89233 Tunisia Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion # 13235B # 39A9DC # 622181 # E41270 # DFDB00 Tunisia Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion # 13235B # 39A9DC # 622181 # E41270 # DFDB00 Copyright © 2014 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank Group 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433, USA All rights reserved Report No. 89233-TN Tunisia ESW: Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion P120911–ESW Disclaimer The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated orga- nizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank, Tunisia, and governments represented do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The present report is based mostly on the quantitative analysis of the Tunisia Household Surveys on Youth in Rural Areas (THSYUA 2012) and its companion, the Tunisia Household Surveys on Youth in Rural Areas (THSYRA 2012). The Tunisia National Youth Observatory (ONJ) is not re- sponsible for the data and figures presented in this report. Electronic copies in Arabic and English can be downloaded free of charge upon request to the World Bank. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470, www.copyright.com. All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522- 2422, email: pubrights@worldbank.org. Vice President: Inger Andersen Country Director: Neil Simon M. Gray Sector Director: Junaid Kamal Ahmad Sector Manager: Franck Bousquet Task Team Leader: Gloria La Cava Photo credits: World Bank. Cover photo credit: Malika Drissi, World Bank. Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Youth Unemployment, Inactivity, and NEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Economic Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi Skills for Employment and Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii Key Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix Developing a Multidimensional Youth Inclusion Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix Chapter 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Background and Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 What is Youth Inclusion? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4 Report Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Chapter 2. Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . 11 2.1 Trust in Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.2 Access to Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.3 Youth Participation in Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.4 Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.5 Promoting Inclusive Youth Participation in Public Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Provide Incentives for Youth-Led NGOs and Volunteering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Scale up of Youth-Led Community Development Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Build Youth-Led Institutions to Strengthen Voice in Decision Making and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 iii iv | Contents Chapter 3. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.1 Youth Inactivity; Young People Who Are Not in Education, Employment, or Training; and Unemployment—An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.2 Discouraged Youth without Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3 Education and Inactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Leaving School Early . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Educational Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Counseling for Better School-to-Work Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.4 Pathways and Obstacles to Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Barriers to Finding Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Chapter 4. Economic Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.1 Employment Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Regional Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Gender Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Job Informality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Education and Low-Skill Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Youth Underemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Youth Employment by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 4.2 Self-Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Innovation and Entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Tunisia’s Self-Employed Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Skill Levels of Self-Employed Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Youth Entrepreneurship: Challenges and Investment Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Chapter 5. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . 67 5.1 Programs of the Ministry of Professional Training and Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Perceptions of Active Labor Market Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Participation in Active Labor Market Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Benefits from Active Labor Market Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 5.2 Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Perceptions of Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Participation in Entrepreneurship Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Contents | v 5.3 Other Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Programs of the Ministry of Youth and Sports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Youth Services Provided by Religious Welfare Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Key Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Strategic Areas for Further Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82  he Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy Chapter 6. T and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 6.1 Taking Stock of Young People’s Gains Since the Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 6.2 Guiding Principles for Strengthening Youth Inclusion and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . 91 6.3 Developing a Multidimensional Youth Inclusion Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Annexes 1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 2 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 3 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 4 Economic Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 5 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Boxes 2.1 Defining Active Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2 Young Artists and Freedom of Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.3 The IDMEJ Project: Investing in Youth Inclusion in Lagging Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.4 Houkoumetna: The “Our Government” Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.1 Young People Who Are Not in Education, Employment, or Training— A Joint Indicator for Youth Unemployment and Inactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.1 Family Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.2 Education in Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.1 Online Platforms Najja7ni and Tounes Ta3mal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Jovenes “Training Plus” Programs for Disadvantaged Youth in Latin America . . . . . . 85 5.2  5.3 Youth Entrepreneurship Program in Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 6.1 Eleven Principles of a National Youth Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 vi | Contents Figures 0.1 Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix 1.1 Map of Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 Dimensions of Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3 Population of Tunisia by Age Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4 NEET Rates among Working Age Population by Youth and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1 Trust in Public and Religious Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.2 Use of Internet to Access Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.3 Access to Information and Communication Technology—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . 16 2.4 Distribution of Youth Volunteers by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5 Influences on Youth’s Life, Education, and Work Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.6 Youth Influence on Local Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.7 Politically Knowledgeable Youth—by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.8 Politically Knowledgeable Youth—by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.1 Youth Employment and NEET Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.2 Youth NEET in Rural Versus Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.3 Youth NEET by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4 Labor Market Discouragement among NEETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.5 Reasons for Being Out of the Labor Force by Gender (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.6 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 15–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.7 Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, Urban Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.8 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 25–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.9 NEETs Registered as Unemployed—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.10 Main Reasons for Finding Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.11 Main Difficulties in Finding Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.12 Sources of Information about Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.1 Employment of Young Tunisians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.2 Destinations of Rural Migrants by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.3 Perceived Gender Discrimination in Private Versus Public Sectors, Rural Tunisia . . . . 47 4.4 Contract Type of Employed Youth (Ages 15–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.5 Satisfaction with Education System and Attainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 4.6 Youth Employment in Low-Productivity Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.7 Education Levels of Young Working Tunisians—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4.8 Urban Youth Underemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Contents | vii 4.9 Youth Employment by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 4.10 Global Competitiveness Index (2011–12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.11 Youth Self-Employment—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.12 Youth Entrepreneurship by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.13 Barriers Faced by Youth in Establishing Small Businesses (Rural Tunisia) . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.14 Youth Entrepreneurship by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4.15 Youth Entrepreneurship in Low-Productivity Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.16 Entrepreneurship by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5.1 Beneficiaries of Programs Financed by the FNE (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 5.2 Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.3 Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs, by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.4 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 5.5 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 5.6 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by NEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 5.7 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 5.8 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 5.9 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs—Urban Versus Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 5.10 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5.11 Matrix of Labor Market Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 6.1 Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 A2.1 Trust in Public and Religious Institutions by NEET (Urban) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 A2.2 Trust in Public and Religious Institutions by NEET (Rural) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 A2.3 Importance of Community Organizations for Local Development, Rural Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 A2.4 Trust in Community Organizations—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 A2.5 Youth Volunteering (Urban Tunisia) by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 A2.6 Youth Participation in Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 A2.7 Active Engagement in Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 A3.1 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 30–59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 A3.2 Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 30–59), Disaggregated . . . . . . . . 111 A3.3 NEET by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 A3.4 Highest Education Among NEETs by Gender (Ages 15–29), Disaggregated . . . . . . . 111 A3.5 Highest Education among NEETs by Region (Ages 15–29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 A3.6 NEETs Registered as Unemployed by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 viii | Contents A4.1 Contract Type of Employed Adults (Aged 30–59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 A4.2 Adult Employment in Low-Productivity Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 A4.3 Adult Employment by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 A4.4 Intention to Work in Public Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 A4.5 Adult Self-Employment—Rural Versus Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 A5.1 Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs by Region and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 A5.2 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 A5.3 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 A5.4 Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 A5.5 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 A5.6 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 A5.7 Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Tables A3.1 Probit Model of Early School Leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 A4.1 Determinants of Employment (Probit Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 A4.2 Determinants of Wage Income (Heckman Selection Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 A4.3 Determinants of Informal Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment (Probit Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 A4.4 Determinants of Educational Attainment (Ordered Probit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 A4.5 Determinants of Wage Income by Sector (Least Squares) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 A4.6 Determinants of Self-Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment (Probit Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Acronyms and Abbreviations ALMP Active Labor Market Programs GDP gross domestic product ANETI National Agency for Employment ILO International Labour and Independent Work Organisation (Agence Nationale de l’Emploi) INS National Statistical Institute ATFP Agency for Professional Training (Institut National de la Statistique) BTS Tunisian Solidarity Bank (Banque Tunisienne de Solidarité) MVTE Ministry of Professional Training and Employment CAIP Labor Market Access and Employability Program NCA National Constituent Assembly (Contrat d’Adaptation NEET Individuals who are Not in et d’Insertion a la vie Education, Employment, or Professionnelle) Training CES Employment Solidarity Program OECD Organisation for Economic (Contrat Emploi Solidarité) Cooperation and Development CIDES Employment Program for PAPPE Program for Small Enterprises Graduates of Higher Education (Program d’accompagnement CNSS National Social Security Fund des promoteurs des petites (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité entreprises) Sociale) SCV Voluntary Civil Service CSO civil society organization (Service Civil Volontaire) FNS National Solidarity Fund SMS Short Message Service (Fonds National de Solidarité) SIVP Professional Internship Program FONAPRA National Fund For the Promotion THSYRA Tunisia Household Survey on of Craft and Small Entrepreneurs Youth in Rural Areas (Fonds National de Promotion de l’Artisanat et des Petits Métiers) THSYUA Tunisia Household Survey on Youth in Urban Areas ix Foreword Youth inclusion is a central theme of the Post- This report attempts to identify the causes 2015 Development Agenda. Young people for widespread youth inactivity based on account for one-quarter of the world’s popu- quantitative survey results along with exten- lation, and especially since the Arab Spring, sive qualitative research and direct consulta- youth have been shaping social and economic tions with young people and relevant service innovations, challenging social norms and val- providers and policy makers. Quantitative ues, and breaking new ground. Connected as and qualitative analysis is combined with a re- never before, young women and men are in- view of successful international youth employ- creasingly influencing the course of their com- ment programs. The conclusions drawn from munities and countries. At the same time, this this extensive research and analysis form the young generation faces many obstacles, ranging basis of a series of proposals for new youth- from discrimination, marginalization, and lack specific policies and approaches for Tunisia. of access, to opportunities and voice in decision making. Globally, while more than one-quarter Tunisia is undergoing dramatic changes. of young people are not in education, employ- With a new government and constitution, the ment, or training (NEET), the share in the Mid- moment is right to engage in a conversation on dle East and North Africa region is a staggering how best to support young women and men 41 percent. in achieving their full potential. Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion will be an essen- To address this mounting crisis of youth ex- tial guide to mapping the way forward. This clusion, we must look beyond unemployment. well-researched and thoughtful report provides This report develops a comprehensive frame- a good starting point from which to begin the work for youth inclusion that highlights how conversation between the Government of Tuni- economic, social, political, and cultural dimen- sia and its hopeful youth. sions need to be addressed simultaneously to de- velop solutions that can help young Tunisians to believe in their future again by enjoying the ben- Simon Gray efits of quality education, finding work or start- Director, Maghreb Department ing a business, working together with voices Middle East and North Africa Region that are heard, and actively participating in civil society and politics at local, regional, and na- tional levels. x Acknowledgements This report was prepared by the World Bank Franck Bousquet, Sector Manager, Urban and in partnership with the National Youth Obser- Social Development, Middle East and North vatory (Observatoire National de la Jeunesse, Africa Region; Simon Gray, Country Director ONJ) of Tunisia. The report’s preparation was for the Maghreb; and Eileen Murray, Tunisia jointly led by Gloria La Cava, MENA Region Country Manager. Youth Coordinator, World Bank Global Prac- tice for Urban, Rural and Social Development, The report benefitted greatly from early and Professor Mohamed Jouili, Director of comments provided by Professor Abelwahab the ONJ, in close collaboration with Tobias Ben Hafaiedh, Consultant; Kamel Braham, Lechtenfeld, Economist, World Bank Global Lead Education Specialist; Balakrishna Menon Practice for Urban, Rural and Social Develop- Parameswaran, Lead Social Development ment, following extensive consultations with Specialist; Nina Bhatt, Lead Social Develop- Tunisian youth stakeholders and academics. ment Specialist; Diego Angel-Urdinola, Senior Additional core team members of this report Economist; Nina Arnhold, Senior Education include Professor Ahmed Khouja, Université de Specialist; Professor Niall O’Higgins, University Tunis; Professor Hayet Moussa, Université de of Salerno; Professor Emma Murphy, Durham Tunis; Houcine Abaab, Public Policy Special- University; and Paul Dyer, Knowledge Program ist; Imen Ben Daadouch, Faculté des sciences Manager at Silatech. Peer reviewers were Wendy humaines et sociales, Université de Tunis; Raja Cunningham, Program Leader, and Sarah Marzougui, Faculté des sciences humaines et Michael, Senior Social Development Specialist. sociales, Université de Tunis; Neji Letifi, Faculté The team would like to express its appre- des sciences humaines et sociales, Université de ciation for the technical contributions of the Tunis; Mohamed Ali Naceur, Social Sciences, members of the Steering Committee, including University of Tunis; and Sofia Trommlerova, representatives of Tunisia’s Ministry of Youth IHEID Graduate Institute Geneva. For the col- and Sports, the Ministry of Professional Train- lection of the rural household data, the team is ing and Employment, and the National Em- grateful to the survey team at Emrhod Tunis, ployment Observatory; the methodological especially Nebil Belaam. contribution of the Institute National de Statis- In addition, important contributions were tique, which provided the sampling frame of made by Tara Vishwanath, Lead Economist; the urban and rural surveys; and the generous Wendy Cunningham, Program Leader (LCC1C), financial contributions and research inputs of Nandini Krishnan, Senior Economist; Professor Silatech, a social initiative based in Qatar that Irene Jillson, Georgetown University; Professor works to create jobs and expand economic op- Imed Melliti, Université de Tunis; Paul Francis, portunities for young people throughout the Consultant; and Atsuko Muroga, Consultant. Arab world. The team is grateful for the ongoing support of xi Executive Summary Overview • young people who are not in education, employment, or training (NEETs) as the Over three years have elapsed since the Tunisian category most affected by economic ex- Revolution. Yet the aspirations of the younger clusion, and the need to ensure their so- generation that sparked sweeping changes cioeconomic integration through tailored across the Middle East and North Africa Region policies and programming. remain unmet. Unemployment among young people aged 15–29 increased after the revo- Active citizenship and civil participation lution, with an official youth unemployment among young Tunisians will be critical to sus- rate of 33.2 percent in 2013, according to the taining the country’s regained positive forward most recent International Labour Organisation momentum. Constructive dialogue between Tu- School-to-Work Transition survey (ILO 2014). nisia’s youth and public institutions, together Even though youth played a leading role in with broader civil society, political organiza- bringing about a change in the regime, they have tions, and the private sector, will be critical in been unable to secure a role in decision making addressing the most pressing barriers to youth and feel that they are not consulted on issues inclusion. Facilitating youth inclusion enables that directly affect them. Nevertheless, there are the mobilization of the new generation as an positive manifestations in the post-revolution economic and social resource, which can di- period. The new Tunisian Constitution, passed rectly contribute to sustaining the stability and in January 2014, enshrines youth participation economic growth of the country. Participatory as a key pillar of the social, economic, and po- decision making in the design and implemen- litical development of the country.1 However, tation of youth policies and programs and in given the time required to translate and imple- the management of civil society organizations ment constitutional principles into laws and (CSOs) yields benefits for all stakeholders, practice, youth participation remains at the for- and is likely to increase the impact of public mative stage. investments. The study provides an analysis of the aspira- This report identifies specific categories of tions and needs of young Tunisians, taking into excluded youth and characterizes them accord- account both noneconomic and economic mea- ing to multiple factors, including regional dis- sures of exclusion that were at the root of the parities, gender inequalities, and limited access revolution. In particular, it highlights: to education, employment, and social goods. The findings help to identify crucial barriers • the continuing rise of youth activism out- to youth inclusion faced by young women and side formally established political institu- men from different backgrounds, especially tions as well as the need to support the from marginalized regions, and describe the transition of Tunisian youth from protest youth’s perceived and actual exclusion from so- to active citizenship; and cial, economic, and political opportunities that xiii xiv | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion drove the Tunisian Revolution (Ayeb 2011). policy at addressing the constraints that youth Overall, the report notes that while the situation face? While also drawing on quantified mea- of unemployed university graduates has often sures, the analysis benefits from qualitative, nar- dominated discourse and policy, other socioeco- rative interpretations and solutions that emerge nomic groups of youth face distinct challenges from young respondents, thereby attempting to to inclusion, which also require the attention avoid technocratic prescriptions that do not res- and actions of policy makers. onate with the discourse of youth themselves. This approach allows an analysis of the range In particular, the report highlights NEETs of economic, social, and political exclusion, as as the most excluded group. NEETs exemplify well as examination of the ways in which they youth inactivity and discouragement, a more are mutually reinforcing. worrisome condition than youth unemploy- ment, which does not include disengaged youth who have given up looking for formal sector Key Findings (or other) employment (United Nations 2013). Youth Participation, Voice, and Active In Tunisia, young women are more likely to Citizenship be NEETs. Highly educated youth, although affected by exclusion, constitute less than one- Very few young Tunisians are active in civil so- fifth of all NEETs. Early school leavers are the ciety, although CSOs are on the rise. Since the most highly represented in the NEET subgroup, revolution, civil society groups have been able irrespective of gender. to register with the state, and an increasing number of organizations focused on civic en- A multidimensional approach is used to gagement have emerged. However, only a small identify and address the social, economic, po- fraction of young Tunisians are active in CSOs, litical, and cultural barriers encountered by and as little as three percent of rural youth par- young Tunisians. Marginalization associated ticipate in CSOs (ONJ 2013). Despite the low with social exclusion tends to occur simultane- levels of participation in associations, 9 out of ously along multiple axes, so policies that ad- 10 young Tunisians consider volunteering in dress only one aspect of marginalization, such CSOs to be important for their communities. as improved access to education, may be too Among the few youth active in CSOs, the most narrow to overcome exclusion more generally frequently mentioned types of volunteering are (World Bank 2013f). A combination of quanti- for CSOs in the fields of regional development, tative and qualitative research methods is used charity and poverty, religious affairs, and sci- as well as an assessment of current youth pro- ence. Sports and leisure clubs are also frequently grams and services in order to ask a range of mentioned in qualitative interviews. questions: Why do young people continue to be active outside formal institutional venues While political participation is a key pillar as opposed to inside them? What channels are of active citizenship, very few young Tunisians needed to increase youth trust in institutions engage in any form of political participation, and voice in decision making? Why are certain except mobilizing for demonstrations. The low groups of youth over-represented among the participation rate by youth in the Tunisian na- inactive and unemployed or those working in tional elections of October 2011 was especially the informal sector? How effectively is public worrisome. Only one-half of under-30-year-olds Executive Summary | xv voted. In addition, very few young Tunisians Youth Unemployment, Inactivity, are active in political parties, reflecting the large and NEET disconnect between the younger generation and the political establishment. Most young Tuni- One of the most pressing barriers for youth in- sians say that they do not follow domestic poli- clusion is the large share of NEETs. This cat- tics, and self-reported knowledge about politics egory includes all officially unemployed youth is low, especially in rural areas. A youth provi- aged 15–29 as well as discouraged young Tu- sion in the new electoral law, which incentivizes nisians who are no longer searching for jobs political parties to nominate at least one young despite their young ages. NEET has been pro- candidate under age 35 among the top four can- posed as a core indicator for the Post-2015 didates on any electoral list, provides an import- Development Agenda to measure the degree to ant entry point for political participation.2 which young people effectively transition into the labor market.3 Young Tunisians have little trust in public in- stitutions, and only 8.8 percent of rural youth NEET rates display significant gender and and 31.1 percent of urban youth trust the polit- regional disparities, and in rural areas, more ical system. There is also a low level of trust in than two out of five youth are NEET, compared the police, especially in rural areas. By compar- with almost one in three in urban Tunisia. In ison, the military, the local Imam, and religious rural Tunisia, half of all young women are organizations receive the youth’s highest trust NEETs (50.4 percent), compared with one in rating of up to 80 percent, which is nearly the three young men (33.4 percent). This compares same level of trust given to family. Like their with urban Tunisia—the primary destination counterparts in Egypt and Libya, young Tuni- for many young job seekers—where about one- sians express little trust in the press, which they third of young women (32.4 percent) and one- see as commercial and manipulative. fifth of all young men (20.3 percent) are NEETs. Gender gaps are significant among NEETs, More than any other medium, young Tu- which affects one in two young women in rural nisians are using the Internet to access infor- Tunisia (50.4 percent) and one in three rural mation. About 50 percent of all Internet users young men (33.4 percent). While these rates are (43.3 percent in rural areas and 53.2 percent in slightly lower in Tunisia compared with other urban areas) use the Internet for education, and countries in the region, such as Morocco, they between one-quarter and one-half of all youth do highlight a large untapped potential for eco- uses the Internet to look for jobs (45.9 percent nomic inclusion. in rural areas and 26.8 percent in urban areas). In addition, more than 9 out of 10 young Tu- High rates of school dropouts appear to be nisians in rural Tunisia own mobile phones. To strongly linked to unemployment and inactiv- advance citizenship in a sustainable way, how- ity. Systemic barriers affecting transitions at ever, youth must progress beyond “virtual citi- the end of grade six and grade nine cause high zenship” to formal political participation at the dropout rates and prevent many youth from local and national levels. completing secondary education. The majority of young Tunisians leave school long before ob- taining a secondary school degree. Reportedly, more than 140,000 students drop out of school xvi | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion annually, 80,000 of these without having com- Dignity was a central demand in the demon- pleted their basic education (Romdhane 2010, strations of the Arab Spring across the region, 127).4 As with other indicators, spatial differ- including Tunisia. ences abound: more than four out of five rural and one out of two urban young people do not The principal barrier to economic opportuni- complete secondary schooling. It is this group ties is regional disparities between governorates that comprises the bulk of NEETs: 83 percent in the coastal, interior, and southern regions, in rural areas and 57 percent in urban areas. On which in many economic aspects are greater the other hand, girls tend to stay in school lon- than the urban-rural divide. Exclusion of Tuni- ger than boys and are more likely to complete sia’s interior and southern regions is a funda- both their high school and university education. mental driver of social, economic, cultural, and Women account for 62 percent of university political youth exclusion. Young Tunisians face students, and 26 percent complete their univer- poor odds in finding employment, especially in sity education compared with 16.8 percent of the interior and the south, according to a recent young men. report on the spatial divide of labor market out- comes (World Bank 2013b). In fact, among the Youth and student organizations should have underlying causes of the 2011 revolution is the the opportunity to voice concerns and offer spatial, economic, and political marginalization solutions about educational policies and reg- of society in parts of the country in favor of the ulations. International experience from other coastal region (Ayeb 2011).5 Rural youth con- middle-income countries shows that, apart tinue to move to cities as they attempt to es- from its immediate value in curbing corruption cape rural areas, despite the lack of good jobs in and malpractice in the school system, greater urban areas. Nearly 90.2 percent of rural house- student participation in schools increases the holds report that members of the direct family6 accountability of teachers and school admin- have migrated to urban areas, mostly siblings of istrators while providing students with greater rural youth. opportunities to influence how curricula are de- signed (La Cava and Michael 2006, 58–60). Ini- Gender gaps remain significant barriers lim- tiatives at secondary and tertiary school levels iting equal access to economic opportunities. could be supported through a competitive grant Despite Tunisia’s gender equality policies, sur- scheme to which students and youth organiza- prisingly few young Tunisian women are work- tions could apply. ing. Less than one in five women in rural Tunisia (18.5 percent) and less than two in five women in urban Tunisia (39.8 percent) have a job. Wages of Economic Opportunities young women are one-quarter lower than wages of young men. In addition, gender exclusion re- Ability, opportunity, and dignity are key re- mains a daunting challenge for young Tunisian quirements for youth inclusion. Ability and women trying to enter the workforce. Nearly skills are needed to succeed in today’s economy two-thirds (61.4 percent) of female respondents and to master the challenges and risks of a glo- report that women are discriminated against balized world. Access to equal opportunity is when seeking work in the private sector. Yet important to reduce social and economic barri- even in the public sector, discrimination against ers to youth inclusion and is central to achiev- women is reported by nearly half (44.4 percent) ing shared prosperity for the next generation. of all female respondents. In rural areas, only 8.3 Executive Summary | xvii percent of young women from the southern and The great majority of employed young Tuni- 15.4 percent from interior regions are working, sians work in low-skilled jobs in low productiv- compared with 23.6 percent in coastal region. ity sectors: 82.5 percent youth in rural areas and 67.0 percent in urban areas work in jobs that do Schools and universities fail to impart essen- not require a secondary degree. Young women tial skills to equip young people confronting the are especially likely to work in the low-skill sec- challenges of the labor market for transition tors: 69.0 percent in urban areas and 85.9 per- to adulthood and active citizenship. Youth are cent in rural areas. Notably, the public sector particularly critical of an overly theoretical ori- provides relatively little employment for young entation of public education, which includes a Tunisians—only 6.8 percent of working youth minimal focus on skills to prepare them for the in rural areas and 12.4 percent in urban areas labor market. Overall, discouragement among are employed in that sector. Agriculture remains students shapes the way in which teachers and an important sector for rural youth employment students interact. Career counseling in second- even though many young people want to leave ary schools and universities is very limited, the sector due to the difficult working condi- resulting in students receiving scant guidance tions and the negative image associated with it. concerning their critical career decisions. There It provides more than one-fifth of all rural jobs were many criticisms of successive educational for young Tunisians (21.9 percent). Manufac- reforms, which students felt were arbitrary and turing and industries provide less than one-third poorly considered and for which many teach- (32.2 percent) of youth employment in urban ers were not well prepared to implement. In Tunisia and less than one-quarter (23.8 percent) effect, even those young women and men who in rural Tunisia. Most young Tunisians work in complete secondary school and continue to a the service sector, including tourism, which also university emerge lacking practical skills and ill- provides most of the jobs in the informal sector. equipped to face the labor market. Tunisia is well positioned to become a re- Informal work is pervasive.7 Few young peo- gional champion in innovation and entrepre- ple have access to secure jobs, with most avail- neurship if it recognizes the potential of young able job openings being informal, without a aspiring businesswomen and businessmen. contract. The few formal jobs come in the form Self-employment is relatively common among of fixed-term contracts. As a result, fewer than young Tunisians: one in ten youth are self-em- one in three young workers have a secure work ployed microentrepreneurs. Notably, self-em- contract and access to social protection. Predict- ployment among young women is virtually ably, informal work is most prevalent in rural nonexistent—only 2.2 percent in rural areas areas (71.9 percent) where agricultural employ- and 1.5 percent in urban areas. However, mod- ment and informal day-labor contracts remain ern technology could make it easier for young the most common form of employment. None- women to start businesses and generate incomes. theless, even in urban Tunisia, more than half Self-employment could also help to overcome of all working youth are employed informally regional disparities. Currently, self-employment (55.4 percent). Young Tunisians are very dis- is more common in the coastal region (12.1 per- content with informal employment. Job infor- cent) and in the south (12.1 percent), compared mality and exploitation are cited as the primary with only 8.1 percent in the interior. concern among employed youth in the qualita- tive research for this report. xviii | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion About 30–40 percent of young entrepreneurs a few programs are available to youth in the work in sectors with high returns on average, interior and southern regions. Most ALMPs demonstrating the potential of entrepreneur- are also tailored for young university gradu- ship. More than half of all self-employed youth ates, despite the fact that the absolute number operate small businesses in the service sector, of young Tunisians without work and without including modern technologies: 45.4 percent a secondary or university degree is about 3.5 in rural areas and 52.1 percent in urban areas. times larger than the number of university grad- Only one in five young urban entrepreneurs uates. In addition, most programs lack rigorous works in the manufacturing and industries sec- monitoring and evaluation, interagency coordi- tors (20.9 percent). In rural areas, 36.4 percent nation, and enforcement of criteria, which cre- of young entrepreneurs work in agriculture and ates disincentives for young people to search for food processing; in urban areas, it is 10.8 per- employment. cent. However, in rural areas, almost all young entrepreneurs work informally, often in unfa- Youth entrepreneurship can play an import- vorable locations. ant role in addressing youth exclusion while strengthening income generation and reducing Young entrepreneurs struggle to gain access youth unemployment. A number of programs to finance, which remains the main challenge in are designed to support entrepreneurs or poten- successfully establishing a business. Existing mi- tial entrepreneurs. However, awareness of ex- crofinance programs seem to have limited reach isting entrepreneurship programs remains low, and are widely perceived as inefficient. One- and only one-third of rural youth and about half third of all young entrepreneurs struggle with of urban youth are aware of existing programs. the heavy cost of bureaucracy, including diffi- Program take-up is very low, especially in urban culties in obtaining required licenses and slow areas, where only about one in a hundred youth administrative procedures. The education level has participated in entrepreneurship programs. among young entrepreneurs is relatively low, On the positive side, a substantial proportion of and most self-employed youth have not com- rural youth who participated reported that they pleted secondary school, rendering it more dif- benefitted from microloan programs. ficult to participate in available programs and negotiate and manage microfinance assistance. Tunisian youth could benefit from an inno- Additional business training and enhanced ac- vative approach that connects education to jobs cess to business information would be helpful to in a three-way collaboration among the school many young entrepreneurs. system, technical colleges, and local corporate partners.8 Many workplace skills, including Skills for Employment and teamwork and other social skills, problem-solv- Entrepreneurship Programs ing, and verbal and writing skills should be embedded in the curriculum. Course learning Tunisia has developed a large system of Active should be based on actual projects to enable Labor Market Programs (ALMPs), which con- students to work in teams, solve problems, stitute the core of its labor market policy, but practice presentation skills, and create business the perceived benefits remain limited. ALMPs plans. Structured visits to companies partnering are mostly unknown to young Tunisians. Most with the model should be part of the academic programs reinforce spatial disparities by overly program. In addition, a mentoring program focusing on urban areas along the coast. Only covering each student from his or her school’s Executive Summary | xix Figure 0.1. Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion 1. Participation and active citizenship Participation • Youth-led community development • Volunteering • Youth councils for participation and voice • Human rights NEETs 2. Access to economic opportunities • Job counseling in secondary and tertiary education Informal youth Economic • Skills training Young women opportunities • Apprenticeships/internships Youth in peri-urban areas • Job intermediation and lagging regions • Youth entrepreneurship 3. Youth-friendly services at the local level • Life skills training • Information and communication technology and language skills Integrated youth • Healthy lifestyles services • Legal support services • Peer mentoring • Sports corporate partner would provide in-depth ca- in education, employment, and regional devel- reer counseling and provide opportunities opment—to address the needs of young people for visiting workplaces and learning through with greater efficiency. These policies should be internships. reformulated with the participation of youth stakeholders—especially youth representative Key Recommendations bodies—as partners in decision making. More- over, policy implementation needs to be sup- ported by performance-based management of Developing a Multidimensional Youth institutions, strengthened by mechanisms for Inclusion Policy close interagency coordination that bring to- A multidimensional youth policy is needed to gether government and youth organizations, reduce barriers to youth inclusion and facilitate and informed by systematic data collection and youth contributions to Tunisian society. The ap- participatory monitoring and evaluation sys- proach to youth development is now ready to tems. As highlighted in figure 0.1, a multidimen- move from piecemeal initiatives to an integrated sional youth policy would include the following set of policies and investments, maximizing three pillars: (1) participation and active citizen- the use of financial resources. To ensure eq- ship; (2) access to economic opportunities; and uity, this can best be achieved through national (3) youth-friendly services at the local level. youth policies and any related reforms that cut across sectors but that have a common focus on These three dimensions of youth inclusion youth inclusion. These will also need to com- policy, which involve participation, economic plement sector-specific policies—such as those opportunities and youth-friendly services xx | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion require a specific set of measures at the national Access to Economic Opportunities and especially at the local level, as indicated Local Level below. • Job counseling services in secondary schools in partnership with the private Participation, Voice, and Citizenship sector and NGOs Local Level • Gender-sensitive youth-led community • Youth-led community development development, also with small cash trans- fers incentives • Competitive grant scheme to support the capacity of nongovernmental organiza- • Job intermediation tions (NGOs) to engage/provide services to excluded youth • Gender-sensitive individual and group en- trepreneurship, through equity building • Institutional channels to influence local grants and access to finance policy—i.e., local youth councils • Apprenticeships and internships tailored • Legal protection for young disadvantaged to less educated youth and NEETs through people in conflict with police gender-sensitive approaches • Confidence/trust building between youth, National Policy Level local authorities and police • Job counseling services in universities through public/private/NGO partnerships • Joint youth initiatives between religious and nonreligious organizations • Access to information—e.g., rigorous monitoring and evaluation, data, and National Level youth policy dialogue on employment • Capacity support of youth-led national policy and Active Labor Market Programs NGOs and coalition building • Youth consultations and participation— • Competitive grant scheme to support stu- also virtual—on labor market reform dent and youth organizations • Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and • Student consultative bodies at secondary evaluation and tertiary education levels • Voice in national policy and reforms—e.g., through National Youth Councils Executive Summary | xxi Youth-Friendly Services society, and communities will be needed to imag- ine and accomplish the task that Tunisia faces of Local Level simultaneously reforming its politics, economy, • Youth-friendly services tailored for NEETs and society. Young people require the space to and other disadvantaged youth, particu- participate fully in this process of renewal and, larly inactive young women, with youth indeed, to benefit from it. The stakes could participation (i.e., life skills, informa- hardly be higher: the possibility of a productive tion and communication technology and and equitable economy and vibrant political e-learning, entrepreneurship and employ- and civil society is set against the possibility of ability skills, legal support services, peer growing polarization, frustration, and cynicism. mentoring, cultural activities, volunteer- Moving toward a constructive outcome holds ing, and sports) the promise of a multitude of rewards, including National Level the energy, awareness, goodwill, and commit- • Capacity building of NGOs providing ment of the young men and women of Tunisia youth services for whom this report bears witness. • Quality standards of content Notes • Certification of skills 1. Article 8 of the new Tunisian Constitution, January 27, 2014. 2. The Tunisian National Assembly passed the new Electoral • Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and Law on May 1, 2014 (Jasmine Foundation 2014). evaluation 3. The indicator is preferable to traditional unemployment mea- sures because it shows the scope of potential problems in the youth labor market. While the revolution has given young Tu- 4. Base Education is defined as grades one through nine. nisians a glimpse of the possibilities of a new 5. The term “Jasmine Revolution” is arguably a misnomer, as it future, the task of building that future largely refers to the plant from the relatively lush and prosperous north- remains to be done. It is a task that cannot be ern coast. Instead, Ayeb argues that “Alfa Grass Revolution” might be a better term, based on the plant growing in Tunisia’s accomplished by youth alone—any more than it interior region. can be accomplished without them. This is also 6. The concept of the direct family includes children, spouse, and not an undertaking that government can pur- parents of the head of household. sue singlehandedly. New forms of partnerships 7. This report refers to job informality based on survey responses of having a written formal work contract. between government, the private sector, civil 8. Based on Litow 2013. Chapter 1 Introduction 2 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion What is a revolution? Why did we take it to the streets? Employment, freedom, and national dignity! But if we were to dissect these slogans, what would they show? We want an equal distribution of wealth, a fair development plan between the regions—[in] the inland regions, between first-class Tunisia and the other Tunisia. University student, Tunis1 1.1 Background and Objective the highest unemployment rates in the country (Filiu 2011). Prior to the revolution, Tunisia had been praised by international institutions for its substantial One of the root causes of this disaffection progress in economic growth and poverty re- can be traced back to the lack of opportuni- duction. It enjoyed an annual average gross do- ties available to young people. Tunisia’s youth mestic product (GDP) growth rate of 5 percent unemployment rate was particularly high at between 1997 and 2007, placing itself among 30.7 percent (for ages 15–24), while the over- the leading performers in the Middle East and all unemployment rate was 14 percent, mak- North Africa Region (average 4.3 percent). In ing the ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment 2009, the per capita income of Tunisians wors- ratio 3.2 (World Bank 2010b). The 2005–09 ened slightly and stood at US$7,200, close to Labor Force Survey data showed that 85 per- the level it had been in 2005. Yet the overall cent of the unemployed were between 15 and 35 decline was not dramatic, and the level still re- years of age (Angel-Urdinola 2012). The Labor mained higher than any neighboring country Force Survey also revealed that unemployment except Libya, surpassing Algeria (US$6,600), among younger age groups had increased be- Morocco (US$3,800), and Egypt (US$4,900). tween 2005 and 2009, while for older cohorts, Tunisia’s life expectancy and literacy rates com- the rate actually decreased. In particular, unem- pared very favorably with other Arab countries. ployment among 15- to 24-year-olds rose from 28 to 31 percent, and that of 25- to 34-year-olds Nevertheless, Tunisia experienced a revolu- increased from 17 to 19 percent. Public opinion tion in January 2011 driven in large measure by surveys highlighted the political significance of longstanding grievances about social, economic, these trends. In a poll conducted after the rev- and political exclusion. Significantly, the revo- olution in January 2011, the majority of the lutionary movement was ignited by the anger respondents believed that the revolution was and despair of a 26-year-old unemployed veg- induced by young people (96 percent), the un- etable vendor in one of Tunisia’s most under- employed (85.3 percent), and the disadvantaged served governorates, Sidi Bouzid. It resonated (87.3 percent) (SIGMA Group 2011). with the many Tunisians who faced similar day-to-day challenges and triggered waves of However, unemployment was by no means protests (Saleh 2010). Such protests were not the only factor. Arab observers viewed the youth new: as early as 2008, unemployed youth had uprising in Tunisia as a response to a sense of been involved in demonstrations in Gafsa, a closed possibilities, given that young Tunisians poor mining area which still suffers from one of had been excluded from expressing their voice Introduction | 3 Figure 1.1. Map of Tunisia 4 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion and exercising active citizenship (Bamyeh 2011). • the continuing rise of youth activism out- The 2005 National Youth Observatory’s survey, side the formally established political in- covering 10,000 young people (aged 15–29), stitutions as well as the need to support revealed a low rate of participation by young the transition of Tunisian youth from pro- people in decisions affecting their lives, limited test to active citizenship; and youth membership in associations, and a dearth of structures through which they could articu- • young people who are not in education, late their opinions. It also showed that young employment, or training (NEET) as the people were generally less optimistic about the category most affected by economic ex- future than they had been in 2000. Similarly, clusion, and the need to ensure their so- in 2007, a United Nations report pointed out cioeconomic integration through tailored the lack of active youth participation in deci- policies and programming. sion making at community, municipal, regional, and national levels; a lack of youth engagement 1.2 What is Youth Inclusion? in the design, implementation, and evaluation of youth-targeted services and programs; lim- This report uses a multidimensional approach to ited opportunities for volunteering or commu- identify and address the social, economic, politi- nity service; and lack of consultations (United cal, and cultural barriers encountered by young Nations 2007). Therefore, youth demands for Tunisians. A variety of paradigms have been dignity should be understood in the broader used to define and explain Arab youth, ranging context of an absence of opportunities for voice from a demographic “bulge” and “dividend;” regarding the direction of the country as well to frameworks of human capital formation, in- as a lack of accountability on the part of public cluding educational and employment failures; authorities. to a state of transition to adulthood, when Arab youth are depicted as being in a stage of In this context, the objective of this policy “waiting;” to a set of youth identities and sub- study, conducted in 2012/2013, is threefold: cultures.2 Taken individually, these paradigms (1) to identify and analyze key barriers to youth present some analytic limitations, as marginal- inclusion encountered by young Tunisian men ization associated with social exclusion tends to and women (aged 15–29) with a special em- occur simultaneously along multiple axes (see phasis on participation, active citizenship, and figure 1.2). According to a compelling inter- economic opportunities; (2) to assess the access, pretation of the Arab youth’s uprisings, young quality, and impact of various public services people share as an experience “a generational and programs for young people, including Ac- narrative of exclusion, which traverses public tive Labor Market Programs; and (3) to provide and private life and results from the political, recommendations for policies and programming economic and social failures of authoritarian on how to address such barriers. regimes” (Murphy 2012). As a result, policies that address only one aspect of marginaliza- The study provides an analysis of the aspira- tion—such as improved access to education— tions and needs of young Tunisians, taking into may be too narrow to overcome exclusion more account essential noneconomic and economic generally (World Bank 2013f).3 measures of exclusion that were at the root of the revolution. In particular, it highlights: Introduction | 5 Figure 1.2. Dimensions of Exclusion Source: World Bank 2014. This study uses a combination of quantita- Fostering youth inclusion requires recog- tive and qualitative research methods—as well nizing the multiple dimensions of exclusion. as an assessment of current youth programs and The range of exclusionary dynamics that affect services—to ask a range of questions, such as: young Tunisians is set out in figure 1.2. Not all Why do young people continue to be primar- young people are subject to all exclusionary ily active outside formal institutional venues? dynamics, but some young people suffer exclu- What channels are needed to increase their voice sion across many or all political, economic, so- in decision making? Why are certain groups of cial, and cultural spheres. For example, young youth overrepresented among the inactive and people who are not in education, employment, unemployed or among those working in the or training may be simultaneously disengaged informal sector? How effectively is public pol- from community life, originate from a poor icy addressing the constraints that youth face? household, and lack social networks, which While drawing on quantified measures, the re- in turn preclude their access to opportunities port also heavily weights interpretations and in the labor market. These may be the most solutions from young respondents themselves in marginalized and disempowered youth. It is an attempt to avoid technocratic prescriptions important to identify and recognize the hetero- that do not resonate with the discourse of the geneity of experiences to most effectively target youth. interventions to those who are most excluded. 6 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Nonetheless, the amelioration of one source of percent of the working age population—aged exclusion will not necessarily lead to inclusion if 15–59 (see figure 1.3).4 Today’s youth represent exclusionary dynamics persist in other spheres. one of the largest social cohorts of Tunisia, fac- Fostering youth inclusion requires interventions ing very distinct social, economic, cultural, and that simultaneously address a range of exclu- policy challenges, many of which have yet to be sionary dynamics, specifically in ways that en- addressed. able greater youth voice and participation in the decision-making processes that affect their lives. Young Tunisians are not a homogeneous The evidence presented in this report indicates group. While the situation of unemployed uni- that interventions are needed to rebuild trust versity graduates has often dominated national between youth and public institutions to foster discourse and policy, other socioeconomic a sense of agency and ownership among young groups of youth face distinct challenges to in- people. The report therefore highlights the im- clusion. This report identifies specific categories portance of fostering voice, participation, and of excluded young people and characterizes active citizenship for addressing socioeconomic them according to regional disparities, gender youth exclusion. differences, access and opportunities, employ- ment and education status, and educational at- In this report, young Tunisians are consid- tainment. This analysis helps to identify crucial ered those aged 15–29. This broader age seg- barriers to inclusion faced by young women ment better captures issues of exclusion and and men from different backgrounds. It also delayed transition to socioeconomic autonomy contributes to an understanding of youth frus- than the 15- to 24-year-old grouping used in tration with and perception of exclusion from other studies and surveys (see, for example, social, economic, and political opportunities, World Bank. 2012c). According to recent pop- which drove the Tunisian Revolution. It was, ulation estimates, youth aged 15–29 make up after all, a young street vendor from the interior 29 percent of Tunisia’s total population and 43 region of Sidi Bouzid whose self-immolation catalyzed the revolt by the younger generation from marginalized regions (Ayeb 2011).  opulation of Tunisia by Figure 1.3. P The analysis introduces a more comprehen- Age Group sive indicator of youth economic exclusion. 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 The indicator is the share of NEETs, which 100+ is consistent with the goals of the Post-2015 90–94 Female Male Development Agenda. This measure goes be- 80–84 yond the narrow definition of youth unemploy- 70–74 ment, which does not include young people who 60–64 50–54 have been discouraged from looking for work. 40–44 The NEET indicator ensures a more accurate 30–34 assessment of inactivity that includes discour- 20–24 aged and disengaged youth who have given up 10–14 looking for formal sector (or other) employ- 0–4 ment (United Nations 2013). Tunisia currently 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 has one of the highest NEET rates in the Mid- Source: United Nations 2010. dle East and North Africa Region, estimated at Note: Measured in ‘000, year 2010, medium variant. approximately 33 percent of the total number Introduction | 7 of young people aged 15–29 years, accord- Overall, this report contributes to research ing to calculations from the European Train- and policy studies in the areas of youth par- ing Foundation (ETF 2014). Highly educated ticipation, education, employment, and labor youth, although still suffering exclusion, are market policy in Tunisia. The concepts of less likely to become NEET than those with less social inclusion and social exclusion are rarely education. Youth who leave school early are the used in either the Francophone or Arab lan- most highly represented NEET subgroup and, guage research literature about Tunisia. The lat- according to a recent analysis by the National ter tends to focus on local traditions, identity, Employment and Training Observatory and and cultural heritage. In the dominant strand the ILO, there are very few policy instruments of Francophone social research, the issue of currently addressing NEETs (Observatoire social inclusion/exclusion has been articulated National de la Jeunesse-Social Science Forum primarily through the lens of the economic inte- 2013). Figure 1.4 presents an overview of gration or marginalization of youth (Mahfoudh- NEET rates for Tunisians of working age, com- Draouti and Melliti 2006). Dropping out of paring young Tunisians (aged 15–29) to those school, unemployment, inactivity, and precar- aged 30 and above.5 Throughout the country, ious work are portrayed as outcomes of mar- young men are about 2.5 times more likely to be ginalization. Some of the existing literature, NEET than men above 29 years.6 In addition, primarily through in-depth interviews, also cap- young women are nearly twice as often affected tures the subjective experience of living the life by NEET than young men. On a positive note, of a marginalized, vulnerable, and unemployed NEET rates among young women are slightly young person (Melliti 2011). A related concept lower compared with women above 29 years, is that of public acknowledgement (reconnais- suggesting a shift in the social roles of younger sance), in contrast to the invisibility experienced women. Nevertheless, NEET rates remain very by an unemployed or inactive young person. high for young women (60.2 percent in urban The plight of unemployed graduates is also seen areas and 81.5 percent in rural areas). in social justice terms as the breaking of a social Figure 1.4. NEET Rates among Working Age Population by Youth and Gender 100 90 88.6 81.5 80 70 69.0 60.2 60 percent 50 46.9 Youth male 40 Youth female 34.6 30 years old and above male 30 30 years old and above female 20.6 20 13.1 10 0 Rural Urban Source: World Bank 2012c; 2012d. Note: Youth refers to age 15–29. Comparison group refers to age 30–59. 8 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion contract with a state that encouraged tertiary This report compares youth living in rural education as a means of accessing secure em- and urban areas as well as in different geo- ployment (Dhillon and Yousef 2009). graphic regions. Tunisia has 24 governorates, aggregated into seven administrative regions, each comprised of several contiguous governor- 1.3 Data and Methodology ates. For the purpose of this report, the gover- This study draws on primary data derived norates are grouped into three distinct survey from qualitative and quantitative methods and regions: the coast, the interior, and the south, on secondary sources. A full overview of data based on the structural differences the country sources can be found in annex 1. The main pri- is facing in terms of regional disparities and mary sources are as follows: social and economic inclusion.7 The analysis also builds on two separate surveys in urban and • A quantitative survey of urban youth rural Tunisia. from 4,214 urban households undertaken in 2012–13 and known as the Tunisia 1.4 Report Structure Household Survey on Youth in Urban Areas (THSYUA). The report is organized along the different dimensions of youth inclusion. Chapter 2 • A quantitative survey of rural youth investigates voice and participation of young from 1,400 households across Tunisia Tunisians and identifies both constraints and undertaken in 2012–13 called the Tuni- opportunities for their engagement in civic sia Household Survey on Youth in Rural and political life. The report then analyzes eco- Areas (THSYRA). nomically excluded groups in decreasing order. • A qualitative component, designed to Chapter 3 highlights the severity of the situa- elicit the narrative perceptions of youth tion faced by young Tunisians that are NEET. with regard to the phenomenon of their Chapter 4 describes the available economic experience with social inclusion and ex- opportunities for young Tunisians; the state of clusion, supplements and helps explain employment and entrepreneurship, including the quantitative findings. This component informal work as well as gender and regional was comprised of 21 focus groups and 35 disparities; and relevant socioeconomic and ed- individual interviews undertaken in 2012 ucational data. Chapter 5 discusses programs with a total of 199 young people in seven and services relevant to employment—such as regions of Tunisia. Active Labor Market Programs, including the quality and impact of the programs. Chapter • A desk review and analysis of institutions 6 presents conclusions and recommendations, and programs serving Tunisian youth was recognizing the need to address the interrelated- undertaken in 2012. ness of the different dimensions by combining a strong focus on inclusive youth policy and in- stitutions with a call for youth participation in decision making. Introduction | 9 Notes 5. The official retirement age in Tunisia is 60 years for men and women. 1. As quoted in British Council 2013, 34. 6. In rural areas, 20.6 percent of older men are NEET compared with 46.9 percent among young men, a NEET ratio of 2.3. In 2. The following contributions exemplify the various paradigms urban areas, the NEET ratio among old versus young men is 2.6 used to analyze the youth dimension: Assad and Roudi-Fahimi (NEET affects 13.1 percent of older men versus 34.6 percent of 2009, British Council 2013, Dhillon and Yousef 2009, and young men). World Bank 2007. 7. For the purposes of this report, the northwest, center-west, 3. The report also builds on the framework of socioeconomic and southwest are collectively referred to as the interior or as constraints (i.e., job relevant skills constraints, lack of labor interior regions. The northeast, which includes Greater Tunis, is demand, and social constraints on the supply side) and interven- treated separately from the rest of southeast for the purpose of tions identified by Cunningham et al. 2010. some of the study’s analysis. The center-east is the coast or the 4. Data is from United Nations (2010), “World Population Pros- coastal region. pects” database. 2010 estimate. Young people aged 15 to 24 represent nearly 20 percent of the total population. Chapter 2 Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship 12 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion We must advance hand-in-hand to achieve the aims of the revolution. We must be active in society, working in associations. We must not be divided, for the stakes are very high for our country. People must be woken up, and that is the role of the political class. They have to be aware of the critical phase through which the country is passing, to invest in this organization building, to be less selfish, and to make the goals of the revolution triumph. Female high school student, Mahdia (coastal Tunisia) Since 2010, young Tunisian women and men the ability to make social contributions and to have stood at the forefront of social change, earn recognition and dignity. It also means hav- continually expressing their desire to participate ing confidence and commitment to economic actively in the public sphere. Yet, as this chapter initiatives. Such inclusion is, in effect, active shows, as of early 2013, when the data collec- citizenship, which is further defined in box 2.1. tion for this study was completed, young Tuni- In the recent Tunisian context, active citizenship sians believed that they continued to lack the can be considered social engagement to realize institutional channels necessary to effectively the ideals of the revolution. participate in postrevolutionary Tunisia, and they expressed little confidence in the country’s The positive interrelationship between the political and public institutions (Parker 2013). exercise of active citizenship and economic out- comes for youth, particularly for young peo- Youth inclusion has direct economic, politi- ple who are not in education, employment, or cal, social, and cultural implications, and it re- training (NEETs), is validated by new global quires the availability of institutional channels evidence. Recent econometric analysis finds for active engagement in community and public that improvement in civil liberties, in addition life. Broadly speaking, youth inclusion includes to economic freedoms such as the reduction in Box 2.1. Defining Active Citizenship The European Youth Forum, one of the world’s best established and most influential youth advocacy platforms, has defined active citizenship as a legal status and a role. A combination of specific attitudes and institutional arrangements must be in place for individuals to exercise “involvement, participation, and influence.” This definition of citizenship also encompasses an individual’s relations with others and the labor market, as well as questions of cultural iden- tity, given that individuals belong to and participate in many different communities—social, economic, and cultural. Citizenship defined as status in a political, legal, and social community is based on a set of legal rules that defines membership in the political community. These rules include legal rights—e.g., freedom of speech, thought, and religious belief, and the right to own property—as well as and political rights—e.g., the right to participate and exercise power. Source: European Youth Forum 2002b. Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 13 taxation and price stability, leads to a significant in community and political processes at the reduction of youth inactivity (i.e., NEETs) in the local and national levels, while not extensive, do long run. As a consequence of this finding, the exist and are expanding. Two key factors that World Bank estimates that improving the level directly affect whether youth engage in society of freedom in various developing regions to that are trust in institutions and the use of social of developed countries is likely to reduce youth media. inactivity by more than half in the Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa or 2.1 Trust in Institutions by 30 percent in Latin America (Ivanic and La Cava, forthcoming). Although the quantitative Active citizenship depends on trust and a will- survey data available for Tunisia does not allow ingness to constructively engage with institu- for a rigorous assessment of the causal relation- tions. Without a minimum level of confidence ship between civil liberties—which enable ac- in institutions, such as local politicians, courts, tive citizenship of the youth—and a decrease in police, and political or religious groups, it is youth inactivity at the country level, the global difficult for youth to work constructively with evidence leads to the conclusion that as civil institutions. Trust is an enabling condition for liberties take root in the country, particularly active citizenship and crucial to the engagement following the new constitutional provisions, of youth in the issues that affect their community NEETs are expected to substantially decrease. or country. Trust must be earned by institutions. Unfair treatment, injustice, or police violence While prospects for Tunisia appear prom- erodes confidence in institutions and without ising, this chapter shows that young Tunisians trust, societies tend to resort to confrontation. still encounter significant barriers to their full exercise of active citizenship. Young people Like the rest of their peers in the Middle East spoke in interviews of disappointments and and North Africa, young Tunisians have little broken dreams, as they face continuing social trust in public institutions. According to the injustice, lack of opportunities for civic and po- Gallup World Poll 2013, with respect to stan- litical engagement, and unemployment, which dards of living, life evaluation, social well-be- they perceive is exacerbated by favoritism and ing, community attachment, volunteering, and regionalism. The deep divide perceived between trust in national government, youth percep- the older generation that dominates decision tions in the Middle East and North Africa and making and the younger one that feels excluded Sub-Saharan Africa score at the bottom when from opportunities and lacks the voice to shape compared with other regions. However, the the future is also a critical issue that must be Middle East and North Africa had more youth addressed for the long-term stability of the reporting worsening standards of living in 2013 country. compared with 2012 and less confidence in na- tional government than African youth (Gallup At the same time, the qualitative research World Poll 2013). shows that, irrespective of gender and region, young Tunisians have developed a set of coping Young Tunisians rely on their families and strategies. These strategies combine family and religious institutions. The military, the local religion as a refuge from instability while focus- Imam, and religious organizations receive the ing on the values of merit, hard work, innova- youth’s highest trust rating of up to 80 percent, tion, self-seeking, and efforts to strengthen their which is nearly the same level of trust given autonomy. The opportunities for participation to family (see figure 2.1). In contrast, trust in 14 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion  rust in Public and Religious Figure 2.1. T areas express substantially less trust in the po- Institutions lice, the government, the justice system, the Universities Banks Community press, and the country.1 Across institutions, the 100% organizations trust level in rural Tunisia is, on average, 20 per- 80% cent lower than in urban areas. The trust levels Schools 60% Country among youth are independent of work status, 40% both within rural and urban areas (see annex 2, Religious organizations 20% Family figures A2.1 and A2.2). The trust levels of Tu- 0% nisian youth in banks and the press are slightly Press Imam higher among those who are working, but oth- erwise, they mirror the trust levels among their Politics Rural peers who are NEET. Justice Urban Police Military The overall discontent and the lack of trust in public institutions resonate among young Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. Tunisians through cultural channels, including rap and other musical forms. Since the pro- tests began in December 2010, rap has been the political institutions was at its lowest during the soundtrack to the Tunisian Revolution, while data collection: only 8.8 percent of rural youth pop, folk, and rock genres have also provided and 31.1 percent of urban youth had trust in musical accompaniment (see box 2.2). political institutions. In urban Tunisia, schools and universities are rated as trustworthy by Like their counterparts in Egypt and Libya, about 80 percent of youth as public spaces for young Tunisians express little trust in the press, dialogue. Stark differences exist between rural which they see as commercial and manipula- and urban youth. As a whole, youth in rural tive. While social media is recognized as having Young Artists and Freedom of Speech Box 2.2.  The arts, most particularly rap music, have been used to express young people’s anger at un- employment, poverty, and political repression. The rapper El General emerged as one of the revolution’s icons. His song “Rais Lebled” (Head of State) is regarded as the “anthem” of the revolution. Since the revolution, rappers have continued to give voice to youth disillusionment. Along with journalists, many musicians fell afoul of the government elected in 2012. They continued criticizing police brutality, expressing their disappointment with the revolution, and advocat- ing for freedom of expression. Seven rappers were arrested in the first six months of 2012. The rapper Weld El 15 received a 21-month jail sentence in absentia on charges of performing songs deemed insulting to the police at a concert in the eastern town of Hammamet. After he surrendered to the authorities, he was retried and received a four-month sentence, against which he appealed. Rapper Klay BBJ was finally acquitted on appeal in September 2013, after being charged and retried twice for criticizing the police. Sources: Al Jazeera 2013b; Auffray 2013. Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 15 raised awareness and supported social mobili- Use of Internet to Access Figure 2.2.  zation during the revolution, it is now viewed Information more ambiguously, as expressed by a young school teacher:2 Education 100% Facebook played a big role at the beginning 80% of the revolution. Since the revolution, the 60% Work Email followers of the different parties have their 40% own pages and publish their programs. It is 20% common to see mutual insults, and instead of 0% serving the revolution, these arguments drag it backwards. Facebook, one of the sources of the revolution’s success, has since turned into News Entertainment a space for attacking other parties. Male pri- mary school teacher, Tunis Rural Urban Job Search 2.2 Access to Information Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. More than any other medium, young Tunisians Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. Multiple answers were allowed during survey. are using the Internet to access information. The Internet is primarily used for entertainment, email, and news, but young men and women also newspapers (1 percent). Access to the Internet spend part of their time online to study, work, or is still limited in many rural areas, which also look for jobs (see figure 2.2). About 50 percent has implications for accessing labor market in- of all Internet users (43.3 percent rural, 53.2 per- formation. However, the relatively high level cent urban) use the Internet for education, and of connectivity has facilitated the emergence of many youth use it to look for jobs (45.9 percent a “youth culture” with its own styles, spaces, rural, 26.8 percent urban). Almost one out of six channels of communications, and leisure activi- young Tunisians also uses the Internet for work ties, distinct from the “official youth culture” of (14.4 percent rural, 15.9 percent urban). the former regime. Access to basic information and communi- Current and former graduate students spoke cation technology is widespread. More than 9 frequently about the Internet in the focus out of 10 young Tunisians in rural Tunisia own groups and individual interviews. Young people a mobile phone. In comparison, between one to have a very positive attitude toward informa- two-thirds of respondents used the Internet in tion and communication technology, seeing it as the previous month (34.3 rural, 60.0 urban; see a source of information, communication with figure 2.3). About one-quarter of interviewed other youth (virtual networking), connection youth are members of a social networking site with the world media and entertainment, and such as Facebook, which is primarily used to in- an effective way to find employment. One Mas- teract with friends and to read news. Television ter’s student from Sidi Bouzid (Central West Tu- remains the main source of news (68 percent), nisia) called the Internet “a second family” for followed by the Internet (13 percent), and per- the young. However, respondents also perceived sonal discussion (12 percent). Relatively few a spatial dimension to Internet access—a digi- relied on radio (6 percent), and even fewer on tal divide exacerbating the feeling of exclusion 16 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 2.3. Access to Information and Communication Technology—Rural Versus Urban Rural male 100 Rural female 92.4 92.8 Urban male 90 85.2 82.4 Urban female 80 70 64.3 percent 60 55.8 50 40 36.5 31.9 30 20 10 0 Cell phone Internet Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth; use of cell phone and Internet in last month. from broader Tunisian society among youth liv- enthusiastic about political engagement and as- ing in the interior of the country. sociational life, it has yet to be implemented in a fully active manner. In contrast to the idealistic People in the interior have nothing apart from aspirations associated with the revolution, the football, the street, and the café. Students are following youth’s sentiments highlight the po- bored at school, and can’t develop their abil- tential risk of engaging exclusively in a virtual ities through creative activities or entertain- public space. ment. Male student, Gafsa I combed through all the information on Face- To find a job, you have to go on the Internet. book to uncover the weaknesses of the ad- This must be the one part of the country where ministration. On Facebook, I take a critical there is no employment bureau. As for “Pub- stance, I am free and neutral, and what I don’t linet Cybercafés,”3 there are only a few in like, I attack. The Revolution of 14 January the center of Médenine, and that is an hour’s is above all a psychic revolution, a transition journey, costing TND2 [US$ (PPP) 2.76]. from one situation to another. We feel liberty Imagine, for anyone who lives in the villages after repression, liberty to communicate our around here, they have to pay for transport ideas. … After 14 January, the Internet is com- to the center of town, wait for an hour, and pletely free of censorship. Male unemployed then pay TND10 [US$ (PPP) 13.79] just to graduate, Médenine, southeast Tunisia register at the employment bureau. How can someone here get access to information? Male We watch TV. We surf the Internet. We go unemployed high school leaver, Médenine to check our Facebook pages at Publinet. We contact our friends in Tunis. We follow the To advance citizenship in a sustainable news. We know what is going on. I would like way, youth must progress beyond “virtual cit- to participate, express my views, but I don’t izenship” to “real” political participation at know how I should do it …. Female unem- local and national levels. While youth were ployed graduate, Mahdia, Central East Tunisia Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 17 Making the transition from virtual to active for CSOs in the fields of regional development, citizenship will require new associational skills, charity and poverty, religious affairs, and sci- which are as important as entrepreneurial skills ence. Sports and leisure clubs were also fre- in building effective agency. Youth can benefit quently mentioned in qualitative interviews. from opportunities to learn how to establish Despite the low levels of participation in asso- and manage associations, including understand- ciations, 9 out of 10 young Tunisians consider ing the legal environment for doing so, man- volunteering in CSOs to be important for their aging budgets, being financially accountable communities. In rural Tunisia, about 92 percent and transparent, lobbying effectively, handling of young women and 85.2 percent of young public relations and communications strategies, men identify community organizations as im- mapping democratic internal processes against portant for local development (see annex 2, effective management structures, and engaging figure A2.3). Trust levels toward community or- in strategic networking. ganizations are relatively lower in rural Tunisia, perhaps reflecting the heterogeneity in quality 2.3  Youth Participation in and the degree of political orientation displayed Civil Society by existing organizations. Only 40.7 percent of young women and 39.9 percent of young men Since the revolution, religious and other civil from rural areas trust community organizations society groups have been able to register with (see annex 2, figure A2.4). Trust is much higher the state, and an increasing number of organi- in urban Tunisia, where 63.6 percent of young zations focused on civic engagement have done women and 60.7 percent of young men say they so. Trade unions and student unions are play- trust community organizations. ing particularly significant roles in civil society (British Council 2013). For example, the Na- Levels of youth volunteering in Tunisia are tional Dialogue between the country’s political very low, however, with less than 1.5 percent factions has been mediated by four influential of all urban youth giving time to CSOs, point- civil society organizations (CSOs), including the ing to the need to develop more effective public country’s largest trade union. The Center for policy to support youth participation in civil so- Information on the Formation, Study, and Doc- ciety, particularly in volunteering. Volunteering umentation of Associations estimates that the among young urban men (2.12 percent) is al- number of registered nongovernmental organi- most twice as common as among young urban zations (NGOs) has increased by almost 50 per- women (0.89 percent) (see annex 2, figure cent since the revolution, from almost 10,000 A2.5). Almost three-quarters of all urban youth to approximately 15,000 (British Council 2013; volunteers live in the coastal region (figure 2.4). Khouja and Moussa 2012). In particular, reli- By comparison, only a marginal 13.2 percent of gious welfare organizations have been growing youth volunteers live in Tunisia’s interior, fol- in urban neighborhoods and in the interior re- lowed by 14.2 percent of youth volunteers who gions most affected by poverty and exclusion. live in the southern regions. The low overall level of volunteering and its regional disparities Nonetheless, only a small fraction of young highlight the scope and need to support youth Tunisians are active in CSOs. According to a volunteerism in Tunisia, particularly in the inte- recent survey, as little as three percent of rural rior and southern regions. youth participate in CSOs (ONJ 2013). Among the few youth active in CSOs, the most fre- Although youth participation in civil society quently mentioned types of volunteering are is still limited—particularly if participation is 18 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion  istribution of Youth Volunteers Figure 2.4. D among disadvantaged youth, who are currently by Region the least engaged. Volunteering should include the less educated; NEETs, including young women; and youth in marginalized regions and 14.2% Coast in peri-urban areas. Box 2.3 describes a World Interior Bank-supported project that provides incentives South for disadvantaged youth to volunteer in their 13.2% communities while offering opportunities to obtain job-related skills. 