34227 v 1 23rd August 2005 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On August 15th, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace accord in Helsinki aimed at ending a thirty year old armed conflict which has resulted in almost 15,000 deaths. Changes in the political environment ­ and in the demands of both sides ­ has allowed for the development of an agreement that many see as being the best hope for peace in Aceh for years. Lessons from the failed Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) of 2002-2003 have been learned. The current agreement appears to represent a more comprehensive strategy for bringing peace to Aceh, with many of the social, political and economic factors that have kept Aceh in a state of perpetual war since the failure of the last agreement, considered, if not fully addressed. Yet while the agreement is more holistic, and the as of the broad political dynamics in Jakarta and Banda political will from both sides is seemingly stronger, Aceh, is necessary in comprehending the likelihood of many challenges remain. The Memorandum of the agreement contributing to a sustainable peace in Understanding (MoU) outlines just the bare bones of Aceh. It is also necessary to help illuminate the ways a settlement. Many issues remain unresolved. in which the World Bank and others can help support Implementation details are unclear. The agreement the peaceful development of Aceh in years to come. has largely involved elite actors on both sides, with civil society actors and the communities they represent, The assessment was conducted from July 26th-August given little space for contribution. There is a massive 19th, 2005 and utilized a number of methods: key perceived gap between the discussions in Jakarta, informant surveys of KDP facilitators; data collected Helsinki and, to a lesser extent, in Banda Aceh, and by SPADA facilitators; newspaper conflict monitoring; realities on the ground for those in the regions. The two field trips to eight districts plus discussions in signing of the accord does not in itself bring peace. Banda Aceh; a review of lessons learned from COHA Whether the conflict ends and peace is sustainable will and other peace processes; and interviews with depend very much on the ways in which a range of Acehnese in Medan and Jakarta. different actors (including the combating parties, but also others) work through the myriad issues that will The paper consists of five parts. After an introduction, arise post-August 15th. Section 2 gives a brief overview of conflict on the ground inAceh today, using survey and qualitative data. This paper constitutes a preliminary assessment of Section 3 sets out potential scenarios post-August 15th, conflict dynamics on the ground in Aceh today, and, with an emphasis on dynamics that could negatively particularly, of how the conflict is experienced by the impact upon the likelihood of sustainable peace. people who make up the vast majority of the populace Section 4 gives suggestions for broad tools that of this beautiful but tragic place: rural Acehnese development actors, such as theWorld Bank and others, villagers. The paper does not seek to analyze the may use to address these, and, more broadly, to support conflict at the macro-level or the intentions of elite the peaceful recovery of Aceh, and outlines principles actors, including the TNI and GAM leadership and for conflict-sensitive development planning. Section the Government of Indonesia. Instead, it assumes will 5 concludes. from these parties to find a solution to the conflict, and considers the local dynamics that may make or Conflict Dynamics in Aceh Post-Tsunami break the agreement. The paper combines a consideration of the broad dynamics of the conflict Despite the fact that conflict levels dropped (with a focus on events post-tsunami) with an immediately after the tsunami, they have been steadily exploration of the views of different local actors, their increasing over the year and, compared to last year, incentives, and the agency they have to either spoil, or still remain high. Since the beginning of this year, 178 consolidate, the accord. Consideration of this, as well deaths and 170 injuries have resulted from 108 GAM- GoI conflict incidents. However, both incidents of Obstacles to Peace: Possible Scenarios Post-August conflict and their violent impacts are concentrated in 15th four "hot spots" districts: NorthAceh, SouthAceh, East Aceh and Bireuen. With the exception of South Aceh, There are a number of potential scenarios that could these districts are on the east coast of Aceh, which has undermine the peace agreement. traditionally been GAM's stronghold. Incentives for Resistance and Security Concerns However, there is both quantitative and qualitative One set of spoilers is local actors ­ including GAM evidence to suggest that that the conflict is moving west, combatants, the TNI and the police ­ who will resist and particularly to SouthAceh district. Indeed, conflict the implementation of the peace agreement because of levels have risen sharply in South Aceh in the past two economic incentives and/or ideological reasons. months (June and July) whereas levels have dropped Particularly at the sub-district level, these actors possess off in central and eastern Aceh. This is due to two considerable scope for autonomous action and many factors: one, GAM members from other parts of Aceh are involved in illegal activities on the side. Maintaining are moving west to seek protection; and, two, the control over these actors will require the use of both command line with the GAM leadership functions less sticks and carrots. well in the west coast region. Monitoring Capacity Although conflict incidents are concentrated, conflict's Partly because there are spoilers within the ranks of impacts on human security and perceptions of safety both sides, as well as because the high levels of distrust are felt across the province. In almost every district, between GAM and GoI, an independent third party villagers told us of how their lives are affected. Many monitor has been charged with overseeing the peace are unable to tend