

Cameroon

GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR

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Africa Region**



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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	<i>Agence Française du Développement</i> (French Development Agency)
BAC	<i>Baccalauréat</i> (General certificate of secondary studies, second cycle)
BEPC	<i>Brevet d'études de premier cycle</i> (General certificate of secondary studies, first cycle)
CAP	Certificate of Professional Aptitude
CPDM	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
CEP	<i>Certificat d'études primaires</i> (Primary studies certificate)
CL	Class level
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
ECAM	<i>Enquête Camerounaise auprès des ménages</i> (Cameroon Household Survey)
EMIS	Educational Monitoring Information System
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
EFA-FTI	Education for All-Fast Track Initiative
FSLC	First School Leaving Certificate
GCE O Level	General Certificate of Education, Ordinary Level
GCE A Level	General Certificate of Education, Advanced Level
GER	Gross enrollment rates
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MINEDUB	Ministry of Basic Education
MINESEC	Ministry of Secondary Education
MINFI	Ministry of Budget and Finance
MINFOPRA	Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform
NER	Net enrollment rates
PET survey	Public Expenditure Tracking survey
PTA	Parents and Teachers Association
PTR	Pupil-teacher ratios
SBM	School-based management
SIGIPES	<i>Système Informatique de gestion intégrés des personnels de l'état et de la solde</i> (Integrated Management System of the Central Government Employees and the Payroll)
UNICEF	United Nation Children's Education Fund
WDR	World Development Report
ZEP	<i>Zone d'éducation prioritaire</i> (Education priority zone)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

1. **This report aims to analyze the extent to which current governance and management practices contribute to explaining differences in education outcomes, focusing on three regions of Cameroon: the Littoral, Far North, and North West.** The three regions chosen for this study differ considerably in terms of education performance, with the Far North being the weakest at one end of the spectrum, and the Littoral region being one of the best at the other end. The report explores the connections between governance and educational outcomes in these three regions, using a qualitative approach. In-depth interviews with government officials and school personnel, observations of school operations, and reviews of documents were used to analyze governance and accountability in both basic and secondary education. Such approach is inductive, context sensitive, and naturalistic, based on an iterative process of knowledge generation.

2. **The analytical framework for the study consists of two broad areas, public expenditure and system functioning.** Under public expenditure, the study examines governance and accountability practices relating to upstream financial decision making and execution. This includes budget allocations and government transfers, financial transfers to schools, procurement procedures, and financial management. System functioning covers activities that must take place consistently over the school year and includes: teachers (recruitment, deployment and transfers, and remuneration), schools (monitoring of teacher performance, administration, and school performance), and extra-government entities. In addition, the report reviews contribution of the community (the citizens and students who are the beneficiary) and the extent to which they are able to demand acceptable standards of service delivery in education is examined. The section on extra-government entities briefly looks at their roles and contributions in bringing about good governance.

Key Findings

3. **There are vital strengths identified in governance practices across the three regions.** First, regional levels understand their role as implementers of the vision and policies defined by the Central Ministries of Basic Education and Secondary Education (referred to as the Center). Therefore, the Center has the potential to positively influence education development within the regions. Second, “control missions” from the Center that monitor financial performance are well positioned to help regional governments keep their accounts in order. Third, the contract-teacher initiative in basic education is an innovative program that is significantly improving the recruitment and deployment of teachers.

4. **Governance and management arrangements contribute to explaining some of the variation in education outcomes across regions.** Several factors limit for instance educational performance in the Far North. First, financial transfers for administration to this region are much

lower than to the Littoral region, resulting in inadequate management, infrastructure, staffing, and skills to efficiently manage education. Second, infrastructure development in the Far North is unsatisfactory due to poor site selection and a high level of collusion between contractors and the public works department. Third, while the contract primary teacher program has had a positive influence on teacher quality and education in the low-performing Far North region, it has not been sufficient to bring it up to par with the other regions examined in this study. As a result, a larger percentage of PTA teachers without the required qualifications are recruited to address this shortage, especially in secondary education.

5. The effectiveness of the compact between the policy maker, education provider, and the beneficiaries is dependent on the instruments and procedures of accountability that exist at the different levels. Taking into account the demands of the policy maker (the Center), the compact between the policy maker and the education provider (regional delegations) is clear and effective. The compact between the education provider and the school is fragile in basic education, due to a lack of clearly defined standards and expectations, vis-à-vis school functioning and outcomes. The monitoring of school and teacher performance is particularly weak in basic education. There is more accountability in secondary education as a result of the high stakes placed on certification and examinations.

6. Vulnerable areas, prone to political interference, and the reported misuse of funds and rent seeking were identified. These areas include infrastructure development and teacher recruitment, deployment, and transfers in both basic and secondary education. In secondary education, specifically, there are reports of irregular financial transfers in the conduct of examinations.

7. There are complexities and ambiguities in how decentralization is understood and implemented in Cameroon. Decentralization in Cameroon mainly consists of a nascent form of administrative deconcentration. Regional delegations are responsible for teacher transfers and the appointment of school heads (principals). Centralized financial transfers, along with the perception among regional delegations that they are mainly implementers of MINEDUB and MINESEC programs, do not support effective deconcentration. Decentralization will be better implemented when regions and municipalities are made more financially accountable with a corresponding mandate for reaching critical educational outcomes.

Box 1: Main constraints to the governance and accountability of public expenditure and system functioning were identified across regions.

- Inadequate resources result in uniform under-financing of budgets in all regions. In response to this inadequate financing, parents and communities have assumed the responsibility for a substantial “top-up” of the budget, complicating the process of budget planning and fund allocations.
- Fund flows do not correspond with the hierarchical structure of government institutions in the regions. Financial transfers are made from the Center directly to each regional level of education administration. Thus, accountability is directed to the Center rather than to the appropriate next or higher level in the regional administration. This process weakens financial accountability in the regions.
- The Center makes financial transfers to schools without a clear system of accounting and reporting. Responsibility for monitoring accounts and expenditure lies with control missions organized by the

Center. These missions are too infrequent and unsystematic to ensure financial accountability.

- Public procurement is based on list prices, which are determined at the national level, and do not take into account price variations across the regions. This creates the potential for informal misuse of funds.
- Political interference in the site selection for new school construction leads to waste and duplication of resources, as well as inappropriate or inconvenient sites.
- The process of teacher recruitment in secondary education is time consuming and inefficient. Political interference in teacher recruitment, deployment, and transfer in both basic and secondary education is consistently reported.
- In basic education, accountability for school functioning and performance is weak and the monitoring of teachers' instruction in the classroom (time and content achievement) is fractured and ineffective. In both basic and secondary education, a comprehensive database of teachers' service records, crucial for managing the teacher workforce, is unavailable.

Potential Areas for Governance Reform

8. **The first area deals with establishing and implementing benchmarks and standards for performance at the school and regional levels of government.** While schools and regional agencies appear to have some standards, they are not comprehensive enough to support quality improvement in education. Establishing appropriate standards across institutions is critical. Implementing these standards will involve defining responsibilities, providing the relevant tools and templates, improving skill in documentation and analysis, and developing strategies for communication and feedback. Expanding the role of the PTAs, by orienting them to the importance of teaching and learning, would further enhance the implementation of standards and improvements in the quality of education. Upgrading the abilities of the inspectorates/*inspection d'arrondissements* (part of the regional delegation) to monitor the implementation of standards at the school level must be a part of this reform.

9. **The second area highlights the importance of improving teacher management and addressing governance issues.** Ring fencing, improving transparency in teacher recruitment, and protecting teacher deployment from political interference are major challenges. Moreover, a common, agreed-upon, and easily understandable performance monitoring instrument introduced for all teachers in basic education is critical to improving teacher management. Adequate documentation and reporting of teacher performance on a regular basis will enable the system to track instructional quality. Finally, implementing an effective system of incentives and sanctions that addresses shortcomings and violations of the standards at the school level will be crucial to improving teacher management.

10. **The third area focuses on the equitable distribution of resources and the effective monitoring of budgets and expenditure.** Considering the substantial contribution of parents, linking national allocations of funds to citizen-based budgeting will be crucial. Instead of the minimum package and financial transfers, Central financing for schools could be based on a budget developed by each school that takes into account PTA funds and in-kind support available such as instructional aids, furniture etc. Targeting financial allocations to weaker regions is also important. To ensure more accountability for expenditures and financial accounting, it will be helpful to augment Center-fielded control missions with regional

involvement in monitoring. Blacklisting problem contractors with publically documented sub-standard construction of schools, especially in the Far North, will demonstrate commitment to improving governance.

11. **The fourth area is establishing a system of public transparency to promote good governance.** Granting a more structured role to local leaders and expanding the involvement of the media to help monitor the school system would be helpful. Accountability and good governance can also be facilitated through regular assessments and independent surveys, complemented by opportunities for citizens to evaluate and share their perceptions regarding the quality of service delivery.

Chapter 1 SETTING THE SCENE

1.1 Country Background

1. **Cameroon has an ethnically and linguistically diverse population.** At the end of World War I, Cameroon was occupied by the French and the British. It gained independence from the French in 1960, and the regions under British control merged with Francophone Cameroon in 1961. Because of its history of dual occupation, both French and English are official languages and bilingualism is promoted across the country.¹ Since its independence, Cameroon has remained stable, with President Paul Biya of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement in power since 1982.² Cameroon has an ethnically and linguistically diverse population of about 20 million with about 200 linguistic and ethnic groups. Its neighbors are Nigeria, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. Although Cameroon is strategically located in both central and western Africa, the "thick borders" that separate countries in this region presents a challenge to economic development (WDR 2009).³

2. **Economically, Cameroon has swung back and forth between periods of high growth and dramatic decline in revenue.** Between 1977 and 1981, Cameroon experienced significant economic development with real GDP (gross domestic product) growth of 13 percent annually, primarily due to increases in the prices of agricultural products and petroleum. When the prices of these commodities sharply dropped, revenues and growth declined. Between 2000 and 2002, real GDP growth rate was 4.23 percent, falling to 3.32 percent between 2003 and 2007. In 2000, due to overwhelming external debt, Cameroon became a "highly indebted poor country" (HIPC) and eligible for financial aid. The insignificant changes in the poverty rate reflects the uneven economic course, unlike the period 1996–2001 where poverty declined 13 percentage points to 40 percent. The country renewed its commitment to establishing a framework for development and in 2003 produced its first Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP 2003) outlining macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs to support growth and reduce poverty. Cameroon's HIPC status ended in April 2006.

3. **Governance is a key constraint to growth and poverty reduction.** In its 2009 report, Transparency International analyzed the "Corruption Perception Index" (CPI) for 180 countries on a scale of 0 to 10 (A zero rank and low score indicates the most corrupt, and 10 and high score the least corrupt of the countries listed). Cameroon ranked 146 with a CPI rating of 2.2,⁴ a decline from 141 in the 2008 CPI. Cameroon's neighbors had these 2009 scores: Ghana 3.9, Nigeria 2.5, Congo 1.9, and Chad 1.6. In another analysis by Transparency International, the "Global Corruption Barometer (2009)" identified Cameroon as having one of the highest reports of petty misuse of funds. Cameroonians perceive public-civil servants as more likely to misappropriate funds than political parties, the parliament, the judiciary, and business and private sectors. In the recent government paper, "Cameroon Vision 2035" (Government of Cameroon 2009), Cameroon hopes to reduce the level of poverty to 10

¹ Cameroon has about 24 major African language groups and about 270 indigenous dialects. Common languages used for trade and commerce include Hausa, Fulani, pidgin English, and Douala (Omatseye 2008).

² The president of Cameroon has the power to appoint regional governors, *département*/division officials, and urban councils. Local citizens select mayors and city councilors.

³ According to the *World Development Report 2009*, (WDR 2009), countries with high density, short commuting distances, and porous borders are more supportive of market forces and thereby more conducive to economic development.

⁴ The CPI is a composite index based on various expert and business surveys. It also represents the perceived effectiveness of the public sector in a country.


percent. The new PRSP (2009–2019) is structured around two pillars, namely, increased competitiveness and improved service delivery. Both Cameroon’s “Vision” document and the PRSP (2009–2019) point to governance and accountability as the main challenges.

1.2 The Education Sector in Cameroon

4. **Significant progress was achieved over the last decade in expanding access to basic education.** Basic education is six years in Cameroon. In secondary education, students choose between two different tracks, general (academic) or technical (vocational), and each track has two segments.⁵ Four ministries are responsible for basic, secondary, technical and higher education respectively. During the 1970s and 1980s, the country had one of the most effective education systems in Africa. As national revenue declined, education development became uneven with periods of growth and decline, similar to the economy. Over the last decade, the education sector has steadily improved, with gross enrollment rates (GERs) reaching 100 percent in basic education and 30 percent in secondary education. The primary completion rate has increased from 59 percent in 2004 to 72 percent in 2008, and the repetition rate decreased from 22 percent to about 18 percent, respectively.

5. **These improvements, however, mask significant differences in education performance across and within individual regions.** In 2000, the Government identified a group of regions in the north of the country (Adamawa, Far North, North, and East) as “education priority zones” (zones d’éducation prioritaires, ZEPs) due to their low performance in education. Improving these priority zones is an important goal for the administration. The GERs and NERs (net enrollment rates) for girls in the Far North are lower than in all the other regions in Cameroon. In addition, completion rates, pupil-teacher ratios (PTRs), and teacher shortages are serious issues in the Far North education priority zone.

Figure 1: Difference in education outcomes in three regions of Cameroon



6. **The government of Cameroon developed an ESSP in 2006 to support comprehensive and sequenced changes in the education sector.** Cameroon’s Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) lists

⁵ Annex 1 contains the structure of Cameroon’s education system.

key outcomes for the education sector (which are captured in some of the Millennium Development Goals). The main objectives of the ESSP are: i) Improving universal basic education by 2015 by reducing grade repetition, increasing the number of teachers in the system, reducing pupil-teacher ratios, increasing pedagogical resources in the classroom, and improving educational management and administration; ii) Expanding preschool coverage; iii) Introducing reforms in higher, technical, and secondary education; iv) Regulating access to post-primary education according to the needs of the job market.

7. **The three regions included in this study represent a range of performance on key educational indicators.** The selection regions comprise two Francophone regions (Littoral and Far North, also a Priority Education Zone), and an Anglophone region (North West). The Littoral and North West regions are relatively high performers when compared to the Far North, which is one of the weakest regions in Cameroon. Table 1 illustrates the differences in educational outcomes that form the basis of this analysis of governance across the three regions.⁶ The regions significantly vary in terms of completion rates and pass rates at the common entrance exam test for high school.⁷ Only 26 percent of the students are successful in the Far North, in contrast to 74 percent in the Littoral region and 59 percent in the North West region. As a result, the proportion of students that graduate from basic education and go on to secondary in the Far North (35 percent) is about half that of the Littoral region (66 percent). Determinants of education quality vary also considerably across regions, with pupil-teacher ratio in the public schools of the Littoral region of 47:1. By contrast, the PTR in the North West region is 77:1, which is not optimal, but is far better than the Far North region's PTR of 152:1.

Table 1. Education performance in basic education in the three regions

	Far North	Littoral	North West
Population	542,080	335,185	361,451
Students enrolled	545,205	340,713	346,794
Gross enrollment rate (GER)			
GER all students	100.58	101.65	95.94
GER girls	81.30	99.95	93.09
Net enrollment rate (NER)			
NER all students	82.91	81.14	75.41
NER girls	67.76	80.22	73.60
Completion rate			
All students	50.69	88.38	76.28
Girls	35.56	88.10	74.69
Learning levels* (% successful students)			
CEP	72.70%	72.42%	64.47%
FSLC	86.45%	77.89%	71.58%
Common entrance exam	26.14%	73.63%	59.20%

⁶ Annex I contains overall statistics on basic and secondary education across the regions. The Republic of Cameroon's "Education Country Status Report" (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the sector. Annex II contains a brief description of the three regions.

⁷ At the end of primary, students sit for the *Certificat d'études primaires* (CEP) in the Francophone regions, and the First School Leaving Certificate (FSLC) in the Anglophone regions. These examinations are organized by MINEDUB. In addition to these examinations, a common entrance exam, organized by MINESEC, determines the transition of students from basic to secondary school.

Schools and teachers in public schools			
No. of schools	1,483	638	920
Total no. of teachers	3,991	6,382	4,706
No. of parent teachers	3,120	839	1,676
No. of teachers needed	8,537	360	2,504
Pupil-teacher ratios*	152:1	47:1	77:1

* Leaflet, "MINEDUB Basic Education in Figures 2008 Edition"; MINEDUB and MINESEC, Examination Board, Government of Cameroon.

Source: MINEDUB Statistical Yearbook 2007/2008.

Table 2. Education performance in secondary education in the three regions⁸

	Far North	Littoral	North West
Total enrollment in secondary education			
Enrollment in general track	76,763	156,204	87,477
Enrollment in vocational track	7,249	44,779	21,491
Enrollment in public secondary education			
Enrollment in general track	71,974	83,049	56,304
Enrollment in vocational track	7,131	25,823	18,337
Change in total enrollment 2006/2007 to 2007/2008 in general secondary education			
No. of students enrolled in 2006/2007	69,071	132,023	72,663
Increase in enrollment in 2007/2008	7,692	24,181	14,814
Increase/decrease (percent)	11%	18%	20%
Change in total enrollment 2006/2007 to 2007/2008 vocational schools			
No. of students enrolled in 2006/2007	14,041	31,273	16,062
Increase/decrease in enrollment in 2007/2008	- 6,792	13,506	5,429
Increase/decrease (percent)	-48%	43%	34%
Transition from basic to secondary (public) education			
Enrollment in CM2 (last year of primary)	60,218	51,870	47,108
First year enrollment, general and vocational secondary tracks	20,960	34,138	23,284
Percent of transition	35%	66%	49%
Learning levels* (% successful students)			
BEPC	35%	42%	67%
GCE O/L	51%	54%	76%
BAC	38%	59%	67%
GCE A/L	30%	63%	88%
Public schools and teachers			
No. of civil servant teachers in secondary schools	788	3,490	3,415
No. of temporary teachers	1,185	2,542	289
No. of secondary public schools	142	105	171

* Learning levels: BEPC = Brevet d'études de premier cycle [General certificate of secondary studies]; GCE O/L = General Certificate of Education, Ordinary Level; BAC = Baccalauréat; GCE A/L = General Certificate of Education, Advanced Level.

Source: MINESEC Annual Statistics 2006/2007 and 2007/2008.

⁸ Raw EMIS data for secondary education is available for 2006/2007 and 2007/2008. No analysis of this data has been undertaken, so no enrollment (or completion) rates, such as GERs or NERs, are available. In order to maintain the relevance of this table for public sector officials, only data available and produced by MINEDUB and MINESEC was used in this report. No other reports were used or calculations made to arrive at rates.

1.3 Objectives and Analytical Framework

8. **This report seeks to provide the Government and its partners with a detailed analysis of educational processes at the regional and school level and to highlight how these directly impact education outcomes.** Providing education is a complex task that has to be sustained over time.⁹ It involves students in a range of age groups, public institutions at different levels, a variety of processes that occur at the same time, continuous interaction between different groups (students, parents, teachers, and administrators), reliable availability and distribution of materials (such as textbooks, paper, and pencils), and a system that must effectively function for 10 months of the year. Focusing on “business as usual”, this study explores whether existing oversight systems can ensure the even application of standards, incentives, and sanctions. It also discusses the operational rules that define the relationship between the central government in Yaoundé and regional government institutions.

9. **While the study highlights governance practices across regions, it also identifies areas or aspects within regions that may need rethinking and reform.** By presenting a comparative analysis of governance at the regional level for basic and secondary education, the report identifies governance issues and highlights critical areas where the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB) and Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC) can improve governance and sector performance. The report provides recommendations on key strategies and actions that could improve governance in school education.

10. **The analytical framework for the study consists of two broad areas, public expenditure and system functioning.** Taking into account the outcomes that education expects to achieve, good governance can be defined as the presence and implementation of standards, rules, regulations, and processes to ensure effective public expenditure and efficient system functioning.¹⁰ Under public expenditure, the study examines governance and accountability practices relating to upstream financial decision making and execution. This includes budget allocations and government transfers, financial transfers to schools, procurement procedures, and financial management. System functioning covers activities that must take place consistently over the school year and includes: teachers (recruitment, deployment and transfers, and remuneration), schools (monitoring of teacher performance, administration, and school performance), and extra-government entities. In addition, the report reviews contribution of the community (the citizens and students who are the beneficiary) and the extent to which they are able to demand acceptable standards of service delivery in education is examined. Figure 2 gives more details on each component of the analytical framework.

⁹ This is in contrast, for example, to building a road, where the task is completed within a relatively short period and includes only financing, labor, and construction materials. The education sector has the largest number of employees and beneficiaries (students). In fact, the highest number of civil servants (78,340) is in Cameroon’s education sector, followed by health (42,073), and police (15,967).

¹⁰ System functioning refers to the management of teachers in their task of instruction and the consistent operation of schools.

Figure 2: Analytical framework

Public expenditure for education

Budget allocations and financial transfers:

- The Ministry of Budget and Finance (MINFI) is responsible for financing the entire education sector and determines the allocations to the regions for both operational and capital/development expenditure. MINFI makes these decisions in collaboration with MINEDUB and MINESEC. This report first examines whether the criteria used for planning and fund allocations for the three regions (Littoral, Far North, and North West) supports accountability. Second, it reviews fund flows among the Center, the regional administration units, and the schools, and the impact of community contributions on the targeted use of public finances. Third, the study focuses on whether regional fund allocations are adequate to support an environment of accountability and the activities necessary to monitor progress and oversee expenditures.

