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Report No: ICR00004981

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
IDA-H7820 / TF-18255 / IDA-D1210 / TF-A2454

ON A

CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 16.2 MILLION
(US\$25 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A UN PEACEBUILDING TRUST FUND GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$1.865 MILLION

AND AN ADDITIONAL IDA FINANCING

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$12 MILLION

AND AN EBOLA RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$4.35 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOR A

PRODUCTIVE SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROJECT
March 30, 2020

Social Protection & Jobs Global Practice
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective {Mar 30, 2020})

Currency Unit = Guinean Franc

GNF 9,381 = US\$1

US\$1.38 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF	Additional Financing
AfdB	Africa Development Bank
ANIES	<i>Agence Nationale d’Inclusion Economique et Sociale</i> (Agency for Economic and Social Inclusion)
CCC	Africa Region
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfer
CFS	<i>Cellule Filets Sociaux</i> (Social Safety Nets Unit)
CQS	Selection Based on the Consultants’ Qualification
DAF	<i>Directeur Financier et Administratif</i> (Financial and Administrative Director)
EC	European Commission
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan
EMP	Environmental Management Plan
EVD	Ebola Viral Disease
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FID	<i>Fonds d’Intervention pour le Développement</i> (Community Development Fund)
FM	Financial Management
FMR	Financial Management Report
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIMO	<i>Haute Intensité de main d’Oeuvre</i> (Labor Intensive Public Works)
IDA	International Development Association
IFR	Interim Unaudited Financial Report
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISN	Interim Strategy Note
LCS	Least Cost selection
LIPW	Labor Intensive Public Works
MASPF	<i>Ministère de l’Action Sociale pour la Promotion de la Femme et l’Enfant</i> (Ministry of Social Action)
MPIC	<i>Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale</i> (Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PDO	Project Development Objective
QCBS	Quality and Cost Based Selection
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOE	Statement of Expenditures

SPP	Simplified Procurement Plan
SSP	Services Support Project
SSS	Single Source Selection
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

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**DATA SHEET****BASIC INFORMATION****Product Information**

Project ID	Project Name
P123900	Productive Social Safety Net Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Guinea	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

Related Projects

Relationship	Project	Approval	Product Line
Supplement	P145117-Additional Financing to Productive Social Safety Nets Project	11-Mar-2014	Recipient Executed Activities
Additional Financing	P156484-Additional Financing Productive Social Safety Nets Project	31-May-2016	IBRD/IDA

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
The Republic of Guinea	Cellule Filets Sociaux

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to provide income support to vulnerable groups and to lay the foundations of a social safety net strategy by testing some of the building blocks necessary for a larger system.

**FINANCING**

		Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
World Bank Financing				
P123900	IDA-H7820	25,000,000	25,000,000	23,231,347
P123900	TF-18255	1,865,000	1,854,473	1,854,473
P123900	IDA-D1210	12,000,000	12,000,000	12,022,331
P123900	TF-A2454	4,350,000	4,349,756	4,349,756
Total		43,215,000	43,204,229	41,457,907
Non-World Bank Financing				
Borrower/Recipient		0	0	0
Total		0	0	0
Total Project Cost		43,215,000	43,204,229	41,457,907

KEY DATES

Project	Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
P123900	19-Jun-2012	14-Feb-2013	12-Oct-2015	02-Oct-2017	30-Sep-2019



RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
30-Jun-2014	2.34	Change in Results Framework Change in Institutional Arrangements Other Change(s)
22-Oct-2014	3.48	Change in Results Framework Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Other Change(s)
09-May-2016	20.66	Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Institutional Arrangements Other Change(s)
14-Oct-2017	30.99	Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Institutional Arrangements Other Change(s)
22-May-2018	34.76	Reallocation between Disbursement Categories

KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	09-Oct-2012	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	.20
02	24-Jun-2013	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.50
03	26-Feb-2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	2.19
04	15-Jun-2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.34
05	10-Jan-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	11.42
06	04-May-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	12.34
07	20-Oct-2015	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	16.58



08	17-Feb-2016	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	18.94
09	23-Sep-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	21.58
10	24-Apr-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	26.56
11	05-Dec-2017	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	31.99
12	28-Jun-2018	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	36.11
13	19-Mar-2019	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	40.23
14	30-Sep-2019	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	41.46

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Education 9

Primary Education 9

Health 5

Health 5

Social Protection 86

Social Protection 70

Public Administration - Social Protection 16

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)

Private Sector Development 100

Jobs 100

Social Development and Protection 68

Social Protection 68

Social Safety Nets 68



Human Development and Gender	34
Gender	8
Education	12
Access to Education	6
Education Financing	6
Nutrition and Food Security	14
Nutrition	7
Food Security	7

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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1. **At the time of Appraisal of the Productive Social Safety Net Project (PSSNP, the Project), Guinea was reemerging from a period of political and social turbulence that had left the country in a state of fragility comparable to that of post-conflict countries.** A military coup in 2008 had led to a suspension of World Bank operations for nearly three years. Following the adoption of a new Constitution and democratic elections in 2010, the World Bank, together with the international donor community, had converged to support the newly elected government. Together, they were working with the Government of the Republic of Guinea (the Government) to help clear arrears to the country's external creditors and achieve the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Completion Point that was achieved in September 2012 (twelve years after having reached the Decision Point).
2. **Guinea was experiencing serious development challenges, including high poverty coupled with a high population growth rate.** Household survey data from 2007 indicated over 53 percent of Guinea's population of 10 million lived below the poverty line, and the population was growing at over 2.6 percent each year. Political instability and the 2008 Food and Fuel Crisis are believed to have pushed the poverty rate upwards to approximately 58 percent in 2010. Urbanization was also rapidly increasing: more than one-third of the population was estimated to be living in urban areas and about 60 percent of the total population was under the age of 25.
3. **Guinea had some of the world's lowest human development indicators and spending in the social sectors was low by international standards.** In 2011, Guinea ranked 178 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) at 0.34. Life expectancy at birth was 54.1 years and the infant mortality rate was at 81 per 1,000, while, at 740 per 100,000 live births, the maternal mortality rate was one of the highest in Africa. Most education indicators, including gross enrollment, dropout and completion rates, had stagnated or deteriorated since 2005, and outcomes for girls were more unfavorable. The share of the education budget fell from 2.3 percent of GDP in 2002 to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2008, far below the average of 4 percent observed in Sub Saharan Africa. Social protection spending, either in the form of contributory pensions or social safety nets, was negligible.
4. **The rapidly growing urban and predominantly young population was generating political pressures, challenging the Government to show quick and tangible results.** In 2010, the population had high expectations, following the first free elections since the country's independence in 1958. However, the majority of the population relied on subsistence agriculture and the informal sector for employment and income, and were employed in low productivity, low wage jobs. Youth suffered disproportionately from unemployment and underemployment. Only one percent of the labor force was enrolled in the public social security system, the CNSS, one of the world's lowest rates. Households lacked adequate risk-coping mechanisms, and, in the absence of a government safety net, relied either on informal solidarity networks or resorted to detrimental coping mechanisms affected their future growth.




Theory of Change (Results Chain)

5. **The PSSNP's Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not describe a Theory of Change.** For this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), the Project's Theory of Change is constructed ex-post, retrofitted from the Project's Results Framework (RF) and its detailed description.

6. Per the Theory of Change, Components 1 and 2 were designed to contribute to the outcome of providing poor and vulnerable households with access to income opportunities and temporary employment. Component 3 focused on project coordination and capacity building, which contributed to building social safety nets systems through training and knowledge exchange. Figure 1 below presents project activities, outputs, outcomes and its expected (long-term) impact. Activities under capacity building and project management had an overall impact on all outcomes. Hence, they are not connected to a single outcome in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Theory of Change



Source: ICR Author



Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

7. **The Project Development Objective (PDO) was "to provide income support to vulnerable groups and to lay the foundations of a social safety net strategy by testing some of the building blocks necessary for a larger system".** Building blocks were defined as a social protection (SP) policy, and operational tools to improve beneficiary identification and registration, monitor the program, and ensure that cash is transferred to eligible beneficiaries in a secure, transparent and timely manner.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

8. **The key expected outcomes as captured in the PDO were to: (i) provide income support to vulnerable groups, and (ii) lay the foundations of a social safety net strategy by testing some of the building blocks for a SP strategy.** The PDO indicators, as defined in the PAD, are presented below. The RF also contained 19 Intermediate Results (IR) indicators (Annex 6B).

- Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs (number);
- Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs – Cash-for- work, food-for-work and public works (number);
- Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Unconditional cash transfers (number);
- Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs – Female (number);
- Beneficiaries enrolled in life skills development;
- People with access to sensitization on nutrition, health, sanitation, and education campaigns;
- People with access to improved infrastructures; and
- Findings from the impact evaluation of the pilots are discussed and incorporated in the social safety net strategy

Components

9. **The Project comprised three components.** Components 1 and 2 were designed to contribute to the expected outcome of providing poor and vulnerable households with access to income opportunities and temporary employment. Component 3 sought to promote institutional capacity building and project coordination. The activities under these components were estimated to total US\$25 million. Detailed project costs are presented in Annex 3.

10. **Component 1: Labor intensive public works program in urban areas with a focus on youth and life skills development (US\$16.5 million - Total costs, including contingencies).** This component sought to implement temporary employment opportunities to increase a household's income while rehabilitating and creating community infrastructure in urban areas and provide life skills development to reinforce basic life skills and workforce readiness behavior to complement the experience acquired in the labor-intensive public works (LIPW).

11. *Sub-component 1.1: Temporary employment opportunities (US\$15.5 million - Total costs, including contingencies).* This sub-component aimed to temporarily increase the revenues of the underemployed and unemployed in the country's regional capitals. It was designed to provide temporary employment opportunities through LIPW to around 24,000 unskilled/semi-skilled people older than 18 years in the five communes of the special zone of Conakry



and seven regional capitals. These LIPW included activities such as rehabilitating and maintaining roads, street paving, painting and upgrading, rehabilitating, maintaining, and constructing public and economic infrastructure, gardening, building sanitary works, etc. The activities were expected to create 2.4 million person days of work, paying between 20,000-25,000 GNF (estimated at US\$3-4), on average per day, depending on the areas of intervention and their respective ongoing market rates. This rate was aligned with wages paid by similar ongoing interventions at the time.

12. *Sub-component 1.2: Life skills development for youth (US\$1.0 million - Total costs, including contingencies).* This sub-component aimed to provide 5,000 youth with training in non-cognitive skills. The youth were to be selected from the LIPW beneficiaries based on demand, a minimum educational level, and regular attendance at the LIPW programs. Training content would focus on topics such as civic education, the rights and responsibilities of workers, conflict prevention and resolution, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, entrepreneurship, management, environmental protection, etc. The training curriculum was to be validated by a consultative commission with representation from the private sector, civil society, and training professionals. A total number of 100 training sessions would be offered over the five years of expected project implementation.

13. **Component 2: Pilot cash transfer program to protect human capital (US\$4.5 million - Total costs, including contingencies).** The pilot cash transfer (CT) program aimed to improve nutrition and girls' education indicators. In addition, the pilot would include accompanying measures such as training and awareness-raising to maximize the impact of the cash transfers.

14. *Sub-component 2.1: Design of the pilot project.*¹ UNICEF was to be contracted by Government to lead the design of the pilot cash transfer program. This was envisioned as UNICEF was deemed to have an adequate network of local institutional infrastructure and the technical capacity required to rapidly facilitate the country's first cash transfer intervention for nutrition and education. This sub-component consisted of carrying out preparatory work for signing the contract (which would include detailed terms of references, expected deliverables, and modalities of payments and reporting). In addition, it would finance the design of a technical annex on targeting, beneficiary selection, registration, and payment methods for the pilot cash transfer, as a first step towards the establishment of cash transfer systems.

15. *Sub-component 2.2: Cash transfer for nutrition (US\$2.25 million - Total cost, including contingencies).* This sub-component was designed to test the effectiveness of cash transfers in reducing the malnutrition rate of targeted children. It was meant to benefit at least 5,000 children aged 0-24 months that were affected by chronic malnutrition in at least two of the regions with the highest chronic malnutrition rates in the country (Kankan and Labé). The amount of transfer per child was determined based on household consumption levels and best international practices. Differentiated amounts were to be tested for the purpose of the impact evaluation. Hence, each household would receive the local equivalent of US\$7, US\$14, or US\$21 per child per month for 18 months. The amount that each household would receive throughout the intervention would be determined through randomized selection before actual implementation. Training on health, nutrition, and sanitation were included in the package to maximize the impact of the cash transfer on nutrition.

16. *Sub-component 2.3: Cash transfer for girls' education (US\$2.25 million - Total cost, including contingencies).* This sub-component aimed to test the efficiency of cash transfers in increasing the primary school completion rate among beneficiaries. It was expected to target at least 5,000 girls in the fifth and sixth grade in at least three regions where the girls' completion rate was among the lowest, namely Boké, Kankan, and Labé. Beneficiary selection was to be based on poverty criteria and a baseline survey to identify eligible beneficiaries and create a composite list. The survey was to be

¹ This Sub-component did not receive a budget allocation in the PAD.



premised on: (i) households with girls enrolled in the third to sixth grade of primary school, and (ii) households with girls of age to benefit from the program (girls who had left school for more than one academic year would be eligible, provided that they were at least 12 years old for the fifth grade and 13 years old for the sixth grade). Like sub-component 2.2, each household was to receive the local equivalent of US\$7, US\$14, or US\$21 per child per month until the end of their sixth-grade school year. Beneficiaries were required to have at least a 90 percent attendance rate. Students who missed school for more than 10 percent of any given term without acceptable justification (as determined by the Parent-Teachers' Association) would have their following installment cancelled. Students who missed a term or dropped out of school without an acceptable justification would be dropped from the program.

17. **Component 3: Project coordination and institutional capacity building (US\$4.0 million - Total costs, including contingencies).** This component aimed to finance institutional capacity building to support the development of the social protection strategy. In view of the Government's weak capacity and to support the work of the Project Implementing Unit (PIU), the Cellule Filets Sociaux (CFS), the Project contemplated a strong and sustained supervision work program, particularly at the earliest stage of implementation. Component 3 would also ensure that the CFS successfully and efficiently managed contracts with partners involved in implementation and conducted supervision to ensure that the Project was being implemented in conformity with key project documents, including the Financing Agreement, the Procurement Plan, and the Project Implementation Manual.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

18. **The Project was restructured at least four times, possibly five.²** The first Project restructuring took place on June 30, 2014³ and made the following changes: (i) modified the names of components; (ii) revised the implementation arrangements; and (iii) amended the design of the cash transfer program to include non-monetary transfers in the form of a school feeding program. This restructuring was combined with US\$2 million in co-financing from the United Nations Peace Building Fund (UNPBF) (para. 19). The second Project restructuring was processed together with the first Additional

² The ICR preparation team faced considerable difficulties in correctly identifying the various project restructurings and Additional Financings (AFs), including a co-financing by UNPBF. According to the documentation found in project files, IDA financing in the amount of SDR 16.2 million (US\$25.0 million equivalent) for the Productive Social Safety Net Project (P123900) was approved on June 19, 2012 (Report No. 66196-GN dated May 23, 2012). The Project was restructured for the first time in June 2014, together with a co-financing from UNPBF (P145117) in the amount of US\$2.0 million (of which US\$30,000 were retained by the WB to cover administrative costs) (Report No. 77843-GN dated June 30, 2014). This funding was to be provided to the Government under a Recipient-Executed Trust Fund in support of the Project's original objectives and components. The second project restructuring in October 2014 was processed together with the first AF (P145117) in the amount of US\$1.865 million also from the UNPBF (Report No. 778-GN dated October 22, 2014). The third project restructuring in May 2016 was processed together with an AF (P156484) from IDA in the amount of SDR 8.6 million (US\$12 million equivalent) and from the Ebola Recovery and Reconstruction Trust Fund in the amount of US\$4.35 million (Report No. PAD1768 dated May 9, 2016). The fourth project restructuring (P123900) was on October 14, 2107 (Report No. RES29442, undated). The fifth and final restructuring was approved on May, 22, 2018 (Report No. RES31708, undated).

However, not all of these restructurings and AFs have been recorded in the system. The Basic Data Sheet for this report, generated automatically from data in the system, lists only the last two project restructurings. The project financing table also in the Basic Data Sheet lists all but the US\$2.0 million co-financing, processed together with the first project restructuring. The team preparing this report consulted internally to obtain clarification, but it is not clear whether the US\$2.0 million co-financing approved together with the first project restructuring is the same financing as the US\$1.865 million approved with the second project restructuring (Annex 6C).

³ Dates on Project Papers, Restructuring papers and the Basic Data Sheet do not coincide. For the purposes of this ICR, dates of Restructurings and Additional Financings are those found on the respective Project Papers.



Financing (AF) (para. 19) on October 22, 2014, which: (i) allocated US\$6.0 million from LIPW to a new component “Response to the Ebola Epidemic”; (ii) revised the pilot cash transfer program to simplify the design and implementation of program conditions and again introduced a school feeding program in selected communities; (iii) modified indicator targets to reflect the reallocation of funds to the Ebola epidemic and the AF; (iv) adjusted institutional arrangements; and (iv) adjusted procurement procedures, expenditure categories, and disbursement arrangements to reflect the World Food Program’s (WFP) and United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF) role in implementation. The third Project restructuring, on May 9, 2016, which was processed together with a second AF (para. 19): (i) adjusted indicators and targets in the RF; (ii) modified the name of Component 2 to reflect the change from conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to unconditional cash transfer (UCTs); and (iii) extended the Grant’s Closing date to September 30, 2019. The fourth project restructuring, on October 14, 2017: (i) modified the Financing Agreement to reflect the new institutional anchorage; (ii) adjusted the Project’s RF, including the wording of indicators and targets; and (iii) again extended the Grant’s Closing Date to September 30, 2019. The fifth and final restructuring, approved on May 22, 2018, reallocated funds within sub-component 2.2, from expenditure Category 1 (Unconditional Cash Transfers) towards expenditure Category 2 (Accompanying Measures).

