NIGERIA’S DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND? POLICY NOTE IN SUPPORT OF NIGERIA’S ERGP 2017–2020 Rifat Hasan Benjamin Loevinsohn Corrina Moucheraud S. Amer Ahmed Israel Osorio-Rodarte Emi Suzuki Elina Pradhan Supriya Madhavan Sara Troiano Michael Sexton Fatimah Abubakar Mustapha Oluwole Odutolu Olumide Okunola NIGERIA’S DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND? POLICY NOTE IN SUPPORT OF NIGERIA’S ERGP 2017–2020 Rifat Hasan, Benjamin Loevinsohn, Corrina Moucheraud, S. Amer Ahmed, Israel Osorio-Rodarte, Emi Suzuki, Elina Pradhan, Supriya Madhavan, Sara Troiano, Michael Sexton, Fatimah Abubakar Mustapha, Oluwole Odutolu, Olumide Okunola Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend Table of Contents Executive Summary v  hat is the demographic dividend and why is it important for Chapter 1: W accelerated economic growth and development? 1  hat is Nigeria’s progress toward the demographic transition? Chapter 2: W 7 Fertility and mortality 7 Family planning 9 Health and nutrition 11 Challenges for adolescents 13 Education15 Chapter 3: How is the demographic transition linked to economic growth and poverty reduction in Nigeria? 19 Chapter 4: W hat policies and strategies can Nigeria adopt to seize the demographic window of opportunity, spur economic growth and reduce poverty? 25 Chapter 5: How can Nigeria ensure that implementation of these policies and strategies will be successful?  29 Technical Annex A: Demographic Dividend in Africa 31 References35 List of Figures Figure ES1. Demographic Transition in Nigeria vi Figure ES2. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Nigeria, South Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa vi Figure ES3. Population Pyramids and Working Age to Dependent Population Ratios in Nigeria and East Asia viii Figure ES4. Real GDP per capita by fertility scenario constant 2011 US$) ix Figure ES5. Poverty headcount (%) by fertility scenario by 2050 (PPP$3.10) ix Figure 1. The four stages of the demographic transition 1 Figure 2. Changes in population age structure, combined with an enabling policy environment, leads to a demographic dividend.  2 Figure 3. Good policies are necessary to turn the window of demographic opportunity into demographic dividends 3 Figure 4a. The demographic transition in Nigeria 8 Figure 4b. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Nigeria, South Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa 8 Figure 5. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2013, national and disaggregated 8 Figure 6. Total fertility rate and wanted total fertility rate, national and disaggregated 9 iii Figure 7. Current use of modern methods of contraception, national and disaggregated, in 2013 9 Figure 8a. Modern contraceptive prevalence rate, 1990–2013 10 Figure 8b. Modern contraceptive prevalence rate by place of residence, 1990–2013 10 Figure 9. Modern contraceptive prevalence rate among married women by women’s participation in household decision-making 10 Figure 10. Current use of modern contraceptive methods and unmet need for family planning by region 11 Figure 11a. Use of skilled birth attendance, by year and age group 11 Figure 11b. Use of skilled birth attendance, by region 11 Figure 12a. Prevalence of stunting among children under age 5 12 Figure 12b. Prevalence of stunting among children by region 12 Figure 13a. Complete vaccination, children aged 12–23 months, 1990–2013 13 Figure 13b. Children (under 5 years) with recent ARI symptoms who were treated at a health facility, by mother’s educational attainment  13 Figure 14a. Age-specific fertility rates (births per 1,000 women) 14 Figure 14b. Median age of key sexual health events  14 Figure 14c. Median age at first marriage, by region, 1990–2013 14 Figure 15. Actual and projected adolescent population (ages 10–19) by fertility scenario 15 Figure 16: Median Years of Schooling and Total Fertility Rates, Women Ages 15-49 16 Figure 17. Population pyramids and working age to dependent population ratios in Nigeria and East Asia19 Figure 18. Population age structures and boats—which would you rather be on?20 Figure 19. Nigeria population projections and working age population shares under three fertility scenarios, 205020 Figure 20. Working-age population shares will continue to grow through 205021 Figure 21a. Total labor supply under medium fertility scenario, 2016–205021 Figure 21b. Number of new jobs required to prevent an increase in unemployment in 2050 by fertility scenario21 Figure 22. Real GDP per capita by fertility scenario (constant 2011 US$)22 Figure 23. Poverty headcount rate (%) by fertility scenario by 2050 (at PPP$3.10 a day)23 Figure 24. Nigeria’s progress toward the demographic dividend & strategies needed to catalyze progress26 List of Tables Table 1. Three-pronged strategy to spark the demographic transition26 Table 2. Invest recommendations to implement the priority strategies to improve human development 27 Table 3. Policy implementation analysis results: achievements and opportunities 30 List of Boxes Box ES1. Successful Experience of Bangladesh in Reducing Fertility ix Box 1. South Korea’s demographic dividend resulted in 40 years of 6.7% annual growth 4 Box 2. Total fertility rate and working age population share help define four Types of countries vis-à-vis the opportunities to realize the demographic dividend 5 Box 3. Successful Experience of Bangladesh in Reducing Fertility  25 iv Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend Executive Summary What is the demographic dividend and policies. The first demographic dividend—or why is it important for accelerated extra boost to the economy based on a produc- economic growth and development? tive labor supply—focuses on the labor supply A demographic dividend is the potential effects of changes in age structure. It can be economic benefit associated with a coun- captured if three things happen. try’s demographic context. 1. The demographic transition needs to be •• A demographic dividend is the economic catalyzed and accelerated: Slow fertility benefit to a country that can take place decline leads to a lower ratio of working when a country undergoes rapid declines age adults to dependents. Hence, rapid in mortality and fertility, producing fertility decline is key in maximizing the smaller, healthier families and a youth ratio of working age adults to dependents. cohort that can be educated and 2. Investments in health and education empowered to enter the labor market. need to increase. •• East Asian countries took advantage of 3. An economic environment has to be this demographic window of opportunity fostered so that this bulge cohort can to drive macroeconomic growth and find well-paying jobs, rather than simply poverty reduction. be unemployed or forced into low- productivity work. The key point underlying the demo- graphic dividend is that population age A slow or stagnating demographic structure—dependency ratio—is critically transition poses considerable risks to important—and even more so than popula- countries. tion size. People are at the heart of the demographic •• Speeding up the fertility decline in sub- dividend, and the extent to which countries Saharan Africa is critical not only for reap these dividends varies and depends on increasing the chance of a dividend, but Enabling Environment Education Population Structure Economics Demographic Health Dividend Governance Source: Population Reference Bureau. v more importantly for decreasing the risk is substantially higher in North-West of a demographically driven disaster. and North-East regions (6.7 and 6.3, •• Fertility rates and youth dependency respectively) compared to South-South ratios in the region remain among the where it is 4.3 (DHS, 2013). The 2017 highest in the world, resulting in lower MICS survey shows even greater investments in children, lower labor differences (7.2 in North-West, 6.3 in productivity, lower female labor force North-East, 4.3 in South-South). participation, high unemployment or •• Women with more education or living under-employment, higher poverty rates in urban areas tend to have a much and higher risk of political instability. lower number of children as compared •• Thus, demographics and demographic to their counterparts with lower levels shifts are key to development in sub- of education or those who live in rural Saharan Africa. areas. TFR is 1.5 children per woman higher in rural areas compared to urban What is Nigeria’s progress toward the areas. Women with no education have demographic dividend? more than twice as many children as Nigeria is a pre-dividend country due to its compared to women with at least high high fertility, declining mortality and school education (DHS). The 2017 MICS skewed young age structure. survey paints a similar picture: TFR is Nigeria has experienced only modest 1.4 children per woman higher in rural declines in mortality and fertility—and areas compared to urban areas—and 3.5 rates remain high, posing risks for popula- children higher among women with no tion age structure and the potential for a education compared with women with demographic dividend. Note that there are higher education. important urban/rural/ geographic differ- •• While wanted fertility is lower than actual ences in fertility rates, and across women’s fertility, the gap between actual and education levels. wanted fertility is very small, reflecting both a desire for large families and •• The incomplete demographic transition relative realization of desired family size. may hinder Nigeria’s growth prospects, as population growth exacerbates the demand Use of modern contraceptives remains for social services and outstrips the capacity very low, lagging considerably behind other of the economy to generate jobs. countries in the region. Fewer than 10% of •• Death rates have been progressively married women reportedly use a modern declining over several decades, method (DHS, 2013) with little to no but the total fertility rate (TFR) progress since 1999. The 2017 MICS survey remains persistently high. The 2017 confirms minimal progress in this regard, MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster finding modern contraceptive use to be less Surveys) places TFR at 5.8. Fertility than 11%. Figure ES1. Demographic Transition in Nigeria Figure ES2. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Nigeria, South Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa 50 450 Total Population in Millions Crude Birth-Death Rates 45 400 8 per 1,000 population 40 350 7 35 Natural 300 6 30 growth 250 25 5 20 200 4 15 150 3 10 100 50 2 5 0 0 1 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Crude death rate Crude birth rate Nigeria South Africa Total population (millions) Sub-Saharan Africa Source: UN Population Division, World Population Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects 2015 Revision. Prospects 2015 Revision. Note: Data after 2015 are projections based on UN Note: Data after 2015 are projections based on UN medium-variant fertility. medium-variant fertility. vi Furthermore, gender inequality continues evidence shows that girls’secondary educa- to be a challenge in Nigeria—and gender tion lowers fertility and unwanted preg- dynamics and women’s empowerment nancy, reduces infant mortality, increases affect the use of modern contraception. childhood immunization and nutrition, and reduces childhood stunting. •• Women who participate more in household Adolescents and their decisions have decision-making tend to have higher use implications for harnessing the demo- of modern contraceptives. In 2013, 18.2% graphic dividend. of women who participated in making at least 3 household decisions used modern •• High levels of fertility reflect young age at contraceptives compared to only 3.5% of marriage, early and frequent childbearing women who participated in none (DHS). as well as low levels of contraceptive use: approximately 28% of girls between the Despite some improvements in mater- ages of 15–19 are already married, and nal survival, under utilization of maternal 23% are already mothers or pregnant with health services remains, which may cause their first child. persistently poor outcomes. •• There are also regional differences, with the youngest ages of marriage seen in •• 2017 MICS data suggests some the North-West, North-East and North- improvement in skilled birth attendance Central regions. These are the same (66%). This contrasts with 2013 DHS regions where age of marriage has been data (40%). relatively stagnant over time with very •• The use of skilled birth attendance is little (if any) progress. lowest among young mothers indicating a need to target adolescents for maternal Adolescents make up a substantial 23 health services, especially as adolescent percent of Nigeria’s population, and the childbearing carries higher risks to both already large number of adolescents is the young mother and her child. expected to more than double in the upcom- ing decades from 41 million to 84 million in Nigerian children suffer widely from both 2050 (under a medium fertility scenario), chronic and acute malnutrition with 37% of posing challenges for provision of health, children under 5 being stunted, and low education, and job training services to coverage of preventative and curative child prepare them for a productive future—but health care puts children at risk for infec- also has implications for the next generation tious diseases, which are the main causes of given patterns of early marriage and early child mortality worldwide (i.e. diarrhea, childbearing, and correlations between malaria and pneumonia) (DHS). The 2017 unemployed youth and political instability. MICS data is even more sobering, finding 43.6% of children under 5 to be stunted. •• Children born to adolescent mothers are at higher risk of mortality, malnutrition, •• The coverage of childhood vaccines and onset of illness than are children of experienced a massive decline during the older mothers. 