uo!ss!w~ad j J O ! J ~ u!elqo asnu S J ~ ~ J O ~ U ~ ! , 'uo!ae~as!Ba~ , ] J a j j e uaA3 - ( £ - ~ - cuoba3as 'p!q!) e!qwnlo3 se q3ns sa!JaunoJ 6U!Joql(6!aU 6 u ! p n l ~ u ! 'sa!~auno3 Jaqao UOJ j eaep 1! q n s oa 6u!JJajaJd .'6u!asal l e 3 o l aJom lueJJen oa paauam6e~jpue ]]ems 00% s! ~openq u! aa?Jelu aqa,, aeqa u!elduo3 sa!uedmo3 leuo!aeu!alnn - ( L - ~ ~ uoia3as Q 'alesn ap!~!asad 'an) sasaa Aa!3!xoa pue 'qaleaq 'A3e3!jja l e 3 o l ~ o sdse j nel a q l :,,uo!leln6a~ a!3!ldxa aJom pue Jaa3!JJSll ~ o sapkho~d j n e l nau e 'so661 A l ~ e aa q l UI '996L u o ~ alepj apeJl ap!~!$sad j o u o ! l e l n 6 a ~ 6 u ! u ~ a ~ os 6n e l 0'5'1 LSS Z'L ZL ~open~3 0'01 S.2 daa ue3!u!woa 0'8L 6'2 =v"l & -sauomo~aqdaA!j pue slua6e 6u!laan 02 sapnl3xa a l q e l aqa u! s u o ! a e ~ l s ! 6 a ~ S d 40 JaVN '(29 'LS dd 'L66L '8256 OU Ll\ldd 'an u! pa3u!JdaJ I p l e Oj-Lssz sue011 sueol ~ o ! l o d ieJnalno!r.l aJodx3 pue A3!lod a p e ~ l :e!qurnlo3 pue apeJ1 pus uo!geo!j!sJan!a :a3d 'an) ueol luamasn[pe ~ o a ~ a - ans 2! 3 auas~ad£2 o l auaxad 62 m o ~ saianp e qa!n u o ! l ~ u n ~ u ou! j I n 3 pue ~ 0 8 6 aq ~l 8 j o pua aqa j e ,,sap!~!asad --- uo S U O ! ~ J ! J J S ~ J a~odm!pasea,, auauu~arrog ' ( 2 ~ E al3!g~e 'L ~aldeq3 '266 ON uo!mlosaa) ,,seuouoJaj sell, 6u!pnl3u! 'suos!od-uou alq!ssod amos oa spuaaxa sap!3!asad j o uo!geln6aa ' ( ~ ' ? ' 2 - a uo!a3as ap!s!gsad 'an) ,,suo!aeln6a~ a p p ! l s a d as!uowJeq 0 3 ~ U e ~ f i o Jleu0!6aJ d aqa W O I pJe6aJ ql!H dn UHeJp Uaaq Seq., '266, q3J'cW 52 '266 O N UO!3nlOSal 'L6-986L m 6u!Jnp sap!3!asad snopJezeq asou a q j j o Aueu ( p a ~ a j s ! B a ~ - a ppauueq ) e!qurnlo3 a Q - L . ? - ~ - uo!gxis j w o ~ saaonb W !?-a uo!aJas 'a6esn ap!J!lsad 'an :aoJj uo!lemJojuI ,,'u!~!Jo j o AJJU~OJ aql aou aJe elap ASolo~!xoa u ~ a a - 6 u o lq6noqlly .sass$ U6!aJOj w o ~ p j a l J ! q n s aq Aeu elep anp!saJ d o ~ 3 pue .'paJ!nbaJ aJe epeue3 '333 ' V S ~a q l u! paqs!lqelsa SI!U!l aXIeJa101 anp!S3JlI ' u o ! ~ R J ~ s ! ~ ~ JJ O j ,,.pap!h~Jd S! Sa!JlUnO3 Jaylo 2 u! asn j o aJuap!ha q3!qn ~ o anq j al!q3 u! p a ~ s a a uaaq IOU aheq q3!qn s j 3 n p o ~ d 9 a oa,, s J a j j o A~ua6ea q l qs!qn 'alqenaua~ 'uo!ae~as!6a~ ~ e a A - a a ~ qleuo!s!ho~d qa!n Is13npoJd nau 1)as pue a~odw! o l sa!ueduos snol l e A~ua6e 6 u ! ~ a a s ! 6 a ~ a q j alduexa ~ o j 'sa!Jluno> padolahap ~ o l e mu! p a ~ a l s ! l a ~ sl3npo~d j o uo!lez!le!~~a~o p3 j salo~d ! d e ~~ o h e s uo!ge~~s!fia ~ ap!3!lsad a q ~u! s a ~ n l e a j saA 0'99 7'0 LL al!q3 U (P1lU03) ueaqqlJe3 a q l "j pue e s p a a y u g e l ........................................................................ --------- --------- ------ ------ ---- ---- ---- ------------- ju,aadtu03 (suo!ll!w s w n p su,ael s, !e s64 $Sn k pUe A ~ a u a $Sn) S66L -0Jd -nUJOj ---------- AJJU~O~ ~3npo~ d asea s ~ ~ o d w !- - - - - - - . - - - -p -u-e-l d- o~-~ --- p"e :SJU~UO~ 03 sdaas ~ ap,asad p a ~ a l s ! f i a j o Jaqwnu eq dad asn uo 1634 0 Z a p e ~ lpue u o g e ln6ad a p p l l s a d :( p . luo3) Table 3 ( c o n t ' d ) : P e s t i c i d e Regulation and Trade region use per ha number o f r e g i s t e r e d pestlde steps t o comnents: and cropland -----------------..- - imports ease product country ---------- formu- pro- 1993 (US$ e n t r y and US$ _____________ _ _ _ _ kgs ____ ails Lat1ns ducts millions) _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ ------ --------- competln? --------- ........................................................................ L a t i n America and t h e Caribbean (contld) Mexico 11 1.1 Mexico has been changing i t s p e s t i c i d e r e g u l a t o r y system as p a r t of p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r NAFTA; Innew p e s t i c i d e r e g u l a t i o n s ... w i l l i n t h e o r y be harmonized w i t h those o f t h e USA and Canadann; however, recent i n i t i a t i v e s t o adopt US maximum r e s i d u e L i m i t s meant d e r e g i s t r a t i n g products and r a i s e d o p p o s i t i o n i n t h e agro-chemical i n d u s t r y (WB, P e s t i c i d e Usage, s e c t i o n D.3.4.2). A recent W B r e p o r t comnents t h a t n4government1sr e g u l a t i o n o f t h e market b y e n f o r c i n g e n t r y b a r r i e r s -- w i t h o u t imposing i n - f a c t o r y q u a l i t y c o n t r o l s - - f a v o r s dominant f i r m s and r e s u l t s i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f chemicals of uncertain q u a l i t y ... B a r r i e r s t o e n t r y r e s u l t from r e g i s t r a t i o n procedures, import and e x p o r t l i c e n s e requirements, p r i c e c o n t r o l s , and p r o t r a c t e d government responsenn (WB, PR: Mexico: A g r i c u l t u r a l Sector Adjustment Loan II, r e p o r t no P-5520-ME, 1991, p 17). Peru 0.7 Venezuela 2.1 .......................... Europe and Central Asia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria 7.8 Czech Rep Georgia Hungary 5.2 Kazakhstan Poland 1 .O Portugal 4.2 Number o f products r e g i s t e r e d from GAO, Pesticides, p 54-55. Romania 1.7 Russian Fedfn Slovakia T a j i kstan Turkey 0.3 Number o f products r e g i s t e r e d from: GAO, Pesticides, p 54-55. Ukraine Uzbekistan note: 7 former USSR 2.3 During 1986-91. ~ e s t i c i d e use d e c l i n e d 47 Dercent over t h e area o f t h e former m n USSR," p r i m a r i iy' because o f " l a c k o f f o r e i g n exchange" (WB, Food and c A g r i c u l t u r e P o l i c y Reforms i n t h e Former USSR: An Agenda f o r t h e T r a n s i t i o n , s t u d i e s o f economies i n transformation, 1992, pp 88-89). P e s t i c i d e s imports ?! 0 f o r 1990 a r e from FAO, Trade Yearbook 1990. z former Cz I k i a 2.9 P e s t i c i d e s imports f o r 1990 are from FAO, Trade Yearbook 1990. $ former Yulvia 4.1 0 .................................... ........................................................................ Table 3 ( c o n t ' d ) : Pesticide Regulation and Trade region use per ha number of registered pestlde steps t o comnents: and cropland .................... imports ease product country ---------- formu- pro- 1993 (US$ e n t r y and US$ kgs aifs l a t t n s ducts millions) competfn? ------------- ---- ---- ---- ------ ------ --------- --------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - m e - - - - - Selected OECD United States 2.0 750 25,000 275.0 Yes I n 1991, EPA reported about 750 a i f s i n production, i n c l u d i n g 20 microbial p e s t i c i d e s ( i n more than 100 products) and 30 biochemical pesticides, i n c l u d i n g pheromones, semio-chemicals, and enzymes; these a i ' s are forumulated and s o l d i n 25,000 products (EPA, EPAfs Pesticide Programs [Washington DC: EPA, 19911, pp 2, 16). From 1967-92, EPA r e g i s t e r e d 347 new a i l s ; during 1972-92 new r e g i s t r a t i o n s included 11 p l a n t growth regulators, 10 b i o l o g i c a l i n s e c t i c i d e s o r fungicides, four pheromones, 106 insecticides, 95 herbicides, and others (Rob Elsworthy, Jihad Alsadek, and Donald Stubbs, 'Chemicals Registered f o r t h e F i r s t Time as P e s t i c i d a l Active Ingredients under FIFRA [Washington DC: EPA, 19931, pp 7, 10-24, 29). The pace o f new r e g i s t r a t i o n s has increased, with 40 new a i l s i n 1995, of which h a l f are biopesticides. France 12,000 1,133.0 Number o f products r e g i s t e r