84860 Social Accountability and Demand for Good Governance Case Study Series January 2014 Designing and Implementing a Capacity Building Program for Social Accountability: Lessons from Cambodia’s Program to Enhance Capacity in Social Accountability Social accountability (SA) refers to the extent and capability of citizens to hold the state accountable and make it responsive to their needs. Although its importance for better governance and reducing corruption is being increasingly recognized, many non-state actors (NSAs) do not have sufficient capacity to effectively engage in SA activities. Consequently, capacity building of NSAs is essential for strengthening SA, and in many countries, demand for programs to build such capacity is growing. The Program to Enhance Capacity in Social Accountability (PECSA) in Cambodia is an example of this type of program. Launched in May 2007, and completed in June 2010, PECSA was a US$2 million grant program managed by the World Bank on behalf of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). It was comprised of a range of capacity-building activities, including formal training, mentoring and coaching, exposure visits, and networking as well as grants for implementation of pilots to apply SA tools on the ground. Over its three-year implementation, PECSA trained a total of 218 civil society organizations (CSOs), CSO leaders, and government officials; awarded 31 grants to 29 CSOs for pilot projects; and convened three large national networking events that brought approximately 1,600 SA practitioners together. The independent end-term evaluation of PECSA revealed a high degree of satisfaction with the program from beneficiaries and PECSA graduates. Fifty-six percent of end-term survey respondents planned to continue working on SA after the close of the program. As a successful capacity-building program on SA implemented in an otherwise difficult governance context, PECSA can offer several insights and lessons that may be helpful to teams designing similar SA programs in the future. Summarizing these lessons is the purpose of this note. Introduction—An Increasing Demand for Social The Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy of Accountability Capacity Building the World Bank (the Bank) has emphasized the important complementary role that NSAs play in their demand-side Addressing governance challenges requires not only gov- push for governance reforms, particularly in challenging ernment action and commitment, but also an active demand governance environments. In its 2012 update, the GAC Strat- for good governance and accountability from citizens and egy gave SA a more central role in the Bank’s agenda because civil society. Social accountability refers to the broad range of of its potential to contribute to effective governance by actions and mechanisms beyond voting that citizens can use strengthening institutions and country systems. But in sev- to help government be more effective and accountable. SA eral countries, efforts by the Bank to engage with NSAs on also encompasses actions on the part of the government, civil governance issues have been constrained by their limited society, the media, and other societal actors that promote and capacity and experience engaging in this specific arena. facilitate these efforts. Consequently, an increasing need and demand from several countries (e.g., Madagascar, Nepal, Mongolia, Kenya, and limited, especially with respect to governance. The alterna- Dominican Republic) emerged for capacity-building pro- tive and more constructive venues for government-citizen grams to introduce SA concepts, tools, and examples to NSAs engagement that SA mechanisms can offer were therefore that could be applied in specific contexts. PECSA, which was seen as an increasingly appealing option by the RGC. implemented in Cambodia between 2007 and 2010, is an Institutional changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s example of this kind of capacity-building program. in Cambodia included a proliferation of CSOs. By the mid-2000s, there were about 2,000 nongovernmental orga- The Cambodian Context and How PECSA nizations (NGOs) in Cambodia.3 Relations between the gov- Came to Be ernment and CSOs have remained contentious, especially Over the last decade-and-a-half, Cambodia has achieved regarding issues of corruption, good governance and social impressive economic growth and poverty reduction despite accountability, natural resource management, and land grab- the postconflict reconstruction challenges following the bing. Nonetheless, by the mid- to late-2000s, many CSOs had demise of the Khmer Rouge. Still, the governance environ- earned the trust of the RGC on a number of social develop- ment in the country remains weak, manifesting in a low- ment issues by working jointly on service delivery, particu- quality public administration and high levels of corruption.1 larly in the health and education sectors.4 While there were still some major gaps, this experience helped the govern- Because of this, it has been widely acknowledged that ment recognize the importance of continuing to cooperate improving governance is the key development challenge for with CSOs in providing service delivery. continued high economic growth and poverty reduction in Cambodia. Consequently, the National Strategic Devel- A study of civil society’s role in SA conducted by the opment Plan and the Rectangular Strategy2 of Cambodia Bank5 in Cambodia argued that CSOs could play a strong role in governance, having made important contributions to (2006–10) had improvement of governance, including the the emergence of a democratic culture in the country, espe- fight against corruption, at the center of their development cially through awareness-raising and training activities. But strategies. In this context, the RGC initiated a number of the study also pointed out that the capacities of Cambodian governance reforms with the aim of increasing the effi- CSOs had been limited in the governance arena and that ciency and effectiveness of government. While most of these there had been little institutionalized interaction between reforms were traditional supply-side interventions such as Cambodian CSOs and the government. public financial management or civil service and administra- tive reforms, over the past decade, there was also a nascent When the idea of PECSA and other demand for good attempt to introduce more demand-side governance measures governance (DFGG) initiatives were being floated with the aimed at improving transparency, participation, and civic RGC in 2006–07, the Cambodian People’s Party had won an engagement—or in other words, social accountability. PECSA absolute majority at the national level. For the first time in is an example of such an intervention. over a decade, there was a noncoalition government at the national level. This led to a greater inclination on the part Several contextual and political economy factors explain of the RGC to promote transparency, accountability, and the emergence of PECSA. Considering the country context participation of NSAs on governance issues.6 Concurrently, from a broad perspective, by the mid-2000s, the demo- though limited in number, there were both individuals and graphic and economic situation in Cambodia had changed ministries within the government more open to SA-type quite significantly since the times of conflict. A burgeoning reforms. These factors created a window of opportunity for middle class had emerged with a younger population; many the Bank to work with the RGC on SA. had grown up in peaceful times. At the same time, labor and peasant classes were becoming more vocal in their frustra- Perhaps the most immediate contextual factor that helped tions about sensitive issues like land grabbing by demon- provide the impetus for the Bank’s engagement with the strating through strikes and even violence. In this context, RGC on governance was a series of corruption scandals engagement between government and citizens remained that emerged in a number of Bank-financed projects in the 2 About PECSA  he Demand for Good Governance Project Box 1. T in Cambodia PECSA was originally set up to be a two-year program financed by a US$2 million grant from the Low Income Financed by a US$20 million IDA grant, the DFGG project was Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Trust Fund managed by intended to enhance the demand for good governance in priority the World Bank.8 Because of the need to maintain a certain reform areas by strengthening institutions, supporting partner- degree of independence from the government to minimize ships, and sharing lessons. The DFGG project is based on the the perception of political capture and associated risks for following three components: (1) support to state institutions; this particular SA facility, it was agreed that PECSA would (2) support to NSAs (i.e., grant provision component); and (3) be managed by an independent agency. Given the Bank’s coordination and learning. Similar to PECSA, grants are provided experience with SA, which was still a relatively new concept to NSAs to implement DFGG activities under Component 2. Three in Cambodia, the RGC agreed that PECSA would be exe- different grant sizes are provided: small (up to US$15,000); me- cuted by the Bank. This arrangement ensured the quality of dium (US$15,000–150,000); and large (US$50,000–150,000). the program, giving it neutral space to remain independent from both government and civil society. In fact, RGC officials More information on the DFGG project can be found at the World saw in PECSA an opportunity for themselves to become ben- Bank’s Projects and Operations website;a information on its grant eficiaries by learning about SA, building capacity for it, and provision component can also be found on the project’s NSA Com- developing a constructive engagement with civil society. ponent’s website.b A series of DFGG learning notes,c developed by the NSA Component’s Secretariat, provide additional informa- Five program components were prepared to make PECSA tion and lessons learned from its SA activities, following those of a comprehensive capacity-building program: (1) Training PECSA.c and Capacity Building; (2) Tools Development and Action a. http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P101156/demand-good-governance-project?lang=en. Learning; (3) Networking and Resource Center; (4) Monitor- b. http://www.dfgg-nsac.org/. ing, Evaluation and Learning; and (5) Program Management. c. http://www.dfgg-nsac.org/en/resources/dfgg-learning-notes. Together, the components would create a capacity-building cycle that followed formal training and mentoring with grants for pilot SA approaches, and then worked toward net- mid-2000s. This brought governance and anticorruption working and the creation of resource centers to help improve efforts to the forefront of the Bank’s Country Assistance learning and effectiveness (figure 1). Strategy for 2005–08, a pillar of which was dedicated to pro- moting citizen partnerships for better governance. Within Component 1—Training and Capacity Building the dialogue that ensued around this pillar, a series of social (Budget: US$633,908; US$483,908 from LICUS + US$100,000 accountability initiatives were launched in partnership with from World Bank Institute-Affiliated Network for Social the RGC, including analytical work on SA,7 an International Accountability + US$50,000 from AusAID)9 Development Association (IDA)-financed DFGG project (box 1), and a capacity-building program for SA—PECSA. Component 1 was aimed at providing training to mem- The specific case for PECSA emerged during consultations bers of civil society, the media, and government on SA with several leading local CSOs who felt that exposure to approaches and tools. When designing this component, the international SA tools and mechanisms would be of great task team needed to make decisions about the component’s value. The DFGG project, which was then forthcoming, was focus. The first decision involved the training format: the also meant to have a grant window for SA work by NSAs. length and depth of the training (e.g., a general overview of Therefore, a training program on SA that would take place numerous tools and concepts, detailed guidance on specific during the preparation period of the DFGG project could mechanisms, and the like). The second decision related to ensure the emergence of high-quality and informed SA grant the audience (e.g., the type of audience the trainings should proposals. And so, PECSA was seen as a natural precursor to target and if the audience should be made up of representa- the DFGG project. tive individuals or entire organizations). The third decision 3 Figure 1: Capacity-Building Cycle and PECSA Components Component 4: Component 1: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Training and Capacity Building Implementation: Implementation: Coalition of local and international Local NGO and international CSOs research institutes Target Audience: Component 5: SAS: Institutional and individual Project Management Training (SAS and practitioners from CSOs, media, Implementation: Specialized and government new to SA Seasoned management team on the Workshops) and Specialized Workshops: Institutional ground Mentoring, Coaching, and individual practitioners familiar Exchange Visits (MCEV) with SA MCEV: Selected SAS graduates M&E, Learning, and Action Learning Information Sharing through Pilot Tests Project Managment (Grants Facility) Component 3: Component 2: Networking & Resource Center Tools Development and Action Learning Implementation: Implementation: Local NGO with existing regional Networking International NGO and grant networks decision-making by Grant-Making Target Audience: Committee Grassroots and national CSOs Target Audience: CSOs wanting to plan and implement SA activities/projects (competitive basis) • Goal: Improved governance leading to poverty reduction and sustained economic growth • Development Objective: To enable civil society practitioners to effectively promote and implement SA approaches • Key Processes: Choice and delivery of training programs, grant-making procedures, networking, and information exchange events related to the trainers: who should develop and implement and examples of SA to a selected group of practitioners.10 the training curriculum? Should it be done by local or inter- These schools proved very useful in providing a concrete national organizations and/or experts? orientation to participants on social accountability. This general training was then complemented by in-depth train- There are advantages and disadvantages to each consid- ings on specific SA tools, including social audits and gender- eration and there are no “right” and “wrong” answers. In budget analysis.11 Various learning events12 and exchanges the case of PECSA, several of the issues were addressed by for practitioners were provided at the SASs, and the in-depth combining options to complement one other. With regard to training made this classroom-based learning interactive and the format for training, the team used several pedagogical practical. approaches to allow training opportunities not only to be interactive classroom-based learning, but also to be based Similarly, with regard to the audience, PECSA targeted on hands-on learning experiences as well as direct coaching both individuals and institutions for training in the hopes of and mentoring. For example, PECSA designed two-to-three- producing and identifying SA champions and institutional- week comprehensive Social Accountability Schools (SASs) izing the culture of SA within specific organizations. More- with the aim of providing an overview of general concepts over, the training not only targeted civil society members but 4 also media and government practitioners. All participants local NGO with experience in capacity building, was also were selected through an open application process adver- hired for the project, a decision that would eventually prove tised in local media combined with targeted invitations. essential to the success of the training component. Final selections were made by PECSA partners13 based on In addition to the in-country training and learning events, criteria that included regional diversity, grassroots presence, Monitoring, Coaching, and Exposure Visits (MCEV) were sector affiliation, and previous SA experience. provided. These hands-on learning experiences were meant With regard to who should design and implement the to complement the interactive classroom-based learning of training, PECSA first decided to rely on two international the SASs as well as the brief in-depth trainings. A total of 27 CSO networks that could draw on their own experiences on SAS graduates were selected to participate in a MCEV either SA as well as on their networks of CSO partners: the Ateneo to India or to the Philippines.15 During the MCEV to the Phil- School of Government (ASoG) in the Philippines, which ippines, as an example, participants visited the Province of houses the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability Abra to learn about the experience of the Concerned Citizens in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP) region,14 and the of Abra for Good Government, globally acknowledged for Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), based in its best practices regarding SA and anticorruption. Online India. The idea was to import international best practices or onsite mentoring of MCEV participants by SA practitio- on SA into Cambodia. However, it soon became clear that ners from CSOs and other agencies in related program areas having a local partner with a greater understanding of the in India and the Philippines was also provided. One great country context—one that could resolve language and trans- advantage of the MCEV was that participants were almost lation related concerns and gain country ownership of the immediately prepared to begin applying their learning program—would be of enormous value. Thus, SILAKA, a through SA pilots back in Cambodia (box 2). Box 2. Spreading a Culture of SA—From Learning to Project Implementation through PECSA Venerable Thorn Vandong, the Executive Director of the Buddhist and Society Development Association (BSDA), graduated from the first SAS and was also selected to participate in the MCEV to India through PECSA. After gaining SA knowledge and skills through learning components offered under PECSA, BSDA applied for grants provided by ANSA-EAP. The grant proposal BSDA submitted was awarded with US$20,000 from ANSA-EAP to spread the culture of SA at the community and commune level. The project consisted of two components: the exercise of SA tools, such as participatory planning and citizen feedback mechanisms, and the promotion of civic engagement through village and commune meetings and forums. The project was implemented in the 15 communes of Kampong Siem district in Kampong Cham Province beginning in February 2009. The BSDA project succeeded in establishing 15 information boards and citizen feedback collection boxes for each targeted commune and in creating templates for citizen report cards on service delivery. Taking this initiative further, the commune councils developed their own citizen report card templates to conduct feedback surveys on education services. Even though the project encountered some difficulties in implementation (e.g., illiteracy and limited capacity and understanding of governance and social accountability among staff, commune councils, and citizens of target community), by June 2009, the participatory planning activity of the project had mobilized a total of 1,123 citizens—of which 284 were female—to be engaged in the commune planning process. The project also moderated village and commune meetings on a regular basis to discuss emerging issues within the communes, using a participatory approach. Because greater trust was built through the project, the BSDA-led citizen feedback boxes started receiving 40–50 messages per month, and the issues raised in them are discussed at subsequent commune meetings. In fact, this redress mechanism is the reason why community members submitted messages in the feedback boxes. BSDA received subsequent funding of US$13,899 from the DFGG project to continue its implementation of citizen report cards. Source: PECSA Newsletter 2009; ANSA-EAP Case Reports; Interviews with PECSA and DFGG project Task Team Leaders. 5 By the end of the program, PECSA completed three and adapt SA approaches and tools best suited for the Cam- rounds of the SASs and four specialized trainings.16 In total, bodian context and to complete the piloting process more 218 participants from 148 institutions were trained. Of the quickly than medium-size grants would have. Subsequently, SAS participants, 77 percent were from local CSOs. A total of the small grants enabled the program to reach more SAS 202 SAS graduates went on to receive the specialized train- graduates, helping to “plant the seeds” of SA.18 Medium-size ing modules for more in-depth learning after each round of grants were then provided by the later DFGG project.19 the SAS. According to the end-term evaluation of PECSA, One important decision the PECSA task team had to the inclusive nature of the training—that is, the inclusion of make was about the implementing agency for this program both CSO and government members as well as national and component. It was agreed by both RGC and the Bank that it local CSOs—added substantial value by building bridges of would be better to have an NSA manage this grant-making trust between them. A random end-term survey of PECSA activity to enhance its independence, impartiality, and cred- graduates conducted several months after the last formal ibility. This arrangement also allowed the RGC and the Bank training found that 74 percent of the PECSA trainees (n=31) to act as oversight institutions instead of implementing exhibited correct knowledge of SA, and 58 percent reported agencies. It was further agreed that, given capacity and neu- improved access to SA-related information and resources. trality concerns, an international NSA would be the favored ASoG noted in its final report on the program that the choice. As a result, and based on a competitive selection trainings provided an important opportunity—not only to process, The Asia