Central financing for schools:

- Schools are the primary focus and ensuring that they receive an appropriate amount of funds and materials is basic to good governance (World Bank 2007). The Center supports schools in three ways, namely, through infrastructure development, adequate supply of essential school items, and financing.

Public procurement and expenditure:

- A good public procurement system purchases quality inputs at the lowest cost available. It avoids wastage, prevents the misuse of funds, and makes full use of all available resources. The study reviews the current policies and procedures for the procurement of goods and services above and below CFA 5 million (CFA = *Communauté Financière Africaine franc*). Textbook procurement constitutes a significant component of public expenditure (Abadzi 2006; Nannyongo 2007). With no other reading material available, it is critical that each child in the classroom have a textbook. Accordingly, the study also looks at how well the production and distribution of textbooks work.

Financial monitoring:

- A well-established financial management system with appropriate, systematic oversight can facilitate good governance. Cameroon executes regular audits, and the study reviews whether these evaluations are sufficient to ensure financial accountability in the regions.

System Functioning

Teachers

- **Teacher recruitment:** For the right teachers to join the workforce, the recruitment process must be transparent and based on a clear set of principles and criteria. Avoiding favoritism, nepotism, and purchased positions is critical to this process.
- **Teacher deployment and transfers:** Newly recruited teachers and teachers in the workforce must be deployed appropriately, keeping in mind the needs and status of educational outcomes across the different regions. If the distribution of teachers is inequitable or disproportionate, the functioning of the system will be adversely affected because some schools will receive too many teachers and other schools too few.
- **Teacher workforce and salary payments:** Teachers' salary payments constitute one of the largest items of expenditure in the education sector. Encouraging the commitment and motivation of teachers is related to adequate remuneration and regular salary payments. Favoritism is defined as the recruitment of one's friends and known individuals without vetting against established criteria or standards. Nepotism is the recruitment of one's relatives (Hallak and Poisson 2005), again outside the established vetting process.

Schools

- **Teacher performance:** School functioning is dependent on the consistent presence of teachers in the classroom and the time spent by teachers on instruction (time on task). In other words, teacher attendance and time on task are basic proxies for evaluating school functioning. Moreover, established procedures for the formal and regular review of teacher performance and sanctions for inadequate performance are important for government officials to understand and address issues at the school level.
- **Administrative performance:** Effective system functioning is dependent on the quality of administration in regional institutions. Relevant job descriptions and performance expectations for government officials that are consistent across regions are critical to this process. In order to perform their duties, administrative staff requires well-equipped offices and sufficient tools, as well as knowledge and skill for management, data maintenance, and analysis.
- **School performance:** An operational oversight system at the school level is crucial for quality service delivery. Consistency in collecting and maintaining data on student attendance and achievement reflects the commitment and abilities of the local administration to manage the school. The role of inspections to ensure effective school performance is also pertinent to the topic of accountability.
- **Community participation:** During the last decade, numerous grassroots activities and campaigns increased the awareness of communities about the policies and performance of government programs (World Bank 2006). This information draws the attention of community members to the importance of education and encourages them to voice their demand for action and proper services (Banerjee et al. 2008). The analysis here explores the extent to which communities are involved with education and are able to share their perceptions of service delivery.

Extra-government Entities

- This study also examines the roles of the media, traditional authorities, and teacher unions in governance. All three entities can play a constructive role in system functioning. They can be involved in both monitoring and supporting school functioning, as well as calling government institutions to account.

1.4 Study Methodology

11. **The study is qualitative, based on a purposive sample of three regions, namely the Littoral, Far North, and North West.** Qualitative research is inductive, where situations and contexts are examined with few preconceived hypotheses or conclusions.¹¹ This type of research is often referred to as “naturalistic.” General knowledge and perceptions are used to interview individuals and observe activities in their natural setting to obtain a more in-depth understanding of institutional structures and decision-making processes. Qualitative analysis is also iterative and, therefore, the knowledge of the researcher in the beginning of the study is challenged, expanded, or reconceived through interviews and observations.

12. **The study uses qualitative method for two reasons.** First, this approach furthers the findings of quantitative research in the area of governance (Campos and Pradhan 2007).¹² For example, quantitative methods used in Reinikka and Svensson (2004) study highlights the financial leakages in the transfer of funds to schools. Qualitative research, on the other hand, can uncover aspects of sector management that allows this to happen, such as inadequate processes, vested decision-making and vulnerable agents. Second, qualitative research uses in-depth interviewing, which presents more opportunities for probing and arriving at a contextually relevant expansion of knowledge about the constraints to good governance.

13. **In addition to qualitative data, the report includes an analysis of quantitative information relevant to governance and accountability,** generated from the Educational Monitoring Information System (EMIS 2007 and 2008), the Household Survey (ECAM 2004), and the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PET Survey 2005). Quantitative information is used to substantiate or expand the discussion of governance. Available research and studies on governance topics and education in Cameroon also informs the qualitative analysis used in this study.

14. **This study encompasses all three levels of the education system, namely, the local, regional, and national levels.** The national (or macro) level refers to the central government in Yaoundé and the local (or micro) level to the school. In between the national government and the schools are three regional levels of government (meso level). In the Anglophone region, basic education includes regional delegations, division delegations, and sub-division inspectorates; in secondary education, there are just regional and division delegations. In the Francophone region, while the entities are the same, the French translations are: *délégation régionale*, *délégation départementale*, and *inspection d'arrondissement*, respectively.¹³ Box 2 describes how each level was examined as part of the study.

¹¹ There are numerous publications on qualitative research. See especially M.Q. Patton, 1990, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications); and N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, 2005, “The Handbook of Qualitative Research,” 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications).

¹² The analysis of governance is often based on perceptions and the “bluntness” of perception-based indicators used in quantitative analysis is seen to be limited to directing reform efforts.

¹³ For clarity, the English version of this report includes “*département*” when using the term division, and “*arrondissement*” when referring to the inspectorate.

Box 2: Sample analyzed in the study and guiding questions

- The regional delegations in Francophone and Anglophone regions
- A divisional delegation each for primary and secondary education in the Anglophone region
- A department/delegation for primary and secondary education in Francophone regions
- An inspectorate for primary education in the Anglophone region
- An inspection d'arrondissement for primary education in the Francophone regions
- A primary education school in Francophone and Anglophone regions
- A secondary school in Francophone and Anglophone regions

In each region, meetings were held with the regional delegation responsible for primary and secondary education, including with the human resource management, budgets and expenditure, statistics and planning, infrastructure development, and examinations departments. Interviews were conducted with personnel in the *département/division* and in *inspection d'arrondissement/inspectorate*. In the secondary and primary schools visited in each of the regions, discussions were held with School Councils and Parent Teacher Organizations (PTA). The team also met with traditional local leaders of the small-scale “kingdoms” in Cameroon, as well as teacher union representatives. Although no discussions were held with the media, its role in improving governance was included in interviews.

The following questions were used to structure and guide the interviews:

- What are the informal rules and behaviors that characterize governance?
- Are the differences between regions attributable to (i) the lack of human resources and skill, (ii) ineffective governance or (iii) misuse and malpractice?
- Can the difference in governance of these three regions explain the differences in educational outcomes?
- How much of the differences are due to the political economy in Cameroon?
- Are there policies, strategies, interventions, etc., that can be put in place to address governance shortcomings?
- What are the similarities and differences in the governance of education across the three regions?

The questions asked to the different government officials helped identify (i) their tasks and responsibilities for either public expenditure or system functioning, (ii) the strategies and actions in place for implementing their allocated tasks, (iii) measures taken to monitor whether these tasks were adequately completed (“rule enforcement”), and (iv) the consequences or system in place for addressing non-performance of tasks and responsibilities. The study also explores the relationship and role of different levels of government and the existence of internal and external institutions and procedures for facilitating accountability in the system.

2.1 Introduction

15. **Efficient management and government of public spending on education are key to ensuring the system performance.** Public expenditure on education represents a large share of total public spending in Cameroon (see Table xx for more details). Optimizing these resources is therefore crucial to ensuring good education outcomes for all children. Governance of public financing in the education sector includes the following areas: (i) budget allocations and financial transfers to the regions; (ii) central financing for schools, which includes infrastructure development, the “minimum package” of supplies and financial transfers; (iii) public procurement and expenditure in the education sector; and (iv) procedures for financial monitoring. These areas constitute upstream expenditure in the education sector and the following discussion focuses on effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of each of these dimensions.

Table 3. Central financial allocations for basic and secondary education

	in CFA millions		
	2007	2008	2009
Total budget	2,251,000	2,482,000	2,301,400
Budget allocated for education	329,632	358,279	402,770
% allocation for education	14.6%	14.4%	17.5%
Budget allocated for basic education	121,929	147,396	153,102
% budget allocated for basic education	37.0%	41.1%	38.0%
Budget allocated for secondary education	166,824	168,156	204,507
% budget allocated for secondary education	50.6%	46.9%	50.8%

Source: MINEDUB and MINESEC budget documents.

2.2 Budget Allocations and Financial Transfers

16. This discussion examines three aspects of budget allocations and financial transfers: the process of planning and budget allocations to regions; the procedures for financial transfers to the regions; and the amounts available for administration.

2.2.1 Budget Allocations

17. **Decisions on the allocation of the budget are centralized and hardly take into account the specific needs of the different regions and delegations.** MINFI, in collaboration with the Central Ministries of Basic Education and Secondary Education (known as the Center), decides on the amounts to be distributed to regional and sub-regional delegations. Supposedly this process is a bottom-up one, with regional delegations putting forward their needs during the budget preparation, and specifying the amount of funding required for each item in the budget. However, in the process of financial allocations, the Center systematically underfunds regional budgets by a certain percentage. Funds

allocated to the regional level do not vary much from year to year, and both the basic and secondary education levels receive a similar amount. This constant lack of correspondence to what is requested promotes a visible lack of seriousness and motivation to analyze school performance and (accordingly) annual financial requirements.¹⁴

18. **There is a move to change this pattern and to work with budgets prepared by the regional delegations based on actual need.** Budget decisions should be based on the number of students, classrooms, and teachers in each region. Considering that the financing of education is centrally determined, it is still unclear how this process will unfold in practice. In order for this change in budget and expenditure planning to be effective, it is important that the Center develop the capacity for fiscal analysis at the regional level and to ensure that true financial needs at the school and *département*/division levels can be determined. It will involve deliberate inter-level collaboration and transparency in financial transactions, which is a challenge, considering the existing structure of financing in the sector.

19. **The substantial financial contribution of parents complicates budget planning and execution and prevents to some extent the achievement of an equitable distribution of resources.** Except for parent contributions to teachers' salaries (described later in this report), the total amount of parents' financial support for education is not known. Parent contributions reflect the commitment of communities to school activities, and may in some cases promote the efficient use of funds. In this sense, parents are literally investing in the educational performance of their children. However, within this context of multiple sources of financing, the need for budget planning and execution becomes even more overwhelming. First, the dependence on funds from parents and the community, and the lack of clear policies related to this support, constrains the government's ability to ensure equitable distribution of resources to regions and schools. Second, although the PTA is expected to declare the size of its contribution to the school budget, it is not possible to predict in advance how much parents and other community well-wishers will voluntarily contribute to the school. This level of unpredictability poses a problem for government decision-making and budget allocation to the regions.¹⁵

20. **Detailed information on parents' contribution to the public education system is needed to make the system more equitable, transparent and efficient.** Consistent and systematic data collected about parents' incomes and the community's ability to finance school activities could facilitate equity in school budgeting. Furthermore, it could prevent the elite capture of government funds (described in more detail later). In addition to regional levels databases on parent contributions, an analysis of data from household surveys would allow more informed and equitable allocations.


2.2.2 Central Financial Transfers to Regional Levels of Government

21. **Education financing in Cameroon for both basic and secondary education is structurally "centralized" rather than "vertically" organized.** It is centralized in that the Center provides funds directly to the regional delegations (i.e., the *départements*/divisions, and to the *inspection*

¹⁴ Uniformity in budget allocations from year to year is normal. However, in developing country contexts, when universal education is not yet achieved, the financial requirements for teachers, classrooms, and instructional materials will change year to year, necessitating a corresponding variation in budget allocations.

¹⁵ If parents know that their contributions will reduce the amount of money allocated by the government to the school, then there appears to be a corresponding reduction in their support. This was the case in the Littoral region.

d'arrondissement/inspectories). As shown in figure 3, it is not vertical because the Center does not transfer funds to the regions for distribution to sub-regional levels and finally to the schools.



22. **Such centrally organized financing has several implications for sub-national administration of the sector.** First, there is little information on whether funding is effectively and efficiently used across the regions. Second, with no vertical organization, the functioning of the system is based on a shared framework of outcome targets in education at the national level, rather than at the regional level. Third, because the connections between educational performance and financing remain unexplored, there is limited ownership and understanding of how to improve school functioning. Personnel in regional government institutions believe that their primary role is coordination and implementation of instructions from the Center. They have limited understanding of their own role as being directly responsible for making progress toward or meeting educational goals with the funds.


23. **Due to diluted accountability mechanisms the Regions have very little ownership for promoting performance in the provision of public education.** Regional delegations indicate a lack of knowledge and information about the size of the budget allocations to the different administrative levels within the region and the amount of funding actually received. Because of the central financing of education, sub-regional institutions are accountable to the Center for the funds received, rather than to the regional administrative level directly above them. Regional delegations are not expected to monitor the budgets and expenditures of the *départements/divisions* or *inspection d'arrondissements/inspectories*. Instead, centrally defined processes (control missions) are in place to monitor accounts and expenditure. Due to this system of accountability, there is no evidence of procedures or commitment within regions to monitor the use of the funds transferred to schools.

24. **In addition to central financing, horizontal financing exists at the school level in basic and secondary education.** Additional revenue is required locally to backfill the severe shortfall of government funds. School Councils and PTAs pay teacher salaries, support school and classroom construction, and procure furniture and school supplies—expenses usually covered in national and regional education budgets. Because parents and the communities supplement government funds, they tend to participate in the planning and use of these funds. This participatory process includes the school head teachers (principal), teachers, and parents/community. For example, the School Council and PTA

members interviewed in the field visit described an interactive “visioning process” that takes place at the school level. Depending on their background and experience, the constituents bring their distinct vision of what needs to be done for the school. The respective visions are then knit together in a plan that guides the use of resources.

2.2.3 Central Financial Transfers for Regional Administration

25. **There is considerable variation in the availability of administrative staff to the three regions, which impacts their ability to efficiently manage the system.** For example, the Littoral region has 47 staff members, which is the largest administrative staff; North West has 38 administrative staff; and Far North has the lowest, with 25 staff. If the ratio between the number of staff and the number of students in the 6–11 age group is considered (see figure 4), the challenges to educational administration in the Far North become evident. In the Far North, the ratio of administrative staff in the regional delegation to students enrolled in basic education is 1:21,808. In contrast, in the Littoral region, the proportion is 1:7,249, and in the North West it is 1:9,126.¹⁶ Key positions, such as the sub-regional director and the director for pedagogy, were vacant in the Far North, which also had a shortage of staff in the *départements/divisions*. This is in contrast to the Littoral region, which is well staffed.¹⁷ This distribution of administrative staff reflects the political capital of the Littoral region, which is able to capture both funds and personnel.



2.3 Central Financial Support to Schools

26. The Center provides direct financial support to schools in different ways. First, it transfers funds for infrastructure development for both basic and secondary education. Second, the Center distributes a “minimum package” only to primary schools, consisting of instructional aids, office supplies, and sports equipment. Third, it provides a small amount of money earmarked for specific items and activities. The amount and details of Central financial transfers to the regions for secondary schools was difficult to

¹⁶ The ratio of the number of administrative staff to students in secondary education shows a similar unequal distribution. However, the administrative staff is concentrated at the school level in secondary education, rather than in the delegations. Since the real management and oversight occurs in the schools, we could not conduct the same analysis of secondary education that we did for basic education


¹⁷ The team attempted to calculate the actual funds received for administration from the Center at the regional and divisional level, but it proved a challenge and could not be uniformly assessed.

ascertain because each school receives a different amount for different items. In addition to administration and a variety of activities, secondary schools receive funds for laboratories, libraries, and stationery, etc. Compared to the primary schools, the secondary schools visited had much clearer and orderly processes for recording expenditures and maintaining accounts.

2.3.1 Infrastructure Development

27. **Construction of new public schools largely favored the Far North, but was not enough to fill the relative disadvantage of this region in terms of school infrastructures.** Cameroon has three types of primary schools: public, private, and community schools. Community schools are built by the community, but receive some support from the government. Figure 5 shows MINEDUB’s focus on the Far North in the education priority zone. This region opened 85 government schools between 2006/2007 and 2007/2008, in contrast to an increase of only 6 schools in the Littoral region. North West actually closed 14 schools due to a decrease in enrollment. The chronic neglect of the Far North in the past will however require more new schools there for the next few years.

Figure 5. Number of new primary schools opened in 2007/2008



Source: MINEDUB Statistical Yearbook 2007/2008.

28. **Site selection for infrastructure development is usually handled at the regional level and requires clearance from the Center.** Identifying sites for new schools is a complex process, based on the analysis of projected enrollments in the catchment area, a survey of possible construction sites, and a review of existing facilities to avoid duplication of service delivery. In regional delegations, the “head of planning” and “head of construction” are responsible for site selection. Communities can also identify a site and submit a demand for a new school to the *inspection d’arrondissement*/inspectorate in basic education and to the *département*/division for secondary education. For both sub-sectors, the request must be first cleared by the regional delegation and then by MINEDUB and MINESEC, respectively. When the Center clears this request and sanctions construction, it is tantamount to assigning a director and allotting teachers for the school.

29. **In all the three regions visited, there were indications to varying degrees that schools construction did not entirely follow a need basis approach, resulting in schools not being put to full use.** There are several reasons for this situation. First, except in the Littoral region, staff in charge of planning new schools was unable to access the demographic data which continues to be regarded as sensitive information and is therefore not widely disseminated. In the Littoral region, because statistical data was available and analyzed, a more rational plan for where to build schools was evident. Second, there was considerable political pressure from traditional leaders, community leaders, and politicians to build new schools in their particular constituencies. Politicians and parliamentarians could bypass regional delegations and pressure the central ministry directly to build schools. It was estimated that about 20 percent of the new schools each year were constructed in response to direct political intervention. In most cases, it resulted in either duplicate facilities or prevented construction of a school where it is really needed. In addition, school construction supported by politicians may be built in sites that are inconvenient or inappropriate for students and learning.¹⁸

2.3.2 Minimum Package

30. **The minimum package was introduced in 2000 to address both the paucity and delay in fund transfers to schools.** Often schools used to receive funds from the Center well into the school year, causing delays in the procurement of much-needed school supplies. In order to enable the school to begin instruction as soon as the school year started, the Center started distributing a set of basic school supplies. The package is distributed with considerable fanfare and the involvement of the regional delegate, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), the governor, the media, and parents.

31. **There exist variations across regions in the number of school and pupils that benefit from the minimum package.** In 2005, according to the PET survey, the minimum package consisted of “(i) office supplies for teachers, (ii) didactic material for teachers, (iii) assessment material for teaching and testing pupils, (iv) sports and recreation materials, and (v) a small pharmacy/first aid box” (PET Survey 2005, 47). This content list was consistent with what school officials reported during field visits. The PET survey showed however some variation across regions in the number of schools that received this package, from 70 percent of schools in the East region to 100 percent in the Littoral. In both the North West and Far North, 88 percent of the schools received the package. However, 55 percent of the schools surveyed across Cameroon felt that this minimum package was not sufficient. In the Far North, the minimum package received was not commensurate with the size of enrollment in the school. The scarcity of equipment was particularly severe in one of the primary schools visited in the Far North, which had class sizes of several hundred children in the early grades.

¹⁸ For example, the team visited a school on the banks of a river that was opened under pressure from a minister. The surroundings were not safe for students and there was no place for sports or future expansion.

32. **Moreover, there was limited evidence that the different items were available and used in the schools visited.** A small amount of stationery for administration, such as registers and paper, were visible in the school office. It was notable that respondents were unable to convey the extent to which these items were integral to the functioning of the school.¹⁹ Overall, regional delegations were unable to confirm whether the packages were efficiently distributed and whether the package was adequate for the number of students enrolled in each school.

33. **Overall, the “minimum package” was felt as not being responsive enough to the specific needs of each school.** Indeed, providing schools with a standardized package produced and procured externally does not take into account the variation in school contexts across regions. Funds provided directly to the school based on a comprehensive budget proposal might be more effective. When preparing the budget, the abilities of the School Councils and the PTAs to supply certain items could be taken into consideration, and the funds used to procure the remaining items according to the needs and conditions of the school.

2.3.3 Financial Support for Primary and Secondary Schools

34. **Similar to the minimum package, the Center transfers funds at the beginning of the school year to the *département/division* for distribution to schools.** The PET survey (2005, 27) called this “transferred expenditure.” When this policy was introduced in 2000, the amount allocated was about CFA 2,500 per student, but it has now been reduced to CFA 750 per student. Schools receive the list of items covered by this fund. In the PET survey, 11 items were included in the list (table 4). The Center revised this list, as seen in the visits to the three sample regions, and now includes only school insurance, library, cultural activities, and maintenance. There are two new items, namely, school health and performance (or incentive) bonuses.

Table 4. List of school items financed by Central funds

Original items	Per student expenditure in 2002 (in CFA)	Per student expenditure in 2009 (in CFA)
1 School insurance	100	100
2 Library	200	50
3 Monthly register	200	
4 Identity cards	200	
5 Cooperative	100	
6 Cultural activities	100	250
7 Sports activities	300	
8 Practice activities	100	
9 School Council	300	
10 Maintenance	400	100
11 School projects	500	
<i>New items added</i>		
12 Performance bonus	-	200
13 School health	-	50
Total	2500	750

¹⁹ In fact, the only clear evidence of useful and important materials received by a school was in the Far North region. These materials were provided by UNICEF.

