Input to the Yemen Policy Note no. 4. on Inclusive Services Delivery Addressing the Challenge of Extreme Water Scarcity for Reconstruction and Beyond WOLD BANK GROUP 1 B Table of Contents Background 1 Introduction: sector situation before conflict 1 Institutional arrangements 2 Financial sustainability 4 Key service delivery issues 5 Conflict-related impacts and challenges 7 Key principles of re-engagement and reconstruction 8 Urban water and sanitation 9 Rural water and sanitation 10 Way forward: shirt to medium term 10 Short-term and medium term for Reconstruction and Restoration 10 Annex 1: Description of the institutional arrangements 13 i ii 1. Background already a driver of conflict. The primary sources of water in Yemen are rainfall and •• This note is a part of a series of pol- groundwater; there is no perennial surface icy notes prepared by the World Bank water supply. The annual renewable water in anticipation of a post-conflict transi- resource is about 2.5 billion cubic meters tion in Yemen. These notes aim to iden- (bcm), of which 60% is groundwater, and tify immediate priorities for stabilization, the rest is surface water. The current an- recovery and restoration of services and nual water use is about 3.9 bcm with an infrastructure in the aftermath of Yemen’s overall annual deficit of 1.4 bcm (MAI, current conflict. A subset within these notes 2013). This deficit is bridged by withdraw- specifically focused on ways to restore ing fossil groundwater resources, which service delivery in an inclusive manner reduce water table by an average of 1-7 immediately after conflict. As such, these meters per year. Several major cities, such notes examined short-to-medium-term in- as Sana’a the capital city and Taiz city, stitutional challenges facing the restora- are experiencing drying up of wells and tion and improvement of service across are having difficulty in sourcing new bulk sectors. They focused on the immediate water. The agricultural sector consumes post-conflict priorities and challenges fac- about 90 percent of water resources (ES- ing Energy, Water, Telecommunication, CWA, 2015:32); (CES, 2008) Education, Health, and Transport sectors in restoring services while also contribut- ••Yemen is one of the few countries in ing to higher-level objectives of addressing the world where poverty has increased systemic inequities and reinforcing trust over the last decade According to the lat- in the state. These notes make practical est Household Budget Surveys data, the suggestions to the Government of Yemen headcount poverty rate in Yemen stands at and international development partners to 34.1 percent of the population in 2014. This provide immediate post-conflict support to headcount is an increase from 2005 when the ensure empowerment, accountability, and comparable estimate was 26.6 percent. Ow- better governance in service delivery. ing to the escalation of violence, conflict and fragility, which has severely impacted eco- nomic activity in Yemen, poverty is expected •• The current paper focuses specifically to have increased further, and perhaps more on steps required to restore Water servic- sharply since 2014. Many of the poor are fac- es in a more inclusive manner immediately ing increasing difficulty in paying for water and after the conflict ends Yemen. sanitation services. Real GDP declined by 28 percent in 2015 alone and is likely to have de- 2. Introduction: sector situation clined further in 2016. before conflict ••According to the recent Yemen •• The conflict-related shock comes on WASH Poverty Diagnostic, access to top of a systemic water resource crisis, WSS has increased; however, due to 1 conflict about 19.4 million people lack ment is provided in Annex 1 and below fig- adequate access to clean water and ure 1 provides a schematic of Urban water sanitation, including 8.2 million who service and Figure 2 a schematic of rural are in acute need. When comparing HBS water service. 2014 with HBS 2005, and DHS 2013, im- provements in access are seen across the •• Private sector is still not well orga- board for the years 2005-2014. However, nized and civil society is somewhat despite improvements for the pre-conflict represented. The private sector is mainly period analyzed, overall levels of access represented by owners of wells and tank- to water and sanitation are very low inter- er trucks who pump and transport water nationally. resources. The private sector has no for- mal structure and no major progress has •• Most available data is pre-conflict, been achieved by MWE and LWCs in cre- and institutional analysis is based ating a partnership with the private sector largely on pre-conflict knowledge. The to provide water services in urban areas. situation is likely to be significantly worse Civil society is somewhat represented by a than presented by existing data. This poli- broad