2000s, and is now back to near-similar •• Poor health and nutrition adversely levels as 1990 (25% of children have affect cognitive and socioemotional been fully vaccinated by age 2) (DHS) development and learning, putting children The 2017 MICS paints an even bleaker of teenage mothers at higher risk of poor picture, finding childhood vaccination to development outcomes...prolonging the be only 23%. intergenerational cycle of poverty. •• Only 1/3 of mothers seek health •• Research shows that youth services when their children have unemployment is linked with political diarrhea or respiratory illness (DHS). The instability, especially in countries with 2017 MICS data suggests this figure is large income inequality and lower levels of closer to 1/4. education among the youth. •• The 2013 DHS found only 17% of children were breastfed, although the 2017 MICS How is the demographic transition suggests some improvement (24%). linked to economic growth and poverty reduction? Girls’ secondary education in Nigeria is Due to slow fertility and mortality declines, particularly concerning given that ample Nigeria will experience rapid population vii Figure ES3. Population Pyramids and Working Age to Dependent Population Ratios in Nigeria and East Asia Nigeria (2015) East Asia (2015) 80+ 80+ 70–74 70–74 60–64 60–64 Age group Age group 50–54 50–54 40–44 40–44 2.6 30–34 1.1 30–34 20–24 20–24 10–14 10–14 0–4 0–4 32 16 0 16 32 80 64 48 32 16 0 16 32 48 64 80 Population (millions) Population (millions) Source: UN (2015). growth and an age structure that is heavily What policies and strategies can Nigeria skewed toward young dependents. adopt to seize the demographic dividend, spur economic growth and reduce •• The current population age structure in poverty? Nigeria is considerably skewed toward young ages; this can be contrasted with •• These dividends are not automatic, and a typical age structure from East Asia, good policies are necessary to turn the where the working age population is window of demographic opportunity into proportionately greater than the share of demographic dividends. dependents. •• In support of Nigeria’s Economic Growth •• The ratio of working age to dependents is and Recovery Plan (EGRP) 2017–2020, expected to progressively increase from coordinated multi-sectoral actions are 1.1 (2015) to a range of 1.4 to 1.7 (2050) under the three fertility scenarios—which implies that there will be increasingly more 1   The LINKAGE model has been used for analysis of the working age adults per every dependent. growth and poverty impacts of age-structure changes as in Ahmed et al. (2016), which showed that demographic change could explain 11 to 15 percent of Nigeria is a high-fertility country and GDP volume growth and approximately 40 to 60 million modest accelerations in its fertility decline fewer poor by 2030 for Sub-Saharan Africa. The can lead to substantial changes in its analytical framework was also used to examine the projected age-structure. impact of demographic change on the global economy (World Bank 2015a), South Africa (World Bank 2015b), and the Southern African Customs Union economies •• Children currently account for 43 percent (Ahmed and Cruz 2016). Additional details on the of the population, and will remain more methodology can be found in technical annex A. It than 40 percent in 2030 and more than should be noted that the scenario analysis does not 35 percent in 2050. account for the discrete structural changes in Nigeria’s •• The working-age population currently economy, such as those that may occur due to unanticipated infrastructure investments. As such, the accounts for 53 percent of the simulation results should be considered illustrative and population, and this age cohort will highlighting the marginal impacts of demographic account for more than 60 percent of the change rather than as forecasts. Please also note that population by 2050 under the medium this analysis uses the 2009 HNLSS data as fertility scenario. recommended and used by the Government of Nigeria for estimating poverty rates, but more recent survey data are available (GHS 2015/16). Economic simulation modeling sug- 2 The levels and trends in poverty, growth, and fertility gests that a one child difference in vary significantly in the North and South which means Nigeria’s fertility rates by 2050 can lead that the impact of lowering fertility is heterogeneous to differences of 29 percent in real across these regions. Note that poverty rates, number of people below the poverty line and fertility rates are GDP per capita.1 Lower fertility will higher in the North. Hence, lowering fertility in the also result in lifting 53 million people North will likely have a higher impact on reducing out of poverty by 2050. 2 poverty in the region as compared to the South. viii Figure ES4. Real GDP per capita by fertility scenario constant 2011 US$) 10,597 12,000 9,362 8,204 10,000 Real GDP Per Capita 8,000 5,839 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Year Constant High Medium Low Source: Simulation results from LINKAGE and Global Income Distribution Dynamics model. Note: The scenarios consider the age-structure changes projected in the medium, high, low, and constant fertility scenarios of United Nations (2015). Figure ES5. Poverty headcount (%) by fertility scenario by 2050 (PPP$3.10) 100 90 Projected population in poverty (millions) 80 74 127 70 221 60 50 43 131 40 101 30 78 30 25 21 20 10 0 2013 No demographic High fertility Medium fertility Low fertility effect 2050 2050 2050 2050 Source: Simulation results from LINKAGE and Global Income Distribution Dynamics model. Note: The scenarios consider the age-structure changes projected in the medium, high, low, and constant fertility scenarios of United Nations (2015). needed for investing in people to drive necessary to turn the window of demographic economic gains. opportunity into demographic dividends. •• The EGRP prioritizes reviewing the current In the short run, the government of status of the Population Policy and Nigeria should consider a 3-pronged developing and implementing a revised approach in order to first spark the demo- Population Policy. In order to meet the graphic transition (see table below). goals of the EGRP and take advantage of Without effectively implementing the the demographic window of opportunity, three short-term strategies to accelerate the revised Population policy should fertility decline, other investments in skills emphasize the needed changes in the development, jobs and savings in the longer population age structure—rather than term will not be able to harness the eco- only focusing on population size. nomic benefits of a demographic dividend. On the other hand, sparking the demo- These dividends are not automatic. graphic transition alone does not automati- Prudent short and medium-term policies are cally lead to demographic dividend. ix Sparking the Demographic Transition: Policy priorities to improve human development outcomes to accelerate the fertility decline 1. Expand access to comprehensive family planning programs (including addressing social norms). 2. Improve maternal and child health and nutrition. 3. Increase female education and empowerment (including reducing child marriage and teenage childbearing, and addressing gender norms). To reap the first demographic dividend, age structure of the population, invest in the large youth cohort brought on by the Nigerian people and drive productivity demographic transition should be educated, through coordinated multi-sectoral actions. healthy and gainfully employed. To reap the Based on implementation challenges second dividend, the income generated by reviewed from Nigeria, several things would the population of working age should con- increase the likelihood of successful imple- tribute to increasing domestic investments. mentation of existing policies and programs Hence, to benefit from the demographic to accelerate demographic transition and dividends, Nigeria should institute fiscal, create an enabling environment to reap labor and social policies in the medi- demographic dividends: um-term by: •• Increased and stable financial i. improving business environment to build commitment from the government labor demand; to keep pace with growing population ii. improving education and human capital; needs, and full disbursement of iii. encouraging female employment in the budgeted funds; formal sector; and •• Greater coordination by the iv. improving institutions for domestic government, particularly given the investments and savings. decentralized governance structure; •• Continued and/or increased The optimal strategy depends also on the engagement of a range of time horizon: some actions will have short- stakeholders in decision-making and term returns on investment (e.g. expanding implementation, including stronger access to comprehensive family planning government leadership of such programs & improving maternal and child partnerships; health and nutrition) while others would •• Institution strengthening and capacity have medium- to long-term returns on building, including greater training investment (e.g. increasing female and deployment of skilled workers for education). policy implementation; and To take advantage of the demographic •• Greater focus on results, data window of opportunity, immediate and collection, and monitoring for results concerted efforts are needed to change the and impact. x Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend Policy Note in Support of Nigeria’s ERGP 2017–2020 Rifat Hasan, Benjamin Loevinsohn, Corrina Moucheraud, S. Amer Ahmed, Israel Osorio-Rodarte, Emi Suzuki, Elina Pradhan, Supriya Madhavan, Sara Troiano, Michael Sexton, Fatimah Abubakar Mustapha, Oluwole Odutolu, Olumide Okunola What is the demographic dividend and why is it important for accelerated economic growth and development? A demographic dividend is the economic Figure 1. The four stages of the demographic benefit to a country that can take place transition when a country undergoes a rapid decline in mortality followed by a rapid decline in Stage Stage Stage Stage 1 2 3 4 fertility, thus producing smaller, healthier Population growth rate families and a youth cohort that can be educated and empowered to enter the labor market. Smaller families result in increased public and private per capita Birth rate Death rate investment in health, education and other forms of human capital. The concept of a Time demographic dividend was introduced in the 1st dividend 2nd dividend late 1990s to describe the interplay between changes in population age structure and fast economic growth in East Asia—i.e. South Korea, Singapore, Thailand (Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 2000; Bloom and Williamson 1997). The concept links popula- Demographic dividends are potential tion dynamics to accelerated economic economic outcomes associated with a growth. The figure below illustrates the country’s demographic context. The extent different stages of the demographic transi- to which countries reap these dividends tion (Figure 1). Declines in mortality are varies and depends on policies. These followed, with a lag, by declines in fertility. dividends are not automatic. This lag, during which mortality is low but 1 Figure 2. Changes in population age structure, combined with an enabling policy environment, leads to a demographic dividend. Enabling Environment Education Population Structure Economics Demographic Health Dividend Governance Source: Population Reference Bureau. fertility remains high, produces a population combination of higher child survival rates bulge and a once-only opportunity for a in one cohort and fewer children in the demographic dividend. The key point following cohorts produces a population underlying the demographic dividend is that bulge—a large cohort that works its way population age structure is critically import- through the age structure—with large ant—and even more so than population size. macroeconomic effects. People are at the heart of develop- 2. Second, investments in health and ment, and the extent to which countries education need to increase. Generally, reap the dividends varies and depends on investments in health and education are policies, and the dividends will not occur higher in cohorts following the bulge. As if fertility does not decline rapidly. The families have fewer children, they and demographic dividend corresponds to a the government have more resources per 20–30 year period in a country’s demo- child to invest in the education and health graphic transition when the proportion of of the surviving children – due to this working age population compared to the quantity-quality tradeoff, human capital number of dependents increases rapidly. increases (Becker 1960; Kalemli-Ozcan, This change in the age structure can lead to Ryder, and Weil 2000; Schultz 2007). an extra economic boost through increased In addition, the labor supply gets an savings and private investments. Figure 2 additional boost, as lower fertility allows illustrates the critical inputs needed for the more women to enter the labor force demographic dividend to take place: a (Bloom et al. 2009). change in population age structure and an 3. Third, an economic environment has enabling policy environment. to be fostered so that this bulge The first demographic dividend—or extra cohort can find well-paying jobs, boost to the economy based on a productive rather than simply be unemployed or labor supply—focuses on the labor supply forced into low-productivity work. If effects of changes in age structure. It can all three steps are successful and well be captured if three things happen. timed, a substantial economic dividend is produced as the large youth cohort 1. First, the demographic transition moves into highly productive jobs, needs to be catalyzed and accelerated. boosting household and national income Improvements in health, especially child while supporting a smaller share of young health, increase child survival. Combined dependents. with investments in family planning, this leads to families giving birth to fewer Further in the demographic