Foundation (TAF), an international NGO learn about SA—but also to learn about each other in a spirit with expertise in the region and on the topic of SA, was of trust-building (e.g., CSO representatives becoming more selected to run PECSA’s grant component. It is important to familiar with the Cambodian bureaucracy and government note, though, that in order to maintain country ownership representatives becoming more open toward CSOs). The and transparency of the selection process, TAF’s role did not SASs also facilitated a space for constructive engagement include the actual selection of grantees. The selection process between CSO members and government—a positive side- was conducted by an independent grant-making committee benefit of this component. This played out most clearly in (GMC). TAF was responsible for the administration and terms of the development of SA pilot initiatives around par- management of the grant process, including due diligence, monitoring, and oversight of grants as well as the provision ticipatory planning and budgeting by CSOs with endorse- of hands-on support for SA activities to the grantees during ments from provincial governments; these were funded the pilot implementation. through Component 2. Component 2—Tools Development and Action Learning The independent multistakeholder GMC was formed in order to ensure country ownership and a fair and transpar- (Budget: US$552,332 from LICUS) ent selection process for grantees. It was comprised of seven This grant-making component, built on the first compo- civil society representatives and two members from the gov- nent, was aimed at providing opportunities for SAS gradu- ernment. GMC candidates were identified by a search com- ates to practice their newly acquired knowledge in real-life mittee composed of representatives from the RGC, the World Bank, TAF, and Cambodian civil society represented by the pilots. CSOs that were not participating in the SASs but that NGO Forum, one of the largest NSA networks in Cambodia. had an interest in working with SA tools were also invited to The candidates were confirmed by His Excellency Deputy submit project proposals. Prime Minister Sar Kheng, who was also leading the Ministry PECSA initially planned to provide both small (up to of Interior.20 Prior to the formation of the committee, all GMC US$15,000) and medium-size (up to US$50,000) grants, but members were required to sign a code of conduct, commit- delays in the launch of this component17 led the task team to ting to professional principles, such as selflessness, integrity, focus solely on small grants, which would be easier to handle objectivity, accountability, confidentiality, openness, honesty, administratively because they reduce financial burdens on and leadership. As noted in the Implementation Comple- CSOs as well as any associated financial risks. Small grants tion Memorandum of PECSA, this was a critical part of the also provided opportunities for Cambodian CSOs to choose process for sustaining the independence of GMC. It was a 6 preventative measure to avoid any perception of politi- According to the Project Completion Report submitted cal capture, favoritism, or potential of conflict of interest21 by TAF, projects funded through this component included by GMC members. The GMC reviewed grant applications ones that promoted citizen participation in commune coun- and selected grantees based on detailed scoring guidelines22 cil activities, monitoring of basic service delivery, and other developed by TAF. SA tools (box 4). By the end of the program, two rounds of small grants, Component 3—Networking and Resource Centers together amounting to approximately US$450,000, were pro- (Budget: US$678,760; US$578,760 from LICUS + US$100,000 vided to total of 31 projects with 29 selected organizations in from AusAID) 20 provinces covering central, northwestern, and southern Cambodia. The grantees were a mix of local, regional, and The third component of PECSA supported the building national organizations; many were working with informal of regional networks among CSOs working on SA. For this, community associations and neighborhood groups or clubs PECSA decided to partner with Star Kampuchea, a local (box 3). Overall, 174 applications were received, demonstrat- network NGO. Star Kampuchea already had regional CSO ing the enormous demand for SA grants. Among the 14 orga- networks in place as part of its own programs, so PECSA nizations receiving grants for the first round, nine were led did not need to create many new networks from scratch. Star by SAS graduates, displaying the continuity between PECSA Kampuchea also had experience in facilitating networking components. activities and providing coaching to its members.  ultimedia Citizen Engagement Campaign for Awareness Raising Box 3. M The Women’s Media Center of Cambodia is one of the successful small-grant-winning local NGOs of PECSA’s first and second rounds as well as the subsequent DFGG project’s medium- and large-grant windows. With PECSA funding, the Citizen Engagement Campaign was the implemented. This project aimed to provide citizens—especially women—with reliable information about legal and development issues including domestic violence, land conflicts, women’s health, migration, and participatory governance through radio, television dramas, and the Women’s Media Center of Cambodia website. This multimedia approach was intended to address the lack of access to information in targeted communities. The project was implemented in the outskirt districts of Phnom Penh and Pursat Province, targeting over 200 viewers and listeners from 20 community clubs established through the project. Additionally, the village community generally benefited from the project because they were invited to join the community club for drama-viewing and radio-listening meetings as well as discussion sessions. As they learned about the project, village chiefs encouraged the village community to participate. A total of seven radio shows and 10 television dramas were developed through the project, each focusing on different topics and involving local authorities such as village chiefs, commune councils, and commune chiefs. The drama-viewing and radio show-listening sessions were always followed by discussions led by trained facilitators. This allowed participants to increase their understanding of social issues (e.g., health, pregnancy and family planning, and drugs), legal procedures, good governance, and the importance of participation in local development processes. The project brought several critical benefits to targeted communes. According to interviews with the commune councils and chiefs, the level of domestic violence decreased as villagers were educated on the topic through the project. Lvea Em, one of the commune chiefs, reported that women became more vocal in expressing their views and that in general villagers started to participate more fully in com- mune meetings after learning about participatory development through the project. While affecting behavioral change in all community members is a difficult task, the Women’s Media Center of Cambodia’s Citizen Engagement Campaign certainly raised awareness on impor- tant social issues and brought some positive changes to targeted communities. Source: PECSA Case Studies Report, Economic Institute of Cambodia 2010. 7 Box 4. Examples of Activities Funded through the Small Grants Mechanism, by SA Focus Area Pilot projects supported by PECSA’s small grant mechanism were successfully implemented in 20 provinces, introducing SA approaches and strategies at the national and subnational level. The focus areas of the projects ranged from natural resource management and private sec- tor governance to decentralized service delivery. Many projects focused on access to information as it relates to transparency; monitoring as it relates to accountability; and mediation as it relates to participation. Access to Information. The Cambodian Civil Society Assessment conducted by the Bank determined that the information networks in Cambodia were extremely weak. Reflecting this result, the greatest number of PECSA-funded pilots focused on promoting access to infor- mation and monitoring. For instance, seven grantee organizations from the first round adopted innovative approaches to promote access to information related to local governance. One such organization, the Cambodian Center for Independent Media, developed a call-in radio talk show that exposed gaps in service delivery in order to provide citizens a platform to pressure government officials to improve service delivery. Monitoring. Grantees applied both qualitative and quantitative SA tools to monitor service delivery, including community report cards, surveys, and focus group discussions. For example, both Amara (Cambodian Women’s Network for Development) and the National Prosperity Association implemented citizen report cards and were able to gain commitments from the provincial departments for undertaking regular monitoring to improve the performance of local health units. Mediation. PECSA grants supported one participatory mediation project by the Khmer Institute of Democracy for both first and second rounds. The Khmer Institute of Democracy provided an alternative conflict resolution to community members in seven provinces on a range of issues including land law, family law, and domestic abuse; it also held community outreach activities for awareness-raising. Based on the success of this pilot and its potential for a scale, the Khmer Institute of Democracy was continuously funded by the succeeding DFGG project (first round: US$129,000) and implementing projects in nine provinces. Source: TAF Project Completion Report for PECSA. Through this program component, networking and knowl- Component 4—Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning; edge exchange events at different levels were provided: three Component 5—Program Management national networking events, the first of which was also the (Budget for Component 4: US$100,000 from LICUS; Budget formal launch of PECSA; three regional networking events; for Component 5: US$205,000 from LICUS) one regional skills building and peer learning event; and one Social Accountability School Alumni Network23 event. The Tasks within the fourth component, Monitoring, Evalu- final report on the networking activities by Star Kampuchea ation, and Learning, consisted of establishing a results stated that provincial-level networks demonstrated varied framework, conducting a baseline analysis, and performing signs of activity, some showing more promise than others. In an ex-post evaluation for PECSA at the completion of the some provinces, for instance, the governor’s representatives program. The key question the task team needed to consider participated in civil society practitioner network meetings, when designing the program’s monitoring and evaluation agreed to host meetings jointly, and participated in com- (M&E) was how robust an evaluation methodology could be munity dialogues on SA. Such partnerships helped cultivate for a program with diverse activities targeting a relatively local government–civil society cooperation in