72.5% Generally, young people say they have lim- ited control over the course of their own lives, including decisions regarding education and work. This may be a reflection of their lack of engagement in civic society or in political af- fairs. Fewer young women than men report that Source: World Bank 2012e. they have influence on important life decisions. Note: Figure refers to all urban youth. No data is available for This difference is much more pronounced with rural youth. respect to work and marriage than with educa- tion (see figure 2.5). youth led—it should be viewed as a promising area for youth to engage in active citizenship in Young Tunisians do not feel that their voice view of the positive perception associated with is heard at the local level. When asked about volunteering. Youth participation in civil soci- whether the mayor or governor listens to local ety, and particularly in volunteering, could be concerns, a mere one in eight young rural Tu- supported as an avenue to promote greater so- nisia said that politicians listen. Only 11.5 per- cial inclusion, especially at the local level and cent of young men and 12.4 percent of young Figure 2.5. Influences on Youth’s Life, Education, and Work Decisions 90 79.6 Coast male 80 78.9 73.2 Coast female 70 68.2 68.7 68.8 Interior male 65.4 63.5 65.5 Interior female 60 56.6 58.0 54.3 South male 51.5 47.4 48.5 South female percent 50 47.3 43.5 43.2 40 30 20 10 0 Education Work Marriage Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Survey questions: “Does your family have a strong role in decisions about: (1) your education; (2) where and what you work; (3) who you will marry?” Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 19 The IDMEJ Project: Investing in Youth Inclusion in Box 2.3.  Lagging Regions Project Design: Following the Tunisian Revolution, the Government of Tunisia launched the IDMEJ youth project to strengthen youth inclusion, with the support of a grant by the World Bank’s Japanese Social Development Fund. IDMEJ means “inclusion and cooperation” in Arabic. The project provides a scalable alternative to existing public works programs. It pro- motes youth-led community development and participation while providing participants with small stipends. The project provides emergency income support and short-term employment to 3,000 youth with a secondary education or less—mostly youth who are not in education, employ- ment, or training (NEETs)—in the disadvantaged governorates of Kasserine and Siliana in the central-western region of Tunisia. Implemented by the National Youth Observatory, the project combines skills training with community volunteering, apprenticeships, and self-em- ployment opportunities. The project is relatively cost effective with a per capita beneficiary cost of less than US$1,000, which could be further reduced through scaling up. Results: As part of the project, youth aged 15–29 receive training in life skills, including financial literacy. Beneficiaries volunteer for up to five months in community projects man- aged by local civil society organizations. Initial project results show that over 85 percent find the training useful. New technical and social competencies were acquired by 76 percent and 80 percent of respondents, respectively. These positive results are in line with an assessment of more than 200 international civil service programs, which exhibited an increase in work skills, career options and education, as well as higher self-esteem and sense of civic responsi- bility (McBride, Sherraden, and Benítez 2003). IDMEJ has indeed led to improved relations between local youth nongovernmental organizations and local governments. Additional funds have already been mobilized by local governments in the Siliana and Kasserine Governorates to replicate and scale up this component based on its success on the ground. Overall, the proj- ect benefits youth by helping to break the cycle of inactivity, supporting young women, and promoting social inclusion and trust. Management and Monitoring and Evaluation: The project is supported by an innovative cost-effective approach to monitoring and evaluation, using an online platform that allows real-time data entry and analysis that is accessible by multiple stakeholders. The project collects direct beneficiary feedback about the quality of services and their impact on employ- ability via mobile phones. Source: Observatoire National de la Jeunesse-Social Science Forum 2013 and World Bank 2014. 20 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion  outh Influence on Local Figure 2.6. Y party or pressure group, campaigning, or stand- Development ing for election. Participation encompasses more 50 than elections; it involves participating in the 40 38.0 38.9 public discourse through organized channels, petitions, and other forms of expression. Nev- percent 30 Male 20 Female ertheless, participation in elections in postrev- 11.5 12.4 10 olutionary Tunisia is an important indicator of 0 public trust in political institutions and an exer- Rural Urban cise of active citizenship by young people, espe- cially given their central role in the revolution. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. The low participation rate by youth in the Tunisian national elections of October 2011 was especially worrisome. Only one-half of un- women in rural Tunisia say they feel that local der-30-year-olds voted. Participation in urban politicians are listening (see figure 2.6). Per- areas was slightly higher than in rural areas (see ceived youth influence on local development is annex 2, figure A2.6). The voting rate of young more than three times higher in urban areas, women and men are very similar. Only 17 per- where 38 percent of young men and 38.9 per- cent of youth aged 18 to 25 registered to vote, cent of young women said that local concerns according to a survey by the British Council matter to the mayor or governor. These regional and the American University of Cairo’s Gerhart disparities underscore the intensity of youth ex- Center (Parker 2013). clusion, especially in rural Tunisia. Low levels of political participation by youth Young Tunisians believe that they cannot eas- reflect the limited space that young people per- ily influence the political process or the postrev- ceive for themselves within established parties. olution transition. Lacking channels to engage During focus group discussions, young people constructively with the political process, young repeatedly said that the revolution was initiated Tunisians take their understandable frustrations by the young but co-opted by the “old” and es- to the streets in the protests that characterize tablished politicians. Persistent unemployment, postrevolutionary Tunis. The café remains the worsening social justice, and the continuing pa- main venue to discuss politics. According to a tronage and regionalism of the old order have recent youth survey, 72 percent of those inter- dampened the optimism ignited by the revolu- viewed said they discussed politics mostly in tion. With scant tangible gains since the revolu- cafés, but politics is also an important topic of tion, the level of disillusionment for many has family conversation (50 percent) (Observatoire intensified to a sense of betrayal. Relatively low National de la Jeunesse-Social Science Forum participation in the elections was a clear indica- 2013). tion youth of disillusionment and lack of faith in formal political parties, as illustrated in the 2.4 Political Participation quote below: Political participation is a key pillar of active A youth revolution has produced an assembly citizenship. Participation entails taking part in with very old people. Young Tunisian activist mainstream politics, including voting, joining a (Parker 2013) Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 21 Young Tunisians are extremely underrepre- Politically Knowledgeable Youth— Figure 2.7.  sented in the Constitutional Assembly. Only 4 by Gender percent of the 216 members of the Constitu- 40 tional Assembly are aged 30 or younger. While 30.0 30 17 percent of the members are between 30 and 24.0 percent 20.3 40 years old, the remaining 79 percent of mem- 20 14.4 Male bers are more than 40 years old. All parties 10 Female registering in the 2011 elections had to include 0 Rural Urban youth candidates on their slates. The fact that so few were actually elected proved to young Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. people that the system privileged older people Note: Figure refers to all youth. in spite of the law. The revolution represented an explosion of disaffection—especially among the youth—and a rupture with earlier forms of it applies to all electoral lists for constituencies activism. Dissent was amplified through direct with four or more seats. However, the youth horizontal communications, a loose network provision is not a requirement but instead for- without clear leadership and operations without mulated as a financial incentive. Any electoral hierarchy or organizational structure. However, list not meeting the youth requirement has half many youth were quickly disillusioned with of its public funding withheld. the functioning of electoral politics. The lack of openness among established parties and the Most young Tunisians say that they do not striking of deals behind closed doors ran con- follow domestic politics. In rural Tunisia, less trary to the principles of fairness and transpar- than one-quarter of all males (24.0 percent) and ency, excluding the very generation that had less than one out of seven young women state brought about political change. A young female that they are knowledgeable about Tunisian activist observed: politics (see figure 2.7). Knowledge about pol- itics is somewhat greater in urban areas, where I have many friends who joined political par- some 30 percent of young men and 20.3 per- ties after the revolution, but just after the cent of young women say they were current on elections, they withdrew because they were politics. The relatively small portion of young disappointed in the strategies of these parties, people who consider themselves knowledge- as there was no collaboration between the able about politics—even in such politicized youth and the elders in the party. Female po- times—highlights the difficulty of following litical activist, Tunis (Parker 2013) the tortuous daily developments in the political processes and accessing independent political A youth provision in the new electoral law, information. Qualitative research also suggests which incentivizes political parties to nominate that young people without much political un- young candidates, provides an important entry derstanding may be vulnerable to manipulation. point for political participation.4 Specifically, Article 25 of the electoral law requires every Yes, I voted, and noticed two things after the candidate list to nominate among its top four elections: people have their religious beliefs, candidates at least one candidate less than 35 and they don’t really understand politics. years old. Importantly, the youth article affects Those who voted for Ennahda made a con- national, regional, and local elections because nection between the party and their religion. 22 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion People who were sincere believers, but not election, reflecting participation rates in the pre- politicized, believed it was the right thing to vious election (ONJ 2013). These findings are vote for the triumph of Islam. Male student, consistent with an opinion poll conducted by Mahdia, East Central Tunisia the National Youth Observatory in April 2013, which showed that youth participation in polit- Self-reported knowledge about politics is ical life was very low: youth engagement did not about one-third lower in rural areas compared exceed 2.7 percent, while preference for a politi- with urban centers. Young Tunisians from rural cal party did not exceed 19 percent of interview- areas in the coastal provinces (17.2 percent) and ees (Observatoire National de la Jeunesse-Social the interior (15.7 percent) have relatively limited Science Forum 2013). knowledge about politics (see figure 2.8). Their counterparts in urban areas report being better Despite this disconnect between mainstream informed (25.6 percent in the coastal region and politics and the realities faced by young Tuni- 24.2 percent in the interior region). The excep- sians, elements within the younger generation tion seems to be young Tunisians in the rural are pursuing innovations to voice distinctively south who report the highest knowledge of pol- democratic aspirations to rebuild Tunisian so- itics, where more than one out of three youths ciety. Shortly after Tunisia’s National Constit- considers themselves well informed. uent Assembly (NCA) was elected, I Watch, a youth-led NGO established after the revolution, Very few young Tunisians are active in po- held a “Model NCA” in which 217 youths from litical parties, reflecting the large disconnect be- throughout the country proposed legislation for tween the younger generation and the political Tunisia’s future. Suggestions were then brought establishment. As few as 1.6 percent of those as recommendations to the elected NCA mem- interviewed in the rural survey were actively bers. Three of the six youth suggestions were engaged in politics as members of political par- reportedly chosen by the NCA members to be ties (see annex 2, figure A2.7). Only 11 percent implemented (Parker 2013). In addition, a new expressed any intention of joining a political youth movement is proposing a group of young party, while the great majority (82 percent) did Tunisians to participate as volunteer members to not even have a preferred political party (ONJ the new government (see box 2.4). 2013). Only about half of young rural Tuni- sians (54 percent) intended to vote in the next In January 2014, after the new constitu- tion was approved, some degree of optimism was restored. After two years of work by the  olitically Knowledgeable Youth— Figure 2.8. P Constitutional Assembly, a draft constitution by Region was completed and put to a vote on January 40 34.3 26, 2014. The assembly adopted the document 30 25.6 Coast with a majority of 200 to 12 and 4 abstentions. 24.2 23.4 percent 20 17.2 Interior Drafted during a period of turmoil and sporadic 15.7 South violence, the new Tunisian constitution seems 10 to have successfully brokered political differ- 0 Rural Urban ences—including the role of religion in gov- ernment—to produce a progressive and widely Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. accepted constitution. The new constitution Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 23 Box 2.4. Houkoumetna: The “Our Government” Movement The movement known as Youth Decides is calling for youth to play a full role in national poli- tics. The use of social media is central to its efforts. In December 2013, Tarec Cheniti, a human rights activist, nominated himself as prime minister by posting his resume on Facebook. Other young Tunisians soon followed suit, including Bassem Bouguerra, the president of Reform, an organization seeking to reform Tunisia’s police force. Bouguerra nominated himself as deputy minister for security reform. Soon, multiple “Youth Decides” subpages emerged on Facebook, with young Tunisians posting their resumes online and volunteering to be part of the government. The movement is a clear expression of the youth’s frustration at their lack of voice in the new political configuration. All of the prime ministers since the revolution were older than aged 50—one was 92-years-old. Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the ruling Ennahdha party, is 72 years old, and Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of the opposition Nidaa Tounes party, is 87 years old. Tunisian youth view the current political struggles as merely a resurgence of stale political ideologies and rivalries aligned with vested interests from the old regime. As Cheniti explained, “There are thousands of young Tunisian men and women who have gained enough education and experience to be able to run our country. These people deserve to be given a chance to lead the democratic transition because, after all, the revolution is theirs.” According to Bouguerra, “It’s about time that the youth started deciding for them- selves, instead of being used by older politicians for political interests.” Sources: Al Jazeera. 2013a; Poetic Politico 2013; Samti 2013. gives Tunisia a decentralized and open govern- Promoting Inclusive Youth 2.5  ment, recognizing Islam as the state religion Participation in Public Life while protecting freedom of belief. Equally important, Article 8 enshrines youth inclusion The new constitution opens the possibility of a along multiple dimensions as a key principle of new phase in Tunisia’s political history, includ- nation building: ing the potential to increase youth involvement in decision making—a civil society space that Youth is a driving force in the building of the youth are keen to fill. The time is opportune to nation. The state shall ensure that youth has consider interventions to support youth aspira- the necessary conditions for the development tions, to foster their participation at the local of their capacities, their taking of responsi- and national levels, and to rebuild their trust bilities, and the broadening and expansion of in policy making institutions as they reach to- their participation in social, economic, cul- ward the roles they have long been seeking and tural, and political development.5 the path that is at last now open to them. The following policy recommendations are there- fore intended to offer concrete avenues for sup- porting youth engagement from the bottom up, starting at the local level. 24 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Provide Incentives for Youth-Led NGOs local administrations, despite the rising tensions and Volunteering in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. Inter- national evidence on similar programs showed While several international organizations are a greater incidence of post-program civic en- providing youth NGOs friendly grants, the gagement and employability than the labor-in- complexity of their requirements often tends to tensive public works programs (Cunningham, privilege more educated youth from the urban Puerta, and Wuermli 2010). More specifically, coastal areas. Such efforts can be complemented it could be opportune to reallocate financial re- by providing competitive grant schemes to de- sources from labor-intensive public works pro- velop the capacity of youth NGOs at the local grams toward scaling up youth-led community level to service and engage young people in development initiatives as a more effective and peri-urban, rural, and lagging regions. Grant ap- empowering mechanism. plications should be simplified to allow greater access from a broader spectrum of youth stake- holders. In addition, there should be clear in- Build Youth-Led Institutions to centives for establishing partnerships with local Strengthen Voice in Decision Making and public institutions, charities, and foundations to Human Rights ensure the scale and sustainability of youth-led Tunisian youth representatives have attempted NGOs activities and community-based volun- to establish these institutional channels in the teering. The grant scheme should also offer ca- past, but these have yet to be formalized and ap- pacity building with respect to how to manage propriately supported to ensure their long-term associations, ensuring their financial account- sustainability. For example, in September 2012, ability and results measurement. youth representatives met with the leadership of the National Constituent Assembly and the for- Scale up of Youth-Led Community mer Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Development Initiatives Justice to convey a report that included recom- mendations regarding the creation of a Youth Youth-led community development initiatives Advisory Council. Prepared by 217 youth from have been successfully piloted in Tunisia. Such all governorates across the country, the report activities include small physical improvements also included results from five working groups: of local infrastructure, environmental manage- (1) fight against corruption and administrative ment, eco-tourism initiatives, income-genera- reform; (2) martyrs and victims of the revolu- tion activities tailored to young women and men, tion; (3) planning, development, and finance; and activities aimed at improving local gover- (4) premise and general principles of the con- nance. The IDMEJ project is one such example, stitution; and (5) structure of the constitution. implemented in the Kasserine and Siliana Gov- Although the report and the overall initiative ernorates by the National Youth Observatory were well received by Tunisian high-level rep- (see box 2.3). These activities, which are mainly resentatives, youth leaders point out that there aimed at inactive youth with a secondary edu- has been no subsequent follow-up (Actualités cation or less in exchange for a small monthly Tunisie News 2012). stipend, are identified and implemented by youth organizations or local youth groups with Appropriate institutional channels will need the support of local NGOs and governments. to be created to strengthen youth participa- Among other positive outcomes, IDMEJ has in- tion in the development and implementation creased trust between youth, local NGOs, and of national youth policy. In most European Youth Participation, Voice, and Active Citizenship | 25 countries, for example, young people and their Notes representative bodies are recognized as stake- 1. “La justice s’acharne sur les jeunes révolutionnaires tu- holders in the implementation of national youth nisiens,” Le Monde, June 16, 2014, reports that young people policies, a system referred to as co-manage- who participated in the revolution have been continuously ac- ment. This means engaging a range of youth cused of and prosecuted for violence and arson against police stations. Following the hunger strikes and pressure exerted by and student organizations, as well as national- the families of these protesters, an amnesty law was passed on and local-level youth councils that can serve as June 2, 2014, covering the period from December 17, 2010 to February 28, 2011. However, confrontations with police contin- channels for the voice of youth on critical pub- ued to occur well after February 2011. lic policy issues. In Tunisia, the establishment 2. These overall findings are confirmed by British Council 2013. of such youth representative bodies could facili- 3. Publinet is a subsidized Internet service in rural areas. tate the effectiveness and coordination of youth 4. The Tunisian National Assembly passed the new Electoral services and other youth-related programs and Law on May 1, 2014 (Jasmine Foundation 2014). 5. Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, Final Edition, January their articulation with national policy makers 26, 2014 (unofficial translation). and/or commune or provincial-level authorities. Such a process could be also be supported by the European Youth Forum and/or well-established national youth councils through peer learning and exchanges. Chapter 3 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment 28 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion For us, unemployment is a kind of blasphemy; an unemployed is not a person, society itself does not accept him, he is not part of the circle of society. That is the true meaning of “unemployed”: a person who is not active in the heart of the society. Tell me, what use is that person? Unemployed graduate, Sidi Bouzid Youth Inactivity; Young People 3.1  searching before finding a job. Tunisia’s youth Who Are Not in Education, are not only struggling economically; they are Employment, or Training; and marginalized and economically excluded. Many Unemployment—An Overview unemployed young women and men see little chance of ever finding work and starting their Youth inactivity is a massive problem in Tuni- careers. Formal employment grows ever more sia. Young people who are not in education, distant for the long-term jobless without con- employment, or training (NEETs) comprise a nections; few young Tunisians are able to find substantial proportion of the potential youth employment. This chapter presents the key chal- labor force in Tunisia (see figure 3.1 and box lenges related to unemployment and inactivity. 3.1). Young people without work who are no The chapter presents youth labor exclusion in longer attending any school or training pro- decreasing order of exclusion and starts with gram spend on average more than three years youth inactivity (NEETs) and unemployment, Figure 3.1. Youth Employment and NEET Framework 1. Labor Force Status 2. Time Use 3. Employment Status 4. Work Status 5. Formality Wage employed Formal Full-time worker Self-employed Unpaid or family worker Employed In Labor Force Voluntary part-time employed Part-time worker Informal Involuntary underemployed Job seeker Unemployed Discouraged NEET Inactivity or housework Out of Labor Force Inactive In education or training Student Student Source: Adapted from AfDB 2012a. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 29 Young People Who Are Not in Education, Employment, Box 3.1.  or Training—A Joint Indicator for Youth Unemployment and Inactivity The acronym NEET refers to young people who are not in education, employment, or train- ing. NEET is comprised of all youth who are either unemployed or inactive. By going beyond the arguably narrow lens of unemployment, the NEET concept helps policy makers consider the needs of all young people who have finished education and training and should be work- ing. The NEET indicator is a powerful tool to analyze youth exclusion by focusing on all young people experiencing difficulties in transitioning from education to work life. NEET is important because it more comprehensively defines youth inactivity, which stan- dard unemployment statistics generally overlook. Inactive youth are those young men and women already discouraged from looking for work despite their young ages. Instead of ne- glecting these young people, the NEET indicator encourages policy makers to consider that discouraged young people require at least as much government support as the unemployed. Discouraged youth—often referred to as inactive youth—are particularly vulnerable. Inac- tive youth are the litmus test for the effectiveness of youth policies aimed at fostering social inclusion. NEET is a well-established concept. Many member countries of the Organisation for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a growing number of developing countries are using the NEET indicator to complement youth unemployment statistics. It is systemati- cally measured by the International Labor Organization and presented in its annual flagship report, “Global Employment Trends for Youth” (ILO 2013). The OECD is also reporting NEET shares, and the organization has prominently applied the indicator in its recent “Afri- can Economic Outlook 2012,” which focused on promoting youth employment in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, including Tunisia (AfDB 2012a), and in the World Economic Fo- rum’s Global Youth Unemployment Study (WEF 2013). Recently, NEET was proposed by the United Nations High Level Panel to be used for the Post-2015 Development Goals (United Nations 2013). Originally coined by the government of the United Kingdom, the acronym “NEET” is used officially by statistical agencies in Canada, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Spain, and South Korea. While more efforts are needed to measure NEET globally, most labor force surveys already include the required variables to establish reliable NEET rates. Source: World Bank 2014. while the subsequent chapter proceeds to high- are NEET. Rates are even higher for young light the underemployed and informally em- women. One out of every two young women in ployed, and ends with youth who are formally rural Tunisia (50.4 percent) is NEET; about one in three urban areas (32.4 percent) (see figure employed. 3.2). The economic loss caused by this lack of productive activity is enormous. Equally im- One in three young men in rural Tunisia portant, however, is the social exclusion that (33.4 percent) and one in five in urban Tunisia 30 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion  outh NEET in Rural Versus Figure 3.2. Y to be rife with corruption. The interior region is Urban Areas also the area where most regular street protests 60 for jobs and better governance have been occur- 50 50.4 ring during the political transition period. 40 33.4 The NEET rate is highest for young women percent 32.4 30 Male 20 20.3 Female in the south, reflecting a virtual absence of ad- 10 equate employment opportunities that corre- 0 spond with the norms and expectations of a Rural Urban more traditional society. More than one out of two young women in the south is NEET (53.7 Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. percent). Female NEET rates are similarly high in the interior region (45.4 percent) and still affect one out of three young women in the millions of young Tunisians experience as they coastal region (31.3 percent) (see figure 3.3). are forced to squander their skills, creativity, Extended periods without work for hundreds and potential. of thousands of young and relatively well-ed- ucated young women risk further reinforcing A large number of young Tunisians are leav- traditional gender roles. It is also likely to delay ing the countryside and often migrating to des- much needed progress in gender equality and olate urban areas. The proportion of NEET female labor market participation for decades in urban Tunisia are less severe than in rural areas. However, in urban areas, the primary destination for many young job seekers—more Figure 3.3. Youth NEET by Region than one-fifth of young men (20.3 percent) and about one-third of young women (32.4 percent) a. Rural is NEET (see figure 3.2). 80 63.0 The severity and regional incidence of NEET 60 50.3 44.1 reflect the extent of despair among youth, which percent 40 35.5 32.3 31.3 Male is particularly acute in the interior and south, Female 20 the cradle of the 2011 revolution. NEET af- fects more than one-quarter in the coastal re- 0 Coast Interior South gion (23.6 percent urban, 37.3 percent rural), more than one-third in the south (35.9 percent b. Urban urban, 47.9 percent rural), and about one-third of youth in the interior region (31.4 percent 60 urban, 42.4 percent rural, see annex 3, figure 48.2 37.4 A3.3). These young people, excluded from the 40 28.3 percent 25.2 labor market for years, are referred to as “Gen- 18.8 23.2 Male 20 Female eration Jobless” (Economist 2013). Youth in the interior face an especially unproductive abyss 0 of years transitioning between their school and Coast Interior South work lives. As focus groups revealed, youth have little faith in their skills or qualifications as Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. they attempt to navigate a system they perceive Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 31 to come. Helping young women without work instrumental, a meager means to an immediate obtain employment or self-employment will re- end. Young Tunisian males in particular may quire renewed government efforts, investments, make the calculation that, as far as marriage and innovative strategies. prospects are concerned, an employed gradu- ate or nongraduate will consistently trump his unemployed counterparts. Therefore, such a Discouraged Youth without 3.2  position may still afford one some modicum of Work social recognition and personal validation that Systemwide nepotism, together with regional would have been impossible to achieve other- disparities in the labor market, have convinced wise. Nevertheless, these modest benefits and many potential job seekers without the benefit shifts in perspective may still be insufficient for of bribery, family connections, or certain re- some, as one young man described it: gional affiliations that seeking employment is When I have my official work, I will not be an exercise in futility. Furthermore, graduates zero. I do not really know when is it going may prefer to hold out for offers of employment to come, but I still have hope. I do not want that are either commensurate with their level of my next new job to be a menial one because education or professional qualifications or that spending my time studying and then taking a provide some potential for long-term job secu- position that has nothing to do with this train- rity and financial stability. In addition to being ing is quite bad. Tunisian youth Unemployed intellectually stimulating and personally fulfill- male graduate, Médenine ing, a position that directly corresponds with a graduate’s educational background and/or About half of all NEETs seem to be dis- substantive professional experience ensures that couraged from searching for work for several whatever unique skill sets and subject matter reasons. Young discouraged women and men expertise that he or she has acquired improves require even greater assistance than unem- rather than atrophies, as would be the case for ployed youth to transition to the labor market example with a “temporary” position in the ser- and to break the cycle of youth exclusion. Dis- vice industry. Conversely, a position that does couragement is particularly high among young not correspond with one’s educational back- women in rural Tunisia—85 percent (see figure ground or substantive professional experience 3.4). Also, one of out two young rural men but that would provide a graduate with some are discouraged—58.3 percent. Labor market form of long-term job security and financial sta- bility, provides male graduates with the social respectability, financial resources, and profes- Figure 3.4. Labor Market Discouragement sional prospects critical to a successful court- among NEETs ship and family formation with his partner. 100 85.0 80 Although low-skilled temporary jobs do not 58.3 percent 60 provide the same stability or potential for ad- 46.0 42.2 Male 40 Female vancement, many unemployed Tunisian youth 20 have begun to view these positions less as tem- 0 porary arrangements and more as being among Rural Urban the few viable options for employment. A young Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. unemployed Tunisian may justify his or her de- Note: Figure refers to NEETs aged 15–29 who identify them- cision to pursue such an arrangement as purely selves as discouraged. 32 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion discouragement among NEETs is only slightly Reasons for Being Out of the Figure 3.5.  better in urban Tunisia, affecting 46 percent of Labor Force by Gender (2010) young urban men and 42.2 percent of young 80 urban women. Male 70 Female 60 Many young job seekers who spend years 50 transitioning between their school and work percent 40 lives are eventually discouraged from continu- 30 ing the job search due to feelings of exclusion, 20 humiliation, and judgment. Many young peo- 10 ple decry what they perceive to be a total lack 0 Student Family reasons Illness/disability Other of empathy on the part of potential employers who one youth said, “treat you like a beggar or Source: World Bank staff based on Tunisia Labor Force Survey tell you, ‘God will provide for your needs.’ They 2010. do not listen to me.” Moreover, youth have lit- tle faith in the likelihood that they will be able to use the skills or qualifications they have ob- tained. They believe that they face a system that the home and marketplace. A woman’s decision is rife with multiple and complex barriers to to pursue employment outside the home may be their social inclusion. Some report witnessing considered subversive and as such, severely di- the failure of individuals whom they regard as minish her marriage prospects. Thus, a young more brilliant or talented than themselves to se- Tunisian woman must carefully weigh the finan- cure stable, long-term employment, and subse- cial and professional benefits of seeking employ- quently lapse into self-defeating apathy: ment against the potential social consequences for herself and for her family. Before the revo- We see people who are brilliant. They are ge- lution, family concerns were the most common niuses, but they still end up unemployed. So reason for women to withdraw from the labor what about me? I am really average. In my force (see figure 3.5). case, I am. That is what worries me. I am afraid of the future. Male high school drop- If a girl wanted to work as a secretary in a out, Sidi Bouzid (interior Tunisia) hotel that would be beyond acceptability from the moral point of view. Female graduate, Many young women are dissuaded from Médenine (South Tunisia) seeking employment by societal norms and expectations, particularly in the interior and Extended periods of youth unemployment re- south, where patriarchal traditions are deeply sult in negative material, social, and psychologi- rooted. Whereas Tunisian men remain generally cal consequences. When hundreds of thousands unrestricted in their choice of employment sec- of young Tunisian women and men are unable tor and venue, Tunisian women often find them- to find work, adverse effects on economic out- selves restricted to education and nursing. One put and social cohesion are quickly evident. En- young woman reported that her wish to work during a prolonged state of material dependence as a hotel receptionist was not “acceptable from on the family denies the discouraged youth op- the standpoint of morality” to her family. For portunities to develop as fully autonomous so- young female graduates, the state of public cial beings, to marry, have children, live in their space is such that many have few opportunities own dwellings, and confidently assert an au- to socialize and network beyond the confines of tonomous worldview, deepening their sense of Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 33 frustration and exclusion. Long periods without do not have a secondary degree (58.8 percent work or education also affect how young Tu- male, 55.8 percent female). Notably, about one- nisians value their lives and the decisions they fifth of rural NEETs have not even completed make. Economic dependence on parents runs primary education (15 percent male, 24.7 per- counter to the cultural expectation that mature cent female; see annex 3, figure A3.4) compared children should repay their families for the care with 6.2 percent of urban male NEETs and 8.4 given to them. Asking parents for money for percent of urban female NEETs.1 personal needs (e.g., a phone card, bus fare, or clothing) is humiliating for them. Very few young NEET Tunisians have com- pleted secondary or tertiary education. In urban You talk about unemployment, well that has areas, only one-quarter of the urban NEETs broken us, trying to find work. Now it is the aged 15–29 have university degrees (25.0 per- only goal, this aim to find work. At an age cent total—19.4 percent male, 28.4 percent when we should be paying back what we female), as shown in figure 3.6. Secondary ed- owe our family, we have become a burden to ucation (Bac) remains the highest level of edu- them. Unemployed graduate, Mahdia (coastal cation for another 10.0 percent of urban youth Tunisia) (10.4 percent male, 9.8 percent female), fol- lowed by vocational training in urban areas (8.0 percent total—11.4 percent male; 6.0 percent 3.3 Education and Inactivity female). Combined, these young women and The largest proportion of inactive youth is men who represent 43.0 percent of all urban found among less educated young people in NEETs are considered skilled but remain unable both rural and urban areas, with the rural share to find work. By comparison, in rural areas, of inactive youth being substantially higher. In only 17.1 percent of all NEETs are skilled: 13.2 rural areas, more than four out of five NEETs do percent with secondary education and 3.8 per- not have a secondary degree (81.5 percent male, cent with vocational degrees, mostly because 83.8 percent female; see figure 3.6). However, skilled youth migrate to urban areas.2 In both also in urban areas, more than half of NEETs rural and urban areas, the interior regions show the lowest education among NEETs (see annex 3, figure A3.5). The creation of employment op- Figure 3.6. Highest Education among NEETs portunities for these hundreds of thousands of by Gender (Ages 15–29) less-educated young women and men remains an immense challenge. 