transition, a children while ensuring that the total possible second dividend results from the desired number of children survive. The savings and investments of the bulge 2 Figure 3. Good policies are necessary to turn the window of demographic opportunity into demographic dividends Window of Demographic Opportunity: a period in which the TDR is low, and the share of working age population is high Total dependency ratio (TDR) Demographic Dividend: the socio-economic gain arising from this specific demographic situation, if the right policy conditions are in place Time First dividend Second dividend Nigeria Permanent increase in Accumulation output per More More of human and capita people in disposable physical capital working age More More workers production income to save cohort as it matures and saves for The Global Monitoring Report (GMR) 2015/16 retirement. This dividend can take place (World Bank 2016) uses two criteria drawn only if policies to promote saving are from the demographic dividend framework to established and the financial sector is identify four types of countries, characterized developed enough to attract savings and by whether their potential for a first demo- translate them into productive investments. graphic dividend is in the past, present, or Later, the bulge cohort ages, leading to a future (Box 2). The first criterion is whether high old-age dependency rate, so savings the working age share is likely to be rising or have to be sufficient to finance this cohort’s not over the next 15 years (2015–30, the time retirement and health care needs. Figure 3 horizon for several development goals). To illustrates what policies have worked globally distinguish two subgroups within these to achieve the demographic dividends. broader groups, the current fertility rate and A slow or stagnating demographic the fertility rate from 1985 are used to transition poses considerable risks to identify how far along countries are in the countries. Africa’s Demographic Transition: initial and final phases of demographic Dividend or Disaster argues that speeding up transition. Most countries in Sub-Saharan the fertility decline in the region is critical not Africa are in pre-dividend phase and a few only for increasing the chance of a dividend, (mostly in Southern Africa) are early-divi- but more importantly for decreasing the risk dend countries.3 To reap the benefits of the of a demographically driven disaster (Canning, demographic dividend, the GMR indicates Raja and Yazbeck 2015). Fertility rates and that countries at different phases of the youth dependency ratios in sub-Saharan demographic transition require different Africa remain among the highest in the world, policy priorities—tailored to their economies, resulting in lower investments in children, societies and culture: lower labor productivity, lower female labor force participation, high unemployment or under-employment, higher poverty rates and higher risk of political instability. Thus, demographics and demographic shifts are key to development in sub-Saharan Africa. In 3   Pre-dividend countries will account for most of the fact, the Africa region has identified demog- global population growth through 2050. The population of this group of countries will grow by 49 percent (or raphy as one of three structural challenges 413 million people) by 2030 and by 132 percent (or 1.1 facing the region, with the other two being billion people) by 2050. Children as a share of the the need to boost productivity and promote population will remain above 40 percent until 2030 inclusiveness (World Bank 2015). and above 34 percent until 2050. 3 Box 1. South Korea’s demographic dividend resulted in 40 years of 6.7% annual growth Over a 40-year period, South Korea underwent 2. Shifting the education and skills a transition in which fertility declined rapidly, development strategy resulting in a higher the age structure started to change, and the skilled labor force. From compulsory total dependency ratio (TDR) declined to yield primary education to “Production- a large share of the population of working-age oriented education” to provide people with adults. The TDR is the ratio of total dependents knowledge and skills needed for economic (ages 0–14 and 65+) to those in working ages development. (ages 15–65). This transition created a window 3. Comprehensive economic plans. of opportunity to accelerate economic growth, (i) Investments in labor-intensive sectors and South Korea undertook policy measures (agriculture, manufacturing, chemical, iron, across sectors to harness this opportunity and steel); (ii) Investments in infrastructure and translated this into growth in GNI per capita: rural construction programs; (iii) Creation of favorable business environment brought 1. Comprehensive population policy leading in foreign direct investments (FDI). to rapid decline in dependency ratios. Implemented through public and private It should be noted that South Korea made sectors: (i) Comprehensive family planning the deliberate decision to enact both family programs; (ii) Investments in training of planning and economic growth policies at the providers on supply of contraceptives; same time (1962), enabling the two efforts to be (iii) Increases in CPR among married mutually reinforcing and possibly more effective couples; (iv) Mothers’ clubs. than if they had been sequentially implemented. Korea’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Total Dependency Ratio (TDR), 1955-2100 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 7 120 6 Total Dependency 100 Ratio (TDR) 5 80 4 60 3 2 40 1 20 0 0 1955–1960 1965–1970 1975–1980 1985–1990 1995–2000 2005–2010 2015–2020 2025–2030 2035–2040 2045–2050 2055–2060 2065–2070 2075–2080 2085–2090 2095–2100 South Korea TDR South Korea TFR Korea reaping the benefits of the DD, 1990–2015 7 120 GNI per capita at PPP 6 Total Dependency 100 Ratio (TDR) 5 80 4 60 3 2 40 1 20 0 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 TDR GNI per capita at PPP 4 Phase Policy priority Pre-Dividend Sparking the demographic transition Improving human development outcomes to accelerate the fertility decline Early-Dividend Accelerating job creation Creating productive jobs for the growing share of the population in working ages to reap the first demographic dividend Late-Dividend Sustaining productivity growth Creating conditions necessary to reap the second demographic dividend and beginning to prepare for aging Post-Dividend Adapting to aging Maintaining and improving welfare in the context of a declining working-age share and a growing old-age share Box 2. Total fertility rate and working age population share help define four types of countries vis-à-vis the opportunities to realize the demographic dividend Growth of Working Age Population Share 2015–2030 TFR 2015 TFR 1985 ≥4 <4 ≥2.1 <2.1 >0 Pre-dividend Early-Dividend ≤0 Late-dividend Post-dividend Pre-dividend countries have fertility levels of the population shrink, their overall age above four births per woman and face very structures are still favorable for the first rapid population growth. Although their high demographic dividend. They are also likely to dependency ratios are expected to decline as be experiencing rapid population aging. more and more children reach working age, the child dependency ratio will likely be too high Post-dividend countries transitioned below and the working-age population share too low replacement fertility levels some time ago to realize the first demographic dividend. (before 1985 in the GMR definition). These countries continue to see shrinking working-age Early-dividend countries are further along the shares of the population and have some of the fertility transition. Fertility rates have fallen below highest shares of elderly in the world. While four births per woman and the working-age share they are past the point of additional benefits of the population is likely rising considerably. They from the first demographic dividend, they can have very favorable age structures to realize the still reap a second dividend from rising savings first demographic dividend. and investments. Late-dividend countries are where fertility For each phase of countries, there are rates are typically above replacement levels of different challenges and policy priorities 2.1 births per woman, but fertility continues that require implementing a unique set of to decline. Even as their working-age shares programmatic recommendations: (continued on next page) 5 Box 2. Total Fertility Rate and Working Age Population Share Help Define Four Types of Countries vis-à-vis the Opportunities to Realize the Demographic Dividend (continued) Phase Policy priorities Recommendations Pre-Dividend Sparking the demographic • Improve maternal and child health and nutrition by transition strengthening provision of basic health care services Improving human development • Expand comprehensive reproductive health & family outcomes to accelerate the planning fertility decline • Increase education, especially for girls • Empower girls and women Early Dividend Accelerating job creation • Invest in human capital (education, vocational & Creating productive jobs for the technical training) growing share of the population • Enhance labor market mobility in working ages to reap the first • Reduce barriers to female labor force participation demographic dividend • Strengthen conditions conducive to domestic savings and job creation Late Dividend Sustaining productivity growth • Continue mobilization of savings for productive Creating conditions necessary investment to reap the second demographic • Ensure public policies encourage labor force dividend and beginning to prepare participation of both sexes for aging • Design cost-effective and sustainable systems for welfare and human development to address needs (health, child care, education, and support to the vulnerable elderly) Post Dividend Adapting to aging • Complete reforms of welfare systems—including Maintaining and improving welfare pensions, health care, and long-term care—that in the context of a declining ensure fiscal sustainability and, as part of integrated working-age share and a growing approaches, protection of the vulnerable, elderly and old-age share others, and encouragement of work among those who are able • Raise labor force participation and productivity (including incentives for participation targeted at women and older cohort; and lifelong learning) • Pursue policies that encourage higher birth rates by making it easier for men and women to combine child rearing and participation in the labor market Source: World Bank 2016. 6 Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend What is Nigeria’s progress toward the demographic transition? Fertility and Mortality Nigeria has experienced declines in 398.5 million mortality and fertility—but rates remain Estimated population of Nigeria in 2050, high, and this may pose a risk for popula- more than double what it is currently tion size and age structure. The incom- plete demographic transition (i.e. transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates) (Figure 4a) may hinder Nigeria’s growth prospects, as population 576 maternal deaths (per 100,000 births) growth exacerbates the demand for social Nigeria’s maternal mortality ratio, the services and outstrips the capacity of the fourth-highest in the world. Nigeria made economy to generate jobs. Death rates have “no progress” toward its maternal health been progressively declining over several Millennium Development Goal decades (Figure 4a) but remain high. The under-5 mortality rate approximately halved between 1990 and 2015, to approximately 109 deaths per 1000 live births; but this rate of 2.5 percent, and it is estimated that remains higher than the sub-Saharan Africa the population will more than double from regional average (UN Inter-Agency Group for 187 million in 2016 to 398.5 million in 2050. Child Mortality Estimation, 2015). There are important differences in Additionally, Nigeria has the fourth-highest fertility rates across groups in Nigeria maternal mortality ratio in the world, at 576 (Figure 5). The total fertility rate in rural maternal deaths (per 100,000 live births) areas is 1.5 children (per woman) higher than (DHS 2013); it was classified as having in urban areas; and there are substantial made “no progress” toward its Millennium differences across socioeconomic groups, Development Goal (World Health education groups, and regions (DHS, 2013). Organization, 2015). The country also MICS survey findings are very similar (for currently has a total fertility rate (TFR) of example MICS found TFR is 1.4 children per 5.74 (Figure 4b) (the MICS survey supports woman higher in rural areas compared to this, placing TFR at 5.8)—and under the urban areas). The TFR among women in the median fertility scenario of the United highest quintile is nearly half that of women Nations World Population Prospects’ (UN from the poorest households. The largest WPP) population projections, the TFR is differences exist between education groups projected to fall to only 4.74 by 2030 and where there is a 3.8 child difference between 3.59 by 2050 (UN Population Division, women with no education and higher 2015). As a result of these trends, Nigeria is education. (The 2017 MICS survey paints a experiencing an annual population growth similar picture) TFR was found to be 3.5 7 Figure 4a. The demographic transition in Nigeria Figure 4b. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Nigeria, South Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa 50 450 Total Population in Millions Crude Birth-Death Rates 45 400 per 1,000 population 8 40 350 7 35 Natural 300 30 6 growth 250 25 5 20 200 150 4 15 3 10 100 5 50 2 0 0 1 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 0 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Crude death rate Crude birth rate Nigeria South Africa Total population (millions) Sub-Saharan Africa Source: UN Population Division, World Population Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects 2015 Revision. Prospects 2015 Revision. Note: Data after 2015 are projections based on UN Note: Data after 2015 are projections based on UN medium-variant fertility. medium-variant fertility. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is 1.4 children > 6 children per woman higher in rural areas compared is the wanted fertility rate among women to urban areas—and 3.5 children higher in North-East and North-West regions among women with no education compared compared to ~4 children among women in with women with higher education the Southern regions children higher among women with no any) decline in lower-fertility Southern areas education compared with women with higher (DHS, 2008, 2013). Additionally, none of education. In terms of regional variation, these socio-geographical zones are at fertility is substantially higher in North-West replacement fertility. Even women at the and North-East regions (6.7 and 6.3, respec- highest wealth quintile, or women from the tively) compared to South-South where it is South South zone, or women with at least 4.3 (DHS, 2013). The 2017 MICS survey high-school education have fertility rates at shows even greater differences (7.2 in least one child higher than the replacement North-West, 6.3 in North-East, 4.3 in South- fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman. South). However, since 2008, the north is Strikingly, while wanted fertility is also where the most noticeable decreases in lower than actual fertility across all TFR have occurred; there has been little (if groups, the gap between observed and Figure 5. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2013, national and disaggregated 8 7 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 6.7 6.9 6.7 7 6.2 6.3 6.1 (births per woman) 6 5.5 5.7 5.3 4.7 4.9 4.7 4.6 5 4.6 4.3 3.9 4 3.1 3 2 1 0 TFR Urban Rural Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest No education Primary Secondary Higher North Central North East North West South East South West South South Source: Demographic and Health Survey 2013. 8 Figure 6. Total fertility rate and wanted total fertility rate, national and disaggregated 8 7 (children per woman) 5.5 5.2 6 Fertility Rate 5 4 3 2 1 0 Total Urban Rural Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest No education Primary Secondary Higher North Central North East North West South East South West South South TFR Wanted TFR Source: Demographic and Health Survey 2013. wanted fertility is very small (Figure 6), < 11 percent reflecting both a desire for large families of married women reportedly use a modern and relative realization of desired family contraceptive method size. On average, wanted fertility is only 0.3 children less than actual fertility. The largest difference between actual and wanted fertility is in North Central region where disaggregated level, the largest differences actual fertility is 5.3 and wanted fertility is exist across socioeconomic groups: while 4.8 children per woman. (DHS 2013). 23% of married women in the highest wealth quintile use modern contraceptives, Family Planning only 1% of women in the lowest wealth Use of modern contraceptives remains quintile do. Similarly, a large gradient exists very low, lagging considerably behind other between education groups. Among women countries in the region. Fewer than 10% of with no education, the contraceptive married women reportedly use a modern prevalence rate (CPR) is only 2%—compared contraceptive method (Figure 7) (DHS, to 22% among women with higher educa- 2013). The 2017 MICS survey confirms tion. The national average also masks minimal progress in this regard, finding regional differences—in South-West, 25% of modern contraceptive use to be less than married women currently use modern 11%. Furthermore, there are substantial methods compared to only 3% and 4% in variations between groups. At a North-East and North-West, respectively. Figure 7. Current use of modern methods of contraception, national and disaggregated, in 2013 50 % currently married women, method of contraception all ages, using a modern 45 40 35 30 25 23 22 25 19 20 17 14 16 14 15 10 12 11 9 10 6 4 3 4 5 1 2 0 Total Urban Rural Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest No education Primary Secondary Higher North Central North East North West South East South West South South Source: Demographic and Health Survey 2013. 9 Figure 8a. Modern contraceptive prevalence rate, Figure 8b. Modern contraceptive prevalence rate 1990–2013 by place of residence, 1990–2013 50 50 % currently married women, method of contraception all ages, using a modern 45 45 40 40 35 35 30 Percent 30 25 25 20 20 16 14 17 17 15 10 10 15 10 9 8 10 10 6 6 7 6 4 5 2 5 0 0 1990 1999 2003 2008 2013 Urban Rural 1990 1999 2003 2008 2013 Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. While CPR is higher now than in 1990, decisions used modern contraceptives there has been little to no progress since compared to only 3.5% of women who 1999 (Figure 8a). Gains over this period were participated in none. Moreover, while the particularly dramatic among women in rural modern CPR has increased over time for areas (Figure 8b) (DHS, 1990, 1999, 2003, women participating in decision-making, CPR 2008, 2013). Though still very low, use of has actually decreased among women who modern contraceptives tripled in relative terms have not participated at all, indicating that in rural areas in the 1990s compared to urban disempowered women have become increas- areas where the gains were less than double. ingly disadvantaged. Evidence indicates that This indicates that efforts are needed in both higher levels of women’s autonomy, education, urban and rural areas given the low absolute wages, and labor market participation are uptake of contraceptives and relatively slow associated with improved reproductive health progress. Gains were also seen among women outcomes. This is important given the in middle-income households and among those significant differences in school enrollment who had completed primary school. between males and females in Nigeria. In Furthermore, gender inequality contin- 2015, the literacy rate among females aged ues to be a challenge in Nigeria—and 15–24 was 65.3%, compared with 79.9% for gender dynamics and women’s empower- males (World Bank WDI, 2015). In 2016 48.5% ment affect the use of modern contracep- of adult women participated in the labor force tion. As shown in Figure 9, women who (that mostly involves work in agriculture), participate more in household decision-mak- compared with 64.1% of males (World Bank ing tend to have higher use of modern WDI, 2016). Gender inequalities are reflected contraceptives. In 2013, 18.2% of women who in the UNDP Gender Development Index; in participated in making at least 3 household 2015 Nigeria ranked 152 of 187 countries. Figure 9. Modern contraceptive prevalence rate among married women by women’s participation in household decision-making 30 currently using modern % currently married women (15–49), contraceptives 20 18.2 11.7 10 3.5 0 Women participate Women participate Women participate in 0 decisions in 1–2 decisions in 3+ decisions 2003 2008 2013 Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. 10 Figure 10. Current use of modern contraceptive methods and unmet need for family planning by region 50 45 40 35 30 Percent 25 24 22 25 20 18 16 15 15 12 12 11 13 10 4 5 3 0 North Central North East North West South East South West South South Current use of modern contraceptive method Unmet need for family planning Source: Demographic and Health Survey 2013. Reported unmet need for family value in boosting postpartum family plan- planning has declined since 1990 (from ning services in facilties. Considerable 21.5% to 16.1%) but remains substantial. differences exist by region: only 12.8% of There is variation across educational groups women in North-West reported skilled (7.6 percentage points higher among women delivery for a recent birth, versus 83.3% of with primary-level education compared to women in South-East and South-West those with greater than secondary educa- (Figure 11b) (DHS, 2013). The use of skilled tion) and income groups (highest among birth attendance is lowest among young middle-income women) (DHS, 1990, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2013). Women in North-Central and South-South also report higher unmet Figure 11a. Use of skilled birth attendance, by year and age group need (by almost double) than women in North-West and South-East (Figure 10), 100 % of births during preceding highlighting the need for supply-side efforts 3 years receiving skilled 90 particularly in these regions (DHS, 2013). 80 birth attendance 70 60 Health and Nutrition 50 42 37 40 40 Despite some improvements in maternal 40 31 30 23 24 26 26 26 survival, low utilization of maternal 20 health services remains, which may cause 10 persistently poor outcomes. Attendance at 0 1990 1999 2003 2008 2013 1 or more antenatal visits has increased among women in Nigeria, from 56.9% in Year of DHS 1990 to 62.7% in 2015—but attendance at 4 All ages Age < 20 or more visits declined over this period, from Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. 50% of women to 44.1% in 2008 (DHS, 1990, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2015). Utilization of antenatal care (at least 1 visit) Figure 11b. Use of skilled birth attendance, by is near-universal among urban women, those region with greater household wealth, and higher educational attainment (DHS, 2015). 100 % of births during preceding 3 years receiving skilled Approximately 18% of women receive a first 90 83 83 80 birth attendance antenatal check during their first trimester; 70 this rate is higher in urban areas (23.3%) 60 48 56 than rural (14.6%) (DHS, 2015). Skilled birth 50 40 attendance is very low (40%) and has 30 22 increased only slightly since 1990 (31%), 20 13 putting both women and their newborns at 10 0 risk for death and disability (Figure 11a) North North North South South South (DHS, 1990, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2013). Cenral East West East West South However, it should be noted that the 2017 2013 MICS data shows some improvement in skilled birth attendance (66%), suggesting Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. 11 Figure 12a. Prevalence of stunting among Figure 12b. Prevalence of stunting among children children under age 5 by region (below-2SD of height for age) 100 (below-2SD of height for age) 60 49.9 90 Percentage of children 48.7 Percentage of children under age 5 stunted 50 under age 5 stunted 42.4 80 40.6 36.8 70 40 60 53 55 49 30 50 44 42 40 31 31 29 20 30 22 22 18 20 16 10 10 0 0 1990 1999 2003 2008 2013 North Central North East North West South East South West South South Year of DHS Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. 2008 2013 Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. 43.6 percent of children under age five are stunted (with and under-5 mortality and in diarrhea incidence rates near or above 50 percent in North- leading to reduced stunting; as well as improve- East and North-West regions) ments in cognitive development.Moreover, every $1 invested in breastfeeding programs yields an estimated $35 in economic returns, making breastfeeding one of the most effective public mothers (26.1% versus approximately 40% health interventions a country can support for women below and above age 20, respec- (Shekar, Kakietek, Eberwein, and Walters 2017). tively) (Figure 11a), indicating a need to From a fertility perspective, exclusive breast- target adolescents for maternal health feeding in the context of lactational amenorrhea services, especially as adolescent childbear- method (LAM) represents one of the strongest ing carries higher risks to both the young suppressants of fertility at a population level mother and her child (DHS, 2013). (Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck 2015). Hence, Children suffer widely from both improvements in the rate of exclusive breast- chronic and acute malnutrition with 37% feeding has the potential to yield further of children under 5 being stunted (Figure benefits in support of the demographic transi- 12a) (DHS, 1990, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2013). tion and dividend. The 2017 MICS data is even more sobering, Low coverage of preventative and curative finding 43.6% of children under 5 to be child health care puts children at risk for stunted. These rates are higher among boys infectious diseases, which are the main than girls (39% versus 25% in 2013), as well causes of child mortality worldwide (i.e. as children in rural locations (in 2013, 43% diarrhea, malaria and pneumonia). The versus 26% in urban areas) (DHS, 2013). coverage of childhood vaccines in Nigeria There are also strong gradients by mother’s experienced a massive decline during the educational attainment and household 2000s, and is now back to near-similar levels as wealth. Rates by geographic region have 1990 (25.3% of children have been fully vacci- declined dramatically in North-Central, nated by age 2) (Figure 13a) (DHS, 1990, 1999, South-West and South-South; lesser 2003, 2008, 2013). The 2017 MICS paints an improvements have been seen in North-East even bleaker picture, finding childhood vaccina- and South-East, while North-West has seen tion to be at only 23%. There is a large urban-ru- a slight increase since 2008 (Figure 12b) ral disparity (42.5% versus 15.8% coverage of (DHS, 2008, 2013). vaccines, respectively) as well as by educational While Nigeria has improved rates of attainment (6.9% among children of women exclusive breastfeeding from 17% to 24% with no educational attainment, versus 64.1% (MICS, 2017), much more attention to this for mothers with post-secondary education) critical intervention is needed. The nutritional and by wealth index (3.6% and 57.7% for the benefits of exclusive breastfeeding have long lowest and highest wealth groups, respectively) been established including reductions in infant (DHS, 2013). There is also a substantial 12 Figure 13a. Complete vaccination, children aged Figure 13b. Children (under 5 years) with recent 12–23 months, 1990–2013 ARI symptoms who were treated at a health facility, by mother’s educational attainment 35 29 100 12–23 month swith full symtoms of acute respiratory infection (ARI) 30 % of children aged 25.3 taken to a health facility for treatment in 2 weeks preceding survey, who were 90 % of children (under 5 years) who had set of vaccines 25 22.7 20 80 16.8 15 12.9 70 10 60 5 50 0 37.1 38.2 1990 1999 2003 2008 2013 40 34.5 35 Year of DHS 30 21.5 17.4 Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. 