the areas of qualitative notion like “capacity building.” Monitoring was decentralization, deconcentration, good governance, and SA. also critical to providing feedback that could help refine and improve the program on an ongoing basis. For instance, con- ducting exit interviews of each of the training rounds served 8 to inform the next round of training and also helped adjust The fifth and final component of PECSA, Program Man- the format for the mentoring used. agement, was key to the success of the program. PECSA had a specialized team of experts stationed at the country Because of the complexity of the program and qualitative office to manage the program. Two seasoned international nature of program activities, the M&E methodology included mixed methods, combining literature review, organizational program coordinators who were also CSO leaders led the profile analysis, organizational timeline, semistructured local PECSA team on the day-to-day management of the pro- interviews with organizational heads and selected individ- gram with occasional technical support from the Bank task ual practitioners, focus groups, and a quantitative survey. team in Washington, DC.25 The role of the coordinators was to manage and coordinate the work of the other four com- PECSA decided to contract this project component to a ponents and to establish links between the World Bank, the coalition of local and international research organizations: donor community in Cambodia, and other partners around the Economic Institute of Cambodia—a local Cambodian issues relating to PECSA and SA more generally. This on-the- think-tank—and Catalyst Management Service of India— ground presence with respected regional CSO leaders at the an international consulting firm. While both organizations helm helped PECSA gain immediate credibility and respect were in charge of the overall M&E, each partner agency was among the local CSO community. responsible for different components, including data collec- tion of components allocated. In this way, identified lessons learned from monitoring could be more easily fed back into Key Challenges the management of each component and into the design PECSA was a complex and innovative capacity-building of the materials and curriculum used in the SASs without program that allowed funding provisions to CSOs and concerns about coordination between the partner organiza- required engagement with various stakeholders. For these tions. Additionally, the lessons learned from PECSA’s M&E informed the design of the succeeding DFGG project. reasons, the task team of PECSA encountered some unique implementation challenges, some of which are summarized The end-of program evaluation by the Economic Institute below with the goal of better supporting future task teams of Cambodia and Catalyst Management Service relied on a engaged in similar capacity-building programs. stratified random sample survey of PECSA beneficiaries who were identified in terms of their characteristics (e.g., whether 1. Relationship Between Government and Civil Society. local or national CSOs and whether from Phnom Penh or a Addressing governance challenges requires government province) as well as their involvement in PECSA (e.g., if they action and commitment as well as an active demand for only attended the training, if they received grants, or if they good governance and accountability from citizens and civil attended MCEV programs). society. PECSA was launched by a request and commitment from the RGC to improve demand-side governance; the gov- The evaluation showed that participants of PECSA ernment was ready to start engaging with CSOs to cultivate assessed the program as having been most relevant in terms constructive government-citizen relationships for better of strengthening existing SA work within their organiza- tions and reported that it was highly effective in enabling governance and enhanced SA. Still, during the life of PECSA them to implement what they had learned. The training and since, there continued to be contentious issues such as and capacity-building component was particularly well the introduction of a new NGO law and several cases of land received—participants said it improved their confidence in grabbing that tested its ability to foster constructive state–cit- dealing with SA approaches. The majority of participating izen engagement in the governance arena. Therefore, while organizations in the survey (93 percent) indicated plans to there was a certain degree of willingness and commitment use SA tools and approaches in future activities and projects from the government for SA, the fragile government–civil with their organizations; these claims were validated during society relationship prevented SA activities to realize their their subsequent engagement with the DFGG project.24 full potential during the course of PECSA implementation.26 9 2. Synergy between PECSA Components. As stated in CSOs—particularly human rights agencies—that felt their the prior section, PECSA was designed to link each project concerns were not being adequately addressed. The criticism component by following the Capacity-Building Cycle (figure was partly due to a lack of understanding among CSOs about 1). In reality, though, creating linkages between some of the the Bank’s mandate to work with and through client govern- PECSA’s project components during implementation proved ments for development. A gap between the Bank and CSOs challenging, partly due to the unexpected delay of the grant in understanding how much change a capacity-building component (Component 2). Not having all program compo- program such as PECSA could bring also contributed to the nents running on time was a missed opportunity to create criticism. This indicates that further outreach and clarifica- synergy between components. tions are needed to manage expectations. It also shows that the process of consulting stakeholders should be sustained, Another side of the challenge was to link Components something future teams should bear in mind. 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and to ensure coordination among the implementing organizations. Originally, ASoG and PRIA 4. Challenges Related to Language and the Concept of were responsible for serving as implementing agencies for Social Accountability in Local Contexts. As noted in the final Component 1—Training and Capacity Building. Coinciden- report on SASs from PRIA, one challenge that implementa- tally, around the same time, ANSA-EAP was launched, being tion teams encountered involved the translation of learning housed at ASoG. Through this channel, ASoG had an oppor- materials—not simply the literal translation of documents, tunity to support Star Kampuchea, the local implementing but efforts to translate SA terminologies and the very notion agency of Component 3—Networking and Resource Cen- of SA in a way that made sense in local contexts. During the ters—on networking activities at the provincial level for implementation of PECSA, it became evident that Cambo- ANSA-EAP. While this was unintentional and there were dian CSOs had more experience in SA than the team origi- some attempts for coordination between implementing and nally expected, but they did not use SA terminology. This funding organizations, this could have been better facilitated language gap had to be closed with effective translation. In in order to maximize the effect of each activity and to create the case of PECSA, a team of international and local imple- synergies. menting agencies worked side-by-side during the project preparation phase to generate terminologies and methods Coordination of this kind, especially with five different to explain concepts like “social accountability,” “empower- partners—as was the case of PECSA— is always challenging, ment,” and “active citizenship,” in the local Khmer language. but the lesson here is that coordination and prior consulta- Finding equivalent terms and concepts that made sense in tions among the project implementing agencies and agencies the Cambodian context was not an easy task because some of providing funding on planned SA activities should be con- the available terms in the Khmer language had associations ducted on a regular basis. Coordination efforts among part- with the Khmer Rouge. This linguistic issue was repeatedly ner agencies are likely to make the capacity-building project raised during implementation, despite the early efforts dur- implementation run smoothly and create stronger synergies ing the preparation phase. The team noted, however, that among project components. the initial intensive discussions about terminologies and concepts helped them strategically select a basic but key 3. CSO Consultations. If SA capacity building is to work, vocabulary early in the implementation phase. it must be customized to local contexts rather than being mere replications of international best practices. In order 5. Procurement and Legal Issues of Bank-Financed Pro- for this to happen, consultations with local stakeholders— grams. Issues of procurement and legal arrangements were including CSOs, government, and other donors27—must the most difficult operational challenges the PECSA task be continuously undertaken from the predesign stage team faced, and they provided the most important lessons throughout implementation. PECSA became one of the for future Bank task teams. As a capacity-building program, most well-consulted projects in the Bank portfolio in Cam- PECSA was effective because it not only contained training bodia because of the continuous stakeholder consultation opportunities (Component 1—Training and Capacity Build- efforts. Despite this, PECSA received criticism from several ing) but also learning-by-doing opportunities for practitioners 10 to pilot recently learned knowledge and skills (Component similar projects should develop an appropriate procurement 2—Tools Development and Action Learning). These two and liability agreement in consultation with the legal and components complemented one another. But because Com- financial teams and plan on a minimum of six months to sort ponent 2 was aimed at funding CSOs rather than the Bank’s out and set up procurement and legal arrangements for the traditional clients (governments), and because the grant grant provision component. component was administered by a separate entity (TAF) but the entire PECSA was executed by the Bank on behalf of the Lessons from PECSA for Future RGC, a combined procurement cum legal issue emerged. Capacity-Building Programs From a procurement perspective, the issue was whether 1. Training of Government Officials. A capacity-building to see TAF as a “contractor” or as an “implementing agency” program on SA like PECSA could be beneficial in postcon- of the grant provision component, which would make it a flict countries or countries with pronounced democratic defi- “sub-grantee” of PECSA. From a legal perspective, the chal- cits. In these environments, not only CSO practitioners but lenge was deciding who would be held liable for any mis- also government officials at different levels of the govern- use of sub-grants: the RGC, the legal recipient of the LICUS ment structure