19. **The Project was complemented with a Co-financing and two AFs.** A co-financing in the amount of US\$1.97 million from the UNPBF was approved together with the first restructuring to scale up the LIPW program. The first AF in the amount of US\$1.865 million was approved (together with the second project restructuring) on October 22, 2014, also with funding from the UNPBF. The funds from the UNPBF were earmarked as emergency funds for the Ebola response. The second AF in the amount of US\$16.35 million, which included an IDA Grant in the amount of SDR 8.6 million (US\$12 million equivalent) and an Ebola Recovery and Reconstruction Trust Fund Grant⁴ (A2454) in the amount of US\$4.35 million, dates from May 9, 2016. This AF provided funding for the Project’s original activities to compensate for funding that had earlier been reallocated to finance the Ebola-related response during the crisis, and to scale up successful activities.

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

20. The Project’s PDO was not revised.

Revised PDO Indicators

21. **There were several revisions to PDO Indicators, in the first two restructurings and in conjunction with each of the AFs.** All 8 PDO indicators at approval were either dropped or revised throughout implementation and were eventually replaced by 11 new PDO indicators over the life of the Project. At closing, the Project had 6 PDO indicators and 1 PDO sub-indicator. A table providing the details on adjustments and revisions to the Project’s PDO and IR Indicators over the Project’s implementation is presented in Annex 6B.

⁴ The Ebola Recovery and Reconstruction Trust Fund (ERRTF) was established in November 2014 to support the recovery and reconstruction response in the three African countries that were most affected by the Ebola epidemic: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Trust Fund was expected to close on June 30, 2018, and was supported by the following donor countries: Denmark, Japan, Norway, Russia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.



Revised Components

22. **Components 1, 2 and 3 were revised in the 2014 restructurings in response to the emergency context resulting from the Ebola epidemic and its effect on the implementation of project activities.** Though the objectives of Component 1 remained largely unchanged (with the addition of a focus on women), the targeting methodology was refined, its geographical spread changed from urban areas to peri-urban and rural areas as well, and daily worker stipends were increased marginally. The 2014 restructuring standardized the LIPW program and recruited non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement a first batch of ten micro-projects on a pilot basis. Component 1 was also revised to make the CFS directly responsible for the day-to-day technical implementation of the LIPW (whereas previously it was to do so in collaboration with the implementing unit of the World Bank-financed Urban Development Project (PCU/PDU3).

23. **Component 2 was modified twice during project implementation.** In 2014, the pilot CT program was redesigned to test the impact of different levels of cash transfer amounts on school attendance and health center visits, and test the relative impact of cash transfers and school feeding programs. Component 2 was also revised to make the CFS directly responsible for the day-to-day technical implementation of the CT program, instead of sub-contracting UNICEF. The newly added school feeding program activity would be implemented by WFP (Annex 6E). The corresponding PDO indicator, 'Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs - Unconditional cash transfers (number)', was also modified to "Conditional" in the first AF due to previously incorrect wording. In the second Additional Financing, the CT program under Component 2 was revised from conditional to unconditional cash transfers.

24. **The name of Component 3 was modified to reflect its lesser emphasis on institutional capacity building for the Ministère de l'Action Sociale et de la Promotion de la Femme et des Enfants (Ministry of Social Action and Promotion of Women and Children – MASPFE).**

25. **Component 4, Response to the Ebola Epidemic, was added in the first AF to support the Government's request for logistical support and social mobilization services to respond to the Ebola epidemic.** The financing mobilized for this Component was to assist the Government in contracting UNICEF to: (i) provide critical logistical support to the treatment teams on the ground, including vehicles for social mobilization, case contact tracing and coordination efforts; (ii) finance a communication campaign and community level mobilization programs, including in the forest regions, and related materials; and (iii) provide training to teachers and officials for the implementation of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) emergency response. Component 4 was allocated a total of US\$7.865 million, of which US\$1.865 million was from the UNPBF and US\$6 million was reallocated from the Project's Component 1. Changes in funding allocations after each project restructuring and AF are provided in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Changes in funding allocations among project components throughout implementation⁵

Component	Allocation at appraisal (2012)	Restructuring and co-financing (2014)	Additional Financing 1 (2014)	Additional Financing 2 (2016)	Restructuring (2017)	Total allocation at completion
1	\$16.5m	\$18.15m (+1.65m)	\$12.15m (-\$6m)	\$21.15m (+\$9m)	\$20.5m (-\$650,000)	\$20.5m
2	\$4.5m	\$4.5m	\$4.5m	\$8.85m	\$9.5m	\$9.5m

⁵ These amounts may not be reflected in the portal. Please refer to footnote no. 2 for a detailed explanation.



				(+\$4.35m)	(+\$650,000)	
3	\$4m	\$4.32 (+\$0.32m)	\$4.32m	\$7.32m (+\$3m)	\$7.32m	\$7.32m
4	N/A	N/A	\$7.865m (+7.865)	\$7.865m	\$7.865m	\$7.865m
TOTAL	\$25m	\$26.97	\$28.835m	\$45.075m	\$45.185m	\$45.185m

Other Changes

26. **The Project's institutional arrangements changed several times during implementation.** In addition to modifying institutional arrangements for implementation of activities in Components 1 and 2 (para. 22 and 23), the Project was anchored under two different ministries and finally under the Prime Minister's Office. A Steering Committee was also appointed in 2014 to be responsible for the overall oversight of the Project.

27. **Other changes included the extension of the Grant's Closing Date to 30 September 2019 in the 2017 restructuring.**

28. **The PIU implemented an additional activity that was not formally included in the Project.**⁶ This involved the organization of informal Rotating Credit and Savings Associations (ROSCAs) comprised of LIPW or CT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. These were designed as an exit strategy from the CT/LIPW programs and were required to have at least one (former) beneficiary each. Approximately \$300,000 of project funds were dedicated to this activity.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

29. **There were significant changes to the RF over the life of the Project.** These were made to reflect implementation progress, adjustments during implementation (e.g., changes in implementation arrangements), new activities included in response to the Ebola epidemic, additional funding made available, and the reallocation of original project funding to those activities. Several minor modifications to the wording of indicators in the RF were also made.

30. **The first restructuring, completed only a year after grant effectiveness, was precipitated by bottlenecks hindering implementation.** PDU3 – which was supposed to implement the LIPW – ceased to exist on June 30, 2013 upon completion of the Urban Development Project, which rendered the day-to-day technical implementation of LIPW unclear. Plans to implement the LIPW through works contracts with firms were limited by the Financing Agreement, which did not include the procurement of works. The cash transfer pilot was also modified for fear that transferring cash exclusively to families with malnourished children was going to create an adverse incentive for families with healthy children. The first AF, a few months later, was brought on by the Ebola outbreak and the need to make emergency financing available through a new component for Ebola response.

31. **The Closing Date extension was justified to allow additional time to complete original and additional activities, as well as to reflect minor initial delays in implementation.** These adjustments had no impact on the original Theory of Change.

⁶ This activity appeared in the approved 2018 Annual Budget Plan (PTBA). It was not formally included in project documents.



32. **Guinea suffered an unprecedented outbreak of EVD between December 2014 and January 2016 (para. 74).** The introduction of Component 4 was an attempt to dedicate financing in an efficient manner to manage the outbreak in the country, which had a total of 3,814 confirmed cases over two years⁷. At the Government's request, the World Bank agreed to restructure the Project to make US\$6 million available, to be channeled through UNICEF, to increase logistical support to the treatment teams on the ground, increase community level mobilization programs in the country's forest region, and provide training to teachers and officials for the implementation of the EVD emergency response. This funding was reallocated from the amounts originally assigned to the LIPW program under Component 1. This had no impact on the Theory of Change because this component served mainly to channel funds to UNICEF to fulfill the Government's request for logistical support and social mobilization services to respond to the Ebola epidemic. The 2016 AF later replenished funding for the LIPW and even scaled up funding for the program (para. 25).

33. **Component 2 was modified to also include boys in the education-focused CT program.** The CFS conducted missions to the field at the start of the CT pilot and reported that they did not observe a significant enough discrepancy in girls' versus boys' school enrollment. This finding was echoed in the 2014 AF based on findings from a draft Public Expenditure Review of the Education Sector.⁸ As such, the Government decided to make cash transfers available to both genders under the age of 14. During implementation, they also discovered that many geo-located schools were not functional and therefore many children could not meet CT conditions, resulting in only 69 percent of children meeting the criteria. Cash transfer conditionalities were eventually dropped in favor of soft conditions.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

34. **The Relevance of the Project's PDO is rated High, as it was relevant at the time of Appraisal and continued to be relevant at completion⁹.** At Appraisal, the PDO was relevant to Guinea's development priorities and consistent with the World Bank's FY12-13 Interim Strategy Note (Section III). At completion, the PDO remained in full alignment with the World Bank's FY19-20 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Guinea. The share of Guinea's population living in poverty stagnated at around 55 percent between 2002 and 2012, and simulations based on the 2014 census suggest a likely increase in this share to nearly 58 percent in 2014 nationally, with both urban and rural areas experiencing increased poverty. Hence, the CPF continues to prioritize interventions designed to help address this. Specifically, Objective 5 (Improved health and social protection, especially in rural areas) of the CPF's Pillar Two (Human Development) aims to continue to improve the coverage and coordination of the social safety net programs. The CPF includes two indicators to measure progress, including the number of beneficiaries of social safety net programs and the number of households in the unique registry with complete information. The CPF highlights that the World Bank will continue to support the building of the social protection system that is being developed as part of the Project, for which

⁷ CDC. Case Counts. <https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/case-counts.html>.

⁸ World Bank. 2015. "Republic of Guinea Public Expenditure Review Volume I: Education." Washington DC, USA.

⁹ Because of the essential relevance of the operation to the CPF, this segment does not assess the ambiguity in the wording of the PDO described in para. 78.



it notes “there has been significant progress”. Finally, the CPF contemplates a proposed new operation that would increase ongoing efforts with a view to improving coverage and coordination of programs, reducing targeting errors, and improving the efficiency of the social spending sectors, inter alia, by ensuring that World Bank-funded projects use labor-intensive technologies (including public works) to the extent possible to maximize income-earning opportunities for the unemployed, especially young people and laying the foundation for a unified social registry, which could be used by other sectors, including the health and education sectors (for example, by better targeting of free care or scholarships).

35. **The PDO and related activities maintained their relevance throughout implementation, especially insofar as providing income opportunities and cash transfers during and after the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic.** Social losses resulting from the epidemic likely exacerbated poverty—a post-Ebola survey of nearly 2,500 households conducted in September 2015 showed that poverty may have increased, with economic damage outlasting the immediate epidemiological effects. Strengthening Guinea’s human capital lies at the heart of the country’s development priorities, and the CPF highlights that the World Bank will continue to maintain systems put in place in the aftermath of the Ebola Crisis.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

36. **The Project achieved important results in an extremely challenging environment characterized by fragility, weak capacity, conflict and insecurity, and political and economic uncertainties throughout its implementation.**¹⁰ Despite contextual challenges and changes to components and ministerial anchorage, the core activities remained relatively consistent throughout implementation. The Government developed key building blocks of a social protection system, including targeting and payment mechanisms, and tested two safety nets delivery models. It also developed its first Social Protection Policy.

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

Objective 1: Provide income support to vulnerable groups

37. **The Project was successful in providing access to income opportunities and temporary employment to 75,338 poor and vulnerable households of which 46 percent were women, almost meeting the revised PDO target of 83,968 households, but greatly exceeding 30 percent women beneficiaries.** Over 505,530 people benefitted from temporary income opportunities through the public works and cash transfer programs both directly and indirectly. Of these, 82 percent of beneficiaries were verified ex-post by the Project as poor, in keeping with the target of 80 percent. Although the impact evaluation did not assess the impact of activities that comprised the majority of the financing, like LIPW, evidence collected by the CFS suggests that beneficiaries used their additional income for food consumption (for example to buy oil, potatoes, beans, and rice), and to invest in productive assets (cows, sheep, and land). This was also observed during the ICR field mission (29 September – 5 November 2020) carried out in Balagan and Linsan, which found anecdotal evidence that beneficiaries received the equivalent of US\$350 over 5 cash transfers, and that 14 respondents out of 21 in Balagan bought food for their households with the cash, while all 17 respondents in Linsan invested their

¹⁰ Evaluation of the Project’s efficacy was made difficult by several factors. As explained in para. 81, several project restructurings make difficult the construction of a longitudinal series of project achievements given the many adjustments to its indicators and targets. Further, there may have been issues with the quality/consistency of data provided by the CFS to report progress (paras. 83 and 84). Finally, because the Project’s PDO indicators were output oriented, an impact evaluation (IE) was built into the design. It was not well implemented, however, and its results provide promising though limited information to validate the Project’s impact.




cash transfers in small economic activities. The Government complemented this by organizing 349 economic activity groups in rural communities as an exit strategy to the unconditional cash transfers. The activity provided matching cash grants toward productive activities. Groups were offered a grant of maximum US\$530 if they were able to save US\$425 in a bank account. According to the CFS, a total of 4,428 beneficiaries received the grant.

38. **The Project provided nutrition/parenting/early learning/stimulation education to over 25,000 beneficiaries.** Though the Project did not seek to measure the impact of these sessions on beneficiaries, anecdotal evidence from the ICR mission suggests many beneficiaries understood the value of keeping their money in a bank account and reinvesting it in productive activities as taught by the local instructor.

39. **About US\$9.33 million was transferred to beneficiaries participating in public works for a little over 1.75 million total person days worked, nearly meeting the 1.78 million Intermediate Result (IR) indicator target for person days worked.** The works resulted in the rehabilitation of 655 kilometers of roads and the cleaning of 715 kilometers of drainage. Elderly beneficiaries that could not do stringent manual labor were invited to sweep streets as the CFS believed that this small action would increase community appreciation of cleaner living spaces. A community-based approach empowered communities to take the lead in managing and implementing the LIPW, as described under Objective 2 below.

40. **Findings from the IE were limited, but did point to some promising findings.** The IE was to assess the impact of a CCT distributed to 1,822 households on nutrition outcomes and school attendance and performance. Despite issues with the IE (para. 85), its findings indicate that while school enrollment and learning outcomes increased everywhere in Guinea, school enrollment was higher in treated villages and for households receiving a higher cash transfer amount as shown in Figure 2 below. The effect is around 11 percentage points of enrollment, from a low basis of around 40 percentage points.

Figure 2. School Enrollment (all children)





Objective 2: Lay the foundations of a social safety nets strategy by testing some of the building blocks for a larger SP system¹¹

41. **The Project's biggest accomplishment was the putting in place of a functioning social protection system in a context where there was none in place.** It was successful in developing the key building blocks of a scalable social protection system which have since been further strengthened by the Government's decision to institutionalize the system by creating a dedicated agency under the Prime Minister's Office. The Project supported the development of a Social Protection Policy (encompassing a social safety nets strategy within it), an objective targeting methodology, a management information system, a Grievance Redress Mechanism, and payment systems that altogether comprise an essential first step in the future expansion of Guinea's safety nets programs.

42. **Social Protection Policy.** The MASPFE developed the National Policy on Social Protection, which was approved by the Council of Ministers and launched on June 13, 2017. The development and approval of the policy signaled increasing commitment to establishing an SP system in the country. Guinea's *Politique Nationale de la Protection Sociale* (National Policy on Social Protection, PNPS) was elaborated in partnership with UNICEF and the ILO and approved by the Council of Ministers on June 13, 2017. The PNPS outlines: (i) the profile of poverty, vulnerability and risk in Guinea; (ii) social protection mechanisms and tools; (iii) Guinea's vision, objectives, strategy and guiding principles; (iv) the six strategic axes; and (v) implementation and M&E systems, priority actions and accompanying measures. The six strategic axes relate to access to decent employment, improvement of living conditions for the poor, access to basic services and food security, access to social housing, and prevention and management of crises and disasters. Though this was an important step towards capacity building per the PAD's original intent, further efforts are needed to improve the coordination between the social protection system that is being transferred to the new agency, and the MASPFE. The Project's actions towards establishing synergy with the MASPFE included appointing a focal point of the MASPFE as the chairman of the Steering Committee of the Project, as well as training and South-South exchanges.

43. **Targeting.** At appraisal, Guinea had no streamlined mechanism to identify poor households for targeted development programs. The Project developed and introduced a three-step targeting process to select project beneficiaries based on recent and rigorous poverty analysis, comprising geographical targeting, a Proxy Means Test (PMT) formula, and community-based verification. Project ISRs consistently reported that over 82 percent of beneficiaries satisfied the criteria for extreme poverty (para. 38). However, as expected given the enormous needs in Guinea, the Project was only able to target a small proportion of the poor. Over the course of several field missions, beneficiaries claimed to be satisfied with community involvement in the selection process, which offset grievances about limited coverage. Beneficiaries recommended that the registration period be extended to facilitate registration for the program, which was perceived as being too short.

44. **Payment system, Management Information Systems (MIS), and Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM):** A payment system was established, in partnership with a bank, *Credit Rural*, based on two-factor authentication. The payment procedure involved three parties and the World Bank, allowing for checks and balances. Despite the Project's geographical spread and limited logistical capacity, the CFS was successful in delivering cash in hand to beneficiaries and even experimented with mobile money. A Management Information System (MIS) with basic monitoring capacity was developed. This may have contributed to discrepancies in reported results (paras. 83 and 84). It may have also led to

¹¹ This objective of the PDO referred to foundations of a safety net strategy, but this ICR assumes that what is meant by that is in reality is a social protection system.



ISRs sometimes reporting results with large discrepancies, including in the Project's final year of implementation. A GRM was developed and grievances were tracked through the MIS from 2017 onward.