Source: PET Survey 2005 and field visits.

35. **The extent to which there is equity in fund transfers is not clear, especially in the Far North, where there is a significant time lag between allocations and increases in school enrollment.** Per pupil expenditure is much lower in the Far North due to the increases in enrollment in basic education. During visits to schools, the team discussed the perceptions of school authorities regarding the use of these funds. Responses revealed limited awareness and hardly any control over the funds received from the Center.²⁰ Although a distribution of funds across different categories is stipulated, school authorities gave priority to sports activities or the “Funesco” (national games) organized by the Center (which suggests that the Center was monitoring expenditure on this item closely). In contrast, officials rarely mention expenditure on items important for instruction and student learning, such as library books or instructional materials.

36. **It is not clear if the administrative delegations monitor the appropriate distribution and use of these funds.** Regional delegations are not responsible for the efficient distribution of Center funds to primary or secondary schools: *départements/divisions* simply transfer the funds. Any systematic effort to closely monitor the use of these funds would be complicated by the absence of uniform procedures for the maintenance of accounts with respect to these transfers at the *département/division* level. This leads in some instances in errors in the amounts transferred, for example, in one of the primary schools visited, the amount received by the school was three times what the departments reported. Accounts maintained were confusing and inadequate in most of the offices visited, except for the Wouri *département* in the Littoral region. This *département* is an example of good practice relevant to other *départements/divisions*. The *département* delegate created a template that specified the items and amount received by each school (see annex III). The head teacher in each school signs this form after receiving the money. Similarly, *département/division* delegations take limited responsibility for monitoring and ensuring accountability for school income and expenditure.

2.4 Public Procurement and Expenditure in the Education Sector

37. Because policies and procedures differ for public procurement above and below CFA 5 million, these two areas are discussed separately. In addition, the procurement of textbooks, a significant component of school education, is included in this section.

2.4.1 Expenditure below CFA 5 Million

38. **In order to limit the misuse of funds, stringent procedures are in place that prohibit the use of cash for procuring goods.** The Ministry of Finance is responsible for all financial allocations and expenditures. The government of Cameroon is committed to limiting possibilities for the misuse of funds, and one way is by prohibiting cash transfers. The allocations to regional entities are notional, based on a system of credit, and stringent procedures govern all transactions. Any expense incurred that is less than CFA 5 million requires filling out a voucher (also called a “*carton*”; see annex IV).²¹ The voucher is given to the retail store or firm, which then submits the voucher to the public treasury for

²⁰ This was in contrast to the resources collected through the PTA, where there much more clarity in how much was collected and what was purchased with this money.

²¹ A new procurement code was introduced in Cameroon in 2004 that significantly improved procurement processes. This new code includes standard bidding documents, manuals of procedures, and a variety of regulatory instruments. Independent audits are also conducted at regular intervals.

reimbursement. Actual cash is rarely exchanged in transactions within regions. Credit managers or financial controllers in MINFI authorize expenditures. While public contract boards review contracts for expenditures above CFA 5 million, such a review is not required for expenditures below 5 million.

39. **While actual cash is not exchanged, the system can be subverted by adjustments made to the costs of supplies.** The Ministry of Commerce puts together estimated costs for commodities, known as “*mercurial* or pricelist.” This list specifies the cost of all the items purchased by the government. Most of the individuals interviewed indicate that the prices are largely overstated. The unofficial line is that the quoted price includes a substantial margin for the supplier and the intermediaries involved in procuring these items. Respondents also stated that if they were given the funds, they could procure the same item two to five times cheaper than the government’s list prices. It appears that the government list prices likely allows for misuse to take place within an accepted system of public expenditure.

40. **There is often distrust in the relationship between the education sector administration and the public treasury.** Education managers interviewed complained about delays in the release of funds. One legitimate reason for the Treasury to deny payment is technical, such as if the financial controller does not authorize the expenditure in the regions. Other reasons include a mismatch between the purchase and the nomenclature (i.e., the credit line does not match the expenditure), and if the quoted price and the quality of the product do not correspond. According to MINFI, although these cases are rare, the public treasury is supposed to report misappropriations or fraud committed by education officials.

2.4.2 Expenditure above CFA 5 Million

41. **Procurement procedures for expenditures above CFA5 million include the involvement of the regional tender board.** Any procurement that is more than CFA 5 million must follow public contracting rules established by the Agency for the Regulation of Public Procurement [*Agence de régulation des marchés publics*]. Tender boards located at the regional and *département*/division levels are responsible for the bidding process and awarding contracts. A project manager oversees contract implementation. Appointment of project managers is discretionary, made by the relevant sub-committee that reviews the contract. Public works departments attached to the regional governor’s office or at the *département*/division level are responsible for all infrastructure construction supported by the government. The public works department advertises a request for proposals and receives financial and technical proposals for the work. Tenders must reflect the current list of prices. Proposals are rated on a scale of A to D, with A being the highest. If the costs are 25 percent above the list prices, the submission is rejected.

42. **Similar to expenditure below CFA 5 million, activities above this amount are based on list prices that are far above the regular rate.** The existence of national fixed prices is not satisfactory for two reasons. First, common pricing is not a cost-effective use of funds because it generates a system in which items cost more than they are worth. It does not take into account variations in prices across regions, especially the geographical factors that affect costing. For example, regions close to Nigeria, due to competitive pricing, can obtain materials and services for much lower rates. While the cost for constructing a classroom based on the list price is CFA 8,000,000, parents’ association claimed that they were able to build a classroom for approximately CFA 3,000,000. Second, because the list prices do not take into account the high cost of construction in remote areas, it becomes a disincentive to construct schools and classrooms in these areas. The unit cost will be far higher in remote areas, given a greater cost for transportation and the unavailability of construction materials.

43. **The weak collaboration between the public works department and the head of construction in the regional delegation to can negatively affect the quality of school construction and facilitate collusive practices.** Restrictions on the timing and frequency of building inspection were sometimes imposed by the public works department to the heads of construction in regional delegations. As a result, regional delegations were unable to ensure that the classrooms and schools were built according to requisite norms and guarantee the quality of the construction. In the Far North, the “Project Logbook” which records all completed works detailed the low quality of buildings and how funds could be diverted in the construction of schools (annex V).²² In some instances, collusion between construction companies and the public works department was noted. Considering that the logbook is a shared document, unsatisfactory construction is either ignored or supported by the leadership. However, in the Littoral region, the head of construction was more deeply involved with the different activities and felt empowered to identify unsatisfactory construction which amounted to only about 10 percent of the projects. The coordination in the Littoral region indicates that it is possible for construction in Cameroon to be less susceptible to the diversion of funds and for the ministries to guarantee quality construction.

2.4.3 Textbook Procurement

44. **Textbooks, which are a crucial component of education, are scarcely available and hardly used for educational purposes.** MINEDUB does not provide textbooks to students; students have to procure textbooks on their own. The distribution of textbooks across the three regions is shown below. The availability of mathematics textbooks is alarmingly low (table 5). The slightly higher percentage of students who have textbooks in the Far North is due to textbooks supplied by UNICEF. Fields visits indicated however that these textbooks were not being used by students and were kept carefully in the head teacher’s cabinet. More students observed in classrooms in the North West appeared to have textbooks.

²² According to Ware et al. (2007), apart from project identification and design (see the section on infrastructure development in this report), irregularities in procurement can occur during advertisement, prequalification, preparation of bidding documents, bid submission, bid evaluation, post-qualification, contract award, and supervision of contract performance. Since this study did not review this list of the different stages of procurement, it is difficult to capture at what stage or process faulty construction of schools occurs.

Table 5. Distribution of textbooks across regions and students enrolled

	Far North	Littoral	North West
Enrollment in basic education	540168	340713	346794
No. of language textbooks in the school system	78424	11482	35135
% of students with language textbooks	15%	3%	10%
No. of science textbooks in the school system	54797	9491	35139
% of students with science textbooks	10%	3%	10%
No. of mathematics textbooks in the school system	2027	1436	849
% of students with mathematics textbooks	0.4%	0.4%	.2%
<i>Source: MINEDUB Statistical Yearbook 2007/2008.</i>			

45. **The high cost of textbooks and absence of policy regarding their mandatory use in class explain in part the dearth of textbooks.** First, there are no local publishers of textbooks, which undoubtedly drive up the cost of textbooks. Books are produced and printed in France for the Francophone regions and in the United Kingdom for the Anglophone regions. During the 1990s, there was a move to liberalize textbook production and establish a national printing press in Yaoundé. This project, however, was abandoned due to domestic politics, pressure from donors and publishers, and the perception that a national press would produce substandard books. Second, because textbooks are not mandatory, parents are resistant to buying them for their children. The high cost of textbooks also makes them unattractive for parents, given the competing demands on their meager resources by PTA fees, examination fees, and other contributions to the school, among others. About CFA 10,000 is required for each student in primary education to obtain all the textbooks required. The minimum package only includes textbooks for teachers and is not meant for students. Some schools have established a rental system for low-cost books (CFA 300 for the year), but the initial purchase of books, which is substantial, remains a problem.

2.5 Central Monitoring of Expenditure

46. **Accountability for the funds received from the Center by the different regional levels of government comes under the responsibility of MINFI based in Yaoundé and its counterparts in the region.** “Control missions” fielded by MINFI visit the different levels of government to monitor whether accounts relating to budget and expenditure are consistently maintained. The missions consist of three to four individuals that visit two to three times a year. Visits are made to the regional delegation and a few *départements/divisions*, inspectorates/*inspection d’arrondissements*, and schools. During the field visits to the regions, the study team met with several control missions immersed in their work. Their primary task is to conduct internal audits and assess whether funds are spent according to the instructions given by the Center. The missions also assess construction of new schools by taking photographs, reviewing the project logbook, and talking with staff.

47. **The rationale and procedures used by the control missions are not sufficient to ensure financial accountability and improve education performance.** The effectiveness of these control missions is compromised for three reasons. First, the visits are not based on a well-defined random sample of schools and *départements/divisions*, organized over time. Control missions rarely visit

schools or *départements*/divisions that are far from the regional capital city, and often seem to visit the same delegations and schools. Therefore, the information that is collected is likely to be incomplete and skewed. Second, control mission report only to the Center. Unless the control mission reports an irregularity, schools or regional delegations do not receive a copy of the report. If there is a problem, the Superior State Control is responsible. The Superior State Control informs MINEDUB or MINESEC, and State Disciplinary Councils take action. A regular feedback loop that includes the school and regional authorities would facilitate more effective financial monitoring. Third, when the Center takes disciplinary action, only serious issues are considered. This approach limits the incentive for incremental improvements and fine-tuning of financial management at the regional level.

2.6 Conclusions

Budget allocations and financial transfers

- **Strategies and processes in place for budget planning and financial allocations are inadequate.** Decisions on the budget allocation to regions are made by MINFI and the Center, and regional administrative entities are not really involved in preparing budgets based on the analysis of need. The substantial contribution of parents to the school system also poses a challenge to government budget planning and equitable allocation.
- **Accountability for financing remains centralized with limited involvement by regional level government entities.** Accountability for the funds received is to the Center rather than to the administrative level immediately above. This situation limits the financial and functional coordination between different levels of government within the region. In both the primary and secondary school levels, due to the considerable local generation of funds, school officials and communities tend to be more involved in managing and monitoring the use of funds.
- **Allocations for regional administration across regions are inequitable.** Far North delegations are understaffed, in contrast to the Littoral region, where there was no shortage of staff. Inadequate staffing levels limit the extent to which oversight activities can be undertaken.

Central financing of schools

- **The impact of the minimum package in terms of efficiency and targeting is unclear.** Allocation of the minimum package does not take into account the capacities and needs of each school. Financial allocations to schools are earmarked for specific items, leaving little room for school level decisions for its use.
- **In school construction, political interference often results in wasting financial resources.**

Public procurement and expenditure

- **Expenditures must comply with government list prices that may contribute to the informal misuse of funds.** Although this system of banning cash transactions limits the possibilities of misuse, more systemic diversion of funds is reported. All purchases must be made according list prices established by the Center. List prices often include wide margins and do not take into account variation in prices across regions, thereby presenting opportunities for the misuse of funds. More specifically, there is indication of collusion between the public works department and building contractors in the Far North.
- **The Center does not supply textbooks to schools. Visits to schools indicate a critical shortage of textbooks in classrooms.** Foreign publishers dominate the textbook industry, driving up the cost, and resulting in a scarcity of textbooks. There is a need to explore alternative options for the production and printing of textbooks.

Procedures for financial monitoring

- **Centrally defined procedures are in place to monitor budgets and expenditures. However, the mechanism and modes of such an operation are inadequate.** Control missions lack rigor and comprehensiveness, due to the nature of their mandate and inadequate systematization. The impression in the field is that control missions are limited and ineffective in ensuring financial accountability across regions.

3.1 Teachers

48. Teacher accountability constitutes a critical area of system functioning. This section examines the effectiveness of the system of teacher recruitment, deployment and transfer, and the size and consistency in salary payments to teachers.

3.1.1 Teacher Recruitment

49. **Restrictions on teachers' recruitment and a surge in enrolments led to the widespread use of community teachers.** Throughout the 1990s, there was a ban on recruiting teachers in Cameroon and, at the same time, school fees were abolished.²³ Reduced allocations and redefined priorities in primary education resulted in increased enrollment and severe teacher shortages all over the country. This situation led to the ad hoc locally-driven recruitment of teachers in both basic and secondary education. In basic education, there were three types of teachers: regular civil servant teachers hired by the Center, contract teachers hired by regional administrations, and teachers hired by the PTAs.

50. **The government introduced a contract teacher program in primary education via decree in the 1990s, with a more detailed description of the program completed in 2000.** The program aimed to incorporate all non-civil servant teachers into a single group of contract teachers. In other words, locally recruited teachers, such as those hired by the PTA and contract teachers hired by regions were to eventually join the official contract-teacher cadre. A well-defined policy outlining salary scales, benefits, and career paths undergirds the contract teacher program.²⁴ A detailed operations manual developed by MINEDUB, which is continually updated, also guides program implementation. Over the last few years, the international donor community has supported the implementation of the contract teacher program, but the number of contract teachers recruited so far (37,200 by 2011) remains insufficient to cover the needs, and parents and regional delegations continue to recruit teachers locally. At the secondary level, two types of teachers are recruited: regular teachers that are part of the civil servant cadre, and long-term or temporary teachers hired by the regional delegations or PTAs. Temporary teachers are hired for a course or semester.

51. **In both basic and secondary education, favoritism and nepotism, mainly through political interference in the recruitment of teachers, are identified as common practice.** Politicians and prominent individuals in the community pressure officials to hire their relatives or friends as contract or secondary school teachers. Because of some of the recent reforms, there are indications that there is less

²³ As in many other sub-Saharan countries, structural adjustment programs targeted the salary of teachers during the 1980s and 1990s. This one-dimensional approach to this issue ignored the broader policy context in which teachers functioned (Welmond 2002).

²⁴ Several levels of promotion have been created for contract teachers and, after 10 years of service, they have a chance to join the regular civil servants cadre. The government of Cameroon gives a cash bonus to teachers in lieu of pension. Contract teachers are also receive similar benefits as regular civil servants. For example, contract teachers are allowed 18 days of leave during the school year and regular teachers 30 days. If they have children, contract teachers can also take advantage of two additional days of leave per child. If leave is not taken during the school year, contract teachers are allowed to accumulate the leave. Regular teachers, on the other hand, are not allowed to accumulate leave.

favoritism and nepotism in the contract teacher program for basic education. For example, public advertisement of teaching jobs and the published expectation that any candidate called for an interview must have a teaching diploma promotes more transparency in recruitment.²⁵ Despite this, pressure to recruit specific individuals continues to be an issue. In addition to favoritism and nepotism, illegal under-the-counter payments to obtain teaching posts appear to be prevalent across regions. Respondents, however, did not identify any specific amounts for obtaining these positions.

3.1.2 Registration of Recruited Teachers

52. **Complex, cumbersome, and inefficient registration processes for teachers result in significant delays in receiving the first salary which impact teachers' performance.** In order to be paid a salary by MINFI, a newly recruited civil servant or contract teacher must go through a registration process with MINFOPRA, which culminates in the assignment of a registration number. The process of registration varies between a few months and as long as three years. Teachers do not receive any remuneration during this period and their position remains in limbo. Some teachers remain at home and wait for the registration process to be completed before they begin working in the school. Others continue to teach in the expectation that their registration will be completed at anytime. PTAs often have to support these teachers until they receive their first salary payment. When these teachers do receive their salary, the sum is quite large (CFA 1,000,000–3,000,000) because it includes many months of arrears. Head teachers complain that these teachers disappear for a while after they receive this large amount from the government.

Box 3: Main steps in the registration process at the MINEDUB and MINESEC


- MINESEC receives the teachers' certificates from the Normal School or pre-service educational institution. The records, which include excessive or redundant information, are forwarded to MINFOPRA, which prepares the registration file for the prime minister's signature. After the prime minister signs, MINFOPRA issues the registration number. MINFOPRA's double handling of the file, before and after the prime minister's signature, is time consuming and requires a considerable amount of staff time. Furthermore, when the file is with the prime minister, MINFOPRA staff loses control of the process.
- While the process described above remains in place for secondary education, MINEDUB has tried to reduce delays in the registration of newly recruited primary teachers. MINEDUB, in collaboration with the prime minister and MINFOPRA, established a single process where all cases are reviewed at the same time. Processing time for new cases is now considerably reduced. Having said this, however, a recent audit of the recruitment process (FDA 2008) highlighted differences between those recruited and those registered, indicating the need for further fine-tuning of this process. Furthermore, there were 251 cases of duplicate registration, based on a comparison of MINFOPRA and MINEDUB data. There is a risk of double payment if these cases are not identified and deleted.

²⁵ Previously, teachers without qualifications but who had connections to people in power were recruited.

3.1.3 Teacher Deployment and Transfers

53. **The deployment of additional teachers to the Far North region has not been sufficient to cover the large increase in enrolments.** Effective service delivery in both basic and secondary education depends on the appropriate deployment of teachers across the regions. The number of teachers hired by the government in the Far North increased more than threefold, from 784 in 2006/2007 to 2,949 in 2007/2008. In spite of MINEDUB's remarkable effort to increase the number of teachers deployed to the Far North (see figure 7), the political capital of the Littoral region drew many new recruits. Even though there is a decrease in the number students in Littoral and the average pupil-teacher ratio is 47:1, a significant number of contract teachers in 2007/2008 were sent to this region instead of the Far North. The North West region also received additional contract teachers in 2007/2008, which is to some extent valid because the average PTR is still high at 77:1. Information on the number of teachers recruited between 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 is not available for secondary education because MINESEC only began to collect secondary education statistics in 2007/2008. Attempts to examine this information at the regional level were also not successful.

Figure 6. Differences in the number of teachers and students in the three regions over two years



Source: MINEDUB Statistical Yearbook 2007/2008 and 2006/2007

54. **Deployment through teacher transfers is also a complex and lengthy process.** Deployment of government-hired (regular and contract) basic and secondary education teachers also occurs through transfers from school to school within and across regions. The Center is responsible for all deployment and transfers in both primary and secondary education. Similar to the recruitment of teachers, transfer procedures are intricate and time consuming. Primary teachers submit their requests for transfer to the *inspection d'arrondissement*/ inspectorate and secondary teachers to the *département*/division. The list moves up the administrative levels to MINEDUB and MINESEC for basic and secondary education, respectively. MINEDUB and MINESEC finalize the transfers and submit the list to MINFOPRA, which informs the regional delegations. Civil servant (regular) teachers in both basic and secondary schools can request a transfer after three years in a school. Contract teachers, on the other hand, have to remain in a school for five years. Outside the three and five year terms, teachers can request a transfer for the following reasons: (i) if he or she is the spouse of a government official who is transferred; (ii) if he or she is the spouse of a military person who is transferred; or (iii) *force majeure*, such as teachers finding

themselves in danger.²⁶ In addition to these three situations, teachers can request a transfer due to illness and family reasons, such as marriage.²⁷

55. Similar to recruitment, teacher deployments and transfers are influenced by vested political interests throughout Cameroon. Teachers frequently request transfers, especially in the North West and Far North regions. In the North West primary schools, 500 regular and contract teachers requested a transfer, and 175 transfers approved; in secondary schools, 190 requests, of which 125 were granted. In the Far North primary schools, 172 teachers requested transfers and 100 transfers approved; in secondary schools, 300 requests, of which 30 were granted. In the Littoral region primary schools, 20 teachers requested transfers and 30 transfers approved; in secondary schools, 19 requests, of which 25 were granted. Anecdotal evidence shows that politicians and individuals in prominent positions demand teacher transfers throughout the school year. Across the regions visited, officials stated that if he or she is the spouse of an important person, a transfer can be requested and should be granted at any time. Although officials spend considerable effort organizing a rational distribution of teachers across schools, about 30 percent of the teachers are changed at various stages by influential persons. It is also difficult to determine whether the transfers requested by teachers are in fact legitimate. For example, in the case of sickness or marriage, administrators try to do some informal investigation. However, investigations are neither thorough nor substantial due to a lack of financial resources and limited staff on site. Understanding the real situation is also difficult because personnel records of teachers are not consistently maintained or regularly updated in the regions.