e d from G AO, Pesticides, p 54-55. Japan 6,299 239.5 Number o f products r e g i s t e r e d from GAO, Pesticides, p 54-55. Germany 948 396.8 Number of products r e g i s t e r e d from GAO, Pesticides, p 54-55. Sweden 348 83.1 Number o f products r e g i s t e r e d from GAO, Pesticides, p 54-55. ................................................................................................................................................. Notes: Pesticide use i n US$/ha i s from various sources. P e s t i c i d e use i n kgs/ha i s f o r a c t i v e ingredients ( a i ) f o r 1982-84 from: World Resources I n s t i t u t e , UNEP, and UNDP, World Resources 1992-93 (New York: Oxford, 1992), pp 274-275. Pesticide imports f o r former USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are f o r 1990. General sources: ADB, Handbook on the Use of Pesticides i n t h e A s i a - P a c i f i c Region (Manila: ADB, 1987). FAO, FA0 Trade Yearbook 1994. G J Jackson, Agrochemical Usage i n Asia Region: A Reference Compendium (Washington DC: W B, 1992). U S General Accounting O f f i c e (GAO), Pesticides: A Comparative Study of l n s u t r i a l i z e d Nation's Regulatory Systems, r e p o r t no GAO/PMED-93-17, 1993. W B, Pesticide Usage i n the L a t i n America and Caribbean Region, mimeo d i s t r i b u t e d by technical department, LAC region, 1993. World Resources I n s t i t u t e , UNEP, and UNDP, World Resources 1992-93 (New York: Oxford, 1992). Table 4: Regulating Pesticides: Reasons, Practices. and Reform Options 1. INPUTS 2. E X T E R N A L I T I E S AND 3. M I N I M A L REGULATORY 4. COMMON REGULATORY 5. COMMON WB ADVICE 6. REFORM OPTIONS TO WHICH EMBODY PUBLIC HEALTH OPTIONS TO MEET PRACTICES I N UB FACILITATE PRIVATE NEW TECHNOLOGY CONCERNS CONCERNS FOR C L I E N T COUNTRIES INTRODUCTION OF NEW E X T E R N A L I T I E S AND TECHNOLOGIES P U B L I C HEALTH chemical (a) environmental ( a through d) taxes: (a through d ) taxes, (a through d ) taxes (a through d ) taxes: esticides: e x t e r n a l i t i e s : vary governments may tax subsidies, and and subsidies: UB see column 3 :any types o f according t o class o f pest c o n t r o l chemicals q u a n t i t y Limits: opposes subsidies but chemicals are chemical, from broad w i t h rates varying taxes based on has n o t pressed f o r c l a s s i f i e d as spectrum poisons according t o negative e x t e r n a l i t i e s and taxes t o a d j u s t p r i c e s pesticides; (which k i l l o r weaken e x t e r n a l i t i e s and p u b l i c h e a l t h impacts f o r negative not a l l are plants and animals i n p u b l i c h e a l t h impacts; are v i r t u a l l y non- externalities poi sons and addition t o target eg, pheromones would be existent; subsidies not a l l pests) t o pheromones t a x - f r e e while broad are comnon, even f o r control pests; (which have no impact spectrum poisons would broad spectrum major classes on the environment c a r r y high taxes poisons; some o f chemical except through target governments l i m i t pesticides pests) q u a n t i t i e s allowed are: f o r import * broad (b), (c), and (d) are (a through c ) product (a through c ) product (a through c) product (a through c ) product spectrum on the f o l l o w i n g page Lists: governments Lists: many UB Lists: UB recomnends Lists: see column 3; poi sons maintain l i s t s of c l i e n t governments t h a t countries also, f o r older products a1 lowed (registered) r e q u i r e time- expedite r e g i s t r a t i o n t h a t are o f f - p a t e n t , * narrow products; products w i t h consuming and c o s t l y f o r newer and s a f e r governments may be spectrum Low e x t e r n a l