20 10 0 No education Primary Secondary 23 percent The percentage of children fully vaccinated 2008 2013 1/4 Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. of mothers seek health services when their children experience diarrhea or respiratory illness 24 percent greatly influence the economic opportunities, of children under 6 months are exclusively health outcomes, and skill sets attained later breastfed in life. Adolescence is also a period when social norms create pathways defined largely by gender. During adolescence, gendered roles and responsibilities often create difference between regions: only 9.6% of opportunities for males, but curtail them for children in North-West have received all girls. Adolescents—and their decisions—also childhood vaccines, compared to 51.7% of have important Implications for harnessing children in South-East (DHS, 2008, 2013). the demographic dividend. Although polio vaccine is a well-publicized In Nigeria, high levels of fertility reflect example of challenges around immunization young age at marriage, early and frequent coverage in Nigeria, it should be noted that childbearing as well as low levels of contra- these low coverage rates go beyond polio ceptive use. Age specific fertility rates show vaccine: coverage with DPT3 is only at 38.2% the relatively high levels of childbearing in nationwide (DHS, 2013). younger women (Figure 14a). Compared to Moreover, there is low health care SSA and other low-income countries, Nigeria utilization for childhood illnesses: only has a much higher adolescent fertility rate one-third of mothers reported that they (117 per 1,000 women 15–19) (UN Population sought care at a health facility for their Division, 2015)—with approximately 28% of child with a recent case of diarrhea, or girls between the ages of 15–19 already suspected acute respiratory infection married, and 23% already mothers or preg- (ARI) (DHS, 2013). The 2017 MICS data nant with their first child (DHS 2013). This suggests this figure is closer to one-quarter. may reflect socio-cultural norms encouraging There were some relatively small differences early marriage and childbearing and limited by mother’s wealth quintile, and educational educational opportunities beyond primary attainment (Figure 13b) (DHS 2008, 2013). education. The median age at first sexual intercourse, and at first marriage, increased Challenges for Adolescents by 1 year during the 1990s, and has not Adolescence (defined as ages 10 to 19 changed since then (Figure 14b) (DHS, 2013). years) is a transformative time that The adolescent fertility rate in rural fosters both challenges and opportunities. areas is more than double than in urban Choices made during adolescence not only areas—and is substantially higher among have immediate consequences but also poorer households. The wealth gradient for 13 Figure 14a. Age-specific fertility rates (births per Figure 14b. Median age of key sexual health events 1,000 women) 300 intercourse/marriage/birth Median age at first sexual 300 250 250 200 200 150 150 100 100 50 50 0 0 19–15 24–20 29–25 30-34 39–35 44–40 49–45 1990 1999 2003 2008 Age group Age group 1990–1995 2000–2005 2015–2010 Median age at first marriage, Age 25–49 High income 2010–2015 Median age at first sexual intercourse, Age 25–49 South Africa 2010–2015 Median age at first birth, Age 25–49 Source: UN Population Division, World Population Source: Demographic and Health Survey, 2013. Prospects 2015 Revision. Approximately 1/3 Approximately 1/4 of girls age 15–19 are married of girls age 15–19 are already mothers or pregnant adolescent fertility has intensified over time: in 1990 and 2003, the adolescent ASFR in variation in TFR overall. There are also the poorest wealth quintile was approximately substantial gradients for age at first sex, at three times higher than that in the wealthi- marriage, and at first birth by wealth index est group; in 2013, this ratio increased to 6, (e.g. an 8-year difference in age at marriage) and in 2015 it was over 4 (DHS, 1990, 2003, and by educational attainment. 2013, 2015). There are also regional differ- In Nigeria, adolescents make up a ences, with the youngest ages of marriage substantial 23 percent of the population, (across survey years) seen in the North-West, and the already large number of adoles- North-East and North-Central regions (Figure cents is expected to more than double in 14c). These are the same regions where age the upcoming decades from 41 million to of marriage has been relatively stagnant over 84 million in 2050 (under a medium time with very little (if any) progress. The fertility scenario). (Figure 15) If fertility does regional differences in adolescent childbearing not decline as much, this figure would be even appear more dramatic than the regional higher at 95 million. However, if fertility were Figure 14c. Median age at first marriage, by region, 1990–2013 Median age at first marriage, 25 among women aged 25–49 22.7 21.8 21.5 20 18.9 16.3 15.3 15 10 5 0 North Central North East North West South East South West South South 1990 1999 2003 2008 2013 Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. 14 Figure 15. Actual and projected adolescent ensuring better health of their children. Poor population (ages 10–19) by fertility scenario health and nutrition adversely affect cogni- tive and socioemotional development and 180 160 learning, putting children of teenage mothers at higher risk of poor development out- Adolescent population aged 10–19 (millions) 140 120 84m comes…prolonging the intergenerational cycle 95m 100 of poverty. Thus, together with other policies 80 that address high fertility, reducing child 60 74m marriage and teenage pregnancy can contrib- 40 41m ute significantly to the fertility declines 20 needed to accelerate the demographic 0 transition and ultimately create better life outcomes for adolescent girls, better oppor- 1990 1965 1980 1995 2010 2025 2040 2055 2070 2085 2100 tunities for the next generation, and the Ages 10–19 Low variant potential to harness a demographic dividend. Medium variant High variant Education Nigeria’s level of educational development ranks No. 152 out of 187 countries in to follow a lower variant scenario, the number UNDP’s (2015) Human Development of adolescents would be 74 million in 2050. Index—a ranking below that of Kenya, Given links between youth unemployment and Ghana, Botswana and Rwanda. The World political unrest, and the high rates of early Bank World Development Indicators provide marriage and early pregnancy, these adoles- further detail. School enrollment at primary cent population projections are concerning. level is low, even when compared to the These large numbers of adolescents need to average for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In be healthy, educated and enabled with job 2013 primary school enrollment stood at opportunities to create conditions necessary 93.7%, compared to 97.8% for SSA. for demographic dividends. The alternate Enrollment amongst boys (94.5%) was higher scenario in which lack of educational and job than girls (92.8%). At secondary and tertiary opportunities lead to high youth unemploy- levels enrollment is above the average for ment rates is not only damaging to the SSA. Secondary level enrollment in Nigeria country’s demographic dividend prospects, (latest data from 2013) stood at 55.7% (boys but could also create environment at high risk 57.8%, girls 53.5%) compared with 42.2% for of civil unrest. A study using political instabil- SSA (boys 45.3%, girls 39.0%), and tertiary ity and unemployment data from 40 develop- level enrollment (latest data from 2011) ing countries between 1991 to 2009 finds stood at 10.1% (boys 11.8%, girls 8.3%), that youth employment is linked with political compared with 8.1% (boys 9.5%, girls 6.6%) for instability and potentially armed conflict in SSA. These gender differences produce a these countries, with increasing levels of school enrollment gender parity index (GPI) education of the youth reducing the magni- of 0.98 (2013 data) at primary level (0.92 tude of the relationship between youth SSA), 0.93 (2013 data) at secondary level unemployment and instability (Azeng and (0.86 for SSA), and 0.71 (2011 data) at Yugo 2015). tertiary level (0.70 for SSA). These projections of the adolescent In terms of enrollment, the World Bank share of the population not only pose World Development Indicators show that challenges for society to provide health, Nigeria fairs poorly. In 2010 34.3% of education, and job training services to children of primary school age were out of adolescents to prepare them for a produc- school, compared with 24.5% for SSA. There tive future—but also has implications for is a notable difference in gender, with 40.0% the next generation given patterns of of girls out of school compared with 28.9% early marriage and early childbearing. of boys. This difference is more dramatic Global evidence shows that children born to than that observed for SSA (26.9% of girls adolescent mothers are at higher risk of out of school, compared with 22.2% of boys). mortality (neonatal, infant and child mortal- As in most other indicators, there are ity), poor nutrition (stunting and low birth large differences in educational attainment weight), and onset of illness than are children of women across socio-geographic zones in of older mothers. Teenage mothers are less Nigeria. For example, median years of likely to take preventive measures for schooling among women ages (15-49) in the 15 North East is 4.1 years as compared 11.2 female education and fertility. For example, years in the South West. The differences are an education policy reform in Nigeria—the even more severe across urban/ rural 1976 Universal Primary Education (UPE) households or across wealth quintiles. program—significantly increased women’s Median years of schooling for women in educational attainment and decreased rural households is zero years, as compared fertility (Osili and Long, 2008). to 10.2 years among women ages 15-49 Additionally, programs targeted at years in urban households. lowering barriers to attending school have Nigeria’s girls’ secondary education reduced teenage pregnancy in low and trends are particularly concerning given middle income countries (McQueston et al. that ample evidence shows that girls’ 2012). A 1985 educational reform in Kenya secondary education lowers fertility and that increased the period of primary school- unwanted pregnancy, reduces infant ing by a year increased educational attain- mortality, increases childhood immuniza- ment of girls and delayed marriage and tion and nutrition, and reduces childhood childbearing (Chicoine 2012). Similarly, a stunting. Research has shown that rates of school building program in Indonesia early marriage decline as girls attain higher between 1974-1978 increased education levels of schooling. A World Bank 100-coun- levels and delayed childbearing (Breierova try study found that for every four years of and Duflo 2004). The same paper showed education that girls attain, fertility drops by that female education has a greater effect roughly one birth (World Bank 1999). on delaying childbearing than male educa- Within Nigeria, socio-geographical groups tion. Finally, a randomized controlled trial with higher educational attainment for that reduced the cost of school uniforms in women tend to have lower fertility. Women in Kenya found that the cost reduction not the South West zone, who on the median only reduced dropout rates, but also subse- have 11.2 years of schooling, have 4.6 children quently reduced teenage marriage and on average, whereas women in the North East childbearing (Duflo et al. 2006). Zone with 4.1 median years of schooling Numerous studies have shown that girls’ have 6.3 children on average (Figure 16). As education also reduces risk of domestic seen before in Figure 5, women with no violence. Reduced infant mortality illustrates schooling have more than twice as many how a mother’s literacy affects the care she children as compared to women with at is able to provide to her children. An extra least high school education (6.9 versus 3.1 year of girls’ education was estimated to children). cut infant mortality by five to ten percent Changes in education policy have been (Schultz 1993). Multi-country data has also shown to have a causal impact on both shown that educated mothers are about 50 Figure 16. Median Years of Schooling and Total Fertility Rates, Women Ages 15–49 12 8 Total Fertility Rate, Women Median Years of Schooling, 7 10 Women Ages (15–49) 6 Ages (15–49) 8 5 6 4 3 4 2 2 1 0 0 Rural Urban North Central North East North West South East South South South West Lowest Wealt Quintile Second Wealt Quintile Middle Wealt Quintile Fourth Wealt Quintile Highest Wealt Quintile Median Years of Schooling, Women Ages (15–49) Total Fertility Rate, Women Ages (15–49) Source: Demographic and Health Survey 2013. 