could gain knowledge of SA and participa- grant; the World Bank, because PECSA was Bank-executed; tory governance through capacity-building programs. At the or TAF, the administrator of the grant component. A solution end of the day, good governance requires combined efforts was ultimately reached in consultation with the Bank’s legal from governments as well as CSOs and citizens. Based on and financial teams, first to split the overall LICUS grant allo- this idea, PECSA welcomed both CSO representatives and cated for PECSA into two parts—one for PECSA overall and government officials for its training component. A few gov- another for the grant-making component specifically. This ernment officials participated in the SAS training alongside made the grant component a standalone project that was CSO representatives, contributing to some level of trust- “recipient executed,” resolving the procurement concern by building between them. However, government officials were making TAF a formal implementing agency/sub-grantee not considered for capacity-building opportunities beyond of the LICUS grant. It also meant that one financial layer of SASs (e.g., the MCEV study tour), nor were they eligible legal liability was removed from the use of funds because an additional account for this specific grant component was for the action-learning (small grant) component, although set up, independent from the rest of the PECSA grant.28 In many CSO grantees worked directly with local government terms of liability, while the Bank would provide oversight, officials. No direct incentives were given to government offi- the legal liability of sub-grantee funds would be with TAF, cials to participate in SA activities. And the fragile govern- with the agreement that TAF would only administer the ment–citizen relationship in the country also dampened the grant and that its core legal responsibility would be to pro- participation of government officials in PECSA. Because of vide adequate due diligence and supervision in the process, these factors, knowledge and understanding toward SA and so the possibility of grant misuse by sub-grantees can be good governance did not penetrate deeply among govern- prevented and minimized. TAF, therefore, would not have to ment officials through PECSA, leaving trained CSO practi- repay costs associated with sub-grantee misuse beyond their tioners to take on SA issues on their own. Toward the end of control if such cases occur. the program, PECSA managed to provide a training session on SA for government officials, but this was too late to have Because of the procurement and legal issues, not all pro- much of an effect on the work of PECSA grantees. gram components under PECSA started on time. In fact, the grant component only came into effect in late 2008. As noted Therefore, a recommendation is to engage in a more delib- earlier, this delay also meant that the medium-size grant erate strategy to influence government officials in the SA component of PECSA was cancelled.29 Not having all the pro- training such as SASs. Task teams can be innovative regard- gram components up and running as planned was a missed ing the content of such a strategy—especially in order to opportunity for PECSA. One recommendation emerging include senior government officials in the trainings because from this challenge is that future task teams involved in this could subsequently lead to institutional change. For 11 example, a certain number of slots30 could be set aside in the a “thousand flowers bloom” strategy is useful in the early training for the participation of senior government officials, stages of nurturing SA work, but greater sectoral focus soon a shorter SA course could be provided to accommodate busy becomes imperative to maximize impact.31 These are addi- senior government officials, and a one-day course exclusive tional areas where PECSA missed opportunities. to senior government officials and CSO representatives Additionally, SA in some of the priority areas, such as could be arranged. Likewise, incentives such as study tours public financial management, was too difficult to imple- or direct roles in implementation of the small grants, among ment because of limitations in the enabling environment and others, could be considered. Capacity-building programs capacity of CSOs. Identifying target sectors as well as realistic like PECSA have enormous potential to transform relation- priority areas to focus capacity building would allow train- ships between governments and civil society by bringing ing and piloting activities to be better targeted and synergies together key actors in the governance arena to share each and coalitions to develop greater effectiveness at a much other’s experiences and build trust and bonds. faster rate. Nevertheless, space should also be maintained to 2. Closing the Capacity-Building Cycle. An effective allow organic prioritization to emerge whenever possible. capacity-building program not only requires training but also learning-by-doing elements. PECSA’s project compo- 4. Developing a Full Strategic Framework Prior to nents were designed to correspond with the capacity-building Implementation. A strategic framework is necessary to cycle (figure 1), starting with training and followed by action identify the mid- to long-term vision for program activities. learning through the grant component. It is not uncommon Without such an overall framework, activities taken under a that a need for practical coaching and mentoring arise after program may be diffused and become unsustainable. PECSA practitioners begin applying learning into practice; this is lacked such a framework at the outset but by mid-term it often the case with any type of learning process. Therefore, became evident that one was needed to provide a view of hands-on mentoring, coaching, and networking compo- how SA practices in Cambodia could be sustained. There- nents are essential in capacity-building programs. They fore, during its mid-term review, PECSA developed a simple enable local practitioners to stand on their own feet. Finally, strategic framework by investing in several workshops and the M&E component closed the capacity-building cycle of additional consultations with key stakeholders, including PECSA by incorporating lessons learned into the training government and other donors (figure 2). materials of the later rounds of training. This type of cycle PECSA’s strategic framework, which aims to sustain SA and interplay of activities should be a core part of future SA practices in Cambodia beyond its program cycle, consists capacity-building programs. of two approaches, one concerning the strategic trajectory 3. Linking the Program Components to the World and the other the targets-by-client type. The strategic trajec- Bank Country Program and Establishing Focus Sectors. tory focuses on a longer-term direction for Cambodian civil Alignment with ongoing Bank projects in the country and society through and beyond PECSA in order to institution- establishing sector focus for both capacity-building and later alize SA practices, as institutionalization of SA activities is pilots are important for achieving greater impact and sus- an enormous goal that will not be achieved during a brief tainability of SA activities. In the case of PECSA, program capacity-building program like PECSA. Component 1— activities were always aligned with the priority areas iden- Training and Capacity Building—was aimed at moving from tified by the Country Assistance Strategy: public financial a supply-driven to a more demand-driven and proactive management, decentralization, public sector development, approach by introducing mechanisms of SA as well as tools and natural resource management. But in retrospect, this that local CSOs could utilize during and after PECSA. Simi- was too broad a scope to achieve significant impacts. Efforts larly, Components 3, 4, and 5 all contained elements to bring to link PECSA grantees to ongoing Bank-financed projects in the isolated and independent Cambodian SA practitioners specific sectors came very late in the program. Only some of and CSOs together in an actively networked and coordinated the grants made under PECSA had a specific sectoral focus fashion in an effort to institutionalize SA practices in Cambo- on education, health, or natural resource management. Such dia over the long run. 12 Figure 2. PECSA’s Strategic Framework Objective: Sustain Practice of Social Accountability Phases in PECSA Awareness Knowledge Practice Institutionalization Implementation Strategic Trajectory • General Audience Through Component 1 & 2 Defined Implementers • Training: Supply-Driven Through Component 1 Demand-Driven • Components: Independent Through Component 4 & 5 Coordinated • Isolated Implementers Through Component 3 Actively Networked and Coordinated Targets by Client Type New to SA • Be Informed • Be Trained Service/Product Provided by PECSA Knowledgeable • Implement about SA • Information (Component 1–5) • Training (Component 1) • Grants (Component 2) • Improve Implementing SA • Expand • Networking (Component 3) • Share • Improve Implementing SA prior to PECSA • Expand • Share The targets-by-client type identifies target goals by clients— is an inherently difficult task. Even so, this must be fully Cambodian CSOs—who are at different stages of maturity developed prior to program implementation. Despite efforts with regard to SA. All PECSA components were meant to during the program design phase, PECSA was not able to be useful for the development of CSOs on SA practices, fully develop M&E and the results framework until about but the maturity achieved by the end of the program could six months into the program’s implementation. Future proj- naturally vary. A recommendation generated from this les- ects should be aware of this difficulty and develop a full- son for similar projects in the future is to develop an overall scale evaluation strategy during preparation. Undertaking a strategic framework upfront32 to match potential clients with results framework workshop prior to the start of a program proposed services and components through the program. could be a useful option to consider. Teams might also con- sult other guidance on M&E of capacity building projects 5. Developing a Clear M&E and Results Framework developed by the World Bank Institute.33 Upfront for Capacity Building and Overall Program. Over- all M&E, particularly the ongoing monitoring framework, is 6. Bringing Together International Experts and Trusted essential to feed learning back into the program components. Local Partner Organizations. For capacity-building pro- Moreover, M&E of a program like PECSA, which includes grams to be effective and sustainable, international experts, many distinct activities and involves diverse beneficiaries, together with trusted and devoted local partners, are 13 needed. While the former can provide advice from experi- in developing a complete Khmer language version of the ence and international best practices, the latter might be SAS modules, including a host of Cambodian SA examples. better positioned to implement the program because of This was used for the last training of