56. Overall, for several reasons, deployments and transfers are often arbitrary and not based on rational requirements and system performance. First, the extent of political interference will not allow a rational and need-based deployment and transfer of teachers. Second, there is no system of forecasting future teacher requirements by analyzing teacher retirements and attrition. Third, it is difficult to predict and analyze the number of PTA-paid teachers that will be employed, due to the dependence on voluntary financial contributions and the availability of qualified personnel.


3.1.4 Teacher Work Force and Salary Payments

57. The variation in the size of the teacher workforce supported by the government results in sub-optimal class sizes and does not promote the “teachability” of the class. The distribution of government paid teachers across the country is not aligned with the differences in student enrollment across the three regions. Although the Far North has about 496,000 students, the Littoral about 150,000, and North West regions about 232,000, all three regions have the same number of civil-servant teachers (about 2,500). Because of this distribution, the level of dependency on the community and parents also

²⁶ *Force majeure* can mean illness or danger as in this anecdote. A school in the north of Cameroon had five teachers. One teacher was hired by the community and the remaining four were contract teachers. The teacher hired by the community died. A member of the community decided that a contract teacher had practiced sorcery on the local teacher to have him killed. This story began to circulate in the village, creating antagonism and fury against all contract teachers. The village decided that such sorcery needed to be severely punished. The community set fire to the homes of the four contract teachers. Fortunately, the teachers rushed out of their homes in time and sought protection from the local Catholic mission. MINEDUB then arranged for the transfer of all the four contract teachers to another region.

²⁷ Marriage is complicated, given Cameroon’s cultural context of polygamy. An important person may request a transfer for just not one wife but also for his other wives. The ministry finds itself in an awkward position in this situation and has to grant the transfer.

varies (figure 7).²⁸ In the North West, PTA teachers (1,676) are about twice the number in the Littoral region (839) and, in the Far North, there are almost four times as many PTA teachers (3,120).²⁹ The size of the regular/contract teacher cadre and the small number of PTA teachers in the Littoral region, again, portray the political power of this region and its ability to capture more funds from the Center. It also illustrates the Center’s susceptibility to political pressure in the past decades at the expense of improving educational performance in the weaker regions in the country.




58. **When comparing the ratio of civil servant teachers (regular and contract) to students enrolled in each region, the inequity is even starker in secondary schools.** With about 83,000 and 56,000 students in the Littoral and North West regions, respectively, the majority of teachers in secondary schools are civil servants (close to 3,400). This is in contrast to the situation in the Far North, which has nearly 72,000 students and fewer than 800 teachers in the system. This skewed distribution is also reflected at the school level in figure 8. Parents in the Far North have no other recourse but to increase the number of secondary school teachers by hiring and paying the salaries of 1,185 PTA teachers.³⁰ Field visits also confirmed the high number of PTA teachers in the Far North (table 6). About 15 percent of teachers in schools visited in the Littoral and North West regions are supported by parents, whereas this number is over 60 percent in the school in the Far North.

²⁸ The regular civil servant teachers in figure 8 include both the “*fonctionnaires*” and the “*contractualisés*,” or contract, teachers in the Statistical Yearbook 2007/2008.

²⁹ In spite of the large number of adequately trained government-supported regular/contract teachers in the Littoral region, about 193,182 students attend private schools.

³⁰ Low enrollment in the North West requires a smaller number of PTA teachers (289). The large number of teachers (2,542) hired by the PTA in the Littoral region appears to be somewhat inefficient and needs to be further explored.

Figure 8. Government (regular and contract) and PTA teachers in secondary education



Source: MINESEC Annual Statistics 2007/2008

Table 6. PTA recruitment at the school level in secondary education

Region	School	Total teachers	Gov't teachers	PTA teachers	% of civil servants
North West	Bambui CCAST	154	130	24	84%
Littoral	Lycee Joss Douala	116	99	17	85%
Far North	Lycee classic Maroua	61	24	37	39%

Source: Field visits.

59. **Different levels of remuneration for teachers that are not commensurate with differences in qualification and, more importantly, effort and performance in the classroom has a negative impact on sector performance.** There is inequity and arbitrariness in the salaries paid to teachers. Regular and contract teachers hired by the Center and those hired by the regions and PTA teachers that work in basic education earn different salaries (table 7). Teachers with different pay scales could work in the same school. Differentiation in pay scales is not connected to differences either in qualifications or in the work undertaken in the classroom. Regular (non-contract) civil servant teachers earn the highest salaries and the PTA teachers the lowest. PTA teachers receive only about 30 percent of the salary received by regular civil servant teachers. In secondary schools, the teacher payment situation is similar to primary schools. Teachers hired by parents earn between CFA 35,000 and CFA 60,000 per month, while teachers hired by the government receive a minimum of about CFA 150,000 per month.

Table 7. Salary payments to teachers in basic education

Type of teacher	Salary range in CFA	Above, or below average per capita GDP	As a proportion of the salary of regular civil servant teacher
Regular civil servant teacher	110,000 to 150,000 per month.	Above	
Centrally supported contract teacher	70,000 to 100,000 per month	Below to average	85%
Regionally supported contract teacher	35,000 and 65,000 per month	Below	50%
PTA teacher	15,000 to 45,000 per month	Below	30%

Source: Field visits

60. **The inability of the system to ensure consistent remuneration for teachers will have consequences in the long term on whether students acquire grade-appropriate skill and knowledge.** Regular civil servant teachers generally receive their salaries on schedule. This is in contrast to how all contract teachers are paid, which is irregular and inconsistent. Field visits could not ascertain whether the payments to PTA teachers were consistent or erratic. Timely payment to PTA teachers depends, on one hand, whether the PTA strategy to persuade parents to contribute to the school is successful and, on the other hand, what are the competing demands on the funds collected. In spite of delayed or irregular salary payments, School Councils and PTAs, as well as the principals, confirmed the generally reliable attendance of both PTA and contract teachers at school. Teachers explicitly expressed their commitment to their schools and to the task of instructing students on a regular basis. One of the reasons for the contract teachers' consistent attendance is the fear of disciplinary action that might prevent or delay future salary payments. It was also apparent that PTA teachers, in the hope of getting a government-paid position in the future, would sacrifice complaining about regularity in salary payments to maintain a good impression with the authorities. Despite this high level of commitment, the morale and institutional climate in a school that has regular civil servant teachers receiving a higher salary, contract teachers with no salary for seven months, and PTA teachers with lower and likely irregular salary payments is not likely to be conducive to student learning.³¹

3.2 Schools

61. Accountability for school performance is the fulcrum for achieving key educational outcomes. This section includes a discussion of the system in place for monitoring teacher and school performance, regional level monitoring of school administration, and community involvement in the school.

³¹ Collecting information on the variability in the non-payment or irregularity of salary payments during the school year, and the impact on improving quality and student learning, will be useful for future strategic reform in the sub-sector.

3.2.1 Teacher Performance

62. **The performance of all administrative staff and regular civil servant teachers (not contract teachers) in both basic and secondary education is captured in what is called the “confidential report”.** The confidential report is a common form for all staff in both the delegations and in schools. Two persons rate the individual on an ascending scale of 1 to 6 as per the following categories (see annex VII for more details):

- Professionalism: punctuality, assiduity, sense of duty, and constant application to assigned tasks
- Professional knowledge, intelligence, effectiveness, output, initiative, and organization
- Personality, collaboration and relations with other staff, respect for seniority, general service to the public

63. **There are several drawbacks in the confidential reports used for monitoring performance.** First, the report is the same for all staff working in the government, regardless of the sector they belong to or the work that they do. Therefore, it does not document or evaluate achievement of tasks and targets set in education, or acknowledge accomplishments by the individual. By ignoring specific successes or failures of teachers and staff, the confidential report signals to the staff a rather confused commitment of the education system to meeting sector goals and producing desired outcomes. Second, the form is sent to MINFOPRA and is not shared or discussed with either the person being evaluated or their immediate superiors. This process does not allow opportunities for self-reflection of performance. In this sense, evaluation does not promote the specific objective of improving teachers’ performance or the general goal of better school functioning. Third, according to officials interviewed, the confidential report does not include suggestions for career development or recommendations for promotion, transfer, demotion, or sanction. Instead, confidential verbal and written reports are made directly to the minister, which influences the decision to promote or demote. This system gives undue power to people in authority who are far removed from the actual context (the school and region, and especially the teachers) and can encourage nepotism and favoritism. Mostly, it does not leave a transparent paper trail that is accessible to all those concerned.

64. **Assessment tools for contract teachers are more appropriate but appear cumbersome given their limited use in practice to improve performance.** The Center has set in place a rigorous and regular review of contract teachers in basic education through “sequential forms” (annex VIII), which document information on teacher absenteeism, curriculum coverage, and salary payment. They must be filled out after every cycle for each contract teacher and sent to Yaoundé. While the form provides a good summary of performance, the frequency of submissions creates additional work for all levels in the system. Furthermore, as school authorities do not analyze the forms, they provide limited information about the quality of instruction. Bi-annual or annual reporting with authentic information that fully captures and certifies performance would be more appropriate and useful. There is no formal process for monitoring locally recruited contract and PTA teachers.

65. **Considering the workload and small numbers of staff, the newly introduced tool to monitor teachers’ instructions in primary schools is unlikely to achieve its intended effect.** In basic education, the pedagogical unit in Yaoundé, with technical support from donors, recently put in place a detailed and complex five-page form to monitor teachers’ instruction in classrooms. This “Teacher’s Inspection Form” (annex IX) monitors how well teachers are using recently introduced pedagogical techniques (such as the new system of continuous student evaluation). Summary findings of this review are sent to Yaoundé. The review itself is not connected to any formal performance reviews, promotions,

or salary scales. A detailed evaluation form was also introduced for the inspectors in the delegation, the “Inspection Form of Inspectors of Basic Education” (annex X). Examination of some of the completed forms during the field visit underscored however the challenges presented to the school and delegation staff in filling them out. Completed forms left many questions unanswered or had vague responses. Rather than entrust this evaluation to overworked and understaffed delegations, it would be far more efficient for a local university or dedicated institute to collect this information on a sample basis.

66. Table 8 summarizes the situation in the three regions regarding the performance review of teachers. There is variation and discrepancy in the instruments used for evaluating the different types of teachers in the system limiting its effectiveness. In secondary education, teacher performance monitoring at the regional level is restricted to the confidential reports described above, and there is more regulation and oversight within the school as described below

Table 8. Performance reviews of teachers in primary education

Type of teacher	Instrument	Frequency	Documentation
PTA teachers	Informal	Irregular	No documentation
Contract (regional) teachers	Informal	Irregular	No documentation
Contract (Central) teachers	Sequential forms	After each cycle	Three forms each year
	Pedagogical review	End of the year	Summary documentation sent to Yaoundé
Civil-servant teachers	Confidential report	End of the year	One form per year
	Pedagogical review	End of the year	Summary documentation sent to Yaoundé
<i>Source: Field visits.</i>			

3.2.2 Sanctions and Incentives

67. **The system of sanctions in place in both primary and secondary education covers major cases of misconduct and is oftentimes slow in taking any disciplinary action.** Sanctions are based on excessive and obvious flouting of work regulations or behavioral rules, such as absence for an extended period of time or blatant misconduct. Implementing sanctions for long, unexcused absences takes place through a hierarchical process. The *département*/division delegation first sanctions the teacher, followed by the regional delegation. If this does not have any impact, it becomes the responsibility of the central government. It begins with the regional delegation sending a “letter of discipline” requesting an

explanation from the offender. If there is no response, this request is followed by a “letter of observation” demanding that the teacher or staff report for duty. If there is still no response, a letter of order is sent with a definite command to return to work. Before disciplinary action is taken by MINIFORRA and MINEDUB, such as salary cuts and finally the removal of the person from the employee list, the media is used to ask the teacher to resume work. If the teacher is removed from the employee list, it takes about two years to rescind this and to restart salary payments.

68. **There is a general system of incentives in both basic and secondary education but it seems to have little impact on performance.** Occasionally a teacher will receive a letter of congratulations for having organized an event or won a competition. The financial support received by primary schools from the Center (described in chapter 1) includes allocations for a performance bonus for teachers. Similarly, PTA contributions are sometimes shared between teachers as a bonus. During field visits, there was however no evidence of this bonus being awarded as an incentive to commend teachers for their performance in the classroom. The impression was that, due to the scarcity of funds, this money was being used for other purposes. Overall, any incentives associated with progress toward achieving key educational outcomes, such as increases in enrollment or improvement in learning levels, were not evident.

3.2.3 Administrative Performance

69. **The main responsibilities of regional delegations as perceived by their personnel are to implement the Center directions.** In basic and secondary education, regional entities of government are expected to follow the organization or process flow charts (organigrams) developed by MINEDUB and MINESEC, which list all the positions, titles and corresponding tasks and responsibilities for each administrative level. For basic education, the organigram has 10 titles, with six of these titles pertaining to Center-level positions. The seventh title in the organigram (annex VI) describes the responsibilities of the delegates at the regional *département/division* and *inspection d'arrondissement/inspectorate* levels. The overarching perception across administrative levels is that personnel consider themselves representatives of MINEDUB or MINESEC and their primary responsibility is to implement policies and programs defined by the Center.³² The importance of making a good impression with Center authorities was commonly mentioned and there was no frustration or unease expressed about the often-imprecise expectations. Officials also pay attention to activities in the organigram that are more closely monitored by the Center. For example, the maintenance of personnel records is included in the responsibilities of regional delegations. However, as described below, this was unsatisfactory due to a lack of oversight from the Center.

70. **The degree to which the different levels of administration maintain and use education indicators varied significantly.** Understanding the effectiveness of service delivery is dependent on the availability of comprehensive statistics for a particular education sub-sector. All the administrative levels in both basic and secondary education have possessed statistical data for the system since 2007 when the EMIS was put in place. However, there is no uniformity in data maintenance, presentation, or analysis. Three delegations in basic education in the Littoral and North West regions undertook some

³² The discussions with the regional delegations, *départements/divisions*, *inspectorates/inspection d'arrondissements*, and school personnel centered on perceptions of tasks, procedures for carrying out these tasks, and the current process of accountability to ensure that they had accomplished what was required.

analysis of the data, although in most cases information on pupil-teacher ratios across divisions and patterns of textbook availability, etc., were not available.³³

71. Similarly comprehensive and well organized documentation on staff performance, including teachers, was rarely available locally. Effective administration is also dependent on consistent documentation and reporting on staffing levels and performance (personnel records). There is no standard classification system, format, or procedure for maintaining a database on teachers and staff. There were detailed files on teachers and staff disciplined in the *département*/division delegations visited. However, it was not possible for any of the delegations to present complete, well-organized, and updated performance records for all teachers, including PTA-paid and regular teachers, either at the school, *inspection d'arrondissement*/inspectorate, or *département*/division levels. Of the 16 offices visited, only about four offices maintained records of regular civil servant teachers. Even these records were unsatisfactory due to haphazard reporting, outdated and incomplete information, absence of performance reviews, and almost no records of career promotions or commendations. The standard response from officials interviewed was that MINFOPRA kept all the information.

72. Finally, the quality and accuracy of the financial information and account keeping was uneven across delegations. There was a significant lack of uniformity in account keeping and presentation of budget and expenditure data. Some of the delegations provided this information in writing and others had computerized data. Accounts observed in some of the offices were sparse and in others more detailed. For example, one of the delegations, when requested for financial data, provided six lines of expenditures, hand-written on a piece of paper. Some of the other delegations, by contrast, had three to four pages of budget and expenditure details. Similar to the documentation on staff, there was no standard classification system and no standard formats or procedures for maintaining financial information. The recently completed audit report (FDA 2008) of the procedures for managing Center hired contract teachers reiterated this situation. The report found that the system for distributing payments was a manual system of accounting that did not allow easy reconciliation of amounts received, distributed, and maintained (preserved).

73. Such variations are largely related to the limited management and IT skills of personnel in some delegations, including the Far North. Most of the regional-level administrators are former teachers. They have acquired management skills either as apprentices or through brief informal bouts of training within the administration. Most of the officials would not have had more than two months of formal training during the course of their entire career in the administration. As a result, officials have limited computer skills, poor knowledge of accounting procedures, and inconsistent reporting or documentation skills. In addition, especially in the Far North, there is a lack of basic resources, such as stationery, files, computers, and even shelves to facilitate data maintenance and analysis. This is in contrast to the Littoral region, with well-stocked offices and a computer in each one. Furthermore, files and shelves were available to organize paper and documents.

³³ The World Bank-supported PASE project has assisted both basic and secondary education to develop education monitoring information systems (EMIS). The development of EMIS is far more advanced in basic education than in secondary. Basic education now produces good documentation and analysis of key outcomes. A process to disseminate the findings across the country was also introduced. Statistics for secondary education, on the other hand, remain unprocessed and unanalyzed.

3.2.4 School Performance

74. **Although head teachers in primary schools appear to possess some knowledge and commitment to oversee activities, school level monitoring is weak.** Schools maintain student enrollment and attendance registers, teachers' logbooks, financial information, and School Council logbooks. However, there is a lack of attention to detail and inconsistency in the information generated, plus a limited use of data in running the school. The system of recording teacher absence in one of the schools visited illustrates this situation. All contract teachers, PTA teachers, and regular civil servant teachers record when they arrive and leave the school in a logbook. Information in the logbook is however inconsistent and, more importantly, never summarized, resulting in a lack of data on teacher absenteeism at the end of the cycle or school year. A teacher could be absent one day a week or arrive late each day. Yet, because absence or tardiness is not added up, the implications of teacher absence on student learning is not monitored or recognized.

75. **In general, secondary schools are monitored more systematically and efficiently than primary schools.** Enrollment and student performance on certification exams are recorded and analyzed. There is considerable attention given to curriculum coverage, student involvement, and in-class evaluations. The *département* delegation noted that for the school year in progress, an average 73.4 percent of the curricula were completed. One of the delegates described how this summary score is sent to each institution, highlighting concerns or recognizing good performance. Teacher absenteeism is also more systematically monitored in secondary schools. Similar to the practice in primary schools, there is a logbook in which teachers enter the time they enter and leave the school. Unlike basic education, the logbook is first checked by "subject masters," who consistently monitor teacher and student absenteeism. This information is then presented to the deputy head teacher who checks and signs off on the logbook before sending it to the *département*/division delegation. Any teacher's absence that is not justified results in disciplinary action. The *département*/division expects to receive information on teacher and student absenteeism and the average grades of students in the class every three to six months.

76. **There is little monitoring of and accountability for the amounts generated from registration fees for examination.** In primary and secondary schools, considerable funds are generated from registration fees for examinations given at school.³⁴ One-third of these funds are sent to MINESEC in Yaoundé and two-thirds are retained to pay proctors and other staff involved. Regional delegates described in detail exactly how and where problems occur. At the administrative level, a significant number of temporary staff is hired to both administer and conduct the examinations. This introduces a large number of personnel that have no long-term accountability within the system. Staff has access to examination fees and there is a carefully worked-out protocol for accounting for these funds. Yet, it is alleged that staff can siphon off some of the money collected by not bringing the total amount to the official registry. Sanctions are in place for financial misappropriation of exam fees. For example, one teacher was disciplined for the misuse of exam funds and was demoted to a school that did not hold exams. Having said this, however, officials are fearful of imposing sanctions because the backlash can be serious. Some of the officials interviewed had received threats on their lives and property.

77. **The low remuneration offered to teachers for proctoring the exams, as well as several years in arrears of paying teachers for exam duty limits the Center's ability to implement sanctions. As**

³⁴ The exam fees for candidates are CFA 2,500 for the CEP, FSLC, and Common Entrance Exam; CFA 3,500 francs for the BEBC and the CAP; CFA 7,500 for GCE O/L; CFA 10,500 for the BAC; and CFA 12,500 for the GCE A/L.

a result, malpractices are frequent. As the proctors are not fully paid, the officials can only close their eyes to irregular practices in the conduct of examinations. Officials also acknowledge that the diversion of fees from examinations has never led to a sanction, either because the accused threatened their personal safety or because they had the support of powerful individuals in the government. At the student-level, the following malpractices were reported: i) one student can register, while another student actually writes the exam; ii) Parents bribe the examiner (the estimated price for raising scores is CFA 10,000) to improve examination results; iii) Parents pay the secretariat to increase the marks made by their son or daughter on the examinations (the estimated price is CFA 50,000 to 80,000.). Of course, at the official level, there is clear understanding that students will be dismissed if they are caught for any of the above malpractices. Yet the actual capacity to do so appears to be limited.

78. **The ability of the inspectorate to monitor school performance is limited.** Since accountability for performance in basic education, especially with regards to improving quality, is imperfect at the school level, the next level—the *inspection d’arrondissement* or inspectorate — needs to play a critical role in monitoring school performance. Divisions or *départements* are sub-divided and each sub-division has an inspectorate. Inspectors are expected to visit each school several times during the year and surprise visits are encouraged. However, a set number of required visits to a school is not stipulated. In practice, the estimated number of schools assigned to each inspector varies from 15 to 100 schools in the North West and 20 to 300 schools in the Littoral and Far North (see table 9 and figure 8). Inspectors who were interviewed outlined the severe constraints faced in travelling to schools. Inspectors often do not have transport and, if they do, the roads are bad. Most important, this administrative level is seriously understaffed. Inspectors list the worst schools in the *inspection d’arrondissement/inspectorate*, yet they confess they have never visited some of these schools. Some schools under their jurisdiction have not been visited for a whole year.