45. **The community-based approach promoted by the Project empowered communities to take the lead in managing and implementing the LIPW.** This was facilitated by establishing community level structures and building community and local government capacity to effectively undertake their roles and responsibilities, closely tied with community mobilization and sensitization to deepen understanding of safety net design and operational processes. While the number of beneficiaries supported and community assets maintained were important in improving household and community welfare in the immediate term, establishing and strengthening capacities of local structures were deemed by the World Bank and the Government to be equally important in the longer term in addressing community resilience in Guinea given the very weak capacity base.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

46. **The Project's Efficacy is rated Substantial.** The Project was successful in introducing and testing two different programs that delivered income support to vulnerable groups, nearly achieving the targeted number of beneficiaries (Objective 1). While deficiencies in monitoring and evaluation (para. 81) make difficult the confirmation of the precise number of beneficiaries, the numbers recorded confirm that the Project was able to reach a total of beneficiaries within a broad order of magnitude of the number targeted. More importantly, however, the Project had a decisive impact on the establishment of critical elements for a functioning safety net system, exceeding by far the objective of only "laying the foundations" for that system (Objective 2). Further strengthening of that safety net system is no doubt required, including for monitoring and evaluation, and plans for that process are being developed (para. 105). But, the fact is that the Project, starting from an environment in which neither the policy, institutional, nor procedural aspects of a safety net system existed, helped develop a functional system with a targeting methodology, a payments mechanism, a GRM and a rudimentary MIS all in place, with appropriate procedures and manuals to ground their application and use. That system has tested and implemented two safety net programs and learned important lessons from their experience. Finally, while not specifically attributable to the Project itself, but no doubt building upon the strong sectoral dialogue in the context of its implementation and the implementation experience itself, the Government has greatly surpassed the Project's objective of "laying foundations" of a system. It has done so by assimilating the building blocks introduced by the Project in its new Social Protection Policy and established permanent institutional arrangements and responsibilities to oversee the implementation of the programs it promotes.

C. EFFICIENCY

47. **The economic and financial analysis in the PAD estimated the Project's benefits for both the LIPW and CT components.** It based the analysis on: (i) the cost-effectiveness and efficiency in terms of beneficiary identification and subsequent enrollment; (ii) provision of an adequate benefit level or sum that does not create dependency or disincentives to work; (iii) delivery of benefits and payments with relative ease; and (iv) development of a well-balanced system for managing information and monitoring and evaluating data. The ex-post economic and financial sustainability analysis is provided in Annex 4 and summarized below.



48. **The efficiency analysis builds on that of the PAD by assessing the cost effectiveness of the LIPW with a similar methodology for the sake of comparison, as well as comparisons across other countries.** There are questions about how the analysis was prepared at appraisal, however, given inconsistencies in the calculation of targets in the RF. Challenges with M&E throughout the program (paras. 83 and 84) cast some doubts on the results of the cost benefit analysis in this ICR, particularly as it pertains to the LIPW program. This is mostly due to varying targets and actuals reported, changes throughout project implementation in the number of days worked under the program (30 to 60, to 30 again), in wages provided, and limited access to disaggregated costs by component. The ICR used data from the RF and consolidated data from Annual Budget Plans, to obtain a sense of the disaggregation of costs within components. The efficiency analysis is also based on total disbursements by component at completion.

49. **The analysis suggests that the LIPW component was cost effective compared to earlier and similar programs in the region and the world.** At appraisal, it was estimated that it would cost US\$1 for every US\$1 transferred in wage benefits. At completion, the ex-post analysis estimated cost-effectiveness of the public works component at 0.37. This means that it costs US\$1 for every US\$2.87 transferred in wage benefits to the intended recipients. Despite Guinea's high operational costs due to a geographically broad targeting strategy, this estimate also compares well to the overall cost effectiveness of similar programs. The cost-effectiveness of the LIPW component is primarily due to the high labor intensity and the targeting efficiency. Project data estimate a labor intensity of 0.60 at completion, implying that 60 percent of program costs went to wage transfers to project beneficiaries. This result is in line with what was assumed at appraisal stage. Targeting efficiency estimated at 82 percent had been possible by combining a PMT-based targeting with community validation. This is in line with evidence from other countries in Africa, e.g., administrative costs for the *Jigisemejiri* Program in Mali declined from 42 percent to 12 percent between 2014 to 2016 with the increase in the number of beneficiaries (WB, AFD, 2018).

50. **Nevertheless, there appear to be inconsistencies with the data at appraisal and at completion that render the efficiency analysis of LIPW inconclusive.** Component 1 was expected to disburse US\$15.5 million to yield 2.4 million person-days worked. At completion, the total cost for LIPW is estimated at US\$17.7 million, generating 1.75 million person-days, and excluding around US\$2.8 million for life skills development from the total cost of US\$ 20.5 million for Component 1. In other words, the cost for each person-day worked at appraisal is about US\$6.5 (this includes the cost of materials, etc.), while at completion, the cost appears to be around US\$11.5. This would suggest that the Project was significantly less efficient than expected. This could be caused by a number of factors, such as inflation or higher cost of materials than expected, limited availability of materials at the local level, higher logistical costs, or simply incorrect estimates at appraisal. And while the CFS overachieved in its delivery of accompanying measures for these beneficiaries, it is also difficult to quantify their impact on beneficiaries' productivity. Consequently, the efficiency analysis for the LIPW is inconclusive based on these divergent findings.

51. **Efficiency analysis of the piloted CCTs that were first based on school attendance and regular visits to health facilities, and subsequently unconditional cash transfers following the Ebola emergency shows more promising results.** In terms of cost effectiveness, it cost US\$1 for every US\$ 2.56 received by beneficiaries. While it was cost effective, this number denotes that the implementation of conditional transfers was challenging, as noted in this ICR. This could be explained by the differentiated cash transfer amounts given to beneficiaries and the need for complex supervision and monitoring of conditions. This may have contributed to inefficiencies in terms of geographic targeting and costs. CCTs targeted only 6,181 children against a target of 12,000, but the undisbursed funds were utilized for unconditional transfers to 6,976 households affected by the Ebola outbreak. This reallocation allowed the Project to deliver safety nets coverage in a timely manner during a period of crisis. Despite implementation problems, the IE of the



conditional cash transfer pilot shows that it was effective in increasing school attendance in treated villages, and that this effect was higher for families receiving higher amounts. However, for health conditionalities, it was not possible to assess the impact on vaccination rate since the Ebola outbreak disrupted health services resulting in a decrease of vaccination rate.

52. **Project management costs including capacity building under Component 3 are reasonable given the Guinean context.** Although capacity building and training do not convey immediate direct benefits for the poor, they are public goods that will result in efficiency gains and cost savings in the medium term as the SP system is expanded. Based on the RF, project management costs were around 18 percent of total project costs. Although this appears to be at the upper end of the spectrum, it is still within generally accepted levels to be considered efficient, particularly in a fragile context and considering that it was the first operation of its kind in Guinea. As such, there was a steep learning curve for the Government. These costs also reflect the high cost of doing business in Guinea with its considerable logistical challenges.

53. **The Project was implemented effectively and utilized funds for their intended purpose.** In spite of the many challenges and changes throughout implementation, the Project disbursed both its original and additional funding fully and took only two more years to complete, which is not excessive given the AFs provided throughout implementation (para. 19). Furthermore, project management costs were at reasonable levels considering the context. A final allocation of the Project's funding is provided in Table 1.

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

54. **Despite the efficiency with which the Project was implemented following the different restructurings, overall, the Project's Efficiency is rated Modest.** This is because the promising results described above have been calculated on the basis of available data, which is in some instances inconsistent given issues with monitoring and evaluation (paras. 83 and 84). While some economic benefits can be inferred based on existing knowledge on the benefits of social safety net operations, the results of the Project's ex-post economic analysis may be somewhat questionable in view of these data inconsistencies.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

55. **The Project's overall Outcome Rating is Moderately Satisfactory.** The Project's Relevance was High in the context of high poverty levels in Guinea and the population's vulnerability to shocks. Its substantial efficacy was achieved by introducing and testing two different programs that delivered income support to vulnerable groups and developing the building blocks of a social protection system. Its Efficiency was Modest because the ex-post analysis, though overall positive, may be somewhat questionable due to data inconsistencies.



E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender

56. **The Project was gender sensitive in its targeting and implementation strategy.** It emphasized the participation of women by primarily targeting poor female-headed households, emphasizing female participation, and sensitivity to cultural aspects of female spaces. The number of female participants exceeded original targets, affirming the body of knowledge that community self-selection practices are not biased toward male participants when adequately trained to identify vulnerability. Meaningful participation of women in public works activities was achieved through: (a) training the selection committees of public works activities on female empowerment; (b) informal nurseries for mothers to drop their children off at so they did not endanger them on site; (c) appropriate work for women, including consideration for pregnant and lactating mothers included in the work norms; (d) selection of work hours taking into account women's household obligations; and (e) separate toilets for female and male beneficiaries.

57. **The CCT, which intended to address gender gaps in access to education for girls through conditions based on their school enrollment and attendance, veered off course early in implementation due to its complex design.** There is no evidence, beyond anecdotal claims by the CFS during ICR interviews, that gender parity in school attendance had been achieved in the targeted zones; the 2015 PER of the Education Sector, which is cited in the 2014 restructuring paper, noted gender gaps in access to education. Recent studies on gender gaps in Guinea reveal that not only were girls enrolling less in school throughout implementation, they still lagged behind boys of similar ages in 2019. The Project could have further explored ways to address relevant gender gaps. On the other hand, enrollment is so low for both genders in Guinea that the inclusion of as many young students as possible was justified.

Institutional Strengthening

58. **The Project was prepared without an established institutional structure for social protection, but contributed to developing a more permanent institutional framework.** To begin implementation and help develop and test the necessary building blocks of a safety net, the Project focused on establishing and strengthening the CFS to carry out activities in a challenging geographical and political setting. The CFS as the Project's PIU, was a temporary unit, established to help carry out project activities while a more permanent institutional structure was defined. While not specifically part of the Project's PDO, the Project helped sustain a strong dialogue that supported Guinea in developing its Social Protection Policy, both through implementation support and support related to World Bank-executed Trust Funds. This Policy enacted in June 2017, among other things, calls for more permanent institutions and mechanisms that are now responsible for further strengthening Guinea's social protection system, and delivering support to its beneficiaries. In this respect, the Project helped generate interest and ownership at the highest government levels to develop a clear vision of the SP policy and institutional arrangements that became reality with the establishment of its new social and financial inclusion agency, the *Agence Nationale d'Inclusion Economique et Sociale* (National Agency for Economic and Social Inclusion, ANIES), in January 2019. The creation of ANIES, the result of a presidential decree in January 2019, signaled high level commitment to the establishment of an established institution to lead social protection programs.

59. **The Project also contributed to institutional strengthening of decentralized structures in a complex environment.** In practice, Guinea's efforts to decentralize powers to local authorities started in 2017. Before that, it was



difficult to involve local government in projects unless funding was provided to them directly. The PSSNP helped carve out relations with them nonetheless and strengthen their implementation capacity. This institutional process strategically brought together four administrative levels and involved collaboration with state and village level staff that worked with communities to help identify beneficiaries and prioritize works. Fiduciary responsibilities for micro-project equipment were given directly to local authorities, who were trained by the CFS on procurement procedures and reporting.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

60. The Project did not mobilize private sector financing.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

61. **Guinea's difficult economic situation during preparation, which had improved in 2012, suffered a setback with the advent of the Ebola crisis no doubt adversely impacting poverty.** External shocks were further compounded by political unrest in the run-up to legislative elections in 2013, and then renewed unrest in the run-up to the October 2015 presidential elections. While reliable data is not available, Guinea's previously high 55 percent poverty rate is believed to have increased as a result of the Ebola crisis and subsequent economic stagnation in 2014 and 2015.

62. **The Project successfully targeted beneficiary households that were poor and vulnerable with limited or no income and employment opportunities.** It applied objective criteria for geographic, PMT-based, and a participatory, community-based targeting process to identify beneficiary households for the LIPW and CT programs. Since the PDO was output rather than outcome-oriented given the complex operating environment, the Project did not measure impacts on poverty of LIPW or CT recipients. The CCT had the additional objectives to promote behavior change for improved nutrition and school attendance, but after the design was deemed too complex and it was changed to an unconditional program, its objectives became more narrowly aligned with the PDO.

63. **Social safety net interventions had a redistributive effect on communities.** The IE of the CCT showed an improvement in school attendance among families who received cash transfers. All beneficiaries interviewed during the ICR mission also claimed that cash transfers helped smooth consumption and that they were able to invest in more sustainable assets such as equipment, seeds, and livestock.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

64. **Rehabilitated community assets resulting from the public works program have helped communities increase their revenues.** Anecdotal evidence during implementation support missions suggested that improved roads enabled produce trucks to enter neighborhoods that were previously unpassable, helping reduce costs for businesses and households to purchase and sell their produce. Conversations with project beneficiaries disclosed that rehabilitated fields that had previously been unused were now abundant with vegetables that the micro-projects helped plant and were being sold to increase the communities' savings accounts (e.g., rainy day funds). Further, a safeguards mission



report in 2015 added that the cleaning of ditches and drains contributed to fewer illnesses due to improved sanitation in the communities, namely malaria that was caused by mosquitos breeding on stagnant water¹².

65. **Evidence collected by the CFS suggests that accompanying measures were attended by most of the communities, not just beneficiaries.** This was a trend reported throughout implementation. Whether out of curiosity or enforced by local authorities, instructors claimed that non-beneficiaries of target communities attended the village trainings *en masse*. The ICR mission found that these trainings resonated with communities who adopted some of the lessons, such as keeping the village refuse away from community common areas. The beneficiaries from the village of Linsan claimed they all had bank accounts which they used regularly and satisfied their need to secure money in a safe place. Beneficiaries in Balagan claimed to have a reduced need for bank accounts as the nearest bank was 30 kilometers away and difficult to access in bad weather.

66. **With poverty soaring as a result of widespread economic instability and fear of EVD, the relevance of the Project's cash transfers became more apparent.** The EVD highlighted structural weaknesses in a country where social protection and health systems are weak and crisis prevention and response capacity are almost non-existent. Anecdotal evidence revealed that populations that received cash transfers were more likely to stay in their hometowns, thereby reducing transmission rates due to internal displacement of communities. They were also more resilient to the EVD and faced fewer long-term economic consequences by resorting to coping mechanisms such as selling assets.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

67. **The Project was prepared shortly after the World Bank had begun reengaging in Guinea after an almost three-year suspension of operations (following a military coup in 2008).** The international community converged to support the newly elected civilian government in 2010, which came to power in the midst of the Food and Fuel Crisis. An updated PRSP for 2011-2012, called for extending safety nets to fight poverty, improve living conditions, and extend access to and coverage of basic services figured prominently in its program. The Project followed the two-stage approach towards social protection outlined in the PRSP: in the short term, assisting the poorest and most vulnerable population groups to weather the negative effects of reforms and rising prices, while moving towards developing a comprehensive safety net in the medium- to longer-term.

68. **As the first World Bank-financed SP project in the Republic of Guinea, there was a dearth of local sectoral experience and lessons.** The design was based on lessons from other World Bank-financed LIPW programs, youth-targeted life skills development programs, and conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs in other countries and comparable contexts. The preparation team also considered lessons learned from a rapid review of the LIPW activities that were implemented in 2008-2010 by the PCU/PDU3 as part of a Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) grant¹³. The key findings from that operation and from other countries that influenced the Project's design were to: (i) develop partnerships with local stakeholders to promote ownership and ensure consistency of the intervention with local priorities; (ii) conduct extensive sensitization campaign to encourage women to participate in LIPW; (iii)

¹² World Bank. 2015. Safeguards Mission Report on the Productive Social Safety Nets Project, August 7-12. Washington DC, USA.

¹³ Guinea, Third Urban Development Project, P113608.



organize transparent beneficiary registration methods; (iii) emphasize micro-projects that are simple in design and implementation; (iv) include youth-targeted training programs to add needed life skills; (v) support either conditional or unconditional cash transfers as both had been found to produce positive impacts on schooling outcomes, and hence long-term benefits for households; (vi) include information and awareness campaigns on essential family practices to strengthen the impact of cash transfers on beneficiaries; and (iv) build the government's capacity to coordinate and manage safety net interventions and systems to ensure sustainability.

69. **The design of the CCT under Component 2 did not take into consideration the scarcity of public services in rural areas.** Component 2 included a CCT in rural areas that sought to generate improved behaviors in two key areas: nutrition in the early years, and school attendance for young girls. Strict conditionalities were included in the design of the program, which required frequent access to school or health facilities by beneficiaries, and where beneficiaries would be quickly removed from the program if they failed to comply with conditions. In addition, beneficiaries were divided into three different groups, where the first group was the control group (no cash transfers), the second group received the equivalent of \$80, and the third group received the equivalent of \$160. This was to test whether different cash transfer amounts had a differentiated impact on behavior over a two-year period. Although this component was designed as a pilot, its design did not take into account the scarcity of public services in rural areas, which would come to present a significant obstacle for beneficiaries to comply with program conditions, precipitating the need for an early project restructuring.

70. **In 2012, the Institut National de la Statistique (the National Statistics Institute, INS) released a new household survey, the Enquête Légère pour l'Évaluation de la Pauvreté (ELEP).** The last household survey had been released in 2007. The Project's design and roll-out benefitted from the most recent data in the ELEP 2012, which was used to define the Project's geographic targeting strategy, and to determine the cash transfer amounts.

71. **The Project's institutional arrangements warranted special consideration and the Implementation Agency's capacity risk was rated high, but project design could have been less complex to mitigate this risk.** The CFS was established in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) under the Permanent Secretariat for the PRSP. Implementation arrangements relied, to the extent possible, on institutions that had proven capacity to deliver quick results on the ground. The CFS was to be provided technical support for implementation of LIPW activities under Component 1 by the Project Coordination Unit of the PCU/PDU3 Project. To ensure smooth implementation of the CT pilot, UNICEF would be contracted to carry out all related activities under Component 2, working closely with the relevant national ministries and helping build government capacity. Local communities would be involved in beneficiary and micro-project selection, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of LIPW projects. Nevertheless, even these efforts to strengthen institutional capacity for project implementation underestimated the logistical challenges to coordinating and overseeing such a complex project with a large geographical scope (notably all of Guinea's seven regions) and poor access to specific project sites.

72. **The PDO was output-focused more so than outcome-focused, which was appropriate given the context.** As the first SP Project of its kind in the country, building SP systems was crucial to project success through the development of targeting, payment, and monitoring mechanisms, and would create discourse around SP interventions at the national level. At the same time, the Project provided LIPW opportunities and cash transfers to address the pressing problems of unemployment, malnutrition, and low school attendance.



