70263 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster Experiences from Latin America Elena Correa Editor AUSTRALIA BANGLADESh BELGIUm BRAZIL CANADA ChINA COLOmBIA DENmARK EGYPT FINLAND FRANCE GERmANY hAITI INDIA INDONESIA IRELAND ITALY JAPAN LUxEmBOURG mALAWI mExICO ThE NEThERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NIGERIA NORWAY PORTUGAL SAUDI ARABIA SENEGAL SOUTh AFRICA SOUTh KOREA SPAIN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND TURKEY UNITED KINGDOm UNITED STATES VIETNAm YEmEN Special thanks and appreciation are extended to the partners who support GFDRR’s work to protect livelihood and improve lives: ACP Secretariat, Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, India, Indonesia, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United Nations Development Programme, United States, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Vietnam, The World Bank, and Yemen. Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster Experiences from Latin America Elena Correa Editor Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Copyright © 2011 by The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433, U.S.A. Internet: www.worldbank.org All Rights Reserved Printing and Manufactured in Washington, DC, 2011 First Printing: September, 2011 This book was originally published by The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Risk and Recovery (GFDRR) in Spanish as Reasentamiento preventivo de poblaciones en riesgo de desastre: Experiencias de América Latina in May 2011. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this book are entirely those of the authors and should not be attrib- uted in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, to members of its Board of Executive Directors, the countries they represent, or the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services (Ministerio de Planificación Federal, Inversión Pública y Servicios), Argentina; the Municipal Housing Secretariat, São Paulo Major’s Office (Secretaria Municipal da Habitação da Prefeitura do Municipio de São Paulo) Brazil; the Low Income Population Housing Agency of Bogotá (Caja de Vivienda Popular de Bogotá), Colombia; and the Office of the President (Presidencia de la República), Guatemala. The World Bank, the GFDRR, the Municipal Housing Secretariat, São Paulo Major’s Office (Secretaria Municipal da Habitação da Prefeitura do Municipio de São Paulo) Brazil; the Low Income Population Housing Agency of Bogotá (Caja de Vivienda Popular de Bogotá), Colombia; and the Office of the President (Presidencia de la República), Guatemala, do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. The boundaries, colors, denomina- tions, and other information shown on any map in this volume do not imply on the part of the World Bank Group any judgment on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this publication is copyrighted. The World Bank and GFDRR encourage dissemination of its work and normally will promptly grant permission to reproduce portions of the work. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, as well as all other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, please send a request with complete information to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: pubrights@ worldbank.org. The World Bank Cover and Design: Miki Fernández Preventive resettlement for populations at risk of disaster: Experiences from Latin America / Haris Sanahuja… [et al.]; Elena Correa - Editor. – Washington, DC : The World Bank : GFDRR, 2011. 121 p. : xx. 1. Preventive resettlement – Argentina – Case study. – 2. Preventive resettlement – Brazil – Case study. – 3. Preventive resettle- ment – Colombia – Case study. – 4. Preventive resettlement –Guatemala – Case study. – 5. Argentina – Preventive resettlement – Case study. – 6. Brazil – Preventive resettlement – Case study. – 7. Colombia – Preventive resettlement – Case study. – 8. Guatemala – Preventive resettlement – Case study. – I. Sanahuja, Haris, coaut. – II. Zelmeister, Ignacio, coaut. – III. Pérez, Rómulo, coaut. – IV. Scombatti, Marilia, coaut. – V. Marques, Ronaldo, coaut. – VI. Poveda Gómez, Narzha, coaut. – VII. Aguirre Cantero, Eduardo, coaut. – VIII. Carmona, Sergio Iván, coaut. – IX. Correa, Elena, comp. Contents Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................ x Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................... xvii Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... xviii Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends Haris Sanahuja 1. Global Patterns and Trends in the Occurrence and Impacts of Disasters ................................................. 1 1.1. The Impacts of Disasters ....................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. Differential Distribution of Risk ......................................................................................................... 5 1.3. Intensive and Extensive Risk ................................................................................................................ 5 1.4. A Changing Climate ............................................................................................................................. 6 2. Disaster Risk Patterns and Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean ................................................... 6 2.1. Disaster Occurrence .............................................................................................................................. 7 2.2. Disaster Impact Trends ......................................................................................................................... 8 2.3. Disaster Risk Configuration in the Region ........................................................................................ 9 2.4. Vulnerability and Risk-driving Factors .............................................................................................. 10 2.5. Urban Areas and the Construction of Vulnerabilities ..................................................................... 10 2.6. Rural Areas and the Construction of Vulnerabilities ....................................................................... 12 2.7. Governance and Institutional Vulnerability ...................................................................................... 12 3. Institutional Frameworks and Strategies for Disaster Risk Reduction........................................................ 13 3.1. Different Approaches and Tools for Risk Management.................................................................... 15 3.2. Risk Reduction Challenges ................................................................................................................... 15 References .................................................................................................................................................................. 17 Web Resources .......................................................................................................................................................... 18 Chapter 2 Resettlement as a Disaster Risk Reduction Measure: Case Studies Elena Correa 1. Preventive Resettlement .................................................................................................................................... 19 2. The Benefits of Preventive Resettlement.......................................................................................................... 19 3. Case Studies ......................................................................................................................................................... 21 3.1. Objectives ................................................................................................................................................ 21 3.2 Scope of the Case Studies ...................................................................................................................... 22 3.3 Methodology .......................................................................................................................................... 22 iii Chapter 3 Argentina: Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program Rómulo Pérez Ignacio Zelmeister A. Country Context and Disaster Risk Management ................................................................................ 25 1. Population and Urbanization ............................................................................................................................ 25 2. Regional Disparities ............................................................................................................................................ 26 3. Socio-natural Disasters....................................................................................................................................... 26 4. Disaster Risk Management ............................................................................................................................... 27 B. Case Study: Resettlement of Inhabitants of Flood-prone Areas .................................................. 30 1. The Housing Subprogram (Subprograma de Vivienda, SPV) ....................................................................... 30 2. Participating Entities .......................................................................................................................................... 31 3. Assisted Self-construction: The Strategy Selected .......................................................................................... 31 4. Flood Protection Program (PPI) ..................................................................................................................... 32 5. Outcomes ............................................................................................................................................................. 38 6. Lessons Learned .................................................................................................................................................. 40 7. External Evaluations .......................................................................................................................................... 41 References .................................................................................................................................................................. 42 Chapter 4 Brazil: Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas Ronaldo Marques Marilia Scombatti A. Country Context ............................................................................................................................................... 43 1. Urbanization and Regional Disparities ........................................................................................................... 43 2. Socio-natural Disasters ...................................................................................................................................... 43 3. Disaster Risk Management ............................................................................................................................... 45 B. The City of São Paulo .................................................................................................................................... 46 1. Disaster Risk Management ............................................................................................................................... 46 C. Case Study: Stream Canalization Program II ....................................................................................... 48 1. Objectives ............................................................................................................................................................ 48 2. Components ........................................................................................................................................................ 49 3. Institutional Organization ................................................................................................................................ 49 4. Profile of the Population .................................................................................................................................... 50 5. Resettlement Alternatives ................................................................................................................................. 50 6. Social Management ............................................................................................................................................ 52 7. Budget and Resettlement Costs ........................................................................................................................ 53 8. Outcomes ............................................................................................................................................................ 53 iv Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America 9. Lessons Learned During the Relocation Process .......................................................................................... 54 References .................................................................................................................................................................. 57 Chapter 5 Colombia: Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach Narzha Poveda Gómez A. Country Context .................................................................................................................................................. 59 1. Population ........................................................................................................................................................... 59 2. Disaster Risk Management ................................................................................................................................ 60 3. The National Emergency Relief and Prevention System ............................................................................... 61 4. Incorporation of Risk Prevention in Development Planning ...................................................................... 62 5. Financing Risk Management ............................................................................................................................ 62 6. Resettlement: A Risk Prevention and Reduction Strategy ............................................................................ 62 B. Capital District of Bogotá ................................................................................................................................. 63 1. Population Growth and Settlement Patterns................................................................................................... 63 2. Main Hazards ....................................................................................................................................................... 64 3. Risk Management and the Bogotá District Emergency Prevention and Relief System ........................... 64 C. Case Study: The Nueva Esperanza Resettlement ................................................................................. 67 1. Studies to Identify the Risk Reduction Measures .......................................................................................... 67 2. Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Sustainable Development Plan .......................................................... 68 3. Resettlement Program ....................................................................................................................................... 68 4. Impacts of Displacement ................................................................................................................................... 72 5. Institutional Organization ................................................................................................................................. 72 6. Eligibility Criteria and Principles Governing the Resettlement Process ................................................... 73 7. Stages in the Resettlement Process .................................................................................................................. 73 8. Rehabilitation and Restoration of High-risk Lots ......................................................................................... 78 9. Post-Resettlement Stage .................................................................................................................................... 78 10. Cost ...................................................................................................................................................................... 79 11 Main Challenges ................................................................................................................................................. 79 12. Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................................................. 81 References .................................................................................................................................................................. 82 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................................. 83 Chapter 6 Guatemala: The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century Eduardo Aguirre Cantero A. Country Context and Disaster Risk Management ................................................................................ 85 1. Population, Cultural Diversity and Exclusion ................................................................................................ 85 2. Hazards, Vulnerability and Risks ..................................................................................................................... 86 Table of Contents v 3. Socio-natural Disasters ...................................................................................................................................... 86 4. Risk Management ............................................................................................................................................... 87 B. Case Study: Panabaj and Tz’anchaj – Reconstruction with Transformation ............................. 90 1. Impacts of Tropical Storm Stan ........................................................................................................................ 90 2. Key Challenges .................................................................................................................................................... 90 3. Reconstruction with Transformation ............................................................................................................... 90 4. Consequences of Tropical Storm Stan in Panabaj and Tz’anchaj ................................................................ 94 5. Spontaneous Reaction of Communities to the Disaster ............................................................................... 94 6. Reaction of Institutions and Temporary Resettlement of Families ............................................................ 94 7. An Initial, Inadequately Planned Resettlement Attempt............................................................................... 95 8. Reorienting and Planning the Resettlement Process .................................................................................... 95 9. Articulation of the Reconstruction Plan with the Land Planning Strategy ............................................... 96 10. Institutional Organization ................................................................................................................................ 97 11. Participation of Traditional Communities, Authorities and Organizations .............................................. 98 12. Building Trust ..................................................................................................................................................... 99 13. Selecting Resettlement Sites and Acquiring Land .......................................................................................... 99 14. The Chuk Muk Resettlement: A Heritage Recovered ................................................................................... 100 15. Environmental Impact Study of the New Site ............................................................................................... 100 16. Characteristics of the New Settlement ............................................................................................................ 101 17. Budget .................................................................................................................................................................. 102 18. Resettlement Schedule ....................................................................................................................................... 102 19. Allocation and Titling of Houses ...................................................................................................................... 102 20. Technical Training and Income Generation ................................................................................................... 102 21. State of the Process ............................................................................................................................................. 103 22. Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................................................. 103 References .................................................................................................................................................................. 105 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................................. 106 Chapter 7 Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies Sergio Iván Carmona Elena Correa 1. Urbanization, Risk and Vulnerability .............................................................................................................. 107 2. Disaster Risk Management ............................................................................................................................... 108 3. Resettlement as a Disaster Prevention Measure ............................................................................................ 108 4. Resettlement as a Multidimensional Process ................................................................................................. 109 5. Resettlement Planning ....................................................................................................................................... 110 6. Housing Solutions .............................................................................................................................................. 110 7. Payment for Housing Solutions ........................................................................................................................ 111 8. Legal Titles to the Houses ................................................................................................................................. 111 9. Environmental Impact Study of the Resettlement ........................................................................................ 112 vi Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America 10. The Transition from the Informal to the Formal Sector .............................................................................. 112 11. Restoration of Access to Social Services ......................................................................................................... 112 12. Restoration of Income ........................................................................................................................................ 112 13. Monitoring Risks and Contingency Plans ....................................................................................................... 112 14. Community Participation ................................................................................................................................. 113 15. Sources of Financing........................................................................................................................................... 114 16. Private Sector Participation ............................................................................................................................... 114 17. Control of Reclaimed Areas .............................................................................................................................. 114 18. Transparency and Accountability .................................................................................................................... 115 19. Documenting and Systematizing Experiences .............................................................................................. 115 Glossary ......................................................................................................................................................................... 116 About the authors ................................................................................................................................................... 120 Haris Sanahuja .......................................................................................................................................................... 120 Elena Correa .............................................................................................................................................................. 118 Rómulo Pérez ............................................................................................................................................................ 120 Ignacio Zelmeister .................................................................................................................................................... 120 Ronaldo Marques Margini ...................................................................................................................................... 121 Marilia Scombatti ..................................................................................................................................................... 121 Narzha Poveda Gómez ............................................................................................................................................. 121 Eduardo Aguirre Cantero ........................................................................................................................................ 121 Sergio Iván Carmona Maya ..................................................................................................................................... 121 Figures Figure 1.1. Occurrence of Geological and Hydrometeorological Disasters (1900-2009) ....................... 2 Figure 1.2. Occurrence of Disasters Worldwide by Type of Hazard (1970-2009) .................................... 2 Figure 1.3. Number of Persons Affected as a Share of the Average Population (1970-2009) ................. 3 Figure 1.4. Percentage of Deaths by Type of Hazard (1970-2009) ............................................................. 4 Figure 1.5. Percentage of Persons Affected by Type of Hazard (1970-2009) ............................................ 4 Figure 1.6. Percentage of Economic Losses by Type of Hazard (1970-2009) ............................................ 4 Figure 1.7. Disaster Occurrence in LAC by Type of Hazard ...................................................................... 7 Figure 1.8. Percentage of Total Deaths by Type of Hazard in LAC .......................................................... 8 Figure 1.9. Percentage of People Affected by Type of Hazard in LAC ...................................................... 9 Figure 1.10. Percentage of Economic Losses by Type of Hazard in LAC .................................................. 9 Figure 1.11. Pressures that Result in Disasters – Pressure and Release (PAR) Model ............................. 11 Figure 1.12. Urbanization Trends in LAC ....................................................................................................... 11 Figure 1.13. Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) ................................................................................ 14 Figure 3.1. Percentage Urban and Rural Population ................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.2. Working Organizational Flow .................................................................................................... 34 Figure 3.3. Drawings of a House ..................................................................................................................... 35 Figure 3.4. Administrative Circuit of the Vouchers ..................................................................................... 37 Table of Contents vii Figure 3.5. Houses Built by Province ............................................................................................................. 38 Figure 3.6. Amounts Invested in each PPI Province .................................................................................... 39 Figure 4.1. Percentage of Rural and Urban Population .............................................................................. 43 Figure 5.1. Percentage of Rural and Urban Population .............................................................................. 59 Figure 5.2. Percentage Distribution of Natural Events in Colombia (1998-2008) ................................... 60 Figure 5.3. Organizational Chart of the District Emergency Prevention and Relief System (SDPAE) 64 Figure 5.4. Types of Houses ............................................................................................................................ 71 Figure 6.1. Percentage of Rural and Urban Population ............................................................................. 85 Figure 6.2. National Council for Disaster Reduction (CONRED) ............................................................ 89 Figure 6.3. The Chuk Muk Resettlement Site ................................................................................................ 100 Tables Table 1.1. Occurrence of Disasters Worldwide by Decade and Type of Hazard (1970-2009) .............. 3 Table 1.2. Occurrence of Disasters by Decade and Type of Hazard in LAC (1970-2009) .................... 7 Table 1.3. Top 10 Lethal Disasters in LAC (1970-2009) ............................................................................. 8 Table 1.4. Indicators of Reducing Underlying Risk Factors ...................................................................... 15 Table 2.1. Savings Achieved by Preventive Resettlement vis-à-vis the Potential Costs of Post-disaster Reconstruction ........................................................................................................ 20 Table 3.1. Urban and Rural Population and NBI ....................................................................................... 26 Table 3.2. Principal Floods in The Provinces of the La Plata River Basin and the Associated Losses (1982-1998) ......................................................................................................................... 27 Table 3.3. Flood Risk-reduction Programs and Housing Subprograms ............................................... 30 Table 3.4. Number of Houses Built in each Program ................................................................................ 31 Table 3.5. Agreements and Responsibilities of the Parties Involved ....................................................... 33 Table 4.1. Number of Natural Disasters by Type and Region (2008) ...................................................... 44 Table 4.2. Number of Municipalities with Cities with Risk-prone Areas .............................................. 44 Table 4.3. Number of Municipalities with Inefficient Drainage Systems ................................................ 45 Table 4.4. Population in Favelas in the City of São Paulo (1970-2008) ................................................... 46 Table 4.5. Number of Families Resettled during the Stream Canalization Program .......................... 48 Table 4.6. Overall Plan for Resettlement in Housing Complexes – Budget US$ ................................... 53 Table 4.7. PROCAV II Objectives ................................................................................................................ 54 Table 5.1. Effects of the Five Severe Natural Disasters .............................................................................. 61 Table 5.2. Disaster Risk Management Instruments ................................................................................... 65 Table 5.3. Participation of Capital District Entities, by Strategy, Program and Project ....................... 69 Table 5.4. Appraised Value of the High-risk Houses ................................................................................. 69 Table 5.5. Social And Cultural Impacts of Resettlement ........................................................................... 72 Table 5.6. Institutional Responsibilities in the Resettlement Process .................................................... 72 Table 5.7. Housing Options Selected ........................................................................................................... 76 Table 5.8. Total Cost of Resettlement ........................................................................................................... 79 Table 5.9. Main Challenges and Solutions ................................................................................................... 80 Table 6.1. Record of High-impact Natural Disasters until 2008 .............................................................. 87 viii Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 6.2. Institutions Involved in the Plan ................................................................................................. 97 Table 6.3. Budget for the Santiago Atitlán Reconstruction Plan .............................................................. 102 Maps Map 3.1. Regions and Provinces ................................................................................................................. 25 Map 3.2. Population Density by Province .................................................................................................. 27 Map 3.3. Flood Prone Areas ......................................................................................................................... 27 Map 4.1. Regions and States ......................................................................................................................... 43 Map 4.2. Drought Areas in the Northeast ................................................................................................. 45 Map 4.3. At-risk Areas in São Paulo ........................................................................................................... 47 Map 4.4. Location of PROCAV II Works and Resettlement Sites .......................................................... 49 Map 5.1. Regions and Departments ............................................................................................................ 59 Map 5.2. Localities of Bogotá ...................................................................................................................... 63 Map 5.3. Geographical Location of Houses Chosen in other Departments ......................................... 77 Map 5.4. Geographical Location of Houses Chosen in Bogotá’s Localities ......................................... 77 Map 6.1 Political Division of the Republic of Guatemala ....................................................................... 83 Map 6.2. Department of Sololá, Municiaplity of Santiago Atitlán .......................................................... 92 Boxes Box 6.1. National Reconstruction Plan ..................................................................................................... 91 Box 6.2. Disasters in the Mayan Worldview ............................................................................................. 94 Table of Contents ix Abbreviations Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends CCAD Central American Commission for Environment and Development Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean CRED Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters EM-DAT Emergency Events Data Base ENSO El Niño-Southern Oscillation Phenomenon GAR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction GDP Gross Domestic Product HDI Human Development Index HFA Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities IDB Inter-American Development Bank IPPC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ISDR International Strategy for Disaster Reduction LAC Latin American and the Caribbean Region MDG Millennium Development Goals NGO Non-governmental organization PAR Pressure and Release PREDECAN Andean Community Disaster Prevention Project Prevención de Desastres en la Comunidad Andina OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance of USAID UNDP United Nations Development Program UNEP United Nations Environment Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction USAID United States Agency for International Development WHO The World Metereological Organization WMO World Meteorological Organization x Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Chapter 3 Argentina CIA Central Intelligence Agency COAH-INA Hydrological Early Warning Operations Center Centro Operativo de Alerta Hidrológico del InA CONAE National Space Activities Commission Comisión nacional de Actividades Espaciales EM-DAT Emergency Events Data Base GDP Gross Domestic Product HFA Hyogo Framework for Action IGM Military Geographic Institute Instituto Geográfico Militar IIED-ALL International Institute of Environment and Development – Latin America Instituto Internacional de Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo - América Latina INA National Water and Environment Institute Instituto nacional del Agua y del Ambiente INDEC Institute of Statistics and Censuses Instituto nacional de Estadísticas y Censos INTA National Agricultural and Livestock Technology Institute Instituto nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria MDS Ministry of Social Development Ministerio de Desarrollo Social NEA Northeast Argentinean Region NWA Northwest Argentinean Region NBI Unsatisfied Basic Needs necesidades básicas insatisfechas PIDU Flood Prevention and Urban Dreinage Program Programa de Prevención de Inundaciones y Drenaje Urbano PPI Flood Protection Program Programa de Protección contra Inundaciones PREI Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Program Programa de Rehabilitación por la Emergencia de las Inundaciones Abbreviations xi SEGEMAR Argentine Mining Geology Service Servicio Geológico Minero Argentino (Argentina) SIFEM Federal Emergencies System Sistema Federal de Emergencias SMN National Meteorological Service Servicio Meteorológico nacional (Fuerza Aérea Argentina) SPV Housing Subprogram Suprograma de vivienda SUCCE Central Emergency Coordination Subunit Subunidad Central de Coordinación para la Emergencia SUPCE Provincial Emergency Coordination Subunits Subunidades Provinciales de Coordinación para la Emergencia Provincial Implementing Units Unidades Ejecutoras Provinciales Chapter 4 Brazil ANA National Water Agency Agencia nacional das Aguas CGE Emergency Management Center Centro Gerenciamento de Emergências CODDEC Civil Defense Coordination Office Coordenadoria Distrital de Defesa Civil COMDEC Municipal Civil Defense Coordination Office Coordenadorias Municipais de Defesa Civil CPTEC Center for Weather Forecasts and Climate Studies Centro de Previsão de Tempo e Estudos Climáticos FIPE Economic Research Institute Foundation Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas GePROCAV PROCAV Management Unit Unidade de Gestão de PROCAV FUNCAP Special Fund for Public Calamities Fundo Especial para Calamidades Públicas IBGE Brazil’s Geography and Statistics Institute Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatística IDB Inter-American Development Bank INPE National Institute for Space Research Instituto nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais NGO Non-governmental organizations xii Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America NEPO Population Studies Unit núcleo de Estudos Populacionais NUDEC Community Civil Defense Units núcleos de Defesa Civil PPDC Civil Defense Prevention Plan Plano Preventivo de Defesa Civil PROCAV Stream Canalization Program Programa de Canalização de Vales SEHAB Housing Secretariat Secretaria Municipal da Habitação SINDEC National Civil Defense System Sistema nacional de Defensa Civil SISMADEN Natural Disaster Surveillance and Warning System Sistema de Monitoramento e Alerta de Desastres naturais UNICAMP University of Campinas Universidade Estadual de Campinas Chapter 5 Colombia ACCI Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional CLOPADS Local Committees of Disaster Prevention and Relief Comités Locales de Prevención y Atención de Desastres CREPADS Regional Prevention Committees of Disaster Prevention and Relief Comités Regionales de Prevención y Atención de Desastres CVP Low-income Population Housing Agency Caja de la Vivienda Popular DANE National Statistics Department Departamento Administrativo nacional de Estadística DNP National Planning Department Departamento nacional de Planeación DNPAD National Directorate for Prevention and Disaster Dirección nacional de Prevención y Atención de Desastres DPAE Directorate of Emergency Prevention and Relief Dirección para la Prevención y Atención de Emergencias EAAB Bogotá Water and Sewerage Company Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá FONADE Emergency Prevention and Relief Fund Fondo Financiero de Proyectos de Desarrollo FOPAE Emergency Relief and Prevention Fund Fondo para la Prevención y Atención de Emergencias Abbreviations xiii IDRD Instituto Distrital para la Recreación y el Deporte INGEOMINAS Colombian Institute of Mining and Geology Ministerio de Minas y Energía - Instituto Colombiano de Minería y Geología NBI Unsatisficed Basic Needs necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas PEDEN Entre Nubes District Ecological Park Parque Ecológico Distrital Entre nubes POT Land Management Plan Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial PNUD Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo SDPAE District Emergency Prevention and Relief System Sistema Distrital para la Prevención y Atención de Emergencias SIRE Risk Management and Emergency Relief Information System Sistema de Información para la Gestión de Riesgos y Atención de Emergencias SISBEN System for Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programs Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios para Programas Sociales SMLV Legal Minimum Wages Salario mínimo legal vigente SNPAD National Emergency Relief and Prevention System Sistema nacional de Prevención y Atención de Desastres UPR Rural Planning Units Unidades de Planeamiento Rural UPZ Zonal Planning Units Unidades de Planeación Zonal VUR Sole Recognized Value Valor Único de Reconocimiento Chapter 6 Guatemala AACID Andalusian Cooperation Agency Agencia Andaluza de Cooperación Internacional al Desarrollo AMSCLAE Authority for Sustainable Management of the Lake Atitlán Basin and Surrounding Areas Autoridad y Manejo Sostenible de la Cuenca del Lago de Atitlán y su Entorno AECID Spanish Cooperation Agency Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo CEPAL Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe CEPREDENAC Coordination for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America Centro de Coordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres naturales en América Central xiv Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America CIAAP Inter-Institutional Coordination Office for Assisting Precarious Settlements Coordinadora Interinstitucional para la Atención de Asentamientos Precarios COCODE Community Development Council Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo COE Emergency Operations Center Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia COMUDE Municipal Development Council Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo CONRED National Coordination for Disaster Reduction Coordinadora nacional para la Reducción de Desastres DICABI Real Estate Cadastre and Assessment Directorate Dirección de Catastro y Avalúo de Bienes Inmuebles EGSA Electrical Power Company of Guatemala Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala Sociedad Anónima FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Organización de las naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación FOGUAVI Guatemalan Housing Fund Fondo nacional de la Vivienda FONAPAZ National Fund for Peace Fondo nacional para la Paz FUNCEDE Central American Development Foundation Fundación Centroamericana de Desarrollo GDP Gross Domestic Product IDB Inter–American Development Bank INE National Institute of Statistics Instituto nacional de Estadística INFOM Municipal Development Institute Instituto nacional de Fomento Municipal INSIVUMEH National Institute of Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology and Hydrology of Guatemala Instituto nacional de Sismología, Vulcanología, Meteorología e Hidrología de Guatemala INTECAP Technical Institute for Training and Productivity Instituto Técnico de Capacitación MAGA Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentación mspas Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social NCAP Netherlands Climate Assistance Program Programa de Asistencia Climática de los Países Bajos Abbreviations xv NGO Non-governmental Organization OMP Municipal Planning Offices Oficinas Municipales de Planificación PET Strategic Land-Use Plans Planificación Estratégica Territorial PROPEVI Program for the Prevention and Eradication of Domestic Violence Programa de Prevención y Erradicación de la Violencia Intrafamiliar SAA Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs of the Office of the President Secretaría de Asuntos Agrarios de la Presidencia SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SCEP Executive Coordination Secretariat of the Office of the President Secretaría de Coordinación Ejecutiva de la Presidencia SECONRED CONRED Executive Secretariat Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Conred SEGEPLAN Secretariat for Planning of the Office of the President Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia SIME Integrated Emergency Management System Sistema Integrado de Manejo de Emergencia SINPET National System of Strategic Territorial Planning Sistema nacional de Planificación Estratégica Territorial SISMICEDE Information Management System in the Event of Disasters Sistema de Manejo de la Información en Caso de Desastre SEI Stockholm Environment Institute SOSEP Social Works Secretariat of the First Lady Secretaría de Obras Sociales de la Esposa del Presidente UDT Departmental Technical Unit Unidad Técnica Departamental UNEPAR Executing Unit of the Rural Water Programme Unidad Ejecutora del Programa de Acueductos Rurales UNICEF United Nations International Children Educational Fund UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction UNPD United Nations Development Programme USAC University of San Carlos de Guatemala Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala USAID US Agency for International Development xvi Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Foreword L atin America and the Caribbean Region has the highest urbanization rate in the developing world, with 80 percent of the population living in cities. It is also the region that, after Asia, has the highest number of disasters a year. The Haiti and Chile earthquakes in early 2010, and the major floods in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela at the end of that year, are recent examples of the onslaught of natural disasters impacting the region. In the last 40 years, these events have killed over half a million and left another 170 million hurt or homeless. Major disasters since 1985, such the earthquake in Mexico and the nevado del Ruiz volcanic eruption in Colombia, have led governments to develop legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk management; these reflect a paradigm shift from an approach that focuses on emergency responses to one that reduces the risk factors by incorporating disaster risk management strategies in the development planning agendas. Preventive resettlement of at-risk populations is now being implemented, among other disaster risk reduction measures. This publication, Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disasters: Experiences from Latin America, presents case studies illustrating how various countries have incorporated this measure in innovative ways. Through examples included in this book, practitioners can compare the advantages and disadvantages of various resettlement alternatives, as well as learn how institutions have been organized and community awareness raised, the types of sources of financing obtained, and how reclaimed areas have been controlled, providing important lessons for future interventions. These experiences can help guide other countries currently developing risk reduction strategies. This publication is a companion to the Populations at Risk of Disaster: A Resettlement Guide which details the steps taken to determine if resettlement is the pertinent measure and describes how to formulate and implement preventive resettlement programs as part of disaster risk reduction strategies. Cyprian Fisiy Francis Ghesquiere Director Regional Coordinator Department of Social Development Disaster Risk Management Foreword xvii Introduction R apid and unplanned urbanization have compounded vulnerabilities to natural disasters in the Latin American and the Caribbean Region (LAC). As a pre- ventive measure, resettlement has been carried out in some LAC countries in recent years. The analysis and dissemination of the results of this strategy to countries worldwide is relevant and timely given the millions of people exposed to natural haz- ards, especially in developing nations. This was the main motivation for preparing the Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala case studies presented in this publication. Chapter I analyzes global natural disaster trends and their impacts. It also studies these trends in LAC and the principal factors that increase the vulnerability to natural disasters. Statistics on the occurrence of disasters, and especially their increasing impact in terms of loss of life and livelihoods, and overall economic losses, underscore the growing importance of disaster risk reduction frameworks at global and regional levels. The chapter concludes with a description of the strategic frameworks and institutional development that are been developed in the region. Chapter II analyzes resettlement as a risk reduction measure and describes the objec- tives and methodology of the cases studied. The next four chapters present the find- ings of each. In those countries, either due to the impacts of major disasters such as in Colombia and Guatemala, or to recurrent events, such as floods in Argentina and Brazil, risk reduction plans include preventive resettlement. Each case presents the country context, the area where the study was conducted, the geographical distribution of the population, the principal natural hazards to which it is exposed, the major disasters faced, and the specific risk management model applied. The Argentina case presents the results from a housing subprogram, a non-structural component of the flood protection program carried out in 120 localities in seven provinces from 1997-2006. This subprogram forms part of an ongoing strategy to reduce the risk of floods that was adopted in 1993, during which 11,911 families have been resettled. This case is an example of resettlement based on Assisted Self-construction and Mutual Assistance Housing Construction. This approach involved the efforts of federal, provincial, and local governments, as well as beneficiaries and construction material suppliers working together in a decentralized, participatory process. The Brazil case involved a resettlement program implemented in the second stage of the Streams Canalization Program (PROCAV II) in São Paulo, from 1995-2007. This program is one of a series of efforts to control the flooding that has wreaked havoc on the city of São Paulo for the past two decades. PROCAV II resettled 5,137 fami- lies, almost double the 2,585 resettled in PROCAV I. The case illustrates the various xviii Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America options to resettle the population, including large housing complexes, new dwellings built in risk-free areas in the same neighborhoods, exchanges of houses between fami- lies whose homes were at risk and others whose were not, but who preferred to move to the housing complexes and cash compensation. The Colombia case involved the resettlement of 1,074 families in Bogotá within a re- habilitation, reconstruction and sustainable development plan for the high-risk nueva Esperanza zone, which began in 2005. Its three components are: the environmental and at-risk land reclamation, the strengthening of social organization and community par- ticipation, and resettlement. This case illustrates a comprehensive approach to resettle- ment, which required strong inter-institutional coordination. It also presents different housing options including: the construction of new dwellings, the partnerships with private construction companies and grassroots housing organizations, and the pur- chase of homes on the market with the technical, legal and social support of the entity responsible for the program. In the Guatemala case, the approach was part of a government policy of reconstruction with transformation developed after the Tropical Storm Stan disaster. The comprehen- sive approach to risk management applied during reconstruction included preventive resettlement of at-risk families. The study describes the experience of the districts (can- tones) of Panabaj and Tz’anchaj, in the municipality of Santiago Atitlán, Department of Sololá, where 915 families were resettled since 2007. This experience demonstrates the importance of community participation, of cultural aspects including inter-cultural negotiations, institutional commitment to innovative practices in urban development and housing design, and the achievements in rebuilding confidence in the State and strengthening the social fabric. Each case highlights experiences that can be replicated, from identifying at-risk popu- lations to the post-resettlement phase. The examples describe different methodological and management tools for future processes, and key lessons about wise and unwise ac- tions taken. The cases also raise various questions for further research to enhance both knowledge and practices in human resettlement. The studies are summaries of technical papers written by various consultants. The full technical papers are available upon request. As noted in the Forward, this paper seeks to provide useful material for the design and implementation of resettlement programs as part of comprehensive disaster risk management strategies. The lessons can be applied by institutions and governments, professionals working in the field, and at-risk communities. Introduction xix Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends By Haris Sanahuja D isasters are the result of the overlapping in time together constitute risk. Accordingly, disasters show and space, of a natural phenomenon of certain where, how and for whom the risk translates into human intensity —that is, a hazard—with a population and material damages and losses. Analyses of the spatial exposed to its impact. A natural phenomenon cannot be and temporal distribution of the occurrence and impacts considered a hazard unless it is analyzed in a socioeco- of disasters provide critical information for assessing the nomic context where its occurrence can affect society. level of risk. The geographical distribution and magni- This context also influences the level of susceptibility to tude of the effects allow analysts to (a) gauge the scope damage—that is, vulnerability—to a particular hazard. of the problem, (b) urge that it be a public policy issue, When a hazard affects two areas with different socio- (c) identify trends and (d) prioritize actions in the field of economic and environmental contexts, the level of dam- disaster risk reduction. age depends on these differences. The Caribbean region, with its diverse island states and 1. Global Patterns and Trends annual tropical storms, offers a useful area in which to in the Occurrence and Impacts analyze the effects of the same natural disaster. Indeed, of Disasters the differences in the extent of damage from tropical Information about the occurrence and effects of disas- storms are related to different levels of vulnerability. For ters worldwide since the beginning of the 20th century example, the low level of human development and se- is available in the global Emergency Events Database vere environmental degradation in Haiti greatly explain (EM-DAT).2 EM-DAT statistics show that the number why the damage is likely to be far larger than in other of disasters—triggered by the occurrence of natural Caribbean states, despite similar levels of exposure. hazards—has accelerated sharply worldwide (see figure Likewise, the impacts are generally lower in countries 1.1).3 with more highly developed disaster preparedness, such 1 as Cuba and Jamaica. Although some argue that the increased number of disasters shown in Fig. 1.1., up to the 1970s, is due to Thus, the probability of a disaster and the magnitude of improved registering and the existence of scientific its impact are defined as the product of two factors – the centers that monitor these events, the upward trend level of the hazard and the degree of vulnerability – which has been confirmed for the past four decades through 1 For the links between the impact of disasters and human development, see UNDP (2004). 