their forest gardens, the centre of process. The list of tasks that the Aceh Monitoring most village economies, for fear of running into GAM Mission (AMM) is responsible for is vast. There is a who have retreated to the foothills. Similarly, tension risk that this team will be unable to satisfactorily cover between those who nominally sympathize with GAM and respond to all incidents and all aspects of its and those who sympathize with GoI is high across the mandate. How local people view the team, and province, regardless of recent local conflict incidents. understand its role, is key. Highly relevant for targeting purposes, these cleavages exist within villages. Sympathies for either GAM or Reintegration of GAM GoI tend to be at the household level and therefore Thirty years of conflict has eroded trust and relations: differences of opinion and mistrust exist within villages. amongst communities, between communities and the Cleavages along ethnic and religious lines are weak. state, as well as between communities and GAM. Communities could reject GAM because of past abuses The main forms of GAM-GoI related conflict continue or because of the fear that welcoming back ex-GAM to be firefights between armed actors and kidnapping combatants with open arms will put them at risk. which almost always involves civilians. Extortion is Similarly, the provision of significant support and aid rampant across the province, particularly on main to ex-GAM combatants could result in serious tensions highways, and is almost entirely carried out by the TNI and social jealousies amongst other victims of conflict. and the police. Sweeping is more common in "black areas", that is villages that, according to the TNI, Population Movements and Village-level Conflict sympathize with GAM. More positively, militias or Over the course of the conflict, large numbers of anti-separatist groups, as they are more commonly transmigrants and Acehnese fled the province. Their referred to in Aceh, are unlikely to be a problem. They return post-August 15th could cause problems relating have very little legitimacy in the eyes of communities to property, including land, left behind. Although the ­ many members are reluctant recruitees ­ and in the numbers of returnees is unlikely to be high in the short- past six months have been in involved in almost no run, the conflict may have weakened the capacity of incidents (total of 3 incidents in Each Aceh and village level mechanisms to handle these issues. Lhokseumawe in 2005). The two most problematic obstacles, at least in the Local community leaders are the key dispute resolution short-term, will be managing local resistance and crime, actors. Even for GAM-GoI related conflicts, theVillage as well as ensuring the smooth integration of ex-GAM Head often plays a key role, for example in negotiating combatants. There is a significant chance that even if in kidnapping cases and settling disputes relating to the peace agreement is successful at the macro-level extortion. Despite the conflict, community leaders have (e.g. in ending the decades-long conflict between the managed to maintain the trust and faith of their GoI and GAM), that the conflict will fragment and communities. Their participation in socializing and morph from that of a separatist struggle (and a monitoring the peace process, as well as in facilitating government's attempt to control it), to one underpinned the trust required for development projects, will be by local economic interests and criminality crucial. (premanism). If this occurs, in the short-term AMM is 2 likely to struggle to fulfill its mandate to investigate n Public dialogues at the district and sub-district and adjudicate on apparent violations. In the longer- levels to: elicit communities' social and economic term, existing security and judicial institutions will have development needs; build dialogue around problems controlling these activities without mechanisms for peace; and improve information developing greater trust and legitimacy from flows. communities. n Commissionaseriesofpublicly-announcedneeds assessments. These should cover: There is a risk that early mistakes in the reintegration - Ex-GAM combatants' reintegration needs; of GAM members could derail the whole peace - Survey of local government needs, including process. All those who have a stake in reintegration, assessments of schools, health clinics and other including receiving communities, GAM leadership and public infrastructure; and, combatants, and the GoI, will watch this process, which - Surveys of the justice and security sector. is set to begin on the 15th September. It will be a litmus n Support cultural events that tap into the test for both Jakarta and GAM's good intentions (and community's widespread desire for an end to conflict their ability to control their armed members). Success and hopes for peace. will depend on getting the incentives and messages n In the longer-term consider truth and right. The schedule is tight. reconciliation mechanisms that relieve the burden and heal the memories of past violence and abuses. Intervention Mechanisms and Principles for n Support local level monitoring programs that Development Actors augment and complement the AMM. Significant scope exists for donors like the World Bank Reintegration of GAM to support the peace process. Generally, development Program development for the reintegration of GAM is actors should think about interventions in the following already underway. Those designing such programs areas: should consider the following suggestions: n Socialization of the peace process n We suggest that the DDR (Disarmament, n Bringing people in to the process Demobilization and Reintegration) programs be n Reintegration of GAM given a name and acronym that means more to n Provision of a peace dividend local people. One suggestion is to rename the n Institutionbuilding program P-KBG. This stands for Pulang Kampung, Pulang Barak, Pulang Gudang (Going home to the village, Going home to the barracks, Socialization of the Peace Process Giving back the weapons). The importance of disseminating the content and n