B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

73. **The SDR 16.2 million (US\$25.0 million equivalent) IDA Grant for the Productive Safety Net Project was approved by the World Bank's Board of Directors on June 19, 2012, signed on July 19, 2012, and became effective on February 14, 2013.** Throughout implementation, the Project was affected by institutional restructurings, and shifting priorities resulting from the Ebola Virus Disease starting in 2014. Except for the very beginning when the Project faced delays, its Development Objectives and Implementation Performance ratings in ISRs were either Moderately Satisfactory or Satisfactory.

74. **Project implementation was off to a slow start following an eight-month delay in Grant effectiveness.** This was mostly the result of difficulties in contracting consultants for key positions within the CFS. By October 2013 several bottlenecks had been identified, both institutional and technical. Key among them was the dissolution of the PIU of the Urban Development Project (PCU/PDU3) in June 2013, responsible for the Project's LIPW implementation. These bottlenecks were addressed in the June 2014 restructuring resulting in marked improvements.

75. **Implementation of LIPW and the CT program were more challenging than previously expected.** The geographical targeting strategy, which focused on the poorest communities based on the most recent poverty data, underestimated the logistical challenges involved with conducting frequent supervision missions and the delivery of cash in hand to those in distant, hard-to-reach areas. The CFS therefore relied heavily on local authorities and community agents to carry out implementation and supervision in hard to reach communities. This reduced costs for the CFS and streamlined the procurement process but weakened monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

76. **The EVD outbreak in 2014 had a devastating impact on Guinea's economic growth, lives, and livelihoods, complicating implementation in an already difficult environment.** By end-2015, Guinea had an estimated 3,800 cases of Ebola and a related death toll of about 2,500 persons. Over 5,000 children were orphaned. Welfare levels based on asset ownership deteriorated, particularly for rural households, consistent with pronounced income decline of more than 30 percent for rural households.¹⁴ Women were significantly impacted in areas affected by Ebola, and food consumption declined. In parallel, urban unemployment reached 18 percent in severely affected areas at the end of 2015, and close to 10 percent of households withdrew their children from school, with the large majority citing Ebola as the main factor. Schools closed for almost a year and health facilities became overwhelmed, thereby reducing access to basic services: hospital consultations decreased in half, vaccination coverage decreased, and almost 100 health centers and rural hospitals closed by end-2014. Directly affected households reportedly experienced trauma, discrimination, stigma, loss of food security, and livelihood. The crisis put additional stress on the already strained traditional coping mechanisms and family support systems and made it nearly impossible for CCT beneficiaries to meet program conditions.

77. **The Project's institutional arrangements were subject to continuous changes.** The CFS was initially anchored under the Permanent Secretariat for the PRSP in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the then Governor of the World Bank. Following a government reshuffle in 2016, the Secretariat for the PRSP was transferred to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MIPC), and with it the CFS. The MIPC issued a decree in March 2017 revising the composition of the Steering Committee for the Project, and the respective reporting arrangements. The CFS stayed with the MIPC until January 2019, when it was officially moved to the Prime Minister's office, under the newly created ANIES,

¹⁴ Source: A mobile phone survey conducted in September 2015 based on interviews with close to 2,500 households across Guinea.



following a Presidential decree. Implementation arrangements for specific components and activities also faced important changes. For Component 1, the closure of the PCU/PDU3 unit put all implementation responsibility for LIPW on the CFS. Likewise, the Government decided to implement Component 2, rather than sub-contract the activity to UNICEF, with support from its focal points in other ministries, notably those of the MASPFE, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Plan, and Ministry of Territorial Administration. Full details of the Project's institutional arrangements are included in Annex 6E.

78. **The design of the cash transfer program was adjusted several times.** Strict conditions, coupled with scarce and unreliable service delivery, made it challenging for beneficiaries to meet program conditions. Furthermore, reliance on public services like health centers and schools to verify conditions was challenging and unreliable. Health agents were to record anthropometric measures of child beneficiaries at every cash transfer and school officials were to verify school attendance. In Guinea, health agents are often unpaid or underpaid and challenges related to mobilizing them and their measurement instruments to visit all child beneficiaries of the cash transfer program were under-estimated. As noted earlier (para. 22), the CFS modified the pilot CCT (Component 2) in the 2014 restructurings to include all children under age 14, not just girls, loosened program conditions for the nutrition program, and added the WFP-implemented school feeding program (Annex 6E). After the pilot's completion, program conditions were eliminated entirely in 2016 in favor of soft conditions, which included attending accompanying measures sessions, enrolling children in school, and taking children to a medical center for a general checkup.

79. **The depreciation of the SDR/US\$ exchange rate reduced the scale of activities that the Project could support.** As of March 2017, the project envelope had been reduced by more than US\$3.25 million due to currency fluctuations. This limited the scope of the Project and created a risk of it not achieving originally established indicator targets. Indicator targets were adjusted to reflect this in the 2017 restructuring.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

80. **The Project's RF was complex, mirroring its design.** This was especially true for a new operation in a new sector, in a context of low institutional capacity and fragility. The wording of the PDO was somewhat ambiguous, especially with respect to its second objective: to lay the foundations of a social safety net strategy by testing some of the building blocks necessary for a larger system. It may be that the preparation team intended that this second objective be related exclusively to the process of testing the activities, that is the LIPW and cash transfer pilots, or it may be that this was a rather weak way of measuring progress towards institutional development and strengthening for putting in place a safety net system. This ambiguity was all the more challenging since only one of the eight PDO indicators in the Project's RF could be interpreted to measure progress towards this objective: "Findings from the impact evaluation of the pilots are discussed and incorporated in the social safety net strategy", but the Project supported only institutional capacity building to support the development of that strategy (under Component 3). The "testing" of these "building blocks" was to rely firmly on a robust evaluation of the CCT that was planned to eventually inform the eventual establishment of



Guinea's safety net system. As noted earlier, the design of the CCT and the evaluation were extremely complex and particularly in the Guinean context.

81. **There was also ambiguity in the RF, as originally designed.** Though the indicators had clear frequency and baseline values, at times data sources were unclear as were the definitions of what the indicators were specifically measuring and the targets they tried to achieve. Some indicators proved impossible to measure, especially those that targeted a specific number of works to be completed under the LIPW program since the specific composition of works was only to become known during implementation. Some indicators were also inconsistent, for example, an original PDO indicator measuring unconditional cash transfer beneficiaries despite the program being conditional, but then including three IO indicators that measured compliance with conditionalities (education and nutrition requirements).

82. **Institutional capacity for M&E was not adequately addressed at the design stage.** The CFS, a new and inexperienced unit, was to be responsible for monitoring and evaluation of a project with a complex design, including the Project's planned impact evaluation, with the support of a contracted M&E Specialist. There was limited consideration for the geographical and logistical challenges involved in supervision and M&E at the design stage, especially considering the large number of beneficiaries dispersed across a wide geographic area, notably all 7 regions of Guinea. The planned M&E methods and tools were: (a) the MIS; (b) surveys that would be conducted through short questionnaires; and (c) supervision visits to the intervention sites.

M&E Implementation

83. **Indicators changed many times during implementation, making it difficult to track progress towards indicator targets throughout implementation.** These adjustments, which were minor in some cases, addressed inconsistencies in the original RF (e.g., conditional vs. unconditional cash transfers, number of roads rehabilitated, etc.), included new indicators to more adequately measure progress towards the PDO's second objective (e.g. mechanisms related to progress with payment systems, beneficiary registration, the Management Information System, etc.), reflected new activities related to the Ebola crisis, and adjusted targets to reflect implementation experience, additional financing, and the longer implementation period. This, combined with the Project's complexity may have contributed to the difficulties that the CFS had with M&E, which resulted in fluctuations in reporting of actual progress in ISRs over the Project's implementation. Nevertheless, the multiple restructurings to the RF (Annex 6B) make constructing a longitudinal series almost impossible over the entire implementation period, possibly with the exception of the more basic indicators such as the number of beneficiaries.

84. **There was regular updating of the Project's RF, but with notable limitations.** Regular data collection and reporting was based on implementation support and monitoring trips by the CFS' M&E Specialist to the regions, which were exceedingly difficult as a result of logistical considerations and in particular during the Ebola crisis. Since indicator definitions were unclear, reported achievements or results provided by CFS fluctuated between ISRs, as noted in the final ISR. Throughout implementation, there were concerns regarding the capacity to monitor activities satisfactorily, partly due to inexperience, logistical challenges, and overly ambitious activities and measures. The World Bank conducted monitoring at the local level through field missions, during which beneficiaries provided qualitative feedback. The MIS, developed with project support, was a key source of data, though the quality of information and data was not always reliable.



85. **An innovation in M&E implementation was the use of “pair-educateurs”, young university graduates selected on the basis of their language and hometown, that assisted with monitoring and supervision of activities at the local level.** These “pair-educateurs” participated in an accelerated course on the Project and monitoring processes and resided within beneficiary communities to support and supervise activities, oversee accompanying measures and trainings, and flag incidents.

86. **The impact evaluation carried out between 2016 and 2018 to test the impact of the CCT on nutrition and education outcomes fell short of expectations.** The baseline study was successfully carried out, but, due to technical shortcomings, the consultancy firm contracted to carry out the end line study was unable to collect sufficient, reliable data with which to conduct robust analyses. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions were drawn and are included in Annex 4 of this report, as are the findings of an ICR mission that visited two beneficiary communities to collect qualitative data on beneficiary satisfaction.

M&E Utilization

87. **The various issues with respect to M&E design and implementation described above limited the utilization of data to monitor the Project’s progress and evaluate its outcomes.** Still, lessons of early experience fed into subsequent adjustments to indicators and to the Project’s design. Implementation of LIPW in rural locations benefitted greatly from the emerging lessons of earlier implementation experiences in Conakry and those highlighted during the Project’s Mid-Term Review. Also, the CCT pilot was modified to finance unconditional cash transfers rather than conditional ones, due to its complex design comprising different cash transfer amounts, and strict conditions that were extremely challenging for beneficiaries to meet.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

88. **The overall rating for quality of M&E is Modest.** This is primarily due to issues with the Project’s initial RF, exacerbated by the multiple efforts to adjust it during various restructurings to indicators and targets, and with issues in the impact evaluation.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

89. **Environmental and social safeguards.** The Project was categorized under environmental classification B given that the proposed public works activities were low-scale and localized. Relevant environmental and social safeguard policies were triggered at appraisal and no waivers of the World Bank’s safeguards policies were required. An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared and disclosed in country and at the Info shop on April 9, 2012 and April 30, 2012, respectively. The CFS used screening procedures contained in the ESMF to identify, assess, evaluate, mitigate, and monitor the impact of the LIPW sub-projects on the environment. These assessments involved consultations with key stakeholders and informed the design of specific Resettlement Action Plans (RAP) and Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMP) when necessary. Once the action plans were drafted, public consultations were held, and community systems to handle grievances were established. All key stakeholders were sensitized and trained on the mitigation measures. Further details are provided in Annex 6E.



90. **The Project was a good example of a social safety net project in terms of design, implementation, monitoring, and reporting of site-specific environmental management plans.** Commendable efforts were made to achieve the goals of implementing environmental and social safeguards, such as: (i) training 22 prefectural Directors for Environment, Water and Forests in screening methods, conducting public consultations, and environmental and social supervision and monitoring; (ii) training more than 372 committee members (Village Sanitation Committee, Village Environment Committee, and Complaints Committee) and 273 NGO members on ESMP implementation; (iii) 392 ESMPs for LIPW activities and 349 ESMPs for economic group activities were prepared and their implementation supervised; and (iv) a protocol for collaboration was signed and effectively implemented between the Guinean Environmental Assessment Office (BGEEE) and the Project to facilitate monitoring of the implementation of environmental safeguards activities.

91. **The World Bank provided regular supervision of compliance with the applicable safeguards policies and the Government produced a safeguards closure report.** The report outlined challenges faced during implementation, particularly on social safeguards issues, including: (i) the availability of the project resources for the implementation of the safeguards activities; and (ii) the low capacity of the National Development Budget in supporting local authorities. The Project's lessons provided important lessons in the development of safeguards instruments for a follow-on safety nets operation.

92. **Fiduciary.** The CFS hired a fiduciary team including a financial management specialist, an accountant, and a procurement specialist, and initially relied heavily on the technical support and experiences of the experienced PDU3 to implement LIPW. Financial Management Reports noted some of the following issues: (i) missing receipts for over \$210,000 worth of advances made in the two preceding years relating to micro-project procurement of equipment; (ii) irregular requests for fund withdrawals; and (iii) the limited the scope of internal audits, creating the risk of loss of internal auditor independence.

93. **The CFS set up adequate mechanisms to verify payments to beneficiaries and manage complaints.** Verification was done by providing beneficiaries with Identification cards with a Quick Response (QR) code to be scanned by payment agencies on site. Though the card system decreased the risk of human error, it was still vulnerable to theft and misuse. The Project experienced corruption complaints in two intervention zones, thereafter cancelling all activities in these areas completely to discourage further corruption in other zones. Finally, to ensure appropriate ownership of beneficiary information, the custody and security of the beneficiary data collected as part of the Project was retained by the CFS and is subject to local data protection law. A Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) was also put in place to record grievances by beneficiaries (or non-beneficiaries) on possible omissions, exclusions, controversies and misperceptions affecting the rationale, approaches and implementation of the Project. The GRM was based on a punctual recording of grievances in the system and the step-by-step follow up of cases towards their solution¹⁵.

94. **Throughout implementation, FM performance was rated as Satisfactory and Procurement performance was rated as Moderately Satisfactory, except in the initial period due to the effectiveness delay.** Given the volatility of the exchange rate, the fiduciary risk rating was increased from Moderate to High. No waivers were required of the World Bank's fiduciary policies, no ineligible expenditures were presented, interim unaudited financial reports were presented in a timely fashion and the final annual audit report for the period ended January 31, 2020 provided an unqualified/clean opinion, with few issues highlighted in the management letters.

¹⁵ It is unclear how many complaints were received, however all complaints were addressed per the ISR.



C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

95. **Quality at Entry is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.** Although project design incorporated lessons learned from various contexts, it was far too complex both because of its multiple components and activities, its broad geographical scope, its ambition to implement all activities concurrently, and Guinea's weak institutional environment. The first restructuring happened early on in an effort to address some of the early implementation challenges that became quickly apparent. The 2014 restructuring was precipitated by escalating immediate needs and rapidly changing dynamics on the ground following the Ebola Disease Crisis. While not directly attributable to preparation quality *per se*, this restructuring reflected, in retrospect, the Project's need for design and implementation flexibility in a country with high poverty and vulnerability and weak institutional capacity. At appraisal, the World Bank's team failed to recognize the capacity needs to manage such an ambitious and geographically-dispersed program early on, with the result that it is hard to judge whether the Project's results reflect a consistent reality.

96. **The RF was complex and inconsistent and the PDO was ambiguous.** The second part of the PDO, concerning the support to establishing the building blocks of a SP strategy, was not clear, nor were the supporting activities described in the component descriptions. Was the objective to test different SP instruments to build a strategy or was the objective to put in place instruments to develop a social protection policy? The fact that the only PDO indicator that referred to this objective was itself ambiguous did little to clarify the meaning of the PDO. The project team appeared to acknowledge the need to develop social protection at the institutional level, but it was incorrectly worded in the PAD as it should have referred to laying the foundations of social safety net systems, rather than a strategy. Since the Government did not have a social protection agenda, a PDO focusing on establishing the building blocks of SP systems was an appropriate objective and developing a strategy would have been one of the building blocks. Further, the RF contained several indicators that were not appropriate, and some of the targets were questionable (Annex 4).

97. **The cash transfer was not designed in accordance with best practices nor with consideration of the local context.** Conditions required that children's anthropometric measures improve upon the 3rd cash transfer and that school-aged children demonstrate that no school was missed without extenuating circumstances. Many medical conditions may prevent stunted or underweight children from recording consistent anthropometric improvements (disease, parasitic infections, etc), while school attendance may be affected by external circumstances such as dangerous school routes, bullying, and inconstant teacher presence in schools. Although the CCT was a pilot, its design was not consistent with the Guinean context nor did it offer any possibility for a sustainable program design.

Quality of Supervision

98. **The Quality of the World Bank's Supervision was Moderately Satisfactory.** As in many low-capacity and fragile countries, the task team's approach to implementation support was based on a variety of different sources and approaches. The task team carried out 17 missions and met with the CFS on a weekly basis with conference and telephone calls, and exchanges of correspondence. Environmental and social safeguards specialists were regularly deployed in the field and, because of their intense supervision and full compliance with the ESMF and resettlement



guidelines, the CFS redesigned and in some cases suspended its activities in contested areas of environmental fragility such as agricultural land reclaimed from river-bed or intermediate and final waste disposal collected under LIPW.

99. **The World Bank's implementation support suffered from the discontinuity in task management.** Task Team Leaders (TTLs) changed five times from project preparation to completion. This discontinuity complicated effective implementation support and is somewhat reflected in the RF that, as mentioned below, was subject to introductions and deletions of similar indicators, with previous TTLs often noting that they had been unsatisfied with the indicators and sought to adjust them to better reflect the Project's achievements as they saw them. The indicators in the RF were never fully defined in the PAD to avoid ambiguity, and each TTL's subjective interpretation of the indicators, which in turn was interpreted by the PIU, resulted in widely oscillating fluctuations of results reported throughout in the Project's ISRs.

100. **However, the several AFs and restructurings highlight a strong point in supervision, which was the Task Team's agility in responding to an unforeseen crisis that would otherwise have jeopardized any of the project's achievements.** The 2014 AF/restructuring was well prepared and responded to the country's urgent needs during the Ebola Crisis. In part because of this, the team's hastiness resulted in subsequent restructurings that seemed at times to duplicate earlier adjustments (e.g., the 2014 AF repeated analysis and recommendations of the earlier 2014 restructuring). Also, because of the approach of making immediate funding available through a reallocation, this began a process of multiple adjustments to the Project's RF. It remains unclear whether the Project Paper dated June 30, 2014, for co-financing in the amount of US\$2 million refers to the same external finance as the AF in the amount US\$1.865 million approved under the later Project Paper dated October 2014. Finally, changes like the transition from conditional to unconditional transfers, helped to simplify implementation.