2 EM-DAT was established in 1988 by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) with the support of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It contains data on the occur- rence and effects of natural and technological disasters in the world, reported since 1900. See http://www.cred.be. 3 Figure 1.1 includes only disasters associated with hydrometeorological and geological hazards. Biological hazards (such as epidemics and insect infestation) were excluded from the analysis because they fall outside the scope of this analysis. 4 EM-DAT distinguishes between disasters associated with natural hazards (natural disasters) and technological disasters. Natural disasters include three types: geological hazards (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides due to tectonic movements, and tsunamis); hydrome- teorological hazards (floods, droughts, storms, extreme temperatures, forest fires, and landslides due to hydrological causes); and biologi- cal hazards (epidemics and insect infestation). Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 1 Figure 1.1. Occurrence of Geological and Hydrometeorological Disasters (1900–2009) 600 500 400 No. of disasters 300 Creation of EM-DAT (1988) 200 100 0 1900 1903 1906 1909 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 1939 1942 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 Source: EM-DAT. Year statistics systematically compiled by EM-DAT and oth- Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of the disasters from er international databases, such as those maintained by 1970 to 2009. The upward trend in the total correlated the Munich Re and Swiss Re re-insurance companies. clearly with the occurrence of disasters of hydrological For example, the number of disasters recorded in the origin, while the frequency of those of geological origin EM-DAT associated with natural hazards doubled from remained fairly constant. Thus, the analysis of types of 4 2000 to 2009, compared with the period 1980 to 1989. disasters over the past four decades showed a predomi- The analysis of geological and hydrometeorological haz- nance of those associated with hydrometeorological ards shows a clear upward trend—from an annual aver- hazards, which accounted for more than 75 percent of age of 257 disasters a year during the 1990s to an annual all disasters reported for that period. average of 382, from 2000 to 2009. Figure 1.2. Occurrence of 600 Disasters Worldwide by Type of Hazard (1970–2009) 500 Total Hydrometeorological Geological 400 No. of disasters 300 200 100 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year Source: EM-DAT. 2 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 1.1. Occurrence of Disasters Worldwide by Decade and Type of Hazard (1970-2009) Hazard Origin Type 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–2009 Total Geological Earthquakes (seismic) 101 196 267 290 854 Landslides (tectonic) 2 17 16 4 39 Volcanic eruptions 23 32 52 60 167 Subtotal 126 245 335 354 1,060 Hydro Landslides 53 101 145 150 449 meteorological Forest fires 26 60 103 142 331 Floods 263 525 865 1,729 3,382 Droughts 65 126 137 170 498 Extreme temperatures 15 38 92 220 365 Storms 291 559 899 1,055 2,804 Subtotal 713 1,409 2,241 3,466 7,829 Total 839 1,654 2,576 3,820 8,889 Source: EM-DAT. Table 1.1 shows the number of disasters per decade from insight into disaster risk patterns. If disasters’ impact 1970 to 2009, with a breakdown of the different hazards in human and economic terms is incorporated into the of geological and hydrometeorological origin. Floods analyses, a very different pattern emerges that reveals di- and storms account for a high percentage of the total and saster risk trends and their spatial distribution patterns. had a more rapid rate of increase than other hazards: for example, floods increased six fold since the 1970s, while According to EM-DAT records, almost 8,900 disasters storms tripled. Overall, in the past decade, there was an associated with geological and hydrometeorological annual average of 344 disasters associated with hydrome- hazards over the past four decades (1979–2009) re- teorological events, compared to 224 in the 1990s. sulted in 3 million deaths, affected 6 billion people, and spawned economic losses of over US$1.8 billion. The number of people affected by these types of disasters in- 1.1 The Impacts of Disasters creased in each decade—not just in absolute terms, but The occurrence of disasters and the relative shares of dif- also as a share of the average world population in each 5 ferent natural hazards provide only initial and partial decade (see figure 1.3). 7,000 4,000 Figure 1.3. Number No. affected persons (millions) of Persons Affected by World population (millions) 6,000 3,500 World population Disasters as a Share of the Affected persons 3,000 Average Population per 5,000 2,500 Decade (1970–2009) 4,000 2,000 3,000 1,500 2,000 1,000 1,000 500 0 0 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2009 Year Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division (http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/region.php). 5 The population figures in the chart for each decade are derived by calculating the average population for that time period. The figures for the number of victims correspond to the sum of the victims for each decade. Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 3 Figure 1.4. Percentage of Deaths by Type of Hazard Figure 1.4 shows the percentage of deaths by type of (1970–2009) hazard for the same period: 36 percent of deaths were Floods directly related to earthquakes, 27 percent to storms, 23 Extreme 8% Landslides percent to droughts, and 8 percent to floods. temperatures 1% 4% Some of the most lethal disasters of the past decade Storms 27% were (a) the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, which killed Earthquakes 226,408, (b) Cyclone Nargin in Myanmar in 2008, which 36% killed 138,366, (c) the Sichuan earthquake in China in Volcanic eruptions 2008, which killed 87,476, and (d) the heat wave in Eu- 6 1% rope in 2003, which killed 72,210. At the start of the Droughts current decade, Latin America and the Caribbean re- 23% Source: EM-DAT. gion experienced another mega disaster—the devastat- ing earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, which killed 230,000 and affected more than two million. Figure 1.5. Percentage of Persons Affected by Type Although earthquakes are associated with the highest of Hazard (1970–2009) mortality rates, a large percentage of people are affect- Extreme Earthquakes temperatures ed by natural hazards related to climatic events such as 2% 2% floods and storms. Figure 1.5 shows the percentage distribution of those Droughts impacted by disasters of geological or meteorological 32% origin in the past four decades: floods account for more than half the total number, while droughts account for Storms 32 percent. In the past decade, floods, droughts, and 13% Floods storms (in that order) accounted for more than 95 per- 51% cent of the 2 billion people affected by natural hazards. Source: EM-DAT. With regard to economic losses, analyses of the past four decades show that storms and floods combined account Figure 1.6. Percentage of Economic Losses by Type for 65 percent, while earthquakes are directly associated of Hazard (1970–2009) with 25 percent (see figure 1.6). Forest fires Droughts 2% 5% Analyses of trends in economic losses due to natural disasters must still overcome many methodological hurdles related to the coverage, processing and stan- Earthquakes 7 25% dardization of data. Nevertheless, one trend that ap- Extreme pears to be pronounced over the past 10 years and is Storms temperatures related to global urbanization is the increasing accumu- 3% Floods 41% 24% lation of economic assets in large population centers in developing countries. Many of those urban centers are located in areas that are geologically unstable or prone Source: EM-DAT. to hydrometeorological hazards. As population density 6 In: “2009 Disasters in Numbers,� United Nations. International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (www.unisdr.org). 7 Although worldwide absolute losses have increased exponentially since the 1970s, when the figures are adjusted for inflation and expressed as a percentage of global gross domestic product (GDP), the increases may be much less marked (Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, UNISDR, 2009a, p.55). 4 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Economic losses in absolute terms are higher in the more developed countries, but when measured against the total wealth in those countries, they are lower in relative terms than in developing countries. Likewise, in small island states, such as St. Lucia, disasters can wipe out several decades of development, while in high-in- come countries, such as the United States, the effects are less perceptible, even in the case of such events as Hur- ricane Katrina, which in 2005 caused economic losses in the order of US$125 billion.10 1.3 Intensive and Extensive Risk The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduc- tion (UNISDR 2009c) distinguishes between intensive and extensive risk, based on differences in the spatial and temporal concentration of losses.11 Intensive risk grows and the pace of economic activity in those hubs refers to the exposure of large concentrations of people quickens, the exposure of economic assets to hazards and economic activities to intense hazard events, which 8 increases significantly. can lead to potentially catastrophic impacts involving deaths and the loss of assets. 1.2 Differential Distribution of Risk Extensive risk, on the other hand, refers to the exposure Although the distribution of hazards makes no dis- of dispersed populations to repeated or persistent haz- tinction between more or less developed countries, ard conditions of low or moderate intensity (UNISDR their impacts in terms of deaths and people affected is 2009c), which can lead to debilitating cumulative disas- much lower in countries with higher levels of human ter impacts. It usually affects large numbers of persons development. For example, Japan and the Philippines, and damages homes and local infrastructure, but without which have similar degrees of exposure to tropical cy- generating high mortality rates or major destruction of clones, have very different mortality risks, which can be economic assets. correlated with the different levels of human develop- ment: Japan’s Human Development Index (HDI) score Globally documented losses due to disasters focus mainly is 0.953, compared to the Philippines’, which is 0.771.9 on a limited number of low-frequency events. Between In the Philippines, with a population of 16 million, the January 1975 and October 2008, EM-DAT recorded annual likelihood of deaths due to cyclones is 17 times 8,866 events (excluding epidemics) that caused 2,283,767 higher than in Japan, which has 22.5 million inhabitants deaths. Of those deaths, 1,786,084 were a result of 23 (UNISDR 2009a; UNISDR 2009b). mega-disasters, mainly in developing countries; in other 8 Teheran and Istanbul, for instance, both of which are prone to earthquakes, have experienced swifter urban and economic growth than the overall growth of their respective countries (UNISDR, 2009a, p.56). 9 The degree of human development achieved by countries is measured on the Human Development Index (HDI) published each year by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI measures average progress in three core dimensions of human development (a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living). For more details on the HDI, see http://www.undp.org. 10 For a more detailed analysis, see UNISDR 2009a, 57–60. 11 The report was coordinated by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat (UNISDR), in collaboration with UNDP, The World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the ProVention Consortium, Norway’s Geotechnical Institute and other ISDR-related entities. Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 5 words, 72.2 percent of the deaths were caused by 0.26 The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report states that tropical percent of the events recorded. During the same period, cyclones are likely to intensify if the surface temperature the economic losses recorded totaled US$1.5 billion. The of the sea rises (Parry et al., 2007); and any increase in the 25 mega-disasters for that period accounted for a mere severity of cyclones will magnify the unevenness of the 0.28 percent of the events, but accounted for 40 percent disaster risk distribution. The Global Assessment Report of the losses, most of them occurring in developed (UNISDR 2009a) provides a telling example: the economic countries. Intensive risk is associated with this pattern risk simulation model shows that 1.9 percent of the gross of mortality and economic losses, combining a high domestic product (GDP) of Madagascar is at risk annu- degree of geographic concentration with a rather limited ally from Category 3 cyclones, but only 0.09 percent of number of events. the GDP of Japan. If these cyclones were to increase to Category 4, 3.2 percent of the GDP of Madagascar would As opposed to intensive risk, where the most representa- be at risk, but only 0.16 percent of the GDP of Japan. tive impact variables are mortality and economic losses, extensive risk exposes large areas to low-intensity but more Based on the concentration and uneven distribution frequent losses, which are related to other types of im- of risk, it may be assumed that in a context of climate pacts—such as a large number of people affected (though change, the interactions between disaster risk and pov- not necessarily killed) and damage to homes and local erty will intensify. This intensification occurs because the infrastructure. For example, 99.3 percent of local losses frequency of hazards such as floods and tropical cyclones reported in the set of countries assessed by the Global increases and the resilience of the affected populations Assessment Report (UNISDR 2009a) accounted for 16 decreases, due to low agricultural productivity, shortages percent of the mortality but 51 percent of housing damage. of water and energy, increases in disease vectors, among other factors (see UNISDR 2009a). The Global Assessment Report points out that low- intensity but very widespread losses are a major, albeit little recognized, component of the effects and costs 2. Disaster Risk Patterns of disasters, and that extensive manifestations of risk and Trends in Latin America are more typical of current risk patterns, which are and the Caribbean characterized by an upward trend in the exposure of In the past 40 years, the Latin American and Carib- persons and assets at the local level (UNISDR 2009a). Since these losses are associated with meteorological bean Region (LAC) has experienced a series of major phenomena, climate change is likely to exacerbate them. disasters triggered by different types of natural hazards. In fact, 97 percent of reports of local losses are related to These included the earthquake in Ancash, Peru in 1970, climatic events and the figures for losses associated with the earthquake that shook the capital of Mexico in 1985, floods and heavy rainfall are increasing more than for and the eruption of the nevado del Ruiz volcano in any other type of natural hazard. Colombia that led to the Armero tragedy, among oth- ers. In the 1990s, huge losses were associated with the El Niño phenomenon, with the destruction left by Hur- 1.4 A Changing Climate ricane Mitch as it tore through Central America and, at The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) the end of a decade filled with major disasters, the tragic has confirmed that changes are already occurring in the mudslides in Vargas, Venezuela in 1999. In the past 10 geographical distribution, frequency, and intensity of years, there have also been strong earthquakes in El Sal- hydrometeorological hazards because of climate change vador (2001) and Peru (2007) and one of the severest (Parry et al., 2007). The changes observed in the volume, hurricane seasons ever to hit the Caribbean, in 2005. intensity, frequency, and type of precipitation are associ- ated with increases in the areas affected by drought, in As the calamities of the past four decades continued, in the numbers of heavy daily precipitation events that lead just the first two months of 2010 the region was hit by an to flooding, and in the intensity and duration of certain earthquake in Haiti, its poorest country, killing 230,000 kinds of tropical storms (UNISDR 2009a). people, and was followed by another strong earthquake 6 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America in Chile, one of the most developed countries in the Figure 1.7 also shows the large share of hydrometeo- region. The following section summarizes the trends rological hazards directly associated with the upward in the occurrence and impact of natural hazard-related trend in the number of disasters, compared to the much disasters in LAC. more stable and lower frequency levels of disasters re- lated to geological hazards. As with the global trends mentioned above, floods and storms are related to al- 2.1 Disaster Occurrence most 70 percent of the disasters recorded for 1970-2009. The LAC Region has, after Asia, the second largest av- In absolute numbers, flood-related disasters have qua- erage number of disasters per year (ECLAC and IDB, drupled in the past decade and storm-related disasters 2000). Figure 1.7 shows the upward trend in the occur- have increased five-fold. rence of disasters associated with hydrometeorologi- cal and geological hazards over the past four decades. Drought-related disasters are also rising, with 3.5 times Since the 1970s, when the region experienced an annual as many in the past decade, compared to 1970-1979. average of 16 major disasters, the statistic has practically Moreover, the frequency of high temperature-related quadrupled in the most recent decade in which there disasters has increased 10-fold compared to the 1970s. were, on average, 63 disasters a year associated with hy- Table 1.2 lists the number of disasters of hydrometeoro- drometeorological and geological hazards. logical and geological origin from 1970-2009. 80 Figure 1.7. Disaster 70 Occurrence in LAC by Type Total Hydrometeorological Geological of Hazard 60 No. of disasters 50 40 30 20 10 0 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Source: EM-DAT. Year Table 1.2. Occurrence of Disasters by Decade and Type of Hazard in LAC (1970-2009) Hazard Origin Type 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 Total Earthquakes (seismic) 23 42 50 38 153 Geological Landslides (tectonic) 0 3 2 1 6 Volcanic eruptions 9 7 24 22 62 Sub-total 32 52 76 61 221 Landslides (hydric) 18 33 37 26 114 Forest fires 1 6 18 13 38 Floods 69 131 147 279 626 Hydrometeorological Droughts 10 19 29 34 92 Extreme temperatures 3 3 13 31 50 Storms 34 70 130 188 422 Sub-total 135 262 374 571 1,342 Total 167 314 450 632 1,563 Source: EM-DAT Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 7 (Figure 1.8). In that same period, the most lethal disas- ters were the 1970 earthquake in Peru (66,000 deaths), and the 1999 mudslides in Vargas, Venezuela (30,000 deaths) (Table 1.3). The earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in 2010, which killed over 230,000 people, was the most lethal of all. Figure 1.8. Percentage of Total Deaths by Type of Hazard in LAC Floods Storms 20% 17% 2.2 Disaster impact Trends Landslides 4% In the past four decades, disasters of geological or hy- drometeorological origin in LAC have killed more than Extreme temperatures 250,000 people, affected an annual average of more than 1% 4.5 million and caused losses of approximately US$121 Volcanic billion.12 In addition, a large number of low and medi- eruptions Earthquakes 9% um-intensity disasters occur on an almost daily basis. 49% Together they significantly damage housing, basic infra- structure and livelihoods, as mentioned in the previous Source: EM-DAT. section regarding manifestations of extensive risk.13 The trend in the number of deaths in the region due to natural disasters declined over the past four decades, With respect to the number of deaths, earthquakes ac- down to 86 percent of the number killed in the 1970s. count for almost half of those recorded for disasters in However, that trend will be radically altered when the LAC from 1970-2009—a total of over 122,000. These large number of deaths caused by the earthquake in were followed by floods, which killed approximate- Haiti is included. ly 50,000 people, and storms, responsible for 42,000 Table 1.3. Top 10 Lethal Disasters in LAC (1970-2009) Top 10 Year Country Name of event Number of deaths 1 1970 Perú Ancash Earthquake 66,794 2 1999 Venezuela Vargas Landslides 30,000 3 1976 Guatemala Earthquake 23,000 4 1985 Colombia Nevado del Ruiz – Volcanic Eruption (Armero) 21,800 5 1998 Honduras Hurricane Mitch 14,600 6 1972 Nicaragua Managua Earthquake 10,000 7 1985 Mexico Mexico DF Earthquake 9,500 8 1974 Honduras Storm Fifí 8,000 9 1987 Ecuador Earthquake 5,000 10 1998 Nicaragua Hurricane Mitch 3,332 Source: EM-DAT 12 These figures were obtained from EM-DAT records for the countries of LAC (www.emdat.be). 13 The occurrence and impacts of these low-intensity disasters in many LAC countries are recorded in the DesInventar database. They are used for the extensive risk analyses included in UNISDR, 2009a (www.desenredando.org) 8 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Disasters of hydrometeorological origin affect more peo- Numerous studies for LAC countries measure cumula- ple than any other types of natural hazards: 166 million tive losses caused by natural disasters as a percentage of people were victims of such disasters in the past four de- gross domestic product (GDP). For example, the cumu- cades, of whom approximately 63 million were affected lative losses due to natural disasters in the 1990s repre- by drought,14 more than 60 million by floods and 35 mil- sented 15.6 percent of GDP in Nicaragua, 12.6 percent lion by storms. Disasters associated with those three haz- in Jamaica and 1.8 percent in Argentina (Arnold, 2004). ards accounted for 84 percent of all victims in that period, The impact of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras is estimat- compared to 12 percent for earthquakes (Figure 1.9). ed to have caused losses equal to 41 percent of its GDP (Benson and Twigg, 2007). Figure 1.9. Percentage of People affected by Type of Hazard in LAC Volcanic The patterns and trends for the above-mentioned inten- eruptions sive and extensive risks on a global scale are reproduced 1% Earthquakes 25% in the region.16 The analysis in the study of national data Extreme temperatures regarding low-intensity losses indicates that mortality 2% and destruction of housing are concentrated in infre- Droughts 33% quent events affecting a limited number of geographi- Landslides 1% cal areas in the region, while damage to housing is very widespread and more frequent. Storms 19% The extensive risk associated with hydrometeorological Floods hazards is expanding geographically, as such hazards 32% occur more frequently and cause increasing damage—a Source: EM-DAT. reflection, in large part, of the greater exposure of per- sons and assets at the local level. Thus, it can be conclud- As for economic losses, EM-DAT data show a total of ed that in a context of climate change, losses associated US$121.13 billion in the past four decades.15 Figure 1.10 with meteorological events will most likely increase in indicates that almost 50 percent of economic losses re- the region. late to the effects of storms, followed by floods, earth- quakes and drought. 2.3 Disaster Risk Configuration Figure 1.10. Percentage of Economic Losses by Type in the Region of Hazard in LAC To understand the particular disaster risk configuration Droughts 7% Earthquakes in LAC, it is important to analyze its physical environ- Forest fires 15% ment and natural dynamics. From a geological per- Volcanic 1% Extreme temperatures spective, LAC is located above a set of five interacting eruptions 1% tectonic plates. The western shores of this region form 1% part of the so-called “Pacific Ring of Fire,� in which the earth’s crust is constantly being transformed. This trans- Floods 24% lates into the high level of volcanic and seismic activity in Andean and Central American countries. For exam- ple, 59 percent of the population of the Andean Com- Storms 49% Landslides munity (54 million inhabitants of Bolivia, Colombia, 1% Source: EM-DAT. 14 Reports on people affected by droughts in LAC highlight Brazil, with 47 million, followed by Bolivia and Peru with over 3 million people affected. Guatemala and Haiti have the highest records for Central America and the Caribbean, with more than two million people affected. 15 All estimates, including for economic losses, refer to natural disasters associated with hydrometeorological and geological hazards. Biologi- cal hazards and technological disasters have been deliberately excluded from the analysis. 16 The national data supporting the analysis of extensive risk found in UNISDR (2009a) form part of DesInventar, a database with ample coverage of LAC. The public can access the DesInventar data on its website (www.desinventar.com). Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 9 Ecuador and Peru) are estimated to live in earthquake- 2.4 Vulnerability and Risk-driving prone areas.17 Also, in the Caribbean basin, the tectonic Factors configuration makes the islands significantly prone to volcanic and seismic hazards. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, disasters can- not be analyzed outside the social, economic, political and The topography, especially the Andes in South America environmental contexts in which they occur. Accordingly, and the Meso-American highlands in Central America, there is broad consensus that the increase in disastrous is associated with the climatic dynamics that trigger events is rooted in a process of increasing vulnerability. frequent mass movements and floods. These mountain chains create a divide between the Pacific slopes, There have been numerous attempts to define the concept with watersheds and shorter rivers that can produce of vulnerability to disasters and to classify it under flash flooding, and the Atlantic and Caribbean slopes, multiple headings, but all researchers view vulnerability with vast plains in which rivers encounter conditions as a state of “being prone to� or being “susceptible to conducive to slow-growing floods. The climate also damage and harm� (Blaikie et al., 1996). In the mid-1990s, leaves its imprint on other parts of the region, as in two models were proposed to explain the underlying the Caribbean, with its annual tropical storms and causes of increased vulnerability. Figure 1.11 shows one hurricanes, and in areas off the coast of Peru, where the of those models, called PAR (Pressure and Release), El Niño-Southern Oscillation phenomenon (ENSO) which examines the evolution of unsafe conditions in the begins and then causes floods and drought in various form of dynamic pressures. Examples of these conditions parts of LAC. are urbanization and environmental degradation, whose causes are found in the political economy. Often, these hazards occur in a chain reaction, which increases the magnitude of their impact. In The processes that shape the emergence of vulnerable mountainous areas, of which there are many in the scenarios are varied, complex and differentiated by sub- region, tectonic hazards and heavy rains can give region, country, and areas within them. Any attempt rise to mass movements, such as mudslides or floods. to describe them in broad terms could over-simplifies Droughts may also create the conditions for forest the issues. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some fires which “set the ground� to exacerbate flooding: for of the major factors driving vulnerability and risk, such example, the extensive drought triggered by El Niño as rapid urbanization and environmental degradation, in 1997-1998 made the vegetable biomass in Central exacerbated in a vicious circle by poverty and persistent America much more combustible (CCAD, 1998). The weak governance. It is also assumed that these factors severe shortage of water and the delayed start of the are inter-related, so that effective and comprehensive rainy season in 1998 allowed fires to spread rapidly; intervention in all of them is essential to reduce disaster therefore the heavy rainfall unleashed by Hurricane risks. One way to present an integrated picture of those Mitch found large areas devoid of vegetation, which driving vulnerability forces is to examine both urban increased soil saturation levels, and caused surface and rural areas. runoff (Sanahuja, 1999). In short, the diversity and intensity of the geological and 2.5 Urban Areas and the hydrometeorological dynamic in LAC create a “multiple Construction of Vulnerabilities hazards� scenario, characterized by dangerous events, One notable feature in LAC is that it constitutes the most such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, urbanized part of the developing world. In 1950, urban landslides, storms, floods, forest fires and droughts. residents accounted for 41.4 percent of the total popula- tion; by 2007, the figure had soared to 78.3 percent and 17 Atlas de las dinámicas del territorio andino: población y bienes expuestos a amenazas naturales [Atlas of the dynamics of the Andes: population and property exposed to natural hazards], General Secretariat of the Andean Community, Cali: Corporación OSSO, 2009). 10 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Figure 1.11. Pressures that Result in Disasters – Pressure and Release (PAR) Model Root Dynamic Unsafe Disaster Hazards Causes Pressures Conditions Lack of: Fragile physical · Local institutions environment: · Training · Dangerous locations · Appropriate skills · Unprotected buildings · Earthquake Limited · Local investments and infrastructure access to: · High winds · Local markets Fragile local economy: (cyclone / · Power · Press freedom · Livelihoods at risk hurricane / · Structures · Ethical standards · Low income levels Risk = typhoon) · Resources in public life hazard + Vulnerable society: · Flooding Ideologies Macro-forces: vulnerability · Volcanic eruption · Special groups at risk · Political systems · Rapid population growth · Lack of local institutions · Landslide · Economic · Rapid urbanization · Drought systems Public actions: · Arms expenditure · Virus and pests · Lack of disaster · Debt repayment schedules preparedness · Deforestation · Prevalence of endemic · Decline in soil productivity disease Source: Blaikie, Piers; Cannon, Terry; Davis, Ian; Wisner, Ben. 1996. Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters. by 2025 it is estimated that approximately 83.5 percent such as those on river banks or slopes prone to flooding will live in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2009). Figure 1.12 and landslides (The World Bank, 2007). Approximately shows urbanization trends for the region. 40 percent of urban settlers are poor and 20 percent-25 percent live in improvised houses in overcrowded slums Figure 1.12. Urbanization Trends in LAC (IDB, 2007a and 2007b). 100 90 In the slums, the houses are of substandard construction. 80 Slums also lack basic infrastructure and safe access roads, 70 and land tenure is irregular and informal.18 Savings or Percentage 60 resources for home improvement, as well as insurance Urban population 50 options for transferring risk, are virtually non-existent 40 Rural population among the region’s poor, and in many cases, neither 30 their land nor property are even insurable (IDB, 2000). 20 10 0 Rapid urbanization in the region is also associated 1950 1975 2007 2025 2050 with environmental degradation, characterized by the Year destruction of ecosystems, deforestation, and an increase Source: United Nations Secretariat, 2007. in solid and liquid wastes, among other phenomena that increase the vulnerability of urban populations. Rapid urbanization and unequal access to land leads poor people to settle in hazard-prone areas because they The occupation of slopes on the outskirts of cities for do not have alternatives. The areas occupied by the ur- marginal farming and livestock activities, as well as for ban poor are often environmental protection areas with human settlements, tends to create landslides that drive not even minimal conditions for safe human settlement, a great deal of sediment into rivers already clogged by 18 According to the UN 2005 report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the number of people in urban slums increased from 111 million in 1990 to 128 million in 2001, making LAC the region with the fourth largest slum population in the developing world. Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 11 the solid waste discharged into them by people who that poverty and inequity are factors contributing to the regard them as “natural dumpsites� and who have no loss of overall sustainable security, in the sense of the alternatives. That, in turn, degrades the water systems ability of an area to provide comprehensive security for next to the urban areas. its inhabitants (UNISDR, 2008). Construction methods and practices also expand areas As in urban environments, risk and vulnerability in ru- of impermeability, shrinking natural drainage capa- ral areas are reinforced by poverty. In that sense, much bilities and ultimately facilitating flooding. When that of the above-mentioned environmental degradation re- expansion encompasses the upper reaches of basins, it flects the lack of opportunities for the dwindling rural could affect the supply to aquifers, which, in many cities population. Some of the factors that spark excessive de- of the region, carry water for both human and industrial pendence on natural resources and unsustainable land consumption. use practices—which include widespread over-grazing, inappropriate farming on slopes, slash and burn prac- 2.6 Rural Areas and the Construction tices, deforestation and the alteration of river banks of Vulnerabilities (IDB 2000)—are the high level of poverty (50 percent of the rural population are poor), lack of opportunities, In rural areas, various factors are related to severe envi- technical skills, capital and information. ronmental degradation, such as the expansion of the ag- ricultural frontier and chronic poverty. These not only 2.7 Governance and Institutional make the rural population highly vulnerable, but also Vulnerability heighten the effects of natural hazards. Finally, institutional vulnerability and a poor “culture The (a) expansion of the agricultural frontier, which is of prevention� in government are key to the increased a response to growing demand in world markets, (b) vulnerability in both urban and rural contexts.19 The unsustainable agricultural practices and their effects on absence of policies and effective incentives to reduce erosion and sedimentation of water basins, (c) slash and vulnerabilities, weak land use planning and the lack of burn practices, or seasonal crops, and (d) deforestation oversight and accountability mechanisms intensify risks and degradation of natural barriers–including the de- and exacerbate the impacts of a natural hazard (UNDP, struction of wetlands and mangroves, among other pro- 2004). cesses, increase the exposure and fragility of the ecosys- tems that play a major role in resilience to the impact With regard to land use planning, the lack of zoning of natural hazards. For example, the enormous impact laws and weak enforcement of any regulations (when of Hurricanes Mitch and George can only be explained they exist) allow informal settlements to arise in high- if the natural resource degradation that preceded them risk areas and degrade the soil through unsustainable are factored in (IDB, 2000). farming and livestock practices. Where stricter regu- lations were adopted, they have not been enforced, or The destruction of mangroves for shrimp farming and higher standards have excluded the poor from legal land the draining of wetlands for agricultural and livestock markets (IDB, 2000). production, or for residential purposes, increases coast- al storm and flooding hazards. The annual rate of de- However, beyond the examples of institutional weakness forestation in LAC from 1990-2005 is 0.5 percent, the that can explain the vulnerability, the core issue is the second highest in the world (after sub-Saharan Africa). relation between disasters and development. The widely Deforestation and related problems, along with soil deg- discussed concept that disasters are largely indicators of radation due to erosion and other causes, are linked to “development failures� (Anderson, 1996) is based on the ongoing land tenure patterns, which prove once again fact that some socio-economic and environmental poli- 19 The Global Assessment Report on disaster risk reduction (UNISDR, 2009a) identifies poor urban governance as one of the “risk drivers� in developing countries and analyzes it in detail in Chapter 4. (http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report). 12 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America cies pursued in the region have generated conditions 3. Institutional Frameworks and of vulnerability that a natural hazard may have turned Strategies for Disaster Risk into a disaster. In that sense, the increased vulnerability Reduction shows that concepts of prevention and mitigation are still not sufficiently built into and assimilated by pub- Over the past two decades, discussion of what today lic policies and development planning processes in the is called disaster risk reduction has been the result of region. a slow transition and change of paradigm. Initially, the emphasis was on the event itself and response activities Disaster risk reduction is still not regarded by many de- (disaster management) but later it changed towards an cision and policy-makers as an investment, despite the approach in which disaster is understood as a manifes- solid evidence accumulated in recent years about the tation of vulnerabilities associated with socioeconomic advantages of prevention and mitigation as opposed to and environmental processes. In this view, natural haz- policies based on response and reconstruction. Thus, ards “trigger� disasters but are not the agents that cause prevention tends to be seen as a “cost� rather than an them (disaster risk management). “investment.� This conceptual trend recognizes that risk is an out- Despite the challenges with respect to including risk come associated with social construction processes and management as an intrinsic part of development plan- linked to the predominant forms of social and economic ning, institutional progress is being made in the region development. For this reason, “disaster risk manage- which shows a growing recognition of the importance ment� is inseparable from “development management.� of disaster prevention and mitigation. Some of the insti- Further, this change in paradigm—from a focus on di- tutional and legislative changes were introduced in 1985 saster, natural hazards, and response, to one in which as a result of the impact and general sensitization trig- risk, vulnerability, and their reduction become domi- gered by the earthquake in Mexico City and the nevado nant themes—has also prompted a reconsideration of del Ruiz volcanic eruption in Colombia. Between 1985 institutional roles and needs, so the countries can deal and the mid-1990s, some national disaster agencies with the issue more effectively. amended their mandates to include aspects of preven- tion, mitigation and emergency relief, but their role was A recent milestone at the international level was the still mainly limited to strengthening disaster prepared- World Conference on Disaster Reduction, in Kobe, Ja- ness activities—such as early warning systems (UNIS- pan, in 2005, which the Hyogo Framework for Action DR, 2004)—and basic mapping of hazards. 2005–2015 (HFA) was adopted. This framework, en- dorsed by 168 governments, aims to substantially re- Since the end of the 1990s, the huge impacts of several duce the loss of life, and the social, economic and envi- disasters in the region, particularly the widespread loss- ronmental assets of communities and countries by 2015. es from the 1997-1998 El Niño phenomenon and the The HFA focuses on three strategic goals and five priori- passage of Hurricane Mitch through Central America, ties for action (figure 1.11), and articulates the respon- served as catalysts by which disaster reduction was sibilities of governments, international organizations, gradually becoming linked to policy agendas and devel- nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civil so- opment planning, both in legislative and institutional ciety with respect to their roles in and contributions to arrangements. These changes on the domestic front, implementing the HFA. starting with the development of national disaster pre- vention and relief systems in certain countries, were To help implement the HFA, the International Strategy accompanied by the development of specialized inter- for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) now includes a “plat- governmental organizations in the subregion20. forms system� (the Global Platform for Disaster Risk 20 The National System for Prevention and Assistance to Natural Disasters in Colombia was launched in 1980. Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 13 Figure 1.13. The Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015) Expected Outcome The substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social,economic and environmental assets of communities and countries Strategic Goals The systematic incorporation The integration of disaster Development and strengthening of risk reduction approaches risk reduction into sustainable of institutions, mechanisms and into the implementation of emergency development policies and planning capacities to build resilience to hazards preparedness, response and recovery programs Priorities for Action Ensure that disaster Use knowledge, risk reduction is a Identify, assess and Strengthen disaster innovation and Reduce the national and a local monitor disaster risks preparedness for education to build a underlying prioritywith a strong and enhance early effective response at culture of safety and risk factors institutional basis for warning all levels resilience at all levels implementation Cross Cutting Issues Gender perspective and Community and volunteers Capacity building and Multi-hazard approach cultural diversity participation technology transfer Source: UNISDR. Reduction), as a new world forum for shaping disaster and sectoral development programs, including rehabili- risk reduction policies, with the active participation of tation and reconstruction in postdisaster situations. governments, civil society, and specialized agencies, in addition to the United Nations system. Likewise, region- This priority for action also promotes (a) income diver- al, thematic, and national platforms are being developed sification options, (b) financial mechanisms for social- to promote the HFA in different regions and countries.21 izing risks, and (c) partnerships between the public and private sectors.22 Table 1.4 shows the six indicators used The biggest challenges to implementing the HFA are to measure progress under this priority, listing the main presented in Priority for Action No. 4, “reducing the un- areas countries must address to reduce underlying risk derlying risk factors,� which involves land use planning factors. 21 For more about the ISDR system, see http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/isdr/. 22 See detailed information on the actions included under Priority 4 of the HFA in ISDR (2007). 14 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 1.4 Indicators of Reducing Underlying Risk Factors Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective of environment-related policies and plans, including for land use, natural resource management, and adaptation to climate change. Social development policies and plans are being implemented to reduce the vulnerability of populations most at risk. Economic and productive sectoral policies and plans have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of economic activities. Planning and management of human settlements incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, including enforcement of building codes. Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes. Procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk impacts of major development projects, especially infrastructure. Source: HFA in UNISDR (2007) 3.1 Different Approaches and development objectives, in communities where risks Tools for Risk Management have been identified. The approach involves reducing poverty, empowering people and planning, and adopting Reducing these underlying risk factors necessarily in- development goals by attacking the underlying causes of volves a discussion of disaster risk management and the risk. tools needed to implement it. Unlike corrective management, prospective manage- The risk management concept refers to an ongoing pro- ment works with risks that have not yet presented cess whose goal is predicting, reducing and controlling themselves but could nevertheless be generated by new risk factors. This process promotes, prepares, and imple- investments and development initiatives, whether by ments policies, strategies, instruments, and actions that governments, the private sector, NGOs, development help society confront natural hazards and minimize the associations, families, or individuals. losses/damage associated with their effects (Lavell 2008). Prospective risk management is therefore an integral part Disaster risk management may be corrective or prospec- of development planning, investment project planning, tive (Lavell 2004). Corrective management takes its and environmental management. It implies practices that point of reference from already existing risk, which is avoid repeating past errors that led to the existing levels the product of past social actions—for example, a settle- of risk. The strategies or other specific tools for prospec- ment, located in a flood zone, that was built with inap- tive risk management are largely similar to those appro- propriate techniques; a hospital constructed without an- priate for corrective management, although the timing tiseismic standards; a community built around a single and orientation of the various activities differ. access road prone to recurrent landslides; or agricul- tural activity ill-adapted to the climate and its extremes. Regardless of whether corrective and prospective risk management succeeds, countries will always need to This corrective management approach may also be con- respond to the crises triggered by extreme events. The servative or progressive (Lavell 2009). The conservative area of risk that cannot be addressed by either correc- corrective model aims to reduce visible risk conditions tive or prospective management is called residual risk, (by protecting housing, shoring up river banks or lots and in this area, humanitarian responses will continue on steep slopes, etc.) and to strengthen institutions so to play a dominant role. they can respond more effectively to emergencies. The underlying factors of existing risks—related to poverty 3.2 Risk Reduction Challenges or power structures—are not considered. Risk reduction is increasingly important on the inter- The progressive corrective model combines reducing national agenda, within a context where rapid urban- existing risk factors with actions based more on ization and environmental degradation combine with Chapter 1 Global and Latin America and the Caribbean Natural Disaster Trends 15 grinding poverty and weak governance—especially at to which some communities are exposed is resettle- the local government level—to deepen vulnerability that ment. Although resettlement is a complex affair, there is stressed even further by the effects of climate change. are examples of successful preventive resettlements that have not only eliminated the risk of disaster but also Thus, the use of risk management tools should be inten- improved the standard of living and safety of the popu- sified and risk reduction criteria made an integral part lation involved and reclaimed the areas at-risk areas to of land use planning and development policies. How- their original use. ever, regardless of whether corrective or prospective risk management measures are implemented, reducing Under current conditions, in which risk scenarios may the underlying factors will continue to pose enormous worsen for millions of people due to development mod- challenges. els and land tenure patterns, an awareness of preventive resettlement outcomes may help improve this practice In certain scenarios, when nothing else can mitigate as a risk reduction measure. the risk, the most viable option for reducing the risk 16 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America References Inter-American Development Bank. 2000. Facing the Challenge of natural Disasters in LAC: An IDB Anderson, Mary B. 1996. A reconceptualization of the Action Plan. Washington DC. linkages between disasters and development. The Disasters: The International Journal of Disaster ———. 2007a. Developing and Supporting the Use Studies and Practice 9 (Harvard Supplement). of Disaster-Linked Financial Instruments: The Role of the IDB in Latin America and the Ca- Arnold, Margaret. 2004. Natural Disasters: Counting ribbean. Washington D.C., May the Cost. The World Bank, Washington D.C. Retrieved from http://web.worldbank.org/ ———. 2007b. The Disaster Response to Prevention WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:2 Companion Paper to the Disaster Risk Man- 0169861~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSi agement Policy tePK:4607,00.html. Lavell, Allan. 2004. Local Level Risk Management: Benson, Charlotte; Twigg, John. 2007. Tools for Main- From Concept to Practice. CEPREDENAC- streaming Disaster Risk Reduction: Guidance UNDP. Quito. Notes for Development Organizations. Benfield ———. 2008. 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ISDR International Strategy for Natural Disas- ter Reduction - http://www.unisdr.org/ UN-Habitat. (United Nations Human Settlements Pro- gramme). 2009. Global Report on Human Settle- ments 2009. Planning Sustainable cities: Policy Directions. London: Abridge Edition. London- Sterling. UN (United Nations). 2005. The Millennium Devel- opment Goals Report. New York 2005. Re- trieved from: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/ MDG%20Book.pdf Wilches Chaux, Gustavo. 2008. Estrategia Internacio- nal de Reducción de Desastres (eird). 2008. La gestión del riesgo de desastres hoy: contextos glo- bales, herramientas locales (eird). 18 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Chapter 2 Resettlement as a Disaster Risk Reduction Measure: Case studies By Elena Correa 1. Preventive Resettlement 2. The Benefits of Preventive Resettlement Preventive resettlement of populations located in high-risk areas is a corrective measure in which all or Resettlement of people living in high-risk areas can part of a community is relocated because of the high eliminate the costs associated with emergency respons- risk of disaster. Such a measure should be seen as a last es and reconstruction. Indeed, loss of life, infrastruc- resort, when it is impossible to mitigate risk factors as- ture and assets, as well as other damages, can all be di- sociated, for example, with landslides, the likelihood minished in both monetary and non-monetary terms, of volcanic eruptions, or severe flooding that cannot as described below: be controlled. ■ Human life. By resettling those living in high-risk In such cases, its pertinence and viability depends on areas, it is possible to prevent the direct impact how well it is incorporated into a comprehensive risk- and costs of a disaster in terms of human lives and reduction strategy. The decision to resettle must be sup- injuries. Moreover, indirect impacts and costs are ported by technical and risk-assessment studies and be also avoided, not only for those exposed to risk built into land-use planning strategies. but also for society as a whole. ■ Infrastructure. Preventive resettlement cannot In addition to reducing risk, resettlement may also pres- avoid the direct monetary costs associated with ent an opportunity to improve the standard of living of rebuilding structures after a disaster (e.g houses, vulnerable groups in high-risk areas. In such cases, it institutional buildings, factories, and public and constitutes a progressive-corrective measure in which private facilities) because they must be replaced action is taken to address not only exposure to existing or rehabilitated. However, indirect monetary risk but also the factors underlying vulnerability. costs and non-monetary costs may be avoided. For example, shelters will not have to be built Further, resettlement may be considered part of a land- use planning strategy, when it is assessed that a com- munity’s socio-economic development may negatively impact the local ecosystem and trigger new natural haz- ards (e.g., communities established in areas designated only for forests).1 In such cases, resettlement could be described as a prospective risk-management measure intended to preempt a propensity to future risk. 1 See Chapter 13: “Relocation� (Reubicaciones) in: Disaster Risk Management Today: Global Context, Local Tools. ISDR, 2008 (Author: Wilches-Chaux). Chapter 2 Resettlement as a Disaster Risk Reduction Measure: Case Studies 19 for the population affected by a disaster and the can continue without affecting the income of the provision of services such as health care and population or revenue for society as a whole. The education will not be interrupted. Industrial and only asset that cannot be relocated is land, which commercial activities will also be able to proceed will represent a cost in resettlement. without interruption. Table 2.1 details the potential savings (shown in light ■ Assets. Resettlement means that all private, green cells) from preventive resettlement, gained by communal and institutional assets can be relocated avoiding post-disaster reconstruction costs; the only to a place where they will not be damaged or cost that remains is that associated with building infra- destroyed. The relocation of productive assets is structure and providing land for new settlements. particularly important so that economic activities Table 2.1. Savings Achieved by Preventive Resettlement vis-à-vis the Potential Costs of Post-disaster Reconstruction Monetary Non-monetary Impacts Direct costs Indirect costs Direct costs Indirect costs Death ■ Economic activity ■ Loss of income ■ Trauma for survivors ■ Social impacts on expected by society ■ Cost of attending to ■ Disruption of family survivors (widows, ■ Funeral costs survivors (widows, and social ties orphans) ■ Areas for disposing orphans) Human lives of bodies Injuries ■ Medical care ■ Loss of employment ■ Injuries, disabilities ■ Psychological expenses and income consequences ■ Loss of work days Houses ■ Loss of investment ■ Cost of temporary ■ Loss of shelter ■ Psychological and ■ Repairs and housing social consequences reconstruction costs ■ Loss of net worth ■ Removing rubble ■ Loss of access to costs credit Communal ■ Loss of investment ■ Temporary facilities ■ Loss of access to ■ Disruption of social facilities ■ Repairs and costs facilities and services activities (churches, reconstruction costs parks, ■ Removing rubble community costs centers) Public ■ Loss of investment ■ Cost of constructing ■ Loss of access to ■ Reduction of human installations ■ Repairs and or adapting facilities and services, capital, increased (medical care reconstruction costs temporary interruptions in morbidity rate facilities, Removing rubble installations to education, delays or Infrastructure ■ schools, costs deliver services interruption in health sports and ■ Total or partial cost care services, etc. recreation of loss of services centers, etc.) Structures for ■ Loss of investment ■ Loss of net worth ■ Reduction in the Potential social productive ■ Repairs and ■ Loss of income supply of goods and conflicts activities reconstruction costs ■ Decline in services (industry, ■ Removing rubble productivity trade, costs ■ Unemployment services) ■ Disruption of production chains ■ Increased cost of transporting goods from external supply zones Continues 20 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 2.1. Continuation Monetary Non-monetary Impacts Direct costs Indirect costs Direct costs Indirect costs Land (private, ■ Loss of investment ■ Loss of economic ■ Loss of identity and ■ Psychological and communal, activities related to belonging social consequences public) the use of land Other private ■ Loss of savings, ■ Replacement of ■ Loss of access to ■ Psychological assets IDs and personal identification services consequences belongings documents and ■ Dependency on (furniture, clothing, personal belongings, foreign aid household electrical costs of bringing appliances, etc.) relief items to ■ Replacement cost of victims. goods ■ Loss of investment Assets Other public ■ Loss of public ■ Reallocation of ■ Reduced expansion ■ Loss of human assets property regular budget funds of coverage or capital ■ Replacement costs to replace assets provision of services ■ Reduced investment in different areas in other areas Other ■ Loss of community ■ Loss of social ■ Alterations in communal property (religious, structure and social and cultural assets cultural, recreational, networks, reduced dynamics educational, etc.) social and cultural ■ Property replacement capital costs Productive ■ Loss of machinery, ■ Loss of income, ■ Reduced quality ■ Stress and other assets equipment, tools unemployment of life and living psychological (private, ■ Cost of replacing conditions consequences communal, productive assets public) 3. Case Studies Resettlement as a preventive measure of disaster risk- 3.1 Objectives reduction strategy is still in its early stages. However, it needs to be analyzed given its benefits in terms of pro- The main objectives of the case studies were to: tecting life and assets, the technology available to iden- tify and assess risks, and the increasing number of disas- ■ Document various experiences with resettling ters and people affected. populations living in high-risk areas, the legal and institutional frameworks in which they were To that end, and with support from the Global Facility carried out, the housing solutions adopted, the for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, preventive resettle- sources and cost of financing, and participation ment experiences were studied in Argentina, Brazil, by communities and local authorities; Colombia and Guatemala. These were selected because ■ Present the lessons learned in a guide on they illustrate conditions and practices in different parts resettlement for disaster risk reduction that of LAC: Central America, Andean countries, and the could be used by governments, institutions and Southern Cone. communities. Chapter 2 Resettlement as a Disaster Risk Reduction Measure: Case Studies 21 ■ Mechanisms for consulting and negotiating the various resettlement options; ■ Mechanisms for consulting with the population involved; ■ Activities and support to the communities before, during, and after relocation; ■ Measures adopted to restore the livelihoods of the resettled population; ■ Participation by local authorities and communities in the resettlement process; ■ Monitoring of risk during the resettlement process and contingency plans; ■ Costs and sources of financing; ■ Monitoring and evaluation systems; 3.2 Scope of the Case Studies ■ Accountability mechanisms; The following factors were examined: ■ The use of reclaimed at-risk areas, strategies for overseeing new occupation of those areas and the ■ The country’s main hazards and disasters; institutions in charge. ■ The legal and institutional framework for risk management and emergency response; 3.3 Methodology ■ The context of the case studied, land use, population patterns, principal hazards, existing risk management To conduct the studies, a team of professionals was measures, institutions responsible, costs and sources formed that included a coordinator with experience in of funding; human resettlement, four professionals (consultants) responsible for preparing the case studies (one per ■ The hazards to which the populations were exposed country), two experts in risk management, and research and their socio-economic characteristics; assistants. The consultants worked directly with the re- ■ The decision-making process for the authorities and settlement programs, although in different roles. The communities in determining the need for preventive governments and institutions involved authorized the resettlement; preparation of the studies. ■ The entities in charge of resettlement, the professional teams responsible for its preparation and To develop the methodology and assemble the team, a implementation, and the inter-agency coordination workshop was held in Bogotá, Colombia, in April 2008. mechanisms; At that time, each professional gave a brief presentation of the case chosen, after which there were discussions ■ Planning and implementing the resettlement; about the objectives, contents, and methodology to be ■ Proposed housing solutions, including a discussion used. In June of that year, a second workshop was held of how housing types, designs and construction in Santiago Atitlán, Guatemala, at which each profes- strategies were selected; sional presented the principal findings of the studies. The participants then identified the most important ■ Solutions for persons without legal land rights titles lessons learned. The workshops held in Colombia and (deeds to property); Guatemala allowed the entire team to gain first-hand ■ The delivery of houses and property titles to families; experience of these two cases. 22 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Since all the professionals had participated in the cases which they materialized differed due to various reasons. studied, the work consisted of reviewing existing infor- First, each resettlement program was conceived accord- mation and documents, which they supplemented with ing to each country’s strategies and premises. Second, their own first-hand experiences. Primary information the information needed had not been systematically was not compiled. compiled, so the professionals had to collect it and sometimes the data required were not available. Third, The risk management experts analyzed disaster trends, the resettlement processes were conducted within dif- globally and in Latin America, and developed the con- ferent time frames and, as some were still under way, ceptual framework and technical processes for defining their outcomes had not yet been evaluated. Finally, the resettlement as a disaster risk-reduction measure. professionals’ profiles differed, and they also performed different functions: some were managers or coordina- Another team that included the same coordinator and tors, while others were field experts or evaluators. All of two professionals familiar with resettlement analyzed these factors were reflected in the studies. the findings and established the outline for the Reset- tlement Guide for Populations at Risk of Disaster, pre- However, the evaluation of conducting the studies was pared in 2009-2010. positive. Although it became impossible to maintain the methodological rigor envisaged at the start, the expe- Although the participants agreed on the broad out- riences were documented and important lessons were lines of the content and scope of the studies, the pace at drawn for potential replication in other countries. Chapter 2 Resettlement as a Disaster Risk Reduction Measure: Case Studies 23 Photo: Willie Heinz/IDB Chapter 3: Argentina Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program By Rómulo Pérez and Ignacio Zelmeister A. Country Context and Disaster Risk Management1 The Argentine Republic is located in the southernmost 1. Population and Urbanization part of South America and covers an area of 3,761,274 km²; of which 2,791,810 km² pertain to the Americas As of July 2009, the total population was estimated at and 969,464 km² are part of Antarctica.2 The country is 40,913,584 (CIA World Fact book), an increase of nearly divided into seven regions, as shown in Map 3.1. and six million over the official figure obtained in the last has 23 provinces and the autonomous city of Buenos demographic and household census conducted by the Aires, the capital. national Institute of Statistics and Censuses (Instituto nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INDEC) in 2001. Map 3.1. Regions and Provinces Historically, urbanization has been continuous, but quickened in the past 50 years. As Figure 3.1 shows, in 2001 nearly 89 percent of the Argentine population was in cities; by 2010, the number was estimated to have in- creased to 92 percent. This makes Argentina one of the most urbanized countries in the world. In Argentina, urban centers at the national and region- al levels, and especially in the provinces, respond to a monocentric primacy system. The Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires, with almost 13 million inhabitants, is 10 times larger than the urban agglomeration3 areas of Rosario and Córdoba and contains 15 times the popula- tion of Mendoza, the city with the next largest popula- tion. In the provinces, one city (usually the provincial capital) accounts for a high percentage of the total and NORTHEAST urban population of that province, and it normally has a larger population than the next largest cities. NORTH CUYO CENTRAL LITTORAL BUENOS AIRES PATAGONIA The urbanization process in Argentina was poorly RIVERS planned. In the past 50 years, cities have doubled or tri- pled in population and have taken over land using both PROVINCE BOUNDARIES INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES formal and informal mechanisms, fostering real estate Source: Instituto Geográfico Militar (IGM) y Dirección Nacional de Protección Civil. speculation (in the first case), and exploiting the very 1 This section is based on a paper by Rómulo Pérez, which was summarized and adapted for this publication. 2 This area includes the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, which are administered by the United Kingdom and are claimed by Argentina. 3 The “agglomerates� are urban structures covering more than two political-institutional jurisdictions, whether adjacent or not. Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 25 Figure 3.1. Percentage of the Urban and Rural Population and NEA, respectively). However, in absolute terms, the 100 central region has the highest percentage of the popula- 90 tion (94.81 percent), and the largest number of Argen- 80 tina’s poor, although it has the lowest relative poverty 70 index of any region (Table 3.1). Percentage 60 50 Urban population Although the NEA region has less than 11 percent of the 40 Rural population country’s population, it contains almost 20 percent of 30 20 Argentina’s poor. The urbanization index in this region 10 is over 78 percent and the area is periodically hit by seri- 0 ous flooding. 1947 1960 1970 1980 1990 2001 2010 Year 3. Socio-natural Disasters Source: Own presentation based on INDEC censuses. The 2010 Due to the country’s topographical and hydrological data are an INDEC projection. characteristics, and the geographical distribution of the population, the principal disasters are caused by floods. poor (in the second). This pattern produced inequitable Other hazards exist, such as earthquakes, mudslides and and socially exclusive cities. Often, the illegal areas oc- drought, but they are far less frequent:4 Argentina is one of cupied land that was ill-suited for urban use and at risk of the 14 countries in the world hardest-hit by flood-related disasters, further exacerbating the problems of the poor. catastrophes, with losses equal to more than 1.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Arnold, 2004). With more than one major disaster every 10 years, the frequen- 2. Regional Disparities cy rate is considered high (The World Bank, 2000). According to the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (nece- sidades Básicas Insatisfechas, NBI), in 2001, the largest The disasters that most severely impact the country oc- population in relative terms with unmet basic needs was cur in the valleys of La Plata River basin because they in the northwest and northeast of the country (NWA last longer (two weeks to more than two months) and affect areas in which 76 percent of the country’s GDP Table 3.1. Urban and Rural Population and NBI Population NBI Share of the Urban NBI population population In relative in the in the In absolute terms Urbanization national national NBI Region Total Urban (1) Rural terms (percentage) index urban total total TOTAL 36,213,461 32,385,281 3,828,180 6,397,277 18 89 100 100 CENTER 22,624,174 21,450,169 1,174,005 3,240,385 14 95 66 51 NEA 4,525,665 3,537,379 988,286 1,219,174 27 78 11 19 NWA 4,458,470 3,504,329 954,141 1,219,995 27 79 11 19 CUYO 2,567,607 2,106,221 461,386 408,548 16 82 7 6 SOUTH 2,037,545 1,787,183 250,362 309,176 15 88 6 5 (1) Places with 2,000 or more inhabitants are considered urban; the rest is the rural population. Source: INDEC. National Demographic and Housing Census 1991 and National Demographic, Households and Housing Census, 2001. 4 Typically, floods result in fewer deaths than other phenomena, such as earthquakes. In the 1944 San Juan earthquake, about 10,000 people died, 10 times more than deaths caused by floods from 1958- 2004, according to EM-DAT data. 26 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America is generated and 70 percent of the population is located ing in huge losses. Table 3.2 shows the number of people (The World Bank, 2000: 17-21). Five of the 10 major affected as well as the economic toll, from 1982-1998. floods of the 20th century occurred since 1983, result- Table 3.2. Principal Floods in the Provinces of the La Plata River Basin and the Associated Losses (1982−1998) Year of the flood Inhabitants evacuated Total losses in US$ millions 1982-1983 177,000 1,800 1992 123,000 1,000 1998 105,000 2,400 Source: Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services, 2007 Map 3.2 shows population densities for each political 4. Disaster Risk Management division and Map 3.3 shows the flood-prone areas. The comparison of these maps illustrates that the most flood- 4.1 Institutional Organization prone areas correlate with those most densely populated. From 1958-1996, the military authorities were in charge of natural disaster prevention and emergency response. In terms of frequency, extent, duration and losses, the In 1958, the function was assigned to what was then the northeastern provinces and part of the central region are army’s Territorial Passive Anti-aircraft Defense Division those hardest-hit by floods. As mentioned earlier, those (Defensa Antiaérea Pasiva Territorial), renamed the Civil regions also contain the bulk of Argentina’s poor, which Defense Directorate (Dirección de Defensa Civil) in 1969. means that damage from floods is exacerbated by the var- In 1996, the Ministry of the Interior (Secretariat of Inter- ious forms of vulnerability associated with poverty. nal Security) assumed these responsibilities and re-named Map 3.2. Population Density by Province Map 3.3. Flood Prone Areas Source: Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Vivienda, 2001. INDEC. Source: Instituto de Tecnología Agropecuaria, INTA. Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 27 the unit again, to the National Directorate of Planning and Teconología Agropecuaria, INTA), the Argentine Min- Civil Defense. This Directorate consists of two units: One ing Geology Service (Servicio Geológico Minero Argen- is responsible for operations and assistance and the other tino, SEGEMAR), the National Institute of Statistics and for civic education. The latter trains and advises munici- Censuses (Instituto nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, palities and institutions on risk management. INDEC), as well as universities and research institutes. Civil defense is structured in the following manner. At In 2007, the government launched the national platform the national level, the President is responsible for coor- for disaster risk reduction, which is coordinated by the dinating and directing the effort, while delegating the White Helmets, to promote the implementation of the function to the Ministry of the Interior. Provincial gov- Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in the country. ernments and the City of Buenos Aires have the Civil This platform consists of a large number of ministries Defense Board (Junta de Defensa Civil) as an advisory and representatives of civil society, academia and the entity and the Directorate of Civil Defense (Dirección de private sector. Defensa Civil) as the organ of execution. At the municipal level, mayors are in charge and have a Municipal Civil Despite the existing institutional organization and the Defense Board (Junta Municipal de Defensa Civil) and a national platform for disaster risk reduction, Argentina Municipal Civil Defense Coordinator or Secretary. needs to improve its risk reduction practices because most of these institutions’ actions focus on the emer- The Civil Defense Directorate’s principal activities are gency disaster response and recovery phases. Moreover, geared to reducing risk, preparing emergency plans, co- there is considerable thematic, functional and opera- ordinating their implementation during emergencies, tional fragmentation among the national agencies and rehabilitating basic services interrupted by an emergen- units responsible for disaster management. cy, and carrying out reconstruction activities or improv- ing the conditions that existed prior to the disaster. Each Also, no federal water law or federal land use and land level of civil defense is autonomous in its own jurisdic- management laws exist. National legislation in these tional sphere. Throughout the system, the hierarchically areas consists of a number of provisions scattered over higher levels lend support to the lower levels. various codes and laws that do not constitute a coherent body of legislation for risk management and its relation As a result of the heavy flooding caused by the El Niño to planning the country’s integrated development. This phenomenon in 1998, the Federal Emergencies System issue is now being addressed by the Sub-Secretary of (Sistema Federal de Emergencias, SIFEM) was estab- Planning and Public Investment. lished in 1999. It is under the Secretariat of Internal Se- curity, establishes linkages with national agencies and 4.2 Reducing Vulnerability to Floods coordinates actions at the federal, provincial and mu- Since floods are the hazard that Argentina faces most nicipal levels. frequently and the one that creates the most damage, the country has tried to reduce its vulnerability by es- Various other national agencies provide information, tablishing hydrological early warning networks and conduct research, or lend resources or technical capac- flood risk-reduction programs. ity from different sectors. They include the Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo So- Hydrological early warning networks of the cial, MDS), the Military Geographic Institute (Instituto La Plata River Basin and definition of flood-risk Geográfico Militar, IGM), the National Space Activities areas Commission (Comisión nacional de Actividades Espa- ciales, CONAE), the National Meteorological Service After the 1982-1983 floods, a Hydrological Early Warn- (Servicio Metereológico nacional, SMN), the National ing Operations Center (Centro Operativo de Alerta Hi- Water and Environment Institute (Instituto nacional del drológico, COAH) was established. The National Water Agua y del Ambiente, INA), the National Agricultural Science and Technology Institute (renamed the Nation- and Livestock Technology Institute (Instituo nacional de al Water and Environment, INA), was tasked with oper- 28 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America ating the Center, which forecasts floods and low water levels, both of which are crucial for river navigation and port activities. Also, based on a study for regulating the Paraná, Para- guay and Uruguay River valley and flood control, the provinces that comprise La Plata River basin passed leg- islation that established the flood-risk areas and defined their potential uses (Halcrow, 1994). Flood risk-reduction programs Since the 1990s, the government conducted several pro- grams with The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank support, the largest or most notable being the following: ■ Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Program (Programa de Rehabilitación por la Emergencia de las Inundaciones, sistance in the form of assisted self-construction and PREI). mutual assistance schemes. This was a multi-sector emergency loan for reconstruct- ing infrastructure and housing for low-income popula- ■ El Niño Floods Emergency Program tions affected by water emergencies. It was executed in The aim of this program was to help finance physical seven provinces from 1993-1998. works and institutional actions to deal with the El Niño phenomenon. It was designed in two stages: The first fo- ■ Flood Protection Program (Programa de Protección cused on prevention and the second on rehabilitation, contra las Inundaciones, PPI) and were implemented from 1998-2004. The project’s This program provided continuity to PREI actions that specific activities included assistance to minimize losses were designed to protect the lives and assets of 5.5 mil- or damage through preventive measures and rehabilitat- lion people, guarantee the normal and unrestricted per- ing infrastructure and services. In addition, 455 houses formance of economic activities in the drainage area of were constructed for families affected by the floods, the Paraná, Paraguay and Uruguay Rivers, and ensure again using assisted self-construction and mutual assis- uninterrupted use of communications and transporta- tance arrangements. tion routes. It was conducted in the provinces of For- mosa, Misiones, Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe ■ Emergency program for recovering areas affected by and Buenos Aires, from 1997-2006. floods This program was developed from 1998-2008 to support The program had two components: (i) structural mea- the economic and social recovery of areas affected by sures, such as civil works, to protect against floods, and floods through activities designed to mitigate their ef- (ii) non-structural measures, such as institutional and fects and the reconstruction/rehabilitation of economic operational strengthening of provincial civil defense and social infrastructure. systems for managing each province’s recurrent floods, promulgating municipal laws on the use of property ■ Flood Prevention and Urban Drainage Program in flood-prone areas, devising environmental manage- ment plans and studies in 21 localities, and creating an (Programa de Prevención de Inundaciones y Drenaje early flood warning system, among others. Ninety-nine Urbano, PIDU) shelters were built for the population hit by floods and This program was begun in 2008 and is expected to end 5,636 houses were constructed with technical-social as- in 2011. Its chief objective is to reduce the vulnerabil- Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 29 ity to floods within the participating provinces, support their contingency plans, strengthen flood protection in Our history was very harsh. My husband used to work on economically important areas, issue regulations for car- a ship, and all of a sudden he lost his job. So, we had to go live on the island, where we spent four years, until the rying out the land management law, devise urban envi- flood came and toppled down what little we had been able ronmental management plans, and conduct educational to build. In that time I had two kids and was pregnant with awareness campaigns. The program also has a housing Milagros. Luckily, this plan gave me the opportunity of hav- component complementing the structural works for ing a home. families living in flood-risk areas. Lucía Andrea Sosa, Concepción del Uruguay, Entre Ríos B. Case Study: Resettlement of Inhabitants of Flood-prone Areas 1. The Housing Subprogram most 10 percent of the US$536.2 million invested in (Subprograma de Vivienda, these programs was allocated to housing. Although SPV) this case study focuses on the flood protection program Three of the federal government’s flood risk-reduction (PPI), it also reviews the 15-year experience of a three- programs included a housing subprogram and a fourth stage housing program for the low-income population is currently being executed. As Table 3.3 illustrates, al- exposed to recurrent floods. Table 3.3. Flood Risk-reduction Programs and Housing Subprograms Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Flood Protection El Niño floods Characteristics Program – REI Program – PPI Emergency Program Total Duration 1993 - 1998 1997 - 2006 1998 - 2004 15 years Total cost 270 224.2 42 536.2 (US$ millions) Cost of housing component 21.9 29.2 2.2 53.3 (US$ millions) Housing component 8.1 13 5.2 9.9 percentage Source of financing for Federal government: Provinces: Provinces: housing component 15 percent 10 percent 10 percent Provinces: World Bank loan: World Bank loan: 15 percent 90 percent 90 percent World Bank loan: 70 percent Number of houses: Planned: 5,000 Planned: 5,000 Planned: 300 Planned: 10,300 Built: 5,820 Built: 5,636 Built: 455 Built: 11,911 Size and cost of Average size: 38m2 Minimum size: 42m2 Minimum size: 42m2 construction materials for Cost of materials: Cost of materials: Cost of materials: houses (US$) US$3,900 US$6,200.5 US$6,200 Source: Based on PREI, PPI and El Niño program reports. 5 Until December 2001, the US$/Argentine peso exchange rate was 1:1. Subsequently, it was 1:3. 30 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 3.4 shows the provinces in which the three stag- es of the risk reduction program’s housing component were implemented and the number of houses built. Table 3.4. Number of Houses Built in each Program Provinces PREI PPI El Niño Sub-total Buenos Aires 513 577 1,090 Chaco 514 1,312 1,826 Chubut 50 50 Córdoba 150 150 Corrientes 1,120 1,016 2,136 Entre Ríos 353 353 La Rioja 50 50 Formosa 951 609 1,560 Misiones 1,450 586 2,036 Salta 105 105 Santa Fe 1,272 1,183 2,455 Tucumán 100 100 Total 5,820 5,636 455 11,911 The provinces participated through the Provincial Im- Source: Based on PREI, PPI and El Niño program reports. plementing Units (Unidades Ejecutoras Provinciales, UEP), Provincial Emergency Coordination Sub-units In all cases, the number of houses built exceeded the (Subunidad Provincial de Coordinación para la Emer- target by 15 to 50 percent due to savings in construction gencia, SUPCE), and housing institutes. materials. Those savings were used to construct 19 com- munity facilities. 3. Assisted Self-construction: The Strategy Selected 2. Participating Entities The idea was to design flexible housing prototypes tai- The various different flood risk-reduction programs lored to meet the tastes and cultural patterns of the in- with housing components were promoted, coordinated habitants, and size of households, using locally available and supervised by the Central Emergency Coordina- construction materials. tion Sub-unit (Subunidad Central de Coordinación para la Emergencia, SUCCE), under the Central Implement- Although the beneficiary families were poor, lacked fi- ing Unit of the Externally Financed Programs and Proj- nancial resources and the opportunity to obtain loans, ects Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Federal Plan- they could nevertheless contribute labor; thus, the ning, Public Investment and Services (Unidad Ejecutora housing strategy adopted was assisted self-construction. Central de la Unidad de Coordinación de Programas y However, that posed educational and training challeng- Proyectos con Financiamiento Externo del Ministerio de es, since the families had little or no experience with Planificación Federal, Inversión Pública y Servicios). construction. Through assisted self-construction schemes, an effort It was beautiful how we organized together. We learned was made to promote participation and train the ben- many things, like team work and collaboration… if someone eficiaries in construction skills; also, this course would needed something, there was always someone to help. There reduce the cost of houses, strengthen community skills, was a lot of solidarity, fellowship and, above all, harmony. and promote solidarity and the spirit of cooperation. There were no fights or discussions. We were all working for the same goal: having a house, a good house. Thus, instead of approaching housing as a charitable Lilian Benítez, Puerto Iguazú, Misiones good, the program promoted the families’ capacity to organize and participate in the construction. Families Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 31 became active subjects in transforming their living con- gotiations for the Bank loan. Finally, the Bank accepted ditions, learned a trade, shared achievements and over- the country’s position. In addition, representatives of came obstacles in order to build their residences. the provinces and local governments did not believe they could rely on the beneficiaries to provide the labor, Negotiating this strategy with both the financing agen- and they thought this would involve a huge effort with cies and the provinces was a long and difficult task, as few results. Indeed, negotiating the strategy with The there was no prior practical experience in the country World Bank and provinces delayed project implementa- with assisted self-construction on the scale proposed or tion by 10 months. with the geographical scope envisaged. 4. Flood Protection Program (PPI) …That is why I think the most important thing was to prove The following illustrates the experience with the hous- that this was a serious project, that it was going to have con- tinuity in time and that it was going to be coordinated by all ing component of the (PPI) in seven provinces—Buenos the participating entities: the province, the Housing Institute, Aires, Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Formosa, Misio- the municipality and the nation. I think that that was what nes and Santa Fe—on the banks of the Paraná, Paraguay differentiated the project from others. and Uruguay Rivers, in more than 120 locations with Ms. Graciela Pereyra, Mayor of Colonia Elisa, Chaco varying degrees of urbanization, in an area of over 2,200 kilometers. As the financing agency, The World Bank expected the housing component to be implemented within shorter 4.1 Cost and Sources of Financing time-frames in order to meet the needs of families af- of the PPI fected by the emergency. It also promoted the idea of Initially, the Flood Protection Program was to cost delivering tents or using a uniform prefabricated hous- US$420 million, but because of the economic crisis ing model for all inhabitants of the river basin. Further, in Argentina as of 2001, that amount was reduced to it wanted to avoid any possibility of patronage and cor- US$224.5 million, which was financed in large part by a ruption, which resulted in long discussions during ne- World Bank loan. Despite the reduced loan amount, the 32 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America share allocated to the housing component was reduced achieved. Each Provincial Emergency Coordination only slightly, from US$31 million to US$29.2 million. Sub-Unit (SUPCE) signed participation agreements with every municipality, provincial housing institutes, 4.2 Organization and Inter-agency and local providers of construction materials. The agree- Coordination ments were designed to establish the rights and duties of the parties involved. Table 3.5 lists the responsibilities The close coordination among the national, provincial of each entity, reflecting the sensitivity with which the and municipal levels, the active participation of the lo- design and implementation of the housing component cal providers of construction materials and the techni- were structured. cal and social assistance enabled the objectives to be Table 3.5. Agreements and Responsibilities of the Parties Involved Agreements SUPCE – Municipalities - Housing Institutes – Providers Responsibilities of the parties Agreements SUPCE – Municipalities SUPCE Responsibilities Municipality Responsibilities ■ Implement, oversee and coordinate the housing subprogram ■ Provide beneficiaries with land and titles, free of charge ■ Provide municipalities with technical advice and social support to ■ Conduct an initial census of the affected population implement the housing subprogram ■ Form a technical and social team to execute the housing ■ Provide municipalities and beneficiaries with studies, calculations component and advise the beneficiaries and guidelines needed to construct the houses (drawings, ■ Assign one builder/bricklayer for every five houses budgets, model lay-outs, and construction guidelines) ■ Lend tools to beneficiaries ■ Provide municipalities and beneficiaries with a list of building ■ Certify progress with housing construction material suppliers ■ Monitor new settlements in rehabilitated and flood-prone areas ■ Provide beneficiaries with vouchers for purchasing materials ■ Adopt security measures in the construction areas to avoid ■ Conduct a final census of beneficiaries, select them through accidents. eligibility criteria, and send the final lists to SUCCE. Agreements SUPCE – Provincial Housing Institutes SUPCE Responsibilities Provincial Housing Institute Responsibilities ■ Defray the cost of construction materials up to a maximum ■ Prepare the urban development project established for each family ■ Execute the sub-division of land and obtain legal authorization ■ Hire technical and social work staff: A minimum of one ■ Prepare the lots earmarked for housing construction professional on each field for every four localities and at least one per 100 beneficiaries. ■ Conduct the final census of beneficiaries, select them based on eligibility criteria, and send the final lists to SUCCE ■ Support the execution of the housing component. ■ Prepare the legal papers for delivering the lots to beneficiaries ■ Prepare a roster of local suppliers of construction materials. ■ Assign professionals and technical staff to help beneficiaries. ■ Provide and pay for construction materials using vouchers. ■ Monitor and oversee the delivery of materials to beneficiaries. ■ Assign vehicles to the technical and social worker teams. Agreements SUPCE – Suppliers of Construction Materials SUPCE Responsibilities Suppliers’ Responsibilities ■ Verify deliveries and quality of materials ■ Provide beneficiaries with construction materials. ■ Pay bills within 15-20 days from when the vouchers are received ■ Ensure that all materials are of the best quality ■ Approve a list of prices for building materials. ■ Deliver materials within 48 working hours of receiving the order ■ Maintain prices for the period agreed upon with SUPCE. Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 33 These agreements could have been terminated either by to comply with its obligations, (c) force majeure or (d) (a) mutual accord between the parties, (b) the province, cancellation of The World Bank financing. The organi- unilaterally, or through SUPCE, if a municipality ceased zational flow is presented in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2. Working Organizational Flow Work Methodology Self-made construction and mutual aid UCPyPFE-SUCCE (Nation) Implementation, coordination and supervision SUPCE’s (Provinces) Execution and social-technical assistance Provincial Municipalities housing Providers institutes Homes built by beneficiaries Population affected by floods and at hydric risk Construction In order to train and strengthen the teams of profession- 53 percent had dirt floors, 83 percent had no water con- als in charge of implementing the housing component, nections, and 86 percent used latrines. inter-disciplinary meetings were held in each province to evaluate practices, procedures and outcomes achieved 4.4 Eligibility Criteria for and to share experiences and learn about successes and Beneficiaries challenges. A distance learning program was also con- ducted for social workers in participating municipalities. In each locality, work teams held meetings for those af- fected by floods and explained the program’s character- istics, the housing component and the rights and duties 4.3 Profile of the Beneficiary of participants. When the number of houses to be pro- Population vided was lower than the number of eligible families, a Although each province where the program was conduct- lottery was conducted in the presence of local authori- ed had its own social and cultural characteristics, some ties and a notary public—to ensure transparency and features were similar with respect to the beneficiaries’ so- credibility—to select the beneficiaries. cio-economic profiles. Families were large, averaging five members each, and, in some provinces, as many as eight. Also, participants agreed in writing to abide by the pro- Of the houses, 55.5 percent had only one room; thus, the gram’s regulations and that they meet the eligibility cri- overcrowding index was high. All households were living teria. They stated in writing that they: below the poverty level, 85 percent of which were in ex- treme poverty. Almost 34 percent had a monthly income ■ Inhabited the land affected by floods of between US$1-US$100. None of the families had legal ■ Owned the damaged/destroyed house titles to their houses. The houses were mostly precari- ous, although they varied from one province to another ■ Owned only that house in terms of construction features, size, number of rooms ■ Showed proof that their income was too low to and access to services. Only 41.7 percent had brick walls, build or repair the house 34 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America ■ Showed proof of having lived in the house for at The houses differed from one province to another, and least three years preference was given to traditional systems which al- ■ Would contribute labor and use materials lowed for simple finishings and later expansion. At the according to instructions from the technical and start of the program, each house cost US$6,200; this social staff overseeing the works figure did not include the value of the land, the urban infrastructure supplied by the province or municipality, or the labor input of the beneficiaries. 4.5 Agreements on Location, Moving and Housing Models The housing designs were flexible, while complying with With respect to location of the new house and housing the following requirements: model, each beneficiary had to agree (in writing) that the relocation would not impair his/her livelihood or ■ Maximum cost: US$6,200 social networks, since the new lot was not far from the ■ Minimum surface area: 42 m2 original location. By signing, beneficiaries also accepted ■ Located in a safe area the housing model, degree of urban development, and the assisted self-construction system. ■ Use of traditional materials from local suppliers ■ Acceptable standards of durability and quality of 4.6 Characteristics and Costs of the life features New Houses ■ Simple construction techniques The housing models were designed by the Provincial Emergency Coordination Sub-units (SUPCE), and tai- The families had five different types of house designs to lored to the local characteristics and culture (to preserve choose from and their proposals were also incorporated diversity) while considering each locality’s physical and into the designs. For example, the houses included porches, financial resources. All this was conducted under the fences and fireplaces, all of which are typical elements of this coastal area’s culture. They are part of our cultural wealth. supervision and subject to the approval of the Central Mr. Víctor Debloc, Commune President of Romang, Santa Fe Emergency Coordination Sub-Unit (SUCCE). Figure 3.3 is a drawing of a house in one of the provinces. Figure 3.3. Drawings of a House Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 35 unable to do the actual construction (either on their own houses or those of others) helped with other tasks. Male heads of households participated in 73 percent of cases and female heads of household in 31 percent. Children and other family members participated in 15 percent of cases. In female-headed households, the participation of women increased (nearly doubled), as did that of children and other family members, while in households headed by men, male participation domi- nated. (Clemente, Bertolotto y Del Valle, 2003). The fact that nobody handles cash avoided conflicts, suspi- cions or requests for reviews by the political opposition or The houses were built with two bedrooms, a dining room, by any other institution. Everything was managed through kitchen, bathroom, laundry room and semi-covered out- vouchers which are the equivalent of materials. Beneficiaries knew what vouchers were like, what each represented. They side area. Housing costs were subsidized and the mu- were fully aware of the different construction stages. nicipalities or housing institute provided beneficiaries Mr. Ocampo, Mayor of Reconquista, Santa Fe. with the houses and deeds, free of charge, provided that the beneficiaries would inhabit the houses immediately and not sell them until five to 10 years had elapsed; the Both in Puerto Iguazú (Misiones) and in San José (Entre number of years before families actually sold their houses Ríos), women were particularly active in construction, varied from one province to another, but the minimum which had a major impact on their self-esteem. This in- remained five years. dicates that a program such as the SPV can be imple- mented in female-headed households and that the more 4.7 Land and Infrastructure they are trained, the more involved they become. Land for the new urban development was contributed by the provinces or municipalities. The infrastructure— new streets, as well as water and electricity connections and grids—were built with national, provincial, and municipal funds, at no cost to the beneficiaries. The Housing Institute was in charge of the urban devel- opment project and preparing the land for construction; beneficiaries were given the lots at no charge. 