16 percent more likely to immunize their Girls’ secondary education is a tool for children than uneducated mothers (Gage et. poverty alleviation. Primary and secondary al. 1997). education produce high returns in terms of Girls’ secondary education results in wage growth. Increasing the share of social benefits to the whole society. women with secondary education by 1 Secondary education equips students with percentage point boosts annual per capita critical thinking enabling civic participation growth by 0.8 percentage points on average, and democratic change. As students pursue according to a 100-country study conducted their education, they are less likely to engage by the World Bank. Access to and success- in or become a victim of violence. In addition, ful completion of secondary education secondary education reduces the risk of shapes the skills mix of the labor force and human trafficking by increasing economic prospects for sustained growth (Bregman opportunities and making children less and Bryner 2003). The more women, and by vulnerable. Quality secondary education allows extension their families, benefit from women to be more empowered and indepen- educational and economic opportunities, the dent, and better able to shape decisions about greater their potential to contribute to sexuality and family formation. economic growth. 17 Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend How is the demographic transition linked to economic growth and poverty reduction in Nigeria? Due to these slow fertility and mortality 65, to the total working age population, declines, Nigeria will experience rapid 15–64) is 88, which is higher than the average population growth and an age structure for Sub-Saharan Africa (86) and for low-in- that is heavily skewed toward young come countries (87). The current population dependents. Approximately 44% of the age structure in Nigeria is considerably Nigerian population is currently under age 15, skewed toward young ages; this can be and this is projected to fall only slightly under contrasted with a typical age structure from all fertility projections (to 32% in the low East Asia, where the working age population fertility variant, and 38% in the high fertility is proportionately greater than the share of variant by 2050). The dependency ratio (i.e. dependents (Figure 17). This youthful popula- number of dependents, aged 0–14 and over tion structure presents challenges in Figure 17. Population pyramids and working age to dependent population ratios in Nigeria and East Asia Nigeria (2015) East Asia (2015) 80+ 80+ 70–74 70–74 60–64 60–64 Age group Age group 50–54 50–54 40–44 40–44 30–34 1.1 30–34 2.6 20–24 20–24 10–14 10–14 0–4 0–4 32 16 0 16 32 80 64 48 32 16 0 16 32 48 64 80 Population (millions) Population (millions) Male Female Source: UN (2015). 19 Figure 18. Population age structures and boats—which would you rather be on? Nigeria’s population age structure (“pyramid”) East Asia’s population age structure (“pagoda”) leads to this boat leads to this boat Dependents Dependents Workers Workers Nigeria: Working Age Ratio = 1.1 East Asia: Working Age Ratio = 2.6 providing health care, education and jobs to fertility scenarios. As seen in Figure 19, the the large cohorts surviving childhood and ratio of working age to dependents is entering their reproductive ages. expected to progressively increase from 1.1 Another way to think about this is in (2015) to a range of 1.4 to 1.7 (2050) terms of Figure 18 which illustrates popula- under the three fertility scenarios—which tion age proportions as boats. Nigeria’s age implies that there will be increasingly more structure (pyramid) is analogous to a boat working age adults per every dependent. where the working age share of the popula- Nigeria is a high-fertility country and tion is roughly equivalent to that of the modest accelerations in its fertility dependent population. In comparison, in East decline can lead to substantial changes in Asia, the age structure (pagoda) is analogous its projected age-structure. Children to a more stable boat where there are more currently account for 43 percent of the than twice as many workers as dependents, population, and will remain more than 40 driving productivity and economic growth. percent in 2030 and more than 35 percent Even if fertility rates in Nigeria in 2050. The working-age population reached replacement level immediately, currently accounts for 53 percent of the there would be several decades of population, and this age cohort will account residual population growth. As the for more than 60 percent of the population absolute number of people born exceeds by 2050 (Figure 20). If fertility declines are the number dying, there are large cohorts slower, as under the WPP’s high fertility of children who then enter their reproduc- scenario, then the future population share tive years and bear children. But if fertility of children is even higher. In contrast, if were to fall, this would cause substantial fertility reductions are faster in the future, differences in the age structure and as under the WPP’s low fertility scenario, dependency ratios. The TFR is projected to then there will be more potential workers drop to 3.9/4.4/4.9 (2032) and 2.9/3.4/3.9 relative to dependents by 2050 due to the (2050) under the UN’s low/medium/high higher share of people aged 15 to 64. Figure 19. Nigeria population projections and working age population shares under three fertility scenarios, 2050 Low variant Medium variant High variant 80+ 80+ 80+ 70–74 70–74 70–74 60–64 60–64 60–64 Age group 50–54 50–54 50–54 40–44 40–44 40–44 30–34 1.7 30–34 1.6 30–34 1.4 20–24 20–24 20–24 10–14 10–14 10–14 0–4 0–4 0–4 32 16 0 16 32 32 16 0 16 32 32 16 0 16 32 Population (millions) Population (millions) Population (millions) Total Population 363.4M Total Population 398.5M Total Population 435M Note: The TFR is projected to drop to 3.9/4.4/4.9 (2032) and 2.9/3.4/3.9 (2050) under the UN’s low/medium/high fertility scenarios. Source: UN 2015. 20 Figure 20. Working-age population shares will 104 million jobs would need to be created by continue to grow through 2050 2050 to prevent unemployment from rising (Figure 21b). Under the constant fertility Share of working age people in total population by fertility scenario (percent) scenario, even in the highly optimistic case 65 that job growth was sufficient to prevent increased unemployment, by then the number of dependent children will have 60 reached 230 million, largely outstripping the impact of new entrants into the labor market, and thus severely mitigating the 55 potential benefits from such job growth. Were job growth to fail to keep pace with new entrants, Nigeria could face mass youth 50 unemployment and its negative impacts. 2015 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Given the association of youth unemploy- Medium High Low Constant ment with insecurity, this is of particular concern. On the other hand, if fertility were Source: Data from United Nations (2015). to decrease according to a low fertility Note: The scenarios consider the age-structure changes projected in the medium, high, low, and constant scenario, the pressure on the job market to fertility scenarios of United Nations (2015). The absorb the new entrants will still be signifi- TFR is projected to drop to 3.9/4.4/4.9 (2032) and cant but more moderate (78 million jobs to 2.9/3.4/3.9 (2050) under the UN’s low/medium/high be created to keep unemployment steady to fertility scenarios. 2050). However, with the number of depen- dent children being 46% lower than under the constant fertility scenario, the low While the key demographic indicator fertility scenario will more likely see even for economic growth is the share of moderate job growth translated into higher working age population relative to depen- income and savings growth. dents, the absolute number of workers is Economic simulation modeling sug- also an important figure to assess the gests that a one child difference in capacity of the labor market to delivering Nigeria’s fertility rates by 2050 can lead the demographic dividend. As illustrated to differences of 29 percent in real GDP below, even under a medium fertility sce- per capita (Figure 22). Under the medium nario the absolute size of the workforce is fertility projection scenario, simulations of set to more than double between now and Nigeria’s economic growth using the 2050 (Figure 21a) which would require the LINKAGE economic model suggest that creation of 86.4 million jobs just to keep real GDP per capita could grow from unemployment at its already worrying level $2777 (constant US$) in 2015 to $4775 by of 14 percent (NBS, 2017). If the current fertility rate were to remain constant Figure 21b. Number of new jobs required to (significantly above the medium variant), prevent an increase in unemployment in 2050 by fertility scenario Figure 21a. Total labor supply under medium 120 fertility scenario, 2016–2050 unemployment (millions) prevent an incraese in New jobs required to 100 200 181 80 180 Total Labor Supply 160 60 140 111 40 (millions) 120 100 81 20 80 60 0 40 Low Medium High Constant 20 Fertility Scenario 0 2016 2030 2050 Data Sources: UN Population Projections 2015; Nigeria Data Sources: UN Population Projections 2015; Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics 2016. National Bureau of Statistics 2016. The TFR is Note: The TFR is projected to drop to 3.9/4.4/4.9 projected to drop to 4.4 in 2032 and 3.4 in 2050 under (2032) and 2.9/3.4/3.9 (2050) under the UN’s low/ the UN’s medium fertility scenario. medium/high fertility scenarios. 21 Figure 22. Real GDP per capita by fertility scenario (constant 2011 US$) 10,597 12,000 9,362 8,204 10,000 Real GDP Per Capita 8,000 5,839 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Year Source: Simulation results from LINKAGE and Global Income Distribution Dynamics model. Constant High Medium Low Note: The scenarios consider the age-structure changes projected in the medium, high, low, and constant fertility scenarios of United Nations (2015). The TFR is projected to drop to 3.9/4.4/4.9 (2032) and 2.9/3.4/3.9 (2050) under the UN’s low/medium/high fertility scenarios. 29 percent 53 million Nigerians The difference in GDP per capita The difference in number of people produced by a one child difference living in poverty in 2050 between the in fertility rate by 2050 high- and low- fertility scenarios 2030 and $9362 by 2050.4 However, permanent improvements, leading to higher under the WPP’s high fertility scenario, incomes over the life-cycle and also contribu- growth is more modest, reaching $8204 by tions to aggregate economic growth as well. 2050; while under the low-fertility scenario, The impact of lower fertility rates in per capita income in 2050 is $10,597. Nigeria includes a lifting 53 million The marginal economic benefits of people out of poverty by 2050. Figure fertility reductions are likely understated 23 shows poverty headcount ratios at the by the model. The analysis makes the PPP$3.10 a day5 for the constant, high-, conservative assumption that the skill-share of the labor force remains constant into the future. If Nigeria manages to increase the 4   The LINKAGE model has been used for analysis of stock of human capital, the growth implica- the growth and poverty impacts of age-structure tion of the demographic transition will be changes as in Ahmed et al. (2016), which showed that even greater as the additional working age demographic change could explain 11 to 15 percent of GDP volume growth and approximately 40 to 60 population becomes more effective and million fewer poor by 2030 for Sub-Saharan Africa. participates more in production. The analytical framework was also used to examine The impact of declining child-depen- the impact of demographic change on the global dency ratios in boosting productivity is economy (World Bank 2015a), South Africa (World also not considered in the scenario Bank 2015b), and the Southern African Customs Union economies (Ahmed and Cruz 2016). Additional analysis, and could also contribute to an details on the methodology can be found in technical underestimation of possible benefits. As annex A. It should be noted that the scenario analysis the number of children per household falls, does not account for the discrete structural changes the public and household-level spending per in Nigeria’s economy, such as those that may occur child can be deepened. Since there will be due to unanticipated infrastructure investments. As such, the simulation results should be considered fewer children to demand services, spending illustrative and highlighting the marginal impacts of on education, healthcare, and early childhood demographic change rather than as forecasts. Please development interventions can be increased also note that this analysis uses the 2009 HNLSS with the same resource envelope. With data as recommended and used by the Government greater investments in the human capital of of Nigeria for estimating poverty rates, but more recent survey data are available (GHS 2015/16). children, there will be direct improvements in 5   To better reflect the impact of poverty under the human development outcomes. The produc- projected movement of Nigeria into upper-middle tivity of these children will experience income status, the use of the World Bank PPP(2011) 22 Figure 23. Poverty headcount rate (%) by fertility scenario by 2050 (at PPP$3.10 a day) 100 90 Projected population in poverty (millions) 80 74 127 70 221 60 50 43 131 40 101 30 78 30 25 21 20 10 0 2013 No demographic High fertility Medium fertility Low fertility effect 2050 2050 2050 2050 Source: Simulation results from LINKAGE and Global Income Distribution Dynamics model. Note: The TFR is projected to drop to 3.9/4.4/4.9 (2032) and 2.9/3.4/3.9 (2050) under the UN’s low/medium/high fertility scenarios. Source: UN 2015. medium-, and low-fertility scenarios. By $3.10 a day poverty-line is preferred. Consider that 2050, 43 percent of Nigerians will remain under the set of assumptions laid out in the scenario in poverty if fertility stays constant. analysis, Nigerian real GDP per capita grows annually in the range of 3.14 to 3.9 percentage points. At these Under the high-fertility scenario (with only rates of per capita growth, Nigeria’ GNI per capita level minimal reductions in fertility), 30 per- of $2,790 (in 2015) is expected to triple. Ravallion cent of Nigerians will remain in poverty. (2016) offers a more formal discussion on this topic. At However, reducing fertility rates to the a glance, empirical evidence shows that it is no surprise low fertility scenario will decrease the to observe higher national poverty lines in richer countries. In identifying who is considered poor within poverty headcount ratio by 8.5 percent- its borders, richer countries tend to use a more age points. Adjusting for the different generous allowance for basic needs. population totals, it is expected that 131, 6 The levels and trends in poverty, growth, and fertility 101, and 78 million will remain in poverty vary significantly in the North and South which means under the high-, medium-, and low-fertility that the impact of lowering fertility is heterogeneous across these regions. Note that poverty rates, number scenarios, respectively. This implies a of people below the poverty line and fertility rates are difference of 53 million in poverty higher in the North. Hence, lowering fertility in the between the high- and low-fertility North will likely have a higher impact on reducing scenarios by 2050.6 poverty in the region as compared to the South. 