trainers workshop that their understanding of the local context. PECSA sought to included government officials and that was well received by have international experts introduce international SA best the participants. Similarly, the local capacity-building partner, practices in Cambodia. The project team also recognized the SILAKA, was given specific training and support by interna- importance of having a very strong set of local partners to tional partners. The development of such an indigenous ver- ensure effective program implementation suited to the local sion of SA capacity-building and training materials as well context. Local partners such as SILAKA and Star Kampuchea as investments in the capacity of local partners was fruitful. played vital roles for PECSA. While strong local partners are 9. Providing Appropriate Incentives to Practitioners. key to a program, PECSA was also an opportunity to expose Capacity-building activities are often time consuming, and them to SA. Indeed, training provided through PECSA ben- SA activities can be challenging depending on a country’s efited almost all SILAKA staff members in deepening their sociopolitical context. For these reasons, it is important for a understanding of SA. Bringing together international experts capacity-building program to provide appropriate incentives and trusted local partners is an important lesson for other SA for practitioners to engage in them. Through PECSA, institu- capacity-building efforts. tional and individual practitioners were given accreditation 7. Recruitment of Program Staff. Having trusted and sea- for participating in trainings. A MCEV to India or the Philip- soned program staff on the ground is a critical element for pines was also offered as part of the training as an incentive the success and reputation of a capacity-building program— to participate. The grant component provided an additional especially in a challenging environment. In the case of incentive for CSO practitioners to be engaged in capacity- PECSA, experienced international program coordinators led building activities for SA, even in a challenging sociopoliti- the team in Cambodia with support from deputy coordina- cal environment. Similar incentives should be considered for tors with local knowledge. Both of the program coordinators future capacity-building programs to attract and sustain the had extensive experience with SA through various institu- participation of CSO members throughout the program. tions, including government, CSOs/NGOs, international 10. Pacing of Program Activities. Capacity-building is organizations, and think-tanks/academia in the EAP region. a gradual process. During the implementation of PECSA, Deputy coordinators were also CSO experts and had local SA various learning events took place in a short time period. experiences as youth leaders in Cambodia. Having seasoned For this reason, participants of the training component did program staff with vast knowledge of SA and experiences not have much time to reflect on their learning or to think with CSOs both at the regional and country level was key to about how the lessons learned should be put into practice in the Bank’s ability to establish a trust-based relationship with their projects and organizations. Learning from this experi- the local CSO community. ence, it is recommended that future task teams of capacity- 8. Identifying Local Champions and Good Practices. building programs design program components in a more While global experiences matter, it is very important to estab- spaced manner. The pacing may also become critical for lish a system for identifying and recognizing local SA cham- continuity between classroom-based participatory learning pions and good practices as the project progresses, with the and subsequent learning-by-doing activities. Continuous potential for a demonstration effect, one of the strongest incen- support on SA should be given during the learning-by-doing tives for others to change their approach to SA. With PECSA, phase through on-site mentoring and facilitated dialogue as the action learning provided opportunities to identify local TAF did during PECSA despite the fact that the organiza- SA champions and good practices. Sharing good practices, tion’s budget did not account for it. Some program activities strategies, and tools in a local context is of great benefit for should be spaced and coordinated in order to provide this other SA practitioners, especially where government–citizen support that would allow practitioners to try institutional- engagement or the enabling environment for SA is limited. izing SA approaches and tools in their projects and institu- Therefore, as one of its last activities, the program invested tions. Arrangement and coordination for continuous SA 14 support should be made with regard to pacing and budgeted more attuned to developing individual skills and capacities ahead of time to ensure the commitment of the implementa- in order to introduce the overall concept of SA. However, a tion agency for such activities. tool-based clinic followed by on-the-job mentoring seemed to be the preferred modality for organizational or institu- Lessons from PECSA for Future Social tional actors. Accountability Projects Supporting Non-State While both target audience units benefitted from PECSA’s Actors capacity-development activities, the end-term evaluation of 1. Conducting Relevant Analysis and Identifying Feasible the program concluded that, in the future, efforts should Entry Points. Knowledge is a powerful tool in designing a be aimed at a small number of dedicated CSOs and focus SA capacity-building program that fits the needs and context on organizational learning rather than on developing indi- of a specific country. This goes beyond just a training needs vidual capacities. This type of training would provide for a assessment or an assessment of the supply-side—i.e., govern- stronger institutionalization of SA culture. While designing ment agencies and legal/policy frameworks. The demand- a capacity-building program, a balance of individual and side assessment—the nature, state, and existing capacities institutional capacity building should be considered, keep- of civil society in areas of SA—should also be examined. In ing country context and intended achievements in mind. Cambodia, the Bank devoted significant analytical efforts 3. Managing Potential Political Risks and Capture. Man- to inform its work on demand-side governance, the most aging actual political risks and capture as well as the percep- prominent being the Civil Society Assessment conducted by tion of them are critical to the success and credibility of an the Bank. Although this Civil Society Assessment was not conducted for the sole benefit of PECSA, it helped to map SA program, especially in environments where constructive out the institutional landscape of Cambodian CSOs and government–citizen engagement is limited. With PECSA, allowed the PECSA task team to identify foreseeable chal- efforts were made to minimize and manage political risks lenges as well as entry points for SA work. For example, the and capture as well as the perception of favoritism. Such Civil Society Assessment stated that the research evidence measures included the determination of an executing agency demonstrated considerable potential interest and willing- for the program, selection of an implementing agency for the ness to expand and enhance citizen or CSO activity and grant provision component, and the creation of grievance impact in the field of SA. It also shed light on the social fabric redress mechanisms (GRMs) for the grant provision compo- of Cambodia by identifying key contextual factors, including nent. PECSA succeeded in managing the potential risks of the recent conflict; political, social, and cultural factors; and political or financial capture and did not encounter any alle- state–citizen relations. This information greatly helped build gations regarding them because SA principles were incorpo- both the case for and the content of the program. Addition- rated into the management of the program itself using these ally, political economy analysis is beneficial for identifying preventative measures and procedures. Experiences and les- champions, gatekeepers, and entry points prior to program sons learned from PECSA were incorporated in the project design. structure and procedures of the succeeding DFGG project, and there they were put to the test (see following section of 2. Individual versus Institutional—Choosing Target this note for details). As PECSA and the subsequent DFGG Audience for Training. Both individual and institutional project showed, managing political risks and capture as actors are equally important in building capacity on SA, well as the perceptions of them in order to ensure fairness but one should be aware of the different pros and cons of and independence requires multiple layers of activities and focusing on one or the other target group. While “individual preventative mechanisms. These may include the establish- actors” act as change agents and/or expert practitioners of SA, ment of a conflict-of-interest policy and/or code of conduct ultimately SA is led by organizations or “institutional actors” for GMC and effective GRMs, conducting continuous and that institutionalize these practices. active CSO consultations, and selecting an implementing As noted earlier, PECSA chose to provide training to agency with the capacity to manage risk factors. Future NSA both individual and institutional actors. The SAS model was support programs should give this adequate consideration. 