4.8 Community Organization Beneficiaries were organized in groups of 20 families (up to 100 people), which promoted and facilitated mutual assistance. They were helped by a SUPCE team composed of a social worker and architect, along with local government representatives. Each group built 20 houses based on the “assisted self-construction and mutual aid with technical and social assistance� model; they achieved a significant amount of unity, participa- tion, and training in building homes. People who were 36 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Overall, 51 percent of the beneficiaries lacked prior Figure 3.4. Administrative Circuit of the Vouchers experience with constructing houses, although this differed depending on the province. For example, in S.U.P.C.E. S.U.C.C.E. Buenos Aires and Corrientes, the percentage was lower (around 30 percent), while in Misiones and Entre Ríos, Prints and registers it exceeded 60 percent. The self-construction process gave participants with no prior experience an opportu- nity to learn a new trade, which enhanced their job and Requests Sends and registers income prospects. Receives 4.9 Delivery of Construction Materials Vouchers were used for construction supplies. Each Forwards monthly Internal audit: family was given vouchers equal to the value of the administrative and status report accounting control materials needed for each stage of the construction process, including the amount for sanitary and elec- trical installations, and building tools. Each received vouchers up to US$6,200, on a gradual basis, as the Issues and requested according to stages work progressed. The vouchers were non-transferable and used only for Monitors construction materials needed at each stage, according to strict issuance and control procedures. They were numbered and printed for pre-established values, with security features to prevent forgeries. Those managing Refers according to construction progress the program kept detailed records of the quantities, amounts, and serial numbers, and closely tracked their use: this included those delivered to beneficiaries, paid Rescue, pays and Management controls to providers, and lost or annulled. reports to SUCCE and rescue vouchers Figure 3.4 depicts the process through which the vouch- ers were issued and administered. They were key to the program’s success because they facilitated the manage- Monthly reports on the progress of the Monitors ment of resources and procedures. construction Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 37 4.10 Use Made of Reclaimed 5. Outcomes Flood-risk Land The housing component was a model for the ways that Land at risk of flooding was reclaimed for public use. institutions can respond; it involved well-coordinated Municipalities issued laws that prohibited any new per- participation at the national, provincial and municipal manent or temporary occupation of the land, or subdi- levels, as well as of the families affected by flooding. It viding it. The land was designated as a flood-risk area fostered decentralized execution, local practices, institu- and earmarked for public green space, and the local tional capacity building and community development. governments were committed to clean it, plant trees, in- stall the equipment needed, maintain and manage the 5.1 Quantitative Outcomes areas. The laws also stated that any future use would have to comply with urban environmental sustainabil- In the course of the PPI, 5,636 houses were built in sev- ity standards—so as to improve living conditions. The en provinces, as listed in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. following photographs illustrate how the land was used once the families were resettled. Figure 3.5. Houses Built by Province Buenos Aires Santa Fe 577 1,183 Misiones Chaco 586 1,312 Formosa 609 Corrientes Entre Ríos 1,016 353 Source: Based on data in the Report of the PPI. Zelmeister. 2009. The three housing components (PREI, PPI, El Niño) involved 120 municipalities of varying sizes, strength- ening their institutional capacities, constructing 11,911 houses and 19 multiple-use facilities, and training 23,822 people in construction techniques. An external evaluation by the International Institute for Environment and Development, Latin America sec- tion-IIED-LA (Clemente, Bertolotto, Del Valle, 2003), conducted two years after the houses were completed showed the degree to which the living conditions of the population were improved; this was assessed through indicators that measured families’ perceptions of the new habitat, of learning a new trade that could affect their income generation capacity, and the role of self- construction in boosting beneficiary organization. 38 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Figure 3.6. Amounts Invested in each PPI Province 8,000,000 7,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 0 Buenos Aires Chaco Corrientes Entre Ríos Formosa Misiones Santa Fe 3,273,842 7,420,473 4,947,171 1,649,589 3,284,,770 3,188,519 5,420,872 Source: Based on data in the Report of the PPI. Zelmeister. 2009. We put our best will and labor, with the guidance of all of 5.2 Qualitative Outcomes them [officials of the institutions]; without their guidance, In addition to the quantitative outcomes, the housing we wouldn’t have done anything. My husband didn’t even components had indirect impacts, both on institutions, know how to lay a brick, so they came to collaborate, we started working together and that became contagious for municipalities, and beneficiaries. the whole city. Lucía Andrea Sosa, Concepción del Uruguay, Entre Ríos ■ For municipalities and institutions Inter-disciplinary teams were formed, consisting of rep- resentatives from the national, provincial and municipal With regard to acquiring new skills, the evaluation levels, the housing institutes and the people affected by found that 92 percent of beneficiaries (without any sub- the flooding. stantial gender differences) who had no previous expe- rience with construction learned skills which helped The programs were good examples of a transparent ad- 41 percent of them significantly increase their income ministration of funds, as they adopted methods (vouch- by doing odd jobs, known as “changas� in Argentina, ers) for purchasing materials that did not involve cash mainly as bricklayers. Although these were short-term transfers to the families. jobs (less than one month’s duration in 55 percent of cases), beneficiaries felt the training enhanced their job The flood-risk program’s housing component promoted opportunities: 66 percent said they had better chances a process for improving the living conditions of urban of finding employment than before and almost 80 per- informal settlements through building the municipali- cent said the training would help them in the future. ties’ technical capacity. Also, local governments and civ- il society organizations’ that participated in the housing At the same time, 91 percent of beneficiaries noted pos- component strengthened their management skills. itive changes in the quality of family life, as they had more room and privacy (due to the separate bedrooms). Adequate houses were built at a reasonable cost. The For 80 percent, the improved quality was associated program fostered the idea of housing as an evolving with the greater security they felt owning a house with process, in which improvements can be made gradually. a legal title, and without the risk of floods and constant evacuations. Over 80 percent said that the frequency New urban developments in the urban areas were built of their children’s illnesses associated with floods and for low-income populations on land at very low or no other water-related causes was reduced. With regard to risk of flooding. the issue of recreation, 88 percent said they had more options than in their previous locations. Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 39 The self-effort and mutual assistance spirit has led to neigh- bors’ higher commitment and enthusiasm to build, to com- plete and to improve the quality of the housing. This is un- usual for the works the municipality carries out. Mr. Juan Carlos Benítez, Mayor of Colonia Delicia, Misiones ■ For beneficiaries New houses in safe locations with appropriate sanitary conditions improved the families’ health and saved them from the loss of assets due to frequent flooding. Another major achievement was the beneficiaries’ im- proved self-esteem. They actively participated in the construction effort, thereby overcoming notions that they were receiving charity. Moreover, women were in- volved throughout the process (characterized by trans- parency and equity), occasionally assuming leadership positions, on an equal basis with men. approach to building homes; also, the national govern- The way in which the community organized for self- ment contributed with physical and human resources. construction triggered a spirit of cooperation, fostered The SUPCEs made a key and timely contribution to solidarity, and improved people’s job opportunities. For various activities. low-income families, the new urban developments, with their network of services, helped integrate them into so- Most of the lessons learned have to do with involving ciety and formal city life, overcoming their former isola- the population early on in the planning and execution tion and ostracism. of the works. Key factors that made this possible were coherent administrative and institutional management, along with the commitment and hard work of the ben- Now my daughter runs around and plays everywhere. She eficiaries. couldn’t do this before. In fact, now when it rains, the chil- dren are inside running from one place to the other. We don’t have to worry whether we are going to be flooded, or be- Instead of the authorities’ adopting a charity approach, cause of the pests, or that they are coming to take us away they made a conscious effort to promote and strengthen because of the flood. Thank God, we see the water pass us community organization and enable the beneficiaries to by, so to speak, on the outside. We are at home! play a proactive role. Lilian Benítez, Puerto Iguazú, Misiones In this learning process, special emphasis was placed on decentralized practices with the active participation of 6. Lessons Learned the population, municipalities, housing institutes, pro- The implementation of the housing component was an vincial governments and suppliers of construction ma- enriching experience for all those involved, including terials. beneficiaries, municipalities, provinces, and the central government. The SUCCE carried out, supervised and Another lesson was the importance of fostering equal monitored the work, in coordination with the provin- opportunities for the low-income families hurt by flood- cial teams and municipalities. ing and avoiding any form of discrimination. For many of the municipalities, the flood risk program’s The PPI benefited from lessons learned in the PREI and housing component was an opportunity to learn a new El Niño programs. For example, the PREI had not cov- 40 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America ered the costs of bathroom materials, electrical fixtures, or construction tools, or those of technical and social assistance. However, in the PPI, these costs were includ- ed, which guaranteed optimal outcomes. With respect to problems, delays were experienced in some cases due to the difficulty of (a) obtaining land suitable for housing in urban areas, (b) lack of coordi- nation to build the utilities’ networks, and (c) lack of municipal or housing institution funds to deliver titles to the beneficiaries. Another major obstacle was that the housing compo- nents depended on foreign loans. Thus, any delay in obtaining or negotiating the loans translated into a sus- pension or delay in executing the program; sometimes, this meant the loss of institutional capacity and experi- enced human resources. With respect to the management model, the coordinat- 7. External Evaluations ed effort among different levels of government (to com- bine local, provincial and national resources), produced The housing components were assessed through three major synergies that ultimately helped authorities meet external evaluations: an ex-post review at the rehabilita- their goals and meet the beneficiaries’ needs. tion program (PREI) stage by The World Bank’s Opera- tions Evaluation Department, in 2000; a second review, The housing component strengthened the capacity of during the Flood Protection Program (PPI), by the In- the technical staff at the municipal level to conduct self- ternational Institute of Environment and Development construction programs; it also advanced their under- – Latin America (Instituto Internacional de Medio Am- standing of urban development techniques. These skills biente y Desarrollo - América Latina, IIED-LA) in 2003; were later applied to municipal community develop- and an ex-post review by an independent consultant. ment programs. These evaluations showed a positive outcome of the Such achievements show the path to build resilient program. In particular, the training component was re- communities and provide lessons that can be replicated garded as “very important.� For many beneficiaries, this elsewhere. The experiences of the housing subprograms meant that they could participate at the different stages can be applied to meet the needs of populations affected of construction and ultimately were in a better position by social, economic and housing emergencies—not just to find work. those suffering from natural disasters. The experience promotes, in an equitable way, low-income population’s Involving the beneficiaries in the process meant that, access to adequate houses and land fit for urban devel- besides the fact that they obtained houses in an area opment. As such, it helps mitigate poverty, one of the safe from floods, they would benefit from a psycho- underlying causes of social vulnerability. social boost to their self-esteem. By contributing their labor, family groups obtained their houses without feeling they were receiving charity. The involvement Here we have a demonstration that it can be done, that re- sults are attained when we join efforts. also strengthened neighborhood solidarity and inte- Mr. Orfilio Marcon, Mayor of Avellaneda, Santa Fe gration in society, offering a sense of belonging at the local level. Chapter 3 Response to Recurrent Floods: Assisted Self-Construction Housing Program | Argentina | 41 References INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos). Censos Nacionales de Población y Vivienda 1947 Arnold, Margaret. 2004. Natural Disasters: Count- a 200:. 1947, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991 y 2001. Ar- ing the Cost. The World Bank, Washington DC. gentina. Retrieved from: http://web.worldbank.org/WB- SITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:2016 Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and 9861~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSite Services. 2007. Operational Manual. Flood Pre- PK:4607,00.html. vention and Urban Drainage Program. Clemente, Adriana; Bertolotto, Mary; Del Valle, Julieta. The World Bank. 2000. Argentina. Gestión de los recur- 2003. Alcance y perspectivas del Subprograma de sos hídricos. Elementos de política para su desa- Vivienda. Una aproximación evaluativa. En: Vivi- rrollo sustentable en el siglo XXI. Buenos Aires: endas por autoconstrucción. La experiencia en el Oficina Regional de América Latina y el Caribe, programa de protección contra las Inundaciones. Unidad Departamental de Argentina y los Grupos Buenos Aires: IIED-LA. de Finanzas, Sector Privado e Infraestructura y Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo Social Sustentable. Halcrow, Ingenieros Consultores. Sir William Halcrow y Partners. 1994. Estudio de regulación del valle aluvial de los ríos Paraná, Paraguay y Uruguay para el control de las inundaciones. Buenos Aires: succe, Ministerio del Interior, Banco Mundial. 42 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Chapter 4: Brazil Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas By Ronaldo Marques and Marilia Scombatti A. Country Context Brazil covers an area of 8,514,877 km2 on the eastern Economic growth and development have generated side of South America. Its territory is divided into five highly unequal geographical and social conditions in regions: the north, northeast, south, southeast and cen- different ways in the five regions: 86 percent of munici- tral-west. It includes 26 states that are divided into 5,556 palities with the highest social exclusion indices are in municipalities and one federal district, where Brazil’s the north and northeast (see the Social Exclusion Atlas capital is located (Map 4.1). of the Campinas State University and the Catholic Uni- versity of São Paulo, 2006). Map 4.1. Regions and States Figure 4.1. Percentage of Urban and Rural Population 100 90 80 70 Percentage 60 50 Urban population 40 Rural population 30 20 10 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Year Source: Department of Economics and Social Affairs. Population Division Home-page. http//esa.un.org/wup2009/unup Source: Instituto Geográfico Militar (IGM) y Dirección Nacional de Protección Civil. The southeast, central west and south regions have the 1. Urbanization and Regional highest urbanization rates (with 92 percent, 86 percent Disparities and 82 percent of inhabitants in urban areas, respective- ly); in the north and northeast, the rates are 73.5 percent According to the latest census by Brazil’s Geography and 71.5 percent. and Statistics Institute (Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE), the population was 183,987,291 in 2007, almost double the 93 million in 1970; of these, 84 2. Socio-natural Disasters percent were urban, due to strong urbanization trends The three types of phenomena that trigger natural di- in all regions (Figure 4.1). sasters in Brazil are storms— which lead to floods and mudslides—drought, and earthquakes. These phenom- ena differ greatly from one region to another, in type, frequency and intensity. Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 43 The most significant natural disasters and risks are re- times occurs with reduced force in other regions (Table lated to floods and mudslides, which occur in all five 4.1). Of the 490 weather events that triggered disasters regions with different frequency and intensity. Drought in 2008, 49 percent occurred in the northeast region tends to hit the northeast hardest, although it some- and 30 percent in the south and southeast regions. Table 4.1. Number of Natural Disasters by Type and Region (2008) Number of disasters by region Type of natural disaster Central–West Northeast North Southeast South Total Percentage Storms, floods, mudslides 54 180 44 58 75 411 84 Drought 3 53 9 4 69 14 Earthquakes 1 3 4 1 Tornadoes 4 2 6 1 Total 57 238 53 65 77 490 100 Percentage 12 49 11 13 16 100 Source: National Secretary of Civil Defense. Disasters Records of São Paulo, press archives, 2008 2.1 Floods According to data from the 2002 National Basic Sani- tation Census, 1,340 municipalities (24 percent of all Although disasters caused by floods affect all regions, those in the country) have risk-prone areas in the cit- they are more frequent and intense in urban areas, ies. These are mostly in the south and southeast regions, where the price of land and houses forces low-income where 878 of the 1,340 cities with at-risk areas are lo- populations to settle into risk-prone areas which are es- cated. (Table 4.2). pecially threatened during heavy rains. Table 4.2. Number of Municipalities with Cities with Risk-prone Areas Regions North Northeast Southeast South Central–west Brazil Total number of municipalities 449 1,787 1,666 1,159 446 5,507 Cities with at-risk areas 66 299 543 335 97 1,340 Percentage 14.7 16.7 32.6 28.9 21.7 24.3 Source: National Basic Sanitation Census (Encuesta Nacional de Saneamiento Básico, IBGE) Other factors that raise the risk of floods are related to The adverse effects of heavy rains and floods are increas- the fragile urban drainage infrastructure, inappropriate ingly severe. According to official figures, in 2008 they disposal of solid waste, and actions that reduce the soil’s led to 130 deaths and US$33.5 million of material losses. permeability. In 2009, they caused 44 deaths, 185,000 people lost their homes, and economic losses exceeded US$1 billion. For example, although 78.6 percent of municipalities (4,327) had drainage systems in 2002, 34 percent (1,438 2.2. Drought municipalities) had operating defects (bottlenecks) conducive to flooding (National Basic Sanitation Cen- Drought occurs in a region known as the Drought Poly- sus, 2002; Table 4.3). gon, an area of 950,000 km2 in nine states in Brazil’s pov- erty-stricken northeast, where approximately 30 percent of families earn less than US$200 a month (Map 4.2). 44 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 4.3. Number of Municipalities with Inefficient Drainage Systems North Northeast Southeast South Central-west Total No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Number of municipalities 449 1,787 1,666 1,159 446 5,507 100 Number of municipalities with urban drainage 222 49 1,227 69 1,468 88 1,094 94 316 71 4,327 79 Number of municipalities with bottlenecks in the urban drainage 66 29 316 26 596 40 403 37 57 18 1,438 34 Source: IBGE. National Survey of Basin Sanitation, 2002. Map 4.2. Drought Areas in the Northeast Harsh living conditions in periods of drought force people to abandon the northeast and migrate to other regions, especially the southeast, in search of better conditions. When they arrive, they cannot afford formal housing. Thus, they look for cheaper plots far from downtown neighborhoods which, in many cases, are located on the banks of rivers that are vulnerable to flooding. 2.3. Earthquakes Seismic activity is slight compared with other countries in Latin America. In the past 50 years, Brazil experi- enced eight earthquakes, four in the southeast. In the south, no earthquakes were recorded from 1955-2008. 3. Disaster Risk Management Two ministries are responsible for preventing and con- trolling natural disasters: The Ministry of National In- tegration, through the National Civil Defense System (Sistema nacional de Defesa Civil, SINDEC) and the Ministry of the Environment, through the National Wa- ter Agency (Agencia nacional das Aguas, ANA). Source: Instituto Geográfico Militar (IGM) y Dirección Nacional de Protección Civil. The Civil Defense System—SINDEC—was created in 1988. It implements national civil defense policy, which Historically, droughts occur every 10 years, but may last aims to: up to three, four, or, in some cases, even five years, due to various factors, including: (a) the temperature in the ■ Promote permanent defense against disasters, region which, at certain times of the year, exceeds 40 de- natural or man-made; grees centigrade; (b) a harsh stream-flow regime, which ■ Prevent or minimize damage, rescue and help the results in minimal and highly infrequent rainfall; (c) the population affected, and rehabilitate and restore terrain and topography, characterized by shallow soil, areas struck by disasters; which causes rapid evaporation of surface waters; and (d) anthropogenic action that destroys natural vegeta- ■ Act when disasters are imminent and after they tion and expands the semi-arid climate. occur; Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 45 ■ Organize and coordinate SINDEC throughout The population is more diverse than in any other Brazil- Brazil. ian city. It mainly consists of descendants of Italian and Portuguese immigrants, but also has large contingents This system has an operating structure based on several of Amerindian and African descent and others from the bodies with different areas of responsibility at the na- major Arab, German, Spanish and Japanese migration tional, regional, state, municipal and sectoral levels. flows. In addition, São Paulo receives large numbers of migrants from other parts of Brazil, particularly the SINDEC’s operations are funded by the Special Fund for north and northeast regions. Although no national and Public Calamities (FUNCAP), the financial instrument regional statistics are kept on the places of origin and established to deal with emergencies. Under the Federal destination of emigrants from the Drought Polygon, Constitution, it can also draw on loans to handle public research by the Population Studies Unit (núcleo de Es- calamities. tudos Populacionais, NEPO) of the University of Campi- nas (Universidade Estadual de Campinas, UNICAMP) ANA coordinates interactions between the ministries indicates that almost 40 percent of the population in at- of National Integration and the Environment, and over- risk areas (slums or favelas) of São Paulo city are from sees the warning system when catchment basin levels the northeast region. rise. It also conducts studies and programs on urban water management and flood control. While only 1 percent of São Paulo residents (71,840) in 1970 lived in favelas, many located near rivers and Brazil also has a National Institute for Space Research streams, by 2008, the figure had soared to 13 percent (Instituto nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, INPE), which, (1,395,000). See Table 4.4. in 2008, established the Natural Disaster Surveillance and Warning System (Sistema de Monitoramento e Aler- Table 4.4. Population in Favelas in the City of São Paulo (1970-2008) ta de Desastres naturais, SISMADEN), a geo-processing tool for overseeing, recovering, storing and processing Population Total population Decade in favelas of São Paulo Percent environmental data. SISMADEN uses a large database 1970 71,840 6,560,547 1 devised by INPE’s Center for Weather Forecasts and Climate Studies (Centro de Previsão de Tempo e Estudos 1980 375,023 8,558,841 4 Climáticos, CPTEC), with information gathered from 1990 891,673 9,644,122 9 across the country. 2000 1,160,597 10,338,196 11 2008 1,395,000 10,886,518 13 The system includes hydrometeorological and other Source: Archives of the Secretaria de Habitação da Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo. data needed to analyze and establish early warnings. SISMADEN allows free use of its services and its data The favelas contain practically all those exposed to can be downloaded at no cost on the Internet. It pro- flooding, especially in the rainy season. Map 4.3 shows vides access to up-to-date climate observations and the location of the city’s at-risk areas. forecasting data and generates mathematical models for devising risk maps of the areas selected. 1. Disaster Risk Management B. The City of São Paulo 1.1 Institutional Organization The case study focuses on the second phase of the Stream Canalization Program (Programa de Canalização de Va- The Civil Defense System of São Paulo reports to the les, PROCAV) in São Paulo, the largest city in Brazil, Municipal Secretariat of Urban Security (Secretaria Mu- which covers 1,509 km2 and has 10.9 million inhabit- nicipal de Segurança Urbana), whose activities are gov- ants, or almost 10 percent of the country’s population. erned by the Ministry of National Integration (Ministé- rio da Integração nacional) within the SINDEC. 46 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Map 4.3. At-risk Areas in São Paulo sen by the community and trained by the Civil Defense offices and whose task, among others, is to inform CODDEC of any flood and mudslide hazards. 1.2 Civil Defense Prevention Plan A principal tool to prevent or reduce risk in the mu- nicipalities is the Civil Defense Prevention Plan (Plano Preventivo de Defesa Civil, PPDC) approved by each city council. It is designed to help those in settlements on slopes and next to streams deal with the risks—depend- ing on the severity of the problem and given the impossi- bility of eliminating those risks, at least in the short term. The PPDC concept is based on taking preventive ac- tions before mudslides occur. The methods include (a) keeping at-risk area data current, (b) ensuring that the criteria and technical parameters of the plans are tai- lored to each municipality’s specific circumstances and (c) training municipal technical teams. The PPDC system has a four-tier structure (observa- tion, upkeep, alert and maximum alert), each with its own procedures. 1.3 Flood Control Programs Source: Instituto Geográfico Militar (IGM) y Dirección Nacional de Protección Civil. In addition to the Civil Defense Prevention Plan, São Paulo has major flood control programs. In particular, they include: (a) increasing the depth of the Tietê river The municipal civil defense system includes all the or- bed; (b) intervening in geological risk areas; (c) urban- gans and entities of direct and indirect municipal public ization of favelas (i.e., slum upgrading); and (d) stream administration, private entities and the community, and canalization. are guided by the Coordinator General of the Munici- pal Civil Defense Coordination Office (Coordenadorias Flood control infrastructure in the Tietê River Municipais de Defesa Civil, COMDEC). Each of the 31 Basin subdivisions of the Mayor’s Office (subalcaldías) has a district-level Civil Defense Coordination Office (Coor- The Tietê River is the most important river in the state denadoria Distrital de Defesa Civil, CODDEC), whose of São Paulo, since it crosses almost the entire state and activities are controlled by COMDEC. is approximately 1,150 km long. It used to be highly polluted and full of sediment, a factor contributing to COMDEC prepares detailed plans about the actions to flooding. be taken and who will carry them out. They include Op- eration Summer Rains, Operation Winter, Operation Starting in 1995, the state and city of São Paulo con- Low Humidity, and Operation Dangerous Products. ducted joint works in this river basin to stem flooding and improve water quality. They involved broadening The system also includes community civil defense units the Tietê River bed to up to 45 meters and increasing its (NUDEC), associations formed by representatives cho- depth by 2.5 meters, constructing dams and reservoirs, Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 47 canalizing streams, and carrying out urbanization activ- in the catchment basins of the metropolitan region and ities alongside them. The program ended in 2008, fol- was carried out in two stages, from 1987-1994 and from lowing an investment of approximately US$1.35 billion. 1995-2007. It was initially estimated that the program would take from four to five years to complete, but, due Interventions in geological risk areas to its complexity, it lasted 10. The US$1.05 billion in- vestment was used to canalize 63.3 km in 21 streams, The Technical Advice Office for Works and Services of construct 60.4 km of roads alongside the canals, and the Municipal Secretariat for Coordination of the sub- build eight dams. divisions of the Mayor’s Office (subalcaldías) seeks to control mudslides on slopes and the banks of streams. The program involved resettling 7,544 families—2,585 From 2005-2008, the program carried out 202 works in from 1987-1994, and 5,137 from 1995-2007—who were 562 locations considered to be at geological risk in 20 occupying the areas where the works were carried out subalcaldías. and where there were recurrent floods. Stream canalization The resettlement solutions for those families included: The unauthorized occupation of land on the banks of ■ Resettlement in three housing complexes streams in São Paulo put the low-income population (benefiting 5,288 families—1,590 in the first stage that settled there at risk. These settlements also cause and 3,876 in the second); water pollution and sedimentation in the streams be- cause they dispose of solid waste directly into them, ■ Resettlement in safe areas of the same neighbor- which in turn, increases flooding risks. hoods (634 families) ■ Cash compensation for properties whose owners One program designed to mitigate and reverse these had obtained official permits and deeds, involving conditions was PROCAV, which began at the end of 1,622 families, 995 in the first stage and 627 in the the 1980s. It included a series of multi-faceted works second (see Table 4.5). Table 4.5. Number of Families Resettled during the Stream Canalization Program First Stage Second Stage 1987-1994 1995-2007 Total Percentage Resettlement to housing complexes 1,590 3,876 5,288 70 Financial compensation, expropriation 995 627 1622 22 Resettlement in remaining areas of same neighborhood 634 634 8 Total 2,585 5,137 7,544 100 Source: Archives SEHAB – GePROCAV – IDB C. Case Study: Stream ■ Reducing the problems triggering frequent floods Canalization Program II along the streams by canalizing them and thus increasing their hydraulic capacity; The case study focuses on the second stage of the Stream Canalization Program PROCAV, from 1995-2007. ■ Reducing the risk of mudslides caused by destabilized construction and streets located next to the streams; 1. Objectives ■ Improving sanitary and housing conditions for The objectives of the second stage of the Stream Canali- the target families by moving those at risk to zation Program included: higher quality houses; 48 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America ■ Improving transportation in the low areas and Map 4.4. PROCAV II: Location of Civil Works and stream maintenance by building streets parallel to Resettlement Sites the canalized streams; ■ Protecting green areas. Thus, PROCAV II was conceived as a program to re- verse environmental and social degradation in the low- lying areas of micro-basins in São Paulo. Under a single program, it improved both the living and sanitary con- ditions of the population in the capital’s most critical sub-basins by canalizing and draining streams and thus helping solve flood-related problems. The program’s other components, such as street con- struction and paving, helped solve traffic and access is- sues and well as problems related to housing, sanitation, reclaiming urban space, environmental education and institution-building. 2. Components The program included the following components: ■ Stream channelization and check dams in 13 Source: SEHAB-GREPROCAV–IDB Archives. streams, along with seven storm water retention ponds; 3. Institutional Organization ■ Building roads to improve traffic and access, and The design and implementation of the program were car- reclaim urban spaces; ried out by the PROCAV Management Unit (Unidade de ■ Resettling the population located in at-risk areas Gestão de PROCAV, GEPROCAV), an institution created and those required for infrastructure works; in February 1987 to ensure greater autonomy within the ■ Establishing green areas and protecting micro- city council. As the unit responsible for budgeting and basins, as well as implementing the environmental administering expenditures, GEPROCAV reported to education plan targeting the population in the the Municipal Secretariat of Urban Infrastructure and program’s service area; was linked with several divisions of the São Paulo city council (Secretariats of Infrastructure, Finance, Legal ■ Strengthening institutional capacities by devising Affairs, Housing, and Ecology and Environment). an information system in the Emergency Manage- ment Center (Centro Gerenciamento de Emergên- The resettlement process was run by the Housing Sec- cias, CGE) to prevent floods and strengthening retariat (Secretaria Municipal da Habitação, SEHAB), the Municipal Ecological and Environmental which formed two management and support teams Secretariat. composed of seven engineers and architects, 11 social workers, two sociologists, and one attorney. Map 4.4 shows the location of PROCAV II works in São Paulo. To construct the housing complexes and manage the so- cial aspects of the resettlement plan, SEHAB hired special- ized companies through competitive bidding processes. Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 49 4. Profile of the Population 5.1 Resettlement in Housing Complexes The favelas were located on public land. Most of the houses were built by the people living in them (80 per- Three new apartment complexes were built for the 3,786 cent) with various materials, especially wood. The vast families that selected that option and for other families majority lacked deeds. in São Paulo: Families had to pay a fraction of the apart- ments’ value, with a subsidized 20-year loan. Two criteria were established: ■ The location should not disrupt the socio-cultural ties forged in the communities; or, if it was required, the disruption should be minimized. Thus the complexes needed to be located at A 1994 socio-economic study conducted by the Univer- an optimal distance, which meant taking into sity of São Paulo’s Economic Research Institute Founda- account the distribution of houses at the time of tion (Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas, FIPE) resettlement. on the 3,876 families resettled in housing complexes ■ Families should not pay more than 10 percent found that nearly 41 percent were in the informal labor of their total monthly income. Currently, the market and 23 percent were under- or unemployed. Al- monthly mortgage payment for each unit is though the most common income range was between almost US$20. one and three minimum wages, 20 percent lived in what was regarded as extreme poverty with a monthly family The areas selected for resettlement in housing com- income of less than one minimum wage. It also found plexes are located in the neighborhoods of Jaraguá, São that the time needed to reach a school or health care Miguel Paulista and Guaianazes (see Map 4.4 above). center was at most 30 minutes, a factor considered dur- The housing complexes include the following: ing the design of resettlement options. 5. Resettlement Alternatives Four resettlement options were designed for the 5,137 families in the at-risk areas or areas needed for infra- structure works. They were: a. Resettlement in housing complexes (3,876 families). b. Resettlement in new houses built in the same favelas, which were improved and upgraded (634 families). c. Resettlement in houses not affected by floods The City Jaraguá. This complex was built in the dis- in the same favelas, (630 of the 3,876 families trict (barrio) of Jaraguá, in the northern part of the city. resettled in the housing complexes) It covers 400,000 m2 and contains 4,000 housing units, 1,641 of which are reserved for those resettled due to d. Cash compensation for property holders the stream canalization program (PROCAV II). The re- (627 families). maining units were distributed to other families regis- tered in the housing program of the Housing Secretariat of the São Paulo municipal council. 50 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Inácio Monteiro. This complex was built in the dis- 5.2 Resettlement in New Houses trict of Guaianazes. It covers 212,000 m2 and has to 2,000 Built in the Same Favelas housing units, 1,481 of which are part of PROCAV II. When a favela had areas that were not at risk of flood- Garagem. This complex is in the district of São Miguel ing, the “favela urbanization� program (slum upgrad- Paulista. It covers 140,000 m2 and has 2,000 housing ing) was adopted, which formed part of SEHAB housing units, 754 of which were earmarked for PROCAV II. policy designed to enhance the quality of the district’s housing, infrastructure, and sanitation, as well as regu- The housing complexes complied with São Paulo’s con- larize the inhabitants’ property rights by awarding them struction code with respect to space between build- housing deeds. This program was successfully imple- ings, green areas, institutional areas, and access routes. mented in three favelas and facilitated the resettlement Also, schools and health centers were built for the re- of 634 families in new houses built inside the same, but settled population since existing facilities were not large upgraded, favelas. enough. Commercial outlets were also built for the families that previously engaged in economic activities This resettlement option involved analyzing, selecting, in their original homes, to allow them to recover their and ranking the favelas, considering the degree and type income. of risk, viability of executing the types of works required, and families’ acceptance of the program. In some cases, Each housing complex consisted of several five-floor the lots for the new houses were municipal so their of- modules with four apartments per floor. The decision ficial use had to be changed to housing. In others, they to limit buildings to this height was taken to accom- were private property and had to be bought. Architec- modate the preferences of the low-income population, tural and urban development plans were created, both and to avoid the need for elevators which would have to construct the new houses and improve the favelas. considerably increased both construction and mainte- nance costs. The apartments had 42m2 of usable space and were built according to legal requirements, with two bedrooms, a sitting/dining room, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a small service area. Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 51 In this option, families were temporarily moved from nicipal council, which delayed the project, as described their homes during the construction of the new hous- below in the evaluation section. ing, infrastructure and sanitation. During that time, families stayed in houses rented and paid for by SEHAB. In PROCAV I, cash compensation was paid to nearly Both the families and SEHAB paid the water and elec- 1,000 families. It was known that these families gener- tricity bills; thus, families learned to incorporate such ally chose to move to other areas of São Paulo, especially utility outlays in their budgets. near rivers, where controls against land invasions were lax at that time. Because there was no official follow-up, 5.3 Resettlement in Houses not no information is available about their experiences. Affected by Floods in the Same Favelas, or “Chess Game� 6. Social Management For families that did not want to move to the housing Social management was closely coordinated with the complexes, either because the type of housing did not bodies responsible for executing the stream canaliza- match their needs or they could not afford even the sub- tion and constructing the housing complexes for the sidized payments, a solution was found known as swap- resettled population, and with entities providing social ping or the “chess game.� These families could exchange services (the Secretariats of Education, Health, Ecology the right to move to a housing complex with families in and the Environment, and Culture) and transportation the same favela but outside the affected area that wanted infrastructure (Secretariat of Transportation - Secretaria to move to the housing complexes. dos Transportes). Meetings open to all favela inhabitants were organized A Resettlement Advisory Council (Conselho Consul- to explain the “chess game.� Participants identified those tivo de Reassentamento) was established, composed of who were not in at-risk areas or affected by the infra- SEHAB technical staff, personnel of the secretariats structure works but were interested in moving into the involved in the resettlement process and community housing complexes and whose houses would be avail- representatives. The Council coordinated activities and able for other families that would have to be resettled helped monitor the process. Local leaders and represen- but wanted to remain in the favela: 630 of the 3,786 tatives also were directly involved, as were non-govern- families that moved to the housing complexes were part mental organizations (NGOs) operating in the areas. of the “chess game.� Families to be resettled in the housing complexes were 5.4 Cash Compensation for Property first registered through an updated census. This helped Owners determine the likely demand for education and health For the 627 families with deeds, PROCAV did not in- clude them in the resettlement but rather compensated them for their properties so they could move some- where else using their own funding. It was considered that the amount they received for the expropriated property was enough to cover the process to find and purchase another property. In effect, these families re- settled themselves. The cash compensation process was conducted by the Legal Sector (Expropriation Division) and the Secretar- iat of Finance (Secretaria de Finanças) of the São Paulo city council. Initially, the plan was to pay fixed sums, but that produced conflicts between families and the mu- 52 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America services and the number of families eligible for this op- Studies and project preparation were 3 percent of the tion. It also helped prepare the population for the sub- total cost of the housing complexes. Basic infrastruc- sequent phases and their new habitat. ture, including electricity, sewage systems, and potable water networks, roads, paving and public lighting, were In addition, a socio-economic study was conducted in estimated to be 10 percent of the total cost. The cost of 1994 by the Research Institute Foundation of the Eco- building schools and health centers was US$3,276,200. nomic and Administrative Sciences Faculty of the Uni- The total cost did not include the value of the land on versity of São Paulo, which focused on the: (a) num- which the housing was built, which was provided by the ber of families to be resettled; (b) composition of each municipality (See Table 4.6). family—number of individuals, age ranges, and school needs; (c) families’ capacity to pay; (d) place of employ- Table 4.6. Overall Plan for Resettlement in Housing Complexes – Budget US$ ment, time needed to get to work; (e) socio-cultural ties, length of residence in the favela, participation in com- Municipality IDB munity activities; and (f) aspirations with respect to the Studies and plans 1,384,974 resettlement options. Infrastructure 4,616,580 Homes 37,694,100 The social management team held periodic meetings Shared facilities 3,276,400 with the communities, their representatives and local Resettlement 775,000 organizations to report on the program’s progress and Urbanization of favelas 2,772,022 prepare for the move. Families were taken to visit the Management team 1,173,028 housing complexes to ensure they were familiar with their future homes and characteristics of the new neigh- Support team 2,083,309 borhoods. They were also trained in meeting their post- Evaluation 76,000 resettlement obligations. Institution building 1,000,000 Subtotal 50,575,013 4,276,400 During the meetings, consensus was reached on: (a) Total 54,851,413 moving schedules (that took into account school atten- Source: GEPROCAV and SEHAB archives dance); (b) criteria for allotting the housing units so as to reconstitute neighborhoods; (c) rights and duties as- sociated with being home owners; (d) families’ financing Each family was allotted US$200 for its move, for trans- arrangements, monthly quota amounts, terms, and con- portation, logistical support, and food. The total for ditions of access to subsidies for specific time periods; these activities was US$775,000. (e) the need for community organization and associated costs; (f) upkeep of the apartments and associated costs; According to data from the PROCAV Management (g) use and maintenance of collective community facili- Unit and the Housing Secretariat, the unit cost for each ties; (h) use and costs of public utilities (drinking water, apartment was US$9,725. wastewater, and electricity). The cost of the favelas’ urban development was US$2,772,022: 634 houses were built, with each at ap- 7. Budget and Resettlement proximately US$4,372. Costs PROCAV II cost US$627 million, US$325 million of 8. Outcomes which was covered by the São Paulo City Council. The remaining US$302 million was in the form of a loan The stream canalization program (PROCAV) achieved from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): its goal of improving the living and health conditions US$54 million was earmarked for the works and activi- of those in the low-lying areas of the most critical sub- ties of the overall resettlement plan (see Table 4.6). basins in São Paulo. Almost all the objectives estab- Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 53 lished when PROCAV II was launched were met (see 9. Lessons Learned During Table 4.7). the Relocation Process The program took twice as long as was estimated; the The resettlement in the streams canalization program main delays were as follows: (PROCAV) was evaluated three times: (a) a mid-term review in 2000; (b) an ex-post review in 2004, and (c) ■ The program extended through four municipal a participatory assessment in 2007, with the project’s governments; thus, the composition of the technical staff and members of the community, to write executing unit changed over time. Certain the project completion report, which was required by works were delayed because contracts were the IDB at the end of the program. suspended until they were reviewed by the new administrations. Although they used different methodologies, the evalu- ations concluded unanimously that the resettlement ■ The complexity of the program, especially process was appropriate. Although the complexities the intervention in the favelas, the slum with regard to the expropriation with cash compensa- upgrading works, as well as the steps needed for tion and the resettlement in housing complexes were expropriations, were all under-estimated. underestimated, the results related to the improvement ■ The lack of a specific contract to support the of health conditions, flood control, and improved hous- institution in charge of carrying out expropriation ing —along with other environmental and social ben- activities—such as topographic surveys of the efits, and public utilities and services— confirmed that buildings to be purchased, identification of real the project and resettlement process were positive. estate records for identifying owners, demolitions, and execution of works to modify a property in The following are lessons learned, based on the different the case of partial expropriations. evaluations of the resettlement process connected with ■ Conflicts with owners because all were offered a the streams canalization program (PROCAV). uniform price, regardless of the characteristics of their homes. This practice had to be changed. Table 4.7. PROCAV II Objectives General Objective Improve the quality of life and health of the inhabitants by canalizing streams in the most critical sub-basins of São Paulo Specific objectives Outcomes ■ Reduce the risk of flooding by increasing the hydraulic capacity ■ No floods or mudslides onto buildings were recorded once work through the canalization of various urban streams. on the 11 streams in the project was completed. ■ Reduce the risk of mudslides onto buildings or roads on the ■ Opening the Emergency Management Center (CGE) in the initial banks of the streams included in the project. phase of the project, which made it possible to forecast weather for the city of São Paulo and issue storm and flood alerts. Since ■ Reduce stream pollution by eliminating the discharge of solid the CGE was created, there have been no reports of deaths due wastes and untreated sewage. to floods in the municipality. ■ Improve the health and housing conditions of the families ■ Better traffic flows in the project area and improved facilities for affected by the project by moving them to better quality homes maintaining streams, once parallel roads were built. and by urban development of the favelas, where possible. ■ Considerably improved health and housing conditions of families ■ Improve transportation facilities in low-lying parts of the sub- moved to housing complexes and those benefiting from urban basins and stream maintenance by building roads parallel to the development in the favelas, which were integrated within the canalized sections. city. ■ Prevent new invasions of empty land and reduce erosion and ■ Reduced discharge of untreated sewage and garbage into urban sedimentation by establishing and protecting green areas. streams. ■ Education and training for health workers on environmental and health issues. 