101. **Cognizant of the complexity, visibility and growing importance of the Project, the task team tried to hire a specialist to be based in Conakry to support implementation.** Such efforts initiated in late 2015 but materialized only at the end of 2017 with the hire of a specialist based in Conakry that remained for almost a year. The consultant was immediately deployed for the Country Partnership Framework field mission in five of Guinea's seven regions and later did four additional field visits. The consultant provided daily support to project implementation, attended donor and government meetings on SP policies and projects, supported World Bank missions, and prepared notes and updates.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

102. **The Overall Rating of World Bank Performance is Moderately Satisfactory.** Quality at Entry is considered MU because of the Project's extremely complex design which was inadequate for the Guinean context, and an inconsistent RF. During implementation, the team rectified the issues at entry, and were agile in dealing with external shocks and changing institutional arrangements. In spite of shortcomings with M&E, the team provided close support to implementation that allowed the project to achieve its objectives and a Substantial Efficacy rating. In accordance with ICR Guidelines, when Bank Performance has one rating in the satisfactory range and another in the unsatisfactory range, the Overall rating of World Bank Performance depends on the outcome rating. Despite the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Quality at Entry, the World Bank's Moderately Satisfactory rating for Supervision was able to affect the Project's Moderately Satisfactory Outcome.



D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

103. **The Risk to Development Outcome is Modest.** Main risks would include: (i) possible lack of Government commitment to SP; (ii) lack of availability of financing for SP, given the Government's difficult macroeconomic situation; and (iii) the risk of possible loss of experience gained under the Project

104. **The Government's commitment to preserving and extending the Project's outcomes is supported by the national policy framework and political momentum that serve as a foundation of a national safety nets system that will continue supporting the delivery of future SP programs.** The Government has demonstrated its commitment to social protection as an important part of its strategy to fight poverty and promote resilience. Its National Policy on Social Protection, approved in 2017 with Project support, and its creation of ANIES under the Office of the Prime Minister, is definitive evidence of Guinea's ownership of its social protection agenda. The Government has moved quickly towards the pre-identification of project beneficiaries and the development of its secure beneficiary database under ANIES, with the objective to extend safety nets coverage to the bottom 40 percent of the population in the form of cash transfers, LIPW, and productive inclusion activities. The Government has also backed this commitment with some limited funding from the national budget to support ANIES activities. During 2018 and 2019, the Bank team was also involved in policy dialogue with the Government and the IMF that included SP policies and targets as part of budget support.

105. **Efforts to maintain and expand SP initiatives would depend heavily on the availability of financing from donors as even in the best of macroeconomic scenarios, the Government is not in a position to scale up safety nets significantly without continued external assistance.** This risk is mitigated as the Government is committed to working with the World Bank to continue counting upon the financial and technical assistance needed to build its institutional capacity and help deliver safety net assistance. The proposed US\$70 million IDA Credit would support a new pipeline project, the Nafa Program Support Project. The proposed project will aim to build upon the Project's experience by scaling-up cash transfers, public works, and productive inclusion activities while continuing to strengthen institutional capacity to implement the program satisfactorily and make further progress on the Government's safety nets agenda.

106. **This risk of possible loss of experience and knowledge gained from the Project's implementation is mitigated by the CFS being absorbed by ANIES in January 2019, in which some of the field staff has been retained.** While many staff of the central CFS are no longer involved, ANIES has new staff who show promising initiative, but with limited experience in the implementation of safety nets. It is clear now that the Project could have included activities geared towards promoting greater continuity in institutional responsibilities, even when the formal institutional structure had not yet been established. As described above, to mitigate this risk, the proposed Nafa Program Support Project incorporates the lessons of this Project's experience and envisages a strong program of institutional capacity building.

107. **The risk that the public works programs financed by the Project will have sustainable results is mitigated by the high ownership of the subprojects by the communities, as the communities themselves chose which public works activities to carry out as a priority.** The ICR mission found that community members organized themselves and maintained community assets, such as the equipment purchased during the public works subprojects, in their neighborhood after closure of the public works activities.



V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

108. **Task teams working in institutionally weak environments, with government teams who have little if any experience with the implementation of World Bank projects, should strive to maintain project design simple, both programmatically and geographically, and to maintain a level of operational flexibility that would allow the Government to face contextual challenges accordingly.** Activities should consider operational constraints and, perhaps more importantly, constraints faced by the program's intended beneficiaries, for example those pertaining to the CCT pilot. As described throughout this report, the Project faced numerous challenges in view of the weak institutional capacity for implementing and monitoring a complex project. The Task Team demonstrated needed flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances but could have been more proactive in addressing issues in M&E that resulted from the complexity of programs and lack of clarity in the indicators.

109. **Projects that support both the development and implementation of new systems and programs in low capacity settings should consider phasing activities to ensure smooth implementation.** The Project helped develop systems (e.g., targeting, payments, GRM) while at the same time to implement new programs (LIPW and CT) that relied on those systems to function. It did so with intensive implementation support and TA by the World Bank, both from Headquarters and in the field. In retrospect, in low capacity environments, it would have been preferable to phase project activities, with the basic systems developed during a first year, and then phasing either by geographic area or program, or both, for implementing the programs targeted to beneficiaries. Implementation support on the ground is also important to ensure smooth implementation, especially during roll-out of programs.

110. **Institutional arrangements and their sustainability require careful consideration, especially when institutional capacity building is intended.** In the absence of an appropriated unit to coordinate the Government's safety net and the Project's implementation, the CFS was established. Initially designed to be supported by the PIU of the PCU/PDU3 and UNICEF, the CFS benefitted more from capacity-building than the MASPFE. This arrangement faced two issues. The CFS' reliance on a well-performing PIU of another World Bank-financed project was a good solution, but that unit was dissolved when the PCU/PDU3 was completed, leaving the Project without the support it needed. This should have been contemplated and addressed before hand. Also, the CFS was dissolved upon project completion on September 30, 2019, before the follow-on project was approved. The institutional arrangements for that project will incorporate very few of the Project's staff, with the result that some of the experience of and lessons learned by CFS' staff has been lost. When projects support institutional capacity building, especially where supporting newly established units, sustainability plans and transition strategies should be put in place to ensure that knowledge is not lost at the end of each operation. The success of the newly planned operation should leverage the institutional and implementation achievements of the Project.

111. **In complex settings, or in an environment in which implementation issues surface, it is ever so important to maintain consistency among task management teams.** This is required to avoid misunderstandings and constant modifications to a project, which can lead to confusion for the Government. Continuity of presence on the ground is also imperative. The task team correctly identified the need for boots on the ground, particularly after travel limitations imposed during Ebola and spontaneous episodes of violent conflict consequently reduced supervision opportunities. If there are difficulties in traveling leading to reduced supervision, by the task team or the implementing agency or both, projects should explore third party supervision.



ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: Four key building blocks of a safety nets system are tested

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Four key building blocks of the safety nets system are tested	Yes/No	N 09-May-2016	Y 09-May-2016		Y 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

The four key building blocks are individually tracked through Intermediary target indicators:

1. System based mechanisms for beneficiary identification are tested



2. Certified payment mechanisms are tested

3. A management information system is tested

4. An electronic beneficiary identification system is tested

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of complaints registered in the grievance redress system that have been addressed in line with established procedures	Percentage	0.00 14-Oct-2017	95.00 14-Oct-2017		100.00 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

While the CFS reported that 100% of complaints were addressed, the number of complaints received is unknown.



Objective/Outcome: Beneficiaries of accompanying measures (including sensitization campaigns)

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Social assistance beneficiaries receiving nutrition/parenting/early learning/stimulation education	Number	0.00 14-Oct-2017	10000.00 14-Oct-2017		25200.00 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

The target was surpassed. This indicator appeared to exclude beneficiaries of other accompanying measures, such as those focused on productive or financial inclusion.

Objective/Outcome: Beneficiaries of safety nets

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs	Number	300000.00 14-Oct-2017	503808.00 14-Oct-2017		505530.00 30-Sep-2019
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs - Female	Number	19741.00	25000.00		41528.00

Comments (achievements against targets):



Beneficiaries of social safety nets programs was calculated using the number of direct beneficiaries for all programs, multiplied by the average HH size in Guinea (6): LIPW (366,672), CCTs (10,932), unconditional CTs (41,586), school feeding programs (49,590), one-shot cash transfers for those in the control group of the CCT pilot who received cash at the end of the pilot (10,182), and economic activity groups (26,568). Following this methodology, the actual at completion was adjusted from that which was reported in the last ISR.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Proportion of poor households among safety nets beneficiaries	Percentage	70.00 09-May-2016	80.00 09-May-2016		82.00 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

This indicator sought to test the validity of the PMT formula through community-based targeting. The precise methodology for calculating this indicator is unknown.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of households benefiting from cash transfers and LIPW	Number	74020.00 14-Oct-2017	83968.00 14-Oct-2017		75338.00 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):



Results were calculated by adding all beneficiaries of CCTs (6181), unconditional cash transfers (6976), beneficiaries of public works (61,112) and recipients of the matching grants (4428). However, the 6181 CCT children come from 1822 households as per the indicator “Beneficiary Households of the CCT” (below), therefore this result should be 75,338 beneficiaries. Based on this calculation, the result has been revised downward from the last ISR.

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Labor intensive public works program with a focus on women and youth, and life skills development

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of Person days of work provided	Number	0.00	2400000.00	1787580.00	1750603.00
		23-May-2012	23-May-2012	09-May-2016	30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

This describes the sum of all days worked by all LIPW beneficiaries.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct beneficiaries of the LIPW activities- number of people	Number	8390.00	35000.00	41118.00	61112.00
		14-Oct-2017	14-Oct-2017		30-Sep-2019



Women benefiting from LIPW	Number	19741.00	25000.00		36668.00
		14-Oct-2017	14-Oct-2017		30-Sep-2019
<p>Comments (achievements against targets): Number of LIPW workers. At first, beneficiaries worked 30 days. This was changed to 60 days in 2016 (source: Additional Financing, 2016), then changed back to 30 days again in 2019. It is unclear how many workers worked 30 days and how many worked 60 days.</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of microprojects transferred to the authorities	Number	0.00	200.00	322.00	408.00
		23-May-2012	23-May-2012	14-Oct-2017	30-Sep-2019
<p>Comments (achievements against targets): Number of microprojects carried out by LIPW workers that were registered with local authorities.</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Wages distributed to workers	Amount(USD)	0.00	7602272.00	7240070.00	9334672.00
		23-May-2012	23-May-2012	09-May-2016	30-Sep-2019



Comments (achievements against targets):

The beneficiaries of urban LIPW received GNF 35,000 until 2016, after which it was decreased to GNF 30,000 to reflect the lower cost of living in rural areas. It was maintained at GNF 30,000 during subsequent urban LIPW in 2019. It is not clear how many beneficiaries received GNF 30,000 and how many received GNF 35,000.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Drainage cleaned	Kilometers	0.00	0.00	425.00	715.00
		23-May-2012	23-May-2012	14-Oct-2017	30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

This indicator was originally to be measured in meters. In the last revision, the measurement unit was changed to kilometers.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Roads rehabilitated	Kilometers	87.00	136.00	137.00	655.00
		09-May-2016	09-May-2016	14-Oct-2017	30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):



This indicator was surpassed. It is unclear if the unit of measurement was inadvertently changed, given significant discrepancies in results reported in the 2016 and 2017 restructurings.

Component: Pilot transfer programs to protect human capital

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Beneficiary households of the CCT	Number	0.00	95.00	9000.00	1822.00
		23-May-2012	23-May-2012	09-May-2016	30-Sep-2019
Children benefiting from the CCT	Number	27890.00	12000.00		6181.00

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator originally read: "Registered CT households who are receiving the CT (%)". The indicator was reformulated to its current version on June 30, 2014, with a target of 4,000 households reflecting a new unit of measurement. The target was increased in May 2016.



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
CCT Beneficiaries complying with conditions	Percentage	0.00	95.00	90.00	69.00
		23-May-2012	23-May-2012	30-Jun-2014	30-Sep-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures the number of children who attended school and visited health centers for regular check-ups.					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Amount transfered through the cash transfers under component 2	Amount(USD)	1500000.00	5000000.00		4379168.00
		09-May-2016	09-May-2016		30-Sep-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures the amount of cash transferred both for CCTs as well as the subsequent unconditional CTs.					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Children benefiting from school	Number	0.00	3254.00	12000.00	8265.00



feeding- number of children		30-Jun-2014	30-Jun-2014	09-May-2016	30-Sep-2019
<p>Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator was originally a PDO indicator but was converted to an IO indicator in 2016. The WFP report on the school-feeding program (Annex 6E) reports 8938 total beneficiaries. It is not known what this discrepancy is due to.</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct beneficiaries of non conditional cash transfers (number of people collecting the grant)- EERTF	Number	0.00 23-May-2012	10000.00 23-May-2012	7000.00 14-Oct-2017	6976.00 30-Sep-2019
<p>Comments (achievements against targets):</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct beneficiaries of the accompanying measures (including financial literacy)- number of people	Number	8390.00 14-Oct-2017	35000.00 14-Oct-2017		38858.00 30-Sep-2019
<p>Comments (achievements against targets):</p>					



This indicator was introduced in October 2017. That Project Paper reports a baseline of 0 for the target, and an actual of 8,390, suggesting that the indicator was already being monitored, however this was the first time it appeared in any official document. The wording of the indicator suggests that it was measuring the number of people who received any kind of accompanying measures through Components 1 and 2, whether human development or productively oriented.

Component: Project management

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
A management information system is tested	Yes/No	N 09-May-2016	Y 09-May-2016		Y 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

This indicator was met. The MIS was used as a beneficiary registry to monitor activities and payments throughout the project's implementation.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
An electronic beneficiary registration system is tested	Yes/No	N 09-May-2016	Y 09-May-2016		Y 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):



The system was used to register beneficiaries of LIPW and cash transfer programs.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
System based mechanisms for beneficiary identification are tested	Yes/No	N 23-May-2012	Y 23-May-2012		Y 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

The CFS provided ID cards with a QR code to beneficiaries.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Certified payment mechanisms are tested	Yes/No	N 09-May-2016	Y 09-May-2016		Y 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

The CFS used two different payment mechanisms—cash in hand through a bank, and digital payments through Orange Money in urban areas.



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Rapid annual beneficiary satisfaction surveys conducted	Yes/No	N 23-May-2012	Y 23-May-2012		Y 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

This indicator was met.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Findings from the impact evaluation of the pilot are discussed and incorporated in the social safety nets strategy	Yes/No	N 23-May-2012	Y 23-May-2012		Y 30-Sep-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

The pilot found that CCTs were too complex given the lack of availability of services and was also extremely challenging to monitor. Conditionalities were dropped in favor of soft conditions after the completion of the pilot in 2017.

Indicator Name	Unit of	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at
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	Measure			Target	Completion
Operating ratio	Percentage	0.00	20.00	18.00	18.00
		30-Jul-2014	30-Jul-2014		30-Sep-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): The operating ratio targets were met.					



B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Provide income support to vulnerable groups	
Outcome indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Proportion of beneficiaries targeted who are poor (%) 2. Beneficiaries of social safety net programs (number) 3. Beneficiaries of social safety net programs - Female (number) 4. Number of households benefiting from cash transfers and LIPW (number) 5. Social assistance beneficiaries receiving nutrition/parenting/early learning/stimulation education (number)
Intermediate indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Direct Beneficiaries of the LIPW activities (number) 2. Women benefitting from LIPW (number) 3. Person days of work provided (number) 4. Direct beneficiaries of non-conditional cash transfers (number) 5. Wages distributed to workers (USD) 6. Children benefitting from conditional cash transfers 7. Number of microprojects transferred to the authorities (number) 8. Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs – School Feeding Programs (number) 9. Drainage cleaned (Kilometers) 10. Roads rehabilitated (Kilometers) 11. Amount transferred through the cash transfers under Component 2 (Amount US\$) 12. Direct beneficiaries of the LIPW activities (number) 13. Beneficiary households of the CCT (number) 14. CCT Beneficiaries respecting the conditionalities (%)
Key outputs by component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cash transferred to public works and cash transfer beneficiaries 2. Accompanying measures 3. Community infrastructure (road, drainage, public facilities, etc.) rehabilitated or maintained



Lay the foundations of a social safety net strategy by testing some of the building blocks necessary for a larger system.	
Outcome indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Four key blocks of a safety nets system are tested (YES/NO)2. Percentage of complaints registered in the grievance redress system that have been addressed in line with established procedures (%)
Intermediate indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Findings from the impact evaluation of the pilots are discussed and incorporated in the social safety net strategy (YES/NO)2. Operating Ratio (%)3. Rapid annual beneficiary satisfaction surveys conducted (YES/NO)4. System-based mechanisms for beneficiary identification are tested (YES/NO)5. System-based mechanisms for beneficiary identification are tested (YES/NO)6. A Management Information System is tested (YES/NO)
Key outputs by component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. National Social Protection Policy2. MIS system3. Payment system4. Targeting tool for beneficiary identification5. GRM



ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name	Role
Preparation	
Azedine Ouerghi, Fanta Toure	Task Team Leader(s)
Alpha Mamadou Bah	Procurement Specialist
Celestin Niamien	Financial Management Specialist
Yacouba Konate	Social Specialist
Africa Eshogba Olojoba	Environmental Specialist
Anthony Molle	Counsel
Wolfgang M. T. Chadab	Team Member
Damien B. C. M. de Walque	Team Member
Meera Shekar	Team Member
Anna Victoria Gyllerup	Team Member
Thierno Hamidou Diallo	Team Member
Mamadou Saliou Diallo	Team Member
Salimatou Drame Bah	Team Member
Josiane M.S. Luchmun	Team Member
Supervision/ICR	
Claudia Zambra Taibo, Giuseppe Zampaglione	Task Team Leader(s)
Alpha Mamoudou Bah, Prosper Nindorera	Procurement Specialist(s)
Jean Charles Amon Kra	Financial Management Specialist
Bolong Landing Soko	Social Specialist
Damien B. C. M. de Walque	Team Member
Kadidiatou Bah	Team Member
Thierno Hamidou Diallo	Team Member
Mamady Kobele Keita	Environmental Specialist
Aissatou Seck	Counsel
Nono Akpedje Ayivi Guedehoussou	Team Member