range of nongovernmental and non- cy note explores broad institutional, finan- profit organizations that are involved with cial and service delivery challenges facing water industry including: Water User As- Yemen’s water sector prior to the conflict, sociations (WUAs) for the sub-basin level; supported by DHS and HBS data, and pro- Water User Groups (WUGs) for wells. poses possible options to contribute to re- storing service delivery Urban water and sanitation •• The service delivery in urban wa- ter supply and sanitation is mainly Institutional arrangements through the Local Water Corporations •• The water supply and sanitation de- (LWCs); however, the private sector (in- livery has been undertaken through a formal) does fill gaps in service from mixture of centralized, deconcentrated, the LCWs. About 23 Local Water Cor- and locally managed service delivery. porations (LWCs) and 10 autonomous The two main ministries at national level water utilities serve about 95% of urban are the Ministry of Water and Environment households, working alongside the Local (MWE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Ir- Councils of the Ministry of Local Adminis- rigation (MAI), and a water authority at tration (MLA) for urban and rural districts. the intermediate level, the National Wa- The National Water Sector Strategy and ter Resources Authority (NWRA), which Investment Program (NWSSIP, 2004, up- sometimes manages water resources dated in 2009) has the following objectives at the country level. The implementation for urban water and sanitation service: (i) agencies at governorates/regional level Increase access for the entire urban popu- include branch offices of NWRA, NWSA, lation, through investment and by involving GARWSP (belongs to MWE), and MAI. the private sector in both service provision The Basin committees are cross-cutting and outsourcing of functions; Put utilities institutions to coordinate the works of all on a business footing whilst keeping ser- water authorities pertaining to basins and vices sustainable and affordable; and (iii) to implement action plans. The detailed Ensure affordable access to poor. description of the Institutional arrange- 2 Figure 1: Schematic of urban water and sanitation service delivery system Financing Public and donor financing Private NWSA 23 Local Corporations and 11 annexed Private Service provider and 16 Private vendors Autonomous Utilities networks branches Water source Public wells and springs Private wells and springs 3%: 0.2 9% : 0.7 Population served 28%: 2.2 million 60%: 4.7 million people million million as primary source people people people Rural water and sanitation •• Several government authorities are use in rural areas based on a demand- responsible for rural development, in- responsive approach (DRA) and on a cluding constructing water projects for cost- sharing mechanism through commu- domestic use in rural areas. These au- nity-based organizations.  It fosters the es- thorities are the General Authority of Ru- tablishment of water user groups (WUGs) ral Water Supply Projects (GARWSP), the so as to engage communities in choosing Social Fund for Development (SFD), the the most appropriate technology, to par- Public Works Project (PWP), and the Min- ticipate in the execution of the project, and istry of Local Administration (MLA) to manage them afterward in a sustainable via the Local Council of districts.  Several way. Prior to the crisis, GARWSP was sup- donors are also involved in developing porting about two thirds of the publicly fi- water resources in rural areas including nanced rural water and sanitation schemes the World Bank, UNICEF, The Nether- and had responsibility for coordinating all lands, Germany, and Japan.  The respon- public interventions in the sector. (Heun & sibility of the GARWSP is to coordinate Vulto, 2008); (JICA, 2007); (World Bank, the efforts of the SFD, PWP and the do- 2006a). The National Water Sector Strat- nors to work together in a cooperative and egy and Investment Program (NWSSIP, complementary manner toward achieving 2004, updated in 2009) has the follow- a sustainable rural development (Heun & ing objectives for Rural water supply and Vulto, 2008); (JICA, 2007); (World Bank, sanitation service: (i) Rapid expansion of 2006a). The primary function of the GAR- coverage with increased investment and WSP is to build water projects for domestic a pro-poor bias, and with a transparent Figure 2: Schematic of rural water and sanitation service delivery system 3 investment application process and de- cially supported eight LWCs (out of 16) in centralized approvals; (ii) Making services 2012 and 2013 to finance their budget def- inclusive, affordable and sustainable, and icits for both recurrent and capital expen- (iii) Improving implementation (a) GAR- ditures. The size of subsides varies from WSP to be reformed and