54 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America 9.1 Resettlement in Housing ■ Lack of coordination among the secretariats Complexes and the firms hired to operate social facilities and services (schools, health clinics) hampered the construction of the housing complexes and What went well in the process of resettling moving of families. A similar lack of coordination people in housing complexes? regarding the financing schedule occurred among The 1994 resettlement plan for the housing complexes the municipal secretariats because each had its involved various actions before the moves, coordinated own annual work and investment plans. in a multidisciplinary effort by the different bodies and ■ There was a time lapse between the census and institutions participating in the process. Through the socio-economic study conducted in 1994 and joint work of the secretariats, the plan was tailored to the moving of families. During that time, the the civil works schedule, and took account of the actions population in the area increased, making the that would have a socio-economic impact on the com- project more difficult, which, in turn, generated munity. These included: mistrust regarding the resettlement. ■ The use of monitoring instruments and mecha- ■ The various levels of family income and cost of nisms (half-yearly reports and mid-term and the new houses were incompatible. This strained ex-post reviews), according to special provisions family budgets and made it more difficult to of the IDB loan contract. Although the process resettle families in the housing complexes. encountered some problems, it identified factors that could have hampered the resettlement pro- cess. 9.2 Resettlement in the Upgraded Favelas ■ One of the main achievements was community participation in the resettlement process, due to the creation of the Resettlement Advisory What went well in the process of resettling people in the upgraded favelas? Council. According to the report submitted after a seminar or- ■ By including commercial areas and units in ganized to finalize the 2007 evaluation (São Paulo City the housing complex designs, families that had Council, GEPROCAV, IDB, PROCAV II Evaluation originally engaged in subsistence businesses were Seminar, April 2007), successful features of the favelas’ able to sustain their income. urban development process included: What did not work well in the resettlement ■ The fact that families could remain in their own process? districts was considered one of the most successful features of this option. Instead of resettling ■ The very large size of the housing complexes, which families in distant areas, a new neighborhood had many buildings concentrated in the same area was created within the improved favela and the receiving families from different regions, made it PROCAV works eliminated the risk of floods. more difficult to build a community and provide social services. The evaluations recommended ■ Community participation in the urban that future projects be smaller, with no more than development meant participants could match 150 apartments, to make it easier for occupants their expectations with the institutional, legal and to create communities. Smaller scale also would budgetary constraints. eliminate the large demand for infrastructure, ■ The rental option, instead of shelters, accommo- goods and services, such as construction of health dated families while new houses were built. Be- clinics, schools, recreation areas, streets, among cause the occupants paid part of their water and others. electricity bills when they moved to the rental Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 55 housing, they more readily accepted the financial processes, so as to achieve a serious commitment responsibilities later. between the parties and also provide mechanisms and instruments for monitoring and managing the What did not work in the process of resettling process. It might also be useful if the loans included people in the upgraded favelas? funds with which to finance the expropriations, so as not to depend solely on the availability of local ■ Cooperation between the secretariat and firms counterpart funds. hired to perform services (street lighting, public transportation and security) did not fully develop b. If it is not feasible to include the costs of expropria- in the time agreed upon; thus, families who were tions in the budget, the multi-lateral financial insti- moved to rental housing during the works phase tutions could require, from the time the contract is were not resettled on schedule. concluded, a guarantee that funds will be available to avoid interruptions in the expropriation process, ■ There was a gap between the time the urbanization which create difficulties in meeting schedules for the project was prepared and its implementation. project’s civil works. ■ No environmental education program was created c. A detailed expropriation plan should be designed, for the community to develop new options with based on a census and socio-economic study of the respect to garbage disposal. target population. The plan should include all of the activities in line with the civil works schedule. 9.3 Expropriation and Cash d. The expropriation plan needs to guarantee fair pay- Compensation ment for the properties involved, so that the amount the displaced families receive will be enough to pur- Unlike the option to resettle in housing complexes, the chase a comparable property. one that involved cash compensation or expropriation was conducted without a specific plan to guide the pro- e. It is essential to anticipate schedules of actions that cess. As a result, the expropriations and compensation can be implemented in a timely fashion and thereby payments were processed through the municipalities’ facilitate the movement of families as the construc- standard procedures. tion begins. This will help them avoid losses caused by lack of income and any activities they have to sus- A key lesson was that authorities should have attached pend. the same importance to the cash compensation option f. It is vital to include communication actions and as to the resettlement option. Experience suggests that negotiating techniques into the expropriation pro- moving low-income populations to housing complexes cess to provide answers to queries and exhaust all is less problematic than compensating residents for the options for acquiring properties by friendly, rather value of their houses, either with funds or replacement than judicial means. houses. Despite the difficulties of resettling families into g. The entities responsible for expropriations must large complexes, they always receive better homes than have adequate human and financial resources. Also, they previously had, which cannot always be guaranteed an instrument should be designed to regulate the in the compensation option. administrative procedures for expropriating real es- The final report on expropriations (of owners affected tate; it should not allow the process to begin without by projects similar to the streams canalization program) guarantees that the funds needed for the compensa- recommended the following: tions are available. This case study offers valuable lessons about different a. The international organizations’ financing the proj- resettlement options. It also shows the risks of underes- ects should pay more attention to the expropriation timating such a complex program. 56 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America References Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo, GePROCAV, Ziguia. 2004. Avaliação expost do processo de remaneja- Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), mento de população. Censo Nacional de Saneamento, 2002; Censos Demográficos 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 e contagem Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo, SEHAB-HABI. 2007. de população 2007. Cadastro de favelas, sistema. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2008. Eva- Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo, SEHAB-HABI- luación final del proyecto. GePROCAV-BID. 2007. Avaliação final do PRO- CAV. National Secretary of Civil Defense. Disasters Records of São Paulo, press archives, 2008. Scombatti, Marília. 2004. Banco Interamericano de De- sarrollo: Informes de seguimiento y supervisión Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo. 2004. Plano general del PROCAV 2000-2004. de reassentamento de População. Universidade de Campinas, Núcleo de Estudos Popula- ———. 2007. Plano preventivo de Defensa Civil (PPDC). cionais (NEPO). 2006. Estudios demográficos. ———. 2007. Urbanização de Favelas. Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo, GePROCAV, BID. 2007. Seminário de Avaliação do PROCAV II, abril. Chapter 4 Changes in the Quality of Life for People in High Risk Areas | Brazil | 57 Chapter 5: Colombia Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach By Narzha Poveda Gómez A. Country Context 1. Population Colombia, located in the northwestern corner of South Based on National Statistics Department (Departa- America, covers 1,141,748 km2 and is divided into 32 mento Nacional de Estadísticas, DANE) projections for departments that include 1,122 municipalities and a 2010, Colombia has a population of 45,324,305. Three capital district. It has six regions: the Andean, Carib- quarters (76 percent) live in urban areas and 24 per- bean, Pacific, Orinoquia, Amazon and various islands cent in rural areas; 70 percent inhabit the Andes range, (Map 5.1). which has three branches in the country, occupying al- most half of the territory. In the 20th century, migration Map 5.1. Regions and Departments from rural to urban areas has been exacerbated by social strife and armed conflict. Colombia became a predominantly urban country in less than a half century (as illustrated in Figure 5.1). According to a 2005 population census, 19.6 percent of urban inhabitants and 53.5 percent of those in rural areas has Unsatisfied Basic Need (Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas, NBI), which reflects the huge disparities between these sectors. Figure 5.1. Percentage of Rural and Urban Population 100 90 80 70 Percentage 60 50 40 30 Urban population 20 Rural population 10 0 1938 1951 1964 1973 1993 2005 Year Source: Instituto Gegráfico Agustín Codazzi, IGAC. Atlas de Colombia. Source: National Statistics Department (DANE) Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 59 Colombia’s hydrometeorological characteristics and hu- man settlement patterns facilitate flooding caused by heavy rains. Four major floods, affecting large areas, were recorded from 1972-2008. Colombia is also ex- posed to the El Niño and La Niña phenomena, as well as to other hazards such as hurricanes, storms and other events related to climatic conditions, such as forest fires. Floods are the most frequent events, but earthquakes wreak the most havoc in terms of deaths and economic losses. According National Emergency Relief and Pre- vention System (Sistema nacional de Atención y Preven- ción de Desastres, SNPAD) data, there were 9,106 events, 58 percent of which were floods (Figure 5.2) from 1998- 2008; they affected nine million people and caused con- siderable damage to houses, services and transportation infrastructure (ERN, 2004). Figure 5.2. Percentage Distribution of Natural Events in Colombia (1998-2008) Earthquakes 1.2% Droughts 0.4% Miscellaneous 4.5% Forest fires 4.1% 2. Disaster Risk Management Volcanic events 0.8% Gales-storms 13.8% Colombia is exposed to geological, geomorphological and hydrometeorological hazards. It is located in a Landslides-erosion highly complex geologic zone due to the movements of 17% three tectonic plates that generate seismic and volcanic activity. It also has 13 active volcanoes. These features Floods-avalanches 58.4% explain the occurrence of earthquakes and tsunamis, for which records are available since 1557 (Office of Source: National Directorate for Prevention and Disaster Relief (Dirección the Comptroller General of the Republic - Contraloría Nacional de Prevención y Atención de Desastres, DNPAD). Emergency re- General de la nación, 2005). These show nine major lief subtotals (percent) 1998-2008. earthquakes in the Pacific and Andean regions, two tsunamis on the southern Pacific Coast (one with a The frequency of the events varies in different geograph- magnitude of Mw 9.2), and several volcanic eruptions ic regions. From 1998-2008, most landslides (83 per- followed by avalanches, like the one caused by the cent) and almost all (99.26 percent) forest fires occurred melting of the nevado del Ruiz in 1985. Earthquakes are in the Andean region. Floods, however, predominated the principal natural hazard because nearly 86 percent of in the Caribbean and Pacific regions (43 percent). the population is located in zones where seismic hazard is medium-to-high (National Planning Department – Of all the disasters, five that occurred from 1983-1999 Departamento nacional de Planeación, DNP, 2001). were of considerable magnitude, causing direct eco- nomic losses from US$46 million - US$1.6 billion per The geo-morphological hazards are manifested as land- event, and reconstruction costs from US$15million - slides. Since 1983, a number of such events occurred, US$857 million (Table 5.1). five of them of considerable magnitude along the An- dean mountain range. 60 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 5.1 Effects of the Five Severe Natural Disasters Name of Event Effects Affected Area km2 No. No. Affected People People Affected Homes Homes Event Date Municipalities Direct* Indirect Killed Injured Persons Destroyed Damaged Earthquake 1983 12 1,033 2,550 287 7,248 150,000 2,470 13,650 * Popayán – Cauca Volcanic eruption 1985 17 422 2,697 28,000 – 4,970 232,542 5,450 5,150 Nevado del Ruiz – 32,500 Tolima Earthquake 1992 33 18,708 39,396 26 80 28,500 1,905 3,941 Atrato Medio – Chocó Earthquake 1994 15 5,000 10,000 1,091 207** 28,569 1,664*** 3,160*** Tierradentro – Cauca and Huila Earthquake 1999 28 107 1,360 3,465 8,256 580,000* 35,949 43,422 Eje Cafetero – Caldas, Quindío Sources: ERN in Colombia. Consultants. Estudio sobre desastres ocurridos en Colombia. Estimación de pérdidas y cuantificación de costos [Study of disas- ters in Colombia. Estimated losses and costs] Chapter 1: pp. 1-106 and pp. 212-217October, 2004. * The revival of coffee. Lessons learned from material and social reconstruction (El Resurgir Cafetero. Lecciones de la reconstrucción física y social): p.33. ** Presentation by Jaime Ruiz. The reconstruction experience, policy challenges and principal outcomes (La experiencia de reconstrucción retos de política y principales resultados): p.32. Office of the Attorney General of the Republic *** Network of Social Studies in the Prevention of Disasters in Latin America. Disasters and Society. January-June 1995 (4) Year 3. “Special edition, Cauca and Huila, Colombia. June 1995-June 1996: p. 20. Retrieved from: www.desenredando.org The consequence of these events, including the cost of de Hidrología, Metereología y Estudios Ambientales), (c) emergency relief and reconstruction, forced Colombia the inclusion of risk prevention and reduction in land- to re-examine its relief models and the legal and institu- use planning, and (d) establishment of financial mecha- tional framework in order to develop a disaster preven- nisms for emergency prevention and relief (the National tion system, along with emergency and rehabilitation Calamity Fund – Fondo nacional de Calamidades - and programs. housing subsidies for families in at-risk areas or those affected by disasters). 3. The National Emergency Relief SNPAD is run by a national committee, composed of and Prevention System the President of the Republic and the National Director- Given its history of disasters, authorities realized the ate of Disaster Prevention and Relief, which is part of need for an integrated system for emergency preven- the Ministry of the Interior and Justice. tion and relief. Thus, since the mid-1980s, the country has increasingly consolidated its legal and institutional The main features of this system are that it is inter-agency, framework in order to improve the disaster manage- inter-sectoral, decentralized and participatory. It consists ment framework. Among the most important advances of national, technical and operations committees and are: (a) the SNPAD and the Directorate of Risk Man- sectoral commissions. Through both regional and local agement for Disaster Prevention and Relief created in disaster prevention and relief committees (Regional 1988, (b) risk assessment studies assigned to and con- Committees of Disaster Prevention and Relief - Comités ducted by specific institutions (the Colombian Institute regionales de prevención y atención de desastres, CREPADS of Mining and Geology - Instituto Colombiano de Minas and local committees of disaster prevention and relief y Geología, INGEOMINAS; and the Institute of Hydrol- –comités locales de prevención y atención de desastres, ogy, Meteorology and Environmental Studies - Instituto CLOPADS), the system also coordinates actions at the Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 61 national, departmental and municipal levels. SNPAD has In addition, since 2005, the National Housing Fund also designed an integrated information system, which provides subsidies for low-income households in urban can identify existing risks and levels of vulnerability. areas affected by disasters or those at high-risk. In rural areas, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop- The system’s planning tools include the National Emer- ment grants such subsidies. gency Prevention and Relief Plan, sectoral plans, and business sector plans. The Government also acquires loans from multilateral agencies, such as the US$260 million loan signed with The World Bank in 2005 to finance the program to re- 4. Incorporation of Risk duce the Government’s fiscal vulnerability to natural Prevention in Development disasters. The country also receives donations from in- Planning ternational cooperation agencies. The chief advantage of including risk reduction in plan- ning processes is that it is incorporated into land use 6. Resettlement: A Risk planning, sector planning and the public investment Prevention and Reduction system. Strategy In 1997, Colombia required that land use plans (Plan One of Colombia’s risk prevention strategies is to resettle de Ordenamiento Territorial, POT) be developed at the the at-risk population in safe areas, when risk cannot municipal level and must consider the location of criti- be mitigated by other means or only by methods that cal hazards and risk areas for disaster prevention pur- are more costly than resettlement. Some of the largest poses; also, they must designate land use in order to re- preventive resettlements involved 10,000 people in the duce risk factors. municipality of San Cayetano, in Cundinamarca, 45,000 in Medellín, and 65,000 in Bogotá. The Ministry of Environment, Housing and Regional Development (Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y De- A 2005 study of resettlement experiences and practices sarrollo Territorial) and SNPAD have provided techni- by the DNP (DNP and Presidential Agency for Social cal assistance to the municipalities to enable them to Action and International Cooperation - Agencia incorporate risk considerations into land use planning. Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación However, efforts need to be improved, since only 20 per- Internacional, ACCI, 2005) showed that from 1994-2004, cent of municipalities had included disaster risk man- approximately 130,000 people (28,555 households) in agement in the POTs as of 2007. 192 municipalities were displaced by natural disasters. The study also found that in 137 municipalities (9.6 5. Financing Risk Management percent of the total municipalities), there were 158 resettlement plans for 95,340 families in at-risk areas Colombia has a financial structure that can respond to to be executed by 2011: 81 percent were in the Andean disaster prevention and relief; it consists of the National region, 13 percent in the Pacific region, and 6 percent Calamity Fund, which receives domestic funds from in other regions. Unfortunately, no consolidated data royalties1, and the National Housing Fund (Fondo na- or a national information system exists about the extent cional de Vivienda). to which the plans were implemented. Further, within each municipality, data tend to be dispersed. Disaster prevention and relief still rely on national-level resources, except for the capital district of Bogotá, which established its Emergency Prevention and Relief Fund (Fondo Financiero de Proyectos de Desarrollo, FOPAE). 1 The companies that exploit non-renewable resources should pay royalties which are an important source of financing of the Government. 62 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America B. Capital District of Bogotá 1. Population Growth and Settlement Patterns Bogotá, Colombia’s capital, is in the country’s geograph- ical center, on a highlands plateau known as the “savan- Bogotá’s population grew from 96,605 at the beginning nah� of Bogotá, at 2,630 meters above sea level. It covers of the 20th century (Montezuna, 1999) to 7 million 177,598 hectares, 17 percent of which are urban, 10 per- at its end. In 2009, according to National Statistics cent are suburban, and 73 percent rural. Department (DANE) projections based on the 2005 census, it had 7,259,597 inhabitants (or 14 percent of the Its urban area contains 20 localities divided into 114 country’s total population), 99.7 percent in the urban Zonal Planning Units (Unidades de Planeación Zonal, area. According to a 2008 DANE study, 16 percent had UPZ)1, composed of several neighborhoods. The unsatisfied basic needs. rural areas have rural planning units (Unidades de Planeamiento Rural, UPR)2, which, in turn, contain The settlement process was unplanned, without ad- “veredas� (small rural areas), which are the smallest equate control of land use; this resulted in human settle- territorial divisions (Map 5.2). ments in environmental conservation areas, in flood- prone strips of land alongside rivers, streams, near to Map 5.2. Localities of Bogotá wetlands and on mountain slopes. Land occupancy and tenure on Bogotá’s outskirts are characterized by illegal subdivisions of lots, a lack of public utilities, non-existence of deeds, poor access roads, and lack of public space and community facilities—reflected in the figures issued by the Housing Secretariat (Secretaría del Hábitat) of the Capital District. According to the technical data sheet of the land use plan for Bogotá (2000), 44 percent of the neighborhoods were created as informal settlements and 23 percent of the land developed needed to be improved. In 2009, 9,700 hectares (3.1 percent) and 1,596 neighborhoods failed to meet urban development standards and requirements, showed signs of environmental degradation, exacerbated social and physical segregation, and had population in high-risk areas. Also, there were 58,810 lots without deeds, 375,992 unfinished houses that were not habitable and needed to be structurally reinforced, and 4,545 households in high-risk areas which were in the process of being resettled (District Habitat Secretariat – Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat, 2009). Source: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. Planeación Distrital. 2007 2 Zonal planning units (UPZ) are urban areas that are smaller than localities (localidades) and bigger than a neighborhood (barrio). The UPZ serve as territorial units or sectors for urban development planning purposes at the zone level. They are a planning tool to facilitate the development of urban regulations with the degree of specificity required in Bogotá because of the big differences between sectors. In planning they are the intermediate level between districts (barrios) and localities. 3 These are the grassroots instruments for rural planning, adopted for ecological management, land occupancy and uses, and agricultural and livestock technical assistance strategies. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 63 2. Main Hazards ment to prevent disasters: Its institutional arrangements reflect an inter-sectoral approach in which both public Demographic pressure on highly sensitive land, com- and private sector entities participate, according to their bined with heavy rains, increases the risk of floods and functions and skills. The groups are coordinated by the landslides. Indeed, from 1943-2006, 56 percent of risk Mayor of Bogotá. events involved landslides, 44 percent were floods and 0.07 percent earthquakes (PNUD, 2007). Forest fires SDPAE is coordinated by the Directorate of Emergency during low water-level periods are another hazard in the Prevention and Relief (Dirección para la Prevención y hills surrounding the capital. Atención de Emergencias, DPAE), a unit that reports to the Government Secretariat (Secretaría de Gobierno) of the Bogotá Mayor’s office, which establishes policies and 3. Risk Management and the coordinates the risk prevention and disaster relief activ- Bogotá District Emergency ities of the various entities. The system, in turn, includes Prevention and Relief System (a) a district committee composed of all the entities in Bogotá has a District Emergency Prevention and Relief the system that play a significant part in risk preven- System (Sistema distrital para la prevención y atención tion and management, (b) local emergency committees de emergencias, SDPAE). Like the national equivalent responsible for emergency prevention and relief, and (c) –SNPAD–this system is designed to be a multi-sector technical commissions in key areas. SDPAE is financed and inter-agency network of public and private entities. by the Emergency Relief and Prevention Fund (Fondo Its main objective is to achieve integrated risk manage- para la Prevención y Atención de Emergencias, FOPAE), as shown in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3. Organizational Chart of the District Emergency Prevention and Relief System (SDPAE) District Emergency Prevention and Relief System (SDPAE) District Committee for Emergency, Prevention and Relief Mayor of Bogotá, Secretariats of Government, Health, Finance, Major of Bogotá Education; DPAE, EAAB, EEB, Civil Defense, Official Firefighters, Red Cross, DAPD, DAAC, DAMA, ETB, Metropolitan Police, National Army FOPAE Planning Commission Environment and Housing Commission DPAE – Bogotá Emergency Prevention Infrastructure, Transportation and Public Utilities Commission and Relief Directorate Planning Commission Operations Commission Local Emergencies Committees Local Major Local Mayor, DPAE Advisor, Local Firefighter and Police Commanders, Civil Defense, Red Cross, DAMA, Directors of Hospitals and Public Services, representative of the Association of Community Actions Boards, representative of JAL, representative of CADEL Source: www.fopae.gov.co 64 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America SDPAE includes 25 institutions in the following sec- Table 5.2 Disaster Risk Management Instruments tors: government, finance, planning and economic de- The institutional framework for risk management in Bogotá: velopment, industry and tourism, security and peaceful DPAE and SDPAE coexistence, education and health, social integration, The land-use plan (POT) and instruments derived from it (the culture, recreation and sports, environment, transporta- master plan and zonal planning units) (UPZ) tion and housing. Each performs a specific task accord- The Risk Management and Emergency Relief Information System (Sistema de Información para la Gestión de Riesgos y Atención ing to their funcions. de Emergencias, SIRE) The District Disaster Prevention and Emergency Relief Plan, which DPAE is a particularly important institution as it estab- offers integrated risk management methodology for regional and lishes risk management policy, prepares technical stud- sectoral scenarios ies, and coordinates disaster prevention, mitigation, Inter-agency networks to prevent and control illegal and relief activities. Others are the Bogotá Water and developments Sewerage Company (Empresa de Acueducto y Alcan- Risk assessment methodology; technical studies and concepts tarillado de Bogotá - EAAB), which is responsible for Resettlement of families in high-risk areas flood control, and the Low-income Population Housing Slum upgrading programs Agency (Caja de Vivienda Popular - CVP), which is in Housing improvements charge of resettling families living in high-risk areas. For District emergency response protocols emergency relief, public utility and transportation enti- Social response to emergencies due to disasters ties play a very important part, as do the police, army, Design and implementation of policies, strategies, plans and firefighters, and civil defense units. projects in coordination with district-level entities, to incorporate emergency prevention and relief into the culture of the capital 3.1 Risk Management Studies district and Instruments Since the 1990s, Bogotá, through the DPAE and na- 3.2 Information Systems tional entities such as INGEOMINAS, has conducted various studies to identify hazards and assess risks. As Given the pivotal role of information in managing disas- a result, it has maps of hazards related to floods, land- ter risks, SDPAE has developed the following systems: slides and forest fires, as well as a seismic micro-zon- ing map. Also, geo-technical and hydrometeorological ■ The Information System for Risk Management systems monitor the evolution of hazards. Data from and Emergency Relief (SIRE); these studies were used to formulate the regional and ■ The Resettlement Information System of the CVP. district-level land-use plan (plan de ordenamiento ter- This system contains information on properties ritorial, POT) and the District Emergency Prevention and houses at risk, public services, types of legal and Relief Plan. tenure, real estate appraisals, the “sole recognized value� (Valor Único de Reconocimiento, VUR),4 SDPAE has designed 12 instruments for disaster pre- socio-economic information on households and vention and emergency relief responses. These instru- on replacement houses; ments establish a logical thread from the formulation of policies to their implementation through specific ac- ■ The Illegal Urbanization Information and Moni- tions and inter-agency coordination (see Table 5.2). toring System (Sistema de Información y Moni- toreo de Urbanizaciones Ilegales), which monitors and controls new settlements in at-risk areas and of those reclaimed by resettlement programs. 4 The Sole Recognized Value is the amount assessed by the District to compensate a household located on high-risk land. It is based on two factors: the amount of the special commercial valuation plus the vulnerability factor. That value is applied to houses with a special com- mercial appraised value of less than 50 minimum legal wages. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 65 tor the occupation of land unsuitable for urbanization, to avoid increasing the number of people to be resettled, as well as rehabilitate the areas reclaimed under the resettle- ment program. This program involves moving house- holds to safe, adequate houses in another part of the city and promoting their social and economic inclusion. The policy framework and methodologies for resettling households from high-risk areas were prepared by the CVP in 2002, as part of the Bogotá Urban Services proj- ect, financed by The World Bank. That framework and methodology drew on the CVP’s experience from the 1990s, and has been updated with more recent lessons learned. 3.3 Sources of Financing Bogotá has an Emergency Prevention and Relief Fund Based on DPAE’s micro-zoning studies, as of September (FOPAE), which finances SDPAE. This Fund receives 2008, it had registered 9,154 households for the resettle- 0.5 percent of the District’s recurrent tax revenue, as ment program in the SIRE. Of those, 5,179 were already well as contributions that may be made by national and resettled and 2,357 were in the process of moving—for district-level entities and private or international orga- a coverage ratio of 82 percent. However, as hazards are nizations. Also, to reduce its fiscal vulnerability, the Dis- dynamic phenomena, new families are being registered trict has been conducting studies aimed at establishing in the SIRE: For example, from June 30-September 15, insurances policies for public and private infrastructure. 2008, 120 new families were included in the system. 3.4 Resettlement of At-risk Housing subsidies for resettling the population Population living in high-risk areas Bogotá has engaged in resettlement processes for four key Within the POT, a special housing subsidy was estab- reasons: high risks, public works, urban sprawl, and urban lished in 2003 called the “Sole Recognized Value� (Valor renewal. These processes have become more pronounced Único de Reconocimiento, VUR), as a financial instru- since 1990: From 1997-2007, 21,490 households and pro- ment for resettling low-income families from areas de- ductive units (in industry and trade) were resettled. clared as high-risk. Resettlement of people in high-risk areas The VUR is made up of: (a) the appraised value of the The Land Use Plan (Plan de Ordenamietno Territorial, land and improvements, according to a special com- POT) adopted in 2000 established the priorities to be im- mercial appraisal5 based on in rem rights of ownership plemented over 10 years in the form of specific programs. (dominio)6 or possession (posesión)7; and (b) an addi- Preventive risk management included low-cost housing tional recognized value due to financial vulnerability programs for low-income families, comprehensive slum for those families whose properties are appraised at less upgrading programs and resettlement for the population than the minimum cost of a typical home in low-cost in high-risk areas. In addition, steps were taken to moni- housing programs. 5 The special commercial appraisal is carried out to assess the value of properties owned by the households to be resettled, using methods that calculate replacement costs. 6 An in rem right of ownership (derecho de dominio real) is that possessed by the owner of property who has a deed drawn up by a notary public and entered in the real estate register. 7 Possession (posesión) is the in rem right allowing tenure for a property or its use to those intending to become owners. 66 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Initially, the amount assessed due to financial vulnerabil- ity was up to 24 legal minimum wages (Salario Mínimo Legal Vigente, SMLV) ($6,441 - 2008 dollars), but that subsidy was still not enough to purchase a replacement house; thus, families had to apply for national or district housing allowances or for private bank loans to acquire the necessary funds. In 2006, in order to facilitate the resettlement process, the VUR was increased to up to 50 SMLV (approximately US$13,000), which meant house- holds could acquire a legal, safe house without having to apply for additional allowances or loans. The requirements the District established for granting a VUR are: Since the area was declared an environmentally fragile ■ The lot on which the household lives has been zone in the 2000 POT and had human settlements, the declared at unmitigated high-risk (en alto riesgo National Planning Department, along with the DPAE, no mitigable); commissioned studies to design the civil works need- ed to rehabilitate the high-risk area in the nueva Es- ■ The household is in a socio-economic stratum8 of peranza district and prevent new settlements; this was 1 or 2; done under The World Bank-financed project to reduce ■ The household can show proof of ownership or Colombia’s vulnerability to natural disasters. Based on possession; the studies, DPAE declared the area a “high-risk zone.� ■ No household member owns other inhabitable real estate anywhere in the country; ■ The owner/owners of the at-risk property 1. Studies to Identify the authorize the use of the “sole recognized value� Risk Reduction Measures (VUR) to purchase a legal, safe replacement Several studies were conducted by a consulting firm9 house; in 2003 and 2004 to determine the types of responses ■ Beneficiaries provide the information needed to needed. They analyzed the physical (topographical, geo- obtain the VUR. morphological, hydrological, urbanization) compo- nents, biological (vegetation cover, fauna) components, and socio-economic aspects (characteristics of the pop- ulation and land tenure). The studies established the C. Case Study: The Nueva buffer zone of the creek—an area that should not be de- Esperanza Resettlement veloped (zona de ronda), and the landslide and flooding The nueva Esperanza neighborhood was in Rafael Uribe hazards. The findings were compared with the land uses Uribe, in the southeast of Bogotá, in a micro-watershed established in the POT. of the Hoya del Güaira creek near the Entre Nubes Dis- trict Ecological Park (Parque Ecológico Distrital Entre The socio-economic component described how nueva nubes, PEDEN), one of the Bogotá’s natural reserves. Esperanza had been transformed from an Andean for- 8 Socioeconomic stratum is a classification of residential areas to apply criteria for granting government subsidies and provide social assis- tance. Strata 1 and 2 correspond to low-income populations. 9 The studies were carried out by Geocing Ltda. Studies and civil works designs were produced to restore the areas and prevent settlements in the high hazard area at nueva Esperanza, Rafael Uribe-Uribe, Bogotá DC, 2004. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 67 est floor into rural land that was used for farming and To develop it, consultations were held with local au- livestock, and finally into an informal urban develop- thorities, oversight bodies, the Office of the Comptroller ment area. General - Personería y Contraloría) and communities. Regarding hazards, the studies found unstable areas DPAE declared the at-risk areas to be protected and es- producing landslides, erosion, and several houses about tablished the following actions to implement the strate- to collapse. The principal trigger was human activity re- gies mentioned above: lated to excavation for housing and road construction, inappropriate landfills, discharge of wastewater and de- ■ To prevent the construction of new houses forestation. by denying applications for building permits (through the local mayor’s office), and carrying It was found that the first emergency relief was used in out civil or landscape works; 1997, to resettle about 100 households. However, the ■ To acquire all the lots so the District had fee effort was not sustainable because some households simple (dominium plenum) for the land, and the returned to the at-risk area due to authorities’ lack of Environment Secretariat could implement the control of the area. environmental management plan to rehabilitate the land, vegetation cover and Güaira creek; When the findings were compared with the land use specified in the POT, it was concluded that the nueva ■ To resettle the entire population; Esperanza area was once part of the principal ecological ■ To incorporate the entire area into the PEDEN. structure of the Capital District and subject to land-use restrictions for the following reasons: Table 5.3 lists the different entities involved in imple- menting the strategies. ■ 54 percent of the area (28.4 ha) with 289 lots was located inside the PEDEN; ■ 17 percent (9 ha), 756 lots, was in high-risk zones; 3. Resettlement Program ■ 6 percent (3 ha), 126 lots, was encroaching on the seepage areas alongside the creek’s buffer 3.1 Resettlement Planning Studies zone (ronda hídrica) and the land reserved for To prepare the resettlement program, the following environmental management and conservation in were conducted: A census, socio-economic study, land the La Güaira creek. tenure study (to determine the ownership status), and property appraisals. The following describes their scope and findings. 2. Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Sustainable Development Census of lots, houses and population Plan Once DPAE declared the area as protected land and at The above-mentioned restrictions and the risk to which high risk, and determined the need to resettle the popu- the population was exposed led the District Planning lation, it conducted a census of 1,450 existing lots (with Department (Planeación Distrital) to design an inte- structures already built, being constructed and vacant), grated rehabilitation, reconstruction and sustainable the population and houses. The data were then linked to development plan in 2005. It included actions to be car- the SIRE database and sent to the CVP, the entity man- ried out over a 10-year period, within a comprehensive aging the resettlements. framework, starting in 2005. The plan incorporated three strategies: (a) environmental and territorial re- Also, the District Planning Secretariat took aerial pho- covery, (b) community organization and participation tographs which were used to demarcate the area of in- strengthen, and (c) resettlement of population at-risk. tervention and the population to be resettled. 68 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 5.3. Participation of Capital District Entities by Strategy, Program and Project Strategy Strategy Strategy Environmental Recovery Resettlement Social and Community Organization Control of illegal occupation Program Program Program 1 Program 2 Program 3 Program 4 Environmental Recovery Resettlement Resettlement Organization Community Welfare Productive Activities and Incorporation of the Social Assistance capacity building Improvement Strengthening Protected Area into the and community City participation Entity in charge Entity in charge Entity in charge Entity in charge Entity in charge Entity in charge Environment Secretariat Low Income Social Integration IDPAC Social Integration Economic Population Secretariat Secretariat Development Agency CVP Secretariat Four Projects One Project One Project Two Projects One Project One Project Participating Agencies Participating Participating Participating Participating Participating Agencies Agencies Agencies Agencies Agencies Environment Secretariat, DPAE, CVP, EAAB, Social Integration Social Integration Social Integration Economic DPAE, Planning CODENSA, Local Secretariat Secretariat, IDPAC Secretariat, Health Development Secretariat, Botanical Mayor’s Office Secretariat Secretariat Garden, IDRD, DIVCV, Government Secretariat, Local Mayor’s Office , Health Secretariat Source: District Habitat Secretariat (Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat). 2007. Land tenure study Table 5.4. Appraised Value of the High-risk Houses Appraised Value in From 2005-2008, the CVP carried out studies of land Colombian Pesos Value in US$ % ownership rights and existing structures and found that Up to 1,000,000 Up to 403 38 two large estates had been illegally split into 1,197 small Up to 2,000,000 Up to 807 24 lots. Thus, it was determined that 100 percent of the Up to 3,500,000 Up to 1,412 15 population possessed the land, but had no deeds. Up to 5,000,000 Up to 2,017 9 Up to 6,500,000 Up to 2,622 7 Appraisal of the lots and structures Up to 8,000,000 Up to 3,227 4 The District Environment Secretariat commissioned a Up to 11,000,000 Up to 5,047 2.4 commercial appraisal of the lots, and the two large es- Over 15,000,000 Over 6,883 0.6 tates were valued at 4,253,879,306 pesos, approximately Average exchange rate of the US$ from 2005-2008: 2.179.25 US$2,444,758 (District Environment Secretariat, 2008). Source. Database. CVP The CVP also commissioned special appraisals of hous- Socio-economic studies ing from 2005-2007. The special appraisals are legally es- The CVP made a diagnostic assessment of the popula- tablished for both preventive and post-disaster response tion in order to (a) analyze the social, economic and cul- purposes. The commercial value of the properties was tural characteristics of people to be resettled, (b) estab- not depreciated because of their at-risk condition. lish the level of their vulnerability, (c) assess the likely impacts of resettlement and (d) devise a resettlement The results reflected the different types of houses in the program. A questionnaire was designed, including place area, with values from US$403 to US$6,883); only six of birth, number of members of the household, kinship, houses were worth more (see Table 5.4) type and number of all members’ identification docu- Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 69 ments (IDs), occupation, education level, monthly in- With regard to education, 49 percent had completed come and expenditures, use of the health system, char- primary school, 23 percent secondary school, less than acteristics of the houses, public utilities connections, 1 percent had technical or higher education, 10 percent and forms of participation. were illiterate, and 17 percent did not provide information. The results showed that the nueva Esperanza popula- Most of the population worked in the informal sector tion had highly diverse origins (from four different re- either as street vendors, waste collectors, maids, or in gions of Colombia—Andean, Caribbean, Pacific and small home-based businesses. Approximately 9 per- Orinoquia). A total of 1,099 households and 4,632 peo- cent worked in factories or construction, or as security ple were identified. Most had migrated to Bogotá for job guards. A high percentage was unemployed. Jobs were opportunities, schooling and to be near to relatives. normally performed outside the neighborhood. The vast majority earned less than a minimum wage and only 3 A smaller percentage were families from Bogotá who percent earned more than 1.5 minimum legal wages10 were paying rent, and they bought lots in nueva Es- (CVP, 2008b). peranza from illegal urban developers with the idea of becoming owners and not having to pay rent. Four Regarding health services, 80 percent had access to gov- percent of households had been displaced by armed ernment-subsidized health care, 9 percent were covered conflict, some of them indigenous people from various by premium-based health insurance plans, 5 percent ethnic groups or Afro-Colombians. The diverse origins had no access at all and 6 percent did not report any created a complex web of inter-cultural relations with a information mix of (previous) small farmers, indigenous and Afro- descendants, which were reflected in different types of Just less than a half (49 percent) the households had leadership. lived in the neighborhood from 1-5 years, almost a third (31 percent) from 6-10 years, 14 percent from 11-15 There were an average of four people per household; years and 6 percent for 16 years or more, which explains women accounted for 51 percent and men 49 percent. the dynamics of the neighborhood’s settlements. Just over half (51 percent) were under 17 years of age, 47 percent were economically active adults, and 1.6 Given the poor socio-economic conditions, the houses percent were elderly. Of the women, 3,183 (69 percent) were highly vulnerable (Figure 5.4). At the same time, were single, 1,017 (22 percent) lived with partners, 232 the population was also vulnerable to being displaced (5 percent) were married, 139 (3 percent) were separat- because of low income, zero capacity to save or have ac- ed and 61 (1.3 percent) were widows. Sixteen percent of cess to bank loans, the type of land rights, and the low households were headed by women. value of houses. For these reasons, they could not afford adequate, safe houses. 10 The minimum legal wage in Colombia in 2008 was US$265 a month. 70 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Figure 5.4 Types of Houses BUILT WITH RECYCLED MATERIALS Such houses—76 percent of the total— had no lighting or PRE-FABRICATED HOUSES—2 percent of the total sanitation services. SIMPLE MASONRY HOUSES—5 percent of the total. These are typically built with trussed stonework without a structure ONE-FLOOR ARCADE MASONRY—15 percent of the total (to attach to), cyclops foundations, and a foundation beam to support possible add-ons. TWO-FLOOR ARCADE MASONRY—1 percent of the total. Built as a vertical (pillars) and horizontal (beams) structure. Confined Cyclops cement with concrete structures—the traditional building system. Source: District Habitat Secretariat – Comprehensive Resettlement Information System, 2008 Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 71 4. Impacts of Displacement The studies identified the impacts of displacement and were used as the basis for designing the resettlement program (Table 5.5). Table 5.5 Social and Cultural Impacts of Resettlement Impact Description Loss of current house The low-income populations, with no access to the formal housing market or loans, build their homes and frustrated plans to gradually, when money is available. Most want a large house with several floors (if possible), so part can be improve it used to generate income (eg. renting rooms or floors, or establishing some type of business). Loss of social networks Over time, people built social networks. Thus, the extent to which they are affected by resettlement is directly related to vulnerability, especially for those needing the most support, such as female-headed households, the elderly and disabled. Awareness of risk and the need to relocate triggers feelings of loss and anxiety regarding the potential Psycho-social problems dangers, as well as the uncertainty associated with displacement. Moves into legally owned houses entails payments—such as taxes and utility fees—not previously in the household budget. Moves also involve expenditures for paperwork and loss of income due to the time spent on acquiring the Household budgeting new house and getting re-established. Households that run businesses or rented out space in the houses suffer a temporary loss of income until they resume those activities, if the new house allowed for them. Disruptions in the host The host community could be affected by the arrival of the resettled households because of increased community pressure on the use of and demand for community facilities and social services. Also, new arrivals can be regarded as undesirable (due to their origins), which creates stigmas. 5. Institutional Organization The CVP directed the resettlement program, while other entities performed specific functions such as risk assess- ments and management, education and health care, community organization, and income-generating projects. Local authorities and emergency relief committees also participate (see Table 5.6 for a list of entities and their activities). Table 5.6 Institutional Responsibilities in the Resettlement Process Activities Entity in Charge Supporting Entities Identifying hazards and risks; preparing technical concepts Identifying lots and population Directorate of Emergency Prevention and Relief - DPAE Identifying total affected area – monitoring risks Prioritizing households for resettlement Designing evacuation routes and training programs; District Social Integration Secretariat temporarily relocating populations (first month) DPAE District Health Secretariat Local Mayor’s Office Rehabilitating reclaimed land District Environment Secretariat DPAE Purchasing land and properties Conducting appraisals and awarding VURs Low-Income Population Housing Agency - CVP Assisting population to be resettled during all the process Providing psycho-social assistance District Social Integration Secretariat Improving sanitation and health conditions District Health Secretariat Continues 72 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Table 5.6 Continuation Activities Entity in Charge Supporting Entities Linking to educational services District Education Secretariat Arranging for household-based productive projects District Economic Development Secretariat Consolidating social networks District Environment Secretariat, District Social Integration Secretariat, Supporting cultural, ecological and productive participation District Institute of Participation and Community Action, Economic initiatives Development Secretariat Source: Secretaría Distrital del Habitat, 2007. To coordinate the actions of the different institutions 7. Stages in the Resettlement involved in nueva Esperanza, a technical-social round- Process table was formed, meeting monthly. It was chaired by the CVP and DPAE, and attended by all the entities per- A comprehensive three-stage methodology was devel- forming tasks, along with leaders elected by the com- oped to support the resettlement process. This included: munity and oversight bodies. ■ Community engagement and awareness-raising Accountability mechanisms were devised to ensure that ■ Support with preparations for move progress with the resettlement and other programs in ■ Monitoring and follow-up (after the resettlement) the rehabilitation was properly reported. 