Lydie Anne Billey

Team Member

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		
FY11	9.850	101,499.21
FY12	29.118	154,046.69
FY13	24.065	80,839.20
FY14	0	0.00
Total	63.03	336,385.10
Supervision/ICR		
FY12	0	21,624.81
FY13	.150	55,011.35
FY14	24.522	139,479.42
FY15	24.629	208,160.06
FY16	10.462	121,160.86
FY17	22.850	154,014.49
FY18	10.651	90,316.58
FY19	24.089	164,839.22
FY20	4.635	56,962.52
Total	121.99	1,011,569.31

**ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT**

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
Labor intensive public works program with a focus on women and youth, and life skills development	14.50	20.5	141
Pilot transfer programs to protect human capital	4.50	9.5	211
Project management	4.00	7.32	183
Response to the Ebola Epidemic	0.00	7.865	
Total	25.00	45.185	181



ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

1. At appraisal, the Guinea Social Safety Nets Project sought to: (i) provide income support to vulnerable groups, and (ii) lay the foundations of a social safety net strategy by testing some of the building blocks for a SP strategy. The Project had three components: (i) Labor intensive public works program in urban areas with a focus on youth and life skills development (US\$16.5 million); (ii) Pilot cash transfer program to protect human capital (US\$4.5 million); and (iii) Project coordination and institutional capacity building (US\$4.0 million).
2. In this annex, the efficiency analysis builds on the economic analysis in the PAD by assessing the cost effectiveness of the LIPW with a similar methodology for the sake of comparison, as well as comparisons across other countries. There are questions about how the analysis was prepared at appraisal, however, given inconsistencies in the calculation of targets in the RF. Challenges with M&E throughout the program, as explained in the ICR, cast some doubts on the results of the cost benefit analysis in this ICR, particularly as it pertains to the LIPW program. This is mostly due to varying targets and actuals reported, changes throughout project implementation in the number of days worked under the program (30 to 60 to 30 again), and limited access to disaggregated costs by component. The ICR used data from the RF and consolidated data from Annual Budget Plans, to obtain a sense of the disaggregation of costs within components. For the cash transfer, a similar cost benefit analysis is presented, as well as the results from the impact of the conditional cash transfer program. The efficiency analysis is also based on total disbursement by component at completion (Table 3).
3. At Appraisal, Component 1 was to provide income earning opportunities to 24,000 young people in urban and peri-urban areas of Conakry, the capital. In 2014, transfers were GNF 35000 per day per household, the equivalent to US\$5.00 at the time, for 30 days. The transfer amount was decreased in the first AF in 2016 to GNF 30,000, the equivalent of US\$3.57 at the time, per day per household for 60 days given the reduced cost of living in rural and peri-urban areas. The target number of beneficiaries was also raised to 68,500 after a first AF and restructuring in 2014, then dropped to 41,118 in the 2016 restructuring. The final number of beneficiaries of LIPW was 61,112.
4. Component 2, which comprised a CCT pilot, was expected to reach 12,000 child beneficiaries in rural areas of Guinea, however it only managed to reach 6,181 beneficiaries. During project implementation, there were numerous difficulties for beneficiaries to comply with conditionalities, particularly in areas with limited access to schools and health centers. Households received eight transfers equivalent to US\$25 over 24 months. At the end of the pilot, the program design was changed to an unconditional one. Undisbursed funds were used to provide cash transfers to another 6,976 households in 159 districts. Under the newly designed cash transfer program, households received five transfers over 12 months to allow for consumption smoothing.
5. Component 3 included project management as well as capacity building activities. Although these types of activities (capacity building and training, for example) do not convey immediate direct benefits for the poor, they are public goods that will result in efficiency gains and cost savings in the medium term as the SP system is expanded. Based on the RF, project management costs were around 18 percent of total project costs. Although this appears to be at the upper end of the spectrum, it is still within generally accepted levels to be considered efficient, particularly in a fragile context and considering that it was the first operation of its kind in Guinea. All the delivery systems of the SP system were being developed under the project, concurrently with the other activities. As such, there was a steep learning curve for the Government. These costs also reflect the high cost of doing business in Guinea with its considerable logistical challenges. Due the lack of disaggregated cost data within this component, it is challenging to present a more robust analysis of its efficiency. However, the cost of project management as a percent of total project



costs, including with multiple restructurings and additional financings, suggests that project management was efficient.

Efficiency analysis for the LIPW

6. This section estimates the cost-effectiveness of the LIPW program in Guinea compared to other programs. Using a methodology developed by Ravallion (1999), the cost-effectiveness of the program estimates how much it costs to transfer US\$1 to beneficiaries based on three variables: (i) labor intensity; (ii) targeting performance; and (iii) net wage gain from the program, which are assessed in greater detail below.

1. The analysis suggests that the LIPW component was cost effective compared to earlier and similar programs in the region and the world. At appraisal, it was estimated that it would cost US\$1 for every US\$1 transferred in wage benefits. At completion, the ex-post analysis estimated cost-effectiveness of the public works component at 0.37. This means that it costs US\$1 for every US\$2.87 transferred in wage benefits to the intended recipients. Despite Guinea's high operational costs due to a geographically broad targeting strategy, this estimate also compares favorably to the overall cost effectiveness of similar programs. The cost-effectiveness of the LIPW component is primarily due to the high labor intensity and the targeting efficiency. Project data estimate a labor intensity of 0.60 at completion, implying that 60 percent of program costs went to wage transfers to project beneficiaries. This result is in line with what was assumed at appraisal stage. Targeting efficiency estimated at 82 percent had been possible by combining a PMT-based targeting with community validation. This is in line with evidence from other countries in Africa, e.g., administrative costs for the Jigisemejiri Program in Mali declined from 42 percent to 12 percent between 2014 to 2016 with the increase in the number of beneficiaries (WB, AFD, 2018). The assumptions underlying this analysis are summarized in the subsequent paragraphs and correspond to row 1 in Table 1.

Table 1. Estimated cost-effectiveness and comparison to other programs

	Guinea (Safety Nets)	South Sudan (SNSDP)	Liberia (CfWTEP)	India (NREG)	Ethiopia (PSNP)	Bangladesh (ESG)
Labor Intensity	0.60	0.70	0.68	0.71	0.85	0.65
Targeting Performance	0.82	0.85	0.80	0.70	0.87	0.80
Net Wage Gain	0.85	0.90	0.93	0.50	0.75	0.50
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio	0.37	0.42	0.40	0.24	0.47	0.54
Cost of transfer US\$ 1	2.87	2.36	1.98	4.02	1.80	1.85

2. Labor intensity is the share of wage costs relative to overall program costs. For the LIPW component, the project budget suggests a labor intensity of 0.60, implying that 60 percent of program costs go to wage transfers to project beneficiaries. This is higher than 50 percent and in line with the assumptions at the appraisal stage. Nonetheless, it is slightly below the levels of other similar projects. In Liberia, for example, the Cash for Work and Temporary Employment Project (CfWTEP) had a labor intensity rate of 0.68 and in South Sudan, the Safety Net and Skills Development Project had a ratio of 0.70.

3. Targeting performance is the extent to which the program benefits reach intended beneficiaries (such as the poor) and can be expressed as a ratio of the final beneficiaries that are eligible for the program. A comprehensive strategy combining the use of proxies to assess the poverty status of beneficiaries and community-based verification resulted in a high targeting performance of 0.82, meaning that 82 percent of beneficiaries can be considered as poor. This is in the range of the performance observed in other countries.



4. Net wage gain is the share of the gross wage received by the poor which is a net gain, after considering any foregone income resulting from participating in the program. In the case of Guinea, it can be assumed that the opportunity cost of participating in the program is very low for several reasons. The Project targeted poor and vulnerable households with limited or no income, meaning that they were unlikely to give up much income to participate in the program. Moreover, LIPW activities occurred in their neighborhoods, so transportation costs are negligible. Overall, the net wage gain is estimated at 0.85 (i.e., for each dollar earned, on average 15 cents are lost from foregone potential income generating activities).

5. In addition to providing additional income to households to cover their basic needs for food, school fees, medical expenses, LIPW also improved communities' assets. In Guinea, activities concerned the cleaning and maintenance of roads, as well as forest rehabilitation allowing better access to markets resulting in indirect benefits for other members of the community. Particularly, evidence from other countries in Africa shows a nominal income multiplier effect on target communities ranging from US\$1.34 to US\$2.52 for each US\$1.00 provided to poor families as a monetary transfer. In Guinea, this multiplier is potentially higher since the Project targeted the poorest households who have a higher propensity to consume what they receive in transfers. This multiplier effect applies equally to each dollar equivalent received under the cash transfer program in Component 2.

6. A comparison of estimated costs per output at appraisal and completion presents a varying picture, however. At appraisal, Component 1 was expected to disburse US\$15.5 million to yield 2.4 million person-days worked. At completion, the total cost for LIPW is estimated at US\$17.7 million, generating 1.75 million person-days, excluding around US\$2.8 million for accompanying measures from the total final allocation of US\$20.5 million for Component 1. In other words, the cost for each person-day worked at appraisal was estimated at around US\$6.5 (this includes the cost of materials, etc.), while at completion, the cost appears to be around US\$11.5. This would suggest that the project was significantly less efficient than expected at appraisal. This could be caused by a number of factors, such as inflation or higher cost of materials than expected, limited availability of materials at the local level, higher logistical costs, or incorrect estimates at appraisal. And while the CFS overachieved in its delivery of accompanying measures for these beneficiaries, it is difficult to quantify their impact on beneficiaries' productivity. On the other hand, the cost of providing LIPW to each individual at appraisal, based on the activity budget (US\$15.5 million for Sub-Component 1.1) and the 24,000 target, was around US\$646 (this includes wages, operational costs, materials, etc.). Given the lack of disaggregated component costs, estimates based on Annual Budget Plans suggest that of the final allocation of US\$20.5 million, \$17.5 million were used for the LIPW activities. If so, this would suggest that the Project made significant efficiency gains during implementation, for a final cost per beneficiary of US\$286.

7. It is difficult to explain these variations which are seemingly contradictory. A likely explanation is that errors of calculation made at appraisal, in terms of costs and targets, make it difficult to assess the efficiency of the LIPW program at closing. Difficulties with M&E as suggested in the ICR also make difficult an accurate assessment of efficiency. Nevertheless, some economic benefits can be inferred based on existing knowledge on the benefits of social safety net operations.

Efficiency analysis for cash transfers:

The Project piloted CCTs based on school attendance and regular visits to health facilities for nutrition services and, subsequently, unconditional cash transfers following the Ebola emergency. In terms of cost effectiveness, using a similar methodology as for LIPW, it cost US\$1 to deliver US\$2.56 to beneficiaries. While the cost of delivering transfers was less than that of the transfer itself, this number denotes that the implementation of conditional transfers was challenging, as noted in this ICR. This could be explained by the differentiated cash transfer amounts given to beneficiaries and the need for complex supervision and monitoring of conditions, as well as high fees charged by the payment provider (in the order of 5 percent). CCTs targeted only 6,181 children against a target of 12,000 in the pilot



phase. Once the program was changed to an unconditional one, it provided transfers to 6,976 households affected by the Ebola outbreak. This reallocation allowed the Project to deliver safety nets coverage in a timely manner during a period of crisis, allowing households to smooth their consumption during the crisis and avoid negative risk coping mechanisms such as distress sales of assets, or changing eating patterns. International evidences highlights the importance of acting early in case of shocks as well as the importance of cash transfers to cope with shocks (WB, 2019). A notable finding of the analysis is that contrary to other countries, cash transfers were not more cost effective than public works in Guinea, which further calls into question the reliability of the data.

8. An impact evaluation of the conditional cash transfer was implemented between 2014 and 2018. There were considerable challenges in collecting data for the end line survey, and the quality of end line data rendered much of it unusable for the purposes of robust analysis. This was particularly true for activities that were designed to improve nutrition behaviors and outcomes, since the collection of anthropometric and health center attendance-related indicators was flawed. Based on the data collected, the IE was mostly confined to an analysis of a few indicators that mostly pertained to the education CCT.

9. As noted in the ICR, the CCT followed a “tiered” design to test the outcomes based on different cash amounts. Every household also benefited from accompanying measures focused on behavioral change toward nutrition and children’s education, particularly for girls (in the first phase of the CCT pilot, after which it was opened to boys and girls aged 14 or under). Each treated village was selected randomly, and beneficiaries were assigned to three groups as defined below:

- 25 percent of beneficiaries did not receive a cash transfer
- 50 percent received 70 GNF, about US\$8
- 25 percent received 140 GNF, about US\$16

10. The IE showed that school enrollment and learning outcomes increased everywhere in Guinea. However, school enrollment was higher in treated villages and for families receiving a higher cash transfer as shown in Figure 1 below. The effect is around 11 percentage points of enrollment, from a low basis of around 40 percentage points.

11. In terms of learning outcomes, the results were not significantly different between treated and control villages. However, since the transfer targeted the poorest households, although new cohorts in treated villages and families were more likely to go to school, they reported lower levels of learning than the control group.

12. Concerning health outcomes, the IE was not able to capture an increase in vaccination rates. On the contrary, the data captures a decrease in vaccination rates that can be attributed to the Ebola Outbreak which disrupted health care services through the country (Delamou, Alexandre, et al., 2017).



ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

The CFS did not submit an official ICR to the World Bank before it was dissolved. However, ANIES submitted the following comments:

ANIES was created on January 31, 2019 and was the institutional anchor for the PFSP for the last 8 months of the Project's lifetime. By this time, there were no longer any activities at the PFSP level per se, if only to "expedite current activities" pending project closure, which took place on September 30, 2019.

ANIES has many observations on the "result" of the PFSP. Though the PFSP was a Guinean Government project, it was financed, designed, and implemented under the close supervision of the World Bank. ANIES, which is also a governmental entity, cannot therefore express certain observations in a World Bank document.

Nonetheless, we can share the following observations:

- The decision to earmark nearly 80% of the total financing for LIPW was strategically and economically questionable. The LIPW are, by nature, "corruptogenic" and unlikely to have a significant economic effect on the reduction of poverty. By this logic, certain (very affirmative) passages in the report that describe the supposed impact of the PFSP on the reduction of poverty in Guinea should be reviewed and/or supported by statistical and/or economic proof.
- We are delighted that the World Bank has finally accepted, at the request of ANIES, a paradigm shift, and that the focus of the NAFA project (under preparation) will be substantially placed on cash transfers and productive inclusion activities (pertaining to agriculture, energy and entrepreneurship). LIPWs will be included in the NAFA project, though to a much lesser extent. Recent empirical studies tend to indicate that ANIES' approach is the right one. Researchers from Princeton and Berkeley conducted a study in Kenya and observed that every US dollar given to a poor person in the form of a monetary cash transfer generated 2.7 US dollars for the local economy. It also limited possibilities for corruption and markedly improved living conditions for the beneficiaries.



ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)

A. Efficacy Indicators

PDO Indicator	Baseline	End line	Target	Achieved
Four key blocks of a safety nets system are tested (YES/NO)	NO	YES	YES	
Proportion of beneficiaries targeted who are poor (%)	0	82.00	80.00	
Percentage of complaints registered in the grievance redress system that have been addressed in line with established procedures (%)	0	100.00	95.00	
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs (number)	0	505,530	503,808	
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs - Female (number)	0	41,528	25,000	
Number of households benefiting from cash transfers and LIPW (number)	0	75,338	83,968	
Social assistance beneficiaries receiving nutrition/parenting/early learning/stimulation education (number)	0	25,200	10,000	

Intermediate Indicator	Baseline	End line	Target	Achieved
Direct Beneficiaries of the LIPW activities (number)	0	61,112	41,118	
Women benefitting from LIPW (number)	0	36,668	25,000	
Person days of work provided (number)	0	1,750,603	1,787,580	
Direct beneficiaries of non-conditional cash transfers (number of people collecting the grant)-EERTF (number)	0	6,976	7,000	
Wages distributed to workers (USD)	0	9,334,672	7,240,070	
Children benefitting from conditional cash transfers	0	6,181	12,000	
Number of microprojects transferred to the authorities (number)	0	408	322	
Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs – School Feeding Programs (number)	0	8,265	3,000	
Drainage cleaned (Kilometers)	0	715	425	
Amount transferred through the cash transfers under Component 2 (Amount US\$)	0	4,379,168	5,000,000	
Roads rehabilitated (Kilometers)	0	655	137	
Findings from the impact evaluation of the pilots are discussed and incorporated in the social safety net strategy (YES/NO)	NO	YES	YES	
Beneficiary households of the CCT (number)	0	1,822	9,000	
CCT Beneficiaries respecting the conditionalities (%)	0	69.00	90.00	



Operating Ratio (%)	25.00	18.00	18.00	
Rapid annual beneficiary satisfaction surveys conducted (YES/NO)	NO	YES	YES	
System-based mechanisms for beneficiary identification are tested (YES/NO)	NO	YES	YES	
Certified payment mechanisms are tested are tested (YES/NO)	NO	YES	YES	
A Management Information System is tested (YES/NO)	NO	YES	YES	



B. Detailed Results Matrix

Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
PDO Statement	The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to provide income support to vulnerable groups and to lay the foundations of a social safety net strategy by testing some of the building blocks necessary for a larger system.										
		PDO LEVEL RESULTS INDICATORS									
PDO Core Indicator One: Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs (number)	0	30,000	Not reported in PP	83,754 o/w 50% women (6,500 co-financing)			28,895	63,118			
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: MODIFIED – Indicator modified in 06/30/14 PP to read “Direct Project Beneficiaries (number) of which female (%)”; % of women not report in 05/09/16 PP; DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 10/14/17 PP;</i>											
PDO Core Indicator Two: Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs – Cash-for-work,	0	24,000	Not reported in PP	68,500 (6,500 co-financing)			24,455	41,118	32,850 o/w 19,741	41,118 o/w	61,112 o/w 36,668

¹⁶ The wording of the PDO Indicators in the main text of the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) dated May 23, 2012 differed from those in the Results Framework in Annex 1 of the PAD. The wording in this table follows that in Annex 1.