15 4. Importance of the Independence of Grant Making Because the issue of grievances is common with grant- Committees. As noted in earlier sections, the GMC—com- provision components, it is recommended that task teams of prised of civil society and government representatives—was similar programs create a GRM with clear procedures for the responsible for making decisions regarding the funding pro- grant-making component, consider the capacity of the imple- vision for PECSA. Project teams find it preferable for civil menting agency to address the grievances, and identify the society representatives with vast experience and great local appropriate level of transparency and disclosure of informa- knowledge to serve on GMCs. But seasoned practitioners tion (e.g., grievances collected and contents of redress), keep- with this type of background are limited in number and are ing in mind considerations of privacy and country context. often involved in CSOs that might apply for program grants, 6. Building Networks for Social Accountability. Build- either directly or indirectly (e.g., as board members). This ing and—more importantly—sustaining networks of stake- potential conflict of interest can also increase the perception holders in support of SA is not an easy or straightforward of political capture and favoritism among CSO representa- task. PECSA’s Component 3—Networking and Resource tives on the GMC, possibly leading to their resignations. Centers—was aimed at building and sustaining the net- PECSA foresaw this possibility and was able to adequately works of SA practitioners and organizations in Cambodia mitigate the risk with its code of conduct.34 Internal good by expanding existing networks of CSOs. SA resource cen- governance rules like a code of conduct and grievance ters and networks established in every region were initially redress mechanisms, among others, are recommended for successful in connecting SA practitioners in the country, but any program with similar grant-making components. the project was unable to sustain the centers because they 5. Ensuring the Credibility of the Program through a were heavily dependent on outside funding. The lesson from Grievance-Redress Mechanism. When grants are provided PECSA here is that the network component requires special to CSOs (or any other entities) on a competitive basis through attention—not only in terms of its creation but also with a program, managing applicants’ expectations and enabling regard to its sustainability. the redress of grievances, especially from organizations not The establishment of networks must be pursued opportu- receiving grants, becomes critical to the credibility of the nistically by identifying emerging opportunities for linking program. For example, if the GMC is not regarded as inde- up CSOs, governments, and other stakeholders. But at the pendent or if it is viewed as favoring one organization over same time, the creation and maintenance of networks must another, an applicant would file a complaint. No allegations be carried out systematically. First, it requires a revenue of misconduct were filed throughout the implementation of model to continue its networking effort beyond the capacity- PECSA. Nevertheless, the GRM was tested with the succeed- building program in a way that is not completely reliant ing DFGG project. The DFGG project received a complaint on external financing. Second, a dedicated person or team from an unsuccessful CSO after the first round of small grant should be put in place to anchor stakeholders. This person or provision due to a suspicion of political capture and the per- team should be well connected, familiar with local context, ception of donor favoritism.35 Fortunately, having learned and have well-developed communication and marketing from the PECSA experiences, the DFGG project and TAF, skills to identify and convene relevant stakeholders. Finally, its grant component partner, had established a clear GRM the networks developed should have linkage to or build on with guidelines, which stated that a filed grievance had to be existing government programs so that the government–civil investigated within a certain timeline, including the disclo- society partnership for SA activities will be continuous. sure on the program website of investigation procedures, the Building and sustaining a community of SA practitioners is content of the grievance, and its redress. This test helped to vital to the institutionalization of SA in a country, requiring make the second round of grant making even more transpar- dedicated and continuous work. ent and responsive. 16 Concluding Remarks Malena, Carmen, and Kristina Chhim. 2009. “Cambodia Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Although PECSA encountered various challenges in its Cambodia.” World Bank, Washington, DC. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ implementation, it succeeded in spreading the seeds for SA external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/06/29/000356161_200 90629023700/Rendered/PDF/491470WP0Box331BLIC10CCSA1Eng1Final.pdf. in the sensitive sociopolitical environment of Cambodia. SILAKA. 2010. “Final Project Report: Project to Enhance Capacity in Social Account- It set the stage for and opened up a discussion about SA, ability (PECSA), On the Local Cambodian Capacity Building Institute, LCBI.” improved the general confidence and awareness of SA for Washington, DC. http://imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServ- both state actors and NSAs, established the principles of SA er/IW3P/IB/2012/06/28/000425970_20120628151537/Rendered/PDF/699770 in the local language and context, and—to certain extent— ESW0P1060countability0P106040.pdf. Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA). 2010. “Final Report: Programme to succeeded in including government actors in capacity-build- Enhance Capacities on Social Accountability (PECSA) March 2007 to June 2010.” ing efforts. All of this contributed to initiating and enhancing Washington, DC. http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/viewer/docViewer/ partnerships between the government and civil society in index.jsp?objectId=090224b080425826&respositoryId=WBDocs&standalone=tr the governance field, which the subsequent DFGG project ue&. was able to leverage. Star Kampuchea. 2010a. “Activities on Social Accountability Networking and Re- source Center.” Washington, DC. http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/ And yet, despite these achievements, there were also sev- viewer/docViewer/index.jsp?objectId=090224b080425826&respositoryId=WBD eral challenges, missed opportunities, and areas where the ocs&standalone=true&. Transparency International. 2012. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012.” http:// program could have better performed. Hopefully, the lessons www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results. learned from these will inform future programs working on World Bank. 2008a. ”Demand-Side Governance Pushes Reform in Cambodia.” social accountability capacity building. –––. 2008b. ”Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 12.8 Million to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demand for Good Governance Project.” http://imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/ References IB/2008/11/17/000333038_20081117234338/Rendered/PDF/423660PAD0P1011 Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific. 2010. “Civil LY10IDA1R20081029711.pdf. Alliance for Social Accountability, Cambodia.” http://www.ansa-eap.net/ –––. 2009a. ”PECSANewsletter 1(1).” http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/viewer/ networking/geographic-focus/civic-alliance-for-social-accountability- docViewer/index.jsp?objectId=090224b08056a53d&respositoryId=WBDocs&sta cambodia/. ndalone=true&. Asia Foundation. 2009. “Program to Enhance Capacity in Social Accountability, –––. 2009b. “PECSA Newsletter 1(2).” Grant Number: FT092718.” Washington, DC. –––. 2010a. ”PECSA Newsletter 1(3).” –––. 2010a. “News Release: Demand for Good Governance Project Announces 21 –––. 2010b. “Worldwide Governance Indicators—Cambodia.” http://info.world- Finalists in Cambodia,” Dec. 22. http://asiafoundation.org/news/2010/12/ bank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports. demand-for-good-governance-project-announces-21-finalists-in-cambodia/. –––. 2011a. ”Implementation Completion Memorandum.” http://wbdocs.worldbank. –––. 2010b. “Program to Enhance Capacity in Social Accountability, Grant Number: org/wbdocs/viewer/docViewer/index.jsp?objectId=090224b080568f64&respos TF092718.” Washington, DC. itoryId=WBDocs&standalone=true. Internal Bank link. Ateneo School of Government. 2010. “Final Report of Accomplishments as Interna- –––. 2011b. ”Strengthening the World Bank’s Engagement on Demand for Good Gov- tional Capacity Building Institution for the Program to Enhance Capacity in So- ernance.” Washington, DC. cial Accountability.” Washington, DC. http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/ –––. 2012. ”Strengthening Governance: Tackling Corruption the World Bank Group’s viewer/docViewer/index.jsp?objectId=090224b080425826&respositoryId=WBD Updated Strategy And Implementation Plan.” http://siteresources. ocs&standalone=true&. worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741- Economic Institute of Cambodia and Catalyst Management System. 2010. “Final 1326816182754/GACStrategyImplementationPlan.pdf. Report on End-Tern Evaluation of PECSA Program in Cambodia.” Washington, –––. Nd1. ”Draft PECSA Budget (FY08–FY10).” Internal Bank document. DC. http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/viewer/docViewer/index.jsp?obje –––. Nd2. ”LICUS Implementation Trust Fund Application Form (revised) Activity ctId=090224b080568f64&respositoryId=WBDocs&standalone=true. Proposal Form (By Implementing Agency).” Interview with the PECSA TTL. 2012. 17 Useful Resources 5. This Civil Society Assessment titled “Linking Citizens and the State: An Assess- ment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia,” is based ANSA-EAP Website: www.ansa-eap.net. on research conducted by the Centre for Advanced Study in Phnom Penn and –––. Civic Alliance for Social Accountability, Cambodia. www.ansa-eap.net/ aimed at analyzing the country context for SA and the capacity of CSOs for SA in networking/geographic-focus/civic-alliance-for-social-accountability- Cambodia. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/ cambodia/. Resources/244362-1265299949041/6766328-1307475897842/CCSA_Eng_Final. Social Accountability & Demand for Good Governance Website. (Internal: FURL pdf. “dfggdb”): http://connect.worldbank.org/explore/SDV/DFGG/default.aspx. 6. An informal political economy analysis commissioned by the Bank during the Internal Bank link. preparation of the DFGG project confirmed this view. Social Accountability & Demand for Good Governance Website External: http:// 7. E.g., Civil Society Assessment (see footnote 5). web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVEL 8. The total program budget was eventually US$2,245,000 (US$1,995,000 from OPMENT/0,,contentMDK:21211265~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSite LICUS + US$100,000 from World Bank Institute’s Affiliated Network for Social PK:244363,00.html. Accountability + US$150,000 from AusAID). Social Accountability E-Guide (FURL: “saeguide”). https://saeguide.worldbank. 9. While the original budget amounts submitted in the LICUS Trust Fund applica- org. tion were US$600,000 (Component 1); US$550,000 (Component 2); US$440,000 World Bank Institute. 2011a. “Intermediate Capacity Outcomes: Capacity Develop- (Component 3); US$250,000 (Component 4); and US$155,000 (Component 5), ment Resource for Program Design and Monitoring and Evaluation of Change these were later adjusted in a revised Trust Fund proposal after six months of Processes. Washington, DC. http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbic- implementation when more detailed cost estimates were available. Additional ms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/Intermediate Capacity Outcomes 2.pdf funding from AusAID and the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability –––. 2011b. “What Do We Mean By Results: Defining Results for WBI’s Capacity (ANSA) had also emerged by then. The revised budget numbers are presented. Development Initiatives.” Washington, DC. http://intresources.worldbank.org/ 10. Module materials from PECSA’s first SAS can be found on the Affiliated Net- WBIINT/Resources/136974-1165007333377/Defining_Results_10.21.pdf. Inter- work for Social Accountability-East Asia and Pacific (ANSA-EAP) website. The nal Bank link. training topics for the first round of SAS were drawn from other international SA –––. 