Inordertoensuresupporttoreceivingcommunities, processes of the peace agreement cannot be consider issuing returnees with a voucher that is understated. This could be done in a number of ways: redeemable upon reentry into a village. The voucher would provide a set amount to the returnee n Support existing networks and mechanisms, (either in cash or kind) but would also provide a set including civil society actors, religious networks, amount to receiving communities. and local media networks. n Considerestablishingafund­potentiallywithin n Use Ulamas to add legitimacy and to aid in reconciliation. the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) or the Decentralization Support Facility (DSF) ­ that Provision of a Peace Dividend local organizations could apply to for funding The cornerstone of a donor strategy to support the for socialization activities. peace process should be the provision of widespread n Utilize the Kecamatan Development Program's development programming in areas previously comprehensive network. affected by conflict. Complimentary peace dividend n Hireanother45InformationFacilitators(FKIs) activities in the immediate, medium, and longer-term in order to expand their coverage to include all could include: of Aceh. n Highly visible immediate activities: Bringing People in to the Process - rebuilding and/or repainting health posts and A major weakness of the Helsinki process has been schools (the latter were often targeted in the the lack of involvement ofAcehnese civil society. Their conflict); inclusion in implementing the peace process is of - rebuilding bridges (many destroyed by conflict) particular importance. Multiple ways for ensuring their through cash-for-work programs; and, inclusion exist. Some include: - clearing trails to forest gardens (many of which became inaccessible due to the conflict). 3 n Medium term: We suggest that more money is n Concentrate on processes as well as outputs put through the next round of KDP across Aceh The processes development programs utilize are to ensure that all villages receive a project more likely to contribute to sustainable peace than through the program. their outputs. n 2006-onwards:SPADAcouldbeexpandedtothe n Built-in complaints mechanisms remaining districts in Aceh; if the first round of Clear and transparent complaints mechanisms can SPADA is successful, more money could be put help to prevent conflicts when problems do occur. through the program n A focus on ensuring transparency and n Livelihoodsprogramming. accountability to limit corruption and suspicion n Use independent civil society Institution Building Civil society is surprisingly strong, if over-stretched, There is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of in many districts of Aceh. It is a vital resource. governance in Aceh. Further, the MoU maps out n Don't forget the Government significant changes to the structure of governance in Long-term and sustainable strategies necessitate the Aceh. Donors should support a transition to involvement of Government at the provincial and accountable, transparent and participatory governance district levels. in Aceh. Concrete support could include: n Provide support to field staff Field staff, such as local facilitators, are often over- n Providetechnicalandfundingsupportforthose looked. In a conflict context they are on the front- responsible for the implementation of the MoU's lines and thus require extra support. Consider: governance agenda. conflict resolution and negotiation training; strong n CommissionaPublicExpenditureReviewatthe and responsive reporting structures; and early provincial and district levels. warning information systems for when things go n Strengthen and support Rakorbang wrong. (Development Coordination Meetings). n Support the establishment of a joint team to Conclusions monitor and control illegal logging. n Commission a comprehensive needs assessment The unprecedented response (national and international) of the justice sector. Specifically, focus on both to the tsunami has created opportunities for a response the capacity of the Courts and Prosecutor's Office to the conflict in Aceh. Human resources and aid to "supply" justice as well as the capacity of civil delivery mechanisms are already in place. In many society and communities to "demand" justice. The parts ofAceh, those affected by conflict, and especially World Bank's Justice for the Poor program, through those in the mountainous interior, are now worse off the SPADA project, already has a component in than those who were directly impacted by the tsunami. Aceh which focuses on the latter. Villages in conflict-afflicted areas, and particularly in n Commission a comprehensive needs assessment the rural mountainous interior, have received almost of the security sector. Lessons could be learnt from no development aid from government, NGOs or a World Bank participatory research program that international donors while the conflict has raged. The looked at how police at the district and sub-district improvement in security that the peace process, if level in East Java and Flores learn and respond to successful, will bring, provides new opportunities for problems reaching some of the poorest people in Aceh. Conflict-Sensitive Development Principles The Helsinki agreement represents the best chance for It is important that development interventions are peace Aceh has had for years. The World Bank, and implemented in ways that take into account the history others, should devote resources (human and financial) of conflict and how development interventions interact to helping to make sure that it succeeds. with conflict dynamics. Development actors in Aceh should consider the following conflict-sensitive development principles: n Distributional issues and targeting Programs targeted at particular population groups, at the expense of others, are more likely to be problematic than those targeted more widely. n Community-drivenapproaches Community projects that use demand-driven approaches are more likely to reflect actual community needs and receive buy-in. 1.Report by Patrick Barron, Samuel Clark and Muslahuddin Daud 4