i t i e s may Local t e s t s , p e s t i c i d e s and de- encouraged t o adopt poi sons be r e g i s t e r e d based on including especially r e g i s t e r o l d e r and generic r e g i s t r a t i o n t o r e g i s t r a t i o n and use i n m u l t i - y e a r Local more dangerous promote competition, * p l a n t growth other countries, e f f i c a c y tests, even products L i m i t i n g unnecessary regulators and without r e q u i r i n g l o c a l f o r products widely o l i g o p o l i e s , monopolies, related e f f i c a c y tests; r e g i s t e r e d and tested and p r o f i t s chemi ca 1s (ii) products w i t h high i n other countries, e x t e r n a l i t i e s may be w i t h L i t t l e o r no * pheromones c a r e f u l l y considered d i s t i n c t i o n between and semio- before r e g i s t r a t i o n , products w i t h high chemicals with attention t o and low e f f i c a c y ; some products e x t e r n a l i t i e s ; many already r e g i s t e r e d may governments a1 low be de-registered companies and farmers t o continue w i t h dangerous o l d products Table 4 (cont ' d l : Regulating Pesticides: Reasons. Practices, and Reform Options chemical (b) p u b l i c health ( b l ) &: (bl) u: many (bl)*: WB (bl) m: to limit pesticides concerns: the threat governments issue r u l e s governments f o l l o w advises implementation a b i l i t y of bureaucrats (cont I d ) t o health f o r f o r production, recomnendations from of FA0 r u l e s t o prevent competitive farmers, consumers, transport, storage, 1 FA0 f o r p e s t i c i d e markets, r u l e s f o r etc, from chemical packaging, labels, rules registration of pesticides varies advertising, and use p e s t i c i d e dealers may from major f o r broad c l a r i f y t h a t companies spectrum poisons t o meeting c e r t a i n non-existent f o r objective conditiions pheromones (NOTE: have a legal r i g h t t o although some p u b l i c produce o r trade health impacts are not e x t e r n a l i t i e s , a (b2) residue l i m i t s : (b2) residue l i m i t s : (b2) residue l i m i t s : (b2) residue Limits: general consensus governments set residue t h i s i s an area where WB advises s e t t i n g and MUCH more a t t e n t i o n i s supports government Limits, t e s t food i n many governments do enforcing residue due t o residue Limits, a c t i o n t o Limit the market, and 1 very L i t t l e ; many limits residue tests, and health impacts) d i s t r i b u t e information have not set Limits; t e l l i n g the p u b l i c about 1 on t e s t r e s u l t s and many do not enforce t e s t r e s u l t s and health health r i s k s I limits risks; t h i s can h e l p t o mobilize consumers and farmers t o favor newer and Less dangerous products ( c ) secondary pest ( C and d l encouraging ( C and d) ( C and d) coordinating ( C and d) encouraging externalities: farmers t o coordinate coordinating pest pest c o n t r o l actions: farmers t o coordinate poisons t h a t k i l l pest c o n t r o l actions: c o n t r o l actions: in WB advises and pest c o n t r o l actions: pest predators may Local organizations many WB c l i e n t supports extension t o see column 3 cause secondary pest w i t h e l e c t e d Leaders countries, c e n t r a l promote farmer outbreaks i n nearby may provide f o r a f o r government o f f i c i a l s cooperation f o r IPM fields; t h i s i s a farmers t o coordinate make decisions about more serious problem pest management a e r i a l spraying, f o r broad than narrow a c t i v i t i e s t o reduce p e s t i c i d e choice, spectrum poisons crops Losses as w e l l as q u a n t i t i e s , and use of conventional timing of (d) resistance: use pesticides applications for of a poison promotes farmers; although resistance i n target t h i s establishes pest populations and coordination, farmers weakens impact of do not have control; subsequent coordination through aoolications farmer-controlled Table 4 (cont ' d l : Regulating Pesticides: Reasons, P r a c t i c e s , and Reform Options - -- - - - 1. INPUTS 2. E X T E R N A L I T I E S AND 3. M I N I M A L REGULATORY 4. COMMON REGULATORY 5. COMMON UB ADVICE 6. REFORM OPTIONS TO UHICH EMBODY P U B L I C HEALTH OPTIONS TO MEET PRACTICES I N UB F A C I L I T A T E PRIVATE NEW TECHNOLOGY CONCERNS CONCERNS FOR C L I E N T COUNTRIES INTRODUCTION OF NEU E X T E R N A L I T I E S AND TECHNOLOGIES P U B L I C HEALTH biological (a) environmental ( a and c ) l i s t i n g and ( a and c) l i s t i n g and ( a and c ) l i s t i n g and ( a and c ) l i s t i n g and pest c o n t r o l externalities: allowing biological allowing b i o l o g i c a l allowing biological allowing biological agents such imported organisms c o n t r o l agents: c o n t r o l agents: many c o n t r o l agents: UB c o n t r o l agents: see as : could c a r r y other governments enforce: governments have advises and supports column 3 and WB advice pests o r diseases, (i) quarantine limited a b i l i t y t o governments t o and support i n column 5 * microbial and new organisms r e s t r i c t i o n s t o ensure quarantine i n s e c t strengthen insecticides, c o u l d have unexpected t h a t imported organisms imports o r t o assess p h y t o s a n i t a r y and ie, viruses, environmental impacts are not carrying pests probable a g r i c u l t u r a l research bacteria, o r diseases; and environmental impact systems; UB a l s o fungi , and (b) public health (ii)environmental o f introduced supports i n t e r n a t i o n a l protozoa impacts: normally screening f o r new biological control a g r i c u l t u r a l research non-existent t o b i o l o g i c a l agents (new agents; governments o r g a n i z a t i o n s and * parasitic insignificant with t o a country or region) take assistance from encourages governments and predaceous b i o - c o n t r o l agents improves t h e chances international t o work together insects t h a t t h e y w i ll have organizations through i n t e r n a t i o n a l ( c ) secondary pests: l i t t l e o r no impact on organizations * more complex may be a problem, non-pest p l a n t s and entomophagous p a r t i c u l a r l y when animals animals, b i r d s and o t h e r including f i s h higher animals a r e NOTE: comnercial NOTE: see column 3 and b i rds introduced as b i o - products based on c o n t r o l agents indigenous b i o l o g i c a l * other c o n t r o l agents w i l l biological g e n e r a l l y have minimal pest c o n t r o l e x t e r n a l i t i e s and may agents, such be r e g i s t e r e d and as s t e r i l e allowed w i t h o u t males o f attention t o efficacy i n s e c t pests (d) p e s t resistance: (d) p e s t resistance: (d) p e s t resistance: ( d ) p e s t resistance: ( d ) p e s t resistance: can be an issue f o r see comnents about see comnents about see comnents about see comnents about v i r u s e s and o t h e r dealing with resistance dealing with dealing with dealing with resistance microbial pesticides t o chemical p e s t i c i d e s resistance t o r e s i s t a n c e t o chemical t o chemical p e s t i c i d e s chemical p e s t i c i d e s pesticides Notes 1. This paper uses the term "pesticide" according to its Falcon, Louis A. 1990. "Innovative Approaches to the standard legal definition, which includes all chemical Industrialization of Microbial Pesticides." in John and microbiological pest control inputs (whether or not Innovutive e. Casida, ed., Pesticides and Alternufi~es: they are poisons or have any negative environmental or Chemicul and Biological Approuches to Peg Control. public health externalities) along with plant growth reg- Amsterdam: Elsevier. ion hators. FAO's 1985 Guidelines for t h e ~ ~ e ~ i s t r a t and Control of Pesticides, p 6, propose a "useful definition Farah, Jumanah. 