100 4.7 3.2 0.2 11.4 6.0 0 80 13.8 12.8 28.4 However, individuals with higher education 19.4 Vocational training University face higher rates of unemployment. When only 10.4 60 9.8 Secondary looking at unemployment in urban areas, it percent Below secondary 40 81.5 83.8 shows that unemployment rates are especially 58.8 55.8 high among individuals with tertiary education 20 (see figure 3.7). Particularly in urban areas in 0 the interior and southern regions, unemploy- Rural male Rural female Urban male Urban female ment rates among university graduates reach levels approaching 40 percent. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 15–29. The low educational levels among many young Tunisians without work suggest that 34 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 3.7. Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, Urban Tunisia Below primary Primary Low secondary 45 Secondary 40 39.0 Tertiary Vocational 35 30 29.1 25.6 25 23.9 23.9 percent 21.7 21.6 20.4 20 18.6 18.8 18.0 19.0 18.7 16.7 16.9 15.4 15 14.413.5 13.3 13.9 14.3 14.3 14.0 13.8 11.8 11.1 11.5 10.1 10.3 10.3 9.7 10 9.5 8.0 7.7 9.3 9.1 7.7 9.5 9.5 7.0 6.5 05 4.1 0 Northwest Northeast Tunis Midwest Mideast Southwest Southeast Source: World Bank. 2013b. Note: The rural survey did not find enough university graduates to report meaningful figures. additional professional training will be needed take up the technical and service sector jobs that to enable NEETs to find jobs. Without training a globalizing economy is likely to offer. The ad- to help young women and men acquire the skills ditional disadvantages faced by youth in rural needed to participate in a modern economy, to- areas are further confirmed by regression anal- day’s NEETs risk becoming a lost generation ysis of early school leaving (see annex 3, table that will face difficulties finding employment A3.1).4 The econometric results also highlight throughout their productive lives. the key roles played by parental education and household wealth. Leaving School Early The vast majority of NEETs never obtain a Figure 3.8. Highest Education among NEETs secondary degree, leaving most of the next by Gender (Ages 25–29) generation under-equipped for tomorrow’s job 3.4 2.9 11.1 7.0 100 market. When looking at all young Tunisians 0.1 0.6 15.8 11.2 who are not attending school (i.e., employed, 80 27.1 Vocational training 36.2 self-employed, or NEET), four out of five youth University 60 Secondary have not completed secondary education in percent 11.1 9.7 Below secondary rural areas—80.7 percent of males and 85.3 40 80.7 85.3 percent females (see figure 3.8). This compares 50.6 47.0 20 to one out of two youth in urban areas that have stopped going to school before completing sec- 0 Rural Rural Urban Urban ondary education (50.6 percent of males and male female male female 47.0 percent of females).3 These young people Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. can be considered early school leavers and are Note: Figure reports the highest level of educational attainment a cause of concern. Early exit from education among all young people aged 25–29 who have left education, including the employed and NEET. leaves the coming generation underequipped to Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 35 Dropping out of school is a phenomenon that young women chose to prolong their studies to affects both young men and women. More than postpone facing the reality of unemployment. half of Tunisia’s children leave school without completing upper secondary education. About I would like to complete my studies. What am I going to do if I stay at home? Watch the TV? 140,000 students drop out of school annually, It’s just further training, but it passes the time. 80,000 of whom have not completed their basic Female university student, Tunis education (Ben Romdhane 2010). Two-thirds of these dropouts obtain no further training and Once economic reforms begin to create eco- to varying degrees, generally find themselves in nomic growth, firms will shift toward sectors exploitative forms of casual labor. Often, they of higher productivity with higher demands for express a degree of bitterness or regret at hav- skilled labor. The need for unskilled manual ing left school due to family circumstances over labor will be replaced by demand for creative which they had no control—e.g., poverty, fam- skills, innovative capacity, and technical special- ily instability, or the geographic area where they izations. Such skills typically require a second- were raised. Youth dropouts may be vulnerable ary degree or vocational training. It is therefore to being recruited by radical religious organi- a serious cause for concern that large portions zations or may have few viable options beyond of young Tunisians are unlikely to benefit from clandestine emigration, as pointed out by one future productivity-driven economic growth. As young school dropout. a result, workers will continue to receive low wages and will face increased job insecurity and One of us stopped school so that another in increased income inequality. the family could study. Like that our family can avoid getting into debt. Better that one of us makes the sacrifice, and I repeat—it is a sac- Educational Quality rifice. Male school dropout, Mahdia (CE) Despite high enrolment rates, educational out- comes are poor across Tunisia. The findings of It is remarkable these days how the state just the 2011 TIMSS survey indicate that 75 percent bypasses the young. That’s why there is so of eighth graders in Tunisia perform “low” and much clandestine emigration. Male school “below low” in mathematics, despite marginal dropout, Mahdia (CE) improvements since 2003. Like most other Mid- Girls stay longer at school than boys and dle East and North Africa countries, Tunisia performs much lower than similar middle-in- account for 62 percent of university students. come countries in other regions (Mullis et al. School and university attendance by girls has in- 2012). Overall, secondary schools do not seem creased markedly since the 1960s and 1970s, and to provide students with the basic competences their academic performance has also overtaken necessary to competitively perform in a global- that of boys. In urban Tunisia, more than one- ized economy (World Bank 2012f, 2013c). third of all young women complete a university education (36.2 percent), a figure much higher Schools fail to impart life skills that would than the proportion of young men (27.1 percent) equip young people to transition to adulthood (see figure 3.8).5 However, women’s higher ter- and active citizenship. Practical skills training is tiary enrollment reflects the absence of employ- largely lacking in schools, as is instruction and ment opportunities for young women, at least in extracurricular activities that help to develop part. Qualitative research revealed than many social, personal, and communication skills that 36 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion would enable young people to reach their full that is in place limits the choice offered to pro- potential and impart the values of work and spective students and access to many popular citizenship. According to a study published by courses. CNIPE in 2008, among the many factors related to the perceived declining standards was the I requested Sociology and English and got abandonment of the examination at the end of Arabic. I hadn’t filled in the ninth and tenth the sixth year of primary school, known as the choices on the form, and the boy sitting next concours.6 Successive curriculum reforms failed to me suggested putting Arabic. […] I dropped to improve basic learning skills by Tunisian stu- the phone when I got the news. Male entrepre- dents. As one student commented: neur, Tunis Before, they weren’t like us; they knew the Much criticism is lodged against the suc- value of things. They knew what the human cessive reforms of the past few decades, which sciences were. Now, there are lots of books, youth believe affected the education sector but nothing in the head. We study lots of com- and that students view as ill-considered and plicated subjects, but they serve for nothing. arbitrary. The reforms resulted in policies that Student, Zaghouan (Northeast Tunisia) teachers were ill prepared to incorporate in the classroom. One such contested policy was A perception exists that the quality of teach- “Arabization,” which is using Arabic as the lan- ers also plays a role in the quality of education. guage of instruction at the primary and, in part, Qualitative research suggests that problems of at the secondary and tertiary levels, including poorly trained teachers start from the lowest for science courses.7 Initiated in the 1980s, the level of the education system, where too many Arabization policy is considered by the youth primary school teachers are recruited straight to have been implemented in an unsuccessful from college, without specialized teacher train- and hurried manner. As one young woman de- ing. As one young respondent said: scribed her experience: It’s not a question of training or recruitment; For three years I studied in secondary school, there are teachers who simply cannot control years 6 to 9, I studied mathematics, physics, their classes, who are simply not suited to the and sciences in Arabic. But we had teachers profession. Female unemployed graduate, trained in French. Personally, being among Madhia (interior Tunisia) the best students, I think that the teacher was confused. He couldn’t communicate, and I Most teachers don’t explain to their students couldn’t understand, because it was in Ara- what approach to take. They just give the bic, and I had the impression that it had been equation and the result. Male nurse, 28, Tunis learned unwillingly. If the course was not in (coastal Tunisia) Arabic from the beginning, and the teacher has not taught in Arabic before, he is not Career counseling in secondary schools and at going to be able to teach the knowledge. […] the university level is very limited, and students It helps neither the student nor the teacher. It lack guidance on critical career decisions. Many is exhausting. Female graduate student, Sidi young people emphasize the absence of support Bouzid (interior Tunisia) and advice regarding the choice of courses and their career implications. In addition, the cen- The final secondary assessment (baccalau- tralized and rigid university admission system reate) is another area of contention. Some 25 Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 37 percent of the final evaluation is based on eval- identification of apprenticeship opportunities. uations derived from continuous assessment, By developing inclusive information and ori- meaning that teachers can assign grades arbi- entation spaces and coaching Tunisian youth trarily. This grading system is open to manipula- toward long-term work goals—especially dis- tion, favoritism, and score inflation. In addition, advantaged youth at risk of dropping out of the timing and manner of how foreign languages school—counseling services would also serve as are introduced into the curriculum are criticized a preventative measure to reduce early school by many students. leaving. This proposed reform is intended to complement necessary structural, long-term re- While most industrialized countries are pur- forms across the education sector in Tunisia. suing a strategy of life-long learning, in Tunisia, opportunities for additional training are very A final key recommendation is to ensure limited after leaving school. On-the-job training that youth organizations have the opportunity for employed youth is very infrequent—only 1 to voice concerns and offer solutions regarding in 10 young employed Tunisians have received educational issues. The experience of other mid- professional training in the past year. According dle-income countries shows that, apart from its to the National Employment Observatory-In- immediate value in curbing corruption and mal- ternational Labour Organisation 2013 School- practice in the school system, greater student to-Work Transition Survey (SWTS), only 10.4 and parental participation in schools increases percent of young employed Tunisians had taken the accountability of teachers and school ad- part in professional training, mostly for further ministrators while providing students with specialization (ILO 2014). Nearly half of these greater opportunities to influence how curricula training activities were funded through public are designed. In Tunisia, this would likely lead programs (40.8 percent). Access to these training to a focus on introducing skills that are valuable activities is similar for young men and women.8 for the job market (La Cava and Michael 2006). University youth organizations can play a Counseling for Better School-to-Work constructive role in improving the educational Transition system. For example, a regional network of Given the high levels of school dropouts from student organizations from several countries in secondary education, counseling services need Southeastern Europe, established in the after- to be established, particularly for students in math of the post-Yugoslavia conflicts, helped the grades most affected by early school leav- to implement several crucial reforms. These ing. To be effective, these services should be organizations succeeded in introducing student professionally managed by private-sector ombudswomen and ombudsmen in several uni- providers in partnership with youth-led non- versities, quality of education assessments, and governmental organizations to ensure proper governance changes affecting education min- outreach to teachers and parents and, most im- istries as well as university administrators and portantly, peer mentoring. Counseling could be faculty (La Cava and Michael 2006). In the incrementally introduced in secondary public United Kingdom, all university departments schools across Tunisia to provide professional have staff-student consultative committees that orientation, relevant information, life skills, review everything from research strategies to and psycho-pedagogical support to facilitate program quality assurance to student demands. the school-to-work transition, including the Students sit on all internal university review 38 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 3.9.  NEETs Registered as Unemployed— Barriers to Finding Work Rural Versus Urban 70 Unemployment offices provide only limited sup- 63.3 60 port, and most NEETs are not even registered 50 46.0 as unemployed, especially in rural Tunisia. In- Male 40 formation about new job openings is difficult to percent Female 30 obtain and is rarely available without connec- 20 14.5 tions. In a labor market with widespread unem- 8.1 10 ployment affecting most families, the few new 0 Rural Urban jobs that become available are first reserved for relatives and friends before regular applicants Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. are considered. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs. Tunisia’s unemployment registration system requires substantial investments and technical boards, and student representatives sit on uni- assistance. The lack of unemployment services versity governing bodies. There is an enormous in urban and especially in rural areas further range of opportunities for including student strengthens rural-urban disparities. More de- unions more fully in university reform and tailed analysis reveals that little regional vari- oversight. Similar initiatives at secondary school ation exists, even though registration in the levels could be supported in Tunisia through a interior region is the lowest overall (see annex competitive grant scheme to which students and 3, figure A3.6). youth organizations could apply. In order to find work, it is necessary to con- sult the Internet, go to an employment office, Pathways and Obstacles to 3.4  but this is one of the few regions where there Employment is no employment office. …It costs 2 dinars for one-hour Internet access … and 10 dinars Unemployment Registration just to register to the employment office. Un- employed graduate, Sidi Maklouf, Médenine Despite the high NEET rates, few young Tuni- sians are registered with the unemployment of- Recruitment processes are widely considered fice. In rural Tunisia, only 14.5 percent of young unfair, especially for public sector jobs. Job men and 8.1 percent of young women without competitions, which are the formal avenue for work are formerly registered as unemployed recruitment, were dismissed as a sham during (see figure 3.9). The registration rates are some- qualitative focus group discussions. The follow- what higher in urban Tunisia—46.0 percent of ing factors, among others, were considered as men and 63.3 percent of women—but are far common practice in influencing recruitment: (1) from universal. Tunisia’s unemployment offices connections, (2) bribery, (3) nepotism, and (4) must greatly improve and expand services to regionalism. While these types overlap, each has reach young NEETs, provide helpful services, its own characteristics. and effectively support youth without work to find employment, especially in rural areas. The However, corruption and nepotism are es- current system barely reaches one in ten rural sential to actually getting a job. When asked youth without work and only one out of two about the two most important aspects in their urban NEETs. job searches, young Tunisians underscored the Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 39 importance of relations—53.6 percent of rural Main Reasons for Finding Figure 3.10.  and 62.6 percent of urban youth (see figure Work Opportunities— 3.10). Qualifications are thought to be of equal Rural Versus Urban importance, expressed by levels of education 80 Rural (50.2 percent of rural youth and 56.9 percent 70 62.6 Urban of urban youth) and work experience (20.9 per- 60 53.6 56.9 50.2 cent of rural youth and 14.7 percent of urban 50 percent 40 youth). 30 20.9 20 14.7 Regionalism describes the phenomenon of 10 favoring youth from the coastal region for many 0 private sector jobs. Regionalism is prevalent and Relations and Education Experience nepotism level contributes to inequities. The favoritism may be because of the perceived ability of coastal Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Because multiple answers were youth to draw on cross-regional networks of allowed, percentages do not equal 100 percent. patronage. At many private sector institutions, including banks and factories, hiring decisions are heavily influenced by regional elites. This is the enormous challenges of expanding youth not only a characteristic of the interior. A female access to labor opportunities in a gender- and student at Zaghouan, only 15 km from Tunis, spatial-inclusive manner. Young Tunisians view said of a factory established there: informal networks and other unfair practices They never employ people from around here. as barriers to the few existing available jobs. In They recruit people from Tunis or Sousse, be- particular, young Tunisians from poor house- cause the bosses and the university professors holds and disadvantaged youth without second- are not from here. Everybody takes on the ary education degrees spend years searching for people that they know. Female student, Zag- work. Moving forward, the integration of disaf- houan (coastal Tunisia) fected (NEET) youth into a labor market that is largely driven by regional disparities, personal Lack of personal contacts is a key obstacle connections, traditional norms, and family pref- in the search for employment among young erences should be a central policy concern for Tunisians, in addition to the overall lack of op- boosting the country’s path to socially sustain- portunities. When asked about the two most able economic growth and stability. The fol- important difficulties in finding work, the lack lowing chapters will highlight measures to be of opportunities and lack of contacts ranked considered for reducing the exclusion among the highest in both urban and rural Tunisia (see the most affected youth categories. figure 3.11). Other important aspects frequently cited are the lack of financial means and quali- Instead of relying on the labor office for fications. These are interrelated, creating multi- information about job openings, most young ple layers of barriers. In focus group interviews, people use informal social networks to find em- participants identified a vicious cycle: lack of ployment. Only 31.0 percent of rural youth and work experience makes it difficult to break into 44.8 percent of urban youth rely on the labor of- the job market, especially into the private sector. fice for information on new jobs. Instead, more than two-thirds of rural youth (67.2 percent) Three years after the beginning of the revolu- and nearly half of urban youth (42.3 percent) tion, the Tunisian government continues to face learn about job openings through networks and 40 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Main Difficulties in Finding Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban Figure 3.11.  80 Rural 67.5 67.8 Urban 70 60 52.8 50 45.4 percent 40 30 23.5 20 16.4 17.7 16.2 12.2 11.9 10 8.4 6.7 0 No opportunities No relationships No financial Recruitment No work in No information resources qualification specialization difficult Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Because multiple answers were allowed, shares do not add up to 100 percent. personal contacts (see figure 3.12). This creates percent in rural areas (see figure 3.12). The In- large information asymmetries, whereby many ternet has surpassed traditional media such as qualified youth do not learn about job openings, television and radio for 14.3 percent of rural further contributing to longer periods of unem- and 2.5 percent of urban youth, and it has sur- ployment and fewer job placements. passed newspapers for 23.9 percent of rural and 21.9 percent of urban youth. However, Among young Tunisians, the Internet has be- many young Tunisians do not have Internet ac- come the second most important source of in- cess, especially disadvantaged youth and young formation about job openings. In urban areas, women and men in rural areas. Alternative tech- 43.3 percent of youth use the Internet to find nologies, such as Short Message Service (SMS), jobs, compared with a still much lower 27.6 provided by public-private initiatives, hold the Figure 3.12. Sources of Information about Work Opportunities—Rural Versus Urban 80 70 67.2 60 50 44.8 Rural percent 42.3 43.3 Urban 40 31.0 30 27.6 23.9 21.9 20 14.3 10 2.5 0.9 1.3 0 Relationship Labor office Internet Print media Radio SMS network and television Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Because multiple answers were allowed, percentages do not add up to 100 percent. Introduction | 41 potential to reach many more young Tunisians. 4. The table reports the results of a Probit model of early school leaving and largely confirms the results also found for edu- The current rate of SMS subscription for new cational attainment as a whole. As before, the very large and jobs opening remains very low among young strongly statistically significant coefficients make it plausible that household wealth is playing a strong causal role in determining people—0.9 percent in rural areas and 1.3 per- educational outcomes. Some of the reasons for this were sug- cent in urban areas. gested above. 5. The rural sample did not include enough university graduates to make a meaningful comparison. Notes 6. A 2008 study by CNIPE (2008) revealed that a good propor- tion of year seven and eight students, in the aftermath of the 1. These rates of educational achievement are better than those discontinuation of the practice of repeating years in 1996, could of older generations. The share of Tunisians aged 30-59 who are neither read nor write Arabic or French. NEET and have not completed secondary education is 91.7 per- 7. Officially, Arabic is the language of instruction at the basic ed- cent (male) and 98.3 percent (female) in rural areas, compared ucation level, and French is taught as a foreign language. French with 71.3 percent (male) and 80.9 percent (female) in urban becomes the language of instruction for technical, scientific, and areas (see annex 3, figures A3.1 and A3.2). mathematic subjects, while all other classes are taught in Arabic. 2. The survey did not capture sufficient rural youth with uni- However, focus groups indicate that mathematics and some sci- versity degrees to make qualified statements about their share. ence classes are being taught in Arabic in locations throughout 3. These results refer to young people living in rural and urban the country. areas, respectively; they do not account for migration. 8. See annex 1 for more details on the results of the 2013 School- to-Work Transition Survey. Chapter 4 Economic Opportunities 44 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Whether you’re a girl or a boy, you tell yourself: “All the same, after all of these years of studying and sacrifice, you end up staying home. Even if you try to work past it, it affects you psychologically … this life does not satisfy you anymore. You would rather live in better conditions, in a better environment.” Female unemployed graduate, Tataouine (South Tunisia) This chapter highlights the economic opportu- 4.1 Employment Opportunities nities available to young Tunisian women and men, and presents the state of employment and Despite Tunisia’s policies on gender equality, entrepreneurship in both formal and informal few young Tunisian women are employed. Less sectors. The results underscore that significant than one in five young women in rural Tunisia regional and gender disparities exist in youth (18.5 percent) and less than two in five in urban employment prospects, also documented in a Tunisia (39.8 percent) have jobs.2 Among Tu- recent World Bank study on labor market out- nisian young people who are not in education, comes in Tunisia (World Bank 2013b). Most em- employment, or training (NEET), rates of em- ployment is offered without written contracts, ployment are substantially lower among women providing limited job security and little access than among men (see figure 4.1). Female em- to social security.1 Lastly, a separate section on ployment is particularly low in the south (8.3 self-employment highlights the substantial en- percent in rural areas and 17.2 percent in urban trepreneurial potential of young Tunisians while areas) and in the interior region (16.1 per- also discussing limited access to finance and the cent in rural areas and 34.3 percent in urban implications of excessive regulations on self-em- areas), compared with young women work- ployed youth. ing in the coastal region (27.5 percent in rural areas and 45.9 percent in urban areas). Male Figure 4.1. Employment of Young Tunisians a. Rural b. Urban 80 80 68.0 58.1 60.3 60 53.6 60 56.6 48.9 45.9 percent percent Male 40 Male 40 34.3 27.5 Female Female 20 16.1 20 17.2 8.3 0 0 Coast Interior South Coast Interior South Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs. Economic Opportunities | 45 youth employment is very low overall, even in the 2011 revolution was the spatial, economic, the coastal region (58.1 percent in rural areas and political marginalization of society in parts and 68.0 percent in urban areas), followed by of the country that favors the coastal region the south (53.6 percent in rural areas and 60.3 (Ayeb 2011).4 A more recent analysis argues percent in urban areas), and the interior (48.9 that the uprisings spread between marginalized percent in rural areas and 56.6 percent in urban communities throughout the country in what areas). Overall, between one-third and one-half was coined “socioeconomic proximity,” rather of all young men who, in principle, could work than geographic proximity (Egel and Garbouj are without employment, implying a substantial 2013). amount of forgone economic output. Youth migration further reinforces existing The chances of young people to find em- regional disparities and urban-rural divisions. ployment depend first and foremost on family Youth migration deprives rural areas of its lim- background. Regression analysis suggests that ited skilled young labor force while feeding the paternal education counts more than a young ever-growing poor suburbs of urban Tunisia. person’s own education in determining whether In effect, migration cements the inability of the the young person finds work, while household rural hinterland to shift toward a high-produc- wealth also appears to play a strong role (see tivity economic model. In this vicious circle, the annex 4, table A4.1).3 This suggests that factors youth of the interior see themselves as victims of that cannot be directly controlled for in the re- neglect and regional bias. Youth migration fur- gression—such as family connections and edu- ther adds to the social pressure in urban areas cational quality, both of which are likely to be that are unable to absorb the rapidly growing correlated with paternal education—play signif- numbers of young unskilled workers. Young icant roles in youth finding employment. Tunisians migrate not only for work but also to exit from the social pressure in rural communi- Regional Exclusion ties, delaying many life decisions, and thereby creating additional frustrations among young [President] Bourguiba developed the Monastir men and women. Migration is seen as traumatic region, [President] Ben Ali developed Sousse, by many—an exile from family and community. but the regions of the interior are forgotten. Many young people depict leaving home and The State should deal with the regions fairly. the emotional and material support of family, Given the rate of unemployment in Sidi Bou- friends, neighborhood, and the café for urban zid, which is twice that in Sousse, they should areas as a sacrifice “where no one sees me” stop investing in Sousse until the other regions rather than as an adventure. catch up, then everyone would be happy. With such measures, equality could be established Rural youth continue to move to cities as between the regions. Male unemployed grad- they attempt to escape rural areas, despite the uate, Sidi Bouzid lack of good jobs in urban areas. Nearly 90.2 percent of rural households report that mem- Young Tunisians face poor odds in finding bers of their direct family5 have migrated to employment, especially in the interior and the urban areas, mostly the siblings of rural youth. south, according to a recent report on the spatial Rural-urban migration continues to be an im- divide of labor market outcomes (World Bank portant pathway for rural youth, especially for 2013b). In fact, among the underlying causes of young men. Nearly one-quarter of male migrants 46 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 4.2. Destinations of Rural Migrants by Gender a. Male b. Female Greater Tunis 2.4% Greater Tunis 15.3% Other urban 16.7% Other urban 24.6% Rural Rural Abroad Abroad 28.4% 48.8% 32.2% 31.7% Source: World Bank 2012d. Note: Figure refers to all current migrants who are siblings of rural youth. have moved to Greater Tunis (24.6 percent), Gender Exclusion to other cities (31.7 percent), or abroad (15.3 percent), while just over one-quarter (28.4 per- Exclusion based on gender remains a daunting cent) of male migrants from rural households challenge for young Tunisian women trying to has moved to another rural location (see figure enter the workforce. Tunisia has made admira- 4.2). In contrast, relatively few young women ble progress in closing gender gaps in education migrate to Greater Tunis (16.7 percent), other and health outcomes, but investments in human towns (32.2 percent), or abroad (2.4 percent). development have yet to translate into higher Nearly half of all migrated female siblings have rates of female participation in economic life.6 moved to other rural areas (48.8 percent). Several established methods are available to better understand the prevailing gender discrim- Unemployed youth compete for the few jobs ination, including self-reported experience and that are available. Rural migrants are sometimes perceptions and wage regression analysis (see seen as undercutting the already low wages for annex 4, table A4.2). Figure 4.3 presents the unskilled workers in urban Tunisia. perceptions of young men and women in rural Tunisia regarding gender discrimination in the Those who come from rural areas are willing labor market.7 Nearly two-thirds (61.4 percent) to work at lower wages. Tunis is invaded by of female respondents report that women are migrants, while other areas of the country are discriminated against when seeking work in the empty, and Tunis residents cannot find a job. I private sector. A smaller but still considerable think there should be a visa to live in the city, number (44.4 percent) perceive gender discrim- so that young people don’t just overcrowd the ination in the public sector. A large proportion place. In Tunis, there is no more space any- of young men agree that discrimination against where. Male informal worker, Tunis (coastal the recruitment of women exists: 44.1 percent Tunisia) in the private sector and 32.4 percent in the public sector. Economic Opportunities | 47 Perceived Gender Discrimination Figure 4.3.  young women by their families. The qualitative in Private Versus Public Sectors, data show that social norms continue to limit the Rural Tunisia mobility of young women for employment (see box 4.1 on family formation). A young woman 70 61.4 living away from her family would be tolerated 60 50 by some families only if the job were consid- 44.1 44.4 40 Male ered socially acceptable and increased her mar- percent 32.4 Female 30 riage prospects—i.e., work that is appropriate 20 to her training, preferably in the public sector. 10 Some of the young female survey respondents 0 indicated that staying in their home regions may Private sector Public sector be seen as an imposition rather than an aspi- Source: World Bank 2012d. ration. Unlike young men, they cannot take on Note: Figure only refers to youth in rural Tunisia. casual, short-term “filler” jobs that may result in gaining relevant skills. Given the scarcity of Discrimination against women in the labor jobs considered appropriate, female graduates market is detrimental to female labor market can face years of unemployment pending their participation and to Tunisia’s development assumed transition to wives and mothers. potential. As the World Development Report Our parents encouraged us to study and work. 2012 states, “gender equality is smart econom- But it is always within limits defined for us, ics” and matters for development (World Bank which we can’t go beyond. It is a question of 2011). Providing women and men with equal mentality. People here think a girl can work as access to education, economic opportunities, a teacher or nurse; these are respectable, de- and assets has the potential to boost productiv- cent occupations. I am only allowed to be a ity. Qualitative research shows that many young teacher and nothing else. I couldn’t work as men believe the importance of a woman having a tourist guide, or in a factory, or anything a job is less than that of a man, given that the man is traditionally seen as the breadwinner. else. And worse, the job would have to be in However, increasingly, two incomes are becom- the south of Tunisia. I couldn’t even dream ing necessary to sustain a household, and em- of working far from home. Female graduate, ployability can be an asset for young women. As Médenine (South Tunisia) one graduate commented: However, driven by the economic needs of Men today are not looking for a housewife, their families, a significant proportion of young they prefer a woman who works and brings women from the interior and southern regions in money. And they are right. Female unem- are working. These young women are typically ployed graduate, Tunis working in factories in coastal towns such as Sfax, where they share accommodations with Familial concerns for women’s safety and others. In this case, there is a trade-off: on one social propriety continue to limit young wom- hand, between the norms governing the type of en’s participation in the labor market. Fewer work considered appropriate for a university options exist for women to work outside the graduate and, on the other, the family’s need for home, especially in the southern region, due to a income and the young woman’s desire to escape lack of economic diversification and the limited the tedium of the domestic sphere. As one fe- availability of work considered appropriate for male graduate put it: 48 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Box 4.1. Family Formation Some segments of Tunisian society perceive the possession of a degree from an institution of higher learning as a burden in several respects, especially among young women. These young women effectively become constrained by their own initiative and academic success because men may perceive women graduates as possessing more autonomy than is their lot in a pre- dominantly patriarchal culture and subsequently consider them inappropriate as potential wives. Furthermore, if the degree does not lead to employment, a young woman must return home to what, in some cases, is a mostly isolated life, particularly in the interior regions and in the south. Moreover, a woman’s sector of employment largely determines whether or not she remains suitable for marriage. Prevailing social norms permit a young woman to work as a nurse or teacher, but they preclude most other lines of work. Nevertheless, young Tunisian women believe that education and professional qualifications are significant assets for potential marriages as economic conditions make it progressively more difficult to manage households on single wages. The notion that both spouses can work is just as common among female nongraduates, who expressed the importance of contributing to household finances. In the words of one young woman “Life is even harder nowadays. It is necessary that both members of the couple work.” Employment status and educational credentials affect marriage prospects for young Tuni- sian men as well, albeit in a different way. On a societal level, many families would prefer that their daughters marry an employed man, regardless of his degree. Thus, unemployed male graduates possess little-to-no comparative advantage relative to unemployed nongraduates. The resultant lack of social status assigned to unemployed male graduates may dissuade po- tential couples from seeking an engagement for fear of being refused by the bride-to-be’s fam- ily, or worse, having the engagement broken off prematurely due to prolonged unemployment and intense pressure on the man to provide for his fiancée. Source: World Bank and ONJ 2012. I worked in a factory for a year after graduat- security. But only 15.3 percent of rural youth ing. I notice that most graduates do the same and 38.8 percent of urban youth have open- since they can’t find suitable work in their field ended work contracts. Figure 4.4 shows the of study. Female graduate, Sfax contract types held by employed youth in rural and urban areas. The labor market for young Job Informality Tunisians is dominated by temporary and sea- sonal contracts and day-labor arrangements. Job informality is common among Tunisian Over one-fifth of both rural (20.1 percent) and youth: less than one in three young workers has urban (20.9 percent) youth work with fixed- a formal work contract and access to social pro- term contracts, which provide limited job se- tection. Under Tunisian labor market regula- curity.8 Predictably, informality is the highest tions, only open-ended work contracts provide among rural youth, with over half (51.7 per- full access to social protection and extended job cent) working as day laborers. Overall, while Economic Opportunities | 49 Figure 4.4. Contract Type of Employed Youth (Ages 15–29) a. Rural b. Urban Open-ended Open-ended 15.3% Fixed term 19.1% Fixed term Temporary Temporary Seasonal Seasonal Day laborer 3.9% Day laborer 38.8% 51.7% 20.1% 17.2% 6.0% 6.9% 20.9% Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure only refers to working youth and excludes self-employed youth. these shares highlight job insecurity among with exploitative treatment by employers. In young Tunisians, contractual stability is much turn, stable employment, including medium- or higher than among older generations with much long-term contracts with social security bene- lower shares of open-ended contracts.9 fits, is cited among the main career aspirations. Registration in the social security system, the Job informality affects young Tunisians from Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS), is all walks of life. Regression analysis shows that frequently cited as the most important