decentralized to one LWC to another depending on the governorate branches, and (b) Common size of the network system and the finan- approaches amongst the three public sec- cial and administrative capacities. Some tor providers (which together put up more of LWCs depend heavily on central bud- than 90% of schemes). get for covering their operation expenses. The central subsidy for capital investment ranges from a minimum of 7% to a maxi- Financial sustainability mum of 88% of total capital expenditure in 2013. All LWCs rely greatly on the cen- Urban water and sanitation ••The MWE is responsible for setting tar- tral government to finance water projects iff policy for water and sanitation services in either from government’s budget or donor Yemen. The Updated NWSSIP (2009-2015) agency’s funds. emphasizes the importance to increase ac- cessibility to service water supply at an afford- able tariff that reflects the real value of water •• Prior to conflict, there was already so that to help in allocating water resources a constraint on collection and setting more efficiently and in achieving fiscal viability tariff at the right level in part because of utilities. The strategy hints that the water of the level of service, with conflict the tariff would gradually increase at an affordable LWCs have reduced to level of service increment to move toward full cost recovery due to damages, limited access to en- of capital and O&M over time. Based on the ergy, further reduction in collection and NWSSIP guidelines, the MWE uses two rules reduced government ability to funds to confirm and approve tariff levels: (1) a cost services. Although a Local Water Corpo- recovery rule to achieve coverage needs, and ration (LWC) affiliated with Local Council (2) an affordability rule to cap tariffs for water can submit a tariff adjustment proposal to and sanitation at a maximum of 5% of house- hold budgets to take care of the poor segment its governorate’s Board, and then present of the society. The sanitation charge usually it to the MWE for final confirmation, allow- ranges from 70% to 80% of the water tariff de- ing the LWCs to be partially free to adjust pending on the infrastructure investment and their tariff according to the needs of cover- O&M cost of each Local WSS Corporation.  ing the increasing service cost. only four There is also a monthly connection fee of YR LWCs have an average tariff greater than 500 plus a fee of 5 % for the Local Council. average production cost including Mocha, Mokalla, Aden and Amran (GIZ 2016). As a result, the private sector (informal) has •• Central Government Subsidy for Ur- filled the gap and provided service. This ban Water Sector: Generally, the tariffs service, however, is more costly (reported of public LWCs is still highly subsi- to be ten time higher) and with limited wa- dized and it is very low when compared ter quality oversight. to the cost of per cubic meter from tanker truck. Ward et al., (2009: 41) mentioned that “In Sana’a, public network water costs Rural Water and Sanitation only one tenth (1/10) the cost of tanker •• In its efforts to increase the access of water.” The central government has finan- rural residents to clean and sufficient water 4 supplies, the government reoriented GAR- part of which is within the LCs power WSP under the MWE to focus on devel- to achieve oping water schemes for the countryside.   Affordable services depend on in- The primary objective of GARWSP is to creased efficiency where options are build water projects for rural areas and limited train rural residents at the project location  A business approach ultimately re- to operate it at their own expense. It has quires higher levels of cost recovery no mechanisms to charge tariffs to recov- which are generally opposed by con- er capital costs or O&M costs. Only few sumers and by the local representa- rural water system that generate income tives on LC Boards  Protection of the poor requires high- for GAWSRP. Therefore, the GARWASP er levels of government subsidy and mostly relies on central budgets for capital new business models, especially PPP, investment and recurrent cost. which have encountered many con- straints and little political support. Key service delivery issues  With conflict all of the above are till existing and the LWCs have less In Urban water and sanitation service: mean to provide service, more dif-  Government and donors have given ficulties to access energy (needed the LCs a clear mandate: (1) afford- for pumping), repair damaged infra- able service expansion and provision; structure, and maintain infrastruc- (2) a business approach as (ultimately) ture, and limited funding from the self-sufficient utilities; and (3) protec- government has reduced the human tion of the poor. There are, however, resources in the LWCs. The private structural problems that impede the re- sector (informal) stepped in, but quired improvements in service levels with higher cost for people and no and there is not enough cost recovery oversight on water quality delivered. capacity in the system to generate the resources for an LC pro-poor strategy. Key issues for RWSS: Not surprisingly, LC investment is actu- ally anti-poor.  