Table 9. Distribution of schools and *départements/divisions* in the three regions

Region	No. of <i>départements/</i> divisions	No. of schools in divisions	No. of civil-servant teachers in divisions	No. of PTA teachers in divisions
Far North	6	128 to 303	33 to 127	198 to 727
Littoral	4	73 to 632	29 to 582	121 to 227
North West	7	78 to 220	53 to 51	130 to 216
<i>Source: MINEDUB Statistical Yearbook 2006/2007.</i>				

3.2.5 Community Participation

79. **The institutional framework for community involvement in education was formalized through the establishment of School Councils and PTAs.** Each School Council has 15 members, as does the PTA. The School Council and head teacher are responsible for all the decisions and activities in the school. They maintain a school cashbook, a logbook listing all transactions, and an inventory of all equipment and furniture. The PTA maintains separate accounts and expenditure records. Minutes are available for School Council and PTA meetings. Local institutions, such as the Development Union (known as Abasakum Development in the North West) and local NGOs, are also involved in the

decision-making and activities taking place in the school. All the primary and secondary schools visited had a School Council and a PTA.

80. School Councils and PTA tend to be involved in the financing of the schools, although the extent of their financial contribution appears to be less in the Littoral region where public resources are more abundant. The School Councils and PTAs in the North West and Far North regions are consistently involved with the school, especially for contributing financial support and overseeing the use of funds. In the North West and Far North regions, the family of each child in primary school is expected to contribute about CFA 1,500 to the PTA. In secondary school, the expectation is CFA 5,000–25,000 per student. In contrast, although parents are active in primary schools, financial support was less robust in the Littoral region. A possible explanation could be that most parents opt for private schools in this region and only parents with very low incomes send their children to public school and cannot contribute as much. However, visits to the schools did not indicate this: parents appeared to be more affluent than those in the Far North. A more plausible reason could be that parents are aware of the political standing of the Littoral region and the potential to obtain Center funds.

81. Although school fees are often used to finance legitimate school related expenditure, including teachers' salaries and infrastructure; however parents are also sometimes requested to pay for illegal fees. School construction and teacher salary payments are big-ticket items for the PTA funds in both primary and secondary education. For example, in one of the divisions visited in the North West region, parents had built eight of the 17 secondary schools. Parents in the Far North are responsible for paying the salaries of more than 60 percent of the secondary teachers. For example, at Maroua Lycée classique (Far North), 100 percent of PTA fees go for salaries. At Douala Joss secondary school (Littoral), salaries consume 80 percent of the PTA fees. PTA funds also procure furniture, library book, computers, and lab equipment across the three regions. Oftentimes, it was noted that school fees were requested from illegitimate reasons. In secondary education, for example, head teachers enrolled students who had failed the entrance examination in 6th grade in order to obtain additional PTA funds. Also, parents were asked by the principals to pay an illegal registration fee, in the range of CFA 50,000 to 100,000, for their children to be enrolled in public secondary schools. PTAs can be in collusion with the head teachers on this issue.

82. In addition, there is significant potential for misuse of funds collected from students' families at the school level. Limited financial oversight by the delegations and poor accounting skills at the school level further exacerbate this situation and allow diversion of funds. The per diem entitlement of PTA members was mentioned as an area where PTA funds could be misappropriated. Each PTA member can collect a “sitting fee” for attending meetings, so there is a tendency to hold frequent and unnecessary meetings so that members can collect more fees.

83. Finally, the ability and commitment of School Councils and PTAs to monitor performance is extremely limited. Information related to school performance is not high on the agenda of the School Council and PTA. For instance, in one of the schools visited, mud floors in classrooms were very dry and full of dust. Students were unable to sit on the floor because of the dust. Each morning teachers and students would walk down to a stream to fetch water to pour on the ground in order to settle the dust. This exercise took about two hours, which essentially reduced the instruction time each day to about three hours. Neither the head teacher nor the PTA was concerned about the time lost for instruction and student learning.

3.3 Role of Extra-government Entities in Governance

84. **Overall, the media plays a limited role in enhancing system functioning.** The media consists of both independent and the government entities in Cameroon, and education is an important topic for both. The government-controlled media, which includes the daily *Cameroon Tribune* and the television channels, is often used for official communication and plays an important role in the system of sanctions for teachers. The radio summons teachers back to work or calls them to order before the government takes more drastic action, such as suspension of salaries. The independent media is somewhat autonomous and is able to report more objectively on the education system. However, in practice its impact is limited, and it rarely calls the government to account. One of the most recent achievements that the media has contributed to is the improvement in the procedures for registering new teachers through pressure to MINFOPRA.

85. **Traditional authorities are still active and valued in all regions of Cameroon, however, their role in monitoring the performance of the education system is limited.** These long-established local leaders, such as the Lamidos in the Far North or the Fon in the North West, retain a presence, an authority, and significant influence over their land and their people. Tribal leaders as representatives of the tribe's ancestors operate as leaders over several thousand "subjects." There is considerable respect for the status and position that they hold. There is an awareness of the need for traditional leadership to integrate modern education with traditional culture, expectations, and behavior. However, how much traditional authorities are involved with education varies widely, but mostly, they have a limited role. They are also not involved with monitoring the government's provision of educational services. In a few cases, especially those leaders who have had greater exposure by studying abroad, there was real interest and motivation in both supporting education and monitoring performance. However, these leaders do not have clear understanding for what they can do or where they can be effectively involved.

86. **There is also variation in how government officials relate to local leaders.** While they respect the traditional leaders, most officials were not sure how to motivate them to become more involved with the school system or in what ways. In the Far North, the delegate had established a more constructive relationship with local leaders. For example, in areas where girls' enrollment and primary completion rates were low, the regional delegate combined school visits with meetings with the Lamidos and Imam in order to enlist their support for girls to attend school regularly. In the future, it will be useful to explore more constructive ways in which the influence and authority of local leaders can be used to improve school education.

87. **There are numerous teachers unions in Cameroon but they have little influence in terms of system accountability and, more specifically, improvement of teacher management.** Konings (2005) identified two phases in the evolution of teachers unions in Cameroon. In the first phase, during the early 1990s, teachers unions were confrontational, demanding higher standards in examinations and better conditions for teachers and students to improve the quality of education. In the second phase, starting in the late 1990s, there was a shift from confrontation to co-optation by the government, which began offering lucrative posts and other forms of remuneration to union members. Unions are in essence no longer autonomous entities that can play a role in improving system accountability. Most of the teachers union representatives interviewed did not give any opinions or highlight the woes of the teaching profession and the quality of education. Instead, they discussed the financial support they received from the government for their jobs and the additional remunerations received in various ways.³⁵

³⁵ One example of the latter is the official use of the secondary school teachers union as proctors during examinations.

The message communicated was that since they were now well cared for, it was no longer necessary to agitate against the education system's limitations or press for improvements in its governance.

Box 4: Prominent teacher unions include an association and two federations:

- The Teachers' Association of Cameroon (TAC) in the Anglophone region
- Federation Camerounaise des Syndicats de l'Education (FECASE [Cameroon Federation of education unions]), made up of:
 - Cameroon Teachers' Trade Union
 - Syndicat National Autonome de l'Education et de la Formation [National independent education and training union]
 - Organization Nationale des Enseignants du Cameroon [National organization of teachers in Cameroon]
 - Organisation Nationale des Enseignants d'Education Physique et Sportive [National organization of physical education and sports teachers]
 - Syndicat National des Enseignants du Primaire et de la Maternelle [National union of primary and kindergarten/pre-school teachers]
- Federation des Syndicats de l'Enseignement et de le Recherche (FESER [Federation of education and research unions]), consisting of :
 - Syndicat National des Enseignants du Superieur [National union of teachers in higher education]
 - Syndicat National Autonome de l'Enseignement Secondaire [National independent union of secondary education]
 - Syndicat National des Enseignants du Primaire et de la Maternelle [National union of primary and kindergarten/pre-school teachers]

3.4 Conclusions

Teachers

- **Teacher recruitment:** Teacher recruitment is reportedly influenced by favoritism and nepotism at the expense of expertise and standard qualifications. Although there is less outside influence in hiring of contract teachers, teacher recruitment overall is prone to favoritism and nepotism.
- **Teacher deployment and transfer:** MINEDUB has made remarkable progress in addressing inequity in the Far North by deploying more newly recruited teachers there. However, there is still anecdotal evidence of political interference in where new teachers are deployed and transferred, especially in secondary education. To ensure a desired transfer, the use of bribes is commonplace, in addition to presenting false information especially related to illness.
- **Teacher workforce and salary payments:** The size of the teacher workforce depends on the amount of funds raised from parents, especially in the Far North has a significantly larger number of PTA teachers in basic and secondary education compared to the other two regions. Except for regular government teachers, payment to all other categories of teachers is erratic and uncertain. The uncertainty in salary payments and the variation in scale and tenure affect the institution's ability to deal with teacher performance as a whole.

Schools

- **Teacher performance:** The current system for ensuring teacher accountability for instruction is weak. The work of regular civil servant teachers in basic and secondary education is evaluated via "confidential reports," which are unrelated to sector activities. Although the work of contract teachers hired by the Center for primary schools are more closely monitored, this has little impact on their performance. Finally, the existing system of sanctions and incentives appears ineffective and lacks rigor in promoting better school performance.
- **Administrative performance:** The regions do not have the capacity nor the mandate to support accountability and monitor school performance. Documentation of education outcomes, maintenance of staff service records and financial accounting are usually weak in the regional delegations, mostly due to a lack of skills and appropriate incentives to perform these tasks adequately.
- **School performance:** There is a lack of organization and consistency in the information collected and used by head teachers, reflecting their limitations in monitoring school performance, especially teacher absenteeism. Mismanagement of funds collected for examinations in schools is reported, and is partly related to poor accountability and control at the school level.
- **Community participation:** A formal compact exists between the education system and the community, which is represented by the PTAs and School Councils. The financial commitment of parents in the Far North and North West regions is higher than in the Littoral region. The financial burden borne by parents leads to coercive practices by teachers and school administrators to raise revenue. The financing of big-ticket items, such as salaries, furniture, etc., are high on the agenda of PTAs and School Councils. In contrast, less importance is placed on teaching and learning.

Extra-government entities

- **There is little support from extra-governmental entities in supporting accountability and performance in the education system.** The media plays a limited role by contributing to the implementation of teacher sanctions. Local traditional leaders are yet to be involved with governance in education. Teachers unions that formerly provided a somewhat independent response to the system no longer play that role. Union members were co-opted into the government system and essentially support its policies and activities.

4.1 The impact of governance on education outcomes

88. **Central ministries play a vital role in good governance, both in terms of planning and executing activities as well as monitoring performance.** This is reflected in the differences between the statistical information available for basic and secondary education. Statistics on enrollment, transition, and teachers in basic education are better organized and streamlined, compared to what is available in secondary education. This is largely due to the positive role of the Center in both developing a statistical database and assisting regions in the collection and maintenance of information on significant outcomes in the sector. Similarly, there is a better distribution of teachers in basic education than in secondary education. The critically low number of regular civil servant teachers in the Far North in secondary education is a reflection of this unequal distribution of teachers. Again, this situation is beyond the capacities and mandate of the regional delegations and is largely the role of MINEDUB and MINESEC.

89. **The structure of governance and accountability for education performance is more clearly defined in secondary than in basic education.** Education performance is dependent on consistent school functioning and regular instruction. In basic education, while there is a concerted attempt to ensure school and teacher performance, the overall strategy is confusing and ineffective when it comes to making teachers accountable for quality instruction. The four types of teachers in the system and the different measures of accountability in place reflect this lack of overall strategy. Most important, the teaching and learning that is critical to improving the quality of basic education is inconsistently monitored. In secondary schools, although it may not be fully implemented, there is a clearer process for monitoring the performance of teachers. In addition, there is an emphasis on the quality of instruction and the improvement of student learning. It is likely that the smaller size of the secondary education sector makes better organization and accountability possible. In addition, the number of high-stakes examinations that certify students forces a higher level of oversight in secondary education.

90. **This report highlights a number of shared strengths and weaknesses in the system of governance and accountability, and show that some of the differences uncovered may explain the variation in educational outcomes across the three regions.** Table 10 shows the positive and negative aspects of governance. Aspects in red are areas that are directly attributable to the Center. The remaining aspects, under regional or local control, may be influenced by the Center, as well as by the situation within the region. The commonalities include both positive dimensions that are conducive to good governance and negative ones that constrain good governance.

Table 10. Commonalities in governance practices across the three regions

Positive	Negative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional offices are committed to the instructions/mandates from the Center • No currency is exchanged. The use of credit vouchers or “cartons” are used for all financial transactions. • Control missions monitor regional accounts and expenditure on a somewhat regular basis. • Strategies are in place for monitoring teacher performance in secondary education. • Financial support from parents is substantial. Communities and parents are consistently involved with the school • Some accounting and monitoring of expenditure in schools. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complexities of government budget allocations exacerbated by the substantial school level parent support for education. • Control missions are not sufficient to ensure acceptable levels of financial management and accounting.* • Mandate for regional delegations is confused especially with regard to the governance of budgets and expenditure within the region. • The registration process for newly recruited secondary school teachers is unsatisfactory. • Inflated list prices used for procurement have the potential to support informal misuse of funds. • Absence of a monitoring strategy for the minimum package and financial transfers to schools affects (i) distribution, (ii) adequacy, and (iii) extent of use. • Weak monitoring of primary school performance is due to a dysfunctional inspection system and the lack of uniformity and consistency in the collection of school level information. • Inadequate overall strategy to monitor teacher performance in basic education leads to limited accountability for regular instruction in the classroom. • Updating and maintenance of teacher and staff service records are unsystematic and inconsistent in both basic and secondary education. • Potential for misuse of funds is generated in the context of secondary school examinations is high. • Political interference in teacher transfers seriously affects school functioning. • Lack of reliability and uneven motivation stems from different types of teachers and corresponding variation in their salaries in both basic and secondary education.

Note: Text in bold is attributable to the Center.

* While the new procurement code adopted in September 2004 brings procurement rules and regulations into compliance with international good practices, the public financial management system requires additional reforms to make budgets and financial reporting reliable, consistent, and substantive.

91. **More specifically, some limitations in accountability and oversight seem to contribute to low education outcomes in the Far North.** The differences between the Littoral and Far North regions are starker than those between the Far North and the North West. These dissimilarities (see table 11) help explain the poorer performance by schools in the Far North, compared to the other regions. The Far North has less administrative staff, which reduces its ability to provide adequate oversight of the system. In contrast, the additional staff and well-equipped offices of the Littoral region are more advanced and efficient. Political interference in selecting sites for schools and collusion between contractors and the public works department seriously hurts infrastructure development in the Far North. Other factors constraining the development of education in the Far North include the smaller number of regular civil servants teachers and the disinclination of teachers generally to teach in this region. This is reflected in the much larger number of transfer requests by teachers there. Although there are efforts to improve the situation in the education priority zone, it still has a shortage of teachers, especially in secondary education.

Table 11. Differences in governance between the Littoral and Far North regions

Far North	Littoral
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administrative staff to student ratio is high - one staff for about 20,000 students. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administrative staff to student ratio is low - one staff for about 3000 students.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimum package and financial transfers are not commensurate with enrollment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accounting in the regional and <i>département</i> delegations is more organized.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offices in the Far North are not well equipped. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rational allocation of new sites for school construction.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbitrary allocation of new sites for school construction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large number of civil servant regular teachers in both primary and secondary.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collusion in infrastructure development between contractors and government officials. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requests for transfers are low.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large number of requests for teacher transfers 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large number of PTA teachers in both secondary and basic education 	
Positive: Positive discrimination in deployment of new teacher recruits in basic education to the Far North	

4.2 Improving education outcomes through better governance: a roadmap

92. This study has shown that weaknesses in the governance and management can result in poor education outcomes. Improving processes and approaches that are sometimes deeply entrenched in the daily life of citizens requires time and a multipronged strategy. A range of possible strategies to improve the governance landscape of public expenditure and system functioning is presented below.

Pilar 1

Setting and Implementing Benchmarks and Standards for Service Delivery and School Performance

Defining standards for performance at all levels

- Significant standards that appear to be missing in basic education include regular attendance of teachers, consistency in the time spent on instruction (time on task), and the availability of textbooks.
- In addition to standards at the school level, a matrix of standards for each different level of government will spread responsibility where it is most appropriate and creates a sense of shared governance.

Facilitating a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of these standards by the community and school personnel

- Introducing structured programs and activities will allow schools and communities to better understand the standards established for service delivery.
- It may demand the development of practices that better motivate school personnel and School Councils to work together (similar to their current joint fundraising) to reach key education outcomes.
- Giving predominance to performance standards and school outcomes, rather than (or in addition to) fundraising, will be a critical challenge at the school level.

Providing the necessary tools, formats and training at the school and regional levels to promote good governance

- Common templates and uniform documentation and reporting requirements for both financial and statistical data are necessary in monitoring system performance.
- Regional and département/division delegations also require basic training for organizing, analyzing, storing, and using information.

Ensuring communication / feedback loops across the system:

- An integrated system with clear channels for information flows, with both vertical and horizontal accountability for content, would make it easier to identify and resolve any bottlenecks and result in more effective oversight of the system.
- This would provide all levels of decision-making with the basis for determining future actions, in addition to informing budget and expenditure planning at the national level.
- This flow of information would also allow local “voices” and the experience of grassroots actors to influence decision-making at the Center (Andrews 2005).

Implementing the oversight role of the inspection d'arrondissement/inspectorate in basic education:

- Stronger oversight is needed by the inspectorate
- This requires investment in personnel, transportation, and additional finances to allow them to visit schools on a regular basis to ensure principal and teacher accountability.

Pilar 2

Teachers: Improving Management and Addressing Governance Issues

Ring-fencing and transparency in teacher recruitment and deployment

- Improving recruitment procedures specifically in secondary education
- Increase transparency in deployment and transfer procedures at both primary and secondary levels.
- Other countries experience (Bogota, Columbia, Mauritania) show that three aspects are key to the success of such reform: i) agreement and strict adherence to a fixed date for all transfers and deployments of existing and new teachers (before the school year begins); ii) public knowledge of the posts available and the criteria for selection; iii) only entity has the mandate for the process (Hallak and Poinsson 2007, CSR 2005)

Streamlining the monitoring of teacher performance:

- Streamline the formats and procedures for monitoring the performance of all teachers (civil servants and contract and PTA teachers), using common measures and standards.
- One possible option is to retain the simplicity of the form introduced by MINEDUB to monitor its new contract teacher program, while expanding it to include more core aspects of instruction.
- When developing new templates, the technical skills of inspectors and principals should be taken into account, otherwise reviews will be ignored, lost, or subverted with spurious information (Andrews 2005).

Maintaining and updating of employee service records:

- Comprehensive, organized, and regularly updated service records of all education-sector personnel, from the highest levels of regional delegations to the school level, would help identify both non-performing and well-performing staff over time.
- A personnel database of all administrative staff in the region could be located in regional delegations. The *département*/division delegations could be responsible for maintaining a complete database of all teachers under their jurisdiction.
- Such data, if analyzed, would also facilitate an understanding of the variations in compliance and their impact on improving education service delivery.

Instituting incentives for good performance:

- Introducing incentives for good performance is necessary, on one hand, to display the system's commitment to standards and, on the other hand, to motivate all personnel to improve the execution of their tasks.
- Graded incentives for levels of improvement and the distribution of incentives across the system will be more helpful to improve system functioning than existing incentives.
- An incentive strategy that includes salary increases and promotions but it is a complex operation and its success depends on how well and how thoroughly the performance of teachers and administrative staff is monitored and documented.
- The Chilean experience (Mizala et al. 2005) where incentive takes into account teacher salaries and student performance is useful but requires a reliable system of learning assessment.

Expanding the existing system of sanctions to include work standards and administrative performance:

- The existing system of sanctions needs to be expanded to include other categories, such as time-on-task, record keeping, etc., that are specifically tied to standards or benchmarks established for service delivery.
- Good governance will be demonstrated when the system can respond with appropriate sanctions to different levels of non-compliance. For example, teachers coming late to school each day would also continue to fall behind in valuable time-on-task, so sanctions should correspond to both the behavior and its consequences.

Pilar 3:

Equitable Distribution of Resources and Effective Monitoring of Budgets and Expenditure

Understanding and streamlining informal and formal costs to parents:

- Understanding in detail the different types of financial contributions made by parents and tracking the amounts received by category throughout the school year can inform any attempt to make government financing for education more equitable and to draft more rational budgets.
- Streamlining and establishing transparency in the purpose and amounts received by the school, can only improve accountability across the system.

Equity and realignment in fund allocations across regions:

- Equity and realignment in fund allocations would improve efficiency in the use of funds across regions, as well as improve performance in both high and low performing regions.
- Taking into account MINEDUB's deployment of newly recruited teachers to the education priority zones as an attempt to redress the neglect of the Far North, the high pupil-teacher ratios indicate the need to continue and expand the strategy of allocating extra resources, especially in secondary education.

Rethinking financial support to schools:

- Rather than a set of miscellaneous items, providing textbooks would help improve learning.
- Alternatively, schools could be given an operating budget that tops up the contribution of parents. Financial support for school operations might be reconceived in one of the types of school-based management (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009), which nurtures autonomy, participation, and accountability

Reviewing control missions and list prices:

- Control missions could be strengthened by introducing a system of random sample-based surprise visits planned for the whole year, which would cover the whole region.
- Regional institutions could also be given specific responsibility for monitoring budgets and expenditures in the region.
- To ensure better use of public finances, it would be useful to revisit the policy of list prices. List prices could be introduced at the regional level, where it is possible to take into account the competitiveness of services and cost of commodities across a region rather than a one-size-fits-all for the country.