6. Eligibility Criteria and 7.1 Community Engagement and Principles Governing the Awareness-raising Resettlement Process The first stage, starting in December 2004, involved get- ting to know the households and community in order Based on the regulations for resettling high-risk house- to determine their socio-economic characteristics and holds, the CPV applied the following eligibility criteria: raise their awareness about the risks to which they were exposed. This was done by visiting households, con- ■ The lot and house were identified by DPAE as ducting semi-structured interviews, sensitizing house- being high-risk; holds to the high risks, supervising their moves, han- ■ The household was living in the high risk area; dling their temporary relocation (where necessary), and ■ The household did not possess any other habitable monitoring the signing of shared responsibility pacts property inside or outside the city; between households and the CVP. ■ The household had not been resettled in any other project in the city; ■ The household was “in possession� of the property, according to the land tenure study. Based on these criteria, 1,074 of the 1,099 households surveyed were included in the resettlement program; the rest were ineligible because 10 families had other habitable houses, six were renters, and nine refused to participate (CVP, 2010b). This last group was referred to a government agency to find a solution. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 73 An office was established in 2004 that the community The environmental lookouts (trained and selected from could access easily, where DPAE and CVP could answer the community), the CVP and Environment Secretariat questions and respond to concerns. This strategy is be- patrolled the areas once a week in order to prevent new lieved to have been crucial for managing the project and occupation of lots. The agencies also created a network meeting expectations, and greatly facilitated the com- within the community to discourage such attempts and munication needed for the resettlement. alert authorities when they were unsuccessful. DPAE was permanently involved in identifying critical Temporary relocation areas and assisting households at greatest risk, which ensured no lives were lost. In resettlement programs where imminent risks exist, authorities must create contingency plans that can be It was considered critical to educate the nueva Esperan- launched when conditions reach certain levels. Thus, za residents about the causes of landslides, the risks to DPAE conducted ongoing geo-technical assessments which they were exposed, and the need for resettlement. of the area and structural inspections of houses from This was accomplished through visits to each house- 2005-2009, and ordered evacuations and temporary re- hold, community workshops, field trips to identify haz- location of households when necessary. ards, community and family emergency plans, and the installation of evacuation route signs. Information on Under the contingency plan, 662 households were tem- risk levels and bans on new settlements were posted on porarily moved to rental housing while more permanent 169 billboards. solutions were sought. To that end, the plan included a real estate roster of houses for rent; it also provided mar- Other important activities involved holding workshops ket vouchers for families that moved to family members’ where households could learn about the resettlement homes, so they could contribute food. process, their rights and duties, and obtain counseling and support services from the various entities. Incorporation in institutional social programs After the awareness-raising activities, the CVP and each In addition to the resettlement program, households household signed shared responsibility agreements were also included (at this stage) in the District’s social which served as a record of the sessions and established programs: The District Social Integration Secretariat the households’ rights and obligations. (Secretaría Distrital de Integración Social) held meetings to brief households on the different programs available and registration requirements. The programs included Prevention of new settlements in Nueva (a) assistance for children through the World for Chil- Esperanza dren (Mundo para la niñez) project, (b) allowances for The District Habitat Secretariat, together with the po- elder adults, (c) community canteens and (d) lists of dis- lice and local mayor’s office, agreed on procedures in the trict and local services. event that individuals tried to develop new settlements. 74 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America 7.2 Support for Moving to Existing houses the New House This involved finding and valuing pre-existing houses in price ranges that matched the amounts the families This stage involved preparing and training households would receive. Since households liked this option, the to find a replacement housing option, transfer the land CVP and its team of architects, engineers and lawyers rights of their original house to the city, and move to a analyzed the real estate market and evaluated the houses new house. from a legal and technical standpoint so as to create a portfolio of available houses from which households Resettlement options could choose. Families also showed houses to the CVP Based on the supply of houses and the population’s team, so it could assess them and pre-approve a move. expectations, the following resettlement options were identified: The CVP assessed the technical, legal and social fea- sibility of both the housing projects identified and the ■ Acquiring a new house on the real estate market pre-existing houses selected by the families. For that, it carried out the following studies: ■ Acquiring a pre-existing house on the real estate market ■ Of deeds, to ensure there were no legal issues or ■ Constructing houses claims (mortgages, seizures, inheritances, etc.); ■ Moving to the households’ place of origin. ■ Of the structural quality of houses, to ensure they were safe and habitable. The building permits were reviewed and the District Planning Secretariat was consulted regarding hazard and risk factors. Additionally, in situ inspections were made; ■ Of urban development, to verify compliance with rules and, in particular, compatibility with the land-use management plan and regulations issued by the Zonal Planning Unit (UPZ), as well as the availability of public utilities; ■ Of available social services (education and health), recreational infrastructure and transportation; ■ Of land use regulations, to ensure that households engaged in businesses could continue to operate them in the houses and neighborhoods where they would be resettled. House construction Given the shortage of new and pre-existing houses in the range that the beneficiaries could afford, the CVP promoted the development of two housing projects: El Caracol (402 houses measuring 38.56m2) and Arbori- zadora Alta (98 houses of 42m2). These houses can be A new house on the real estate market enlarged under a building permit valid for two years. This option involved identifying low-cost housing proj- These urban development areas have community facili- ects developed by the private sector or low-cost housing ties (kindergartens, community meeting rooms, parks, associations and conducting a technical and legal valu- sports grounds), access to schools and health centers, ation. and public transportation. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 75 The housing projects were contracted out after a com- they had to be priced at levels the beneficiaries could af- petitive bidding process under an agreement signed ford according to the amount received by the appraisal with the Development Projects Financial Fund (Fondo of the current house and the housing subsidy VUR. Financiero de Proyectos de Desarrollo, FONADE). The urban development and the houses were designed by To help households choose replacement houses, the the CVP. This entity also supervised the construction CVP organized “housing fairs� at its headquarters and in contracts. The process took about two years. Metrovivienda11 about the new and pre-existing homes. Private sector construction companies were invited to Moving back to place of origin attend and present their projects alongside CVP’s port- This form of resettlement was for families that wanted folio of pre-existing houses on the market. Families to return to their places of origin. Households received could see the house locations and main features (type support and advice on purchasing a house or farm and of construction, area, distribution, value), access roads, were ensured access to social services. public transportation routes, and urban facilities (e.g., schools, parks) in the area. They also selected several houses to visit, with CVP officers. Acquisition of at-risk properties and moving households Further, the CVP conducted tours to the urban develop- From 2005 to 2010, the CVP acquired the land, rights ments, so families could see the type of construction, of possession, and at-risk houses. Also, it identified size, layout, possibilities for expansion, probable dates and approved offers of replacement houses and ad- of delivery, cost and bargaining terms. vised families on how best to select their new houses. It awarded Sole Recognized Value (VUR) housing subsi- Once beneficiaries selected houses, they signed a com- dies and provided beneficiaries with guidance, support mitment to continue the purchasing process. As of Feb- and training throughout the process. Using the assessed ruary 2010, the CVP reported that 1,059 households value of improvements and the replacement house sub- had selected their housing options: Of these, 1,042 were sidy, households were able to choose among the differ- resettled (97 percent of the target). Table 5.7 shows the ent housing options established in the previous stage. options selected. This effort involved integrated management of social, legal, technical and administrative dimensions. Table 5.7 Housing Options Selected Pre- Choice of a replacement house New existing Location House House Total Families were informed about the CVP’s criteria for pur- Other localities in the 584 189 773 chasing replacement houses, which had to be legal and Capital District unencumbered, technically stable, and habitable. Also, Municipalities in 273 – 273 Cundinamarca in the vicinity of Bogotá Other municipalities 3 10 13 in Colombia Total 860 199 1,059 Source. CVP. 2010. As the Table shows, 73 percent of households were re- settled within the Capital District and 26 percent in mu- nicipalities close to Bogotá (Map 5.3). Only 13 house- holds chose to return to their places of origin (Map 5.4), 11 Metrovivienda is the entity in charge of promoting low-cost housing projects. 76 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America in municipalities in the Andean, Caribbean, Orinoquia Map 5.4. Geographical Location of Houses Chosen in Bogotá’s Localities and Pacific regions. A large majority (81 percent) opted for a new house. Map 5.3. Geographical Location of Houses Chosen in other Departments Source. CVP Data Bases 2008. When beneficiaries bought new and pre-existing houses from private construction companies, the CVP trans- Source. CVP Data Bases 2008. ferred the money directly to the sellers after receiving authorization from the household. This course reduced Moving to replacement house the risk that funds might have been mis-used or that The team of professionals prepared the families well beneficiaries would be defrauded. in advance, helping them organize the moves and cov- er the costs. Once legal documents were completed, Legal titles to the new houses households moved to their new houses, where they were met by CVP professionals. The beneficiaries then All households received deeds to their new houses and signed documents which certified they received their thus became legal property owners. The deeds state the houses, and the condition and utilities of the houses houses are family property and not just that of the male at the time. The new owners also received an Owners’ head of household, which protects the rights of women Manual containing the housing unit’s technical specifi- and children and safeguards the property in the event cations, a copy of the building permit, the unit’s design a household head becomes insolvent or goes bankrupt. plans, a description of the types of maintenance needed, The designation also means the head of household may and rules governing the use of private and public areas. not sell the house, and only a family law judge may lift that restriction. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 77 Preparing for the resettlement Restoring social services During the process, the CVP performed various ac- The CVP coordinated with the Education Secretariat tivities to help households resettle. These included (Secretaría de Educación) about the enrollment of re- preparing family life plans—in which the beneficiaries settled children in their new neighborhood schools. described their current living conditions, actions and Disabled children were enrolled in special schools. commitments for resettlement, enrollment of children Further, the population was cross-checked against the in schools, and preparations for buying their replace- identification/classification System for Potential Ben- ment houses. Further, since most replacement houses eficiaries of Social Programs (Sistema de Identificación could be expanded or improved, the CVP provided y Clasificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios para Progra- training on different types of construction, along with mas Sociales, SISBEN) when the resettlement activities information on procedures to obtain building permits. were prepared, and children under four, along with the disabled and elderly, were included in the District’s so- Using the services of the local hospital and under the cial programs. umbrella of the basic sanitation and urban agriculture project, the Health Secretariat offered day courses on environmental sanitation, food security, household hy- 8. Rehabilitation and giene, safe water, urban agriculture and family vegetable Restoration of High-risk Lots gardens and orchards. The goals of the rehabilitation plan were to restore envi- ronmentally friendly conditions on the at-risk land and Environmental education generate effective controls over new attempts to occupy lots. The plan involved incorporating the lots into the In coordination with DPAE, the District Environment Entre Nubes District Ecological Park (PEDEN), one of Secretariat (Secretaría Distrital de Ambiente) carried out the city’s ecological structures. a pilot project for vulnerable segments of the population in nueva Esperanza to instruct them to serve as environ- Once the resettled families turned over their original mental lookouts in the high-risk zone and surrounding properties and signed documents to this effect, the CVP areas. A total of 135 people, from both the population to referred the records to DPAE, which handled the demar- be resettled and other neighbors, were selected, trained cation and rehabilitation, and to the local mayor’s office, in risk prevention and mitigation, and environmental to ensure that controls would be in place to prevent new restoration, and certified. They included female heads settlements. According to the CVP’s report on the status of households, people displaced by armed conflict, the of 1,197 properties, 1,170 were demolished and the land unemployed, and parents of families with numerous restored, as of March 2010. The environmental lookouts children, who were paid for attending the courses and participated in the work. for the activities they performed, and still work in the area. Also, workshops and activities were also held on The process involved fencing off the areas, demolishing other environmental topics and reforestation days were houses, collecting debris (1,014 tons of solid waste were held for children. collected during this time), preparing the soil for plant- ing trees and shrubs (12,643 trees and 952 plants), re- Peaceful co-existence storing the surface soil on slopes, and recovering 5,583 The CVP organized one-day “peaceful co-existence� meters of rainwater and sewage. courses, which established rules of behavior for relating to neighbors and the community, and for managing public and private areas. The guidelines for harmonious 9. Post-resettlement Stage living are regarded as essential for preparing families for The post-resettlement stage, managed by the CVP, was resettlement and evolve into useful tools for helping house- aimed at monitoring and following up the resettled holds integrate with the city and new neighborhood. population, ensuring that good quality of life conditions 78 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America were maintained. The teams of professionals coordinat- ■ Providing 100 percent of the population access to ed with other entities to provide education and training health care; programs and encourage beneficiaries to use utilities ef- ■ Providing care for 100 percent of the disabled; ficiently, pay the bills punctually, progressively develop their houses, improve their management skills, and as- ■ Providing care for 100 percent of the elderly; sume responsibility for looking after their houses and ■ Supporting income-generation projects. public spaces. They also ensured the resettled families were effectively connected with the basic social services network (health care, education, welfare and income- 10. Cost generating projects). The total investment in the resettlement program and the activities related to restoring the reclaimed land The CVP established a post-resettlement assistance period from 2004-2009 was US$17 million. According to the to be conducted for 12 months, with the following goals: CVP, the average cost of a house, including the so- cial, technical and legal assistance per household, was ■ Boosting self-management capacity for integra- US$15,121. No estimate was made of education and so- tion into urban life; cial integration costs (see Table 5.8). ■ Enrolling 100 percent of the school-age population in the educational system; Table 5.8. Total Cost of Resettlement* Investment Cost (US Dollars) Program Institution in Millions Source Resettling households CVP 15.0 Resetlement Directorate, Sub Directorate of Finance and Planning Advisory Office CVP Improving habitats District Health Secretary 0.17 Sanitation Directorate Hospital Rafael Uribe Uribe Hospital Rafael Uribe Uribe Identifying at-risk households FOPAE 0.23 Ecosistems Directorate District Environment Secretariat Recovering degraded land District Department of 0.59 FOPAE environmentally Environment Ecosistems Directorate District Environment Secretariat Recovering degraded land Local Development Fund 0.21 Ecosistems Directorate environmentally Rafael Uribe Uribe District Environment Secretariat Improving resettled households’ CVP 0.84 Ecosistems Directorate productive activities Secretariat of Economic District Environment Secretariat Development IPES Total cost 17.04 *Cut off date: December 31,2009 Source: CVP, 2010 11. Main Challenges of the head of household to provide some information, the lack of legal tools to solve some problems, and prob- The implementation of a resettlement program is not lems with host populations. Table 5.9 also shows how free from problems and obstacles. Table 5.9 summarizes the inter-institutional and inter-sectoral actions, as well the main issues, such as the intervention of third par- as the CVP management, were key to overcoming the ties interested in obtaining personal benefits, the fear problems. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 79 Table 5.9. Main Challenges and Solutions Challenges Solutions Some community leaders opposed DPAE decisions on preventive Awareness-raising with each household and a standing invitation evacuation and the resettlement process. to leaders and delegates of the three sectors to round- table talks, as well as community meetings. 156 new land occupations in the area, after the 2004 census, Inter-sectoral monitoring by the District Habitat Secretariat’s Sub- which were not eligible for resettlement. Some were the result of Directorate of Inspection and Surveillance, District Environment lot sales “including the right to resettlement.� Secretariat, DPAE and CVP; proceedings brought by the local mayor’s office. Installing a zonal security committee, headed by the local mayor and police chief. Involving the Government Secretariat to persuade families to leave. Establishing a grassroots housing association. Legal difficulties in dealing with the new land occupations. Inter-agency and local authorities address the problem. Difficulty locating households that left by their own means after The CVP posted notices in various offices calling for those families the DPAE ordered the evacuation. to report and a few appeared. Reluctance of the population to provide information about origins The CVP and households jointly analyzed each household’s and income, which made it harder to (a) assess their socio- income-expenditure structure, by constructing life plans in economic conditions, (b) do the financial analysis for the house which family members assumed responsibility for commitments purchase and (c) cover the costs of notarizing the deeds to the connected to the resettlement and sustainability. new houses. Insufficient supply of housing in the required price range. The CVP promoted construction of two housing projects, with 500 housing units and urban facilities. Households’ insistence that properties be built on 72 m2 lots The CVP and households jointly analyzed the advantages of (although 76 percent had houses built of recycled material with an houses in urban districts with the kind of development, social and average area of 40 m2). community facilities they offer. Some community leaders pressured households to request Households signed certificates for the housing option they housing alternatives other than those arranged by the CVP, which selected. delayed the selection process. Pressure from leaders who carried out new land occupations to be Involvement of the local mayor’s office, District Habitat Secretariat, included in the resettlement. Government Secretariat, and data from prior studies, the census, and aerial photographs. Authorities offered to evacuate these households and pay one month’s rent; together, the actions were effective in most cases, as were the Government Secretariat’s efforts to persuade families to withdraw voluntarily and establish a grassroots housing association. Delays in delivering the new houses by the builders, after heavy The CVP supervised construction. rain postponed construction; The host population resented the resettled population, believing Meetings in the host communities to inform them of the District’s they were among those demobilized from illegal armed groups; risk management actions and its project to resettle the at-risk population; The CVP assured host communities that the households were resettled people, not part of the demobilization process; Resettled population was blamed for difficulties in achieving Manuals on harmonious civic relations were developed, peaceful coexistence and security in the areas where they moved. agreements reached, and conflict resolution bodies were created. 80 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America 12. Lessons Learned ■ Control of at-risk areas to reduce the number population exposed to natural hazards; Because the resettlement program was still being con- ducted and the nueva Esperanza Rehabilitation, Recon- ■ Innovative sources of financing of disaster risk- struction and Sustainable Development Plan will not be reduction plans; completed until 2015, there have not yet been any evalu- ■ Government subsidies for supporting low-in- ations to compare the different resettlement options or come populations to offer access to adequate, safe the restoration of socio-economic conditions. However, houses; the case provides important lessons related to: ■ Community participation in the resettlement process; ■ Incorporation of preventive resettlement pro- grams in comprehensive disaster risk- reduction ■ Promotion of risk-reduction culture in all the plans, and land-use plans; processes; ■ Participation and coordination of government ■ Recovery of at-risk areas and their incorporation institutions to respond properly to the multiple in the ecological structure of the Capital District. resettlement dimensions; It is expected that these lessons will help other cities and ■ Advantages of having an institution that only di- countries. rects the resettlement of at-risk populations; Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 81 References ERN Colombia. Estudio sobre desastres ocurridos en Co- lombia. Estimación de pérdidas y cuantificación de CVP (Caja de la Vivienda Popular). 2008. 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Bogotá. Abril. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 83 Chapter 6: Guatemala The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century By Eduardo Aguirre Cantero A. Country Context and Disaster for 68 percent of the total and includes four cultures Risk Management (Maya, Garifuna, Xinca and Mestizo) and 25 ethnic groups, with 25 different languages. The remaining pop- The Republic of Guatemala is located in the northern ulation is mestizo (ladina). part of the Central American Isthmus and covers an area of 108,889 km². The country is divided into eight Figure 6.1. Percentage of Rural and Urban Population regions and 22 departments (Map 6.1). 100 90 Map 6.1. Political Division of the Republic of Guatemala 80 70 Percentage 60 50 40 30 Urban population 20 Rural population 10 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year Source: National Statistics Department (DANE) Over half the population (51 percent) is poor and 11.7 percent live in extreme poverty. 2006). The indigenous population accounts for a disproportionate share of those percentages: 74 percent live below the poverty line, 24 percent in extreme poverty (Hall and Patrinos, 2006). The country experienced three decades of armed strife, culminating in the signing of Peace Accords between guerrilla groups and the government on December 26, 1996. The quest for a political solution to the country’s historical conflicts has generated new opportunities for 1. Population, Cultural Diversity dialogue and understanding. Today there is a compre- and Exclusion hensive agenda geared to overcoming the root causes of According to projections by the National Institute of conflict and paving the way for a new path to develop- Statistics (Instituto nacional de Estadística, INE), Gua- ment. temala’s population is approximately 13 million, with 47 percent living in urban areas and 53 percent in rural In practice, the combination of high poverty rates, areas (Figure 6.1). The indigenous population accounts cultural diversity, and the agenda for development Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 85 worst threat, followed by tropical storms and hurri- canes, although volcanic eruptions may also cause se- vere damage. However, the most frequent and specific phenomena are floods and landslides (Inter–American Development Bank, IDB; National University of Co- lombia - Universidad nacional de Colombia, 2004) that cause continuous impacts at local level. Although these events are not widely perceived as major disasters, they have significant cumulative impacts. As the study of natural disasters and at-risk zones re- vealed (UNEPAR, SIDA, UNICEF, 2001), the risk posed by these hazards is exacerbated by the high levels of pov- erty, human settlements in at-risk zones, deforestation, lack of appropriate infrastructure, lack of land manage- ment norms and construction codes, and institutional constraints. stemming from the Peace Accords poses a series of major challenges for risk management and disaster 3. Socio-natural Disasters response, especially when they involve inter-cultural Research by the Implementing Management Unit of the dialogue and negotiations. Rural Water Supply Programme (Unidad Ejecutora del Programa de Acueductos Rurales, UNEPAR), Swedish In- ternational Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 2. Hazards, Vulnerability and UNICEF (2001) on disasters from 1530-1999, re- and Risks vealed 21,447 events, 68 percent of which were of hy- Guatemala’s geographical location in the Central Amer- drometeorological origin and 32 percent geo-dynamic. ican Isthmus, between two oceans, places it in an inter- A World Bank study on risk management for priority tropical convergence zone prone to hydro-meteorolog- countries (2009), shows that from 1902-2005, Guate- ical extremes, such as hurricanes, heavy rainfall and mala experienced 62 natural disasters that affected ap- storms that in turn cause floods and landslides (Rafael proximately six million people. The same study ranked Landívar University, 2005). That situation is exacerbat- Guatemala fifth among countries with the highest eco- ed by exposure to the El Niño phenomenon, which has nomic risk exposure to multiple hazards, given that 83 a major impact on the pattern of rainfall and droughts. percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) is generated in at-risk areas. Guatemala is also located over three tectonic plates whose interaction and shifts produce frequent earth- A 2005 study of hazards and social vulnerability (Rafael quakes. Also, the volcanic belt stretching across the Landívar University, 2005) found 1,733 settlements with country from west to east contains 37 volcanoes, 11 of approximately 210,000 inhabitants who are exposed to which are classified as active; three have erupted in the floods. It also estimated that 7 percent of the national past 10 years (Rafael Landívar University, 2005; Otto H. territory has a more than 50 percent likelihood of expe- Bohnenberger, 1969). riencing freezing temperatures affecting 16,500 people, while 5 percent, with a population of 485,000, face a Thus, the principal hazards are geological (earthquakes, very high or extreme risk of drought. volcanic eruptions, land collapses, sinkholes, seaquakes and landslides) and hydrometeorological (hurricanes, The same 2005 study found 641 settlements near the floods, drought and hailstorms). Earthquakes pose the Great Faults, with 84,000 people, who could be affected 86 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America in the event of an earthquake (due to movements of the were the 1976 earthquake, which killed 23,000 people tectonic plates). In the 20th century, there have been 12 and caused damage estimated at 17.9 percent of the earthquakes, an average of one every eight years (IDB – GDP; Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which killed 268 and Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2004). caused a 4.7 percent decline in GDP; and Tropical Storm Stan in 2005, which affected 27 percent of the popula- Of the various disasters the country has experienced, tion. Table 6.1 summarizes the impact of those events. those with the severest social and economic impacts Table 6.1. Record of High-impact Natural Disasters until 2008 Recent disasters Date Number of Number of Economic Losses People Killed People Affected (US$ Million) Earthquake February 1976 23,000 375,000 1 200 Hurricane Mitch November 1998 268 743,000 876 Tropical Storm Stan October 2005 669 3,500,000 983 Source: - Earthquake in 1976: US Agency for International Development (USAID), 1978. “Disaster relief case report: Guatemala – earthquake February 1976�, Washington. - Hurricane Mitch: IDB. 2002. Central America after Hurricane Mitch. The Challenge of Turning a Disaster into an Opportunity. In: www.iadb.org - Tropical Storm Stan: USAID. 2006. Response to the Stan Disaster. 4. Risk Management helped strengthen the country’s legal and institutional framework in those areas. Although much remains to The Guatemalan authorities’ concern with regard to vul- be done, the basis for a sound and strategic approach to nerability and procedures for mitigating the impact of risk management has been laid. disasters increased in the wake of the three mentioned above. However, the response models differed in each case due to historical and other special circumstances. 4.1 Hazard and Vulnerability Studies A critical factor for disaster risk management was the In the 1970s, management typically consisted of deci- inadequate understanding of the natural and social dy- sions taken in a vertical chain of command involving the namics that generate hazards. To overcome that short- military, with no participation by the population (with coming, since the end of the 1990s (post Hurricane respect to the 1976 earthquake). Toward the end of the Mitch), several studies were conducted. The most nota- 20th Century, the response to Hurricane Mitch focused ble were a 2001 review carried out with United Nations on reconstructing physical infrastructure, but still with- support on disasters and at-risk zones, and a 2005 study in a vertical decision-making process. The private sector on social and environmental vulnerability, by the Insti- participated but the community did not. Finally, in the first decade of the 21st Century, the current model of tute of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment reconstruction with transformation was developed. This of the Environmental and Agricultural Sciences Faculty model not only allowed society to participate in deci- of the Rafael Landívar University, which lists the major sion making with a cultural and gender perspective, but steps needed to reduce vulnerability. also emphasized reconstruction of the social fabric, re- spect for human rights, the incorporation of risk man- In 2004, with Inter-American Development Bank sup- agement into sustainable development, and application port, Guatemala began applying the risk management of the subsidiary-with-solidarity principle. indicators system, which made it possible to gauge the country’s vulnerability and risk and, on that basis, iden- The historical transformations in Guatemalan society tify effective risk-management measures that consid- and the cumulative effect of the disasters fostered a lon- ered macro-economic, social, institutional and techni- ger-term vision of risk prevention and management and cal factors. Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 87 In its prevention activities, CONRED promotes research designed to improve the understanding of risks. Also, it coordinates risk-reduction programs and provides training in that field. It is also responsible for declaring high-risk zones. When an emergency arises, CONRED (a) activates the Emergency Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia, COE), (b) activates the inter-agency liaison system; (c) advises the President of the Republic regarding the declaration of disaster ar- eas; (d) coordinates and supervises the response to the emergency; and (e) keeps the public informed of the sit- uation. During the reconstruction phase, it coordinates the programs and distribution of international coopera- tion aid. When designing its programs, CONRED relies on tech- nical information produced by Guatemala’s National In- stitute of Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology & Hy- drology (Instituto nacional de Sismología, Vulcanología, In 2005, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Meteorología e Hidrología de Guatemala, INSIVUMEH), Food published its “Thematic Atlas of Watersheds in the Republic of Guatemala,� while the National Cli- which was strengthened after the 1976 earthquake. mate Change Program of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources produced studies on climate Another major advance was the 2001 Law on Social change, with the support of the Netherlands Climate Development and Human Settlement, which contained Assistance Program (Programa de asistencia climática two disaster risk-management mandates: One for iden- de los Países Bajos, NCAP) and technical assistance tifying risk reduction strategies and the other for foster- from the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and ing disaster preparedness in the population. the United States. In March 2009, Guatemala established a National Dialogue Table on disaster risk-reduction to strength- 4.2 Legal and Institutional Framework en sectoral efforts on this topic. Under the political leadership of the Vice President of the Republic and In 1996, a legislative decree established the National the technical coordination of CONRED’s Execu- Coordination for Disaster Reduction (Coordinadora tive Secretariat, the National Dialogue Table aims to nacional para la Reducción de Desastres, CONRED), achieve multi-sectoral coordination for the Hyogo which formed part of the Coordination for Natural Framework for Action 2005-2015 and other pub- Disaster Prevention in Central America (Centro de lic policies, such as the regional program for pre- Coordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres na- vention, mitigation and response 2009-2011. It has turales en América Central, CEPREDENAC), founded been recognized as the National Platform for risk in 1993. reduction along with the Coordination Center for National Disaster in Central America (Centro de CONRED includes the National Council for Disaster Coordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres natu- Reduction, which is made up of public sector, autono- mous and private sector entities; a board and an execu- rales en América Cental – CEPREDENAC). tive secretariat; and regional, departmental, municipal and local coordination offices (Figure 6.2). 88 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Figure 6.2. National Coordination for Disaster Reduction (CONRED) National Council Secretary and Undersecretary Internal Office of Communication, Advisors Audit Investigation and Statistics (OCIE) Coordination, Strategic Coordination Sectoral and Regional Geographical Information Planning and Projects Cooperation Cooperation Systems Department AWPs National Cooperation Sectoral Department Department Department Investigation Department Project International Cooperation Regional Dissemination & Department Department Department Audio-Visuals Section Information Delegate, Region I* Management Section Operations Risks Education Financial Administrative Management Management Management Management Management Delegate, Region II* Public Relations Delegate, Region III* and Protocol Section Risk Non-Formal Accounts Human Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | Analysis Training Department Resources Delegate, Region IV* Preparation Department Department Department & Plans Budget Delegate, Region V* Department Monitoring Section Formal I.T. Systems & Natural Training Delegate, Region VI* Department Phenomena Department Transmissions Department Department Delegate, Region VII* Admin. Resources Delegate, Region VIII* Hazards Department Vulnerability Procurement Section Section (*) The 22 departmental delegates report to the regional delegates 89 4.3 Disaster Risk Management B. Case Study: Panabaj and Model Tz’anchaj – Reconstruction with Transformation The overall CONRED’s strategy for disaster risk reduction focuses on operations and the programs, 1. Impacts of Tropical Storm Stan such as the National Response Plan, the Inter-Agency As a result of the national disaster wrought by Tropi- Liaison System, the Emergency Operations Center cal Storm Stan on October 5, 2005, the Government de- (COE), the Information Management System in the clared a state of public emergency. The total economic Event of Disasters (Sistema de manejo de la información impact was estimated at US$983 million (3.4 percent of en caso de desastre, SISMICEDE), the National 2004 GDP) of which US$400 million involved damage Operations Manual and the Integrated Emergency and US$583 million outright losses. Most (59 percent) Management System (Sistema Integrado de Manejo de of the losses were sustained by low-income segments EMERGEnCIA, SIME). of the population and small-scale producers, with little ability to recover what they lost. The strategy also incorporates risk management in Strategic Land use Planning (Planificación Estratégica The storm left 17,000 houses either totally destroyed or Territorial, PET) prepared by the Secretariat for declared unfit for human habitation. In terms of damage Planning of the Office of the President (Secretaría to houses, it was the worst natural disaster the country de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia, had experienced, exacerbating the shortage of 1.2 mil- SEGEPLAN), and strengthens local coordination lion homes. in high-risk areas through CEPREDENAC and the CONRED Executive Secretariat (Secretaría Ejecutiva de la CONRED, SECONRED). 2. Key Challenges The adoption of this comprehensive strategy was a radi- The storm’s impact posed an enormous national chal- cal shift from a model that focused on response and lenge with regard to the reconstruction of economic and reconstruction to one where prevention plays a key social infrastructure (roads, bridges, service stations, role. The new model also supersedes the civil defense etc.) and the creation of 80 new urban centers. approach by establishing responsibilities in all govern- mental entities, according to their particular functions, In addition, a degree of inter-agency coordination was to attack the root causes of risk and act across sectors. required that was unprecedented. Also, it was neces- sary to restore trust in the State and institutions, ex- The integration of risk prevention in Guatemala’s strate- pand community participation, and take the social and gic land-use planning and investment programs as part cultural characteristics of the population into account. of public administration strategy achieves two major Timely, appropriate, effective and transparent engage- objectives: First, it generates an institutional commit- ment was also needed to undo the damage of previous ment to develop risk-reduction strategies and second, it experiences of disillusionment and the lack of credible channels major public investment funds toward efforts institutions. to overcome the historical and structural causes of risk. However, the implementation of this strategy is often 3. Reconstruction with limited by financial constraints and, despite efforts to Transformation change it, the emergency response approach still pre- To meet the challenges, the President called for “national dominates. This is why, when events and catastrophes reconstruction� in November 2005 and presented the arise, it is necessary to declare a state of emergency and broad outlines of the Reconstruction with Transformation Congress has to approve transfers and generate funds model, which adopted a more inclusive stance and prom- by cutting the budgets of the various ministries and sec- ised comprehensive measures within a framework of de- retariats. velopment and sustainability. The main features were: 90 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America ■ Participation by the population in setting priori- Commission was established to execute the reconstruc- ties; tion plans. ■ Applying the subsidiary-with-solidarity principle; The crisis forced the government to adopt and encour- ■ Strengthening democratic governance and legiti- age a more dynamic pace than was usually followed. It macy; set up an inter-agency team managed by the National ■ Strengthening civic values through joint work Coordinator for Reconstruction and composed of vari- and agreements; ous types of professionals—architects, engineers, an- thropologists, economists, journalists, archeologists, ■ Involving the private sector through the procure- sociologists, urban development specialists and envi- ment mechanism; ronmentalists—committed to forming 80 new settle- ■ Incorporating a cultural and gender perspective; ments in 15 departments to resettle approximately 7,400 ■ Adopting a new integrated and sustainable rural families (50,000 people) who were either victims of the development strategy. disaster or at imminent risk. When this reconstruction model was adopted, it offered Strengthening the social fabric played a decisive part in the opportunity to (a) rehabilitate the social fabric, (b) confidence-building, as it fostered citizen participation; rebuild and strengthen the country’s infrastructure in a this improved transparency and matched grassroots way that could avoid reproducing previous risks, (c) en- “demand� with reconstruction “supply.� Specifically, the dow households with better productive infrastructure, Plan did the following: and (d) construct the institutional underpinnings for risk management aimed at supporting sustainable hu- ■ Mobilized internal and external solidarity; man development. ■ Promoted measures that fostered the population’s participation in social and productive rehabilita- These goals led to the national Reconstruction with tion efforts; Transformation Plan, which has three major compo- ■ Boosted communication mechanisms, the quest nents and three connected themes: (Box 6.1) for points of consensus, and coordination on the Box 6.1. National Reconstruction Plan work to be done between society and the govern- ment; Components ■ Physical infrastructure and the management of watersheds ■ Included a social and cultural perspective in deci- ■ Reactivation of productive activities and family income sion making; ■ Rehabilitation and strengthening of the social fabric ■ Linked the program’s actions with Millennium Cross-cutting Themes Development Goals, the Peace Accords, and na- ■ Risk management and integrated management of watersheds tional development priorities. ■ Transparency and accountability Resettlement of the affected and at-risk populations of ■ Decentralization the Panabaj and Tzanchaj districts in the municipality of Santiago Atitlán illustrates how challenges were faced The Office of the National Coordinator for Reconstruc- and how the Reconstruction with Transformation model tion of the Office of the President (Coordinadora nacio- was applied. This case was selected because of the special nal de Reconstrucción de la Presidencia de la República) factors associated with the building of trust, strengthen- was responsible for creating and implementing the Plan. ing the social fabric, retrieving traditions and culture, A National Manager for Reconstruction was appointed, adopting an environmental approach and creating the as were departmental managers. The population of the potential to develop productive activities—all geared to 15 departments affected by Tropical Storm Stan also achieving sustainable development. participated. In each, a Departmental Reconstruction Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 91 This integrated and culturally sensitive approach made Cakchikel, Kiché and Tz’utujil groups and two-thirds it possible to coordinate the reconstruction/resettlement (66 percent) are rural. In 1998, the illiteracy rate was 62 plan with the integrated development plan for Santiago percent and the poverty rate, as measured by unsatisfied Atitlán. Also, the government viewed it as a model for basic needs and income and consumption levels, was 76 similar cases and a set of lessons learned in post-disaster percent. With an extreme poverty rate of 33 percent, the management and reconstruction that could serve as a region is one of the country’s poorest, far below the na- pilot for resettlement as a disaster prevention tool. tional average. Santiago Atitlán, located south of Lake Atitlán, is one of 3.1 Location, History and 19 municipalities in Sololá. It covers an area of 136 km2 Socio-cultural Characteristics and contains six urban districts (cantones), two rural districts, and two villages, the most important districts Department of Sololá: Municipality of Santiago being Panabaj, Tz’anchaj, and the (urban) municipal Atitlán capital. It has 44,920 inhabitants, 94 percent of whom belong to the Tz’utujil Mayan ethnic group, while 6 per- This department is in the southwest of the country, with cent are mestizo (Municiplaity of Santiago Atitlán, Of- the capital 140 km from Guatemala City (Map 6.2) ficial website). Map 6.2. Department of Sololá, Municiaplity of Santiago Atitlán Panabaj and Tz’anchaj Districts Panabaj and Tz’anchaj are rural districts, approximate- ly 13 km2 and 11 km2, respectively. According to the 2002 INE census, Panabaj had 2,797 inhabitants and Tz’anchaj had 1,263. The majority of the population belongs to the Tzútujil ethnic group, one of the Mayan descendants. In both districts, the main economic ac- tivities are agriculture and craftwork; poverty rates are high. Almost all (95 percent) the inhabitants of Panabaj and 90 percent of those of Tz’anchaj speak the Tz´utujil language; 60 percent of women and 30 percent of men have little knowledge of Spanish (CONRED, 2006). The capital of this ethnic group, when the Spanish ar- rived in 1524, was on the west side of the entrance to Santiago bay, on a rocky promontory (FUNCEDE, 1994 in CONRED, 2006), at a place now known as Chuitina- mit, Chuicinivit or Chuk Muk, this last name meaning “terraces or steps between stones,� a reference to the contours of the land and a feature important for the re- settlement process as will be described later. The name of the Panabaj district derives from the words Pan’, which is translated as between and Abaj, which means stone, which together are construed to mean According to National Institute of Statistics (INE) esti- “place between (or among) stones.� Another name for mates, Sololá’s population was about 307,791 in 2000. the community is Prw´a´ch´ba´k, words that are inter- It is one of the departments with the highest share of preted as “full of mud� or “headland of mud.� Accord- indigenous people: 94 percent are members of the ing to the literature, this is a reference to the mudslides 92 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America that have occurred in that place from ancestral times. Previous disasters in the region (CONRED, 2006) The 2006 CONRED study also mentions that the Pan- abaj and Tz’anchaj districts have experienced disasters The name Panabaj indicates the ancestral inhabitants throughout time. Historical references, hydrometeoro- were well aware of the risks it presented. logical analyses, studies of stratigraphic profiles and in- terviews with the elderly in the districts and municipal- The name of the Tz’anchaj district derives from the ity of Santiago Atitlán confirm at least three disasters of words T´zan´, which is translated as the tip (or end) and a similar nature in the past 100 years, all associated with chaj, or pine tree. Together, these words are construed heavy rainy seasons accompanied by storms and hurri- to mean “at the end of the village there are many pine canes and always in October or the first half of Novem- trees,� suggesting that the name of the district derives ber. The first, though not well identified disaster, was from the forest of pine trees and other trees that once between 1910 and 1920, the second was in 1949, and abounded in that area. (CONRED, 2006) the worst of the three was in the mid-twentieth century, which caused an avalanche and a series of landslides. The 2006 CONRED study stresses the importance to the indigenous people of their spiritual guides (aj´kij), In addition to natural disasters, the region experienced whom they highly respect and credit with knowing the an extended period armed conflict in which clashes of- cosmogony and spiritual heritage of the Tz´utujil peo- ten affected the civilian population more severely than ple. They are also considered intermediaries between the combatants. Indeed, the population was harassed nature and the spiritual and human worlds. both by the military and armed insurgents. Among the most important spiritual features are the Following the murder of 13 people in Santiago Atitlán in institution of the Rilajmam (the Old Grandfather), the December 1990 by soldiers assigned to the military out- guild system, and the powers ascribed to ceremonial post in the Panabaj district, the population petitioned places, such as Lake Atitlán, volcanoes and the hills sur- the Government to immediately withdraw the troops, rounding the municipality. which it did. The local population still remembers the event and their rejection of the security forces. As a re- The extended family is patrilineal or male-dominated, sult, that distrust of the military and the Government is especially with regard to domestic economic decisions. rekindled even in humanitarian crises, such as natural Another distinguishing feature is that grandparents, disasters. adult children and grandchildren usually live together in the same house, which creates greater integration among family members and guarantees continuity in cultural patterns. Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 93 4. Consequences of Tropical Storm Stan in Panabaj Box 6.2 Disasters in the Mayan Worldview and Tz’anchaj To understand the Panabaj case and the way reconstruction was organized, it is necessary to understand Mayan beliefs Tropical Storm Stan created significant damage in this about natural phenomena and their view of the creation region. Although the National Institute of Seismol- and evolution of the universe. ogy, Volcanology, Meteorology & Hydrology (INSI- In that cosmogony, natural disasters occur because of the VUMEH) warned Santiago Atitlán’s municipal authori- loss of moral, ethical, and cosmic-spiritual values. In Ma- yan culture, everything in the environment is related to na- ties and firefighters about adverse climate conditions, ture, and principles such as harmony and equilibrium are the local or municipal plan for preventive actions did embedded in four fundamental elements: the creator and not function appropriately. shaper, the cosmos, nature, and the human being. The Mayan cosmovision relates humans with the natural In the early hours of October 5, 2005, in the space of just elements in a close inter-dependency, creating the unity eight minutes, a million cubic meters of rushing water, needed for spiritual and material life with respect to events stones and trees fell from the Tolimán volcano and par- that occur individually or collectively, with the passage of tially destroyed the district. Statistics for Panabaj and time. Thus, a “natural disaster� is the result of disequilib- Tz’anchaj reported 287 families that lost family mem- rium in relation to the elements in that cosmogony, i.e. a lack of harmony among living beings. The Mayans per- bers, houses, possessions and crops: 600 were killed, ceived that what happened with Tropical Storm Stan was a leaving 31 orphans and 77 widows, and 205 houses were failure to respect Mother Nature, because humans placed destroyed. The families were moved to shelters on land themselves above those relations and, faced with the de- donated by the Catholic Church for reconstruction of struction of the environment, created their destiny. their houses. Natural phenomena do not occur because of divine will. Rather, they are the result of an imbalance caused by hu- man beings themselves. Therefore, before founding a city or settlement, nature has to be asked for permission and forgiveness in a special ceremony. If nature acquiesces, it will send clear signals to that effect in the form of fire. Source: CONRED, 2006 For eight days, roads were blocked by landslides, the rain continued, and it was impossible to send aid by air. The first rescue team to reach the area was a military patrol that had to walk three days to get there. Unfortunately, and although its survival was at stake, the population wanted the soldiers to withdraw and rejected their help, because of the violent events of 1990. The military with- 5. Spontaneous Reaction of drew without being able to deliver any assistance. Communities to the Disaster In the first days after Tropical Storm Stan, people fo- cused on basic rescue and survival activities. Indig- 6. Reaction of Institutions and enous organizations and families began relief work in Temporary Resettlement of Santiago’s hardest-hit communities. Boatmen voluntari- Families ly moved people from high-risk communities to safer The first social assessments were produced by the mu- places. Female volunteers prepared the first supplies and nicipal councils, public sector and non-governmental food for the communities that suffered the most, such organizations (NGOs). There was also a clear sense of as in Panabaj. Many youths and men formed groups to the need to organize the information available, prepare clear roads and paths. a departmental diagnostic assessment, and implement 94 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America a reconstruction plan related to the land planning pro- was not suitable for resettlement because of the level of gram approved by the Community Development Coun- risk. Those worries prompted CONRED to commission cil (Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo, COCODE) of the study “Assessment of the Risk of Landslides and De- Sololá at the beginning of 2005. tritus Flow in Santiago Atitlán, Sololá,� which was con- ducted by Cordillera S.A. consultants in 2006. The study Five days after the event, humanitarian aid arrived and, found that the reconstruction in Panabaj was on haz- in an open town hall meeting, the National Fund for ardous land and thus established the criteria that would Peace (Fondo nacional para la Paz, FONAPAZ) was govern the location of resettlement sites, as well as the designated as the body responsible for coordinating na- type of disaster mitigation measures to be implemented. tional and international assistance. Out of respect for the traditions and customs of Santia- The Executive Secretariat of the Office of the President go, a community assembly was held for the 230 families (Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Presidencia) began building placed in shelters in the at-risk zone. At that meeting, 280 shelters on land donated by the Catholic Church the government, the Reconstruction Commission, mu- and social welfare programs were started, mainly to care nicipal authorities and traditional leaders determined for pregnant women, children under five and school- that the housing construction could not continue and children, and to promote productive projects. The Ex- that new lots should be found in a safe place approved ecutive Secretariat also supported the Program for the by CONRED. They estimated that the process would Prevention and Eradication of Domestic Violence (Pro- take from 12-18 months. grama de Prevención y Erradicación de la Violencia In- trafamiliar, PROPEVI), to help families with domestic violence issues associated with the tragedy and life in 8. Reorienting and Planning the shelters. the Resettlement Process Based on the lesson learned from the inappropriate choice for a resettlement site, and in keeping with the 7. An Initial, Inadequately Central Government’s Reconstruction Management Planned Resettlement Office policies, the resettlement effort was redirected to Attempt ensure it would be coordinated with the strategic land To achieve a rapid response, housing construction be- planning program and have the inter-agency coopera- gan on the land donated by the Catholic Church. How- tion and transparency needed to restore credibility and ever, after the construction started, both the authorities achieve community participation, all within the Recon- and local inhabitants became concerned that the land struction with Transformation Framework. Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 95 To that end, the Santiago Atitlán Reconstruction Commission was advised of the need to negotiate a reconstruction/resettlement model, respecting and strengthening the municipality’s traditional community- based organizational structure, which is built around a stakeholder network and institutions with ancestral elements integrated into the Western government- type system. At the heart of the institutions in Santiago Atitlán is the Tz´utujil people’s cosmic worldview, its history and notion of spiritual life. Participation in the planning and implementation of the reconstruction and resettlement programs was or- ganized by the Municipal Development Council (Con- sejo Municipal de Desarrollo, COMUDE), the body that authorized the Municipal Reconstruction Commission. Although the process started by addressing the plight and resettlement of families that lost their houses as a result of the storm, the Government later widened its eligibility criteria to include families living in at-risk Given the area’s particular characteristics in terms of its areas as a way of preventing future disasters. In this way, natural and cultural resources and high poverty indices, the post-disaster resettlement also became a preventive the plan included four components that included: resettlement of at-risk populations. ■ Rebuilding houses, schools, health centers, water 9. Articulation of the supply and sanitation systems, roads, community Reconstruction Plan with the ceremonial centers and archeological sites, and a Land Planning Strategy guarantee that they will be built in low-risk areas; ■ Reducing economic, social, cultural and The Reconstruction Commission based the plan on environmental vulnerability at the local, municipal Sololá’s Sustainable Development Plan, which had and departmental levels. Risk management was been designed with a land planning focus, according built into the Strategic Land Use Plan (PET); an to guidelines issued by the Secretariat for Planning and early warning system was created; COCODE’s Risk Programs of the Office of the President (SEGEPLAN). Management Commission was established; and a This approach aims to promote economic and social search and rescue team was formed to respond to development with equity, based on each region’s potential emergencies; and capacity, incorporating both gender and ethnic perspectives. ■ Creating an economic and productive focus through support to agricultural and livestock, The Reconstruction Plan was drafted by a planning agro-forestry, tourism, and handcraft microen- team composed of Sololá’s Governor, the manager of the terprises; Development Council, SEGEPLAN, the United Nations ■ Strengthening the social fabric to increase oppor- Development Programme (UNDP), the Authority for tunities for community participation through the Sustainable Management of the Lake Atitlán Basin and development councils, while fostering transpar- Surrounding Areas (Autoridad y Manejo Sostenible de la ency through social audits, civic education, and Cuenca del Lago de Atitlán y su Entorno, AMSCLAE), conflict resolution. and the NGO “Vivamos Mejor.� 96 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Thus, the resettlement process became part of the 10. Institutional Organization Reconstruction Plan, which in turn was in line with Sololá’s Sustainable Development Plan—within the PET. The reconstruction process began, combining the efforts of the Municipal Development Council (COMUDE) of The Plan was prepared in consultation with the de- Santiago Atitlán and a Reconstruction, Housing and Basic partmental and municipal development councils, Services Commission, which together obtained the active with the support of the Departmental Technical Unit participation of leaders, municipal authorities, Mayan au- (Unidad Técnica Departamental, UTD) and the Mu- thorities from the affected communities and NGOs. nicipal Planning Offices (Oficinas municipales de planificación, OMP). It was approved and signed in an Given the integrated model, close institutional coordi- official ceremony in the National Palace of Culture, nation was required among all the entities involved in in the presence of the President and Vice President, the resettlement planning and implementation process. the Reconstruction Manager, government ministers Table 6.2 lists the different entities involved in the coor- and representatives of the traditional, municipal and dination, implementation, financing, and technical as- Tz’utujil community. sistance associated with the plan. Table 6.2. Institutions Involved in the Plan Component Coordination Execution – Financing Technical Assistance Identifying and Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs of CONRED acquiring land of the Office of the President the Office of the President Secretariat for Planning and (Secretaría de Asuntos Agrarios de UN Human Settlements Programme Programs of the Office of the la Presidencia, SAA) President (SEGEPLAN) Real Estate Cadastre and UN Human Settlements Programme Assessment Directorate (Dirección de Avalúos y Catastro de Bienes Inmuebles, DICABI) Designing houses and Executive Coordination Secretariat Executive Coordination Secretariat CIAAP urban development of the Office of the President of the Office of the President UN Human Setttlements (Secretaría de Coordinación (SCEP) Programme Ejecutiva de la Presidencia, SCEP) Inter-Institutional Coordination Office for Assisting Precarious Settlements (Coordinadora Interinstitucional para la Atención de Asentamientos Precarios, CIAAP) Constructing houses Guatemalan Housing Fund (Fondo FOGUAVI CIAAP Nacional de la Vivienda, FOGUAVI) UN Human Settlements Programme Technical Institute for Training and Productivity (Instituto Técnico de Capacitación, INTECAP) Providing water and Municipal Development Institute INFOM INFOM sanitation (Instituto Nacional de Fomento SCEP UN Human Settlements Programme Municipal, INFOM) National Fund for Peace (FONAPAZ) UN Human Settlements Programme Providing energy SCEP Electrical Power Company of EEGSA Guatemala (Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala S.A., EEGSA) Electricity Generation and Distribution Company in Guatemala. Unión FENOSA DEOCSA -DEORDA Providing education Ministry of Education Ministry of Education CONRED Executive Secretariat (SECONRED) United Nations Human Settlements Programme Continues Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 97 Table 6.2. Continuation Component Coordination Execution – Financing Technical Assistance Devising productive Ministry of Agriculture, MAGA SEGEPLAN activities Livestock and Food (Ministerio UN Human Settlements Programme Technical Institute for Training and de Agricultura, Ganadería y Productivity (INTECAP) Alimentación, MAGA) UN Human Settlements Programme Promoting health Ministry of Public Health and Social MSPAS Social Works Secretariat of the First efforts Welfare (Ministerio de Salud Pública Lady (SOSEP) y Asistencia Social, MSPAS) Promoting cultural and Ministry of Culture Ministry of Culture Ministry of Culture archeological aspects 11. Participation of Traditional Communities, Authorities and Organizations Stakeholders took part in the resettlement by identify- ing and acquiring land, designing houses and urban development schemes, and preserving the archeological heritage, as described below. Land The Reconstruction Commission established a Land Procurement Commission to find land suitable for the resettlement. It consisted of representatives from the community and the Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs. models to perceive spaces and dimensions, it was nec- Designing houses and urban development essary to conduct an exercise in which the community itself formed human chains to give an idea of the size The Reconstruction Commission also established the and shape of a house and of the rooms inside it. That Urban Design and Housing Design Commissions, comprised of four members from the community and process produced consensus, after which a model house some from the Guillermo Toriello Foundation, the was designed that could be used in subsequent phases of Executive Secretariat of the Presidency (SCEP), the the resettlement. National Reconstruction Manager, the National Housing Fund (FOGUAVI) and the UN Human Settlements Preserving the archeological heritage Programme. A Ministry of Culture archeologist trained local leaders about archeological remains that might be found on the The urban and housing design proposals were based on a study of customs and traditions by the University of lots earmarked for resettlement. In turn, the leaders su- San Carlos de Guatemala (Universidad de San Carlos pervised the construction teams so as to identify archeo- de Guatemala, USAC), which influenced the layout of logical remains. When some were found, the commission streets, demarcation of lots assigned for houses, and the was informed and the land demarcation was realigned. design of houses. The community was actively involved For example, during construction, the remains of a Ma- in the housing design process. However, because peo- yan dwelling were discovered– the only one of its kind in ple were not familiar with technical drawings and scale the country—which has since become a tourist attraction. 98 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America 12. Building Trust mation generated in the course of the reconstruc- tion; Trust between institutions and communities involved in any social program is a key factor to success. As men- ■ Conduct public events on accountability at the tioned earlier, in Panabaj and Tz’anchaj, trust was de- national and departmental levels to ensure the stroyed when some in the military killed members of public was kept informed about the project’s the community in 1990. For that reason, strong mea- progress and its impact, in addition to traditional sures were taken to restore trust and encourage the accountability mechanisms; community to participate and help oversee the process. ■ Promote extensive social auditing so as to obtain These measures are described below. the views/complaints of individuals and orga- nized groups and ensure that any alleged act of Establishing the participation network and corruption was detected and punished according strengthening the social fabric to the laws. Citizen participation and strengthening the social fab- ric were key to restoring trust in the Government and Given this commitment, it was possible to facilitate implementing the Reconstruction with Transformation transparent, swift, competitive, and publicly audited policy. procedures. In Sololá and Panabaj, transparency mea- sures were adopted at both the municipal and depart- As noted above, residents of Santiago Atitlán had expe- mental levels. To this end, representatives from the rienced several major upheavals in recent times—the Commission of Reconstruction, Housing and Basic 1976 earthquake, nearly 36 years of internal armed con- Services presented monthly reports to the Municipal flict, and wide-scale destruction from Tropical Storm Development Council (COMUDE) and the Commu- Stan. These factors, exacerbated by poverty and the iso- nity Development Council (COCODE), listing each lation caused when the road was blocked by landslides, construction work, its location, costs, starting and end- severely strained community relations and weakened ing dates, names of the construction companies, and the social fabric. progress. This process was reinforced by the local social audit, which provided management and the reconstruc- When the resettlement process began, there was seri- tion team with accurate information about the situation ous mistrust among community groups and political on the ground, so the ministries could deal with issues parties and between government authorities and the related to the contractors’ compliance. community. Thus, it was crucial to create a dialogue among community leaders and authorities so as to promote a sense of partnership and heal the divisions. 13. Selecting Resettlement Sites A huge effort was also made to restore relations be- and Acquiring Land tween the central government and municipality and Based on the results of the assessment of landslide and between them and community leaders by creating a detritus flows in Santiago Atitlán—particularly in the commission with a uniform proposal and vision for Panabaj and Tz’achaj communities—commissioned rebuilding Santiago. by CONRED (2006), it was determined that the entire municipality of Santiago, and especially Panabaj and Establishing agreements on transparency Tz’anchaj, were highly vulnerable to floods and land- To achieve the goals pursued in the participatory pro- slides and declared it an “uninhabitable emergency cess and rehabilitate the social fabric, it was essential zone.� The findings implied that the land donated by the to reach an agreement on transparency. To that end, Catholic Church, where houses were being built, was in February 2006, the President and ministers publicly also located in a high-risk area. committed to: One outcome of the open assembly for the 230 families ■ Facilitate unrestricted access to all public infor- living in shelters was the establishment of the Negotia- Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 99 tion Commission consisting of the leaders of the dif- under which the latter transferred US$1 million for di- ferent groups—the reconstruction manager, munici- rect purchases of land. pality, several guest NGOs, government institutions, and some families who were not in shelters but would Once lots were identified, the Land Procurement Com- have to be resettled since the area was declared unin- mission negotiated with the owners to purchase and habitable. Thus, the original resettlement scheme also then legalize the lots. The process of purchasing land became a preventive program for families at high risk, from 70 smallholders lasted eight months. Given the lo- and the total number of households increased from cation of the sites, it created a veritable jigsaw puzzle of 230 to 915. lots. When half the land required was purchased, talks began with the community on a suitable type of urban Several meetings were held to review different propos- development. als for resettlement sites. However, all were rejected by community representatives and the Reconstruction Commission because “the Tz’utujil indigenous people 14. The Chuk Muk Resettlement: were born, had grown, and wished to die on its land� A Heritage Recovered and would not leave their region. Thus, they asked the The site selected for the new Tz’utujil city—known as Government to look for resettlement land that was safe Chuck Muck—was especially significant, since it was and located in their area and with their participation. As where the Mayan ancestors lived before the Spanish con- a result, a Land Procurement Commission was created, quest. This was confirmed by the discovery of Tz’utujil whose criteria for selecting alternative sites were partly dwellings from the 11th century, creating a deeper sense shaped by a review of urban development trends, so as of cultural identity and heritage (Figure 6.3) to find land that was likely to be earmarked for hous- ing with easy access to well maintained roads, services, Figure 6.3. The Chuk Muk Resettlement Site urban facilities and proximity to the municipal admin- istrative center. The sites also had to be geographically strategic and not exposed to natural hazards. The Com- mission attempted to coordinate the effort with Santia- go Atitlán’s housing plans for that sector. The search for land became complicated because the area CONRED defined as safe consisted of micro-lots whose owners claimed to have occupied them for sev- eral generations but had no deeds, and the entity created for the reconstruction could not purchase land without formal legal titles. Moreover, many of the smallholders were either not interested in selling or asked prices five to 10 times higher than the cost authorized by the Real Estate Cadastre and Assessment Directorate (DICABI), which made it impossible to buy them. Thus, a special land acquisition mechanism was estab- 15. Environmental impact Study lished, consisting of the municipality, the National Fund of the New Site for Peace, and community representatives to ensure The municipality and Office of the Reconstruction transparency and fair prices, as well as the legitimacy of Manager, with the consent of the Santiago Atitlán Re- property rights. construction Commission, commissioned the Guiller- mo Toriello Foundation to do an environmental impact To obtain the lots, an agreement was signed by the mu- study of the new site. The report was shown to various nicipality and National Fund for Peace (FONAPAZ), institutions participating in the Chuk Muk resettlement 100 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America and was endorsed, as legally required, by the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources. The study found that the environmental impacts of the 915-house project, along with services and facilities, were “not sig- nificant� and satisfied an urgent need of the affected and at-risk populations, while creating jobs and lowering the country’s housing deficit. Finally, it certified that any negative impacts could be mitigated, provided the proj- ect complied with the recommendations in the environ- mental security, contingency and human safety plans. 16. Characteristics of the New settlement At the time, no precedents existed in Guatemala for the kind of participatory project design adopted for the bath house (temazcal1) (3.5 m2), land for growing new settlement. Given the complex nature of the discus- fruits and vegetables (40 m2), a stack of firewood sions, the Human Rights Prosecutor’s Office was invited (2.5 m2), a shed (3 m2) and an area for drying to participate as an observer and mediator. With the laundry (10 m2). participation of the community and various stakehold- ers, a balance was found between the indigenous and ■ Houses. The housing designs were made accord- Western visions of what was needed, resulting in the ing to the population’s socio-cultural characteris- first successful integration of urban development with tics, which require specific areas for daily activities. indigenous traditions, culture and customs and Western The design was developed based on the concept of technology. Thus, the Chuk Muk resettlement came to a house that is adequate, modular, and can be ex- be called the first Tz’utujil city of the 21st Century. panded. Through a sensitization process, informa- tion-sharing and assistance, the community made Following lengthy negotiations, and based on the stud- informed decisions, generated proposals and nego- ies by the University of San Carlos de Guatemala, par- tiated solutions. The decisions were based on inputs ticipants agreed to the criteria with regard to commu- from the professional team and the community. nity features, location of the lots, characteristics of the ■ Income generation. The resettlement was con- houses, access to services, infrastructure, and sources of ceived as a “productive habitat� for the communi- income generation, as detailed below. ties’ economic revival and as a way to raise their income levels, which were very low prior to the ■ Community organization. The project recog- disaster. Thus, space was allotted for stalls and nized the existing form of community organiza- the sale of staple goods, handicrafts and locally tion, based on extended families. Thus, the spatial woven cloth. Also, a strategic area for restaurants planning allowed for groups of houses, equal to the was reserved that would allow for enjoying beau- number of families in the extended family pool, tiful views and cultural activities. built around a small square or patio, with a tree in ■ Communal areas. These areas were also de- the middle and a common area for various activities. signed to blend with the architecture and art of the ■ Size of lots. The basic lot was 150m2, 7.5m region. The open public area was designed to be wide and 20m deep (irregularly shaped lots had used for various activities such as markets, civic to have the same total area). The lot size was de- gatherings, sports and cultural events, including an signed to accommodate a house (56 m2), an area open-air theater with a capacity for 1,125 people. for breeding poultry (35 m2), a traditional steam 1 A temazcal is a type of sweat lodge use as part of a curative ceremony to clean the mind, body and spirit. Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 101 ■ Cultural activities. The natural terracing of the Table 6.3. Budget for the Santiago Atitlán Reconstruction Plan land provided areas that were ideal for an open- air theater and other cultural, educational and lei- Item Cost In Us$ sure activities. Space was even found for the flying Human Settlements 4,296,988 pole (Palo Volador)2 used for special community Safe Water 86,800 events. Further, a Tz’utujil regional museum was Environmental Sanitation 1,235,920 built to strengthen cultural identity and use as a Social Infrastructure 1,787,470 tourist attraction. Roads 1,187,200 ■ Services. The resettlement area included waste- Risk Reduction 287,630 water drains and a natural wastewater treatment Health And Social Welfare 1,456,056 plant, along with a well and pipes leading to each Economic Reactivation 301,000 house. Citizen Participation 18,122 Total 10,657,186 ■ Road infrastructure. The project included three access roads to the main road, as well as Source: SEGEPLAN. Reconstruction and Risk Reduction Plan for the de- partment of Sololá. Based on the 2006-2007 Sustainable Development Plan. streets inside the settlement area. ■ Risk management. Possible hazards in the re- settlement area were identified and mapped, with 18. Resettlement Schedule community participation, and a risk-manage- ■ Phase I, or Chuk Muk I, took 12 months and was ment plan was designed. completed by the end of 2007 ■ Chuk Muk 2 took 18 months and was completed 17. Budget in 2008. Because the disaster had not been anticipated, the na- ■ Chuk Muk 3 was finished in 2009 tional budget lacked the funds needed for a project of ■ Phase 4 began in February 2008 and was expected this nature. Thus, the budgeting and financing mecha- to last 30 months. nism depended heavily on contributions from various sources. 19. Allocation and Titling The total for the reconstruction project for the 19 mu- of Houses nicipalities in Sololá was US$92.7 million, including According to the community organizational structures US$10.7 million for the municipality of Santiago Ati- and patterns, the three principal community leaders as- tlán. Table 6.3 provides a breakdown of the costs by activity. The government was able to fund US$3.56 signed the houses to families. Legal titles were provided million of the total and asked the international com- for the land and houses under the category of “family munity to contribute the rest in funds and activities property,� which meant they belonged not to the head of through UNDP. In the end, the government received the household but to the family as a whole. One condi- contributions from the Spanish International Coop- tion was that the house could not be sold for 18 years. eration Agency for Development (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, AECID), 20. Technical Training and Andalusian Cooperation Agency (Agencia Andaluza Income Generation de Cooperación Internacional al Desarrollo, AACID), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agen- A key feature of the national reconstruction program cy (SIDA) and UNDP. The delay in the initial funding was the economic and productive revitalization of the slowed the project implementation. affected communities, to be achieved with support from 2 The Palo Volador is one of the most spectacular Guatemalan dances is in which men climb a 100 foot wooden pole, tie themselves to a rope attached to the top and wrapped around their body, and jump, spinning to the ground. 102 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America institutions such as the Guillermo Toriello Foundation tient and pessimistic; there have been cases where fami- and the UN Human Settlements Programme. lies, faced with the long wait, have considered returning to where they lived before. In the short term, an effort was made to hire the popula- tion that was to be resettled to do the construction. To that end, the Technical Training Institute (INTECAP) 22. Lessons Learned provided courses in bricklaying, carpentry, plumbing, Although there were no an evaluation available at the electricity, and other skills. moment of finalizing the study, several lessons related to the responses during the emergency and the recon- At the same time, employment and income generation struction and resettlement process could be drawn. programs were developed to stimulate the economic re- vitalization of the families, based on their skills, poten- tial and social characteristics, and according to the new 22.1 During Emergency Response environment and their new responsibilities. An inven- and Reconstruction tory was compiled of their resources and skills; studies were conducted of existing demand for employment in The disaster and the emergency response highlighted the public and private sectors; the community was of- the following: fered training; and sources of loans for families were identified. The productive projects chosen were consis- ■ The extreme vulnerability to natural disasters of tent with the Strategic Plan for the Lake Atitlán Basin the housing, transportation, roads and education- and the Municipal Development Plan. al infrastructure; ■ The environmentally precarious nature of the Throughout the process, consideration was given to the country, exacerbated by deforestation and inap- importance of the municipal government in local eco- propriate land use, which significantly increased nomic development. For that reason, the Guillermo To- the vulnerability; riello Foundation focused on strengthening municipal institutions in areas such as overall and land-use plan- ■ The minimal importance attached by local and ning, and economic development. municipal authorities to risk management and emergency response; The integrated model, which is still being developed, ■ CONRED’s limited regional presence: At the has already yielded encouraging outcomes and contin- time of the disaster, it had only eight departmen- ues to attract more government and NGO programs. tal units. Now, each of the 22 departments has Subsequently, a school was built, along with a health CONRED units. center and community center, which also serves as the ■ CONRED and the National Emergencies Fund headquarters for the Council of Elders, the Community (Fondo nacional de Emergencias) lacked human, Council, and the offices for women, elderly and youth. technical and financial resources of CONRED There is also a press and culture center, a natural medi- and the National Emergencies Fund (Fondo na- cine clinic and a risk-management office (El Periódico, cional de Emergencias); 2010). ■ The weaknesses of the existing housing institu- tions. The massive loss of houses was the greatest 21. State of the Process challenge the Government faced. That weakness created a gap between planning and implementa- At the moment of finalizing this study, the project had not been evaluated. However, data show that the first tion, which led many of the institutions to impro- families were resettled in January 2007, and about 700 vise; families were resettled by January 2010. As to be expect- ■ The lack of government-owned machinery and ed, those families that have not yet benefited are impa- supplies; Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 103 ■ The lack of flexibility of the Government Procure- and disasters. This was a major challenge but one ment Law for emergency situations, which led to that benefited the entire process; major delays; ■ Inter-cultural dialogue, recognition and respect ■ The need to design grassroots mitigation plans for other cultures throughout the process; with a high level of ownership by communities ■ Participation of the community in the design and to organize and strengthen stakeholders so of the new settlements and houses, which made they can implement the plans in line with their it possible to recover the house designs of the traditions and customs; Tz´utujil people population, based on the extend- ■ This experience also showed that it is not neces- ed family model, and including space for produc- sary to create new institutions for risk manage- tive, social, and cultural activities; ment and reconstruction. For countries with se- vere financial constraints, it is better to develop ■ Strengthening the social fabric as a fundamental inter-agency mechanisms that help ministries and tool for processes of reconstruction with transfor- secretariats cooperate effectively. Those mecha- mation; nisms need to have high-level political support ■ Strengthening community organization, which from the Office of the President; meant stakeholders established themselves as le- ■ Resettlement should be a prevention tool, rather gitimate representatives in relation to national than a mechanism for responding to emergencies; and municipal public institutions, as well as inter- national aid agencies. It created the conditions for ■ Financial resources are critical for implementing resettlement plans on schedule. The Government’s channeling the community’s contribution to the resources were insufficient and it was necessary to reconstruction and facilitated social audits and apply for supplementary funds from international the management of conflicts that might arise dur- agencies and NGOs. Given the lack of resources, ing the process; the resettlement was not completed on time. Such ■ The important role of women in community or- delays not only affected the families, but also un- ganization and during the process; dermined the trust in the government institutions ■ The replacement of the basic or “minimum roof � that the process had restored. house concept with that of an adequate, modular, gradually built and improvable house; 22.2 During the Resettlement Process ■ The transparency mechanisms agreed upon with the communities, which helped restore confi- Significant achievements included the following: dence in the Government. ■ Coordination of national, departmental, munici- Finally, it should be highlighted that this well planned pal and local levels in the design and implementa- and implemented resettlement, based on the active tion of the resettlement plans; participation of all stakeholders and respectful of ethi- ■ Coordination of the resettlement plans with stra- cal and cultural values, became an opportunity not just tegic land planning programs, to guarantee their to build houses but also to rebuild community trust in sustainability; the State, to strengthen the social fabric, forge greater ■ The important decision to include ethnical, so- communal cohesion, improve living conditions, rein- cial and cultural considerations in the design and force cultural identity and generate opportunities for implementation of the resettlement plans, such as the economic, social and cultural inclusion of histori- the ancestral settlement pattern, traditional forms cally excluded groups. These factors not only increased of social organization, the indigenous cosmic the communities’ resilience to natural hazards, but also world view, ethics, and understanding of nature contributed to the process of national reconciliation. 104 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America References Secretaría de Planificación de la Presidencia (SEGE- PLAN). Reconstruction and Risk Reduction Plan Bohnenberger, Otto H. 1969. Los Focos Eruptivos Cua- for the department of Sololá. Based on the 2006- ternarios de Guatemala. Instituto Centroamerica- 2007 Sustainable Development Plan. no de Investigación y Tecnología Industrial. Gua- temala. Retrieved from: http://www.insivumeh. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agen- gob.gt/folletos/FVQGT.pdf cy (SIDA), Executing Unit of the Rural Water Programme (UNEPAR), United Nations Inter- CONRED (National Coordination for Disaster Reduc- national Children Educational Fund (UNICEF). tion). 2006. Evaluación de riesgos por deslizamien- (2001). Desastres naturales y zonas de riesgo en tos y flujo de detritos en Santiago Atitlá. Cordillera Guatemala. Coordinación general del arquitecto S.A. Sololá. José Luís Gándara. El Periódico. Guatemala, Sábado 27 de febrero, 2010. Unidad Ejecutora de Proyectos de Acueductos Rurales, Retrieved from: http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/ Fondo de las Naciones Unidas Para la Infancia es/20100227/ciencia/139820/ (UNEPAR-UNICEF). 2001. Desastres naturales y zonas de riesgo en Guatemala. Guatemala, 94 p. Hall. G., Patrinos A. (Eds.) 2006. Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development in Latin Amer- Universidad Rafael Landívar, Facultad de Ciencias Am- ica: 1994-2004. The World Bank. Retrieved from: bientales y Agrícolas. 2005. Amenazas al ambiente http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/down- y vulnerabilidad social en Guatemala. Documento load/9781403999382.pdf?expires=1308694969&i técnico del perfil ambiental de Guatemala. Insti- d=id&accname=guest&checksum=60C3F068D6 tuto de Agricultura, Recursos Naturales y Ambi- 954577CB95830377D8FF22. ente. Retrieved from: http://www.infoiarna.org. gt/media/file/publicaciones/propias/doc_tecni- Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); Universidad cos/vulnerabilidad/Amenazas%20al%20ambien- Nacional de Colombia. 2004. Indicadores para te%20(low).pdf] la gestión de riesgos. Aplicación del sistema de in- dicadores 1980-2000. Manizales, Colombia: BID, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Universidad Nacional de Colombia –Sede Man- 1978. “Disaster relief case report: Guatemala – izales–, Instituto de Estudios Ambientales (idea). earthquake February 1976�, Washington. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2002. Cen- The World Bank. 2009. Disaster Risk Management tral America after Hurricane Mitch. The Chal- Programs for Priority Countries. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. Retrieved lenge of Turning a Disaster into an Opportunity. from: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/14757_ In: www.iadb.org 6thCGCountryProgramSummaries1.pdf Municiplaity of Santiago Atitlán. Official web site. Re- trieved from: http://www.inforpressca.com/san- tiagoatitlan/informe_stan.php Chapter 6 The First Tz´utujil City of the Twenty-First Century | Guatemala | 105 Bibliography FAO (Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Ag- ricultura y la Alimentación), SEGEPLAN ( Sec- INSIVUMEH (Instituto Nacional de Sismología, Vulca- retaría de Planificación de la Presidencia). 2006. nología, Meteorología e Hidrología de Guatema- Base metodológica del Sistema Nacional de Plani- la). Sf. Evaluación del alud tipo Lahar que soterró ficación Estratégica Territorial (SINPET – SEGE- al cantón de Panabaj y afectación del cantón de PLAN). Guatemala: SEGEPLAN, FAO. Tzanchag. insivumeh. ———. 2006. Marco conceptual del Sistema Nacional MAGA (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Ali- de Planificación Estratégica Territorial (SINPET – mentación), Unidad de Planificación Geográfica SEGEPLAN). Guatemala: SEGEPLAN, FAO. y Gestión de Riesgo, Laboratorio de Información Geográfica. 2005. Atlas temático de las cuencas hi- SEGEPLAN (Secretaría de Planificación de la drográficas de la República de Guatemala. Presidencia). 2006. Guía de facilitación de la planificación estratégica territorial (PET) y Plan Ministerio de Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. 2007. de Desarrollo Municipal. SEGEPLAN – Sistema Estudio de evaluación de impacto ambiental del Nacional de Planificación Estratégica Territorial, desarrollo habitacional ChokMuc 2, arquitecto SINPET, Gobierno de Guatemala. Pedro José Asturias (Colegiado 454). Programa Nacional de Reconstrucción. 2007. Informe CONRED (National Coordination for Disaster Reduc- anual de reconstrucción 2007: de la crisis a la tion). 2008. Tomado del artículo escrito por Alber- emergencia, de la emergencia a la reconstrucción, to Ramírez E. del diario Prensa Libre de la edición de la reconstrucción a la transformación para el del día lunes 29 de diciembre de 2008: 4 y 5. desarrollo. Gerencia de la Vicepresidencia de la ONU (Organización de las Naciones Unidas, CEPAL República de Guatemala. (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el PET (Planificación Estratégica Territorial). 2006. Cuenca Caribe), SEGEPLAN ( Secretaría de Planificación del Lago de Atitlán; Consejo de Desarrollo Depar- y Programación de la Presidencia de Guatemala). tamental de Sololá. 2005. Efectos en Guatemala de las lluvias torren- ciales y la tormenta tropical Stan. Octubre. 106 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Chapter 7 Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies By Sergio Carmona and Elena Correa T his chapter presents a comparative analysis and ested the Andean forest, these activities contributed to the main conclusions from the cases studied in erosion and landslides—confirmed by a study commis- the earlier chapters. It is expected that the les- sioned by the Capital District of Bogotá, as part of its sons learned in these experiences could be useful to plan to rehabilitate the high-risk areas. guide other resettlement programs designed to reduce the risk of disasters. Poverty is another factor that intensifies the marginal populations’ vulnerability to risks. In all the cases, the population was at or beneath the poverty line, which 1. Urbanization, Risk and made them doubly vulnerable, as they could not satisfy Vulnerability basic needs and confront emergencies. One conclusion involves the factors that give rise to hu- man settlements in high-risk areas. In Argentina, Brazil In many cases, these settlements are considered “illegal� and Colombia, rapid urbanization without proper land because they do not comply with urban development use planning, policies to provide housing for the poor regulations and families lack the legal titles requested and supervision of settlements in at-risk areas, led low- by governmental agencies to build basic infrastructure. income and marginalized segments of the population to This creates a vicious circle with severe consequences build houses in prone risk areas. for these groups and the city as a whole. Some efforts are underway to break that pattern through programs Poor people settle in areas that are either at-risk or un- such as São Paulo’s “urbanization of favelas� and Bogotá’s suitable for human settlement because they have no comprehensive slum upgrading program. They involve other options. For example, in Guatemala, when the (a) providing legal titles to land where there are no haz- most appropriate area for resettlement after the dev- ards, (b) identifying at-risk zones, (c) establishing miti- astation from Tropical Storm Stan was selected, it was gation measures, including resettlement, if exposure to the one traditionally occupied by the Mayans until they the risk cannot be otherwise reduced, and (d) improv- were forcibly removed during the Spanish conquest and ing urban infrastructure—all of which integrate these colonial period. settlements with the formal city. In addition, human settlements in at-risk areas exacer- Lessons from the cases indicate the importance of land- bate exposure to hazards and their impacts because of use planning and strengthening institutions—to make the lack of basic infrastructure, which, even when it ex- the planning possible, as well as developing inclusion ists, is built by settlers without construction standards policies for the poor, so they, too, can access adequate, or technical assistance. That was evident in Brazil and safe houses. This lesson is especially pertinent given Colombia. For example, in São Paulo, when families liv- the rapid urbanization growth. By 2007, half the world’s ing on the banks of streams discharged wastewater and population lived in cities (UN-Habitat, 2007). And, solid waste into the waterways, this caused sedimenta- while the urban population is expected to increase from tion and increased the likelihood of flooding. In Co- 0.8 billion to one billion from 2010-2050 in developed lombia, when settlers excavated land on slopes to build countries, the number is expected to soar in develop- houses and roads, discharged wastewater, and defor- ing countries, from 2.7 billion to 5.4 billion.1 If such 1 See World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision; World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision. Chapter 7 Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 107 remarkable growth is not accompanied by the kinds of Community participation has also played an important policies such as those mentioned above, billions will be role in risk management, although this varies by coun- exposed to disaster risks. try: Guatemala is a good example of where transition from vertical and authoritarian arrangements to par- ticipatory practices that included cultural and gender- 2. Disaster Risk Management related variables, was extremely effective. The cases also revealed how countries are introducing risk management policies and improving their legal and 3. Resettlement as a Disaster institutional frameworks for that purpose. Some of the Prevention Measure risk-management processes are fairly advanced, as in Colombia, where a national emergency response and In each of the four cases, a different approach was ad- prevention system exists that applies a comprehensive opted when resettlement was used to reduce the risk of approach. Here, authorities coordinate the efforts of disasters. In Colombia, such efforts are part of public national, regional and local institutions and involve all policies that were built into land use planning, with the relevant ones in the process. In addition, the coun- specific rules and instruments, as illustrated in the case try has established financing mechanisms to respond to of Bogotá—one of the cities that is more advanced in emergencies and prevent disasters, and has integrated terms of implementing this strategy. Its efforts include risk management into land-use planning and develop- creating (a) micro-zoning maps showing the location ment processes. of at-risk properties and families, (b) information sys- tems that store data and make it possible to monitor and Guatemala has also made major progress by establishing oversee new settlements, (c) financial mechanisms, such the National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction and as housing subsidies for at-risk families, and (d) institu- adopting a comprehensive strategy that incorporates tions specialized in resettlement. risk prevention in the country’s strategic land planning programs and investment plans. In Guatemala, preventive resettlement was included in the post-disaster reconstruction process when it was In general, advanced risk-management strategies gener- found that families, while not affected by the disaster, ate harmonious institutional and legal frameworks that were living in high-risk areas and also needed to be re- facilitate planning, resource allocation, the monitoring settled. This strategy was included in the Government’s of risk management plans and ways to incorporate the Reconstruction with Transformation program, but has plans into development processes. not yet been converted into a public policy that is sys- tematically applied throughout the country. It is interesting to note that the countries with compre- hensive risk management policies are those that have In Argentina, resettlement programs targeted popula- experienced major disasters. In both Colombia and tion groups exposed to the risk of floods; these largely Guatemala, such events showed how vital it was to have depended on foreign loans, which made it more difficult (a) a full understanding of hazards and of the popula- to ensure their continuity and sustainability. tion’s vulnerability, (b) a national emergency prevention and response system, (c) special financial instruments, In Brazil, resettlement is part of an attempt to recover and (d) risk-management policies incorporated into small urban watersheds but has not yet been incorpo- land-use planning and in national and local develop- rated into public policies. ment plans. Thus, it can be concluded that resettlement must be Another lesson is that prevention is the best investment incorporated in comprehensive risk management poli- possible because responding to disasters has serious hu- cies, which should (a) provide housing programs for the man consequences and financial impacts on a country’s poor, (b) adopt land-use planning, (c) identify at-risk development. areas, (d) monitor human settlements in at-risk areas, 108 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America and (e) supervise reclaimed areas to ensure that addi- Conversely, when resettlement is