benefit informality is independent of household wealth, of any job, even among workers without formal meaning that poor and better-off youth are contracts. To many young workers, being reg- equally affected by informality. Youth in the in- istered in the social security system is perceived terior region face a higher probability of being as a means of maintaining dignity in the face of informally employed, while young Tunisians job loss. Work that does not meet these criteria with higher education face a lower probability is considered “false work” (faux travail), under- of being informally employed. The same is true taken only for the sake of survival. for young women, for whom informal jobs are less acceptable for social and cultural reasons I have no goals as regards choice of work. I (see annex 4, table A4.3). have no ambition. I accept any work I find. The most important thing for me is that I be Young Tunisians are largely discontented registered legally under the CNSS. Male infor- with informal employment and the risk of ex- mal worker, 21, Gafsa (South Tunisia) ploitation that comes with it. This is corrobo- rated by the young men and women interviewed The predominance of informal youth em- who frequently cite the short-term nature of con- ployment may be partly due to labor market tracts as a major aspect of job insecurity. Young distortions, which could be addressed by re- women and men associate short-term contracts form. According to a recent study on Tunisia’s 50 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion labor market regulations, several factors appear Tunisia’s recent history of providing basic to drive job informality (World Bank 2013c). education throughout the country is impres- First, inflexible labor regulations, associated sive, achieving nearly universal literacy rates. In with open-ended contracts, make it very difficult 2008, official literacy rates were 96.1 percent to terminate employment, leading firms to use among young women and 98.2 percent among informal short-term contracts instead (World young men, although rates in rural areas tend to Bank 2013c).10 Second, high income taxes on be lower (UNICEF 2012).13 Similarly, the rate wages—approaching 29 percent—create finan- of enrollment in tertiary education has risen cial incentives for workers and employers to from only 6 percent in 1987 to 35 percent in avoid formal contracts. Third, the social secu- 2007, with nearly half a million young Tuni- rity contribution is perceived as an additional sians currently participating in higher education tax because individual payments are not linked (Haouas et al. 2012).14 Much of the increase has to respective benefits (World Bank 2013c). Bal- happened in recent years when, for example, the anced reforms in labor market regulation are number of annual university graduates more needed to provide greater flexibility to firms than doubled in five years from 24,500 in 2001 while increasing protection for young work- to 52,300 in 2006 (Haouas et al. 2012). ers. In particular, the entitlements and rules for Despite achieving high rates of literacy and dismissal associated with fixed-term and open- university enrolment, Tunisia’s education sec- ended contracts should be aligned with interna- tor is failing to meet the needs and aspirations tional standards.11 of the young generation. Young people are in- In addition, limited education is one of the creasingly disenchanted with the overly theo- key drivers for labor market informality. Regres- retical knowledge they are taught, leaving them sion analysis shows that informal employment unprepared for the labor market, as are youth is strongly associated with a lack of educational in other Middle East and North African coun- qualifications in rural areas (see annex 4, table tries (World Bank 2008). This section presents A4.3). Controlling for individual factors, infor- young people’s views on the educational system, mality appears to be particularly pronounced which they see as synonymous with ill-equipped in the southern governorates.12 The estimations classrooms, poorly trained teachers, outdated also illustrate that young women are less likely curricula without relevance to the contempo- to have informal contracts. Given social norms rary labor market, lack of advice on the prac- regarding the appropriate forms of employment tical steps needed to obtain employment, and a for young women, the absence of formal em- failure to promote the entrepreneurial spirit and potential of the private sector (see box 4.2 for ployment seems to exclude young women from an overview of the education system). the labor market. Educational attainment is strongly related to Education and Low-Skill Jobs family background. Paternal education plays an important role, as one would expect, but so does What I studied in university has no relation to household wealth. An estimation of educational what I now do at work, even though it is vir- attainment suggests that household wealth tually in the same field. We had lots of theoret- plays an important role in determining educa- ical courses, but the practical side was almost tional attainment (see annex 4, table A4.4).15 nonexistent. Female bank employee, 28, Tunis This may be due to the relationship between Economic Opportunities | 51 Box 4.2. Education in Tunisia Basic Education.a Basic education from grades 1–9 is compulsory and is comprised of six years of primary education and three years of preparatory education, which is also referred to as lower secondary or middle school. At the end of grade six, students must score above 50 percent on their exams to continue to middle school. Traditionally, many students have to repeat the sixth year of primary education, which has led to increased dropout rates after only six years of education. In the early 1990s, about one-fifth of young Tunisians had to repeat the sixth year, and while the rate of this repeating has gradually reduced over the past twenty years, it is still relatively high (8 percent in 2012) (Ministère de l’Education 2012). The official primary level dropout rate was 12 percent in 2000 and 6 percent in 2009 (World Bank 2009a). Those primary education students who cannot make it to the general preparatory education are offered the opportunity to access technical preparatory schools, which can lead either to secondary education or vocational training programs. At the end of the ninth year, additional dropouts occur because students must obtain the Basic Education Completion Diploma. Secondary Education.b Passing the ninth grade exam is required to enroll in the four years of secondary education from years 10–13 (previously 10–12). At the end of grade 11, second- ary education students have to choose between nine streams that focus on academic and spe- cialized studies. While these are meant to help students prepare to enter a university or to join the workforce, course content is mostly designed to prepare students to take the final exam of secondary education. Passing the final exam of secondary education is required to continue to public universities, as the exam is both a school-leaving and a university-entrance examina- tion.c Until 2000, some 60–70 percent of secondary students failed the final exam each year, an outcome related to a number of factors, including—but not limited to—those associated with the educational system and youth engagement. The improvements in the baccalaureat pass rates observed since 2000 (from 32 percent in 2000 to 64 percent in 2011) is mostly due to a change in the exam rules. The failure rate further highlights the fact that youth have not acquired sufficient knowledge to prepare them for employment. continued family wealth and educational quality as well Notwithstanding advances in literacy and as the high opportunity cost for low-income enrollment, the quality and performance of the families in allowing their children to pursue fur- education system is among the most challenging ther education. However, it also may be due to areas of public policy in Tunisia. The limited the importance of connections, as noted above. quality of education, as measured by objective Coming from a wealthy background may be a criteria, and the limited capacity of the state to key factor in being able to realize the potential deliver education and training for employment returns to higher education. continue to be the most urgent policy areas to 52 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Box 4.2. Continued Vocational Training. Three different types of technical training are open to students. Basic technical training is an alternative to secondary education and lasts two years.d The profes- sional technical degree requires at least two years of secondary education, followed by two years of practical training.e The advanced professional technical degree is available to voca- tional students by adding another two years of study to the advanced technical degree—i.e., two years of secondary school plus four years of technical training.f By 2007, about 10 percent of Tunisian students were enrolled in a vocational training program (World Bank 2007b). Tertiary Education. Tunisia has rapidly expanded access to tertiary education during the past decade, currently enrolling over 35 percent of young Tunisians and spend- ing more than two percent of its gross domestic product on public universities. Tertiary education used to be structured in three phases of two years each, but has recently been transformed toward the European and British system of Bachelor’s (3 years), Master’s (2 years), and Doctorate (3–5 years).g a. Referred to in French as Enseignement de base. b. Referred to in French as Enseignement secondaire. c. The exam is referred to in French as Examen National du Baccalauréat. d. Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle in French. e. Brevet de Technicien Professionnel in French. f. Brevet de Technicien Supérieur in French. g. Licence-Mastère-Doctorat (LMD) in French. Source: World Bank. 2008. address. The quality of education and training Satisfaction with Education Figure 4.5.  and their value on the labor market is perceived System and Attainment by young Tunisians to have declined over time. 80 73.9 Rural 70 My mother, when she passed the sixth grade Urban exams (concours), could speak French well. 60 Now students at that level cannot even read. 50 43.9 percent I have given private lessons to primary school 40 33.1 35.8 students who couldn’t even write their names. 30 Female unemployed graduate, Madhia (CE) 20 10 As many as two-thirds of young Tunisians are 0 unsatisfied with their national education system. Satisfaction Satisfaction Rates of satisfaction are very low among both with own with quality of educational level educational system rural (33.1 percent) and urban (35.8 percent) youth (see figure 4.5). Rural respondents were Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. particularly unsatisfied with their educational Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or train- attainment, with only 43.9 percent expressing ing programs. Economic Opportunities | 53 satisfaction with their educational level, which result, a “two- or even three-speed system” has is a reflection of the mediocre quality of schools developed. Increasingly differentiated by the rise in rural areas. In urban areas, while satisfaction of private education, with sizable tuition fees and rates are higher, more than one in four young regional variation, the education system reflects people are unsatisfied with their educational and amplifies Tunisia’s generational, spatial, and attainment. social divisions. One student commented on the quality of education with specific regard to the Students and former students, including grad- “Arabization” of education: uates, were particularly critical of the overly theoretical orientation of most school and uni- The most important thing that I wish to bring versity courses, which they believe fail to provide to light is the story of the three years that I them with the skill mix necessary for the labor studied in high school, from the seventh year market. School imparts little knowledge of the through the ninth. I studied math, physics, labor market and few of the skills relevant to en- and the sciences in Arabic and we, we had pro- tering it. The education system does not provide fessors who taught these subjects in French. I the critical thinking and reasoning skills that think personally, owing to my having been are essential for engineers and scientists (TIMSS among the best students, that the teacher was 2007). As one graduate put it: confused, [that] he could not communicate the information, as he had done before. And I studied at the technical secondary school I could no longer understand him. Because at Mahdia. I think that these twelve years of it was in Arabic and I had impression that it study we did up to the baccalaureate were too had been implemented by force. If the course theoretical. The practical side was almost non- has not been [taught] in Arabic since the be- existent. Even the study trip was just for show. ginning, and the person has not taught in Ar- The teachers knew nothing. I found that later, abic previously, he or she will not manage to in the world of work. There were so many pass on the information. So over the course of gaps. We had never tried to apply what we had these three years, I was under the impression learned. Male student, Mahdia (CE) that I was translating …. In basic education, the Arabization of the sciences benefits neither While the poor quality of education has been the student nor the professor because it is tir- lamented about for years, this issue has now ing. Female university student, aged 26, Sidi reached a critical point in Tunisia. In the eyes Bouzid of Tunisia’s youth, schools have become “man- ufacturers of the unemployed.” Although they Youth are demanding better quality educa- produce increasing numbers of graduates each tion, as are potential employers. Many manu- year, a culture has arisen in which credentials are facturers require technical and analytical skills, valued over skills (Haouas, Sayre, and Yagoubi while the service sector needs young people with 2012). Student degrees are devalued by their very soft skills (IFC 2011). Young Tunisians express numbers as well as by their declining quality and strong doubts about both the quality and the credibility. Regional disparities in the quality relevance of curricula. Many young people are of education are pervasive. Urban and coastal willing to pay for more useful education to en- areas have benefitted from a history of colonial hance their job opportunities and indeed, some Franco-Arab education, which the rural zones do so. Not even half of new graduates are ready and the interior and mountain areas lack. As a for the workplace when hired, according to 54 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion private employers (IFC 2011). Consequently, education are currently working in low-skilled many employers must provide substantial train- jobs. These are typically defined as jobs in sec- ing for their new hires to ensure work readiness. tors with limited productivity and relatively low wages. Generally speaking, most low-produc- The challenge of providing better education tivity firms that offer the majority of low-skill cannot be met by the Tunisian government jobs can be found in agriculture, basic indus- alone. To achieve higher quality in education at tries, and low value-added manufacturing, con- all levels, greater effort is needed to bring to- struction, mines, energy, and much of the textile gether all relevant stakeholders. These include industry (World Bank 2014). Most jobs in these public and private education providers, civil sectors require little specialized training and society, public sector policy makers and admin- tend to yield lower wages. Annex 4, table A4.5 istrators, private employers, and—above all— presents additional evidence on the determi- Tunisia’s young people. nants of wage levels and highlights youth em- ployment in sectors that can be characterized by Few partnerships exist between employers low-productivity firms. and educa-tional institutions. While the com- prehensive dual appren-ticeship systems of Ger- The great majority of employed young Tuni- many, Austria, and Switzerland have proved sians (82.5 percent in rural areas and 67.0 per- difficult to effectively implement in other coun- cent in urban areas) work in sectors with limited tries, in many industrialized countries, modern productivity.16 Figure 4.6 shows the share of jobs educational systems routinely involve work ex- held by young Tunisians between 15–29 years perience and internships for students (OECD in sectors of largely low productivity. Young 2012). Key enablers for such partnerships that women are especially likely to work in these could promote high quality and appropriate low productivity sectors—69.0 percent in urban education are missing. In this regard, three areas and 85.9 percent in rural areas. However, weak areas stand out: (1) standards and inde- the situation for young men is only slightly bet- pendent quality assurance, (2) funding mecha- ter, with 65.9 percent of young men working nisms such as training vouchers tailored to the in the low productivity sector in urban areas needs of young Tunisians in rural and urban and 81.4 percent in rural areas. Young women areas with different education backgrounds, in urban areas (69 percent) have an especially and (3) tools for information transparency and matching between employers and students in training (OECD 2012). In view of the overall Youth Employment in Low- Figure 4.6.  regulatory environment and coordination needs Productivity Sectors across multiple government entities, organiza- 100 tions from civil society and the private sector 81.4 85.9 80 69.0 can have important roles in organizing, mon- 65.9 Male percent 60 itoring, or providing crucial educational and Female 40 matchmaking services. 20 0 To provide adequate employment for gradu- Rural Urban ates and other skilled youth, the Tunisian econ- omy requires many more jobs in both low- and Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. high-skill sectors. Most highly skilled Tunisians Note: Figure only refers to working youth and excludes self-employed youth. with secondary, vocational, or university-level Economic Opportunities | 55 higher probability to work in low-productivity Education Levels of Figure 4.7.  sectors than do older women in urban areas (58 Young Working Tunisians— percent), while the rates are similar across age Rural Versus Urban groups for urban men.17 100 3.2 2.6 0.4 8.8 6.4 0.1 Tunisia’s economy, based on its low-skill eco- 12.1 10.6 15.4 23.1 80 Vocational training nomic model, provides insufficient skilled jobs 29.0 31.1 9.5 University 11.3 for young graduates (World Bank 2014). Al- 60 Secondary percent 27.4 Middle school though many young graduates are seeking work, 25.8 Primary 40 firms continue to employ unskilled youth. In 42.5 40.1 Below primary urban areas, 59.6 percent of all working youth 20 33.2 26.4 are unskilled.18 The proportion is even higher in 0 13.1 15.2 5.6 7.0 rural areas at 83.7 percent. The virtual absence Rural Rural Urban Urban male female male female of secondary and university education among working youth reflects the dominance of low- Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. skill jobs generated by the Tunisian economy. Note: Figure only refers to working youth, including self-em- The dearth of skilled jobs also explains why uni- ployed youth, and excludes youth in education and training. versity graduates face such serious difficulties in finding qualified work. In the short-term, young Tunisians may ratio- Most employed young Tunisians have not nalize dropping out of school even before com- completed secondary education, and promot- pleting secondary education. However, in the ing their participation in a modern globalized medium-term, the large number of unskilled economy will remain a challenge. In rural areas, youth reflects a serious national underinvest- almost three out of four (71.5 percent) work- ment in human capital, affecting individuals ing youth have dropped out of school before and the country’s long-term potential. Unskilled completing secondary education (lycée). An young women and men will find it difficult to additional 13.5 percent of rural working youth benefit from future economic growth driven by did not complete their primary education; many increased productivity. The challenge presented of them never attended any school (see figure by the lack of a skilled workforce is discussed 4.7). Similarly, in urban areas, more than half further below. of all working youth lack a secondary degree (57.6 percent), and an additional 6.1 percent One important message emerging from the has no education. However, a modern knowl- analysis is that any future attempt to reform the edge-based economy generates skilled jobs re- education system should be founded on a strong quiring personnel with the ability to develop partnership with the private sector and young complex technical products reliant on knowl- people themselves. The challenge is for all of edge and creative innovation. these stakeholders to work together to counter the practice of imposing top-down reforms and The Tunisian economy is underequipped for artificial barriers to education while introduc- future growth.19 Because of Tunisia’s lack of ing innovative thinking and solutions and, most high productivity job opportunities, the demand importantly, upholding the promises to a gener- for skilled workers is weak. Consequently, many ation of young people. Although a full prescrip- young Tunisians drop out of school because the tion for education reform is beyond the scope investment in their education pays poor returns. of this report, young Tunisians should play an 56 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 4.8. Urban Youth Underemployment only 7.6 percent of young men and 7.4 percent of young women work for six hours or less per day. 100 84.0 84.8 80 74.6 70.6 Youth Employment by Sector 64.0 67.9 60 percent The public sector provides relatively little em- Male 40 Female ployment for young Tunisians—only 6.8 per- 20 cent of working youth in rural areas and 12.4 percent in urban areas. These low percentages 0 Coast Interior South challenge the notion that young Tunisians choose to remain unemployed while awaiting Source: World Bank 2012e. public sector jobs. In fact, the proportion of Note: Figure only refers to working youth in urban areas and young people wanting to work in the public sec- excludes self-employed youth. Underemployment is defined as workdays of six hours or less. tor has fallen markedly over the past few years, from about 46 percent21 in 2009 to less than 5 percent22 in 2012. This seems to reflect a shift in understanding among young Tunisians that, de- active role in the process of identifying chal- spite job security, the public sector is no longer lenges, developing solutions, and monitoring nearly as attractive as it once was. Now employ- the implementation of reforms, while private ing only one in ten young working Tunisians— sector entities could become part of the suite of including teachers, doctors, and nurses—the solutions. public sector no longer dominates in the aspira- tions of unemployed youth. Youth Underemployment The agriculture sector remains a major em- Underemployment is a significant problem in ployer for young Tunisians in rural areas, pro- urban Tunisia, affecting two out of three em- viding more than one-fifth of all rural jobs for ployed urban youth. Underemployment is de- the youth (21.9 percent). This share remains fined as part-time work with workdays of six consistent with data from 2009, when agricul- hours or less. This is the norm for most youth ture generated 12 percent of the gross domestic working in urban areas. By this definition, 65.7 product, provided work for 22 percent of the percent of all young men and 70.6 percent of all total workforce, and contributed approximately young women in urban areas are underemployed 5.4 percent to overall economic growth (Oxford (see figure 4.8).20 Underemployment levels are Business Group 2009).23 However, many young only slightly higher among women, suggesting rural Tunisians are uninterested in rural life and that part-time work among young women is a employment even though agriculture is a major result of labor market conditions rather than employment sector (see figure 4.9).24 Research choice. The highest rates of underemployment shows that four out of five young Tunisians for young women are found in the urban south working in urban areas are employed in the ser- (84.8 percent). The interior region has the high- vice sector (37.9 percent). In rural Tunisia, most est proportion of underemployed young men in jobs, including most informal employment, are urban areas (74.6 percent). In contrast, underem- in the service sector, which accounts for 29.7 ployment is virtually absent in rural areas, where percent of all employed youth. Economic Opportunities | 57 Figure 4.9. Youth Employment by Sector a. Rural b. Urban 6.8% Agriculture 6.8% Agriculture Construction 12.4% Construction 21.9% Industry and 10.6% Industry and manufacturing manufacturing 29.7% Services Services Public sector Public sector 17.8% 37.9% 32.2% 23.8% Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure only refers to working youth and excludes self-employed youth. The agricultural sector includes jobs in the food pro- cessing industry. Tunisia’s service sector has a strong com- in both rural and urban areas. Annex 4, figure parative advantage and significant potential for A4.3 presents the sector of employment among exports, especially in information and commu- working age Tunisians aged 30–59 by sector: nication technology, professional services, trans- 32.2 percent of Tunisians in rural areas work port and logistics, tourism, and health (ITCEQ in agriculture, followed by 22.4 percent in ser- 2010). Trade of services, particularly with the vices, 22.0 percent in construction, 12.9 percent European Union, is one of the most promising in manufacturing, and 10.5 percent in the public sectors as a source of economic growth and job sector. In urban Tunisia, the generation aged 29 creation, especially for skilled youth (World or older works mostly in services (35.1 percent), Bank 2013a). Currently, more than half of all followed by the public sector (29.0 percent), youth from rural Tunisia (52.8 percent), and industry and manufacturing (17.3 percent), nearly two-thirds (64.9 percent) of urban youth construction (12 percent), and agriculture (6.6 plan to work in services (see annex 4, figure percent). Apart from the large public sector in A4.4). The tourism sector has been hit hard urban areas, these shares show that, on average, by the ongoing political transition, and hotels Tunisia’s young generation has better jobs than and restaurants currently provide few jobs for their parents. Regression analysis shows that young people (6.9 percent in urban areas and the sectors which yield the highest wages are in- 5.4 percent rural areas).25 However, tourism is dustry and services, apart from the public sector bound to recover. New services, such as eco- (Annex 4, table A4.5). Traditional labor inten- tourism, could provide important opportunities sive sectors, such as agriculture and construc- for youth in nontraditional vacation locations. tion, yield relatively low wages. Young people with better skills tend to earn more, while youth However, Tunisia’s young generation works on informal contracts earns less, as do women in more productive sectors than their parents and young people in the interior of the country. 58 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion 4.2 Self-Employment finance to previously underserviced areas and communities and will likely introduce new and The poor also have a right to buy and sell. innovative microfinance products. Salem Bouazizi, brother of Mohamed Bouazizi, Sidi Bouzid, interior region, as quoted in De Stimulating economic innovation through the Soto 2011 right mix of targeted regulations and economic incentives present policy challenges to most governments around the world. Innovations Innovation and Entrepreneurship can be loosely defined as any new method, idea, or product, and permanent innovation is largely Tunisia is relatively well positioned to become a considered an essential ingredient to economic champion in innovation and entrepreneurship, growth in modern economies. To better foster provided that it recognizes the potential of its innovation and entrepreneurship in high-perfor- aspiring generation of self-employed youth (De mance sectors, different approaches have been Soto 2011; World Bank 2010). Compared with developed, which include manufacturing com- other Middle East and North African countries, plex products in innovation hubs; supporting Tunisia’s performance is above average in terms the vertical and horizontal integration of the of innovation (see figure 4.10). The Global information and communication technology Competitive Index, which ranks the competi- sector into existing and new economic sectors; tiveness of 142 countries by several dimensions and supporting service industries such as the on a seven-level scale, ranked Tunisia 40th, well banking sector, which is crucial for economic before Morocco, 73rd; Algeria, 87th; Egypt, success. Tunisia is already boasting some social 94th; Jordan, 71st; and Lebanon, 89th (WEF entrepreneurs, such as the Cogit Dialogue Cen- 2011). Tunisia also ranked better than Turkey ter, and others, such as the Digital Mania Stu- (59th), which is often considered a champion dio, are also among the many start-ups in the in competitiveness. Tunisia’s recently approved Middle East and North Africa Region that have microfinance legislation enables international achieved market success since the Arab Spring microfinance institutions to provide access to (Korenblum 2013). Figure 4.10. Global Competitiveness Index Tunisia’s Self-Employed Youth (2011–12) Institutions Self-employment is relatively common among Innovation 7 Infrastructure young men—1 in 10 are self-employed. Specif- 6 Business 5 ically, in urban Tunisia, about 13.1 percent of 4 Macroeconomic sophistication 3 environment all young men are self-employed, a rate that is 2 nearly twice as high as rural Tunisia’s 7.9 per- 1 Market size 0 Health and cent (figure 4.11). The relatively high share of primary education youth entrepreneurship among men reflects the Technological presence of an enormous entrepreneurial spirit Health education readiness and training combined with a lack of employment opportu- Financial Goods market Egypt nities. In comparison, self-employment among market Labor development market efficiency Jordan older generations is much higher, especially efficiency Morocco among men, ranging from 18 percent in rural Tunisia areas to 22.7 percent in urban areas among Source: WEF 2011. 30–59 years olds (see annex 4, figure A4.5). Economic Opportunities | 59 Youth Self-Employment— Figure 4.11.  relatively high education levels, and strong on- Rural Versus Urban line skills, would likely enable young women 14 working from home or in offices or shops to 13.1 12 create value-added businesses. Women in rural 10 and urban areas alike expressed a strong in- 8 7.9 Male terest in starting their own income-generating percent Female 6 activities. As a young woman who received a 4 microloan through the microfinance institution 2.2 2 1.5 Enda indicated: 0 Rural Urban It is comforting, especially for a young woman, to work for herself. Personally, I detest having Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. a boss. I have worked in a dry cleaner, in a taxi Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or train- ing programs. call center, and as a salesperson in a boutique. In each case, there was an awful amount of pressure … no mercy. It was a shock for me In contrast, self-employment among young to work in such circumstances. Now I work women is virtually nonexistent—2.2 percent well for myself after being unemployed for in rural areas and 1.5 percent in urban areas. two years. Young self-employed woman in the These results are confirmed by a regression anal- informal sector, Tunis ysis that controls for other factors (see annex 4, table A4.6).26 The qualitative research shows Overall, self-employment is most common in that public and private investments in female the coastal region and in the south. The interior entrepreneurship could lead to high returns and region has the lowest rate of youth self-employ- viable enterprises, especially in view of the lim- ment, and only 8.1 percent of young men are ited opportunities for formal employment. The self-employed (see figure 4.12). In comparison, combination of a wide array of market niches, 12.1 percent of young men are self-employed Figure 4.12. Youth Entrepreneurship by Region 18 17.0 16 14 Male urban 12.5 12.5 Male rural 12 11.1 Female urban Female rural percent 10 8 6.1 6 5.1 5.1 4 2.2 2.0 2 1.3 0.9 0 0 Coast Interior South Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs. 60 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion in the coastal region and in the southern gov- Graduates from 1992 or 1996 still haven’t ernorates. As pointed out above, among young been able to find jobs. What remains? The women, self-employment is a rare phenomenon, private sector. I could tell you about the ex- and even in the coastal region, which has the ploitation that happens there, the favoritism, highest share of female self-employment, it only the bribes. … People are at the end of their reaches 2.1 percent. tether. There is nothing else left [but to work for oneself]. Male self-employed, Tunis Almost all self-employed youth work with- out any formal registration, leaving them Self-employed youth struggle to gain access without access to finance and often vulnerable to finance, which remains the main challenge to exploitation and extortion by police and in successfully establishing a business. The other public officials. The fact that virtually all rural survey asked young entrepreneurs about self-employed youth work informally reflects the most significant difficulties in establishing the complexity of the administrative procedures a business. As figure 4.13 shows, “Access to and regulations that are required to register a Finance” was considered the single most im- small firm. The qualitative research also shows portant barrier for young entrepreneurs in all widespread skepticism of young people about regions—93.7 percent in the coastal region, the role of the public sector and banks when it 95.4 percent in the interior region, and 94.5 comes to supporting small businesses. percent in the south. These results demonstrate the higher barriers met by young entrepreneurs The state should find a solution, but instead of compared with those encountered by firms in encouraging us [to start a business], they put general. As indicated by the recent report, “In- barriers in our way. Student of agriculture, 22 vestment Climate Assessment,” access to fi- years. Zaghouan (coastal Tunisia) nance is also regarded as a major constraint by Figure 4.13. Barriers Faced by Youth in Establishing Small Businesses (Rural Tunisia) 100 93.7 95.4 94.5 90 80 Coast 70 Interior 60 South percent 50 43.9 40 34.6 36.7 29.0 26.9 30 26.4 20 10.1 9.9 7.4 10 6.7 6.0 4.8 2.3 4.2 5.0 0 Finance Location Information Training Bureaucracy Corruption Source: World Bank 2012d. Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth. Economic Opportunities | 61 39 percent of small- and medium-size Tunisian and other aspects crucial to youth-led firms. To firms (World Bank 2013j). better manage risk and portfolios, providers of financial products are also likely to target niche Existing microfinance programs have limited groups such as rural women or certain sectors reach and are widely perceived as inefficient. such as small information and communication Specialized banking products tailored to young technology firms. Nontraditional financing, such people are largely absent, although the 2014 as crowd-funding, could complement the credit microfinance law is designed to facilitate the in- market for Tunisia’s self-employed youth. How- crease of institutions offering new services, such ever, while this new law will have a rapid short- as savings, transfer, and insurance.27 The cur- term impact on access to finance, in the rural rent lack of available finance for young entre- areas, where most smaller microfinance associ- preneurs was mentioned in several focus group ations are located, it could also generate adverse discussions. effects on the market and on stability, which could mean young graduates may not have ac- When all of the other doors are closed, it is cess to microcredit in the medium-term if their best to have one’s own project, be one’s own risk-pricing profile is above the regulatory ceiling. boss, and realize one’s dreams. But, there is a problem of finance, of markets. Female entre- However, one-third of all self-employed youth preneur and graduate in biomedical engineer- struggle with the burden of bureaucracy, includ- ing. Tunis (coastal Tunisia) ing the costs, difficulties, and delays entailed in obtaining the required licenses. The rural When credit agencies have a good idea pre- youth survey finds that bureaucracy represents sented to them, they will have their own a major challenge for more than one-third of grounds for not giving finance. Then they will self-employed youth in the coastal region (34.6 sell the idea to someone else. Hence, you will find the idea for a project in Zaghouan resur- percent), more than one-third in the south (36.7 faces in Sousse. Unemployed graduate, Zag- percent), and more than one-quarter in the in- houan (coastal Tunisia) terior (26.9 percent), as shown in figure 4.13. Especially for small businesses, bureaucracy The amended microfinance law is bound to represents a high burden because these firms open financial market to new financial inter- tend to lack the means to employ qualified staff mediaries and could provide more innovative to process the administrative requirements. As a products tailored to small firms led by youth. In consequence, high levels of bureaucracy induce July 2014, the National Assembly amended the small firms to remain informal. Put another 2011 microfinance law with the aim of strength- way, the bureaucratic burden imposes a de facto ening the supervision and regulation of banking tax on the competitiveness of firms and forces institutions providing microfinance while open- businesses to use informal credit and to work ing the sector to international competition. This without licenses (De Soto 2012). These findings could mean that up to half-a-dozen new institu- are confirmed by the recent Tunisia Investment tions could begin offering products within the Climate Assessment, which indicates that firms coming months, with more to follow. Increased spend about 13 percent of annual sales to ad- competition will require providers of microcre- dress regulations (World Bank 2013j). This ex- dit to become more innovative and flexible in the pense reflects the cumulative cost of interacting design of their financial products, including col- with the administration and includes compli- lateral, interest rates, delayed repayment plans, ance time. 62 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Driven by informality, many self-employed Youth Entrepreneurship Figure 4.14.  youth operate their businesses in unfavor- by Education able locations to avoid fines and extortion, 100 3.6 4.8 very much like the self-employed young man 0 14.2 0 8.7 10.7 6.4 17.1 3.5 from Tunisia’s interior who triggered the Arab 80 7.2 Vocational training 39.3 23.4 University Spring. Business location is the main concern 60 31.1 27.3 Secondary percent among half of self-employed youth in the south- Middle school Primary ern governorates (43.9 percent), followed by the 40 39.5 Below Primary 41.1 33.0 interior region (29.0 percent), and the coastal 20 41.8 region (26.4 percent), as shown in figure 4.13. 14.1 10.0 10.0 6.5 6.6 The qualitative research highlights that youth 0 Rural Rural Urban Urban attempt to avoid problems with law enforce- male female male female ment, which can reportedly lead to fines or re- quests for bribery. Many self-employed youth, Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth and excludes especially mobile street vendors and other more youth in education and training. flexible microbusinesses, therefore chose to op- erate in locations away from their primary cus- tomer base. This issue is crucial and at its heart left school before reaching secondary education is caused by regulations and rules designed (83.0 percent). About one out of 10 self-em- under the old regime that were aimed at large ployed youth in rural Tunisia do not have any firms. The resulting vulnerability of self-em- formal education (see figure 4.14). In urban ployed youth should be urgently addressed, not areas, average education levels are only slightly only because it can be argued that it triggered higher, although some university graduates oper- the Arab Spring throughout the region (De Soto ate small firms in urban areas, especially young 2012). men (6.4 percent). Overall, it appears that self-employment is mostly driven by economic Additional business training and enhanced exclusion from employment opportunities, espe- access to business information would be help- cially among youth with low levels of education. ful to many self-employed youth. The survey re- These findings are also supported by a regression sults show that “limited access to information,” analysis of self-employment, which shows that as well as “needs for additional skills training” the lack of secondary and tertiary education are are currently holding self-employed youth back key factors in increasing the probability of being (see figure 4.13). Business training is an import- self-employed (see annex 4, table A4.6). ant field for youth investment, can be vitalized through public-private partnerships, and has the Most young entrepreneurs work in low-pro- potential to strengthen local economies and to ductivity sectors with limited economic returns. generate youth employment. However, 30–40 percent of young entrepreneurs work in high-productivity sectors, demonstrat- Skill Levels of Self-Employed Youth ing the potential of entrepreneurship.28 Low-pro- ductivity sectors are characterized by low return The education levels of self-employed youth are on investments, which limit the ability of young very low, and most have not completed second- entrepreneurs to obtain the necessary resources ary education. Education levels are the lowest to expand and grow. Many firms in low-pro- in rural areas where most self-employed youth ductivity sectors face difficulties in growing Economic Opportunities | 63 Youth Entrepreneurship in Figure 4.15.  