Although data show improvements,  Expanding services requires heavy access to safe water and sanitation investment which government cannot remain very low by regional standards provide. and well below urban levels.  But, in order to expand services,  The sustainability of investment in need to secure new water resources the rural water sector is worrisome, especially in the high populated ur- given the data above as well as anec- ban centers located in the western dotal evidence that shows that when mountainous part of the country such GARWSP drills wells, it does not find as Sana’a, Taiz, Ibb, Dhamar, Amran, water or for those wells that do find wa- Hajja, Al-Mahwait, Saddah, etc. ter, some of the wells go dry within 3-5  The transfer of water from rural to years. These results could in part be high populated urban areas is a chal- attributed to drilling without adequate lenges given the strong oppositions of feasibility studies and illegal drilling by rural communities. powerful farmers.  Quality service provision depends  GARWSP project cycle is complex on adequate financing, efficiency and and long, with projects taking up to adequate bulk water supplies, only six years to complete. Further, most of the donors who provided funds to 5 GARWSP did not have the adequate dwindles fiduciary or technical supervision  GARWSP has adopted social mobi- mechanisms, hence the impact and lization and community capacity build- sustainability of these investments is ing only half-heartedly and women’s questionable. role in project section and manage-  There is little cooperation amongst ment remains limited agencies and no joint programming.  Sanitation and health education are  Community ownership has in- generally neglected in favor of meeting creased but competition amongst com- engineering and financial targets munities inherent in DRA marginalizes  With conflict, all of the above is- the poorest, the more remote areas sues are still a concern and the and the most water-scarce locations GARWSP has less means to build  GARWSP is reluctant to tap the en- turnkey water service delivery and ergies of CBOs and NGOs, and is still sanitation, to support communities operating with a more top-down ap- in managing the water and sanita- proach. tion systems, and limited funding  The range of technologies offered from the government has reduced is limited and focused on the higher the human resources. cost, often unsustainable groundwater pumping sources, and schemes are vulnerable to failure as the resource Box 1: Damage Need Assessment Phase 1 In this damage assessment for the WASH sector, the major asset classes considered included water towers/tanks, water pumping stations, water reservoirs, waste water treatment plants, pumping stations, building and offices, tube wells and treatment facili- ties as indicated on below table. Because of difficulties in assessing the functionality of sub-surface piped networks through satellite imagery and because damage to the electric grid has compromised the delivery of water services, damage information on .sub-surface water supply, drainage and sewage was limited Damage costs to WASH facilities in Sana’a, Taiz and Aden ranged from US$ 78 million to US$ 96 million as indicated on below table. Due to a lack of reliable data and access on the ground, damage costs to Zinjibar’s WASH facilities could not be es- .timated Table . City-Specific Damage Cost in the WASH Sector WASH Low Estimate )Cost (US$M City )High Estimate (US$M )(US$M Sana’a 22 24 27 Aden 48 53 59 Taiz 9 10 11 Total 78 87 96 .The actual damage costs might even be higher Most baseline, unit cost and damage information for this assessment originated from the .water and sanitation local corporations in Sana’a, Aden and Taiz 6 3. Conflict-related impacts and to searching for additional water sources, challenges mainly collecting water from Mosques or from donated standpipes/tanks, or pur- •• The political instability and armed chasing water from private tanker trucks conflict that erupted across the coun- or harvesting rainwater (Donaghy, 2015); try since early 2011 have noticeably ag- (Al-Mujahed et al, 2015). gravated water service delivery. It has •• Additional challenges faced by wa- led to direct and indirect effects on water ter services. According to various media infrastructure and water management op- outlet sources including TV/press inter- erations. The MWE published the latest views with local water corporations (mul- cost estimate of damages on water infra- tiple sources) indicating that many