¹⁷ As per Project Paper dated June 30, 2014 for the first Project Restructuring.

¹⁸ As per Project Paper dated May 9, 2016 for the second Project Restructuring.



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
food-for-work and public works (number)									women	25,000 women	women
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: NEW TARGET introduced in 05/09/16 PP includes 18,000 people benefiting from the LIPW financed by the second AF; MODIFIED – Indicator modified in 10/14/17 PP to read “Direct Beneficiaries of the LIPW activities (number), and a separate indicator was introduced to reflect the number of women benefiting from LIPW”; both of these indicators were modified to become IO Indicators;</i>											
PDO Core Indicator Three: Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs -Unconditional cash transfers (number)	0	10,000	Not reported in PP	12,000					6,976	7,000	6,976
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: The text of the PAD mentioned only “Beneficiaries with access to cash transfer”, i.e., no mention of unconditional; MODIFIED – Indicator modified in 06/30/14 PP to read “conditional cash transfers” to reflect that the restructured project finances a conditional cash transfer program; MODIFIED – indicator modified in 10/14/17 PP to “direct beneficiaries of non-conditional cash transfers (number of people collecting the grant)-EERTF (number)” and converted to IO Indicator;</i>											
PDO Core Indicator Four: Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs – Female (number)	0	11,604					14,000	25,000			
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 06/30/14 PP because of redundancy with PDO Indicator One; RE-INTRODUCED – Indicator re-introduced in 05/09/16 PP; DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 10/14/17 PP;</i>											
PDO Indicator Five: Beneficiaries enrolled in life skills development (number)	0	5,000	Not reported in PP	5,000							
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 10/14/17 PP;</i>											
PDO Indicator Six: People with access to sensitization on nutrition, health, sanitation, and education campaigns	0	TBC	Not reported in PP	5,000			5,000	35,000	0	10,000	25,200
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: MODIFIED – Indicator Modified in the 05/09/16 PP to read “Beneficiaries of accompanying measures (including sensitization campaigns (number))”; Indicator modified in the 10/14/17 PP to read “Social assistance beneficiaries receiving nutrition/parenting/early learning/stimulation education (number)”, and target set a 10,000;</i>											
PDO Indicator Seven: People with access to improved infrastructures	0	500,000	Not reported in PP	411,000							



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in the 05/09/16 PP;</i>											
PDO Indicator Eight: Findings from the impact evaluation of the pilots are discussed and incorporated in the social safety net strategy	NO	YES		YES					YES	YES	YES
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in the 05/09/16 PP; INTRODUCED – Indicator reintroduced in the 10/14/17 PP as an IO indicator;</i>											
NEW PDO Indicator: Beneficiaries of Safety Nets programs – School Feeding Programs (number)			0	3,254			7,847	3,000	7,940	3,000	8,265
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 06/30/14 PP is a Standardized Core Sector Indicator that counts the beneficiaries of the school feeding program under Component 2; This indicator was converted to an IO Indicator in 10/14/17 PP;</i>											



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
NEW PDO Indicator: Four key blocks of a safety nets system are tested (YES/NO)							NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
									07/04/17	09/30/19	09/30/19
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP;</i>											
NEW PDO Indicator: Children benefitting from conditional cash transfers							16,862	12,000	27,890	12,000	6,181
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP to reflect the number of children benefitting from the conditional cash transfers under the parent operation; This indicator was converted to an IO Indicator in 10/14/17 PP;</i>											
NEW PDO Indicator: Beneficiaries of safety nets programs – unconditional cash transfers (number)							0	7,000			
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR re-introduced in 05/09/16 PP to reflect the number of households benefiting from the cash transfers financed by the second AF; DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 10/14/17 PP;</i>											



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
NEW PDO Indicator: Proportion of beneficiaries targeted who are poor (%)							70	80	0	80	82
									08/28/17	09/30/19	09/30/19
<i>COMMENT:</i> NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP to measure the number of people targeted who live under the poverty line; MODIFIED – Indicator modified to read “Proportion of poor households among safety net beneficiaries (percentage)” in 10/14/17 PP;											
NEW PDO Indicator: Direct project beneficiaries (number, Corporate)							139,794	378,708			
<i>COMMENT:</i> NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP to reflect the number of beneficiaries targeted by the project multiplied by 6 (size of households); DROPPED											
NEW PDO Indicator: Female beneficiaries (%)							40	40			
<i>COMMENT:</i> NEW INDICATOR – indicator re- introduced in 05/09/16 PP; MODIFIED – indicator modified in 10/14/17 PP to “Beneficiaries of social safety net programs - Female”; DROPPED											
NEW PDO Indicator: Percentage of complaints									0	95	100



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
registered in the grievance redress system that have been addressed in line with established procedures (%)											
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR – indicator introduced in 10/14/17 PP;											
NEW PDO Indicator: Beneficiaries of social safety net programs (number)									300,000	503,808	566,844
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR – indicator introduced in 10/14/17 PP;											
NEW PDO Indicator: Beneficiaries of social safety net programs – Female (number)									19,741	25,000	41,528
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR – indicator introduced in 10/14/17 PP;											



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
NEW PDO Indicator: Number of households benefiting from cash transfers and LIPW (number)									74,020	83,968	79,697
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT:</i> NEW INDICATOR – indicator introduced in 10/14/17 PP;											
INTERMEDIATE RESULTS INDICATORS											
Intermediate Results Indicators: Component 1: Labor intensive public works program with a focus on women and youth, and life skills development											
Intermediate Indicator One: Person days of work provided (number)	0	2,400,000	Not reported in PP	2,055,000 o/w 195,000 co-financing			715,285	1,787,580	978,829	1,787,580	1,750,603
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT:</i>											



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
Intermediate Indicator Two: Wages distributed to workers (USD)	0	7,602,272	Not reported in PP	10,275,000 o/w 975,000 co-financing			3,376,985	7,240,070	3,749,877	7,240,070	9,334,672
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
COMMENT:											
Intermediate Indicator Three: Basic socioeconomic infrastructures rehabilitated/constructed/main tained to benefit poor neighborhoods of targeted cities (to be broken down by the 5 sub-indicators below)	0	200	Not reported in PP	350					219	322	408
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
COMMENT: MODIFIED – Indicator modified in 06/30/14 PP to read “Micro-projects completed”; MODIFIED – Indicator modified in 10/14/17 PP to read “Number of microprojects transferred to the authorities (number)”;											



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
<i>Intermediate sub-Indicator One: Market places constructed and improved (number)</i>	0	0									
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 06/30/14 PP as the type of micro-project is not known a priori but instead during Project implementation which makes it impossible to evaluate the end-of-project target value;</i>											
<i>Intermediate sub-Indicator Two: Drainage Cleaned (number)</i>	0	0	Not reported in PP	30			395,311	425,311	386	425	715
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: MODIFIED - Indicator modified in 06/30/14 PP to read “People in urban areas with access to “improved Sanitation” under the Project (number)”, as this is a Standardized Core Sector Indicator; MODIFIED – Indicator modified to read “Drainage cleaned (Meter)”; MODIFIED – Indicator unit of measure was modified in 10/14/17 PP to kilometers;</i>											
<i>Intermediate sub-Indicator Three: Latrines constructed and rehabilitated (number)</i>	0	0									
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 06/30/14 PP as the type of micro-project is not known a priori but instead during Project implementation which makes it impossible to evaluate the end-of-project target value;</i>											
<i>Intermediate sub-Indicator Four: Roads Rehabilitated (non-rural) (number)</i>	0	0									
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 06/30/14 PP as the type of micro-project is not known a priori but instead during Project implementation which makes it impossible to evaluate the end-of-project target value;</i>											
<i>Intermediate sub-Indicator Five: Roads Constructed (non-rural) (number)</i>	0	0									
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 06/30/14 PP as the type of micro-project is not known a priori but instead during Project implementation which makes it impossible to evaluate the end-of-project target value;</i>											
Intermediate Indicator Four: Public works programs completed with satisfactory technical quality (%)	0	90	Not reported in PP	90			100	90			



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 10/14/17 PP;											
NEW II Indicator: Amount transferred through the cash transfers under Component 2 (Amount US\$)							1,500,000	5,000,000	Not reported	5,000,000	4,379,168
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP;											
NEW II Indicator: Roads rehabilitated, Rural (Kilometers)							87	136	47	137	655
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP; MODIFIED – This indicator was modified in the 10/14/17 PP to not specify “rural”, and the target was increased marginally;											
NEW II Indicator: Direct beneficiaries of the LIPW activities (number)									8,390	35,000	61,112
									07/04/17	09/30/19	



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 10/14/17 PP;</i>											
Intermediate Results Indicators: Component 2: Pilot transfer programs to protect human capital											
Intermediate Indicator Five: Registered CT households who are receiving the CT (%)	0	95	Not reported in PP	4,000			1,855	9,000	3,235	9,000	1,822
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: MODIFIED – Indicator was reformulated in the 06/30/14 PP to “Households who are receiving the CCT (number)”;</i>											
Intermediate Indicator Six: Registered CT households who are receiving the CT for education (%)	0	95									
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator was dropped in the 06/30/14 PP as the restructured project does not include a specific CT for education;</i>											
Intermediate Indicator Seven: Registered CT households who are receiving the CT for nutrition (%)	0	95									



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator was dropped in the 06/30/14 PP as the restructured project does not include a specific CT for education;</i>											
Intermediate Indicator Eight: CT Beneficiaries complying with requirements (%)	0	95	Not reported in PP	90			88	90	98	90	69
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: MODIFIED – Indicator was modified in the 06/30/14 PP to read “CCT beneficiaries complying with condition (percentage), as the pilot cash transfer program in the restructured project was a Conditional Cash Transfer; MODIFIED – Indicator was modified in the 05/09/16 PP to read “CCT Beneficiaries respecting the conditionalities”;</i>											
Intermediate Indicator Nine: CT for education beneficiaries complying with requirements (%)	0	95									
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator was dropped in the 06/30/14 PP as the restructured project does not include a specific CT for education;</i>											
Intermediate Indicator Ten: CT for nutrition beneficiaries	0	95									



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
complying with requirements (%)											
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
<i>COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator was dropped in the 06/30/14 PP as the restructured project does not include a specific CT for education;</i>											
NEW II Indicator: Children benefiting from the CCT									27,890	12,000	6,181
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in the 06/30/14 PP to measure the efficiency of project implementation;</i>											
Intermediate Results Indicators: Component 3: Project Management											
NEW II Indicator: Operating Ratio (%)			n/a	20			13.51	18.00	15.00	18.00	18.00
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in the 06/30/14 PP to measure the efficiency of project implementation;¹⁹</i>											
NEW II Indicator: Direct beneficiaries of the accompanying measures									8,390	35,000	38,858

¹⁹ The operating ratio is defined as the ratio of the sum of cumulative operating costs (travel expenditures and other travel-related allowances, equipment rental and maintenance, vehicle operation, maintenance and repair, office rental and maintenance, materials and supplies, and utilities) and cumulative consultant fees of Social Protection Unit's employees since the beginning of the Project, divided by cumulative disbursements since the beginning of the Project. Salaries or allowances of civil servants are not covered under the Project.



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
(including financial literacy)- number of people (Number)											
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in the 10/14/17 PP to calculate total number of beneficiaries of accompanying measures											
Intermediate Indicator Eleven: A central database to manage the list of beneficiaries is established (%)	NO	YES		YES							
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator was dropped in the 05/09/16 PP;											
Intermediate Indicator Twelve: Consolidated reports are submitted to the WB on schedule (%)	NO	YES									
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017									
COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator was dropped in the 06/30/14 PP, as this is a standard IDA requirement that is reported elsewhere;											
Intermediate Indicator Thirteen: Rapid beneficiary	NO	YES		YES			NO	YES	YES	YES	YES



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
satisfaction surveys conducted on an annual basis (%)											
	10/17/2012	10/02/2017							07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: MODIFIED - Indicator was modified in the 06/30/14 PP to read "Two rapid beneficiary satisfaction surveys conducted (Yes/No); MODIFIED – Indicator was modified in the 05/09/16 PP to read "Rapid beneficiary satisfaction surveys conducted on an annual basis (YES/NO);</i>											
NEW II Indicator: System-based mechanisms for beneficiary identification are tested (YES/NO)							NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
									08/28/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP;</i>											
NEW II Indicator: Certified payment mechanisms are tested (YES/NO)							NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
<i>COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP;</i>											
NEW II Indicator: A Management Information System is tested (YES/NO)							NO	YES	YES	YES	YES



Indicator (unit)	Baseline in PAD ¹⁶	Target in PAD	Achieved or Baseline 06/30/14 ¹⁷	New Target per 06/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 11/30/14	New Target per 11/30/14 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 03/31/2016 ¹⁸	New Target per 05/09/16 restructuring	Achieved or Baseline 10/14/17 restructuring	New Target per 10/14/17 restructuring	Actual at Completion 09/30/19
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP;											
NEW II Indicator: An electronic beneficiary registration system is tested (YES/NO)							NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
									07/04/17	09/30/19	
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 05/09/16 PP;											
Intermediate Results Indicators: Component 4: Prevention of the Ebola Epidemic (introduced w/ PP dated 11/30/14)											
NEW II Indicator: Number of beneficiaries in ebola affected regions (number)							0	10,000			
COMMENT: DROPPED – Indicator dropped in 10/14/17 PP;											
NEW II Indicator: Number of people trained on ebola prevention (number)					0	200					
COMMENT: NEW INDICATOR introduced in 11/30/14 PP; DELETED – Indicator deleted in 05/09/16 PP;											



C. Restructuring Information

From: Operations Help Desk <operationshelpdesk@worldbank.org>
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 3:58 PM
To: Michael G. Nelson <mnelson3@worldbank.org>; Astrid Sophie F Uytterhaegen <auytterhaegen@worldbank.org>
Subject: RE: Portal issue: data sheet

Dear Astrid

Following on the email below:

P123900 was approved on 19 June 2012 and is the Parent Project

P156484:

This is Scale up AF to the value of \$16.35m (\$12m IDA grant + \$4.35m Ebola Recovery and Reconstruction Fund) and was approved on 31 May 2016.

P145117:

This was processed as a small grant, supplement to P123900. But financing tab for this shows as a \$25m IDA grant in the portal - this is wrong.

The ISDS, though, shows this as \$2m TF. The ISDS was disclosed on 4 September 2013, and was prepared on 7/18/2013:

<https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/imagebank/Pages/docProfile.aspx?nodeid=18191274>

However, I do not see any grant agreement for that amount, and also seem to have trouble finding the Project Paper. There is no financing attached to this P code, but the ISR links back to the P123900.

Then there is grant agreement for \$1.865m signed in December 2014. But there is no Project Paper for that.

It might be that the \$2m and \$1.85m that you are referring to are the same, with the AF approved, but the GA being issued with delay. However, you will need to check the WB Docs folder for documents and approvals, and you might also need to check with previous TTLs at the time what the status was.

What I can make out from the monitoring page of P123900 is the following:

There is \$37m in IDA funds (this equates to \$25m original commitment, and \$12m AF through P156484) and \$6.2m in TFs. This is made up of the \$4.35m which was approved as part of the AF (P156484); and then also \$1.855m which was approved on October 6, 2014 (Client connection shows this as \$1.865 originally, and unused funds cancelled).

I hope that this helps.

Best regards,

Shaun



D. UNICEF Report on Ebola Response Expenditures

UNICEF Report Grants H-990-GN and H-782 GUI

Introduction

The following is a summary of the progress report on Government-World Bank-UNICEF partnership to accelerate response to Ebola in Guinea. UNICEF will support the Government's efforts to implement the emergency component by providing Supplies and Related Services under this Agreement that is part of a broader Government/UNICEF Ebola Investment Plan. More specifically, this grant covers:

- Supplies Items
- Services Related to:
 - Social Mobilization and Communication
 - Nutrition targeting children less than 5 years with severe acute malnutrition
 - Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH).

UNICEF EVD Response Result

Under the leadership of the National Coordination for Ebola, the Country has adopted a broad National Strategy with the support of various global and in-country stakeholders, including UNICEF. In operationalizing this strategy, several plans have been implemented. The latest plan is aimed at achieving zero Ebola cases while laying the foundation for a more resilient health system. The strategy, known as STEP is built around four strategic objectives (SO) that include:

- S01. Stop the Ebola outbreak;
- S02. Treat the infected;
- S03. Ensure Essential Services (Food, Nutrition, WASH, Logistics, Emergency Telecommunications, Education, Protection including Child Protection and GBV, Livelihoods, Early Recovery); and
- S04. Preserve Stability

Based on its comparative advantage and the experience so far, UNICEF has tailored its contribution at the Community and District levels taking advantage of our improved understanding of the epidemic (transmission pattern and geographical dynamic):

Social Mobilization

Social mobilization and community engagement have been one of the key components of the national response to end the epidemic. Main challenges are related to the weakness of the health system and a number of socio-cultural barriers including stigma, distrust and fear, and community resistance and violence. In response to



these challenges, significant progress has been made in scaling up community led social mobilization activities using various platforms, use of rural radio network, involvement of Community Watch Committees (CWCs), local NGOs, youth and women groups, Faith based organizations (FBOs) and broader civil society.