their firms operate in productive sectors. While Low-Productivity Sectors specific business activities were not addressed 80 in the survey, this suggests that about one-third 70 68.8 of firms that are run by young Tunisians are in 60.1 60 57.2 58.9 fields with growth potential. 50 percent Male 40 Female Half of young entrepreneurs operate small 30 businesses in the service sector, including mod- 20 ern information and communication technol- 10 ogies—45.4 percent in rural areas and 52.1 0 Rural Urban percent in urban areas (see figure 4.16). The prioritization of services is important for future Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. growth since services provide the backbone of Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth. modern economies and are essential for endog- enous growth. A growing number of young and beyond small- or medium-size enterprises. Even mostly urban Tunisian entrepreneurs are target- though some low-productivity firms manage to ing Internet and smartphone users. This young survive for the relatively long-term, they tend to wave of entrepreneurs holds enormous potential face many challenges and struggle with low re- because of the high productivity environment turns. In rural Tunisia, 67.5 percent of all youth in which these firms operate, allowing for rapid entrepreneurs work in low-productivity sectors; firm growth and job creation. The versatility the rate is 57.3 percent in urban areas (see figure of many information technology products fa- 4.15). Nonetheless, the survey data show that vors export. The most common examples are even though almost 90 percent of young entre- smartphone apps, which can be sold worldwide. preneurs are unskilled, some 30–40 percent of Technology firms have started to spring up all Figure 4.16. Entrepreneurship by Sector a. Rural b. Urban 4.8% Agriculture 1.4% Agriculture 10.8% Construction Construction Industry and Industry and manufacturing manufacturing Services 14.7% Services 36.4% Public sector Public sector 45.4% 52.1% 20.9% 6.3% 7.1% Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all self-employed youth. 64 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion over the Middle East and North Africa Region Youth Entrepreneurship: Challenges and (Schroeder 2013). Investment Opportunities Modern technology makes it easier for young It feels good to work, especially for one- women to start businesses and generate incomes. self. Personally, I hate to work for a boss. I Working mostly in Arabic, women-owned tech- worked in a laundry, in a taxi phone line, and nology firms help families achieve a work-life as a salesgirl in a shop. There is always a lot balance, offer collaborating crowd-sharing plat- of pressure, and never any consideration for forms, and sell products to women. Neverthe- the employee. No mercy. It really shocked me. less, challenges remain because it is more difficult Now, after two years unemployed, with my for young women to obtain credit than men and family pressuring me to work, I have a pro- because women are constrained by social norms. fession and the work is good. Female informal The Internet opens young people’s minds to pos- sector worker, Tunis (coastal Tunisia) sibilities, and youth-led firms from Tunisia will be important in that regard. Tunisia’s young entrepreneurs could benefit from local innovation hubs to create an envi- In rural areas, 36.4 percent of young entre- ronment conducive to business and to help preneurs work in agriculture and food process- informal entrepreneurs become formally estab- ing; the rate is 10.8 percent in urban areas. The lished. New innovation hubs and cyber parks, agricultural sector has significant potential for including business incubators and workspaces young entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, qualitative that regularly conduct competitive startups with research emphasizes that the aspirations of investors, have begun to generate success stories young entrepreneurs to develop family farms that inspire young entrepreneurs (Yaros 2012). are often thwarted by a lack of finance. Online networks help to bring people together and provide additional training and mentorship It would be good to give work to people here to young entrepreneurs, especially in rural areas and participate in the development of the vil- where face-to-face meetings and trainings are lage, but the conditions are difficult. To get costly to organize (World Bank 2013e). credit, one needs property as collateral, or one’s own funds. But we are poor. Male school Online training can help self-employed youth dropout, Mahdia (coastal Tunisia) gain skills not taught in schools and universi- ties (La Cava et al. 2011). By teaching business One in five young urban entrepreneurs skills, financial literacy, marketing, and lan- works in manufacturing and industry (20.9 per- guages such as English and French, online plat- cent) compared with only 7.9 percent of rural forms provide bottom-up solutions. Platforms entrepreneurs. This difference is a reflection of including MobiWorks, MobiSouk, and Ta3mal the disparity in investments between rural and help to overcome the structural shortcomings of urban Tunisia, itself a driver of the higher levels Tunisia’s education system, which yields too few of unemployment and inactivity in rural Tunisia science, math, and informatics graduates for a (World Bank 2013b). modern economy.29 Online learning can bring quality education to more people, including adults, and especially to young women. How- ever, the digital divide—diminished Internet ac- cess in rural areas—may be a barrier to online training. Economic Opportunities | 65 Notes wealth may play a role. However, the size and strength of the relationship, as well as the weaker role played by wealth in em- ployment determination suggests that family wealth is playing 1. Employment is defined as paid work. The quantitative results a key role. are based on survey questions inquiring about recent employ- ment history. 16. For this report, productivity is classified by sector. Sec- tors with predominantly high productivity firms include trade, 2. These employment statistics exclude youth enrolled in educa- communications, tourism (hotels and restaurants), banks and tion or training programs. insurance companies, social and cultural services, and real es- 3. The regression analysis simultaneously controls for differences tate services. Sectors with mostly low-productivity firms include in age, educational level, parental background, and regional dis- primary economic activities—e.g., agriculture and fishing, food parities. The potential endogeneity of the variable suggests that industry, building materials, ceramics and glass, mechanical, not too much weight be placed on the coefficient values related chemical and electrical industries, textile and shoes industries, to household wealth. other industries, construction and public works, mines and en- 4. The term “Jasmine Revolution,” is arguably a misnomer, as it ergy, transportation, repair, and manufacturing. refers to the plant from the relatively lush and prosperous north- 17. See annex 4, figure A4.2 on adult employment in low-pro- ern coast. Instead, Ayeb argues that “Alfa Grass Revolution” ductivity sectors. might be a better term, based on the plant growing in Tunisia’s 18. Skilled jobs are defined as requiring at least a secondary interior region. school degree or vocational training. 5. The concept of the direct family includes children, spouse, and 19. For a more detailed analysis, refer to World Bank 2014. parents of the household head. 20. For many youth, particularly those still in school or inter- 6. This finding resonates with the conclusion of the recent ested in searching the job market, part-time work can be an MENA Development Report on gender equality (World Bank optimal choice and should be encouraged. However, qualitative 2013h). These findings are further supported by the regression research shows that youth usually do not choose part-time work. results on different forms of employment reported in annex 4. 21. Based on Gallup Data reported in AfDB 2012a. 7. One survey question asked: “Do you think women searching for work in the private/public sector are discriminated against?” 22. Only 4.3 percent of rural and 2.2 percent of urban young Tunisians plan to work in the public sector. 8. There is an argument in favor of fixed-term contracts since the increased flexibility could enable employers to increase hiring of 23. Agriculture could become an important source of growth youth. However, without access to social protection, fixed-term and youth employment, especially in the fertile northern parts contracts are widely perceived by youth as exploitative. of Tunisia. Supporting labor-intensive crop production for the many small farmers in the interior regions could also help to 9. See annex 4, figure A4.1 on contract type of employed adults reduce regional disparities. In addition, Tunisia could take ad- (aged 30–59). vantage of existing opportunities for agricultural exports to the 10. While originally intended to protect workers, it can be ar- European Union, which does not subsidize its fruit and vegetable gued that labor regulations have encouraged informality. To production. allow greater flexibility in adapting staffing to economic condi- 24. See annex 4, figure A4.3 on sector of employment of em- tions, fixed-term contracts were introduced in the early 2000s. ployed adults (aged 30–59). Fixed-term contracts can be used to hire workers under flexible short-term contracts, which are renewable for up to four years. 25. Tourism is included in the service sector. For workers, such contracts provide only a limited improvement 26. In addition to gender, the Probit model of self-employment compared with informal employment since both are character- controls for age, family background, and region. ized by high job insecurity. In addition, because of the flexibility 27. Chapter 5 presents a more extensive review of existing mi- allowed by fixed-term contracts, firms tend to avoid open-ended crofinance programs. contracts for new hires altogether. 28. Low productivity sectors include agriculture and fishing, 11. For a detailed discussion of recommended labor market re- food industry, building materials, ceramics and glass, mechan- forms, please see World Bank 2013c. ical, chemical and electrical industries, textile and shoes indus- 12. The Probit estimation includes controls for differences in age, tries, other industries, construction and public work, mines educational level, parental background, and regional disparities. and energy, transportation, repair, and manufacturing. High 13. Ages 15–24. productivity sectors include trade, communications, hotels and restaurants, banks and insurance companies, social and cultural 14. The total number of students is expected to peak in 2014 services, and real estate services. at 449,000. 29. For more details, see, for example, www.ta3mal.org. 15. As before, the model controls for gender, age, parental back- ground, and region. Once again, the potential endogeneity of Chapter 5 Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services 68 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion These [employment] programs are the tools of a policy aimed at calming a people in rebellion who are demanding work. They are not a durable solution. Unemployed male, Jendouba, North West Tunisia This chapter provides an overview of access to of the total number of beneficiaries, while youth economic opportunities through Active Labor with limited education, that constitute the larg- Market Programs (ALMPs) offered by the Min- est group of youth without work, accounted for istry of Professional Training and Employment about 34 percent. In absolute terms, young Tu- (MVTE) and other available youth services. It nisians without work and lacking a secondary also presents young people’s perceptions regard- or university degree is about 3.5 times larger ing the benefits and quality of the programming. than the number of university graduates. The effectiveness of the programs is assessed both in terms of their impact on employability and social inclusion. A set of recommendations Programs of the Ministry of 5.1  is presented to make existing youth program- Professional Training and ming and services more effective and inclusive. Employment Tunisia has invested a substantial share of In response to youth unemployment and inac- its gross domestic product (GDP) for ALMPs, tivity, the MVTE has put in place a number of but beneficiaries consider the benefits from these ALMPs aimed at easing young people’s labor programs limited. ALMPs accounted for almost market transition. The National Agency for one percent of GDP in 2011, the highest in the Employment and Independent Work (ANETI) Middle East and North Africa at the time of the is responsible for implementing the largest em- revolution, lately stabilizing at around 0.5 per- ployment programs and services in the country. cent (World Bank 2013c). These programs are Specifically, ANETI is responsible for: not well known to most young Tunisians. Youth participation in the programs is fairly low and, • providing general guidance for jobseekers, most importantly, the programs tend to be pri- • providing jobseekers with information marily focused on urban areas along the coast. about employment opportunities, Few programs are available to youth in the in- terior and southern regions, reinforcing spatial • matching jobseekers with open positions, disparities. • implementing Active Labor Market Pro- The majority of ALMPs are tailored for grams, and young graduates. The current bias toward grad- uates should be revised to ensure that young • promoting small businesses and support- Tunisians without university degrees—particu- ing self-employment. larly young people who are not in education, employment, or training (NEETs)—can have ANETI falls under the MVTE and has 91 of- equitable access to programs tailored to their fices distributed over Tunisia’s 24 governorates. needs and labor market opportunities. In 2011, Its budget was TND 420 million (US$ (PPP) university graduates accounted for 66 percent 579 million) in 2012. In total, these programs Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 69 currently support around 270,000 job seekers skills, on-the-job training, job search as- each year (World Bank 2013c). The number sistance, and a monthly stipend of TND of beneficiaries has more than doubled in five 200 (US$ (PPP) 275.70). While originally years, and ANETI is currently planning to fur- designed as an activation program, in ther expand its activities (World Bank 2013c). practice, AMAL primarily provided cash ANETI employs nearly 900 employment coun- assistance to unemployed graduates. De- cilors—more than 70 percent of them are help- sign flaws and conditions that were dif- ing university graduates (Abaab 2012). On ficult to enforce meant that incentives to average, Tunisia’s employment councilors are search for jobs and accept job offers were responsible for 1,200 unemployed youth, which actually reduced (Robalino et al. 2013). is far above the ratio of about 100 job seekers The program was designed to offer partic- per councilor recommended by the International ipants a stipend of TND 200 (US$ (PPP) Labour Organisation (ILO) (Abaab 2012). 275.70)—equivalent to 80 percent of the minimum wage—and a series of services, ANETI’s programs aim to prepare job seek- ranging from training in life and technical ers for the job market and place them in em- skills, counseling, job search assistance, ployment through a combination of on-the-job and wage subsidies. In practice, only training, employer incentives, subsidized social 20,000 participants received the stipend security coverage, and small monthly stipends. along with various services, while an addi- Most of these programs are focused on unem- tional 120,000 only received the stipend. ployed graduates.1 Many of ANETI’s programs The program design did not recognize the overlap or have similar approaches. In addition, capacity constraints of ANETI that pre- there is a generalized lack of program coherence vented the implementation of the coach- or monitoring and evaluation of programs.2 ing and internships in the private sector. ANETI’s monitoring system is not results-based The lack of technical leadership at the and only provides data on take-up rates—i.e., central and local levels and the absence of outputs. There have been some attempts to eval- meaningful coordination between the im- uate ANETI’s employment programs, but the re- plementing agency ANETI and the MVTE sults are outdated, sporadic, donor driven, and made matters worse (Abaab 2012). Dis- lack scientific credibility (World Bank 2013c). continued in 2013, AMAL provides useful Ninety percent of ANETI beneficiaries have lessons for rethinking ALMPs in Tunisia, enrolled in one of its three main programs particularly to avoid costly subsidies with (World Bank 2013b). limited impact on employability. It is nev- ertheless worth noting that AMAL was a • AMAL (meaning “hope” in Arabic) was transition program, which was later ad- originally designed to provide unem- justed to serve disadvantaged youth. No ployed university degree-holders with em- evidence is available to measure the results ployment services for up to 12 months. of that program (Abaab 2012, 23). Launched by the interim government in response to the 2011 revolution, AMAL • Professional Internship Program (SIVP)3 quickly became the largest of ANETI’s subsidizes the costs of hiring university schemes; it has since been discontinued graduates in firms and targets university because it was unsustainable. The pro- graduates who remain job seekers six gram was expected to offer beneficiaries months after graduation. The program career coaching, training in hard and soft seeks to introduce educated first-time job 70 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion seekers to the labor market by placing them Additional training for young workers in internships with a stipend, which usu- could be helpful to fill skill gaps between ally run for a year. SIVP is among the larg- unemployed youth and available vacancies est of the Tunisian ALMPs, with almost (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2012). 47,000 beneficiaries in 2011, of which about 60 percent were young women. The ANETI also manages a number of smaller program gives beneficiaries a stipend of programs with overlapping objectives and TND 300/month (US$ (PPP) 414/month) youth beneficiary categories. and covers social security contributions as • Voluntary Civil Service (SCV)5 subsidizes well as up to 200 hours of training costs the costs of hiring university graduates (World Bank 2012b). SIVP beneficiaries in civil society organizations. The pro- are heavily concentrated in coastal/in- gram arranges up to 12 months of work dustrial regions. Most SIVP contracts are placements, providing a monthly stipend signed in Tunis (25 percent), followed by of TND 200 (US$ (PPP) 276). In 2011, Ariana and Sfax (10 percent each). An the program had about 8,000 participants evaluation of SIVP’s performance revealed (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2012). Associations that program beneficiaries have very low do not have to meet any quality criteria rates of job insertion after program com- to participate in the program. Indeed, pletion (at 23.7 percent in 2010) (World most associations that participate are very Bank 2012b). small, often with low capacity, which re- • Labor Market Access and Employability duces the attractiveness of the program Program (CAIP)4 began in January 2009 (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2012). for graduates and nongraduates. CAIP • Employment Program for Graduates of is Tunisia’s third largest ALMP program Higher Education (CIDES)6 targets univer- with approximately 40,000 beneficiaries sity graduates who have been unemployed annually, of which about 90 percent are for more than two years. The program nongraduates. CAIP pays small monthly subsidizes wages and provides monthly stipends of TND 100 (US$ (PPP) 138) plus stipends of TDN 150 (US$ (PPP) 207) for social security coverage. Essentially, CAIP internships and jobs (World Bank 2012b). provides subsidies to hire unskilled and In addition to the stipends, the program blue-collar workers. The program was de- pays part of the employer’s contribution to signed to provide capacity training to assist social security for up to seven years, con- young Tunisians in gaining professional tributing a declining share over time. The qualifications to further their employment program reached about 3,000 beneficiaries prospects by tailoring training to specific in 2011. In theory, employers are required jobs. In reality, such trainings rarely take to hire beneficiaries after program comple- place (World Bank 2013c). Although the tion, but in practice, placement rates are rate of insertion of CAIP is by far the high- very low—21 percent in 2010. est among the ALMPs, the rate of termi- nation of contracts also remains very high. • Youth Back-to-Work Program7 provides The main reason given by companies and beneficiaries with a monthly stipend of union leaders is the lack of appropriate TND 200 (US$ (PPP) 276) and additional skills and limited matching between candi- social security coverage. The program fur- dates and firms, which is done by ANETI. ther covers the costs of up to 200 hours Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 71 of training and associated travel costs. short-term jobs for young Tunisians who have The program is relatively small, with only left school. It does not target one specific group about 1,000 interns in 2011, and operates of unemployed individuals. Instead, CES aims mainly in the cities of Monastir and Tunis. to integrate the unemployed within the frame- Most (approximately 90 percent) partici- work of regional and local employment pro- pants are nongraduates. motion initiatives. The largest CES activity provides short-term labor-intensive employ- • Fifty Percent Wage Subsidy Program8 ment in public works projects, which supported aims to encourage private companies to about 14,000 youth in 2010 (World Bank hire first-time job seekers with a univer- 2012b). The program also includes a number of sity degree by paying half of their wage smaller initiatives targeted at unskilled youth. up to a maximum of TND250 (US$ (PPP) However, many CES programs lack coherence 344.63) per month for up to 12 months. with other programs. Some CES instruments The program is limited to regional devel- overlap extensively with existing ANETI pro- opment zones (as defined in the Invest- grams—e.g., internship programs for young ment Code) and only applies to new firms graduates—while others duplicate similar pro- active in certain high value-added activi- grams implemented by the Ministry of Regional ties with a strong knowledge component. Development and other donors—e.g., Labor The Fifty Percent Wage Subsidy Program Intensive Public Works. There have been cases is a relatively small program with only of public works projects that were never com- about 500 graduates in 2011. pleted or that have paid wages to workers who In 2012, a decree was passed to fundamen- did not show up for work. In addition, there is tally amend all ALMPs under ANETI and to evidence that CES programs do not have clear introduce a “wage voucher” and a “training governance frameworks or procedures or trans- voucher,” effectively merging all existing pro- parent allocation of funds (World Bank 2013c). grams into two interventions.9 In principle, the CES programs largely lack monitoring and do decree allows ANETI to subcontract with non- not generally cross-reference beneficiaries with governmental (NGOs) and private providers for ANETI records, allowing some individuals to the provision of employment services, including simultaneously benefit from various programs. intermediation and soft-skills training, and it The long-term labor market impact of public introduces a mandate to promote better mon- works programs can be insignificant, and re- itoring and evaluation for ALMPs. This new search has found a stigma attached to public regulatory framework for ANETI signals some works jobs, which may decrease the employ- positive evolution and simplification of ALMPs ability of participants over the long run (Ro- in Tunisia. However, the slow implementation balino et al. 2013). Alternative approaches for of the reform raises questions as to the level of a scalable project design to activate unemployed commitment to pursue this reform by decision youth without a secondary education—mostly makers and other immediate stakeholders. NEETs—is presented in the following chapter. Apart from ANETI, several parallel pro- Apart from ANETI, the Tunisian government grams exist, such as the Employment Solidarity also implements a number of training programs Program (CES),10 which includes Labor Inten- through the Tunisian Agency for Professional sive Public Works. Together with a number Training (ATFP).11 ATFP was established in of regional programs, CES is funded through 1993 under the MVTE with the responsibility the Fund 21–21 of the MVTE. CES provides of vocational training. Its budget is TND 200 72 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion million (US$ (PPP) 276 million), all from pub- Perceptions of Active Labor Market lic funds. ATFP manages 137 training centers Programs across all of Tunisia’s governorates, including specialized centers for training in particular sec- Overall, it appears that limited knowledge tors—e.g., construction, electronics, mechan- about most ANETI programs leads to very low ics, tourism, and textiles (48 centers)—as well rates of participation by eligible youth. One- as centers for apprenticeship (61), young rural third of youth think that they are not eligible women (15), for crafts (13). These centers train for these programs, and more than one-quarter around 60,000 students per year and employ do not know how to register, according to re- about 7,300 staff. ATFP offers a range of train- cent survey results presented below.12 Lack of ing, including (1) residential courses at training information on how to register seems even more centers; (2) apprenticeship agreements involv- problematic in the case of programs that are not ing a company, with the apprentice spending up managed nationally. to a half of his or her time in training; and (3) Awareness of existing programs is very low, courses tailored to the industry of a particular especially in rural areas. Few of the programs region. designed to support unemployed youth in their Figure 5.1 illustrates the 2011 distribution search for employment are known to more than of young beneficiaries of ALMPs. The majority one-quarter of young respondents (see figure were university graduates—66 percent versus 5.2). Even the largest program, AMAL, which 33 percent of less-educated youth. The number provided wage subsidies for unemployed uni- of beneficiaries was higher than average in 2011 versity graduates, was only known by 42.5 per- because of the large coverage of the now discon- cent of urban respondents and a meager 20.5 tinued AMAL program. Nevertheless, the figure percent of rural youth. Similarly, SIVP, another provides a good basis for comparing youth ben- program that subsidizes wages for unemployed eficiaries by category. graduates, was only known by 33.2 percent of Figure 5.1. Beneficiaries of Programs Financed by the FNE (2011) 450,000 405,500 400,000 350,000 300,000 Mainly targeted to high-skilled youth 250,000 Mainly targeted to low-skilled individuals 200,000 155,000 150,000 113,500 100,000 90,000 50,000 30,000 17,000 0 AMAL progam ANETI Microcredits Regional employment ANETI Total (programs to promote programs (coaching for insertion into entrepreneurship) wage employment) Source: National Employment Fund 2011. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 73 Awareness of Active Labor Market Figure 5.2.  Awareness of Active Labor Market Figure 5.3.  Programs—Urban Versus Rural Programs, by Education AMAL AMAL 100% 50% CES Regional 80% 40% SCV CES Regional Program 60% SCV Program 30% 40% 20% 20% 0% 10% Public works SIVP 0% Public works SIVP Other employment CAIP programs Rural Nongraduate rural Other employment CAIP Urban Nongraduate urban programs Graduate urban Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison. young urban respondents and by 19.5 percent Other programs, including AMAL, SIVP, and of young rural Tunisians. CAIP, which targets SCV are much better known by young gradu- nongraduates, remains largely unknown: only ates. Importantly, programs that are open for 10.7 percent of urban youth and 21.1 percent young Tunisians without a university degree, of rural youth have heard of the program. The such as Labor Intensive Public Works or CAIP, two best-known programs in rural areas are the are largely unfamiliar to their target group in Labor Intensive Public Works Program (35.2 both rural and urban Tunisia. percent) and other ALMP activities provided under CES, the regional development program Overall, young people who know about (35.2 percent).13 Awareness of programs by ALMPs have a very low assessment of these young Tunisians does not vary much by region programs, as reflected in the qualitative analy- or gender, although youth in the rural south sis. Programs, including AMAL, are seen as a have an increased awareness of the Labor Inten- kind of sinecure implemented for political rea- sive Public Works Program (see annex 5, figure sons. Youth have little faith in the programs. A5.1). They are considered ineffective and even as “a sham” and a panacea designed to artificially re- The awareness of young urban nongraduates duce the number of unemployed (Abaab 2012). of employment programs is very low, even for the few programs that are open to nongradu- I haven’t tried them [programs]. I no longer ates. Only one out of five young urban Tunisians have any confidence in the state. Even when without a university degree is familiar with the there is a good job going, those who work in Labor Intensive Public Works Program (20.4 the employment bureau sell it dear. Male un- percent), and only one out of 10 knows about employed graduate, Mahdi, Tunisa coast CAIP (10.1 percent), as shown in figure 5.3. 74 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion I know many people who have jobs thanks to Participation in Active Labor Market influence with contacts or parents working at Programs the employment bureau. Female department head in bank, 28, Tunis The participation level in the programs is very low. Barely one in 10 youth interviewed ever Public Works and SIVP courses are not participated in a major program such as AMAL far-reaching solutions. There is a big difference or SIVP. Overall program take-up is low in urban between public works, training, or the AMAL areas, and even lower in rural areas (see figure program, and for example, the establishment 5.4). The programs with the highest take-up of a factory, which might employ 700 people. were AMAL (11.0 percent in urban areas and Male student, Gafsa, South Tunisia 9.8 percent in rural areas), SIVP (12.1 percent in urban areas and 8.0 percent in rural areas), and Young people consider employers, especially SCV (3.9 percent in urban areas and 11.5 per- the private sector, to be the main beneficiaries cent in rural areas). All of these programs tar- of active employment programs. Wage subsidies geted university graduates, which explains why are largely considered to be providing disincen- the overall youth participation, comprised of tives for firms to permanently hire unemployed less educated youth, is so low. A further break- youth. In particular, subsidies can lead to a fur- down by region shows that among other pro- ther expansion of exploitative practices, as indi- grams, including the regional program, CES had cated by a young respondent. their highest take-up in the rural coastal region and virtually no take-up in the rural interior and What does the company do? It profits from the the rural south, further reinforcing regional dis- system to recruit personnel under SIVP, pays parities (see annex 5, figure A5.2). them miserably, dismisses them at the end of the contract, and sends the money gained out Young people who participated in youth of the country. Unemployed male graduate, training programs complained in interviews Zaghouan, North-East Tunisia of overcrowded classes, old and obsolete Figure 5.4. Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs—Urban Versus Rural 14 Rural 1.2 12.0 12 11.0 11.5 Urban 10 9.8 8.0 8 percent 6.7 6 5.6 3.9 4 3.2 3.4 2.0 2 1.0 0.3 0 AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public works CES employment Regional programs Program Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 75 Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Education Figure 5.5.  40 37.2 35 Nongraduate rural 30 Nongraduate urban 26.5 Graduate urban 25 percent 20 15 11.3 10.4 10 8.2 9.4 7.9 6.6 7.0 5 4.5 2.6 4.6 3.3 4.0 3.2 4.1 3.1 1.4 0.7 0 0 0 AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public works CES employment Regional programs Program Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison. equipment, poor administration, and lack of youth reported that they had participated in opportunities after the completion of training. major programs designed for graduates, such A school dropout, currently working on his as AMAL (4.5 percent in urban areas and 8.2 family’s farm, described his attempts to obtain percent in rural areas) and SIVP (11.3 percent further training: urban areas and 7.0 percent in rural areas), rais- ing questions about the targeting mechanism In the welding workshop, there were eight and financial management of the graduate-only welding stations for 35 people. The trainer programs. The limited design of these programs did not convey any information. There were was also revealed in qualitative research, which no work materials available. It’s nothing un- found that most programs are perceived merely usual—lots of things like that affect trainees. as political tools mainly benefitting the private … Half of us abandoned the course before the sector. end. Male school dropout, 23, Sidi Bouzid, in- terior Tunisia Take-up of Tunisia’s ALMPs is relatively high, but little is known about their impact on After the revolution, urban university gradu- employability and job placement. For exam- ates enrolled in considerable numbers in the larg- ple, only 8.2 percent of previous participants est programs—AMAL and SIVP. More than one of AMAL in urban areas were employed by the in three young urban graduates (37.2 percent) time of the 2012 survey, which is much lower said they had participated in AMAL and over than the average rate of employment (see fig- one-quarter (26.5 percent) in SIVP (see figure ure 5.6). In comparison, 24.2 percent of previ- 5.5). About 6.2 percent had, in fact, participated ous urban SIVP participants were working at in both programs. Other programs for graduates the time of the survey. While the data do not are less subscribed, such as SCV (6.6 percent). allow a causal analysis, the correlations sug- Surprisingly, a large number of nongraduate gest that the SIVP apprenticeship program was 76 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 5.6. Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by NEET Non-NEET rural Non-NEET urban 30 27.7 NEET rural 25 2.4 NEET urban 20 percent 15 13.3 11.8 10.7 10.2 10 8.2 7.9 8.1 9.0 7.6 9.0 8.3 8.4 5.9 5.9 5 4.4 4.0 4.4 4.8 3.5 3.5 2.6 0.9 1.0 0.4 1.0 0 0 AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public works CES employment Regional programs Program Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. substantially more effective in improving em- becoming discouraged and remaining out of the ployability when compared with the largely un- labor force, the risk of skills degradation and targeted cash transfers of AMAL.14 If anything, obsolescence is increasing. However, the fiscal AMAL appears to have reduced the chances for impacts of such extensive programs have seri- employment among registered youth. ous macroeconomic implications for a small economy such as Tunisia’s. Even in Organisa- tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- Benefits from Active Labor Market ment (OECD) countries, which tend to have Programs relatively advanced institutions and practices in It is difficult to assess the impact of these labor this respect, an average of less than 0.6 percent market programs, both because of a lack of sys- of GDP was spent on ALMP measures in 2011 tematic monitoring data and the issue of attri- (ILO 2013). bution. The attribution problem occurs because Available evidence shows that most ALMPs, a graduate may have obtained a given job with- such as AMAL and SIVP, are largely regressive out a program. Reported labor market insertion rates vary between sources and are not based on and primarily support better-off youth mostly a causal analysis but rather on self-reported sur- with higher education. The vast majority of pro- vey results. Insertion rates vary between 10–20 grams systematically exclude NEETs and young percent for the three main programs—CAIP, Tunisians with less education, many of whom CIDES, and SIVP (Abaab 2012). come from poorer backgrounds, even though they constitute over three-quarters of the un- The cost per successfully placed benefi- employed youth population. In the absence of ciary is high for most programs, and in some any rigorous attempt to evaluate the impact of cases extremely high. For example, SIVP cost Tunisia’s large ALMPs, basic correlation analy- TND 9,000 (US$ (PPP) 12,407) per success- sis suggests that AMAL—the country’s largest ful placement (Abaab 2012). ALMPs need to program—has made the employability of it par- be implemented more effectively to address ticipants worse.15 Employment rates of previous the mismatch between inactivity and skills. In- AMAL beneficiaries are substantially lower than deed, with more and more potential workers the average employment rate among Tunisian Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 77 youth. Placement rates of SIVP appear some- The Tunisian Solidarity Bank (BTS)16 also what higher, although it remains unclear if the manages microcredit and entrepreneurship pro- program creates any net benefits to participants. grams. These programs provide concessional loans to prospective entrepreneurs, including youth, either directly or through associations. 5.2 Entrepreneurship Programs The program of direct loans provides credit of Youth entrepreneurship can play an import- up to TND 100,000 (US$ (PPP) 137,850) re- ant role in addressing youth exclusion while payable between six months and seven years, strengthening income generation and reducing with a grace period of between six months and youth unemployment. Pilot projects have re- three years, and an interest rate of five percent cently been launched throughout the Middle (Abaab 2012). The operational objectives of the East and North Africa Region, including Tu- BTS include: (1) facilitation of access to finance nisia (see for example, Premand et al. 2012). for small developers with limited resources and While many of these projects show important without bank guarantees; and (2) financing of impacts, they focus mainly on university grad- income-generating projects and job creation in different sectors—e.g., small trades, crafts, ag- uates and other skilled youth. However, disad- riculture, and services across the country (rural vantaged youth without a secondary education, and urban) (Abaab 2012). who, overall, constitute the largest share of NEETs in rural and urban areas, do not have access to many of the programs. Many of these Perceptions of Entrepreneurship young women and men already have entrepre- Programs neurial experience in the informal sector, and additional training can empower disadvantaged Awareness of existing entrepreneurship pro- youth to develop thriving firms. grams exceeds that of ALMP programs but remains low. As shown by figure 5.7, approxi- A number of programs are designed to sup- mately one-third of rural youth is aware of en- port entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs. trepreneurship programs such as PAPPE—34.0 ANETI administers the Program for Small percent, the National Fund For the Promotion Enterprises (Program d’accompagnement des of Craft and Small Entrepreneurs (Fonds Na- promoteurs des petites entreprises or PAPPE), tional de Promotion de l’Artisanat et des Pe- which is focused on the self-employed and is tits Métiers or FONAPRA)—33.9 percent, the open to both graduates and nongraduates. The National Solidarity Fund (Fonds National de program provides loans of up to TND 100,000 Solidarité or FNS)—34.1 percent, microloans (US$ (PPP) 137,850) per project; although the offered by BTS—36.5 percent, and other mi- average loan size in 2011 was TND 247 (US$ croloans—36.2 percent. In urban areas, on the (PPP) 340.50). In addition, the PAPPE program other hand, only FNS (56.9 percent) and BTS’s provides coaching and support in project design microloans (42.4 percent) are well known. As and the development of business plans as well for the remaining programs, less than one-quar- as the possibility of a practical internship with ter of urban youth is aware of FONAPRA (23.5 a firm for up to a year. A monthly stipend of percent), only one-fifth knows about microloans TND 100 (US$ (PPP) 137.85) is provided for other than BTS’s loans (20.5 percent), and only nongraduates for up to 12 months. The stipend one out of nine are familiar with PAPPE (11.3 for university graduates is twice that amount. percent). Young Tunisians’ levels of awareness The program reportedly had 17,000 beneficia- about the programs do not differ much by re- ries in 2011 (World Bank 2013c). gion, with the exception of youth in the rural 78 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion  wareness of Entrepreneurship Figure 5.7. A much better known by young graduates than Programs—Urban Versus Rural by youth without university degrees, as shown by figure 5.8. The difference in awareness of Program for Small Enterprises these programs is lowest for other microloan (PAPPE) programs (10.3 percentage points) and highest 60% for BTS microloans (23.4 percentage points). 