23 Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend What policies and strategies can Nigeria adopt to seize the demographic window of opportunity, spur economic growth and reduce poverty? To harness the demographic dividend, potential benefits of the demographic policies are required that both hasten the dividend (Table 1). First, Nigeria should transition to smaller cohorts and enable expand access to comprehensive family cohorts to be more productive (Canning, et. planning programs (including addressing al.). Countries at different stages of their social norms and empowering women). demographic transition require different Second, Nigeria needs to improve maternal policy solutions tailored to their economies, and child health and nutrition. There is an societies and culture. According to the opportunity to continue the progress made in typology developed in the GMR 2015/16, bringing about a reduction in infant and child Nigeria is currently a pre-demographic mortality by continuing to invest in programs dividend country due to its high fertility that reduce morbidity and malnutrition. levels, declining mortality levels and young Improved survival of children will assist age structure (Figure 24). For Nigeria, the couples to attain their desired family size and priority is to spark the demographic transi- contribute to a reduction in fertility. Third, tion—it can do so by improving human stronger efforts are needed to increase development outcomes to accelerate the female education and empowerment, which fertility decline. will help postpone marriage and childbearing The government of Nigeria should and enable women to take informed decisions consider a three-pronged approach to about their reproductive health. Without improve human development to accelerate effectively implementing these three strate- the fertility decline in order to reap the gies, other investments in skills development, 25 Figure 24. Nigeria’s progress toward the demographic dividend & strategies needed to catalyze progress 9 8 7 Nigeria TFR 5.5 6 LE 52.3 5 4 3 2 1 0 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 Life expectancy (years) Pre-dividend Late-dividend Early-dividend Post-dividend Source: Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016. Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey, 2013. Table 1. Three-Pronged Strategy to Spark the Demographic Transition Sparking the Demographic Transition: Policy priorities to improve human development outcomes to accelerate the fertility decline 1. Expand access to comprehensive family planning programs (including addressing social norms and empowering women). 2. Improve maternal and child health and nutrition. 3. Increase female education and empowerment (including reducing child marriage and teenage childbearing, and addressing social norms). jobs and savings in the longer term will not be girls’ education and empowerment programs, able to harness the economic benefits of a including by encouraging retention in school demographic dividend. (by lessening constraints, and/or incentivizing There is an opportunity to learn from enrollment), providing reproductive health implementation experiences elsewhere to services, and improving girls’ skills. Box 3 increase the likelihood that the above takes an in-depth look at the implementation strategies will be effectively implemented. experience in Bangladesh. Table 2 summarizes the implementation The optimal mix of policy options lessons learned for each of the strategies depends also on the time horizon. Some above and indicates investment priorities and actions will have short-term returns on recommendations. Options for increasing investment—for example, expanding access access to family planning include demand- to comprehensive family planning pro- and supply-side interventions; evidence grams & improving maternal and child suggests that community-based interven- health and nutrition. Others would have tions are most successful when they include medium- to long-term returns on invest- both supply and demand components. ment, such as increasing female education. High-level political support for population and Examining impact and assessing success fertility issues is also important for achieving for each strategy, over its appropriate time change. Interventions that aim to delay age horizon, also involves different sets of at marriage, which can affect fertility by indicators. A combination of strategies will postponing childbearing, have incorporated be necessary for Nigeria to consolidate community-based campaigns and mentor- successes while catapulting it to overcome ship programs. Fertility can be influenced by other challenges. 26 Table 2. Evidence-based global best buys to implement the priority strategies to improve human development Expand access to comprehensive Improving maternal and Increase female education and family planning (FP) programs child health and nutrition empowerment Short- • Strengthen community-based • Integrate infant care • Expand youth programs to include term distribution of contraceptives into postpartum FP & health topics and provision of FP services services • Develop programs for peer- • Develop social marketing/BCC • Support community education among traditional strategy distribution of child leaders • FP education and services into health technologies via • Provide in-kind financial incentives existing health services existing health system for schooling Medium- • Expand FP education method mix • Develop mechanisms • Create mentoring and peer term to ensure choice of method for community-based programs for vulnerable girls • Facilitate community-level distribution of child • Introduce community discussions communications campaigns health technologies about early marriage • Introduce cost-reducing • Develop social • Strengthen infrastructure (school mechanisms, particularly for programs for behavior construction) vulnerable groups change for child health • Offset financial burden for • Launch media campaigns about care vulnerable groups FP • Promote postpartum FP counseling and service provision Long- • Develop subsidies for FP products • Introduce cost- • Develop interventions that target term and services reducing mechanisms families • Integrate FP into national for child health care • Change policies about required insurance and/or strategic • Develop nutrition years of primary schooling purchasing systems subsidies/supplements for poorest households Source: Shekar, Yazbeck, Hasan, and Bakilana. 2016. Population and Development in the Sahel: Policy Choices to Catalyze a Demographic Dividend. Box 3. Successful Experience of Bangladesh in Reducing Fertility Context: In the early-1970s, a Bangladeshi women from woman had about 6.3 children on average. influential families In combination with poor nutrition and lack in the village with of access to quality health services, this high eight or more years fertility rate jeopardized the health of both the of education and woman and her children. Beyond the health users of family impact, high fertility and rapid population growth planning. Over time, the FPMCH expanded to represented a major constraint to the country’s include other cost-effective interventions, such economic development and social progress. as immunizations, to improve family health. The program used mass media to influence Program Implementation: In 1977, the a change in attitudes about family size, and International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease religious leaders were actively involved in the Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) initiated an social and behavior change communication experimental family planning and maternal efforts. and child health (FPMCH) program in the Evaluation results showed families living in religiously conservative area of Matlab, which the program area were healthier and wealthier included 149 villages with a total population compared to those in a comparison area: of 180,000. In the program’s initial stages, community health workers made regular • a woman in the Matlab area had one less home visits to married women in the villages child (a 15 percent reduction in fertility) and offered them a choice of family planning • the time between her second and third methods. The field workers were married births was nine months longer (continued on next page) 27 Box 3. Successful Experience of Bangladesh in Reducing Fertility (continued) • the family is more likely to obtain water 1995 and 2005, the number of girls enrolled from a source at home in secondary school tripled (Jones et al 2010). • the family has greater assets and a more Furthermore, early marriage declined: among valuable home girls age 13–15, the proportion married dropped • the children are more likely to be vaccinated from 29% to 14%, and among girls age 16–19, against DPT, polio, and measles. the proportion married decreased from 72% to 64% (World Bank 2007), reflecting a delay in The Government of Bangladesh also added marriage. investments to improve girls’ education and delay marriage. In 1994, the Female Stipend Successes: As a result of strong political Programme (FSP) began giving stipends to commitment, stakeholder engagement, girls in secondary school conditioned upon sustained investments and successful (a) attendance, (b) scores on achievement implementation of appropriate policies and exams, and (c) remaining unmarried until programs, the current TFR in Bangladesh is 2.2 reaching age 18 or completing secondary school. children per woman. The population growth rate These efforts have resulted in an increase in is 1.2% and total dependency ratio 52, yielding girls’ secondary school enrolment—between nearly 2 people in working ages per dependent. Sources: Levine 2007, Gribble and Vos 2009, Jones et al 2010, World Bank 2006. 28 Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend How can Nigeria ensure that implementation of these policies and strategies will be successful? In support of Nigeria’s Economic Growth and concerted efforts are needed to change the Recovery Plan (EGRP) 2017–2020, coordi- age structure of the population, invest in its nated multi-sectoral actions are needed for people and drive productivity. investing in people to drive economic gains. However, in addition to “what” priorities The EGRP prioritizes reviewing the current are identified for investment, the “how” of status of the Population Policy and develop- implementation is equally important. Thus, ing and implementing a revised Population using the findings of Table 2 as a starting Policy. The revised Population policy should point, an additional analysis using newly emphasize the needed changes in the popula- developed tools and primary data collec- tion age structure—rather than only focusing tion was conducted to examine how on population size. This will require invest- Nigeria has designed, adopted, translated ments in health, nutrition, population, water and implemented policies around sparking and sanitation, social protection, education the demographic transition, and successes and gender to help overcome the human and challenges in implementation seen so development challenges currently faced by far in the country.7 A survey instrument Nigeria (Ministry of Budget and National was developed and administered with data Planning 2017). The limited fiscal base of the country has curtailed expenditure on social sectors in recent years. Average spending on 7   A framework was developed to analyze the policy process (Shekar, Yazbeck, Hasan and Bakilana 2016). It is the social sectors overall in 2005–2010, widely agreed that to achieve significant change, policies consisting of health, education and social must be designed well and must be implemented fully and assistance (i.e. social protection less civil successfully. Many attempts have been made to servant schemes), amounted to 5.8% of gross disentangle the complex factors involved in policy domestic product (GDP) and close to 20% of implementation. The characteristics focused on in this analysis have been distilled from two key models (Crosby consolidated government expenditure (Hagen- 1996; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980) and have been Zanker, Tavakoli. 