1994. Pesficide Policies in Developing of pesticides" for legal purposes as: Countries. World Bank Discussion P a p e r 238. Washington, DC: World Bank. Any substance or mixture of substances intend- ed for pre-venting, destroying, or controlling any Food and Agriculture Organization. 1985. Guidehnesfor pest, including unwanted species of plants or Re,trution and Controlof Pesticides. Rome: FAO. animals... T h e term includes substances intend- ed for use as a plant-growth regulator, defoliant, General Accounting Office (GAO). 1993. Pestin'dies: A desiccant, or fruit thinning agent or agent pre- CompurutK,e S t d y of Indu~triolizedNations' Regulrrtoory venting the premature fall of fruit and sub- Systems. Washington, D C : GAO, report no. stances applied to crops either before or shortly GAOPMED-93-17. after harvest to protect t h e commodity from deterioration during storage and harvest. G i pps, Terry. 1987. Breaking the Pesricide Hubit: Alternurives to 22 Hazardom Pesti&s. Minneapolis: 2. T h e World Bank Operation Manual, 1993, GB 4.03, International Alliance for Sustainable Agriculture. section 11, para 20. Also, GB 4.03, section 111, para 7, (World Bank) restricts but does not prohibit use of pro- H a n s e n , Michael. 1987. Escape from the Pesticide ject funds for the most dangerous pesticides. Treudmill: Alternatives to Pesricides in Developing Countries. Mount Vernon: Institute for Consumer 3. Richard C Staples and Gary H Toenniessen, eds, Policy Research. Plunt Diseuse Control: Resistance and Suscep[ibi/ity (John Wiley and Sons: New York, 1981). In this book, see H o r n , David J. 1988. Ecologicul Approach to Pest especially: Ivan B u d d e n h a g e n , "Conceptual and Munagement. NewYork: Guilford Press. Practical Considerations When Breeding for Tolerance or Resistance"; and Raoul Robinson, "Ecological Aspects Jackson, G. J. 1992. Agrochemical Usuge in Aricr Region: A of Disease Resistance." Reference Compendium. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 4. For a longer discussion of cultural practices to control pests, see: "Cropping Systems Working Group Report," Jarvis, Lowell S. 1994. 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IR-4 Project, "USDNIR-4 Biopesticide Research Implications on Human Dietary Exposure," Journuf Program Guidelines," brochure produced and distrib- of ApR"mlturulFood C h i s t r y . 4 0 5 18-524. uted by USDA/IR-4 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: IR-4 Project, Cook College, Rutgers University, 1995). Ki sh or, Nalin . 1992. Pegicide Externuh~ies,Compurutive Advuntuge, and Commodity Trade: Cotton in Andhru Prudesh, Indicr. Policy Research Working Paper 928. References Washington, DC: World Bank. Asian Development Bank. 1987. Hundbook on the Use of Pesricides in the Asiu-Pucific Region. Manila: Asian Kovach, J, C. Petzoldt, J. Degni, and J. Tette. 1992. "A Development Bank. Method to Measure the Environmental Impact of Pesticides." Nm York's Food und Lye Sciences Bufktzn. Environmental Protection Agency. 1993. Pesticide (Geneva, New York: New York State Agricultural Re../ltion (PR) Notice 93-9. (July 21). Experiment Station) 139:l-8. McClintock, J. Thomas. 1995. 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