40% Awareness among nongraduates in rural areas Microloans, is consistently high at around one-third, while other 20% FONAPRA among urban nongraduates, the FNS especially 0% is known by more than half of all respondents (53.0 percent). Even though the programs target unem- Rural ployed youth, young Tunisians without work Microloans, FNS BTS Urban have lower awareness of existing programs than youth with work. Young Tunisians who Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. are NEET have substantially less knowledge of Note: Figure refers to all youth. existing programs than their non-NEET peers. This information gap is substantial, especially south who seem to have a higher awareness of for microloans and small self-employment pro- PAPPE compared with their peers. But at the grams, and leads to further economic exclu- same time, they have a lower awareness of mi- sion of young Tunisians from disadvantaged croloans, other than BTS’s loans (see annex 5, backgrounds. With regard to gender, very few figure A5.3). differences exist. Nevertheless, it appears that in urban areas, young women have a higher Awareness of programs is very low among awareness of FONAPRA and microloans than young urban Tunisians without university de- of the loans offered by BTS. In rural areas, no grees. Most entrepreneurship programs are clear difference exists (see annex 5, figure A5.4). Figure 5.8. Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education 80 73.0 70 Nongraduate rural 64.8 Nongraduate urban 60 Graduate urban 52.9 50 percent 41.5 40 33.0 31.6 32.6 31.1 29.5 30.5 30.7 30 24.4 19.9 20.4 20 9.6 10 0 Program for small FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans, enterprises (PAPPE) BTS other Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 79 Figure 5.9.  Take-Up of Entrepreneurship youth without university degrees. Only one in Programs—Urban Versus Rural 100 university graduates enroll in any of the publically provided entrepreneurship programs. Program for Small Enterprises The take-up is substantially higher among youth (PAPPE) without university degrees, particularly for the 5% microloan programs PAPPE (1.9 percent urban 4% 3% and 3.8 percent rural), FNS (1.7 percent urban Microloans, and 4.7 percent rural), and BTS (3.0 percent other 2% FONAPRA 1% urban and 3.0 percent rural), as shown in figure 0% 5.10. This finding suggests that while university graduates are more inclined to seek wage em- Rural ployment, less educated youth are more likely Urban to pursue self-employment, notwithstanding the Microloans, FNS fact that these available entrepreneurship pro- BTS grams currently exclude youth who are self-em- ployed in the informal sector. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Program take-up among young Tunisians without work is substantially higher in rural areas. While the take-up among NEETs and Participation in Entrepreneurship working youth reaches similar levels in rural Programs areas, urban NEETs participate in entrepreneur- Program take-up is very low, especially in urban ship programs with a substantially lower prob- areas where only about one in 100 youths has ability than working urban youth. For instance, participated in entrepreneurship programs. 6.7 percent of young working Tunisians in urban Overall program take-up is low in rural areas, areas participated in microloan programs other and even lower in urban areas (see figure 5.9). than BTS’s microloans (3.8 percent in BTS mi- The programs with the highest take-up were croloans), as compared with only 2.2 percent of FNS (4.7 percent rural and 1.6 percent urban), urban NEETs (0.6 percent in BTS microloans) the Program for Small Enterprises (3.8 percent (see annex 5, figure A5.6). Furthermore, differ- rural and 0.8 percent urban), and other micro- ent patterns in take-up by poverty status and loans (4.6 percent rural and 3.4 percent urban). area of residence can be observed (see annex 5, A breakdown by region shows that PAPPE, figure A5.7). While in urban areas the take-up FONAPRA, and FNS programs have the highest is clearly higher among youth from poor house- take-up in the rural coast and the interior. Young holds, there is substantial heterogeneity in rural Tunisians in the rural south, on the other hand, areas. In particular, young Tunisians from poor are more interested in microloans programs than rural households participate mainly in FNS (6.1 their coastal peers (see annex 5, figure A5.5). percent), the Program for Small Enterprises (4.1 Overall, youth entrepreneurship should be used percent), and other microloans (3.0 percent). more extensively in lagging regions. Youth from richer rural households, on the other hand, tend to participate in all entrepre- Urban university graduates, a priority group neurship programs: other microloans (5.4 per- for policy makers, have barely enrolled in any cent), FNS (3.9 percent), the Program for Small entrepreneurship programs. Microloan pro- Enterprises (3.7 percent), BTS microloans (3.5 grams have the highest take-up among urban percent), and FONAPRA. 80 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 5.10. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Education 7 Nongraduate rural 6.4 Nongraduate urban 6 Graduate urban 5.4 5 4.7 percent 4 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3 1.9 2 1.7 1.3 1.0 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 Program for small FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans, enterprises (PAPPE) BTS other Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth who are not in education or training. The rural sample does not include sufficient graduates to allow a comparison. 5.3 Other Youth Services Decree 119 of 2011 loosened central control of the Youth Centers, providing more democratic management systems and greater financial au- Programs of the Ministry of Youth and tonomy, allowing them to more effectively cater Sports to local needs and preferences. Additional staff, notably young graduates, has also been re- The Ministry of Youth and Sports has a range cruited. Official statistics indicate that the per- of programs for youth; the longest established manent Youth Centers attracted almost 90,000 and best known are the Youth Centers. These users in 2011, and the rural and mobile centers centers are aimed at promoting healthy lifestyles attracted 390,000. But given the lack of a rigor- and preventing risky behaviors. The first center was established in 1963. They offer a range of ous monitoring system, it is unlikely that such leisure and occupational training activities in figures reflect the actual number of users. Ac- technology, language, and the arts, and aim to cording to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, promote citizenship and the integration of the the most popular activities were sports and ac- young into society. There are 316 permanent cessing the Internet. Attendance was reported to centers with sports fields and other facilities have fallen by 36 percent since 2010, reflecting in towns across the country, 224 rural centers a declining trend of attendance over a num- (Maisons des Jeunes Rurales), 14 more exten- ber of years. Funding remains one of the main sive complexes, and 44 mobile clubs (Clubs de problems facing the Youth Centers, along with Jeunes Mobiles) bringing activities to otherwise lack of adequate infrastructure and equipment, underserved rural areas. including computers. Most importantly, Youth Centers would require a more comprehensive The image of the Youth Centers was tar- set of youth-friendly services with relevant con- nished by their use for propaganda events tent and direct youth engagement in service de- under the old regime. Soon after the revolution, livery to attract the optimal number of users. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 81 Youth Services Provided by Religious welfare organizations tend to be better funded Welfare Organizations (Khouja and Moussa 2013). Reportedly, some welfare organizations started providing schol- Since 2011, religious welfare organizations have arships to pay for private courses for high- developed an alternative approach to service school students and medical services and, in delivery for excluded youth from marginalized some cases, they provide small funds to young communities, filling some of the gaps in pub- people wanting to marry (Khouja and Moussa lic services and programs. In sheer numbers, 2013). Moving forward, new incentives should religious welfare organizations have registered be put in place to promote partnerships between and expanded after the revolution (Khouja local governments, NGOs supporting youth in- and Moussa 2013). Within a few months of clusion, and welfare associations to build on the revolution, religious welfare organizations their effective outreach to disadvantaged youth stepped in to fill the vacuum created by dete- at the community level, to mainstream their riorating public services in marginalized areas, approaches, and to bring them closer to other becoming key economic actors in some places institutions operating at the local level (Khouja (International Crisis Group 2013). It has been and Moussa 2013). reported that some of these groups started help- ing with schooling, serving as mediators in local conflicts, assisting with administrative issues, 5.4 Conclusions and and advising in marital problems (International Recommendations Crisis Group 2013). In several poor villages and Key Challenges urban areas, religious welfare organizations are also engaged in the informal economy, and in Programs to promote youth opportunities in some cases have started to provide interest-free Tunisia currently face a number of challenges, loans to self-employed youth (International Cri- which cannot be addressed by central minis- sis Group 2013). tries and agencies alone. As highlighted by good practices in Tunisia and abroad, these chal- Most of the new associations operate in lenges can be addressed more effectively by di- poorer peri-urban areas near the big cities along rectly engaging the private sector, the emerging Tunisia’s coastal region, where economic and NGO sector concerned with youth employment social exclusion are rampant. Extensive qualita- issues, local governments, and young people as tive research has been conducted to inform this partners. With nearly 100,000 young Tunisians study. Results from Ettadham-Douar, a major entering the labor market each year,17 the re- suburb of Tunis with a population of approxi- form of ALMPs is urgently needed (ILO 2013). mately 600,000, highlight the situation (Khouja and Moussa 2013). Several religious welfare or- Key challenges preventing the good perfor- ganizations have sprung up in peri-urban areas mance of ALMPs include the following: since the revolution, and banners and sign- boards are ubiquitous. Many of these organiza- • A large set of costly ALMPs have been tions are filling a void left by the collapse of the “piling up” over time, resulting in dupli- old regime, which used to dominate civil society cations, insufficient capacity to manage through the activities of its political party. In them, and a lack of measurable results comparison with other much longer-established on the ground (Melliti 2011). The gov- civil society organizations, the new religious ernment has already passed a decree that 82 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion integrates all existing programs into four The next generation of ALMPs youth em- sets of interventions: (1) training and job- ployment needs to build on an increased knowl- search assistance; (2) wage subsidies; (3) edge base. Informed program design needs to support to entrepreneurship; and (4) re- focus on three fundamental tasks, namely: (1) gional employment support programs, no- better understanding of the causes and con- tably public works/workfare programs. If sequences of poor labor market outcomes for implemented, this integration could result youth; (2) developing tools to guide the design in substantial savings. However, ALMPs and implementation of youth employment pro- continue to offer the same number of ac- grams; and (3) supporting a new generation of tivities, often ineffectively. impact evaluation that focus on assessing how different design features of a given program, in- • ALMPs are regressive and predominantly cluding interactions with other programs, affect cater to university graduates. About 80 labor market outcomes for youth (Robalino et percent of expenditures in employment al. 2013). support programs go to tertiary education degree-holders (Abaab 2012), although they constitute only about one-quarter Strategic Areas for Further Action of NEETs.18 Existing ALMPs tend to ex- Tunisia’s greater political stability offers a clude young people from less-educated, unique opportunity to reform its broad set of lower-income backgrounds residing in youth programming and services while making peri-urban, rural, and lagging regions. them more inclusive, cost effective, and account- • The state’s statutory monopoly over em- able. As shown by the analysis throughout this ployment intermediation inhibits choice report, Tunisian youth are not a homogeneous and the entry of a wider range of providers group. There are several subgroups, each with and services into the market, particularly its own set of constraints to accessing economic private-sector providers (Abaab 2012). and social opportunities, and ALMPs and youth services need to consider the needs of the vari- • ALMPs tend to be overcentralized. There ous subgroups in their programming. The fol- is lack of scope for local ownership and lowing policy recommendations are intended participation by local administrations, to improve the effectiveness and coverage of relevant NGOs, and charitable orga- ALMPs’ programs and youth services, building nizations with strong local outreach in on the continuous policy dialogue since 2011 disadvantaged areas, and among youth between the Government of Tunisia and various stakeholders. Centralization of program agencies, including the World Bank. delivery inhibits innovation and adapta- tion to Tunisia’s diverse circumstances. Upgrading of ANETI’s Employment Services • Current monitoring and evaluation ar- Ensuring coverage for all relevant youth sub- rangements continue to be sporadic, lack groups necessitates the following actions, which rigor, and are insufficiently developed to build on the recommendations of several techni- assess the respective impacts of the vari- cal reports. Other reports emphasized measures ous programs. Follow-up support to for- to improve ANETI’s capacity to provide its mer beneficiaries after completion of their beneficiaries with state-of-the-art employment activities is often lacking. services, including counseling, training in hard Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 83 and soft skills, and labor intermediation. They mobile-based employment intermedia- also recommended simplifying the administra- tion and skills training platforms, such tion and delivery of ALMPs (Robalino et al. as Ta3mel and Najja7ni (see box 5.1). 2013). Moving forward, the following actions ANETI’s staff currently has limited ca- are critical: pacity and numbers to meet the various needs of job-seeking youth or to connect • Remove regulatory constraints to allow them to private employers. Information the private sector to participate in provid- and communication technology solutions ing intermediation services. The impor- can be cost-effective, accountable, and tance of including the private sector in the youth-friendly complements to scale-up delivery of employment services, notably outreach and increase the number of ben- intermediation, is confirmed by the Pri- eficiaries served. In addition, Tunisia has a vate Employment Agencies Convention very vibrant set of young information and adopted by the International Labor Or- communication technology entrepreneurs ganization in 1997, which Tunisia should that ANETI could engage to develop solu- ratify (Convention 181 supported by Rec- tions in this area. ommendation 188). Also, the labor code should be adjusted to allow the operation • Develop state-of-the-art monitoring sys- of private intermediation agencies. tems through online and mobile solutions. Online platforms like the one utilized to • Develop public-private-NGO partner- monitor results in real time by the Idmej ships through performance-based con- project19 could be easily adapted by tracts to provide employment services ANETI and other youth service providers to youth aligned with labor market de- to enter and analyze data pertaining to mands, while reaching out to disadvan- multiple ALMPs throughout the country. taged young people in peri-urban, rural, The online platform would provide valu- and interior regions. Partnerships would able information as to whether funds are enable ANETI to deliver more tailored spent correctly—i.e., whether training ac- skills, entrepreneurship training, intern- tivities and internships with firms are in- ships, and on-the-job training to unem- deed conducted and what type and how ployed graduates and other youth, such many young people are benefitting from as less educated and inactive young men and women who may not be registered as them. In addition, an easily accessible unemployed. In any case, ANETI should beneficiary feedback via mobile phones no longer function as a monopoly for the could provide information on the quality provision of employment and intermedi- and relevance of the training and intern- ation services in Tunisia, as this limits its ships, on the timeliness of cash transfers ability to effectively serve young people’s to young beneficiaries, and the employ- needs. ability impact of such interventions on beneficiaries over time. These are low-cost • Improve and expand placement services solutions, allowing for access to infor- by the systematic use of new technolo- mation about the progress of programs, gies. ANETI’s programs could be con- which can guide evidence-based budget nected to newly-established online and reallocations and/or cuts to ALMPs. 84 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Box 5.1. Online Platforms Najja7ni and Tounes Ta3mal The online platform “Tounes Ta3mal” offers a virtual career and entrepreneurship center for Tunisian youth. Co-funded by Silatech and Microsoft, this initiative is designed to provide Arab youth with resources ranging from online career guidance, employability and entre- preneurship education, work experience, and employment opportunities. Launched in Oc- tober 2013, the “Tounes Ta3mal” site (Tunis Works) offers free, ad-free access to more than 600 e-learning courses available in Arabic, English, and French. Integration with the mobile “Najja7ni” service is underway to expand reach and access. Young users can register and engage with the platform by themselves. Silatech works to deploy the platform in the context of local partnerships with academic institutions, nongov- ernmental organizations, and other youth-serving organizations, including Tounes Ta3mal, as an integrated element of their youth programming. The resources on the platform complement and expand the services offered by these organizations to better address the needs of their youth. For example, career centers can use the online job-matching service to help students find relevant internships or jobs in their area. Other organizations have used e-learning con- tent on Tounes Ta3mal to design blended learning courses that rely on the platform for content but actually take place in the classroom. “Najja7ni mEmploi” is the region’s first mobile-based career center, offering employability support service that connects young people without Internet access to employability resources, financial inclusion, and job opportunities via basic mobile phones. Free services include career guidance, labor market and training opportunities, English-language learning, financial liter- acy, CV (resume) writing, self-awareness, and setting up businesses, among others. Quizzes, Short Message Service (SMS) alerts, and personality tests keep the user updated with informa- tion regarding vocational areas of work. They can also reach out to potential employers by posting a mini-CV with Najja7ni Employment. Najja7ni mEmploi’ is complemented by mEducation and mEnglish programs. Between these three initiatives, Najja7ni reaches almost one million registered users, although there may be some replication due to people subscribing to more than one service. The mEmploi service was relaunched with job-matching functionality in January 2014 and is in its first quar- ter of operation. It has already gained a registered user base of nearly 300,000, of which over 200,000 used employability mLearning and 96,000 created mini-CVs to receive job alerts for about 2,500 jobs. The initiative is a partnership among Silatech, Tunisiana,a ProInvest, and EduPartage and works closely with youth-focused initiatives of the World Bank, the National Agency for Em- ployment and Independent Work (Agence Nationale de l’Emploi or ANETI), and Microsoft Citizenship. The initiative has won many global awards, including the Stevie Silver Award and the Global Telecom Business Innovation Award. a. Tunisiana is a Tunisian mobile phone provider and part of the Ooredoo group. Source: Silatech, May 2014. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 85 Establish Integrated Local Youth-Friendly free time. Such services should establish linkages Services with Youth Participation with other interested institutions, such as local youth-led NGOs, charities, local governments, Integrated Local Youth-Friendly Services offer- and employment services to maximize youth ing a one-stop shop to young Tunisians can be outreach, particularly to disadvantaged youth in established at the local level, serving the less educated and NEETs in particular. Integrated peri-urban, rural, and lagging regions. The most Local Youth-Friendly Services can be pro- successful international experiences include vided by building on and expanding services the strong youth participation element in the of ANETI and by using the existing venues of management of integrated local youth services the Ministry of Youth and Sports. These ser- and structured partnerships with local govern- vices can provide youth with life skills; relevant ments to ensure their long-term sustainabil- information and coaching on local economic ity. In addition to positive outcomes for youth opportunities; job intermediation; information employability, evidence shows that integrated, and communication technology training; access local, youth-friendly services have contributed to social, cultural, and sports activities; access to greater social cohesion and trust with local to legal protection services; information about authorities by promoting active youth partici- healthy lifestyles; volunteering opportunities; pation and cross-cutting engagement with a va- and opportunities for other constructive uses of riety of local institutions (World Bank 2007c). Jovenes “Training Plus” Programs for Disadvantaged Youth Box 5.2.  in Latin America The Jovenes programs offer comprehensive training to unemployed and economically disad- vantaged youth, aged 16–29, to improve their human and social capital and employability. The demand-driven model has been implemented in eight Latin American countries, custom- ized to local contexts and labor markets.a Technical training and internship experiences with employers are combined with training in basic life skills and other support services to ensure the social integration and job readiness of beneficiaries. Private and public institutions con- tracted through public bidding mechanisms provide training and organize internships. The program targets the poor, with more than 60 percent of participants coming from low-income families, including early school-dropouts. Impact evaluations show that the programs increased the probability of beneficiaries find- ing employment after graduation, especially among young women. In Argentina, the program increased the probability of employment for young adult women (aged 21 and older) by about 10 percentage points over a control group. In Chile, the program increased the probability of employment by 21 percentage points with strongly significant results for youth aged 21 and younger. In Argentina, the program increased monthly wages by about 10 percent over a con- trol group, with results more favorable for young males and adult females. a. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Source: Aedo and Núñez 2001. 86 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Prioritizing Inclusive and Comprehensive effective than traditional vocational classroom “Training Plus” Programs trainings (Cunningham et al. 2010). The total hours spent in classroom training result in a “Training Plus” programs successfully combine lower impact on the program’s rate of return technical training with behavioral skills train- than the time spent with on-the-job training ing, internships, employment services, and proj- (Lee et al. 2012). Such programs have succeeded ect accreditation. It emphasizes demand-driven in increasing the employability and earnings skills training based on agreements with private of low-income youth in several Latin Ameri- sector partners to provide internships to its cli- can countries (see box 5.2). Priority should be ents. Training Plus programs have proven more given to Training Plus programs while the less Box 5.3. Youth Entrepreneurship Program in Peru The Programa de Calificación de Jóvenes Creadores de Microempresas provides assistance and training to youth in developing business plans and creating profitable businesses. The program is implemented by the Peruvian nongovernmental organization Colectivo Integral de Desarrollo and was started in 1999 as an initiative to counteract the significant lack of entrepreneurial skills among low-skilled young people. Its objective is to improve the earnings and quality of life of beneficiaries. The target population is economically disadvantaged young people aged 15–25 who own a small and/or informal business in operation for less than a year or who demonstrate entrepreneurial skills and reside in the targeted localities. The program offers different types of services. During the preparation phase, interested youth benefit from mentorship and training to prepare business plans that will be presented for selection. After selection, eligible youth or beneficiaries of the program are offered mentor- ship, training, and internship services. Program beneficiaries can also access microcredit. The program has been cost effective, with a beneficiary cost under US$1,000. Impact estimates suggest an increase of 7.8 percentage points in the probability of beneficia- ries having operating businesses and an 8 percent increase in average incomes. These estimates also show an increase of almost 40 percentage points in the probability of businesses operating for more than a year and an increase in earnings of 40 percentage points. An important sec- ondary effect is job creation. Beneficiaries employ 17.3 percent more workers than the control group, which consisted of interested but non-enrolled peers. Further evaluation and follow-up is needed to monitor the success of the program over a longer span—e.g., a follow-up on busi- nesses in operation for at least two years. Regarding its replication in other localities, increasing the program’s scale may actually hamper its effectiveness because the executing agency may not have sufficient capacity to offer the types and frequency of personalized services previously rendered to youth. The institutional capacity of the executing agency and/or of the institu- tions involved—as measured by personnel, knowledge, and types and frequency of services—is critical. Low frequency and low quality of services would dramatically reduce the program’s probability of success. Source: Puerto 2007. Skills for Employment and Other Youth Services | 87 effective but costly ALMPs, such as vocational Establish “Comprehensive Entrepreneurship” training in classrooms and AMAL-type cash Programs transfers, should be phased out. By integrating Comprehensive entrepreneurship programs and reducing the number of ALMPs, savings combine entrepreneurial skills training, access can be reallocated to Training Plus programs to capital, and mentoring for young start-ups aimed at less educated youth from peri-urban, with established entrepreneurs. Youth entrepre- rural, and lagging regions. neurship is another important area of potential Figure 5.11. Matrix of Labor Market Interventions Barriers Policy Intervention Job counseling at secondary and tertiary levels; second Insufficient basic skills chance programs Job-relevant skills Technical skills mismatch Comprehensive Training Plus Programs constraints Behavioral skills mismatch Behavioral skills training Insufficient entrepreneurial skills Entrepreneurial training Slow job growth economy Public service programs/youth-led community initiatives Affirmative action Lack of labor demand Employer discrimination Subsidies to employers who hire target groups Employee monitoring Employment services Job matching Web-based and mobile phone information-sharing Job search constraints Skills certification Signaling competencies Training center accreditation Comprehensive entrepreneurship programs Firm start-up Lack of access to financial or constraints social capital Microfinance Gender-sensitive outreach of excluded groups Nontraditional skills training Social constraints Exclusion constraints, including on the supply side gender and birth place Safe training, employment, and income-generation opportunities for women Program design adjustment to group needs Source: Adapted from Cunningham et al. 2010. 88 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion investment in Tunisia, especially for secondary current gaps in addressing barriers that cause school graduates; graduates of technical train- economic exclusion and lack of access to op- ing courses; informal urban workers; and rural portunities in the country’s programming. Fig- youth with promising business ideas, including ure 5.11 concludes the chapter by summarizing young women. Such interventions would com- key categories of barriers discussed so far and plement the current focus of the PAPPE microfi- offering evidence-based program interventions nance program, which mostly benefits university that contribute to address such barriers.20 graduates. A number of different approaches have been Notes found to be successful in increasing the effective- 1. In 2009, the MVTE undertook the reform of the ALMP port- ness of youth entrepreneurship programs. These folio, consolidating ALMPs into six programs to facilitate their management and financial control. All wage insertion programs include: (1) providing extensive mentoring and consist primarily of on-the-job training, include a small monthly business development services to young bene- stipend, and subsidize social security contributions of partici- ficiaries throughout the entire project business pants. The number of beneficiaries of wage insertion programs has increased markedly in recent years, from 85,889 in 2008 to cycle through the direct participation of exist- 95,415 in 2009, and to 138,674 in 2010. ing entrepreneurs, where possible—recruited 2. In 2011, ANETI was able to identify 100,356 vacancies (in- through chambers of commerce, for instance— ternships and permanent positions), but they only filled about 46 percent of them. Vacancies are entered into a database that is to mentor aspiring entrepreneurs; (2) guiding open to job seekers, and most positions are filled by individuals and helping young entrepreneurs to gradually who contact the enterprise directly and then inform ANETI of build the practical and empirical knowledge nec- the match. ANETI does not systematically match registered un- employed youth to available vacancies. essary to start and consolidate new businesses 3. SIVP—Stage d’Initiation à la Vie Professionnelle. and to find concrete opportunities to enter al- 4. CAIP—Contrat d’Adaptation et d’Insertion a la vie ready-existing value chains; (3) strengthening Professionnelle. beneficiaries’ self-esteem and confidence as en- 5. SCV—Service Civil Volontaire. trepreneurs; and (4) accompanying young en- 6. CIDES—Contrat d’Insertion des Diplômés de l’Enseignement Supérieur. trepreneurs in their search for and securing of 7. Contrat de Réinsertion dans la Vie Active. financial services to support their businesses 8. Prise en charge par l’Etat de 50 pourcent des salaires versés. (Cunningham et al. 2010). Box 5.3 presents the 9. Decree no. 2012–2369 was passed on October 16, 2012. key features and positive outcomes of the Young 10. CES—Contrat Emploi-Solidarité. Micro Entrepreneurs’ Qualification Program in 11. ATFP—Agence Tunisienne de la Formation Professionnelle. Peru, considered one of the best global practices 12. Estimates from recent survey data (World Bank 2012d; 2012e). in youth entrepreneurship. While these recom- 13. The Labor Intensive Public Works Program is part of the mended programs have been evaluated with CES activities. largely positive results, it will be critical to intro- 14. These results are only descriptive and do not account for ed- duce them incrementally into Tunisia and to test ucation level, family backgrounds, access to networks, and other important factors among the program participants. and evaluate what works best before implement- 15. World Bank calculations. ing programs on a larger scale. 16. Banque Tunisienne de Solidarité. 17. According to the ILO 2013 School-to-work Transition Sur- Building on previously presented findings vey (SWTS), 94,000 Tunisians aged 15–19 plan to enter the on youth exclusion in Tunisia, this chapter labor market in 2014. See ILO. 2014. 18. World Bank calculations using recent survey data (World provides an overview of existing programs Bank 2012d; 2012e). and services aimed at young Tunisians as well 19. Arabic for inclusion and cooperation. as international good practices. It highlighted 20. Based on Cunningham et al. 2010. Chapter 6 The Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy and Institutions 90 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Young people in Tunisia should take responsibility and take their seat at the table and not wait for it to be given to them. Mohueb Garoui, Co-founder I-Watch, “The Arab Youth and Development Debate,” April 1, 2014, Tunis Taking Stock of Young People’s 6.1  trusted political institutions, according to Gains Since the Revolution this study’s findings. Despite Tunisia’s impressive social and politi- • Participation. Despite dynamic online ac- cal achievements, inclusion of young Tunisians tivism, community and civic engagement remains a largely unfinished project. Compre- through formal institutions continues to hensively addressing the legitimate aspirations be slight. of youth will be critical for Tunisia to sustain • Social exclusion. Youth feel socially un- its positive forward momentum. This report dervalued, and their potential contribu- presents Tunisian youth’s interests, aspirations, tion is thwarted by political and social and identities, and shares how young Tunisians structures that are not geared to address experience their frustrating socioeconomic cir- their problems. They often lack the skills, cumstances. The Arab Spring demonstrated information, and confidence to challenge that, while economic exclusion is a critical issue, exclusionary practices. it is by no means the only form of exclusion ex- perienced by young men and women. Youth are • Economic exclusion. Unemployment subject to a wide range of additional forms of among young people aged 15–29 increased political, social, and cultural exclusion, which after the revolution, with an official youth in turn can exacerbate their economic exclusion. unemployment rate of 33.2 percent in 2013, according to the most recent ILO • Political exclusion. Even though youth School-to-Work Transition survey (ONJ played a leading role in bringing about 2014). The rate of young people who are a change in regime, they have been un- not in education, employment, or training able to secure a role in the subsequently (NEETs), however, is substantially higher. formed government, and they feel that It is one of the highest in the Middle East they are not consulted on issues that di- and North Africa Region. In rural areas, rectly affect them. 20.6 percent of older men are NEET com- • Confidence and trust. Like their peers pared with 46.9 percent of young men—a across the Arab world, young Tunisians NEET ratio of 2.3. In urban areas, the have very low confidence in government NEET ratio among old versus young men and other public institutions. In late 2012, is 2.6 (NEET affects 13.1 percent of older only 8.8 percent of surveyed rural youth men versus 34.6 percent of young men). and 31.1 percent of surveyed urban youth Young women are nearly twice as often The Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy and Institutions | 91 affected by NEET than young men—60.2 supporting community-based, youth-targeted percent in urban areas and 81.5 percent in interventions that address their multifaceted rural areas. Moreover, a large proportion needs. These would include services such as of youth depend on the informal sector free remedial education, supporting youth en- for income generation, which provides gagement in community life, providing youth- no stable income and no access to social friendly spaces and programs, and promoting protection. active labor market interventions involving work-based training and youth entrepreneur- Moreover, exclusion continues to be man- ship (International Crisis Group. 2013a). ifest not only in the political and economic sphere, but also in social and psychological terms. Exclusion inevitably influences the iden- 6.2 Guiding Principles for tity and self-image of young people, which in Strengthening Youth Inclusion turn has an impact on their capacity to fulfill and Participation socially sanctioned roles. This report has high- Participatory decision making in the design and lighted the persistent geography of exclusion implementation of youth policy and programs through which young people in lagging re- as well as in the management of community or- gions of the interior and the south as well as in ganizations yields benefits for all stakeholders peri-urban areas suffer disproportionate exclu- and is likely to increase the impact of public in- sion. Young women are particularly vulnerable vestments (World Bank 2004). A key message of to some forms of exclusion due to social norms the report is that enabling active citizenship and that restrict their economic, social, and political civil participation among young Tunisians will inclusion. Cumulatively, these multiple forms of be critical to sustaining the country’s regained exclusion impact individuals, preventing them positive forward momentum. Constructive di- from actively contributing to Tunisian society. alogue between Tunisia’s youth and public in- The majority of NEET and underemployed stitutions, together with broader civil society, youth—particularly those with lower levels political organizations, and the private sector, of educational attainment—has been largely will be critical in addressing the most pressing ignored by mainstream youth programs and barriers to youth inclusion. Facilitating youth services. Rather, they are part of the “other Tu- inclusion enables the mobilization of the new nisia,” which was evoked at the beginning of generation as an economic and social resource this report by a young activist highlighting the that can directly contribute to sustaining the urgent need for greater equity. They are often political stability and economic growth of the the beneficiaries of alternative support systems country. The new constitution provides an ex- provided by religious welfare organizations. cellent framework for innovative pathways to Bridging the divide with this “other Tunisia” is youth engagement and inclusion, provided that an urgent imperative for equity. An appropriate the spirit of Article 8 meaningfully guides the de- strategy to address this particularly vulnerable velopment of the policies and programs, which population in Tunisia is the encouragement of are priorities for young Tunisians. Participation partnerships between nongovernmental orga- is also one of the eleven guiding principles for nizations (NGOs) and welfare organizations as effective national youth policy, as outlined in well as local governments, with a view toward the Council of Europe’s Eleven Principles of 92 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion a National Youth Policy (see box 6.1). These Given Tunisia’s clear commitment to democ- principles range from the need to offer training racy, it would be valuable to align Tunisian in- in life and technical skills that complement the stitutions with good international practices that formal education system to the establishment of can strengthen the participation of youth in the representative youth advisory bodies that con- design, implementation, and evaluation of rel- tribute to government decisions. evant policies and programs. Such policies and Box 6.1. Eleven Principles of a National Youth Policy 1. Nonformal learning: Encourage active learning outside of the formal education sys- tem—e.g., life skills, foreign language training, and technical skills—through open and inclusive youth nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 2. Youth training policy: Promote the development of good trainers in the youth sector, a prerequisite for the formation of effective youth NGOs. 3. Youth legislation: Draft legislation that includes youth NGOs in policy decision making and that ensures the efficiency of government institutions working on youth issues. 4. Youth budget: Allocate an administrative budget and project grants to youth organizations. 5. Youth information policy: Inform young people about opportunities that exist for them and ensure communication among all stakeholders in youth policy and transparency in the conduct of youth policy. 6. Multilevel policy: Outline youth policies to be implemented at both the national and local levels. 7. Youth research: Regularly identify the key issues for youth well-being, the best practices in addressing these issues, and the potential role of youth NGOs. 8. Participation: Support the active involvement of youth organizations in the design and implementation of youth policies. 9. Interministerial cooperation: Implement youth policies in a cross-sectoral manner, en- suring joint ministerial responsibility, possibly through a designated youth coordinating agency. 10. Innovation: Stimulate creative and innovative solutions to youth problems. 