2012). In order to meet the synthesized into a single framework to identify goals of the EGRP and take advantage of the characteristics of policy implementation for analysis of demographic window of opportunity, more sparking the demographic transition. The complete 29 analyzed according to the policy frame- iv. institution strengthening and capacity work. Policies and programs in health, building, including greater training and education, gender, youth, and population deployment (with an emphasis on were analyzed to reflect the “global best equitable geographic distribution) of buys” in Table 2. Based on implementation skilled workers for policy implementation; experience in Nigeria derived from the policy and space analysis (Box 3)—particularly for health, v. greater focus on results, data collection, population and youth policies and programs— and monitoring for results and impact. several things would increase the likelihood of successful implementation of existing policies These findings indicate that there is not and programs: only policy space for expanding invest- ments in the global best buys (as outlined i. Increased and stable financial in Table 2) but also policy space for commitment from the government to improving implementation for successful keep pace with growing population needs, achievement of objectives based on the and full disbursement of budgeted funds; implementation challenges observed. ii. greater coordination by the government, particularly given the decentralized framework captures three stages of the policy process: (1) governance structure (which may produce policy design and adoption, (2) policy translation for sub-nationally differential implementation implementation, and (3) policy implementation. and/or commitment to policies and Characteristics were specified for each of these stages. programs); For example, for policy design/adoption, a key aspect is iii. continued and/or increased engagement the policy objective. For policy translation, an assessment of evidence-based choice of activities as well as an of a range of stakeholders in decision- operational plan with specific activities are needed. For making and implementation, including policy implementation, financial resources, stakeholder stronger government leadership of such support, institution building and monitoring for results partnerships; are key characteristics that determine success. Table 3. Policy implementation analysis results: achievements and challenges Achievements Challenges Financial Policies are accompanied by detailed Funds have been insufficient resources implementation plans, including financial • Problematic given increasing need sources • Government funds are low and inconsistent, • Government budget now has a health with an allocation-release mismatch line item Concerns about unsustainable and/or volatile donor • With exception of Vision 20:2020 funds which does not have such a plan Stakeholder Champions for youth & health, within Government support is not uniform (especially low support and outside the government (also private in Parliament, Legislature) sector, civil society, religious groups) Slow behavior/attitude changes due to literacy, Policy development process includes tradition, religion consensus-building • Under-developed commitment to development issues by government Leadership & support have increased over time Institution Creation of new structures to implement Shortage of skilled workers building/ policies (e.g. NPOPC) • Perceived to be getting worse strengthening There are clear roles and responsibilities • Major geographic disparities for parties, and coordination is improving Coordination challenges • Groups are not meeting regularly • Government needs to increase its capacity for leadership/coordination Weak public sector • Problems with, and perceptions of, corruption • Lack of a national population council Monitoring for Evidence-based planning and policy Data do not exist for policy evaluations results development, including situation • Lack of a new census is seen as particularly assessment and use of survey data challenging Priorities are still set by donors’ interests and programs (not necessarily evidence-based, locally- led or transparent) Other Broad social determinants also matter (poverty, security, unemployment) States vary widely in policy implementation, commitment 30 Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend Technical Annex A: Demographic Dividend in Africa Following the approach applied in Ahmed et multi-nested CES function. At the top of the al. (2016), Ahmed and Cruz (2016) and World multi-nested structure, an aggregate of Bank (2015a, 2015b), the LINKAGE the intermediate inputs is combined with an recursive dynamic computable general aggregate value added under Leontief equilibrium (CGE) model of van der technology. Unskilled labor is substitutable Mensbrugghe (2011) is used to examine the for a skilled labor and capital composite, economic impact of demographic change on while skilled labor and capital are themselves growth. The model is then used to consider complementary. The model takes a vintage the marginal impacts of different fertility approach to capital in production, so produc- rates on nine Sub-Saharan African economies, tion can occur with either ‘old capital’ or ‘new by considering the age-structure changes capital’. The key difference being that ‘new under the UN WPP’s medium, high, low and capital’ is slightly more substitutable (or constant fertility scenarios. These economies slightly less complementary) with skilled are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, the labor than ‘old capital’. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Output is produced by different production Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Togo. streams—differentiated by capital vintage. LINKAGE is supported by globally consis- Each production stream has an identical tent data on production, consumption, production structure based on a multi-nested investment, and trade from the GTAP Constant Elasticity of Substitution functional Database Version 9. This is a global database form, but with different technological param- covering 140 economies. Sudan, the eters and substitution elasticities. At the top Democratic Republic of the Congo, an Niger of the nest, a value-added bundle is combined were not covered within the database, and with an intermediate inputs bundle under the the database had to augmented using Social Leontief technology assumption. The inter- Accounting Matrices (SAMs) for these mediate inputs bundle is combined with countries. different inputs, with an Armington assump- LINKAGE is a multi-sectoral, multi-country tion applied to specific inputs. That is, for a and multi-agent dynamic recursive CGE given type of intermediate input, there is model that assumes perfect competition, substitutability between domestic and with equilibria in a given year being depen- imported inputs, and then again between dent on current year prices and quantities, imported inputs from different source and the previous year’s equilibria. Household countries. The value added bundle is made up demand behavior is modeled using the of unskilled labor being slightly substitutable Constant Difference of Elasticities function, with a capital and skilled labor bundle. Skilled while production is assumed to be based on a labor and capital are highly substitutable. 31 LINKAGE also considers segmented labor the elderly dependency ratio coefficients markets in developing countries, i.e. there are being greater than that that of the young separate labor markets for unskilled labor in dependency ratio coefficients. Since invest- agriculture and non-agriculture. Endogenous ment is modeled as being savings driven, migration of unskilled labor from one market total global investment is driven by total to another within a country is modeled as a global savings, with the amount of invest- function of the wage of unskilled workers in ment in a given country being a function of agriculture relative to the wages received by both domestic savings as well as the current unskilled workers in the non-agriculture account balance, which is determined market. exogenously. The additional implication of Since LINKAGE is a structural micro-foun- the savings driven investment assumption dations model that is consistent with is that that as dependency ratios fall in a neo-classical growth theory, aggregate given country, domestic savings will rise, growth depends on changes in the labor which in turn will boost investment. The force, the capital stock, and total factor opposite would hold true for a country where productivity. The economic impact of demo- dependency ratios are rising. graphic change must therefore occur through While the numerical analysis will ulti- one of these channels, and the key neo-clas- mately account for the full effect of all the sical growth drivers in LINKAGE that will be different drivers of consumption, savings sensitive to demographics are the labor force and investment, it may be useful to see how and the capital stock. As a simulation is sensitive the µs parameter is to dependency implemented over time, the skilled and ratios. This is done by applying youth and unskilled labor forces for a given country are elderly dependency ratios calculated from exogenously changed. At the same time, the the United Nations (2015) to the βy and βe model keeps track of the young (less than 15 coefficients considered in LINKAGE. βy and years of age), working age (15–64 years of βe are the same for all countries, and so age), and aged (over 64 years of age) popula- differences in the savings share parameter tions, following the values of the medium values across regions are driven solely by the fertility scenario of the UN (2015). These data differences in dependency ratios. are used to calculate the youth and elderly A few observations can be made. First, the dependency ratios in each year of a given contribution of the elderly dependency ratio simulation, and are in turn used to help to savings stays almost constant over time determine domestic savings behavior. for African countries,⎛ GDP /while it rises for the ⎜ POP ⎞ ⎟ Domestic savings as a share of GDP (µs s = β s µregions. )= αs other s + β g LNThe ⎜ second ⎟ observation ⎟ is that –1 ⎜ ⎝ GDP / POP ⎟ is a linear function of three factors (exclud- the contribution of –1 the –1 ⎠ dependency youth ing the persistence effect) and has the ⎛ POP l 15 ⎞ ratio ⎛ to African ⎟ e ⎜ POP g 65 ⎞ countries’ ⎟ savings as a share following functional form: +β y ⎜ ⎜ of GDP ⎟ ⎟ βtwo +is ⎜ to ⎟ ⎟ three times greater than the ⎜ ⎝ POP ⎟ WAP ⎠ ⎜ ⎝ POP ⎟ WAP ⎠ contribution of the elderly dependency ratio. ⎛ GDP / POP ⎞ ⎟ Finally, the overall effect of youth and elderly µ s = αs = β s µ–1 s + β gLN⎜⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟  ⎟ ⎝ GDP–1 / POP–1 ⎠ dependence ratios on the savings as a share ⎛ l 15 ⎞ ⎛ g 65 ⎞ of GDP is rising, despite the large ‘youth y ⎜ POP ⎟ e ⎜ POP ⎟ +β ⎜ ⎜ WAP ⎟ ⎟+ β ⎜ ⎜ WAP ⎟ ⎟ EQ. 2 burden’ that Africa is carrying into the future. ⎝ POP ⎟ ⎠ ⎝ POP ⎟ ⎠ This means that African households can be expected to save more due to just the The first factor is for the growth of GDP demographics, while households in other per capita. The second and third terms are regions will be saving less. for the youth and elderly dependency ratios, The impact of the changing dependency respectively. The function is parameterized ratios while modulated by the βy and βy following the empirical estimates of Loayza (which are the same for all developing et al. (2000). These coefficients are con- countries) will of course vary across coun- stant over the time horizon of the simula- tries, since countries have different depen- tions. The coefficients for the growth term dency ratios in the benchmark year and are positive for all countries which imply undergo demographic change at different that as countries grow they save more. The paces. coefficients on the dependency ratio terms Four scenarios with differing age-struc- are negative for all countries. So, as depen- ture changes are considered. The four dency ratios rise, the propensity for house- scenarios are identical in regard to their holds to consume rises and savings as a labor productivity growth rates but differ in share of GDP fall, with the magnitudes of their demographic projections. The scenarios 32 consider demographic projections from four References UN WPP’s fertility scenarios – the medium Ahmed, S.A, and M. Cruz. 2016. “Making the fertility, high fertility, low fertility, and most of demographic change in constant fertility scenarios. From each UN Southern Africa” World Bank Policy WPP scenario, data for three variables are Research Working Paper 7798, World determined: the average working-age Bank, Washington DC. population growth rates for every year till Ahmed, S. A., M. Cruz, D. S. Go, M. 2050, and the child and aged dependency Maliszewska, and I. Osorio-Rodarte. ratios for every year till 2050.8 The first 2016. “How Significant Is Africa’s variable is used as a proxy for the labor Demographic Dividend for its Future supply growth rate, under the assumption Growth?” Review of Development that current employment ratios remain Economics 20(4), 762–793 constant. The second and third variables are Dellink, R., J. Chateau, E. Lanzi, and B. used as inputs to determine savings and Magné. 2015. Long-term economic hence investment in a given year. Moreover, growth projections in the Shared all scenarios assume fixed employment Socioeconomic Pathways. Global ratios, implying that unemployment rates Environmental Change. DOI:10.1016/j. and labor force participation rates at least gloenvcha.2015.06.004 stay the same. Loayza, N., Schmitt-Hebel, K. & Serven, L., The medium fertility scenario is considered 2000. What Drives Private Saving the “baseline” or “business-as-usual” scenario. across the World? The Review of In this scenario, the real GDP per capita Economics and Statistics, 82(2), pp. growth rates of the different economies are 165–181. allowed to grow along a targeted pathway. Till van der Mensbrugghe, D., 2011. LINKAGE 2018 they follow the growth projections of Technical Reference Document - Version 7.1, the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects Washington DC: World Bank. June 2016. After 2018, they follow the World Bank. 2015a. Global Monitoring long-term growth projections of Dellink et al. Report 2015/2016: Development Goals (2015) under the assumptions of the Shared in an Era of Demographic Change. Socio-Economics Pathways Scenario 2, till Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 2050. The income per capita growth in this ———. 2015b. South Africa Economic Update: baseline scenario provides an endogenously Jobs and South Africa’s Changing determined labor productivity growth rate. Demographics. 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