Blacklisting contractors:

- In the Far North, where school construction was unsatisfactory, the region could introduce a system of blacklisting contractors that provided sub-standard construction, since reporting them internally does not seem to deter unscrupulous contractors.
- Public exposure in newspapers, perhaps, might get the attention of contractors with school construction and spur them to work without fraud.
- Taking such action would require the support of the highest levels of administration, as well as traditional local leaders. PTAs can be induced to lobby for clear adherence to pre-determined construction specifications and building codes to keep teachers and students safe.

Pilar 4:

Establishing a System of Public Transparency to Promote Good Governance

Expanding the role of the media and local leaders:

- Both the media and local leaders should be utilized much more fully to push for more transparent and fuller accountability in the education sector in Cameroon.
- The media in Cameroon plays an important dissemination role for the government, but could do more to highlight critical issues for public debate.
- Traditional leaders can be critical advocates for public accountability if they are systematically introduced to the challenges in the education sector.


Conducting surveys and assessments to improve transparency:

- Regular assessments or surveys conducted by autonomous institutions or external agencies could strengthen transparency.
- Such assessments include: micro-level surveys (including public expenditure tracking, quantitative service delivery, and teacher absenteeism surveys), household community surveys, and learning achievement surveys (Amin et al., 2008)
- Other tools that raise public perceptions of education service delivery, such as school report cards, force transparency and encourages public pressure for change.

ANNEXES

Annexe I: organisation du système et statistiques

The Basic and Secondary Education System



Region	Population		GER in public schools		Public schools and teachers	
	Girls	Total	Girls	Total	No. of schools	No. of teachers
Adamaoua	72745	144652	56258	134981	550	2055
Center	238106	482460	192054	394907	1575	9280
East	74048	151082	69746	152016	1483	2921
Far North	269715	542080	199231	495717	648	6382
Littoral	167805	335185	72314	147531	638	3991
North	148412	303089	112286	285885	814	3935
North West	179314	361451	111168	232434	920	4706
West	197264	391375	177173	366809	1172	7428
South	52943	109193	51524	108225	721	3382
South West	124163	244805	74280	151441	703	3531
Cameroon	1524515	613074	1116034	2469946	9224	47611

Teachers in Basic Education					
	Regular	Contractuel	Contractualize	PTA	Total
Adamaoua	302	124	1053	576	2055
Center	3772	434	2854	2220	9280
East	637	213	1148	923	2921
Far North	986	313	1963	3120	6382
Littoral	1783	395	974	839	3991
North	672	220	1224	1819	3935
North West	1233	669	1128	1676	4706
West	2941	193	1969	2325	7428
South	1152	213	1391	626	3382
South West	1096	892	807	736	3531
Cameroon	14574	3666	14511	14860	47611

Public Secondary Education							
	Enrollment: Vocational		Enrollment: General		No. of schools	Teachers	
Region	Girls	Total	Girls	Total		Regular	Temporary
Adamaoua	1076	4279	7667	22691	57	760	346
Center	9203	26293	62925	129535	228	7891	4032
East	3265	9464	8068	19619	64	917	786
Far North	2235	7131	15918	71974	142	788	1185
Littoral	11132	25389	40738	83049	105	3490	2542
North	3039	10058	10365	39105	62	1264	872
North West	5797	16187	29535	56304	171	3415	289
West	8665	24469	68174	133763	185	4292	4277
South	3373	8726	15250	33505	108	966	715
South West	5665	13520	30700	60079	135	3388	510
Cameroon	53450	145516	289340	649624	1257	27171	15554

Annexe II : les trois régions

L'Extrême-Nord

La capitale de la région francophone de l'Extrême-Nord est Maroua. Cette région a une population de 2,7 millions d'habitants. Elle est frontalière avec le Tchad à l'est et avec le Nigéria à l'ouest. Elle est divisée en six départements. Exposée à des cycles de sécheresses et d'inondations, la végétation est de type savane broussailleuse au sud et savane boisée au nord.

L'économie régionale est entièrement tributaire de l'agriculture et de l'élevage. La région souffre d'un certain isolement, qui est à la fois perçu et réel dans le centre, ce qui explique l'existence d'un parti politique ayant pour fief le Nord (l'Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès). La région se caractérise également par la présence de nombreux chefs traditionnels et religieux, ainsi qu'une importante population animiste.

Le Littoral

La capitale de la région francophone du Littoral est Douala. Cette région a une population d'environ 2,2 millions d'habitants. À l'exception de la Baie du Biafra, qui constitue l'une de ses lignes côtières, la

région du Littoral est bordée par d'autres régions du Cameroun. Elle est divisée en quatre départements. La végétation se compose de mangroves le long de la côte et de forêts autour de Douala et à l'intérieur des terres. La population est urbanisée à 85 %.

L'agriculture – traditionnelle et moderne – joue un rôle crucial. Le secteur forestier est important dans la région, où sont concentrées 70 % des industries camerounaises, notamment sidérurgie, industrie chimique, exploitation du bois, bâtiment et production alimentaire. En raison de son poids économique et de sa population, Douala a une grande importance stratégique sur le plan politique. C'est généralement dans cette ville qu'éclatent les manifestations contre la politique de l'administration centrale ou l'augmentation du coût de la vie. La région compte de nombreux syndicats qui contribuent à tempérer la domination du pouvoir central.

Le Nord-Ouest

La capitale de la région anglophone du Nord-Ouest est Bamenda. Cette région a une population de 1,8 million d'habitants qui la place au troisième rang des régions du Cameroun. Soixante-deux pour cent de sa population a moins de 20 ans. Le Nord-Ouest fait partie des prairies de l'Ouest. La région est divisée en sept départements.

L'économie est dominée par l'agriculture, avec un important sous-secteur de l'élevage. L'industrie est embryonnaire. À l'exception de la fabrication de savon, la transformation des produits agricoles est la principale activité industrielle. L'artisanat est également très développé (menuiserie, vannerie et poterie). Le principal parti d'opposition au Cameroun, le Social Democratic Front, a une solide base de soutien dans la région et conteste souvent la domination francophone du pouvoir central.

Annexe III: gestion des infrastructures

CES DE KAKATARE	18 000 000	Ets. MOHAMADOU TCHIKAMI BP 247 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	ADJONCTION DE CHARNIERES, DE RAMPE D'ACCES, FISSURES SUR CERTAINS MURS
-----------------	------------	---------------------------------------	-------	-------	--

2

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix- Travail- Patrie

MINISTERE DES ENSEIGNEMENTS SECONDAIRES

DELEGATION REGIONALE DE L'EXTREME-NORD

SOUS-DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES GENERALES

SERVICE DU MATERIEL, DES INFRASTRUCTURES,
DE LA MAINTENANCE ET DES EQUIPEMENTS SCOLAIRES

B. P. 1020 MAROUA- TEL. 22 29 28 38- FAX 22 29 30 55

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Peace- Travail- Fatherland

MINISTRY OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

FAR NORTH REGIONAL DELEGATION

GENERAL AFFAIRS SUBDIRECTORATE

DEPARTMENT OF MATERIAL, INFRASTRUCTURES,
MAINTENANCE AND SCHOOL EQUIPMENTS

P. O. BOX 1020 MAROUA- PH 22 29 28 38

NIVEAU DE REALISATION DES PROJETS INSCRITS AU BIP 2007 ET 2008 DES STRUCTURES SCOLAIRES DU DEPARTEMENT DU DIAMARE

DESIGNATION DU PROJET	LOCALISATION	MONTANT	B I P	ADJUDICATAIRES	TAUX DE REALISTE	ENGAGEMENT CREDIT	OBSERVATIONS ET SUGGESTIONS
REHABILITATION DU SYSTEME ELECTRIQUE	LYCEE DE MAROUA SALAK	16 000 000	2	Ets. ARA BP 595 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	LEVER TOUTES LES RESERVES AVANT RECEPTION DEFINITIVE DU 27/04/2008
EQUIPEMENT DE 04 SALLES DE CLASSE EN BUREAUX ET TABLES DES PROFESSEURS	LYCEE TECHNIQUE DE MAROUA	1 000 000	0	Ets. RAMAS & FILS BP 649 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	MATERIELS EN BON ETAT DUTILISATION
ACQUISITION PHOTOCOPIEUR NUMERIQUE IR 1600	LYCEE TECHNIQUE DE MAROUA	2 500 000	0	Ets. RAMAS & FILS BP 649 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	MATERIELS FONCTIONNELS ET EN BON ETAT DUTILISATION
ACQUISITION RENOUE TYPEUR A STENCIL (MANUEL ET ELECTRIQUE)	IDEM	1 440 000	7		100 %	100 %	

1

CONSTRUCTION D'UN BLOC SANITAIRE (06 LATRINES)	IDEM	4 500 000	2	Ets. AMADOU NASSOUROU BP 96 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	ABSENCE DE CANIVEAUX PREVUS ; FACADE TOITURE MAL EXECUTEE ; SERRURES FRAGILES.
	LYCEE DE MAROUA SALAK	4 500 000		Ets. FAMSA BP 1037 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	
AMENAGEMENT DES SALLES DE CLASSE	LYCEE BILINGUE DE MAROUA	50 000 000	0	Ets. AHMADOU BOUBA BP 21 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	FISSURES A COLMATER ; SERRURES ET INTERRUPTEURS A REMPPLACER AVANT RECEPTION DEFINITIVE.
EQUIPEMENT EN BUREAUX ET CHAISES DES PROFESSEURS	LYCEE DE GAZAWA	500 000	0	Ets. COBATHY BP 365 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	BON ETAT D'UTILISATION. PLAN RESPECTE.
EQUIPEMENT EN TABLES BANCS	IDEM	1 800 000	8	Ets. ALHADJI OUMAROU BP 367 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	EN BON ETAT D'UTILISATION ET PLAN RESPECTE ;
	LYCEE DE MESKINE	1 800 000		Ets. FAMSA BP 1037 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	
ACQUISITION D'UN PHOTOCOPIEUR NUMERIQUE IR 2016 AVEC 06 TUBES D'ENCRE	LYCEE DE MAROUA DOMAYO	2 600 000		Ets. K. LA ROCHE BP 904 MAROUA	100 %	100 %	PAS ; APPAREIL EN BON ETAT DE FONCTIONNEMENT.

15 DEC 2008



LE CHEF DE SERVICE/DES/EN
 Chef de Service du Matériel
 des Infrastructures de la Maintenance
 des Equipements Scolaires

Annexe V: gestion des données dans la délégation départementale du Wouri

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix – Travail – Patrie

MINISTRE DE L'EDUCATION DE BASE

DELEGATION REGIONALE DU LITTORAL

DELEGATION DEPARTEMENTALE DU WOURI

BP. 2202 – TEL. 33-41-30-61 – DOUALA

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Peace – Work – Fatherland

MINISTRY OF BASIC EDUCATION

REGIONAL DELEGATION OF LITTORAL

DIVISIONAL DELEGATION OF WOURI

P.O. BOX 2202 – PHONE 33-41-30-61 – DOUALA

ETAT DE REPARTITION DU FONCTIONNEMENT DES ECOLES DANS LE WOURI

DEUXIEME SEMESTRE 2008

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
 Paix - Travail - Patrie
 MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION DE BASE
 DELEGATION REGIONALE DU LITTORAL
 DELEGATION DEPARTEMENTALE DU WOURI
 BP. 2202 - TEL. 33-41-30-61 - DOUALA

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
 Peace - Work - Fatherland
 MINISTRY OF BASIC EDUCATION
 REGIONAL DELEGATION OF LITTORAL
 DIVISIONAL DELEGATION OF WOURI
 P.O. BOX 2202 - PHONE 33-41-30-61 - DOUALA

PAIEMENT FONCTIONNEMENT DEUXIEME SEMESTRE 2008


ARRONDISSEMENT	PRIME DE RENDEMENT	FONCTIONNEMENT DES ECOLES	TOTAL GENERAL	OBSERVATION
DOUALA 1 ^{er}	2.198.570	7.795.216	9.993.786	
DOUALA 2 ^e	2.294.710	8.146.116	10.440.826	
DOUALA 3 ^e	3.401.700	13.387.790	16.789.490	
DOUALA 4 ^e	1.315.600	5.133.716	6.449.316	
DOUALA 5 ^e	1.624.038	7.425.522	9.049.560	
DOUALA 6 ^e	268.640	1.369.558	1.638.198	
TOTAL	11.103.258	43.257.918	54.361.176	

Arrêté le présent état à la somme de Cinquante quatre millions trois cent soixante un mille cent soixante seize francs CFA.

*P.J : Récépissé du reversement
 de la somme de 1974 F au trésor public.*

DOUALA, le 18 2 DEC 2008

LE DELEGUE DEPARTEMENTAL



Alain Emmanuel Eho - Njeuette

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix-Travail-Patrie

MINISTRE DE L'EDUCATION DE BASE

DELEGATION REGIONALE DU LITTORAL

DELEGATION DEPARTEMENTALE DU WOURI

B.P.2202.TEL.33-41-30-61.DOUALA

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Peace-Work-Fatherland

MINISTRY OF BASIC EDUCATION

REGIONAL DELEGATION OF LITTORAL

DIVISIONAL DELEGATION OF WOURI

P.O.Box 2202.Phone.33-41-30-61.DOUALA

PAIEMENT DU FONCTIONNEMENT POUR LE SECOND SEMESTRE 2008 AUX RESPONSABLES
DES ECOLES PRIMAIRES PUBLIQUES DU WOURI

ARRONDISSEMENT: DOUALA 1^{er}

NOM DE L'ECOLE: E.P. AKWA GPK

NOM DU DIRECTEUR: Mme Kouedi Marie-Louise

Mle. SOLDE: 154 288 F

N°. CNI: 100 859 423

N°. TELEPHONE: 99 80 72 69

EFFECTIFS: G. 2213 F. 255 T. 478

N°	DESIGNATIONS	MONTANTS	OBSERVATIONS
01	Assurance Scolaire 100F/Elève	47 800 F ✓	R. A. S
02	Activités sportives et Ani- mation culturelle 250f/él.	119 500 F ✓	
03	Primes de Rendement 200f/élève	95 600 F ✓	
04	Fond d'appui à la santé Scolaire 50f/élève	23 900 F ✓	
05	Maintenance des équipements 100f/élève	47 800 F ✓	
06	Bibliothèque scolaire 50f /élève	23 900 F ✓	
	TOTAL	358 500 F ✓	

FAIT A DOUALA



Kouedi Marie Louise
Institutrice Principale
Classe Exceptionnelle

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix-Travail-Patrie

MINISTRE DE L'EDUCATION DE BASE

DELEGATION REGIONALE DU LITTORAL

DELEGATION DEPARTEMENTALE DU WOURI

B.P.2202.TEL.33-41-30-61.DOUALA

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Peace-Work-Fatherland

MINISTRY OF BASIC EDUCATION

REGIONAL DELEGATION OF LITTORAL

DIVISIONAL DELEGATION OF WOURI

P.O.Boxe 2202,Phone.33-41-30-61.DOUALA

PAIEMENT DU FONCTIONNEMENT POUR LE SECOND SEMESTRE 2008 AUX RESPONSABLES
DES ECOLES PRIMAIRES PUBLIQUES DU WOURI

ARRONDISSEMENT: DOUALA 1^{er}

NOM DE L'ECOLE: PUB. JOSSA

NOM DU DIRECTEUR: EKOMBO E. RAYMOND

Mle. SOLDE: 591 076 V

N°. CNI: 104036435

N°. TELEPHONE: 99 49 23 61

EFFECTIFS: G. 197 F. 206 T. 403

N°	DESIGNATIONS	MONTANTS	OBSERVATIONS
01	Assurance Scolaire 100F/Elève	40300F	ok
02	Activités sportives et Ani- mation culturelle 250f/él.	100750F	ok
03	Primes de Rendement 200f/élève	80600F	ok
04	Fond d'appui à la santé Scolaire 50f/élève	20150F	ok
05	Maintenance des équipements 100f/élève	40300F	ok
06	Bibliothèque scolaire 50f/élève	20150F	ok
	TOTAL	302250F	

FAIT A DOUALA LE 02/12/2008



Ekombo E. Raymond
INSTITUTEUR

Annexe VI: Organigramme des services déconcentrés

De la Délégation régional de l'Éducation de Base

Article 76

(1) Placée sous l'autorité d'un délégué régional la délégation provinciale de l'éducation de base est chargée :

De la coordination et de l'animation, a l'échelon de la Province des activités pédagogiques des Enseignements Primaire et Maternel

De l'application des programmes et méthodes d'enseignement définis par le ministère

Du suivi de la programmation et de l'organisation de la formation continue des personnels relevant de son ressort de compétence en liaison avec la direction des ressources humaines

De la préparation des actes relatifs a l'affectation et a la mutation des personnels de son ressort de compétence ainsi que de leur évaluation

De la nomination des directeurs d'écoles primaire et maternelles après visa du ministre d l'éducation de base

De la signature et de la délivrance des diplômes du certificat d'études primaires et du first school leaving certificate.

De la nomination des présidentes de jury des examens relevant de sa compétence

De la constitution des listes des correcteurs des examens relevant de sa compétence

De la sensibilisation de tous les partenaires a l'importance de la communauté éducative

(2) Elle comprend

Le service de l'accueil du courrier de liaison et de la traduction

Le service des normes et de l'évaluation des apprenants

Les inspections pédagogiques provinciales

La sous direction des affaires générales

Le service de la carte scolaire de l'orientation-conseil et des activités post et périscolaires

De la Délégation Départementale de l'Éducation de Base

Article 89

(1) Placée sous l'autorité d'un délégué départemental la délégation départementale de l'éducation de base est chargée :

Du suivi de l'application des programmes et des méthodes d'enseignement

De la simulation des actions propres a assuré l'enracinement et le rayonnement de l'école dans son milieu

Du suivi des actions de maintenance et d'entretien des bâtiments et des équipements scolaires publics

De la centralisation des besoins de formation

De l'élaboration des plans de formation continue du personnel

De la gestion pédagogique administrative et financière des personnels de l'enseignement primaire et maternel de son ressort due compétence

De la synthèse des propositions de nomination des directeurs d'écoles de son ressort de compétence

De la gestion matérielle des examens et des concours au niveau du département

De la délivrance des attestations de réussite au certificat d'études primaires et au first School Leaving Certificate.

(2) Le Délégué Départemental est assisté de deux Conseillers Pédagogiques

(3) La Délégation Départementale de l'Éducation de Base comprend

Le Service des Affaires Administratives et Financières

Le Service des Statistiques de l'orientation conseil et des activités post et préscolaire

De l'Inspection D'Arrondissement ou de District de l'Éducation de Base

Article 92

(1) Placée sous l'autorité D'un inspecteur, l'Inspection D'Arrondissement ou de District est chargée

De l'identification et de la formulation des besoins de l'arrondissement ou du District en écoles et en personnel

De la tenue de la carte scolaire de l'Arrondissement ou du District et du fichier du personnel enseignant relevant de son autorité

De l'inspection administrative et pédagogique des écoles ou groupes scolaires relevant de son autorité

De l'organisation matérielle des examens et concours relevant de sa compétence

Du suivi de la santé des élèves et enseignants de sa circonscription

En relation avec les inspections Médico scolaires provinciales et les formations sanitaires locales

De l'organisation et du suivi des activités post et périscolaires de sa circonscription

De l'inspection de l'assistance et du conseil des directeurs d'école et du personnel enseignant de son ressort

De l'évaluation des personnels relevant de son autorité

De l'élaboration d'une liste d'aptitude aux fonctions de directeur d'école

De la proposition de nomination aux fonctions de directeur d'école de son ressort de compétence

De l'analyse des besoins de formation de ses personnels et de la transmission des résultats au délégué départemental.

(2) Elle comprend

Le bureau des affaires pédagogiques et des examens

Le bureau des affaires générales

Le bureau de l'orientation-conseil et de la statistique

Le bureau de la santé et des activités post et périscolaire

Annexe VII: exemple de rapport confidentiel sur un enseignant

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix - Travail - Patrie

BULLETIN DE NOTE CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Peace - Work - Fatherland

PARTIE A REMPLIR PAR L'AGENT NOTE
section to be completed by officer being reported upon

ANNEE : 2007
YEAR

MINISTERE BASIC EDUCATION
Ministry: _____

Personnel des Services : Centraux - Extérieurs (1) EXTERNAL
Service : Central - External (1) _____

Nom et prénoms : _____ Matricule (solde) N° : 118292-W
Surname and other names: _____ Services N° (from Salaries Department) _____

Date et lieu de naissance : 30/11/1952. VEKONI BUI DIVISION
Date and place of birth: _____

Nom du père : TATAH 'L'
Father's name: _____

Nom de la mère : NGON 'L'
Mother's name: _____

Grade (2) : IPEG B2 1er Ech. 3^e Ech. INDICE 650
Rank (2): _____

Date de la dernière promotion : 18/12/2004
Date of last increment: _____

Fonctions de responsabilité éventuellement tenues (3) : _____
Duty posts held (3): _____

Date d'entrée dans l'administration : 03 OCTOBER 1977
Date of first appointment: _____

Services antérieurs à l'entrée dans le cadre actuel : TEACHING PRESBY. EDUCATION AUTHORITY
Previous appointments: _____

Interruption de service : NIL Leurs durées : NIL Leurs causes : NIL
Breaks in services: _____ Length: _____ Reasons: _____

Distinctions honorifiques et récompenses BEST WORKER OF THE YEAR AWARDED 1999-2000
Decorations and awards: _____

Diplômes et titres universitaires : FSLC, TEACHERS GRADE II & I, GCE O/L 04, A/L 02
Degrees and other certificates: _____

Connaissances accessoires : FRENCH
Other knowledge: _____

Situation de famille : célibataire - marié(e) - divorcé(e) - veuf(ve) (1) : MARRIED
Family Status: bachelor - married - divorced - widower - widow (1): _____

Nom de famille et prénoms du conjoint : BONGBEN MARY IMMACULATE
Name of spouse: _____

Nombre d'enfants vivants et dates de leur naissance : (06) SIX
Number of living children and birth dates: _____

18/12/77 19/10/79 17/07/84
09/08/86 01/12/92 29/05/95

Lieu actuel d'affectation : PROV. DEL BASIC EDUC. NORTH-WEST. BAMENDA
Present address: _____

Domicile permanent des parents : VEKONI. JAKIRI SUB DIVISION. BUI DIVISION
Permanent Residence of Parents: _____

Je déclare exacts les renseignements donnés ci-dessus.
I declare that the information given above is correct

At BAMENDA Le 12/07/2007
on _____

Signature : [Signature]

- (1) Rayer la mention inutile.
Delete where inapplicable.
- (2) préciser si vous êtes décisionnaire, auxiliaire, contractuel, fonctionnaire stagiaire ou fonctionnaire titulaire ; ensuite préciser la catégorie, la classe et l'échelon.
The officer must state precisely whether he is recruited on the basis of a decision, auxiliary staff, contract officer, unconfirmed or confirmed officer, furthermore he must indicate his category, class and incremental position.
- (3) Exemple : Chef de bureau ; Chef de service ; Directeur ; etc.
Example : Bureau head, Service/head, Director, etc.