11. Youth advisory bodies: Establish structures—e.g., consultative committees with a mandate to influence government on youth issues. Source: European Youth Forum 2002a. The Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy and Institutions | 93 programs include education and employment pillars with their respective measures: (1) par- policy reform, local economic development, and ticipation and active citizenship; (2) Access to innovative youth service delivery with youth economic opportunities; and (3) youth-friendly participation. To promote greater trust in the services at the local level. interaction with public institutions, it will be es- sential to ensure that youth leaders are selected These three dimensions of youth inclusion through transparent and democratic processes policy, which involve participation, economic and that they are subject to term and age limits. opportunities and youth-friendly services re- Top-down selection of youth interlocutors would quire a specific set of measures at the national be rightly perceived as tokenism and would ulti- and especially at the local level, as indicated mately discourage genuine participation. below. Developing a Multidimensional 6.3  Participation, Voice, and Citizenship Youth Inclusion Policy Local Level A multidimensional youth policy is needed to • Youth-led community development reduce barriers to youth inclusion and facilitate • Competitive grant scheme to support the youth contributions to Tunisian society. The ap- capacity of nongovernmental organiza- proach to youth development is now ready to tions (NGOs) to engage/provide services move from piecemeal initiatives to an integrated to excluded youth set of policies and investment strategies, allow- ing efficient use of financial resources. As Tunisia • Institutional channels to influence local emerges from its long recession, public budgets policy—i.e., local youth councils will continue to remain constrained, requiring judicious resource allocation and selectivity. To • Legal protection for young disadvantaged ensure equity, this can best be achieved through people in conflict with police national youth policies and any related reforms that cut across sectors but that have a common • Confidence/trust building between youth, focus on youth inclusion. These will also need local authorities and police to complement sector-specific policies—such as • Joint youth initiatives between religious those in education, employment, and regional and nonreligious organizations development—to address the needs of young people with greater efficiency. These policies National Level should be reformulated with the participation • Capacity support of youth-led national of youth stakeholders, especially youth repre- NGOs and coalition building sentative bodies, as partners in decision making. Moreover, policy implementation needs to be • Competitive grant scheme to support stu- supported by performance-based management dent and youth organizations of institutions, strengthened by mechanisms for close interagency coordination that bring to- • Student consultative bodies at secondary gether government and youth organizations, and and tertiary education levels informed by systematic data collection and par- ticipatory monitoring and evaluation systems. • Voice in national policy and reforms—e.g., As highlighted in figure 6.1, a multidimensional through National Youth Councils youth policy will include the following three 94 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure 6.1. Multidimensional Policy for Youth Inclusion 1. Participation and active citizenship Participation • Youth-led community development • Volunteering • Youth councils for participation and voice • Human rights NEETs 2. Access to economic opportunities • Job counseling in secondary and tertiary education Informal youth Economic • Skills training Young women opportunities • Apprenticeships/internships Youth in peri-urban areas • Job intermediation and lagging regions • Youth entrepreneurship 3. Youth-friendly services at the local level • Life skills training • Information and communication technology and language skills Integrated youth • Healthy lifestyles services • Legal support services • Peer mentoring • Sports Source: World Bank. Access to Economic Opportunities National Policy Level • Job counseling services in universities Local Level through public/private/NGO partnerships • Job counseling services in secondary schools in partnership with the private • Access to information—e.g., rigorous sector and NGOs monitoring and evaluation, data, and youth policy dialogue on employment • Gender-sensitive youth-led community policy and Active Labor Market Programs development, also with small cash trans- fers incentives • Youth consultations and participation— also virtual—on labor market reform • Job intermediation • Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and • Gender-sensitive individual and group en- evaluation trepreneurship, through equity building grants and access to finance • Apprenticeships and internships tailored to less educated youth and NEETs through gender-sensitive approaches The Way Forward: Inclusive Youth Policy and Institutions | 95 Youth-Friendly Services While the revolution has given young Tu- nisians a glimpse of the possibilities of a new Local Level future, the task of building that future largely • Youth-friendly services tailored for remains to be done. It is a task that cannot be NEETs and other disadvantaged youth, accomplished by youth alone—any more than it particularly inactive young women, with can be accomplished without them. This is also youth participation (i.e., life skills, infor- not an undertaking that government can pursue mation and communication technology singlehandedly. New forms of partnerships be- and e-learning, entrepreneurship and em- tween government, the private sector, civil soci- ployability skills, legal support services, ety, and communities will be needed to imagine peer mentoring, cultural activities, volun- and accomplish the task that Tunisia faces of teering, and sports) simultaneously reforming its politics, economy, National Level and society. Young people require the space to • Capacity building of NGOs providing participate fully in this process of renewal and, youth services indeed, to benefit from it. The stakes could hardly be higher: the possibility of a productive • Quality standards of content and equitable economy and vibrant political and civil society is set against the possibility of • Certification of skills growing polarization, frustration, and cynicism. Moving toward a constructive outcome holds • Beneficiary feedback and monitoring and the promise of a multitude of rewards, including evaluation the energy, awareness, goodwill, and commit- ment of the young men and women of Tunisia for whom this report bears witness. Bibliography Abaab, Houcine. 2012. “Cartographie des institutions Angel-Urdinola, Diego F., Stefanie Brodmann, and Anne et principaux programmes de soutien à l’emploi des Hilger. 2012. “Labor Markets in Tunisia: Recent jeunes, en Tunisie.” Background Paper, Tunisia Youth Trends and Policy Options.” Middle East and North Inclusion Report, World Bank, Tunis. Africa Human Development Sector Unit (MNSHD), Report, World Bank, Washington, DC. 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The first stage was the selection of 352 for rural and urban Tunisia and additional com- enumeration areas, using the General Census of prehensive qualitative research. Population and Housing in 2004 as sampling frame. The second stage was the selection of 12 households, after full listing, within each sam- Urban Survey pled enumeration area. Data collection took As part of this study, the Tunisia Household place mainly in May and June 2012, with ad- Survey on Youth in Urban Areas (THSYUA) ditional repeat visits taking place later in 2012. was conducted in 2012. The survey was con- Fieldwork was carefully monitored to maximize ceived by a group of Tunisian professors and response rates; the response was at least 85 per- students, called Projet Citoyen, from various cent in each region. universities in Tunisia, particularly from Ecole THSYUA uniquely combines original data on Superieure des Sciences Economiques et Com- objective household and individual characteris- merciales de Tunis (ESSECT). Motivated by the tics with data on perceptions and aspirations, observed differences between different parts of particularly among youth. Based on a question- the country, including neighborhoods in the naire that is broader and more detailed than a Grand Tunis area, the aim of the survey was to labor force survey, THSYUA allows a deeper scientifically understand urban inequality, with understanding of the correlations of labor out- a specific focus on economic opportunities for young people. This effort led to collaboration comes and seeks to better understand the job as- between the Tunisian National Statistical Office pirations, perceptions, and constraints faced by (Institut National de la Statistique or INS), the young Tunisians in accessing economic opportu- General Commissariat for Regional Develop- nities and basic services. A unique feature of this ment, and the World Bank. The INS provided survey is that specific modules were fielded to all the sampling frame, the commissariat, as the individuals aged 15 and older, in every sampled main government counterpart, provided guid- household. In contrast to a typical labor force ance for the scope of the survey and its urban survey in which only very basic information on focus, and the World Bank provided technical employment is collected, this survey captured and financial support. detailed aspects of job searches, unemployment, working conditions, and job satisfaction. In ad- THSYUA was designed to be regionally dition, household members aged 15–29 were representative. The survey was representa- administered a module to gather information on tive across the seven regions of Tunisia—with their attitudes on government and the economy Grand Tunis counting as a region separate from as well as their participation in skills training the northeast. The survey covered 4,214 urban programs and other programs to expand job households. The sample was drawn in two opportunities (World Bank 2013b). 105 106 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Rural Survey on the disaggregation of Tunisia into enumer- ation areas.1 Each enumeration area contains Building on the data collection in urban areas, about 100–120 households. In total, 70 enu- a second survey was implemented in 2012 in meration areas were randomly selected—29 rural areas. The Tunisia Household Survey on along the coast, 10 in the south, and 31 in the Youth in Rural Areas (THSYRA) has a sam- interior survey regions. The relative distribution ple size of 1,400 households in the entire rural between the survey regions corresponds to their area of Tunisia as defined by the INS. For the respective shares of youth population. From purpose of sampling, administrative governor- each of these 70 enumeration areas, 20 house- ates were grouped into three survey regions. holds were randomly selected, leading to a total The data is representative on the level of these sample size of 1,400 households. survey regions, which largely correspond to socioeconomically and geographically distinct The random sampling of Primary Sampling rural zones. The first survey region covered Unit (PSUs) was performed by experts from the coast and included coastal governorates in the INS who were also responsible for the the north and east of the country. The second sample frame of the urban survey (THSYUA). survey region covered the south and included The drawing of 20 households from each PSU the southern governorates. The third survey re- is processed on a systematic and clearly de- gion covered the rural interior of Tunisia and fined approach. A random-walk procedure was included the remote areas of central and west- conducted for each of the PSUs of the sample, ern Tunisia, including the Algerian border. The which included two separate starting points at survey was conducted in December 2012 and opposing ends of the east-west dimension of overlapped with parts of the data collection of each PSU, moving toward the population center the urban survey. The differences in seasons of the PSU to allow for full coverage of both may have led to some systematic differences in centrally and remotely located households. terms of employment, which tends to be lower in rural areas during the winter, but probably did not affect other outcomes. The data of the Survey Comparisons rural and urban survey have not been pooled for The International Labour Organisation (ILO) any of the analysis. Youth-to-Transition Surveys and the World The THSYRA sample was drawn from the Bank Youth Surveys (THSYUA and THSYRA) latest available census, the 2004 General Cen- build on the same official sampling frame pro- sus of Population and Housing, provided by vided by the National Statistics Institute. In the INS. This census also provided the sam- principle, survey results should be very similar. pling frame for the corresponding Urban and The main differences between the surveys are Peri-Urban Youth Survey. Proportionality of the the sample size (ILO surveys are larger) and the possible locations for determining the number survey period (ILO survey took place in 2013, of households in rural areas was used to en- while the World Bank youth surveys took place sure representativeness. Because of the overall in late 2012). Overall, the estimates of youth research focus on youth, the sampling design unemployment and NEET based on ILO data ensures representativeness of the youth popula- are about 5–8 percentage points higher than tion, which is defined by ages 15–29. The pro- the World Bank estimates. When taking into portionality to youth population size is based account the different survey times and samples, Annex 1. Data Sources | 107 the differences are within a reasonable range of groups: school dropouts, those with secondary measurement variation. school education, students, youth who had ac- quired professional training, unemployed grad- In a separate publication by the National uates, young people working in the informal Employment Observatory, using the 2013 sector, micro-entrepreneurs, young salaried ILO Youth-to-Transition Survey, estimates are workers, and young entrepreneurs. Interview presented for “unemployed youth and not in parameters covered education, educational re- school or training” (ILO 2104). This definition form and quality, experience of unemployment appears somewhat similar to the NEET concept and employment, and the state of the country used in this study, but differs in one important since the revolution. aspect. NEET includes all unemployed youth and all youth who are discouraged and are not The use of personal relationships, social in- actively searching for work. The NEET defini- stitutions, and professional networks to iden- tion is more inclusive and considers all young tify and recruit respondents resulted in a gender people. Because a large segment of the Tunisian bias that favored males and in having a larger youth population is discouraged and does not proportion of respondents in the upper range actively search for jobs, these young people are of ages, including several respondents older officially not defined as “unemployed.” NEET than age 29. Researchers were concerned that is broader and considers all unemployed youth excluding unemployed graduates older than and all discouraged youth, except those in edu- age 29 would alienate them from their younger cation or training. In fact, the main rational for peers and, in so doing, disrupt cohesion among using the NEET concept instead of unemploy- Tunisian youth living in the same towns or ment is to highlight the large segments of youth neighborhoods. who are excluded from economic opportuni- ties. Because of the narrow definition of unem- Acting as facilitator and note-taker, respec- tively, an academic consultant and student-con- ployment, NEET estimates for Tunisian youth ducted focus group held discussions in French presented here are nearly twice as large as the using guides and procedures that had been de- figures presented for “unemployed youth not in veloped and pilot tested by the World Bank in school or training” (ILO 2104). cooperation with the National Youth Obser- vatory and consultants. Researchers obtained Qualitative Research permission from each of the focus group partici- pants in order to audiotape the sessions. During Researchers organized 21 focus groups com- the focus groups, participants were invited prised of between 8 and 12 participants each, to participate in individual interviews. Those and conducted 35 individual interviews. In who expressed an interest in doing so provided total, the qualitative research involved 199 the facilitator with their names and contact young people in all seven regions of the coun- information. try: Tunis (NE), Zaghouan (NE), Mahdia (CE), Jendouba (NW), Sidi Bouzid (CW), Gasfa (SW), Based on selection criteria—primarily the and Médenine (SE). In order to achieve a rep- consultant’s assessment of the participant’s ac- resentative sample, researchers took participant tive participation and demeanor in the focus gender, rural/urban residency, and other charac- group in which he/she participated, the facilita- teristics into account to develop the following tor selected a participant from among those who 108 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion had originally volunteered to be individually in- method—specifically the editing style of anal- terviewed. The facilitator subsequently elicited ysis, using the full transcription of the focus additional detailed narrative information from groups and the individual interviews (Glaser the participant using a semistructured interview and Strauss 1967). Through this process, using guide developed by the World Bank in coopera- a structured form, the researcher carefully read tion with the National Youth Observatory and the responses to identify key words in each re- consultants. Consultants also conducted inter- sponse, used these to develop categories of re- views with individual service providers work- sponses within the questions, and then used ing for public or NGO institutions and others these categories to develop themes across the providing services to youth in the 14 commu- question items. This process is hierarchical, with nities included in the sample. As with the selec- key words being the foundation and the themes tion of focus group participants for individual being the highest level of answer grouping. The interviews, facilitators used criteria that were analysis was also independently carried out by developed by the National Youth Observatory World Bank advisers to ensure quality control; in cooperation with the World Bank. All inter- this is standard practice in qualitative research. views were audiotaped with the permission of The consultants used the software program the interviewee. NUDIST ™ for the analytical process. In the case of both the focus groups and in- dividual interviews, the audio recordings were Note transcribed, and the local consultants, with 1. Enumeration areas are also referred to as District de Recense- support from the students, analyzed the data ment by INS. using the Glaser and Strauss grounded theory Youth Participation, Voice, Annex 2.  and Active Citizenship Trust in Public and Religious Figure A2.1.  Trust in Public and Religious Figure A2.2.  Institutions by NEET (Urban) Institutions by NEET (Rural) Universities Banks Community Universities Banks Community 100% organizations 100% organizations 80% 80% Schools Country Schools Country 60% 60% 40% 40% Religious 20% Religious 20% Family organizations Family organizations 0% 0% Press Imam Press Imam Justice Politics Justice Politics Urban works Police Military Rural works Police Military Urban NEET Rural NEET Source: World Bank 2012e. Source: World Bank 2012d. Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29 who are not in Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29 who are not in school or training. school or training.  mportance of Community Figure A2.3. I Trust in Community Figure A2.4.  Organizations for Local Organizations— Development, Rural Tunisia Rural Versus Urban 94 70 92.0 60.7 63.6 92 60 90 50 Male 39.9 40.7 Male 88 40 percent percent Female Female 86 85.2 30 84 20 82 10 80 0 Rural Rural Urban Source: World Bank 2012d. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. Data is only avail- Note: Figure refers to all youth. able for rural areas. 109 110 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion  outh Volunteering (Urban Figure A2.5. Y Figure A2.6. Youth Participation in Elections Tunisia) by Gender 54 53 52.9 2.5 2.12 Male 52 51.5 2.0 51 Female percent 1.50 1.5 Overall 50 percent Male 1.0 0.89 49 48.4 Female 48 47.4 0.5 47 0 46 Volunteering 45 44 Source: World Bank 2012e. Rural Urban Note: Figure refers to all youth. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure includes all youth aged 15–29. Figure A2.7. Active Engagement in Politics 90 82.0 80 70 60 percent 50 40 30 20 11.0 10 1.6 0 Political party Intention to No preferred member join political party political party Source: ONJ 2013. Note: Figure includes rural youth aged 15–29. Youth Inactivity and Annex 3.  Unemployment Figure A3.1. Highest Education among Figure A3.2. Highest Education among NEETs by Gender (Ages 30–59) NEETs by Gender (Ages 30–59), Disaggregated 4.0 0.5 100 0.2 4.8 3.4 0.6 1.0 7.1 3.8 14.8 8.7 4.0 0.5 80 100 0.2 4.8 3.4 9.2 0.6 1.0 7.1 3.8 Vocational training 4.9 14.8 8.7 80 16.1 Vocational training 60 University 19.3 percent 9.2 Secondary 21.9 University 91.7 98.3 71.3 80.9 Secondary 40 Below Secondary percent 60 35.7 24.9 Middle school 40 Primary 20 74.1 38.3 Below Primary 30.8 0 20 39.9 Rural Rural Urban Urban male female male female 15.6 0 20.7 Rural Rural Urban Urban male female male female Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 30–59. Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 30–59. Figure A3.3. NEET by Region Figure A3.4. Highest Education Among 60 NEETs by Gender (Ages 15–29), 50 47.9 Disaggregated 42.4 40 37.3 35.9 31.4 100 4.7 3.2 0 0.2 11.4 6.0 30 percent 23.6 13.8 12.8 Rural 80 19.4 28.4 Vocational training 20 Urban 23.7 27.8 University 10.4 9.8 10 60 Secondary percent 20.8 Middle school 0 35.5 22.1 Primary 40 Coast Interior South Below Primary 38.6 20 31.8 25.2 Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. 24.7 15.0 6.2 8.4 Note: Figure refers to all NEETs. 0 Rural Rural Urban Urban male female male female Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs aged 15–29. 111 112 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure A3.5. Highest Education among NEETs by Region (Ages 15–29) a. Rural b. Urban 100 4.1 3.5 4.2 100 5.5 6.2 0.2 0 0.3 9.3 11.3 14.3 13.6 25.9 80 Vocational training 80 23.8 28.3 Vocational training 27.9 23.6 25.9 University University 10.7 8.4 60 Secondary 60 9.1 Secondary percent percent Middle school 21.7 Middle school 34.2 Primary 19.9 27.1 Primary 40 38.0 40 41.1 Below Primary Below Primary 29.6 28.8 20 20 20.8 18.4 24.4 14.9 6.7 9.7 8.6 0 0 Coast Interior South Coast Interior South Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs. Figure A3.6. NEETs Registered as Unemployed by Region a. Rural b. Urban 80 80 70 70 63.1 66.2 60.1 60 60 52.1 50 50 45.6 Male percent Male 40.0 percent 40 40 Female Female 30 30 20 14.9 20 14.1 14.1 10 9.1 7.2 8.6 10 0 0 Coast Interior South Coast Interior South Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all NEETs. Annex 3. Youth Inactivity and Unemployment | 113 Table A3.1. Probit Model of Early School Leaving Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia Female -0.3551*** -0.3685*** -0.4262*** -0.2608*** -0.2459*** -0.2617*** (0.0669) (0.0695) (0.0725) (0.0511) (0.0516) (0.0524) Primary Completed* -0.5171*** -0.2838** -0.2079*** -0.0531 (0.1249) (0.1251) (0.0585) (0.0608) Secondary Completed* -1.2092*** -0.8645*** -0.4319*** -0.1559 (0.1519) (0.1569) (0.1060) (0.1090) Tertiary Completed* -1.3352*** -0.8738*** -0.9332*** -0.7071*** (0.1456) (0.1508) (0.0999) (0.1038) Vocational Training Completed* -0.7510*** -0.4287** -0.5310*** -0.3689* (0.1931) (0.1938) (0.1977) (0.1994) 2nd Wealth Quintile -0.1460 -0.1339 (0.1301) (0.0871) 3rd Wealth Quintile -0.4249*** -0.4382*** (0.1251) (0.0877) 4th Wealth Quintile -0.6567*** -0.5604*** (0.1289) (0.0909) 5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) -1.3011*** -0.8949*** (0.1298) (0.0934) Interior 0.0208 -0.0902 -0.2921*** -0.1651*** -0.1490*** -0.3616*** (0.0799) (0.0843) (0.0930) (0.0561) (0.0570) (0.0618) South 0.0842 -0.0215 -0.0650 -0.0656 -0.0292 -0.1356* (0.0770) (0.0828) (0.0851) (0.0748) (0.0757) (0.0778) Observations 1,934 1,934 1,934 2,758 2,758 2,758 Pseudo R-squared 0.0217 0.0958 0.1720 0.0142 0.0431 0.0774 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent did not complete secondary education; 0 otherwise. Single age dummies are included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with an asterisk capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 years or above). Sample: Young people aged 19–29 years; youth currently in secondary education or below or in vocational training is excluded. Annex 4. Economic Opportunities Table A4.1. Determinants of Employment (Probit Model) Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia Female -0.6288*** -0.6085*** -0.6076*** -0.5984*** -0.9781*** -0.9664*** -0.9650*** -0.9685*** (0.0764) (0.0772) (0.0771) (0.0773) (0.0592) (0.0596) (0.0599) (0.0603) Primary Completed 0.3163** 0.4005** 0.3690** 0.2715*** 0.3151*** 0.2574*** (0.1605) (0.1653) (0.1641) (0.0808) (0.0819) (0.0836) Secondary Completed 0.2570 0.4065** 0.3280* 0.0294 0.1027 -0.0002 (0.1919) (0.1967) (0.1959) (0.1070) (0.1087) (0.1111) Tertiary Completed 0.0004 0.1650 0.0166 0.4592 0.8384 0.7672 (0.1723) (0.1802) (0.1846) (0.6191) (0.6915) (0.7032) Vocational Training 0.0993 0.2316 0.1058 -0.0377 0.0595 -0.0237 Completed (0.2036) (0.2109) (0.2146) (0.1677) (0.1680) (0.1734) Primary Completed -0.1797 -0.2139* -0.0422 -0.1192* Parent (0.1161) (0.1189) (0.0618) (0.0642) Secondary Completed -0.5282*** -0.5813*** -0.2534** -0.3662*** Parent (0.1565) (0.1594) (0.1290) (0.1351) Tertiary Completed -0.3276** -0.4279*** -0.6440*** -0.7674*** Parent (0.1514) (0.1565) (0.1445) (0.1459) Vocational Training -0.3995* -0.4396* -0.4663* -0.5261** Completed Parent (0.2231) (0.2276) (0.2632) (0.2558) 2nd Wealth Quintile 0.0055 0.2710*** (0.1247) (0.0886) 3rd Wealth Quintile -0.0315 0.4070*** (0.1271) (0.0929) 4th Wealth Quintile 0.1807 0.5020*** (0.1324) (0.0965) 5th Wealth Quintile 0.3585** 0.5303*** (Richest) (0.1404) (0.1070) Interior -0.3342*** -0.3389*** -0.3761*** -0.3365*** -0.3065*** -0.2770*** -0.2632*** -0.1236* (0.0909) (0.0912) (0.0923) (0.0951) (0.0626) (0.0631) (0.0636) (0.0671) South -0.5477*** -0.5543*** -0.5864*** -0.5836*** -0.3129*** -0.3084*** -0.2911*** -0.2602*** (0.0868) (0.0871) (0.0886) (0.0898) (0.0802) (0.0803) (0.0807) (0.0817) Observations 1,553 1,553 1,553 1,553 2,419 2,419 2,419 2,419 Pseudo R-squared 0.0765 0.0840 0.0919 0.0989 0.134 0.140 0.148 0.160 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent worked in the last 12 months; 0 otherwise. Single age dummies are included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with “Parent” capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older). Sample: Young people aged 15–29; youth currently in education or in vocational training is excluded. 115 116 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Table A4.2. Determinants of Wage Income (Heckman Selection Model) Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia Female -0.3074*** -0.2862*** -0.2638*** 0.1893*** 0.1819*** 0.1558** (0.0745) (0.0801) (0.0816) (0.0680) (0.0666) (0.0627) Primary Education Completed 0.2002 0.1473 0.0272 0.0163 (0.1466) (0.1454) (0.0703) (0.0683) Secondary Education Completed 0.3918** 0.3056 0.3776*** 0.3106*** (0.1862) (0.1887) (0.0946) (0.0922) Tertiary Education Completed 0.6684*** 0.5094*** 0.1991 0.0409 (0.1592) (0.1603) (0.2590) (0.2411) Vocational Training Completed 0.4629*** 0.3396** 0.1156 0.0383 (0.1604) (0.1624) (0.1267) (0.1234) 2nd Wealth Quintile -0.0646 -0.0688 (0.0902) (0.0740) 3rd Wealth Quintile 0.0369 0.0135 (0.0853) (0.0723) 4th Wealth Quintile 0.1821** 0.0529 (0.0898) (0.0771) 5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) 0.2645*** 0.3193*** (0.0974) (0.0895) Interior -0.4678*** -0.4295*** -0.3651*** 0.0912 0.0766 0.1365** (0.0904) (0.0852) (0.0871) (0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0590) South -0.4780*** -0.3992*** -0.3826*** 0.0264 0.0299 0.0423 (0.0895) (0.0920) (0.0930) (0.0861) (0.0863) (0.0814) Observations 1,570 1,570 1,570 2,420 2,420 2,420 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: Estimation with Heckman sample selection correction. Dependent variable is logarithm of monthly wage. Single age dummies are included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables used in the selection equation of Heckman procedure are a set of dummy variables capturing educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older): Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, Primary Education Completed, Secondary Education Completed, Vocational Training Completed, Tertiary Education Completed. Sample: Young people aged 15–29; youth currently in education is excluded. Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 117  eterminants of Informal Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment Table A4.3. D (Probit Model) Explanatory Variables Rural Tunisia Female -0.6563*** -0.7160*** -0.7100*** -0.7141*** (0.1073) (0.1092) (0.1097) (0.1106) Primary Completed -0.4102** -0.3963** -0.3889** (0.1809) (0.1822) (0.1825) Secondary Completed -1.1626*** -1.1429*** -1.1025*** (0.2133) (0.2144) (0.2148) Vocational Training Completed -0.6029* -0.5720* -0.5153 (0.3232) (0.3264) (0.3299) Primary Completed Parent -0.1340 -0.0775 (0.1051) (0.1056) Secondary Completed Parent -0.0107 0.0437 (0.2379) (0.2476) Tertiary Completed Parent -0.1375 -0.0272 (0.2876) (0.2855) Vocational Training Completed Parent -0.4883 -0.3783 (0.4678) (0.4874) 2nd Wealth Quintile 0.0264 (0.1813) 3rd Wealth Quintile 0.1609 (0.1863) 4th Wealth Quintile -0.2684 (0.1778) 5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) -0.2120 (0.1878) Interior 0.2491** 0.2634** 0.2519** 0.1952* (0.1060) (0.1089) (0.1081) (0.1154) South 0.1871 0.1758 0.1862 0.1389 (0.1427) (0.1485) (0.1480) (0.1478) Observations 932 932 932 932 Pseudo R-squared 0.0601 0.103 0.105 0.116 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Notes: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent was informally employed in the last 12 months; 0 otherwise. Age dummies are included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with “Parent” capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older). Tertiary univer- sity excluded in rural areas due to sample size. Sample: Young people aged 15–29 years in employment over the last 12 months; youth currently in education or in vocational training is excluded. 118 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Table A4.4. Determinants of Educational Attainment (Ordered Probit) Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia Female 0.1115* 0.1008* 0.1400** -0.2125*** -0.2210*** -0.2038*** (0.0596) (0.0601) (0.0607) (0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0451) Primary Not Completed -0.6485** -0.4124 0.0099 -0.0793 Parent (0.2666) (0.2660) (0.0737) (0.0743) Primary Completed Parent -0.1773 -0.0609 0.2293*** 0.0816 (0.2566) (0.2550) (0.0618) (0.0634) Middle School Completed 0.1394 0.1327 0.4889*** 0.3245*** Parent (0.2606) (0.2578) (0.0843) (0.0851) Secondary Completed Parent 0.4633* 0.4648* 0.5283*** 0.3118*** (0.2680) (0.2663) (0.1117) (0.1136) Tertiary Completed Parent 0.6339** 0.5109* 0.9487*** 0.7321*** (0.2660) (0.2638) (0.1059) (0.1085) Vocational Training 0.1987 0.1937 0.7284*** 0.6177*** Completed Parent (0.2891) (0.2851) (0.1994) (0.2039) 2nd Wealth Quintile 0.2001** 0.2987*** (0.0947) (0.0705) 3rd Wealth Quintile 0.3744*** 0.5523*** (0.0975) (0.0731) 4th Wealth Quintile 0.6384*** 0.6216*** (0.0990) (0.0771) 5th Wealth Quintile (Richest) 1.1567*** 0.7826*** (0.1054) (0.0847) Interior -0.0671 0.0498 0.2002** -0.0830* -0.0941* 0.1081** (0.0733) (0.0756) (0.0806) (0.0489) (0.0494) (0.0527) South 0.0433 0.1181* 0.1370* 0.1070* 0.0872 0.1440** (0.0673) (0.0686) (0.0700) (0.0584) (0.0595) (0.0612) Observations 1,658 1,658 1,658 2,436 2,436 2,436 Pseudo R-squared 0.0344 0.0738 0.108 0.0155 0.0339 0.0515 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: Ordered probit estimation. Dependent variable is educational attainment measured by five categories. Categories in urban sample are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, Primary Education Completed, Middle School Completed, Secondary Education or Vocational Training Completed, Tertiary Education Completed. Categories in rural sample are: Never Attended School, Primary Education not Completed, Primary Education Completed, Middle School Completed, Secondary or Tertiary Education or Vocational Training Completed. Single age dummies are included in the estimation but not shown. Refer- ence categories are: Never Attended School, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with “Parent’ capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older). Sample: Young people aged 15–29; youth currently in education is excluded. Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 119 Table A4.5. Determinants of Wage Income by Sector (Least Squares) Variables Urban Tunisia Age 0.2863** 0.2217 0.2342* 0.2253* 0.2374* (0.1390) (0.1390) (0.1378) (0.1365) (0.1363) Age squared -0.0045 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0040 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) Female -0.0859 -0.1249** -0.2108*** -0.2083*** -0.2560*** (0.0535) (0.0511) (0.0528) (0.0488) (0.0506) Skilled 0.3963*** 0.3573*** 0.3231*** 0.3025*** (0.0514) (0.0535) (0.0517) (0.0548) Construction 0.1603 0.1725 (0.1543) (0.1501) Industry 0.3991*** 0.3259** (0.1454) (0.1426) Services 0.2625* 0.2503* (0.1448) (0.1414) Public Service 0.4571*** 0.3516** (0.1484) (0.1454) Informal Employment -0.3156*** -0.2790*** (0.0497) (0.0517) Interior -0.3432*** -0.3355*** -0.3282*** -0.3116*** -0.3090*** (0.0726) (0.0697) (0.0679) (0.0659) (0.0647) South -0.2307*** -0.1979*** -0.1297* -0.1446** -0.1002 (0.0686) (0.0682) (0.0726) (0.0684) (0.0712) Observations 748 748 748 748 748 R-squared 0.1979 0.2620 0.2865 0.3026 0.3158 (continued 120 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Table A4.5. Continued Variables Rural Tunisia Age 0.2180*** 0.1836** 0.1823** 0.1583** 0.1632** (0.0815) (0.0803) (0.0801) (0.0792) (0.0796) Age squared -0.0042** -0.0037** -0.0037** -0.0032* -0.0033** (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) Female -0.1894*** -0.2371*** -0.2805*** -0.2941*** -0.3054*** (0.0455) (0.0438) (0.0482) (0.0465) (0.0489) Skilled 0.3124*** 0.2383*** 0.2601*** 0.2147*** (0.0463) (0.0493) (0.0460) (0.0483) Construction 0.0592 0.0590 (0.0594) (0.0591) Industry 0.1981*** 0.1359** (0.0571) (0.0574) Services 0.2160*** 0.1743*** (0.0603) (0.0602) Public Service 0.4363*** 0.3378*** (0.0943) (0.0953) Informal Employment -0.2587*** -0.1915*** (0.0474) (0.0483) Interior -0.0749* -0.1049** -0.0889** -0.0839** -0.0793* (0.0421) (0.0412) (0.0406) (0.0414) (0.0407) South -0.1706** -0.1769*** -0.2043*** -0.1623** -0.1874*** (0.0674) (0.0670) (0.0660) (0.0662) (0.0660) Observations 935 935 935 935 935 R-squared 0.0469 0.0951 0.1294 0.1263 0.1443 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of monthly wage. Reference categories are: Sector Agriculture, Region Coast. Sample: Young people aged 15–29 who earned wage in the last 12 months (rural sample) or in the last seven days (urban sample); youth currently in education is excluded. Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 121  eterminants of Self-Employment, Conditional on Being in Employment Table A4.6. D (Probit Model) Explanatory Variables Urban Tunisia Rural Tunisia Female -0.9099*** -0.8903*** -0.9062*** -0.9066*** -0.2168* -0.2170* -0.2325* -0.2463* (0.1717) (0.1722) (0.1703) (0.1696) (0.1312) (0.1310) (0.1297) (0.1350) Primary Completed -0.1445 -0.2068 -0.2237 0.0797 0.0475 -0.0085 (0.2821) (0.2845) (0.2846) (0.1610) (0.1623) (0.1635) Secondary Completed -0.2379 -0.3461 -0.3359 0.0362 0.0057 -0.1219 (0.3497) (0.3406) (0.3402) (0.2191) (0.2221) (0.2337) Tertiary Completed -0.8450*** -0.9766*** -1.0008*** (0.3245) (0.3332) (0.3507) Vocational Training -0.0700 -0.1756 -0.1926 0.3775 0.3343 0.1772 Completed (0.3569) (0.3540) (0.3594) (0.3188) (0.3223) (0.3213) Primary Completed Parent 0.1833 0.1568 0.1754 0.1258 (0.1945) (0.1940) (0.1153) (0.1176) Secondary Completed 0.3437 0.3064 0.3801* 0.2770 Parent (0.2873) (0.2793) (0.2305) (0.2267) Tertiary Completed Parent 0.2958 0.2514 -0.0961 -0.2294 (0.2747) (0.2706) (0.3333) (0.3383) Vocational Training 0.2745 0.3135 0.4578 0.2869 Completed Parent (0.3941) (0.4070) (0.4670) (0.4261) 2nd Wealth Quintile -0.2049 -0.1367 (0.2280) (0.1840) 3rd Wealth Quintile 0.1084 -0.1362 (0.2191) (0.1919) 4th Wealth Quintile 0.0582 0.1059 (0.2071) (0.1920) 5th Wealth Quintile -0.0026 0.4959** (Richest) (0.2404) (0.1989) Interior 0.1637 0.1182 0.1445 0.1553 -0.3402*** -0.3497*** -0.3399*** -0.2682** (0.1717) (0.1750) (0.1768) (0.1847) (0.1130) (0.1150) (0.1155) (0.1257) South 0.3792** 0.3447** 0.3548** 0.3420** -0.5123*** -0.5194*** -0.5308*** -0.4813*** (0.1651) (0.1687) (0.1701) (0.1702) (0.1701) (0.1682) (0.1712) (0.1763) Observations 719 719 719 719 929 929 929 929 Pseudo R-squared 0.0819 0.1060 0.1100 0.1140 0.0257 0.0276 0.0341 0.0599 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: Probit estimation. Dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent was self-employed in the last 12 months (rural sample) or in the last seven days (urban sample); 0 otherwise. Age dummies are included in the estimation but not shown. Reference categories are: Never Attended School or Primary Education not Completed, 1st Wealth Quintile (Poorest), Region Coast. Variables marked with “Parent” capture educational attainment of the most educated adult household member (aged 30 or older). Sample: Young people aged 15–29 in employment over the last 12 months; youth currently in education or in vocational training is excluded. 122 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure A4.1. Contract Type of Employed Adults (Aged 30–59) a. Rural b. Urban 5.8% Open-ended Open-ended 13.3% Fixed term 17.4% Fixed term Temporary Temporary Seasonal 1.5% Seasonal 27.6% Day laborer Day laborer 6.5% 54.5% 6.2% 61.3% 6.0% Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure only refers to working adults and excludes self-employed adults. Figure A4.2. Adult Employment in Low-Productivity Sectors 100 88.6 89.9 80 Male 68.7 58.0 Female 60 percent 40 20 0 Rural Urban Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure only refers to working adults and excludes self-employed adults. Annex 4. Economic Opportunities | 123 Figure A4.3. Adult Employment by Sector a. Rural b. Urban Agriculture 6.6% Agriculture 10.5% Construction Construction Industry and 12.0% Industry and 29.0% 32.2% manufacturing manufacturing 22.4% Services Services Public sector Public sector 17.3% 12.9% 22.0% 35.1% Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure only refers to working adults and excludes self-employed adults. The agricultural sector includes jobs in the food pro- cessing industry. Figure A4.4. Intention to Work in Public Sector a. Rural b. Urban 4.3% Agriculture 2.2% Agriculture 14.4% 16.2% Construction Construction Industry and Industry and manufacturing 0.7% manufacturing 6.9% Services Services Public sector Public sector 15.9% 52.8% 21.6% 64.9% Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. 124 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure A4.5. Adult Self-Employment—Rural Versus Urban 25 22.7 20 18.0 Male Female 15 percent 10 5 4.7 1.8 0 Rural Urban Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure excludes all youth enrolled in education or training programs. Skills for Employment and Annex 5.  Other Youth Services Figure A5.1. Awareness of Active Labor Market Programs by Region and Gender a. Region b. Gender AMAL AMAL 50% 50% CES Regional 40% CES Regional SCV 40% Program 30% Program SCV 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% Public works SIVP Public works SIVP Coast urban Male rural Interior urban Male urban South urban Other CAIP Female rural employment Coast rural Other CAIP employment Female urban programs Interior rural programs South rural Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Figure A5.2. Take-Up of Active Labor Market Programs by Region 18 Coast urban 16 Interior urban South urban 14 Coast rural 12 Interior rural South rural percent 10 8 6 4 2 0 AMAL SCV SIVP CAIP Other Public CES employment works Regional programs Program Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. 125 126 | Breaking the Barriers To Youth Inclusion Figure A5.3. Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region Program for Small Enterprises (PAPPE) 70% 60% 50% 40% Microloans, 30% other FONAPRA 20% 10% 0% Coast urban Interior urban South urban Coast rural Interior rural Microloans, FNS South rural BTS Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Figure A5.4. Awareness of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET and Gender a. NEET b. Gender Program for Program for Small Enterprises Small Enterprises (PAPPE) (PAPPE) 80% 60% 60% 50% 40% Microloans, 40% 30% FONAPRA Microloans, other other 20% FONAPRA 20% 10% 0% 0% Non-NEET rural Male rural Non-NEET urban Male urban NEET rural Female rural Microloans, FNS NEET urban Microloans, BTS FNS Female urban BTS Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Annex 5. Skills for Employment aand Other Youth Services | 127 Figure A5.5. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Region 9 Coast urban Coast rural 8 Interior urban Interior rural 7 South urban South rural 6 5 percent 4 3 2 1 0 Program for FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans, Small BTS other Enterprises (PAPPE) Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Figure A5.6. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by NEET 8 Non-NEET rural NEET rural 7 Non-NEET urban NEET urban 6 5 percent 4 3 2 1 0 Program for FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans, Small BTS other Enterprises (PAPPE) Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. Figure A5.7. Take-Up of Entrepreneurship Programs by Poverty 7 Non-poor rural Poor rural 6 Non-poor urban Poor urban 5 4 percent 3 2 1 0 Program for FONAPRA FNS Microloans, Microloans, Small BTS other Enterprises (PAPPE) Source: World Bank 2012d; 2012e. Note: Figure refers to all youth. # 13235B # 39A9DC # 622181 # E41270 # DFDB00