more structures as of February 2016 indicating water utilities have partially or totally halt- that the total costs can reach to more than ed services during 2015 not because of $170 million (MWE, 2016). The Damage any physical damages but due to the lack Needs Assessment (phase-1) prepared by of fuel supplies, long periods of electrical the donor community indicates that water outages, a huge lack of revenue collec- infrastructure, including distribution sys- tion, water theft, tampering water meters, tems, pumping stations, water tanks, and and high absenteeism among unmotivat- well-fields, were heavily damaged in some ed technical staff who must work without cities and towns, most notably in the cities salaries. of Aden, Taiz, Zinjubar, and Sana’a.  Such damage has disrupted water deliveries in these four cities. The Damage Needs As- •• The business of private tanker trucks sessment provided a sense of how the in- has been flourishing over the past five frastructure were damaged, some informa- years in both rural and urban areas, and tion from social media on how the service is currently the major source of domestic delivery got impacted, even if these are water in many cities and towns including anecdotal evidence it does illustrate the Sana’a, Taiz, Ibb, Mahwait, and Manakha.  range of deterioration of service. Indeed, Even though the private water tanker it was already pre-conflict situation that Ye- trucks, like any other business, suffer from men’s public water-distribution networks the high prices and the shortages of fuel, suffered from chronic intermittent deliv- they have leveraged their comparative ad- ery, but the conflict has extended such in- vantage to purchase fuel from the black termittency to the point where thousands market to continue their operation (Alshar- of households across the country resort mani, 2015). Fuel and other price rises has impelled water tanker prices to more than Figure 4: LWC in Hadramout request customers to double: “the price of a water truck delivery pay their water bills was YR2,000 in parts of Al Hodeida before the conflict, it is now YR8,000. In Sana’a where a delivery cost YR4,500 before, it costs YR10,000 now” (OXFAM, 2015a); (Human Right Consultant, 2015). 7 Sanitation services have also been severely 4. Key principles of re-engage- impacted by the political crisis and armed con- flict. According to multiple media outlet sources, ment and reconstruction the number of sewage system breakdowns have increased dramatically over the past four years •• Yemen is trapped in a vicious ‘cy- due to lack of maintenance caused mainly by the cle of conflict’ with chronically weak reduction of revenues to pay workers. Most of the state institutions directly contributing sewage leaks are taking place in Hadhramout, to the current round of violence. This Hodeida, Taiz, and Aden. Heightened health risk, violence, in turn, has further undermined together with food and water insecurity, have be- state institutions thereby portending even come the daily burden on the majority of Yemeni more violence for the future. The contin- households. ued weakening of national institutions has also diminished chances of sustainable Figure 3: Sewage Breakdown in Hodeida peace as any peace-agreement would be undermined without a strong institutional foundation to safeguard its terms. There- fore, any recovery and reconstruction plan post-conflict would also have to mandato- rily focus on reinforcing state institutions— while addressing urgent humanitarian needs—to prevent the slide back into con- flict. Experiences from around are replete Source: http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/ with instances where the singular focus on news /2015/09/22/780938.html#ixzz4GRYzbdAK post-conflict humanitarian relief—without regard for institutional transformations— Box 2 : Key Reconstruction challenges facing Yemen’s water sector • Water scarcity, exacerbated by conflict, could trigger further conflicts • Supply chain constraints include lack of fuel, power, conveyance, nonrevenue water including increased theft, unpaid salaries (leading to absenteeism), source depletion • Cost of private (tanker) water is high and water quality is questionable • Cholera cases have been linked to lack of WASH services • Physical damage to water distribution system including to pumping stations, wa- ter tanks, and well fields • Lack of fuel supplies and electricity that stop the operation of pumping stations and treatment facilities • Selling of LCs’ appropriation of oil products to the black markets • Vandalization and theft of LC property including cars, water meters, chlorine, oil products, sewage covering caps, copper electrical cables • Proliferation of checkpoints, making it challenging and dangerous for tanker trucks to transport water • Lack of backup generators to operate wells, pumping stations