RECEPISSE DE DEPOT DU BULLETIN (Acknowledgment receipt for confidential report)

Bulletin de l'année 2007
Report for year 2007

Au nom de : M. - M^{me} - M^{lle}
Name Mr. - Mrs - Miss

Grade : IPEG B2 1/3 INDICE 650
Rank: _____

Date de dépôt : _____
Date of receipt: _____

Signature et cachet de l'autorité ayant reçu le bulletin :
Signature and official stamp of Receiving Officer :

Appréciations et notes du Second Supérieur hiérarchique direct Comments and Marks of Second Higher Officer	NOTES ATTRIBUÉES (Marks awarded) Marquer d'une croix la case qui convient (Mark a cross above applicable square)									
<p>D. - Conscience professionnelle : Ponctualité, assiduité, Noter sur (over) : 6 dévouement et application au travail. Professional consciousness : punctuality, assiduity, sense of duty and constant application to assigned task. APPRECIATIONS (Comments)</p> <p>MARKS AND COMMENTS CONFIRMED</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> <td>(X)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>de mauvais à passable below average to average</td> <td>de moyen à bon above average to fairly good</td> <td>de très bon à excellent good to excellent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0 à 2</td> <td>3 à 4</td> <td>5 à 6</td> </tr> </table> <p>NOTE (mark) : ...6.../6</p>	()	()	(X)	de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent	0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6
()	()	(X)								
de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent								
0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6								
<p>E. - Connaissances professionnelles, Intelligence, efficacité, rendement, esprit d'initiative, sens d'organisation. Noter sur : (over) 6 Professional knowledge, intelligence, effectiveness, output, initiative and organisation. APPRECIATIONS (Comments)</p> <p>MARKS AND COMMENTS CONFIRMED</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> <td>(X)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>de mauvais à passable below average to average</td> <td>de moyen à bon above average to fairly good</td> <td>de très bon à excellent good to excellent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0 à 2</td> <td>3 à 4</td> <td>5 à 6</td> </tr> </table> <p>NOTE (mark) : ...5.25.../6</p>	()	()	(X)	de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent	0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6
()	()	(X)								
de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent								
0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6								
<p>F. - Personnalité, sens des rapports humains, respect de la hiérarchie, serviabilité vis-à-vis du public. Noter sur : (over) 5 Personality, collaboration and relations with other staff, respect of seniority, general service to the public. APPRECIATIONS (Comments)</p> <p>MARKS AND COMMENTS CONFIRMED</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> <td>(X)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>de mauvais à passable below average to average</td> <td>de moyen à bon above average to fairly good</td> <td>de très bon à excellent good to excellent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0 à 1</td> <td>2 à 3</td> <td>4 à 5</td> </tr> </table> <p>NOTE (mark) : ...5.../6</p>	()	()	(X)	de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent	0 à 1	2 à 3	4 à 5
()	()	(X)								
de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent								
0 à 1	2 à 3	4 à 5								
<p><i>Bananda</i> le - (on) 08 OCT 2007 THE PROVINCIAL INSPECTOR - CO-ORDINATOR (Qualité et Fonction - Rank and Position) PROVINCIAL Signature et Cachet (Signature and official stamp)</p>  <p><i>Mwisa Ngweni Chigweni</i></p>	<p>TOTAL (A + B + C) = 16.75/17 Appréciations générales (General Comments) <i>Should be advanced.</i></p>									

ou le préfet, ayant arrêté la notation.
- Prefect who gave the final marks and comments.

NOTE (mark)**2.5**.../3

individual

Le (on) **29 OCT 2007**

THE PROVINCIAL DELEGATE

M. Ed. I. Ibadan MA (Nairobi) CAPES, B.A.T Y de


NOTE DEFINITIVE
Concluding mark

I - Moyenne des notes attribuées par les deux supérieurs hiérarchiques
Average of marks awarded by the two superior officers

$(A + B + C) + (D + E + F) = \dots 16.75 \dots / 17$

II - Note de comportement général (G)
Mark for general conduct = **2.5** / 3

III - Note définitive
Concluding mark = **19.25** / 20

Appréciations et notes du Supérieur hiérarchique direct Comments and Marks of immediate Higher Officer	NOTES ATTRIBUÉES (Marks awarded) Marquer d'une croix la case qui convient (Mark a cross above applicable square)									
<p>A. - Conscience professionnelle : Ponctualité, assiduité, Noter sur (over) : 6 dévouement et application au travail. Professional consciousness : punctuality, assiduity, sense of duty and constant application to assigned task. APPRECIATIONS (Comments)</p> <p><u>Présence hiérarchique constante</u> <u>and constantly applies to assigned</u> <u>tasks.</u></p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> </tr> <tr> <td>de mauvais à passable below average to average</td> <td>de moyen à bon above average to fairly good</td> <td>de très bon à excellent good to excellent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0 à 2</td> <td>3 à 4</td> <td>5 à 6</td> </tr> </table> <p>NOTE (mark) :/6</p>	()	()	()	de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent	0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6
()	()	()								
de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent								
0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6								
<p>B. - Connaissances professionnelles, Intelligence, efficacité, rendement, esprit d'initiative, sens d'organisation. Noter sur (over) : 6 Professional knowledge, intelligence, effectiveness, output, initiative and organisation. APPRECIATIONS (Comments)</p> <p><u>Intelligent and very effective with</u> <u>output.</u></p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> </tr> <tr> <td>de mauvais à passable below average to average</td> <td>de moyen à bon above average to fairly good</td> <td>de très bon à excellent good to excellent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0 à 2</td> <td>3 à 4</td> <td>5 à 6</td> </tr> </table> <p>NOTE (mark) : <u>2.75</u>/6</p>	()	()	()	de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent	0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6
()	()	()								
de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent								
0 à 2	3 à 4	5 à 6								
<p>C. - Personnalité, sens des rapports humains, respect de la hiérarchie, serviabilité vis-à-vis du public. Noter sur (over) : 5 Personality, collaboration and relations with other staff, respect of seniority, general service to the public. APPRECIATIONS (Comments)</p> <p><u>Relates well with colleagues and</u> <u>the public. Respects hierarchy.</u></p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> <td>()</td> </tr> <tr> <td>de mauvais à passable below average to average</td> <td>de moyen à bon above average to fairly good</td> <td>de très bon à excellent good to excellent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0 à 1</td> <td>2 à 3</td> <td>4 à 5</td> </tr> </table> <p>NOTE (mark) : <u>5</u>/6</p>	()	()	()	de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent	0 à 1	2 à 3	4 à 5
()	()	()								
de mauvais à passable below average to average	de moyen à bon above average to fairly good	de très bon à excellent good to excellent								
0 à 1	2 à 3	4 à 5								
<p>A. (at) <u>BAMENDA</u> le - (on) <u>12 5 MAY 2007</u>  Signature et Cachet (Signature and official stamp) <u><i>Amanta Nte Glogom Aminda M.</i></u></p>	<p>TOTAL (A + B + C) = <u>16.75</u>/17 Appréciations générales (General Comments)</p> <p><u>Should be advanced.</u></p>									

PENI-HORS-ECHELLE - Note de comportement général attribuée par : le Ministre - le Gouverneur
Marks and comments awarded for comportment by the Minister - Governor

Appréciations : (Comments)

A duty conscious

A (at) Bamenda
Le (grade et fonction)
The (Rank and designation)
Signature et Cachet
(Signature and official stamp)



Décret n° 74-138 du 18 février 1974 portant statut général de la fonction publique (Art. 70 à 75).

Décret n° 76-570 du 4 décembre 1976 conférant aux Gouverneurs de Province et aux Préfets certains pouvoirs en matière de gestion de personnel.

Arrêté n° 3277-MFP-DP du 27 octobre 1977 fixant les modalités de notation des agents publics.

Circulaire n° 6327-MFP-DP du 11 novembre 1977 sur la notation des agents publics.

II. - AUTORITES COMPETENTES POUR NOTER

A. - Notation des personnels des services centraux.

La notation définitive des personnels des services centraux est arrêtée par le Ministre, ou sur délégation, par le Secrétaire général, le Directeur ou le Sous-Directeur.

Du point de vue de la notation, les Adjointes aux responsables des services centraux (adjoints aux chefs de service, adjoints aux directeurs), font corps avec l'autorité dont ils sont adjoints pour noter leurs subordonnés. Ils sont eux-mêmes notés par cette autorité et le supérieur hiérarchique au second degré.

1) Les agents des services centraux qui n'occupent pas des postes de responsabilités sont notés de la manière suivante : la première note est attribuée par le supérieur hiérarchique direct (chef de bureau), la deuxième par le supérieur hiérarchique au second degré (chef de service). La notation définitive est arrêtée par le Ministre ou, sur délégation par le Sous-Directeur.

2) Les chefs de bureau d'Administration centrale sont notés de la manière suivante : la première note est attribuée par le chef de service ; la deuxième par le Sous-Directeur. La notation définitive est arrêtée par le Ministre ou, sur délégation, par le Directeur.

3) Le chef de Service d'Administration centrale est noté de la manière suivante : la première note est attribuée par le Directeur ; la deuxième par le Secrétaire général. La notation définitive est arrêtée par le Ministre ou, sur délégation par le Secrétaire général.

4) Le Sous-Directeur d'Administration centrale est noté de la manière suivante : la première note est attribuée par le Directeur ; la deuxième par le Secrétaire général. La notation définitive est arrêtée par le Ministre.

5) Le Directeur d'Administration centrale est noté par le Secrétaire général et le Ministre.

6) Le Secrétaire général est noté par le Ministre.

B. - Notation des responsables des services extérieurs.

1) Les Gouverneurs de provinces et les Chefs des représentations diplomatiques du Cameroun à l'étranger sont notés par le Ministre dont ils relèvent.

2) Les collaborateurs directs des Ambassadeurs (Conseillers, Secrétaires d'Ambassade, etc.) sont notés par l'Ambassadeur et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

3) Les responsables provinciaux des services techniques sont notés par le Gouverneur et le Ministre dont ils relèvent.

4) Les Préfets et autorités administratives assimilées sont notés par le Gouverneur et le Ministre chargé de l'Administration territoriale.

5) Les responsables départementaux des services techniques sont notés de la manière suivante : le Préfet attribue la première note, le responsable provincial du service technique considéré attribue la deuxième note. Le Gouverneur arrête la notation définitive.

6) Les Sous-Préfets et les Chefs de Districts sont notés de la manière suivante : le Préfet attribue la première note, le Gouverneur arrête la notation définitive.

7) Les responsables d'Arrondissement et de District des Services techniques sont notés de la manière suivante : le Sous-Préfet ou le Chef de District attribue la première note, le responsable départemental du service technique considéré attribue la deuxième note ; le Préfet arrête la notation définitive.

C. - Notation des Agents d'exécution des Services extérieurs.

Les agents d'exécution des services extérieurs sont notés de la manière suivante.

1) Agents d'exécution travaillant sous le responsable provincial du service technique.

La première note est attribuée par le responsable technique provincial. Le Gouverneur arrête la notation définitive.

2) Agents d'exécution travaillant sous le responsable départemental du service technique.

La première note est attribuée par le responsable technique départemental, le Préfet arrête la notation définitive.

3) Agents d'exécution travaillant sous le responsable d'arrondissement ou de district du service technique.

La première note est attribuée par le responsable technique du service d'arrondissement ou de district ; la seconde note par le Sous-Préfet ou le Chef de District ; le Préfet arrête la notation définitive.

4) Agents d'exécution travaillant dans une Représentation diplomatique du Cameroun à l'étranger.

La première note est attribuée par le collaborateur direct du Chef de la Représentation diplomatique supervisant le service concerné ; l'Ambassadeur arrête la notation définitive.

D. - Notation des fonctionnaires en détachement.

Le fonctionnaire en détachement est noté de la manière suivante :

La première note est attribuée par le responsable de l'organisme de détachement ; le Ministre de tutelle de l'organisme arrête la notation définitive.

E. - Notation des fonctionnaires admis en stage.

Le fonctionnaire admis à un stage de formation ou de perfectionnement d'une durée supérieure à six mois, est noté par le Directeur du stage ; le Ministre de l'Administration dont relève l'agent arrête la notation définitive.

Decree N° 74- 138 of 18 February 1974 : General Rules and Regulations of the Public Service (Article 70 to 75).

Decree N° 76- 570 of 4 December 1976 to grant certain power relating to personnel management to Governors of Provinces and Prefects.

Order N° 3277- MFP- DP of 27 October 1977 to outline the procedure

Circular N° 6327- MFP- DP of 11 November 1977 : confidential reports on public officers.

II. - COMPETENT AUTHORITIES TO FILL CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS

A. - Reports on staff working in central services.

The concluding marks (in all cases " marks" include Observations) in respect of staff working in central services shall be awarded by Ministers or, upon delegation, by Secretaries General, Directors or Sub-Directors.

In so far as filling confidential reports is concerned, deputy heads of central services (Deputy Services Heads Directors) shall act with the officers to whom they are deputies for the purpose of reporting upon their immediate superiors and in the second instance by officers higher in authority than their superiors.

(1) Staff working in central services, who do not hold, duty posts, shall be reported upon in the following manner : The first mark shall be given by the immediate superior (bureau head), the second mark by the next superior in hierarchy (service head). The concluding mark shall be given by the Minister or, upon delegation, by the Sub-Director.

(2) The bureau heads, in the central administration shall be reported upon in the following manner : The first mark shall be given by the Service Head, and second mark by the Sub-Director. The concluding marks shall be given by the Minister or, upon delegation, by the Director.

(3) The service heads in the central administration shall be reported upon in the following manner : The first mark shall be given by the Sub-Director and the second mark by the Director. The concluding mark shall be given by the Minister or, upon delegation, by the secretary general.

(4) Sub-Directors in the central administration shall be reported upon and the following manner : The first mark shall be given by the Director and the second by the Secretary General. The concluding mark shall be given by the Minister.

(5) Directors in the central administration shall be reported upon by Secretary General and the Minister.

(6) The Secretaries General shall be reported upon by the Ministers.

B. Reports on heads of external services.

(1) Governors of provinces and heads of Diplomatic Missions abroad shall be reported upon directly by the Ministers under whom they fall.

(2) Diplomats working directly under Ambassadors (Counsellors Secretaries, etc.) shall be reported upon by the Ambassador and the Minister of foreign Affairs.

(3) Provincial heads of technical services shall be reported upon by the Governor and the Minister under whom they fall.

(4) Prefects and administrative authorities ranking as such shall be reported upon by the Governor and the Minister in charge of Territorial Administration.

(5) Divisional heads of technical services shall be reported upon in the following manner : The Prefect shall give the first mark and the Provincial Head of the technical service in question shall give the second mark. The Governor shall give the concluding mark.

(6) Sub-Prefects and District Heads shall be reported upon in the following manner : The Prefect shall give the first mark and the Governor the concluding mark.

(7) Sub-Divisional and District heads of technical services shall be reported upon in the following manner : The Sub-Prefect or the District Head shall give the first mark, the Divisional Head of the technical service shall give the second mark, the Prefect shall give the concluding mark.

C. - Reports on staff not holding duty posts working in external services.

Staff not holding duty posts working in external services shall be reported upon in the following manner :

(1) Those working under the provincial head of a technical service The first mark shall be given by the Provincial Head of service. The Governor shall give the concluding mark.

(2) Those working under the divisional head of a technical service : The first mark shall be given by the divisional head of service, The Prefect shall give the concluding mark.

(3) Those working under the sub-divisional or district head of a technical service : The sub-divisional or district head of the technical service shall give the first mark, the Sub-Prefect or District Head shall give the second mark and the Prefect shall give the concluding mark.

(4) Those working in Cameroon Diplomatic Representation abroad : The first mark shall be given by the immediate assistant of the head of the Diplomatic Representation supervising the service concerned while the Ambassador shall give the concluding mark.

D. - Reports on officers on secondment.

An officer on secondment shall be reported upon in the following manner : The first mark shall be given by the head of the organization to which the officer is seconded and the concluding mark shall be given by the Minister who has supervisory powers over the organization question.

E. - Reports on officers undergoing in-service training.

An officer undergoing in-service training or a further training course for a period longer than 6 months shall be reported upon by the Director of the establishment where the in-service training is taking place, the Minister charged with responsibility over the Department to which the officer belongs shall give the concluding mark.

Annexe IX : rapport d'inspection (MINEDUB)

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
PAIX – TRAVAIL – PATRIE

MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION DE BASE

SECRETARIAT GENERALE

INSPECTION GENERALE DES
L'ENSEINEMENTS



REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
PEACE – WORK – FATHERLAND

MINISTRY OF BASIC EDUCATION

SECRETARIATE GENERAL

INSPECTORATE GENERAL OF EDUCATION

INSPECTION GENERALE DE PEDAGOGIE
CHARGE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT MATERNEL,
PRIMAIRE ET NORMAL

INSPECTORATE OF PEDAGOGY IN CHARGE
OF NURSERY, PRIMARY AND TEACHER
EDUCATION

TEACHER'S INSPECTION REPORT

Done on _____ at _____
By _____ Rank _____

A) TEACHER'S IDENTIFICATION

Name : _____ Surname _____

Date and place of birth _____

Rank _____ Grade _____ Echelon _____ Service No. _____

Date of entry into teaching _____ Capacity _____

Seniority at present Rank _____

Date of assumption of duty at recent post _____

Date of last Inspection _____ Mark _____/20

Date of last promotion _____

Family status : (married, bachelor, divorced, monogamous, polygamous)

Number of children under his/her care _____

Schools and/or training centre attended by the teacher (indicate the last three)

1 : from to

2 : from to

3 : from to

B) IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOL

School _____

Sub-division _____ Division _____ Province _____

Headteacher _____ Rank _____

School type (half day, full) : _____

Cycle (complete, incomplete) _____ Number of class _____

C) CHARACTERISTICS OF CLASS INSPECTED

Class inspected : Does it accommodate several classes ? Yes No

If yes. Which ? _____

1 – Enrolment :

No. 1

No. 2

Name	Girls	Boys	Total	Girls	Boys	Total
Enrolled						
Present						
Average Rate % of attendance during the month prior to the inspection						

2 – Class equipments :

Name	Number	State	Name	Number	State
Tables			Teacher's books		
Office Chairs			Geography maps		
Desks			Language tables		
Cupboards			Science tables		
Dictionaries			-English Books		
Syllabuses			-French Books		
			-Maths Books		
			-Science Books		

Observations and advice _____

D) OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS OF TEACHING SITUATIONS
 D.1) GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF TEACHER IN CLASS

No.	Behaviour observed	Very mediocre 0	Mediocre 1	Average 2	Good 3	Very good 4	Excellent 5
1	Teacher's dressing						
2	Position of teacher's desk in relation to the rest of the class (where there is one)						
3	Maintenance of class equipment						
4	Pupils' cleanliness with regards to the environment						
5	Decoration of the class						
6	Teacher's voice quality and audibility						
7	Quality of Pupil/teacher relationship						
8	Quality of pupil/pupil relationship						

T1 :..... /40

Observations and advice : _____

D - 2 RESPECT FOR THE DEMANDS OF THE PROFESSION

No.	Behaviour observed	Very medi 0	Mediocre 1	Average 2	Good 3	Very good 4	Excellent 5
1	Regularity						
2	Punctuality						
3	Obligatory documents and charts (do they exist ?)						
4	Handling of compulsory documents						
5	Rate and quality of preparation of lessons scheduled for the month						
6	Rate of correction of children's books						
7	Quality of remarks in the books						
8	Level of coverage of syllabuses						

T2= _____ /40

D - 3 LESSON(S) COVERED

SUBJECT	LESSON HEADINGS
1	1
2	2
3	3

LESSONS/SCORES

No.	Behaviour observed	1st Lesson					2 nd Leasson					3rd Lesson							
		1	2	3	4	5	0	1	2	3	4	5	0	1	2	3	4	5	
1.	Quality of the operational objective of the lesson (conditioned of performances, expected behaviour, performance criteria).																		
2.	Mastery of subject matter																		
3.	Pupils' motivation (skill with which the teacher communicates the objectives of lesson to the pupils.																		
4.	Degree to which revision relates to lesson																		
5.	The lesson in progress (ability to lead the pupils from the known to the unknown)																		
6.	Use of didactic material (relevance of the material to the course content)																		
7.	Language used (adequately)																		
8.	Pupils' participation in the learning exercise																		
9.	Aptitude for partial and general recapitulation.																		