seen mainly as a new tional households do not settle there. If these compo- house in a safe place, resettled people often experience nents are not included, preventive resettlement could economic or social disruption; thus, the process must become an incentive for low-income people to settle in be multi-dimensional, to help people re-establish their 2 at-risk areas in order to obtain government assistance. livelihoods and adjust to their new environment. Incorporating resettlement into comprehensive risk Another problem arises when populations do not par- management strategies also ensures continuity in the ticipate in the planning and implementation, and the process. For example, it has been found that if resettle- programs fail to consider their social and cultural char- ment is not incorporated into comprehensive risk man- acteristics. agement strategies, the efforts may be interrupted be- cause they depend on foreign loans, international aid, Since resettlement is multi-dimensional, it must be budget allocations or changes of government. planned and implemented with the participation of var- ious sectors and institutions. Key entities include those Further, such inclusion helps identify the at-risk popu- responsible for housing programs, public utilities (water, lation in advance, through studies of hazards, risks and electricity, sewage systems, communications and trans- vulnerabilities, such as were conducted in Bogotá. That portation), social services (education and health care), information made it possible for authorities to deter- training and support for productive activities, as well as mine the magnitude of the problem, formulate strate- oversight bodies. Although one entity typically leads the gies and plans for addressing it, estimate the resources resettlement process, other governmental institutions needed to respond to it, monitor new settlements, gen- (such as those responsible for health and education) erate institutional and legal frameworks, and system- must assume responsibility in their specific areas for the atize the results to learn from the experience. resettled groups. Their participation also generates syn- ergies in the implementation of institutional programs and deployment of human and financial resources, to 4. Resettlement as a ensure the socio-economic integration of resettled com- Multidimensional Process munities in their new habitat and guarantee the conti- Human resettlement is a complex process. If done inap- nuity of social programs. propriately, it can create serious problems: For example, if it is poorly planned or implemented, resettlement may The multi-dimensional approach was adopted in all the trigger social, economic and cultural disasters worse cases studied. In Brazil, the Secretariat for Housing led than one it is supposed to prevent. Unfortunately, there the process, which also included the Secretariats for Edu- are hundreds of such failures. This risk has led interna- cation, Health, Transport, Ecology, the Environment and tional organizations such as The World Bank and other Culture. In Bogotá, the process was conducted by the multilateral agencies, to require that resettlement poli- entity specialized in resettlement of at-risk populations, cies be included in the operations they finance. closely coordinated with those responsible for emergency response and prevention, education, health, productive The ultimate aim of resettlement is to help people re- activities and other social programs. In Guatemala, the build their livelihoods, which means not just their hous- reconstruction manager appointed by the Vice-President es but sources of income, economic activities, social re- of the Republic coordinates a large number of govern- lations, access to public services, and cultural practices. mental institutions, international agencies and NGOs This can be achieved if the families and communities that support various processes, including land purchases, moved to new habitats are offered the economic, social the design and construction of houses, protection of ar- and cultural conditions that will help them re-adapt and cheological findings, education, health, productive proj- develop their potential further. ects and public services. In that country, the institutional 2 For further information on the risks associated with resettlement see Michael Cernea’s publications. Chapter 7 Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 109 synergies created to overcome one of the major hurdles 5. Resettlement Planning in the resettlement—namely, land procurement—in- volved the National Fund for Peace (FONAPAZ), the The studies found that once the decision was made to re- Municipality of Santiago Atitlán, the National Valuation settle a population, it was crucial to carry out a census Commission, international agencies and the communi- and socio-economic assessments, in order to plan the ties. In both Guatemala and Colombia, the process was activities required. A census establishes the number of improved when families were included in the design of people in the target population and sets cut-off dates for social welfare programs that were part of national and lo- determining the program’s beneficiaries. For example, in cal public policies, such as the care of children, women Bogotá, such dates helped authorities monitor the settle- and the elderly, even prior to resettlement. ment of new families in the at-risk areas, as well as the sale of houses “including the right to resettlement� and ■ Interdisciplinary teams they did not have to deal with ever-increasing numbers. The multi-dimensional nature of resettlement also re- In addition, socio-economic and cultural studies pro- quires that inter-disciplinary teams be formed to deal vide useful information to ensure that the populations’ with the various aspects. In all the cases, the teams were unique characteristics are considered in the housing de- organized within the entities responsible. In Brazil, pro- sign and to plan the resettlement. Of the different cases fessionals from other institutions or firms were hired to studied, the Guatemala case should be highlighted with help manage the social impacts. the study conducted by the University of San Carlos de Guatemala on community practices and customs and ■ Interinstitutional coordination the participation of traditional authorities in design- Such broad participation (agencies, local authorities and ing the houses and new settlements. In Argentina, the communities) means the activities must be well coordi- analysis of cultural characteristics was reflected in the nated. Brazil’s “Resettlement Advisory Council,� Colom- types of houses built; also, the use of local materials was bia’s “Technical-Social Working Group� and Guatemala’s promoted to reduce construction costs and facilitate “Santiago Atitlán Reconstruction Commission� are ex- maintenance. amples of inter-institutional coordination strategies. In São Paulo and Bogotá, the programs helped incor- ■ Coordination among different governmental levels porate families into the formal city; and the socio-eco- Similarly, when various levels of government are in- nomic data helped authorities re-establish social servic- volved, their efforts must be closely coordinated. For es and educate families about the obligations they would example, in Argentina, agreements were signed speci- incur in formal housing complexes. fying how responsibilities would be distributed among central, provincial and municipal levels and the hous- 6. Housing Solutions ing institutes. The coordination produced significant re- sults: 120 localities across 2,200 km in seven provinces The cases studied show there is no single recipe for re- participated in the housing component of the flood settling a population; rather, a wide range of options ex- risk-reduction programs. ists, such as hiring private firms to construct the new houses (Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala), creating In Guatemala, resettlement is coordinated at the high- partnerships with private construction companies or est planning, inter-agency and decision-making levels, with NGO housing organizations (Colombia), support- ensuring coherence, integrated management and the in- ing self-construction and reciprocal assistance (Argen- volvement of all national, regional, and local authorities. tina), families exchanging houses (the so-called “chess game� in Brazil), purchasing pre-existing houses on the In large cities such as São Paulo and Bogotá, the differ- market with technical, legal and social services (Colom- ent levels of the administration within the cities coordi- bia), and providing cash compensation to beneficiaries nated their efforts. (Brazil). Where several housing options are available, 110 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America as in São Paulo and Bogotá, this expedites the resettle- it requires well-planned technical and social assistance ment. and the timely delivery of materials. In Argentina, Colombia and Guatemala, the new houses With regard to the practice of relocating households in were designed to allow for gradual expansion, based on buildings within large housing complexes (Brazil), the each family’s needs and resources. independent evaluation recommended avoiding such solutions and focusing instead on smaller complexes The Colombian example was particularly interesting. As that are better suited to fostering harmonious com- mentioned above, families received legal, technical and munity relations. Another lesson from Brazil’s experi- social services to help them select new or pre-existing ence—already encountered in numerous resettlement houses on the market. Another interesting option was programs elsewhere—is that cash compensation is not developing partnerships between the entities in charge an appropriate solution and creates problems for both of the program and private construction companies, the families and cities. For example, in the initial phase since the existence of an assured market is a strong in- of the program, the families that received cash compen- centive for firms to develop housing projects. sation without any assistance, returned to areas unsuit- able for human settlements. Another interesting option was the “chess game� (Brazil) that helped families which did not want to leave their In addition to the information already obtained from neighborhoods. Under the plan, they exchanged the the studies, comparative cost-benefit analysis reviews houses they were offered in the resettlement program are needed to better understand the advantages and dis- for ones owned by other families which were located in advantages of each housing solution. the same (original) neighborhood but where the sites were not at-risk. This created a win-win solution for the participating families and helped expedite resettlement. 7. Payment for Housing Solutions Of all the options, perhaps the most noteworthy was Because the families involved in all the cases were ex- the self-construction and mutual assistance arrange- tremely poor, the governments had to subsidize housing ment (Argentina). The magnitude of the program, its costs. In Argentina, families contributed their labor and broad geographical scope (in a large country), the par- received free construction materials and technical assis- ticipation of different levels of government and entities, tance. In Guatemala, they received their new houses free and its major achievements dispel the myth that self- of charge. In Brazil, families that were resettled in hous- construction is inefficient or impossible; it also proved ing complexes assumed 10% of the cost of their new that women could participate on an equal footing with men. This option had comparative advantages in terms houses by obtaining government subsidized long-term of costs, community participation and secondary ben- loans. In Colombia, families initially received a partial efits. For example, various external evaluations found subsidy and had to pay part of the costs; however, Bo- the population’s self-esteem increased, along with high gotá authorities later decided to subsidize all the costs. levels of “ownership,� which prompted greater care and maintenance of the properties. It also trained many Despite the cases show different arrangements regard- people in house construction, thus strengthening hu- ing payment for the new houses, due to a lack of com- man capital (regardless of gender) and enhancing the parative evaluations, it is impossible to draw firm con- community’s entrepreneurial skills, which in turn, in- clusions about the best payment arrangements. This creased their job opportunities. Moreover, the pro- aspect should be studied further. gram promoted community solidarity and cooperation, helped reduce the cost of houses and generated savings 8. Legal Titles to the Houses the residents later used to construct community facili- ties. Another lesson is that self-construction does not In all the cases, families were given deeds to their hous- mean leaving communities to their own devices; rather, es, which had a significant impact on their net worth Chapter 7 Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 111 and status: They went from being informal or illegal Such problems were addressed in different ways. In Bra- settlers to legal owners with deeds. zil, it was necessary to build schools and health centers for the families resettled in the housing complexes. Also, It should be noted that deeds were provided to fami- the moving was scheduled on dates that had the least lies, rather than individuals, as a way of safeguarding negative effect on the children’s schooling. In Colombia, the rights of women and children (Guatemala and Co- arrangements were made with public entities to register lombia); also, families were prevented from selling their families with schools and health centers close to their houses for a given period of time (Argentina and Gua- new houses. In Argentina, no extra actions were needed temala). because the families’ distance from schools and health centers was not altered substantially. In Guatemala, these facilities were built later, due to the synergies in Chuk 9. Environmental Impact Study Muk with public entities and international agencies. of the Resettlement Guatemala was the only country to assess the environ- 12. Restoration of Income mental impact of the new settlements. This is an impor- tant activity because collective resettlements may put Peoples conducting economic activities within their pressure on natural and social resources and negatively homes or neighborhoods may lose this source of income affect the environment. Therefore, measures should be when they move. Thus, it is important to study their so- included to mitigate any adverse impacts. cio-economic conditions to determine the nature of the families’ economic activities and assess whether income will be lost through resettlement. None of the cases pro- 10. The Transition from the duced detailed information on such aspects, but they all Informal to the Formal considered the issue. In Brazil, commercial premises were Sector built inside the housing complexes for families that had One of the many challenges for resettled families and been engaged in a trade. In Argentina, income sources those who plan the resettlement process is moving peo- were not affected because distances were not significantly ple from an informal to a formal environment. In the altered by resettlement. In Colombia, income-generating formal city, they must assume new responsibilities, such projects are under way. In Guatemala, the new settlement as paying for utilities and taxes. Also, in some cases, the was designed as a “productive habitat,� with spaces incor- new urban setting may require a different type of neigh- porated for subsistence and commercial activities, and borhood behavior. special programs were conducted to revive the econo- mies of the communities affected by the disaster. For this reason, once households were resettled (in Bra- zil and Colombia), they were provided with manuals It should be noted that while much can be done to im- about rules and regulations to promote harmonious re- prove family incomes, resettlement cannot solve a coun- lations with the neighbors and trained on how to handle try’s or region’s structural problems. the costs associated with new houses and the efficient use of utilities, among other topics. 13. Monitoring Risks and Contingency Plans 11. Restoration of Access Since preventive resettlement is a response to communi- to Social Services ties exposed to high risk hazards, authorities must mon- Resettlement may sometimes cause children to miss a itor the risk conditions, and develop contingency plans year of school or lose access to schools entirely. Also, to react properly. In the cases studied, two approaches the population may lose its access to health care, since were adopted: Guatemala constructed shelters, while families were registered at health centers in their origi- Bogotá (Colombia) subsidized housing rentals pend- nal sites. ing permanent solutions, or gave grocery vouchers to 112 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America households that went to live with relatives. The feasibil- Esperanza zone, and social workers visited families pe- ity of Colombia’s rental strategy will depend on the sup- riodically. In Guatemala, community leaders, Tz´utujil ply of available houses (for rent). The shelter option may authorities and representatives of civil society organiza- work if it does not involve prolonged stays that create tions all participated in the “Reconstruction Commis- other problems. The delay in implementing the resettle- sion.� The different mechanisms used illustrate the op- ment in Guatemala led families living in shelters to con- portunities that exist for informing the community and template returning to the high-risk area. promoting its participation in decision making. The population must also be informed about the types 14. Community Participation of hazards and risks to which they are exposed. The cases studied illustrate how the type of hazard demands As in any social process, successful programs cannot different efforts to make people aware about the risk. be designed and executed without active community For example, where phenomena occur regularly (such participation. This helps residents (a) become aware of as floods), people were well aware of the problem and the type of impacts they may face in the resettlement its consequences. However, where the hazards were la- process, (b) analyze different resettlement options, (c) tent (such as landslides in Bogotá), or families were not manifest their expectations and (d) find solutions with affected by a particular event (such as Tropical Storm the team responsible for the process. Participation is the Stan, in Guatemala) but were still at risk, a major effort path to free and informed consent and legitimizes the was needed to help people understand and acknowledge decisions made. the dangers. In these cases, the institutions made a great effort to sensitize people. The risk assessment studies In addition, participation make possible to reach agree- were presented and discussed with those potentially af- ments on the nature and scope of programs, share re- fected, field trips were conducted to observe problems sponsibilities for their implementation, and jointly in situ, and awareness campaigns were launched to help monitor and evaluate them. Such agreements may be households understand their serious exposure to risk recorded in minutes or documents that help those in- and the need to be resettled. volved clarify their roles and responsibilities. For exam- ple, in Argentina and Colombia, families signed agree- Through information and dialogue, the possibilities ments to participate in the process and assumed their for participation are defined. For example, communi- responsibilities. ties participated in the census (Brazil); in monitoring risk (Colombia); in finding solutions, such as procur- To enable the participation, the population must be in- ing land for resettlement (Guatemala) and searching for formed from the beginning about the studies and activi- housing on the market (Colombia); in designing houses ties to be conducted, the institutions involved and the and new settlements (Guatemala); in building their own team responsible for the program. In each case studied, houses (Argentina); and in performing specific activi- the implementing agencies developed information and ties tailored to the particular characteristics of a project, communication strategies. In Argentina, teams from such as the community participating in archeological the municipal units informed potential beneficiaries conservation (Chuk Muk, in Guatemala), or helping re- about the program and guided them throughout the store the environment in the nueva Esperanza district process. In Brazil, opportunities for community par- (Bogotá -Colombia). ticipation were created in the Resettlement Advisory Council and the social management team held periodic Recognizing community organization and participation meetings with the communities to reach consensus on patterns and structures, is not only a sign of respect but major issues such as the criteria to adjudicate houses, the also builds and strengthens solid relations and trust. A parties’ rights and duties, and the resettlement schedule. key example occurred in Guatemala, where multi-cul- In Colombia, the community’s elected leaders partici- tural management, in which - indigenous identity pat- pated in the “Technical-Social Working Group,� offices terns, forms of political organization that combined tra- were established to assist the community in the nueva ditional and contemporary leadership structures, and Chapter 7 Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 113 religious beliefs - converged to create a social organiza- involved housing subsidies for rural and urban popu- tion model for reconstruction. lations, including those special subsidies in Bogotá. These subsidies allowed the administration to include In some cases, community organization had to be pro- the most vulnerable settlers (who had no ability to pay moted in order to achieve sufficient participation. For for their houses in the formal market), so as to protect example, in Argentina, to conduct the self-construction their lives and assets and gain access to legal and safe process, it was necessary to facilitate the community or- housing. ganization thorough groups of 20 families to build 20 houses each one. This facilitated participation and also In these experiences, which involved creating financial ensured that families helped each other to achieve the instruments that targeted the most vulnerable people, program’s goals. a clear message was conveyed with regard to citizens’ rights and the governments’ responsibility toward ex- Community participation is also crucial for monitor- cluded and poor people, core features of any form of ing the programs. Communities that have been histori- comprehensive risk management program. cally marginalized do not trust government institutions; thus, by including them in monitoring and verification at every stage of the process facilitates management and 16. Private Sector Participation enables the communities become aware of obstacles and The cases also show the various types of private sector contribute to solving them. participation in the resettlement processes. These includ- ed conducting risk assessments or socio-economic and cultural studies of the population (Colombia and Guate- 15. Sources of Financing mala); providing services, where private firms were hired The cases illustrate the various ways that resettlement to implement the social management program (Brazil); can be financed. These include funds from government constructing houses (Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala); budgets, multilateral bank loans, grants from interna- and providing construction materials (Argentina). tional agencies, and community contributions. These sources were tapped in all the cases in one way or an- Especially noteworthy are the partnerships, as in Argen- other, and to varying degrees. tina and Colombia, between the institutions responsible for the resettlement and the private sector. The agree- Government allocations can be provided in different ments signed in Argentina by the provincial emergency ways: They can be (a) a special allocation such as in coordination units and private suppliers of construction Guatemala, when the government altered its national materials (that involved carefully monitored and con- budget to respond to the devastation from Tropical trolled use of voucher mechanisms), helped guarantee Storm Stan, (b) counterpart funds for loans from multi- transparency in the use of resources. The partnerships lateral agencies (Brazil and Argentina), or (c) funds for with private construction companies in Colombia using emergency response and prevention (Colombia). This “real estate window displays� to present their projects to last mechanism is regarded as the one most likely to the communities benefited both the construction com- ensure program sustainability. With regard to the spe- panies and the families who thus had a wider range of cific sources, Brazil created the Special Fund for Public options from which to choose. Calamities (FUNCAP) and Colombia established the National Calamity Fund. Also, Bogotá established an 17. Control of Reclaimed Areas Emergency Prevention and Response Fund (FOPAE), which receives 0.5% of the Capital District’s current tax After at-risk populations are resettled, the reclaimed ar- revenues, as well as other contributions. eas should be rehabilitated and carefully monitored. If this does not occur, costly new problems will arise for To finance the housing needs of low-income families in governments, institutions and territorial entities; and high-risk areas, one interesting mechanism (Colombia) the efforts to reduce disaster risk will be vanished. 114 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America Thus, the reclaimed areas must be earmarked for ap- lottery in which local authorities or public notaries propriate use and strict controls must be applied over took part. After this, families were given vouchers to new settlements. To this end, the countries adopted dif- purchase construction materials (rather than cash), ferent approaches. In Argentina, Colombia and Guate- subject to tight controls by the entities responsible. mala, regulations were issued banning new settlements In Colombia, the families that chose new houses built in such areas; in Guatemala, the government prohibited by private contractors or pre-existing houses, also did investments by public agencies and international orga- not receive cash; instead, they authorized the entity in nizations in the high-risk areas. In Argentina, rehabili- charge to transfer the money directly to the seller. An- tated areas were turned into public green zones, includ- other important mechanism (in Brazil, Colombia and ing parks and sports grounds, which the municipalities Guatemala), was to form committees, commissions or agreed to oversee and maintain. In Colombia, Andean working groups made up of representatives of the local forest lands were incorporated into a municipal ecologi- authorities, government entities and the community, cal park and people from the community were hired to which enabled all participants to monitor and oversee do the rehabilitation. In Brazil, the rehabilitated areas the programs. were used for infrastructure, such as stream canaliza- tion projects or roads. Thus, it is important to regulate Accountability is tightly linked to transparency. For land use, ensure that authorities enforce the rules, and example, the public acts of accountability organized at earmark these areas for public use in ways that benefit both the national and departmental level in Guatemala the community—all of which helps prevent new settle- played a major part in building confidence among com- ments in at-risk areas. munities, the government, and other institutions. 18. Transparency and 19. Documenting and Accountability Systematizing Experiences Transparency is critical to the programs’ success and The analysis presented above shows some lessons of the for confidence-building with communities and stake- cases studied. It would be important to promote prac- holders. Although the entire process must be transpar- tices in order to document and evaluate resettlement ex- ent, it is particularly vital when it comes to determining periences around the world to identify strategies, meth- which families will participate, the types and amounts odologies and instruments that will most effectively of benefits to be delivered, and the use of resources. In benefit the communities and governments. It will also Argentina, where resources were insufficient to cover allow replicating experiences and continually improve all the families, beneficiaries were chosen by a public practices. Chapter 7 Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 115 Glossary* Acceptable risk Climate change The level of potential losses that a society or community (a) The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change considers acceptable given existing social, economic, (IPCC) defines climate change as: “a change in the political, cultural, technical and environmental condi- state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by us- tions. ing statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or Adaptation the variability of its properties, and that persists for The adjustment in natural or human systems in re- an extended period, typically decades or longer. Cli- sponse to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their mate change may be due to natural internal processes effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial op- or external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic portunities. changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use�. Biological hazard Process or phenomenon of organic origin or conveyed (b) The United Nations Framework Convention on Cli- by biological vectors, including exposure to pathogenic mate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change as micro-organisms, toxins and bioactive substances that “a change of climate which is attributed directly or may cause loss of life, injury, illness or other health im- indirectly to human activity that alters the composi- pacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, tion of the global atmosphere and which is in ad- social and economic disruption, or environmental dam- dition to natural climate variability observed over age. comparable time periods�. Building code Contingency planning A set of ordinances or regulations and associated stan- A management process that analyses specific potential dards intended to control aspects of the design, con- events or emerging situations that might threaten soci- struction, materials, alteration and occupancy of struc- ety or the environment and establishes arrangements in tures that are necessary to ensure human safety and advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate re- welfare, including resistance to collapse and damage. sponses to such events and situations. Capacity Coping capacity The combination of all the strengths, attributes and re- The ability of people, organizations and systems, using sources available within a community, society or orga- available skills and resources, to face and manage ad- nization that can be used to achieve agreed goals. verse conditions, emergencies or disasters. Capacity Development Corrective disaster risk management* The process by which people, organizations and soci- Management activities that address and seek to correct ety systematically stimulate and develop their capacities or reduce disaster risks which are already present. over time to achieve social and economic goals, includ- Critical facilities ing through improvement of knowledge, skills, systems, The primary physical structures, technical facilities and and institutions. systems which are socially, economically or operation- * Reproduced from the UNIDR 2009. Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland. May. Retrieved from: http://unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf 116 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America ally essential to the functioning of a society or commu- ring episodes of changed ocean and weather patterns in nity, both in routine circumstances and in the extreme many parts of the world, often with significant impacts circumstances of an emergency. over many months, such as altered marine habitats, Disaster rainfall changes, floods, droughts, and changes in storm A serious disruption of the functioning of a community patterns. or a society involving widespread human, material, eco- Emergency management nomic or environmental losses and impacts, which ex- The organization and management of resources and re- ceeds the ability of the affected community or society to sponsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, cope using its own resources. in particular preparedness, response and initial recov- Disaster risk ery steps. The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, live- Emergency services lihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a The set of specialized agencies that have specific respon- particular community or a society over some specified sibilities and objectives in serving and protecting people future time period. and property in emergency situations. Disaster risk management Environmental degradation The systematic process of using administrative direc- The reduction of the capacity of the environment to tives, organizations, and operational skills and capaci- meet social and ecological objectives and needs. ties to implement strategies, policies and improved cop- Environmental impact assessment ing capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of Process by which the environmental consequences of a hazards and the possibility of disaster. proposed project or programme are evaluated, under- Disaster risk reduction taken as an integral part of planning and decision mak- The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks ing processes with a view to limiting or reducing the through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the adverse impacts of the project or programme. causal factors of disasters, including through reduced Exposure exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people People, property, systems, or other elements present in and property, wise management of land and the en- hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses. vironment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. Extensive risk The widespread risk associated with the exposure of Disaster risk reduction plan dispersed populations to repeated or persistent haz- A document prepared by an authority, sector, organi- ard conditions of low or moderate intensity, often of a zation or enterprise that sets out goals and specific ob- highly localized nature, which can lead to debilitating jectives for reducing disaster risks together with related cumulative disaster impacts. actions to accomplish these objectives. Forecast Early warning system Definite statement or statistical estimate of the likely oc- The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate currence of a future event or conditions for a specific area. timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened Geological hazard by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in Geological process or phenomenon that may cause loss sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss. of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic Ecosystem services disruption, or environmental damage. The benefits that people and communities obtain from ecosystems. Greenhouse gases Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural El Niño-Southern Oscillation phenomenon and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation of A complex interaction of the tropical Pacific Ocean and thermal infrared radiation emitted by the Earth’s sur- the global atmosphere that results in irregularly occur- face, the atmosphere itself, and by clouds. Glossary 117 Hazard Prevention A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other and related disasters. health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and Prospective disaster risk management services, social and economic disruption, or environ- Management activities that address and seek to avoid mental damage. the development of new or increased disaster risks. Hydrometeorological hazard Public awareness Process or phenomenon of atmospheric, hydrological The extent of common knowledge about disaster risks, or oceanographic nature that may cause loss of life, in- the factors that lead to disasters and the actions that can jury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of be taken individually and collectively to reduce expo- livelihoods and services, social and economic disrup- sure and vulnerability to hazards. tion, or environmental damage. Recovery Intensive risk The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, The risk associated with the exposure of large concen- of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disas- trations of people and economic activities to intense ter-affected communities, including efforts to reduce hazard events, which can lead to potentially catastrophic disaster risk factors. disaster impacts involving high mortality and asset loss. Residual risk Land-use planning The risk that remains in unmanaged form, even when The process undertaken by public authorities to iden- effective disaster risk reduction measures are in place, tify, evaluate and decide on different options for the use and for which emergency response and recovery capaci- of land, including consideration of long term economic, ties must be maintained. social and environmental objectives and the implica- tions for different communities and interest groups, and Resilience the subsequent formulation and promulgation of plans The ability of a system, community or society exposed that describe the permitted or acceptable uses. to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recov- er from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient Mitigation manner, including through the preservation and resto- The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of ration of its essential basic structures and functions. hazards and related disasters. Response National platform for disaster risk reduction The provision of emergency services and public assis- A generic term for national mechanisms for coordina- tance during or immediately after a disaster in order to tion and policy guidance on disaster risk reduction that save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety are multi-sectoral and inter-disciplinary in nature, with and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people af- public, private and civil society participation involving fected. all concerned entities within a country. Retrofitting Natural hazard Reinforcement or upgrading of existing structures to Natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of become more resistant and resilient to the damaging ef- life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, fects of hazards. loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage. Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its Preparedness negative consequences. The knowledge and capacities developed by govern- ments, professional response and recovery organiza- Risk assessment tions, communities and individuals to effectively antici- A methodology to determine the nature and extent of pate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, risk by analyzing potential hazards and evaluating exist- imminent or current hazard events or conditions. ing conditions of vulnerability that together could po- 118 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America tentially harm exposed people, property, services, liveli- Sustainable development hoods and the environment on which they depend. Development that meets the needs of the present with- Risk management out compromising the ability of future generations to The systematic approach and practice of managing un- meet their own needs. certainty to minimize potential harm and loss. Technological hazard Risk transfer A hazard originating from technological or industrial The process of formally or informally shifting the finan- conditions, including accidents, dangerous procedures, cial consequences of particular risks from one party to infrastructure failures or specific human activities, that another whereby a household, community, enterprise may cause loss of life, injury, illness or other health im- or state authority will obtain resources from the other pacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, party after a disaster occurs, in exchange for ongoing social and economic disruption, or environmental dam- or compensatory social or financial benefits provided to age. that other party. Vulnerability Socio-natural hazard The characteristics and circumstances of a community, The phenomenon of increased occurrence of certain system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging geophysical and hydrometeorological hazard events, effects of a hazard. such as landslides, flooding, land subsidence and drought, that arise from the interaction of natural haz- ards with overexploited or degraded land and environ- mental resources. Structural and non-structural measures Structural measures: Any physical construction to re- duce or avoid possible impacts of hazards, or application of engineering techniques to achieve hazard resistance and resilience in structures or systems. Non-structural measures: Any measure not involving physical con- struction that uses knowledge, practice or agreement to reduce risks and impacts, in particular through policies and laws, public awareness raising, training and educa- tion. Glossary 119 About the Authors and Contributors Haris Sanahuja, an Argentinean now living in a book on Socio-Economic Impacts of Large Projects: Panama, has a B.A. in Biology and an M.A. in Geography Assessment and Management (1999). (ecorrea@ from the University of Costa Rica. He has 15 years of worldbank.org/correaelena@gmail.com) international experience in sustainable development, particularly in, disaster risk reduction He has consulted Rómulo Pérez, an Argentinean, is an architect with an M.A. in Urban and Regional Planning from for international organizations, including The World the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). He has lectured Bank, sub-regional organizations like the Center for at both the UBA and Argentina’s Catholic University. Coordination of Natural Disaster Prevention in Central Having 18 years’ experience with urban and regional America (CEPREDENAC) and United Nations agencies, planning, he is currently doing research at the UBA’s such as the UN Development Programme’s Bureau for Higher Institute for Urban Planning, Regional Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP/BCPR) and the Studies and Environment. He has worked on projects Secretariat of the UN International Strategy for involving the recovery of degraded urban areas and Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). Also, he worked at the the restructuring/expansion of the Central Area of UNISDR headquarters in Geneva until 2005, and as Avellaneda; Argentina’s environmental strategies the Regional Policy Advisor of UNISDR Americas, program; and the master plan for the River Salado Basin based in Panama, until 2009. His principal research, in Buenos Aires province. Recent publications include: either as co-author or reviewer, includes the UN Derecho de superficie y dimensión social de la propiedad publications Living with Risk: A Global Review of del suelo. Un instrumento para la implementación de Disaster Reduction Initiatives (UNISDR) and Reducing políticas públicas activas de desarrollo urbano ambiental. Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development (UNDP/ (2007) [Surface Rights and the Social Dimension of BCPR), and over a dozen scientific articles in journals Land Ownership. A Tool for Implementing Proactive specializing in disaster risk-management and ecology. Public Policies in Environmental Urban Development], (haris.sanahuja@gmail.com) Reconfiguración institucional de gobiernos urbanos, el caso de los grandes aglomerados (co-authored, 2007) Elena Correa, a Colombian, is a psychologist [Institutional Reconfiguration of City Governments; The and specialist in regional development planning, which Case of the Large Urban Centers] and Estructuración she studied at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogota. institucional para la planificación y gestión integradas She has over 25 years’ experience with social impact del aglomerado urbano de Buenos Aires (co-authored, assessments of development projects and resettlement. 2005) [Institutional Structuring for Integrated Planning Having joined The World Bank in 2000 as a Senior and Management of the Buenos Aires Urban Center] Social Development Specialist, she has worked in the (romuloperez@fibertel.com.ar). Latin American and the Caribbean Region for seven years. At present, she is in the Social Development Ignacio Zelmeister, an Argentinean, is an Department working on involuntary resettlement architect with a post-graduate degree in Metropolitan caused by development projects, natural disasters and Environmental Management from the National conflict. Before joining The World Bank, she taught at University of Buenos Aires. He has worked for 17 years several Colombian universities, worked for 12 years as at the Emergency Coordination Unit of Argentina’s Coordinator for Resettlement and Social Programs in Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and two large hydro-electric projects in Latin America, and Services on the resettlement of the very poor living provided independent consulting services for assessing in areas affected by flooding and on the planning and managing socioeconomic impacts in complex and coordination of housing programs using self- projects in several countries. Her publications include construction and mutual assistance. He has also 120 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America worked in private sector management positions in at the University of San Carlos, Director of the Farusac construction companies. He is a co-author of: Viviendas Research Center, professor and founder of M.A. por autoconstrucción. La experiencia en el programa de programs in Human Settlements and Environmental protección contra las inundaciones [Self-Built Homes. Protection. He has also been a consultant for UNDP, Experience with the Flood Protection Program] and the World Bank and the GTZ. He has won national and Arquitectura para la emergencia social y ambiental international awards for his work promoting housing [Architecture for Social and Environmental Emergencies] for low-income families. Publications include: Historia (zelig@fibertel.com.ar nachozel@gmail.com). de la Arquitectura contemporánea de Guatemala (1997) [The History of Contemporary Guatemalan Architecture] Ronaldo Marques, a Brazilian, studied pub- and Arquitectura vernácula guatemalteca (1991) lic administration and has a post-graduate degree in [Guatemalan Vernacular Architecture]. He has been economics from the University of Campinas. He has editor/director of the journals Resultados and En obra, 25 years’ experience in the field of socio- environmen- published by the Architecture Faculty of the University tal studies. Currently, he is the Coordinator of Brazil’s of San Carlos. Currently, he is Sustainable Development Special Committee on the Environment of Companhia and Institutional Relations Manager at Cementos Paulista de Trens Metropolitanos (CPTM). In 2004, he Progreso S.A. (eduardoaguirrem@gmail.com). served as Municipal Secretary for Services of the Mu- nicipality of Sao Paulo (ro.mm@terra.com.br). Narzha Poveda Gómez, a Colombian, has a B.A. in Social Sciences and an M.A. in Educational Marilia Scombatti, a Brazilian, studied so- and Social Development from the National Pedagogical ciology and has an M.A. in Urban Planning from the University of Colombia. She has 29 years’ experience University of the Sorbonne. She has 30 years’ experi- working on social development projects and ence with involuntary resettlement projects. She has environmental impact studies, as well as teaching post- been a consultant for private sector enterprises, the In- graduate courses, and consultancy work. She worked ter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. for nine years on resettlement of populations at risk Her areas of expertise include: social and environmental or disaster, coordinated interdisciplinary teams and impact mitigation; resettlement plans; media programs; formulated public policies. She also participated in the environmental training; and the monitoring and evalu- preparation of a resettlement toolkit and roadmap. She ation of social program outcomes. She has worked in has also prepared and conducted national and regional Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hondu- socioeconomic studies (narzha@gmail.com). ras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (marilias- combatti@gmail.com). Sergio Iván Carmona Maya (1962-2009), a Colombian, was an anthropologist who studied at the Eduardo Aguirre Cantero, a Guatemalan, University of Antioquia and obtained an M.A. in Ibero- is an architect who graduated from the University San American Political Systems and an Advanced Studies Carlos de Guatemala and specializes in risk management. Diploma in Governance and Democracy. For 15 years He has served in several government posts, including he worked as a strategy and development specialist on the Manager of the Office of the President and the Vice inter-connected electricity grids in Colombia. He was President of the Republic. From 2006-2008 he was a World Bank consultant, an advisor in Colombia to Coordinator General of Guatemala’s Reconstruction several government institutions. He was a professor, or- with Transformation Plan following Hurricane Stan. ganizer of the M.A. degree in Environmental Manage- He was also National Coordinator of Pro Habitat ment at the National University of Colombia, and the (Production and Housing), a UN and Guatemalan director-founder of its Laboratory on Environmental government project to design 60 urban centers for Conflicts and Development. He wrote and co-authored risk prevention and mitigation. He was National books and articles on subjects relating to the social and Coordinator of the reconstruction and risk management cultural dimensions of environmental impacts, anthro- component of the municipal local development pology and sustainable development, social manage- program supported by the German Cooperation agency ment, inter-cultural relations, conflict mediation and (GTZ), and Assistant Secretary of the Peace Secretariat. environmental management in development projects. He has also served as Dean of the Architecture Faculty He died in December 2009. About the Authors 121 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster Experiences from Latin America The Latin American and the Caribbean Region faces two increasingly stark trends: rapid urbanization and frequent natural disasters. Combined, they substantially increase the intensive risk of disasters to which thousands of people are exposed. Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America presents case studies from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala that offer an overview of the countries’ main hazards and their disaster risk-management systems. Also, they illustrate how preventive resettlement has been incorporated as a disaster risk-reduction measure, and describe resettlement alternatives, institutional arrangements, sources of financing and recovery and control of reclaimed areas. These experiences provide important lessons for future interventions and can help other countries currently developing risk reduction strategies. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433, USA Telephone: 202-458-0268 Facsimile: 202-522-3227 Web site: www.gfdrr.org