2013. “Improved Consensus and Teamwork, Strengthened Coalitions and En- training programs and linked to the themes of Cambodia’s Country Assistance hanced Networks: Attributes and Indicators of Relational Intermediate Capacity Strategy. Subsequently, a training needs assessment was conducted through Outcomes.” Summary Note. Washington, DC. http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/ consultations with a range of CSOs to make the training more tailored to the Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/Summary Note on Relational In- Cambodian contexts and needs. termediate Capacity Outcomes.pdf. 11. These in-depth trainings were provided in a much shorter timeframe than the general SA trainings. Notes 12. Examples of learning events included essay writing, mock project proposal creation, distance learning exchanges, and feedback interactions with each 1. The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment ratings for property rights and participant. rule-based governance, quality of public administration, and transparency and 13. The final selection of government participants was done by the Ministry of In- control of corruption indicators placed Cambodia at 2.5 on a 1 (worst) to 5 (best) terior while the final selection of CSO participants was done by SILAKA, a local scale at the time of PECSA. Additionally, in 2007, the World Bank Institute Gov- NGO implementing this program component in partnership with other interna- ernance Indicators ranked the country in the 8th percentile in terms of control of tional partners. corruption and the 21st percentile in terms of government effectiveness. Cam- 14. Supported by the World Bank Institute, ANSA supports CSOs in their efforts to bodia still ranks ranked 157 out of 174 in Transparency International’s Corrup- monitor governments in the field of service delivery and to build demand for SA. tion Perception Index for 2012 and ranks in the bottom 25th percentile in terms ANSA-EAP was established in 2008 as a project of ASoG in the Philippines. of Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law in the Worldwide Governance 15. The rounds of MCEV to India or the Philippines were intended to become South– Indicators. South learning opportunities, and while the trips were beneficial to many par- 2. The strategy (2006–10) places good governance at its heart with focus on follow- ticipants, the contextual differences between the visited countries and Cambodia ing four areas: (1) fighting corruption; (2) legal and judicial reform; (3) public detracted from this learning method, according to some participants. administration reform; and (4) reform of the Cambodian Armed Forces. http:// 16. These were on social audits, budget analysis, procurement tracking, and gender- www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/aid_management/nsdp.pdf. based budgeting in accordance with identified focus areas of PECSA. 3. Malena and Chhim (2009). This number includes both local/national and inter- 17. A combination of procurement and legal issues related to setting up the sub- national NGOs present at the time in Cambodia. granting facility under PECSA caused the component to be effective only during 4. One of the impediments observed in state–civil society relationship in Cambo- the second half of the program. See the Key Challenges section for more detail. dia is the divide between rights-based advocacy groups, international media, 18. These benefits are identified with small grants, but there are also disadvantages. and international NGOs and service delivery CSOs. The government’s distrust For example, because of the constraints of time and funds, pilot projects may of the rights-based groups, which they associate with fomenting international face difficulty being fully implemented, having the accountability loop work, criticisms, made the government less attentive to interactions with CSOs in gen- and making a lasting impact. Therefore, choices about the size of grants pose real eral. Introduction of social accountability approaches and tools through PECSA dilemmas that task teams must consider carefully. and the succeeding Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) project (see box 1) therefore intended to build and provide the “missing middle” in the spectrum of CSOs for constructive civic and state–civil society engagement. 18 19. In fact, some of the CSOs that were later awarded medium-size grants under the 28. Therefore, PECSA had two separate project numbers, one for PECSA (P106040) DFGG project (Component 2—Support to Non-State Institutions; see box 1) were and another solely for the grant provision component (P113529). the grantees of PECSA’s small grants. The DFGG project provided two rounds 29. As noted, this medium-size grant component was taken up by the succeeding of grants that overlapped with PECSA. Among 31 pilot projects funded by the DFGG project. medium- and large-size grants of the DFGG project, 10 were previous grantees of 30. The threshold for government officials’ participation suggested by the PECSA PECSA, and among these, 5 were supported continuously by the first and second partners is 30 percent. This number is based on an observation of government– rounds of PECSA grants, prior to winning the DFGG grants. CSO interactions during constructive meetings for PECSA. In Cambodia, when 20. The confirmation of appointees by the government was required given that the government officials became the majority in number, civil society participants RGC was the official recipient of both the LICUS Trust Fund and the succeeding became less likely to speak frankly and to actively participate. International Development Association-funded DFGG project. But the selection 31. This is not only because of the technical expertise and focus that can be achieved of grantees was independently determined by the GMC without further govern- but also because working with service-delivery CSOs may be more politically ment influence. This arrangement provided legitimacy on the government side, feasible/acceptable and constructive, as was the case in the Cambodian context. and local CSOs were not opposed to this type of endorsement. 32. While an implementable strategic framework with short, mid-, and long-term 21. For details, see the Lessons from PECSA for Future Social Accountability Projects goals is important, developing one prior to a program implementation might Supporting Non-State Actors section of this note. be too ambitious a goal. Keeping this in mind, project teams should prepare a 22. The eligibility criteria and guidelines were part of the operations manual of the simple, measureable, and flexible action plan or roadmap (e.g., targets-by-clients DFGG project, which was also used by PECSA. The manual can be found at type of goals). http://www.dfggmoi.gov.kh/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrappe 33. Links to publications on development of results framework for capacity-building r&Itemid=147&lang=en. projects developed by the World Bank Institute’s Capacity for Development and 23. A network created by the SAS graduates. Results Practice can be found in the Useful Resources section at the end of this 24. As noted earlier, several CSOs that received funding from PECSA continued to note. receive funding through the succeeding DFGG project. 34. In fact, while no allegations of conflict of interest concerning GMC members 25. Both of the program coordinators had vast experience in demand-side gover- took place during the implementation of PECSA, the mechanism was tested with nance and SA, leading networks of CSOs and NGOs in the Philippines, working the succeeding DFGG project. One of the GMC members of the DFGG project with international organizations, and so on. They were supported by deputy resigned in accordance with its code of conduct because the member was associ- coordinators who were CSO experts with experience in SA activities as youth ated with an organization that planned to apply for funding provided by the leaders in Cambodia. DFGG project. The actual allegation was not filed during this process because the 26. Similarly, the timing of PECSA—during a period of intense fiduciary scrutiny voluntary resignation of the GMC member took place prior to the application for and tension with the World Bank concerning the corruption scandal emerged funding. This mechanism sustained the independence of GMC. on different Bank-funded projects—also narrowed the focus of broader gover- 35. With respect to transparency, the complaint itself and information on actions nance dialogue to corruption. As a result, the nuances of SA as a tool for good taken by TAF (the implementing organization) are disclosed on the project’s governance may not have received the prominence it deserved during PECSA’s website under the Complaint Handling section. http://www.dfgg-nsac.org/en/ duration. contact/complaints-handling. 27. To learn more about engagement (e.g., consultations) with NSAs by look- ing at best practices and lessons learned, see “Guidance Note on Bank Multi- Stakeholder Engagement.” http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/07/08/000333037_20090708235404/Ren- dered/PDF/492200BR0SecM2101Official0Use0Only1.pdf. 19 Abbreviations and Acronyms ASoG Ateneo School of Government M&E monitoring and evaluation ANSA-EAP Affiliated Network for Social Accountability MCEV Monitoring, Coaching and Exposure Visits in East Asia and the Pacific NGO nongovernmental organization Bank World Bank NSA non-state actor BSDA Buddhist and Society Development PECSA Program to Enhance Capacity in Social Association Accountability CSO civil society organization PRIA Society for Participatory Research in Asia DFGG demand for good governance RGC Royal Government of Cambodia GAC Governance and Anticorrupton SA social accountability GMC Grant Making Committee SAS Social Accountability School GRM grievance redress mechanism TAF The Asia Foundation IDA International Development Association LICUS Low Income Countries Under Stress This note was prepared by Saki Kumagai and Janmejay Singh with assistance from Michelle Söller and under the overall guidance of Helene Grandvoinnet and Sanjay Agarwal. The authors are grateful to the valuable comments provided by Carmen Malena, Gavin Tritt, Janelle Plummer, Joel Pagsanghan, John Clark, Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay, and Mehr Latif, as well as the peer reviewers for the note—John Garrison, Luiza Nora, Marcos Mendiburu, and Maria Ionata. Lastly, authors are grateful to Laura Johnson for excellent editorial support, design, and formatting assistance. All errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this case study are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, or its affiliated organizations, or to members of its board of executive directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank does not grantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. The World Bank, Social Development Department Fax: 202-522-3247 1818 H Street NW Email: asksocial@worldbank.org Washington DC 20433 Web: www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment CDD website: www.worldbank.org/cdd