Key Results

- An additional 2 million people have been reached with key messages on prevention and case management through interpersonal communication and door to door campaigns (leaflets, billboards, mass media etc.), bringing the total number of people reached to more than 5.5 million. The focus has been on active identification of cases, contact tracing, safe burials and key individual prevention including hygiene practices (soap and chlorine).
- UNICEF continued its strategic partnerships and support to rural radio networks. 23 rural radio stations continue to regularly broadcast Ebola-relevant messages in order to improve awareness and promote behavioural change. Daily messages are being broadcasted to 22 prefectures. In addition, UNICEF supported the creation of three new radio stations in Forecariah, Boffa and Yomou.
- In collaboration with Fondation Hironnelle, technical and financial support has continued to strengthen the capacity of 60 technicians in 23 rural radio stations. Also, through continued UNICEF support, Hironnelle built capacities of four new rural radio stations in Yomou, Lelouma and Mandiana, and Forecariah.
- UNICEF has supported the creation of an additional 590 Community Watch Committees (CWCs) bringing the total number to 2,459 with 17,213 members. UNICEF has assured continued support to these CWCs through partnership agreements with four prominent local NGOs: CARITAS, PLAN Guinea, AGIL and CNOCS.
- An additional 15 PCAs have been signed with local NGOs, Youth Groups, Civil Society Organizations, and Faith Based Organizations, bringing the total number to 35. Among the new partners are the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Security, both key in tracing (suspected) Ebola cases.
- In order to address the obstacles in the areas that continue to report new Ebola cases, UNICEF and the Ministry of Youth have mobilized an additional 2,000 youths, bringing the total number to 8,000.
- UNICEF's Community engagement efforts have helped to set up psychosocial support to Ebola orphans and affected families; the program is being rolled out in partnership with the Government and seven national and international NGOs through partnership agreements (PCAs) with: Mende des Enfants, Enfance du Globe, ChildFund, Plan Guinea, Aime, Aguias and Search for Common Ground.

Table 1: Number of CWCs supported by each partner

Partner	Number of CWCs supported
PLAN Guinee	674
CARITAS/OCPH	905
CNOCS	780
AGIL	100
Total	2459

Following results have been achieved working with more than 222 Community Councils for the Protection of Children (CVPE) have been set up and are actively involved.



- ✓ An additional 1,220 children who have lost one or both parents have been identified and registered, bringing the total number registered to 5,826 children.
- ✓ Community volunteers have provided psychosocial support to an additional 41,153 children affected by Ebola, bringing the total number reached to 90,671 children. This represents 76 per cent of the 120,000 targeted, up from 41 per cent previously.
- ✓ Cash transfers were made to 1,443 children who have lost one or both parents to Ebola, to help families to supplement their food needs and meet other household expenses including school fees. This brings the total number of children who have benefitted from cash transfers to 4,691.

Logistic

196 supervision vehicles and ambulances plus 2 transport trucks have been supplied to the Government in addition to 300 motorbikes. Therefore, given the trend of the epidemic and the related needs, 50 more vehicles and 100 motorbikes than originally planned have been purchased with no change in the allocated budget lines.

UNICEF has deployed one supply officer to the National Central Pharmacy and two logistic officers based on the field for end user monitoring

Looking Forward

Thanks to the grant and partnership, significant progress has been made in a multi-pronged approach in addressing the Ebola epidemic while supporting efforts towards the recovery of the health system in the Republic of Guinea. However, additional support is still needed to achieve the goal of improving maternal and child health. Furthermore, intensified efforts are still required to ensure that a more resilient health system is in place in the context of the ongoing efforts around the revitalization of the national health system. Though the number of new cases of Ebola has significantly decreased in the past three months, the country has not reached the goal of zero cases yet. In moving forward, more investment is needed in:

- ✓ restoring the trust of communities in the health system through community engagement
- ✓ procuring primary health centers with essential drugs targeting women and children,
- ✓ Improving infection control and prevention in hospitals, health centers and health posts through intensified WASH activities
- ✓ Alleviating the impact of the epidemic on child protection and
- ✓ Revitalizing the education sector

UNICEF has the trust of the national government and communities, and the technical experience and expertise in these priority areas to provide the necessary support in accelerating national efforts toward the goal of zero Ebola cases and the recovery of the health system



First Agreement H990-GN: EBOLA EMERGENCY PROJECT (USO 11,483,040.00)

Starting Date: 17 September 2014

Closing Date: 30 September 2015

Part 1 – Fully spent

	Item description and services	Budgeted USD	Spent USD	Remark
Vehicles	28 Vehicles for supervision, tracking of contacts and body transportation	880000	884234	
	50 motorcycles	120,000	94,800	
	2 transport trucks for medical equipment	200,000	232,700	
Kits Ebola	Disinfectant (1.7 million bottles of de chlorine)	816,000	733,939	
	Cleaning gloves (25000)	53,250	12,015	10,000 procured
	Surgical gloves (4,500,000 or 45000 boxes of 100)	270,000	231,575	
	Masks (200,000)	40,000	10,968	33,000 procured
	Tents (100)	210,000	192,189	125 Tents Procured
	Bars of soap (250,000)	50000	37517	
	Freight	450000	349178	Country office was able to negotiate special cargo that brought some of the item and thus reduce cost.
	In country Storage, Maintenance Transport and Distribution Cost	0	155672	
	Sub Total 1	3089250	3089250	

Part II – Fully Spent

	Item description and services	Budgeted USD	Spent USD	Remark
Vehicles	18 ambulances	720000	640000	
	100 motorcycles	240000	189600	
Social Mobilization & communication	18 ambulances	720000	640000	



	100 motorcycles	240000	189600	
	300 Billboards	600000	588500	
	800 000 Posters	336000	310000	
	6 Light panels (for 4 months)	17160	14099	
	800 000 Flyers	336000	335898	
	15 000 T-shirts	70200	76000	
	41 200 Stickers	20640	15528	
	20 Public Information Stands (for 3 months)	120000	145000	
Nutrition Supplies	200 boxes F-75 Therap.diet, sachet	14524	14524	
	250 boxes F-100 therap. Diet	17392	17500	
	4800 boxes Therapeutic spread, sachet	259200	259200	
	46 boxes Resomal	1147	965	
	2500 pack amoxicillin 250mg and 500mg	5875	13825	
	508 box a Ibendazole	1006	951	
	134 box gentamycin	1147	949	
	33 Length board	6694	8912	
	10 weighing scale infant	855	809	
	50 mother-baby weighing scale	6999	5997	
	59 pack Zinc	82	82	
	15 pack MUAC	49	44.52	
Wash supplies	Chlorine for water treatment, one-liter bottles	17166	17166	
		1080000	1080000	
Services Relates to	Social Mobilization & communication supplies, distribution and proper use of social mobilization and communication materials, including training of communication materials, including training of community volunteers and community health workers, community-based outreach anthropology survey and use of media.	651000	651000	
		367444	367444	
		878000	878000	



	Nutritional supplies. For distribution and proper use of nutritional supplies for children (5 years with severe acute malnutrition)	85500	85485	
	Wash supplies for distribution and proper use of disinfection and hand wash supplies, hygiene promotion and original nutrition practices	90000	102500	
		110000	116000	
		100002	172597.48	
	For provision of Wash package (water and latrine) in nutrition treatment centers	750000	745000	
	For access to water in Conakry	50000	65000	
	UNICEF In Country Direct Cost	878000	878000	
	Cost Recovery Part I	154463	154463	
	Cost Recovery Part II	392349	392349	
	Sub Total 2	8393790	8393790	

Second Agreement H-782 GUI: Projet de Filets Sociaux Productifs (USD 6,000,000.00)

Starting Date: 20 November 2014

Closing Date: 02 October 2015

Fully Spent

	Item description and services	Budgeted USD	Spent USD	Remark
Vehicles and Motorbikes	100 motorized vehicles	4000000	3456560	150 Vehicles bought because of economies of scale at the Government's request
	150 motorbikes		284400	150 Motorbikes
Social Mobilization	300 Billboard for 6 months	600000	150000	
	800,000 Posters	336000	125000	
	800,000 Flyers	336000	347608	
	41,280 Stickers	20640	26000	



	15,000 T-Shirts	70200	63800	
	Door to door campaign	308860	735555	
	Sensitization via radios & TV broadcasts	100000	137611	
	Training & participation of 100 active teachers & 12 parliamentarians, 70 locally elected 35 senior govt officials in affected zones on reluctance and resistance	228300	328566	
	Completion of KAP surveys		44900	
Cost Recovery			300000	
Total		6000000	6000000	

The Final Financial Report shall include verification signed by an authorized official of UNICEF:

"We hereby confirm to the best of our knowledge and based on the available records that the above amounts are drawn directly from the audited financial ledgers of UNICEF. All documentation authenticating these expenses has been retained by UNICEF in accordance with its documents retention policy and will be made available to UNICEF external auditors for examination during the course of their audit of UNICEF's Financial Statements."

Certified by:

Dr Mohamed Ayoya,

Name and Title:

UNICEF Guinea Representative



Date:

3/6/15



E. World Food Programme Report

World Food Programme

PROJECT DETAIL BY CONTRIBUTION

		GUIMOF 10024655 GUI-C-00006-01
Confirmed Contributions		
	In Kind	0
	Cash	1 284 654
	Stock Transfer	
Total Confirmed Contributions		1 284 654
Expenditures		
Project Costs		
	Food and Related Costs	961 256
	Cash & Voucher and Related Costs	0
	Capacity Dev'l & Augmentation	0
	Total Direct Operational Costs	961 256
	DSC	239 355
	Stock Transfer	
Total Direct Project Costs		1200611
Indirect Support Costs		64 043
Total Expenditures		1 284 654
Balance of Contributions 19106/2017		0

Edouard NIZEYIMANA, Country Director

Prepared By Moha

Certified By



WFP Guinea Implementation Report Safety Nets [School Feeding Program]

Project Title: School Feeding Program – Social Protection/
WB IDA (H7820)
Amount: US\$ 1, 284 ,654
Period: 2015 -20 17
Num. of schools: 54 Primary Schools
Objective: Pilot project on best practise in the social safety net

Context at implementation:

The World Bank granted the Government of the Republic of Guinea an IDA grant (H7820) of US \$ 25 million for the implementation of a project called "Productive Social Safety Nets" aimed at supporting vulnerable groups. Part of this contribution was allocated to the World Food Program (WFP) for the implementation of a school feeding program.

This project, which started in 2015 in partnership with the Government of the Republic of Guinea, contributes to improving the educational and nutritional outcomes of children enrolled in school. School canteens not only promote the physical, mental and emotional well-being of students, but also help them better focus on their studies. School feeding aims to improve the enrolment and attendance rates and reduce the dropout rates, particularly for girls. Each school day, the children received warm and nutritious meals at lunchtime. Performance is remarkable compared to the baseline of the indicators, which have progressed steadily.

This document is the final report, covering the period from May 2015 to March 2017.

Information on the implementation of the project:

Throughout the project, the WFP implemented school feeding activities in all 54 primary schools supported by the government's social safety nets project with funding from the World Bank.

The strategy for implementing this activity increasingly involved the partnership and active participation of beneficiary communities, with the goal of the community taking full ownership of the project.

Table 1: Number of schools in program - May 2015 to March 2017

Prefecture	Number of schools planned	Number of schools treated	Completion rate
Mali	17	17	100%
Pita	5	5	100%
Télimélé	14	14	100%
Siguiré	7	7	100%
Kérouané	11	11	100%
Total	54	54	100%



The enrollment increased from 7,847 at the start of the project in 2015 to 8,938 schoolchildren at the end of the project in March 2017.

The table below shows encouraging results, considering the high demand for enrolment in schools especially that have canteens.

Table 2: Number of beneficiaries per activity - May 2015 to March 2017

Activity	Planned			Treated			Rate of Completion		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
Hot meals distributed	5228	4772	10000	4544	4394	8938	87%	92%	89%
Take-home rations distributed	n/a	1000	1000	n/a	4394	4394	n/a	439%	439%

The ratio of girls to boys enrolled in schools showed a positive trend compared to the baseline data collected during the identification of schools. Despite obtaining satisfactory results in the intervention zones with school meals, the trend shows that additional efforts are still required to achieve equal access to education for girls and boys.

One may note a rate of 439% of girls reached through the distribution of the take-home ration. This is explained by the fact that assistance was extended to all girls in the treated schools due to the precariousness of the targeted areas, rather than only targeting girls in sixth grade per the original design. The increase in the number of beneficiary girls was made possible through the mobilization of additional resources by the WFP in order to meet the evolving needs of the project.

Table 3: indicators of gender parity in the treated schools - May 2015 to March 2017

Indicator	Target	Reference value	Most recent value
Proportion of girls enrolled in treated schools compared to total number of enrolled children	52%	44%	49%
Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in treated schools	1	0.78	0.96

From May 2015 to March 2017, the WFP distributed around 1,058 tons of food to the targeted schools, representing a completion rate of 121%. This rate is explained by the gradual increase in the number of students enrolled throughout of the project, which was made possible thanks to additional WFP funds to expand assistance.

Table 4: Quantity of rations planned and distributed - May 2015 to March 2017

Rations	Tons		
	Planned	Distributed	Percentage
Cereals (Rice)	540	491	91%*
Legumes	108	97	90%*
Oil and hot meal	122	103	84%*
Oil for girls (World Bank funding)	92	92	1
Oil (other contributions)	n/a	267	n/a
Salt	10	8	80%*
Total	872	1058	121%

*The international fluctuations in the price of rations affected the planned amounts (tons)

Results of monitoring direct effect indicators

The annual increase in the enrollment rate in treated schools indicates that the distribution of hot meals has not only helped to reduce short-term hunger among the students but has also favored a substantial enrollment of children of school age in general (44%), but particularly for girls (61%). This result seems encouraging given the high levels

of poverty in these areas and the reluctance of some parents of students to enroll their daughters in school.

Table 5: Annual increase in enrolment rate – school year 2016/2017

Prefecture	Number of students enrolled at the start of school year 2015/2016		Number of students enrolled at the start of school year 2016/2017		Yearly increase in enrolment – school year 2016/2017	
	Total	Girls	Total	Girls	Total	Girls
Mali	2194	1032	2984	1725	36%	67%
Pita	554	254	768	368	39%	45%
Télimélé	993	442	1548	782	56%	77%
Siguiri	1188	535	1719	711	45%	33%
Kérouané	1017	356	1545	618	52%	74%
Total	5946	2619	8564	4204	44%	61%

Trends show parents are sending their children to schools which have school feeding programs, especially girls. The most evident cases are those in the prefectures of Kérouané and Télimélé where one can observe a high rate of increase in enrollments, especially among girls.

Table 6: Enrolment rate increase over 3 years

Indicator	Baseline value – school year 2013/2014	Midline value – school year 2015/2016	Endline value – school year 2016/2017
Annual enrolment rate for girls and boys	-1,70%	6,93%	8,24%
Annual enrolment rate for girls	3,90%	9,15%	9,31%
Retention rate for boys	79.50%	99.42%	99,60%
Retention rate for girls	81.90%	99.44%	99,45%

Project achievements

- Thanks to the school feeding program, the number of students has doubled in treated schools as parents of students are incentivized to send their children to school, especially the girls. This is because the students either benefit from meals or because they bring food rations, such as oil, home.
- It facilitated the transfer of teachers to the treated schools because the presence of canteens is a motivating factor and helps maintain teachers in rural areas, which in turn yields better academic results.
- It favored punctuality, retention and progression to higher classes among students.
- It increased cohesion between the community and the treated schools by organizing meetings during which collective solutions to school-related problems were proposed and adopted.
- It decreased the distance traveled by students who live in remote villages for the midday meal. This allowed schoolchildren to stay within the school bounds while waiting for classes to resume.



- The rations made it possible to increase household income because the oil given to each girl was consumed directly by the household, allowing the family to save on oil expenditures.
- The school feeding program has encouraged the beneficiary communities to emulate them, collecting contributions from community members for the reconstruction of the canteen infrastructures and the purchase of condiments.

Challenges encountered

- Difficulty to access certain target schools and poor road conditions.
- Incoming school directors in the middle of the school year, who have no knowledge or experience of canteen management.
- Latrines and water sources were poorly maintained and at times inexistent in some schools.
- Insufficient teachers in targeted schools leading to students being transferred to other schools without a canteen, causing high absenteeism and finally dropouts among transferred students.
- Some infrastructures quickly deteriorate due to termite infestations.
- Certain schools recorded higher rates of student absenteeism during peak seasons for gold panning.
- Early and/or forced marriage of girls in grades 5 and 6.
- The dry season caused wells to dry up, making it difficult to water gardens.
- Destruction of vegetable gardens by stray animals.
- Some cases of ration diversion were reported by our monitoring and control agents with the assistance of the Ministry of Education.

Recommendations

- Expansion of the project to consolidate the achievements of school feeding programs;
- Develop a strategy that helps keep children in school, especially in mining areas;
- Avoid the sudden transfer of incoming school directors in the middle of the school year who are inexperienced in management of school canteens;
- Increase awareness of early marriage of young girls;
- Whenever possible, consider reviewing the activities of school canteens in the 54 schools of the project;



- Meet the need for more teachers to avoid the multi-grade system in the target schools;
- Regularly strengthen the capacities of teachers for the clear and precise reporting of school data;
- Advocate for the construction of adequate school infrastructure to replace the hangars in target schools.

WFP Guinea Outlook

- Increased ownership of school feeding programs to be in a better position to advocate for funds;
- Introduction of local purchases and vouchers/voucher value in connection with the canteen (from school feeding to food linked to local production);
- Promotion of complementary activities around canteens;
- Promote and strengthen activities related to agriculture and local purchases from small producers;
- Encourage activities raise awareness to nutrition;
- Continue the process on the sustainability strategy through needs assessment (SABER)



Beneficiary account and pictures:

Aissatou CAMARA, Parent of student: phone number 623 78 04 25.

All my daughters will go to school because ignorance costs more than education. If my daughter was not in school, I would not have received the oil. This is an advantage for the food basket of our household. Our children come back from school full and this represents savings for us. I ask everyone to educate their children, proteges or dependents especially if they are a girl.

Let us not forget that it is the tray filled with peanuts placed on the head of the girl that will lead to debauchery, not school.

Mamady 3 CAMARA, Parent of student: phone number 621 21 34 41.

The lunch meal constitutes for us parents of students an essential service because the schooling has increased, the students follow the primary cycle until high school, then college. Before the fourth year of primary school, boys and girls drop out of school in favor of gold panning with all the possible harmful consequences. Some households have two meals and others three a day thanks to the school lunch program. This means that the burden on the housewife has gradually decreased.

None of my children eat lunch at home because they are full from eating at school. Students whose villages are 4 and more kilometers away stay in school or our homes while waiting for evening classes that start at 3 p.m.

I noticed more cohesion not only between the students but also between the parents of students. The teaching personnel are starting to develop a dynamic to better prepare students for the transition to higher education levels and success in college entrance exams (7th year).




Old hanger serving as classroom at a primary school



Réfectoire de l'EP Napougou



F. Implementation Arrangements





ANNEX 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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