10.	Degree of clarity of explanations, instructions and demonstrations.																			
11.	Manner in which sections of the lesson that are not understood are repeated.																			
12.	Use of the blackboard																			
13.	Exercises of application and their corrections																			
14.	Discipline in class																			
15.	Respect for lesson duration																			
16.	Level of attainment of objectives																			

T3=...../80 T4=...../80 T5=...../80

E. PERFORMANCE AND INITIATIVES OF TEACHER

No.	Behaviour observed	1	2	3	4	5
1	Evolution of the class average					
2	Collaboration with colleagues					
3	Teacher's participation to school life					
4	Degree of satisfaction of headteacher to teacher's performance					
5	Initiative when faced with difficulties in class					

T6=...../25

Observations and Advice :

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

General Average on 20

For 3 lessons observed $(T1+T2+T3+T4+T5+T6) = \dots\dots\dots /20$
18

For 2 Lessons observed $(T1+T2+T3+T4+T6) = \dots\dots\dots /20$
13.75

For 1 lesson : $(T1+T2+T3+T6) = \dots\dots\dots /20$
9.5

The Teacher

Read and signed
Name and Surname of Teacher

The Inspector

DONE ON _____ AT _____

BY _____ RANK _____

Annexe X : rapport pour les inspecteurs (MINEDUB)

A. OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT OF PEDAGOGIC SUPERVISION STAFF.

The objectives of the assessment of pedagogic supervision staff in our educational system are as follows:

1. To provide scientific and objective bases for the taking of administrative decisions.
2. To improve intellectual skills in the widest variety of areas.
3. To promote knowledge and build capacities for the use of different working methods and techniques.
4. To improve on the efficiency of the educational system as evident in the pupils school performance and the smooth functioning of the school system.
5. To see to the concord between the Inspectors practice of their profession and the standards set as concerns pedagogic, administrative and methodological innovations.
6. To identify the strengths and weakness of inspectors with a view to sustaining these strengths and correcting the weaknesses.
7. To make Inspectors more professionally conscious.
8. To hail the initiative of inspectors as regards their tackling pedagogic, administrative and public relations problems.
9. To determine the degree of responsibility of each and everyone in the success or failure of the educational system.

B. DRAFT ASSESSMENT.

Assessment must result in findings germane to the achievement of the set goals. To this end, the person assessed must strictly observe the rules binding them, before, during and after the assessment, notably:

1. There must be mutual respect between the assessor and the assessee.
2. The assessor may inform the assessee about the period when the first inspection of the year will be carried out and even about the impromptu inspections that will follow.
3. The assessor shall make the assessee know the objectives of the inspection, and provide the assessee with the relevant inspection form at least one month ahead the inspection.
4. The assessor and assessee must discuss the inspection, as it is unraveled before preparing the final report.
5. The assessor must tell the assessee about the influence the final mark will have on his career.
6. At the end of the inspection, the assessor must tell the assessee when and how he will have the feed back.

C. HOW TO COMPLETE THIS FORM.

1. From section 1 to section 11, complete or tick the appropriate element.
2. From section 111 to section 1X, ring the figure that corresponds with your opinion.
3. In section X, make the appropriate remarks.
4. In the confidential part, tick the box that represents your opinion.

SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS.

1. CIVIL STATUS.

- (a) Full Name _____
Service Number _____
- (b) Sex: Male or Female
- (c) Date of Birth _____
- Division of Origin _____
- (d) Place of Birth _____
- (e) Marital Status: Married; Polygamist Monogamist
Widow (er) Divorced
Single Applicant for divorce
- (f) Number of dependent Children in your care: _____

2. EDUCATION.

- Highest certificate in grammar or technical education.
- (a) Has the Inspector been trained in a Grade I TTC Grade II TTC,
Year: _____ Year: _____
Advanced Teachers Training College, Any other training school
(Specify) _____ Year _____ Nothing,
- (b) Highest Academic Certificate _____
- (d) Highest Professional Certificate _____ Year: _____
- (e) Number of Refresher Courses _____, and Seminars attended _____

3. CAREER PROFILE.

- (a) Profession the assessee practiced or wanted to practice before entering the teaching profession _____
- (b) Grade with which the assessee entered the teaching profession _____
- (c) Year of entering into the teaching profession _____
- (d) Previous posts held in the teaching profession 1. _____
2. _____ 3. _____

- (e) Official Text of Appointment: No. _____ of _____
 (f) Date of Assumption of Duty in Present Post: _____
 (g) Seniority in the present post _____ years.
 (h) Year of appointment to the present post _____

(i) Mark and date of the last inspection ___/20 on the _____ None

(j) Rewards: _____

II. IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DIVISIONAL INSPECTOR.

1. Regional Inspectorate of Basic Education _____

2. Date of opening establishment: _____

3. Number of full-fledged government nursery schools _____ incomplete.
 (in the sub-division)

4. Number of full-fledged private nursery schools _____ incomplete.
 (in the sub-division)

5. Number of full-fledged government primary schools _____ incomplete.
 (in the sub-division)

6. Number of full-fledged private primary schools _____ incomplete.
 (in the sub-division)

7. Characteristics of the inspectors office block;

(a) General conditions: Poor Average Good

(b) Internal space: Inadequate Fairly Inadequate Adequate

(c) Convenience: Electricity; Yes No

Telephone; Yes No

Toilets; Yes No

(d) Maintenance: Irregular Regular

8. Inspectorates Furniture:

(a) Offices: Bad condition Good condition Insufficient Sufficient

(b) Chairs: Bad condition Good condition Insufficient Sufficient

(c) Cupboards: Bad condition Good condition Insufficient Sufficient

(d) Cabinets: Bad condition Good condition Insufficient Sufficient

9. Inspectorates' Equipment and Supplies

- (a) Number of typewriters: In a bad state of repair _____ in good State _____ Northing _____
- (b) Number of duplicating machines: In a bad state _____ In good state _____ Northing _____ state _____ Northing _____
- (c) Number of computers: In bad state _____ In good state _____ Northing _____
- (c) Number of computes: In bad state _____ In good state _____
- (d) Nothing _____

Supplies: Insufficient Sufficient

10. Credits Earmarked.

ITEM	AMOUNT	REMAINDER
Total =		

- Number of vehicles on the road _____, Year of being put on the road _____
- Number of vehicles in a bad state of repair _____
- Cause _____
- Year of being put on the road _____
- Number of vehicles beyond repairs _____
- Cause _____, Year of being put on the road _____

11. Characteristics of classrooms in the Area.

a. Government Schools in the sub-division:

Number in classrooms of permanent materials _____, Semi permanent materials _____, and non-permanent materials _____

b. Private schools in the sub-division:

Number in classrooms of Permanent materials _____, semi permanent materials _____ and non-permanent materials _____.

12. Number and Characteristics of Specialized Facilities and other Infrastructure.

a. Government schools and Private schools.

Boarding schools: Number _____, Accommodation capacity _____

Public funding Private

School canteens: Number _____, Accommodation capacity _____

Public Funding Private

Libraries: Number _____, Number of books _____ Origin:

Public funding Private

Infirmaries and sickbays: Number _____, Origin of medical supplies _____

Public funding Private

Other specialized infrastructure: Nature _____,

Number _____,

Public funding Private

13. Inspectorate's Administration Staff.

SEX	PENI	PENIA	IPEG	IEG	ICEG	IAAEG	IAAEG	MEG	MEGA	AE	TOTAL
MEN											
WO-MEN											
TOTAL											

14. Teaching Staff In Schools

SECTOR	PE NI	PAEN I	IPEG	IEG	ICEG	IAEG	IAAE G	MEG	MEG A	TOTAL
Public										
Private										
TOTAL										

15. Deployment Of Teachers In School

SECTOR	full-fledged School									
	Schools with at least 6 teachers		Schools with 5 teachers		Schools with 4 teacher		Schools with Teachers		Schools with 1 to 3 Teachers	
	Numb er	Enroll ment	Numb er	Enroll ment	Numb er	Enroll ment	Numb er	Enroll ment	Numb er	Enroll ment
Public										
Private										
Total										

16. Number of Pupils In the Sub-Division

a. Government Schools: Boys _____, Girls _____, Total _____
 b. Private Schools: Boys _____, Girls _____, Total _____

4. THE INSPECTOR'S PERSONALITY (C1=2)

Extent to which the inspector shows proof of dignity, respect and self-respect in his attitude, the performance of his duties and relations with his collaborators and superiors(see the PDNE or the DDNE or an administrative authority).

_____ 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2.

Mark= _____ /2pts

5. MEETING THE EXIGENCIES OF THE PROFESSION (A=6)

Extent to which the inspector show proof punctuality, assiduity, perseverance, concentration, (rigor) in the performance of his duties (See the PDNE or the DDNE or an administrative authority).

_____ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Mark= _____ / 6pts

V. INSPECTOR'S PERFORMANCE IN PEDAGOGIC ORGANISATION AND CONTROL (B1=2)

1. Relevance and originality of initiative and objectives relating pedagogic supervision and assistance in the area.
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
2. The schedule of pedagogic activities is complete (visit of schools, inspections, pedagogic days, and meetings with other pedagogic officials, pedagogic guidance)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
3. The tables relating to pedagogic organization and control are complete (school mapping, allocation of lessons, schedule of activities to be carried out by the pedagogic affairs and Examination Bureaux, schedule of examinations of the year, schedule of visits to educational facilities, etc)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
4. Nature of control of the management of school curricular through the harmonization of examination distribution and questions sent to schools.
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
5. Instructions on the deployment of teachers in classrooms are complete (according to level, seniority in service, seniority in post, experience is the class taken, responsibility or convenience, etc)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
6. Rate of visas of pedagogic documents presented by officials in the field (see the duplicates of documents during inspection).
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
7. Nature of organization of pedagogic days (see the copies reports submitted to hierarchy)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
8. Nature of papers presented during pedagogic days (respect of guidelines, relevance of content, presentation and language, bibliographical references of the theoretical aspect and the practical aspect)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
9. Relevance and originality of the remarks and observations made by the inspector on inspection forms
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
10. Percentage of schools visited, and inspections carried out
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
11. Nature of distance pedagogic control (see the mechanism in place)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
12. Extent to which the inspectors collaborators are satisfied at the way inspection missions are organized (see the bureaux heads and other pedagogic supervisors)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

Mark = Total of score divided by 30= _____/2pts. (round up)

VI. PERFORMANCE AS AN ADMINISTRATOR (B2=2)

1. Relevance and originality of initiative and objectives relating to the administrative management of the area
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
2. Relevance and implementation of instructions given on discipline in schools (entry and exit) punctuality and assiduity, trend of activities in school premises and classrooms, hoisting of the flag, casual and annual leave, holidays etc _____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
3. Degree of equity in the distribution of school materials in proportion to the number of teachers in each school
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
4. Degree of observance of schedule for the dispatch of compulsory periodic documents, performance of administrative duties (see the documents sent following the schedule)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
5. How complete the compulsory registers are (enumerate them, and determine the proportion as compared to the required number)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
6. The way in which registers and achieves are kept (see specification, physical state, respect of chronology, respect for entry norms, filing)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
7. How orderly filing is done (per government or private school, per category of staff)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
8. How complete the compulsory tables are(enumerate and determine the proportion per the required number
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
9. Ability with which the inspector initiates proposals to make or made to the authorities on congratulations, encouragement's, warnings, remarks, rewards
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
10. Degree of faithfulness in the transmission of information and mail in both directions (see the incoming mail and out going mail registers)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
11. Degree to which the inspectors collaborators think the inspector is making efforts to provide the inspectorate and schools with equipment and supplies, examination materials, sports material, equipment(see the bureaux Heads)
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
12. Degree to which the bureaux heads are satisfied at the way the responsibilities are shared.
_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

13. Mechanism of distant administrative control (see mechanism in place and results)

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

14. How comprehensive is the school mapping? (see the number of elements presented by school mapping per required number) _____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

Score = Total score divided by 35 = _____ 12 marks (round up)

VII. PERFORMANCES IN CO-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS (C2=3)

1. Relevance of the inspectors objectives and initiatives with regards to co-curricular activities and public relations

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

2. Relevance of instructions on the formation and running of P.T.A's

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

3. Relevance of instructions on the creation, running and maintenance of school gardens, animal farms, art and craft workshops and other productive activity within each school.

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

4. Relevance of instructions on the running of sporting and cultural activities and the pupils' participation (see the bureaux heads)

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

5. Nature of material assistance provided to schools for the promotion of productive, sporting and cultural activities and participation in FENASSCO

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

6. Relevance and implementation of instruction on the measures taken as concerns hygiene, sanitation and security in each school

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

7. How often the inspectors collaborators and P.T.A's require his service in case of difficulty (see the PDBE or DDBE or an administrative authority)

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

8. Nature of formal and informal relationships between the inspector and the authorities and officials of other services (see the PDBE or DDBE or an administrative authority)

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

9. How often does the inspector attend meetings convened by the authorities and P.T.A's to which he is invited

10. (see the PDBE or DDBE or an administrative authority)

_____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

Score = Total score divided by 15 = _____ /3 (round up)

VIII. SCHOOL PERFORMANCE OF THE SUB DIVISION IN PUBLIC EXAMS(B3=2)
 (Mark 1 or 2 and not 1 and 2)

1. If the Inspector has served for less than a year
 - a. General average of the subdivision in the last term examinations
 _____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
 - b. The trend of this general average in the relation to the grand total of the past two years for the same terms.
 _____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

 2. If the Inspector has served for more than a year.
 - a. Percentage of success at last years FSLC = _____% score
 _____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
 - b. Trend of this percentage in relation to the grand total of the past two years for the same terms
 _____ 0 1 2 3 4 5
- Score = Total score divided by 5 = _____/2

VIII. HOW SATISFIED THE EXAMINAR IS AT THE INSPECTORS WORK ON THE WHOLE

(D=3) _____ 0 1 2 3 4 5

Score = _____/3

	FINAL MARK
A = A	= _____/6
B = B1 + B2 + B3	= _____/6
C = C1 + C2	= _____/6
D = D	= _____/6

TOTAL = _____/20

Annexe XI : restitution de l'étude

A l'issue de cette étude, a été proposé un dialogue sectoriel entre la Banque mondiale, auteur du rapport, les ministères en charge de l'éducation et de son administration au Cameroun, ainsi que des représentants de la société civile. Ce processus a consisté en la mise en place d'ateliers régionaux dans deux des trois régions visitées par l'étude (Nord-Ouest et Extrême-Nord), et en l'organisation d'une table ronde nationale à Yaoundé.

L'atelier de Maroua (Extrême-Nord) a réuni 56 personnes le 25 Janvier 2011. L'atelier de Bamenda (Nord-Ouest) a réuni 68 participants le 28 Janvier 2011. Enfin, la table ronde nationale à Yaoundé a réuni 86 participants le 1^{er} Février 2011.

Ce processus de restitution a eu pour objectif, en plus de la publication des analyses et des recommandations du rapport, la définition d'un plan d'action.

De manière plus précise, les objectifs poursuivis étaient les suivants :

- présenter les conclusions de l'étude à une audience large rassemblant les responsables du secteur éducatif aux niveaux central et déconcentré ainsi que les membres de la communauté éducative et de la société civile ;
- recueillir les réactions des participants sur des propositions de réformes, et identifier un nombre restreint d'activités concrètes qui pourraient être mises en œuvre au niveau central et local ;
- aboutir au niveau local à l'établissement d'un plan d'action qui serait présenté aux autorités centrales du secteur pour discussion et validation au cours de la table ronde de Yaoundé.

Les ateliers régionaux ont réuni :

- Gouverneurs et préfet sésants
- Délégués Régionaux du MINEDUB, MINESEC, MINFI, MINFOPRA, MINEPAT
- Parlementaires locaux
- Représentants de la société civile locale,
- Représentants des Associations de Parents d'Elèves locales,
- Représentants des syndicats d'enseignants locaux,
- Représentants locaux de l'association des maires (CVUC)
- Chefs traditionnels.

La Table Ronde nationale à Yaoundé a réuni :

- MINEDUB, MINESEC, MINFI, MINFOPRA, MINEPAT
- Membres du Parlement impliqués sur le secteur Education
- Représentants à Yaoundé des services déconcentrés du MINEDUB, MINESEC, MINFI, MINFOPRA, MINEPAT
- Représentants de la société civile au niveau national,
- Représentants des Association de Parents d'Elèves au niveau national,
- Représentants nationaux des syndicats d'enseignants,
- Représentants nationaux de l'association des Maires (CVUC)

Bilan des ateliers régionaux:

Le rapport a été accueilli de manière globalement positive. En effet, les problématiques traitées dans le rapport, issues d'un dialogue qualitatif approfondi avec des acteurs du terrain, font écho aux préoccupations rencontrées au quotidien par les usagers et les personnels du système éducatif camerounais. Toutefois, certains représentants des ministères ont fait remarquer le fait qu'une étude de ce type, si elle permettait de pointer des dysfonctionnements ponctuels, ne saurait permettre de généraliser l'existence de ces dysfonctionnements.

Lors des ateliers régionaux, ont été discutés de manière ouverte les différents points clés mentionnés par l'étude.

La gestion et l'évaluation du travail des enseignants s'est révélée être une préoccupation récurrente des participants. Qu'il s'agisse des « maîtres des parents » au statut jugé précaire, des nouveaux contractualisés ou des fonctionnaires, les participants ont fait remarquer que le suivi de la carrière et de la qualité du travail des professeurs (absentéisme notamment) souffrent parfois de lacunes préjudiciables à la qualité du service d'éducation. Cela étant, les participants reconnaissent la difficulté d'une répartition optimale des enseignants, eu égard aux contextes difficiles, en particulier dans les zones rurales isolées. La prise en compte d'autres facteurs devient alors nécessaire, tels que les conditions de vie, le mode de recrutement (question par exemple de la forte féminisation du métier d'enseignant, en particulier dans le primaire), ou l'environnement social et culturel dans lequel évolue l'enseignant.

Le rôle des APE (Associations de Parents d'Elèves) a été largement discuté, et a été posée régulièrement la question de l'effectivité de leur pouvoir. Notamment, la question de l'accès à l'information a été jugée essentielle sur ce thème, en vue d'un meilleur suivi des dépenses, des activités, et des performances d'un établissement scolaire.

La question du paquet minimum a également fait l'objet de débats. Si de nombreux intervenants s'accordent à trouver cette dotation utile, beaucoup d'autres jugent que la manière dont sa distribution est organisée ne garantit pas son efficacité. Des suggestions ont été faites pour son amélioration. En revanche, il a été noté que le paquet minimum ne doit son existence qu'à la faiblesse des dotations financières directes aux écoles. En ce sens, la question de son remplacement par une allocation budgétaire aux établissements a été posée par des représentants d'établissements se disant sous-financés.

De manière spécifique, à l'issue des ateliers régionaux, 3 thèmes de discussion ont été retenus pour guider les débats et travaux de la table ronde à Yaoundé :

- i) Le management des enseignants
- ii) La gestion du paquet minimum
- iii) L'implication des communautés dans l'éducation

Bilan de la table ronde nationale:

- Les Ministres présents ont promis l'adoption d'actions visant à améliorer la gouvernance dans le système éducatif Camerounais.

- les Ministres présents et les représentants de la Banque mondiale ont exprimé le souhait de mener ces discussions à des actions plus concrètes sur le terrain qui contribueraient à améliorer de façon significative, la gouvernance dans le système éducatif Camerounais.
- Un plan d'action faisant suite aux ateliers a été mis en place (annexe XII)

Annexe XII : proposition de plan d'action faisant suite aux ateliers

Améliorer la performance du système éducatif Proposition de plan d'actions

Yaoundé, 1er Février 2011

Améliorer la gestion des enseignants

- ▶ **Activités ciblant les services déconcentrés**
 - ▶ Equiper les services déconcentrés d'outils simples de suivi de la performance des enseignants
 - ▶ Faciliter la remontée systématique de l'information quant aux enseignants absents
- ▶ **Activités ciblant les enseignants**
 - ▶ Réviser les critères sur lesquels les enseignants sont évalués afin de lier plus étroitement l'évolution de la carrière aux performances
 - ▶ Evaluer la possibilité de mettre en place une prime d'exercice en zone difficile (a l'exemple de l'expérimentation en cours dans la zone de Bakassi)
 - ▶ Sensibiliser les enseignants sur les formalités de transfert du paiement de leur salaire dans la zone ou ils enseignent

Renforcement du rôle des communautés

- ▶ **Rôle des communautés dans l'intégration des enseignants**
 - ▶ Impliquer davantage les communautés dans l'accueil et l'intégration des nouveaux enseignants
- ▶ **Rôle des communautés dans le fonctionnement du système**
 - ▶ Faciliter l'établissement d'un Conseil d'Établissement fonctionnel pour toutes les écoles
 - ▶ Faciliter la compréhension par les communautés des textes réglementaires et dispositifs législatifs existants.
 - ▶ Renforcer les capacités des communautés quant au suivi pédagogique des élèves et enseignants

Améliorer la gestion du paquet minimum

- ▶ **Activités ciblant les autorités décentralisées**
 - ▶ Mener des actions de formation pour faciliter l'appropriation par les maires de leur nouveau rôle
 - ▶ Faciliter l'implication de l'ensemble des parties prenantes dans les décisions concernant la composition du paquet minimum
- ▶ **Activités ciblant les chefs d'établissement et APE**
 - ▶ Systématiser la divulgation des montants disponibles pour le paquet minimum aux chefs d'établissement et aux communautés

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