and the treatment in case electricity is cut off • Lack of backup equipment and spare parts for wells and producing plants • Shortage of wells that can be used as backup for emergencies • Insufficient funds to cope with emergency needs 8 have ended up being costly missed oppor- parts of Yemen while also incrementally tunities for breaking the cycle of violence. enhancing inclusiveness, resilience and Box 2: Yemen: Damage assessment in twelve Local Corporations A 2016 study by GIZ reveals the status and needs of Yemen’s urban water and sani- tation system, based on a survey of twelve Local Corporations. There is a very large number of IDPs everywhere and a very difficult socio-economic situation with wide- spread shortages of basic necessities and high prices. A large number of people are without access to improved water and sanitation. The situation of the utilities is very difficult, characterized by negative cash flow, depleted bank balances, budget shortfalls, high levels of unpaid liabilities and receivables, and drying up of fiscal and donor transfers. The difficult cash situation has led to non-payment of salaries and many staff are no longer at work. There has been widespread physical damage and pillaging, with many wells out of operation and widespread destruction of networks, resulting in growing interruptions in water supply and increase in non-revenue water. Investment and expansion are at a halt almost everywhere. Immediate actions required are generally: • Immediate cash infusions to pay salaries and procure supplies and fuel • Repair of major damage • Rehabilitation of wells and pumps • Re-equipment of operation and maintenance capability • Reconstruction of offices • Emergency sanitation and health education provision Source: DAS 2016. Yemen Water Sector: A Managerial, Financial, Human Resource, Operational Structures Assessment of Twelve Water Corporations, and their Affiliated Utilities. GIZ Sana’a/Eschborn •• There is thus a clear need for new thus, the effectiveness of service delivery thinking on Yemen to support more sus- institutions. tainable and inclusive ways of service delivery during conflict and immediate Urban water and sanitation post-conflict periods. In this context, the The DNA and the GIZ-executed DAS have key challenge for Yemen’s development given estimates of damage to urban water and partners is to devise new and innovative sanitation infrastructure in several cities (see ways to support the country, to not only Box 1 DNA and Box 2 the GIZ DAS). These recognize the fundamental causes and estimates will need to be confirmed and a effects of conflict and fragility but also, rapid institutional status assessment will be importantly, enhance the resilience and required to determine what capacity exists in coping capabilities of communities and the LCs or at NWSA for procurement of imme- households. Therefore, these notes on diate needs. Several LCs have specialized inclusive service delivery—including the procurement units, largely to deal with donor current note on Water—propose a new ap- projects, and these may still have capacity. proach that focuses on attending to urgent service delivery needs in the most affected 9 Rural water and sanitation the water sector) is a way for multilat- A localized (deconcentrated and/or decen- erals (such as the Bank) to implement tralized) approach will be essential, but emergency activities. The UN agencies support will be required from central agen- have the ability to manage fiduciary re- cies. A rapid institutional status assessment quirements in fragile context. For exam- will be required to determine what capacity ple, UNICEF also has good relations with each of the main agencies has (GARWSP, the long-standing institutions in the water SFD, PWP) and for what type of intervention. sector in Yemen, and works well through All other capacity should also be included community engagement, which is impor- (UNICEF, Save the Children, Oxfam, national tant in terms of sustainability including NGOs…..) These agencies should be incen- stewardship of Yemen’s very scarce water tivized to form governorate/district level teams resources, and makes best use of the ex- to conduct: (1) joint identification of needs; (2) isting supply chains. UNICEF also allows preparation of a recovery and reconstruction to have the humanitarian activities while in program; (3) implementation, with roles deter- parallel building the need for better water mined by the procurement and field delivery security and contributing to preserving in- capacity of each agency and its skills in the stitutions balancing, essential to keep in- required technology. A possible implemen- stitutions functioning and the social fabric tation set up could be: PWP carries out pro- during protracted conflicts like the one we curement; GARWSP and PWP take care of are being witnessed in Yemen. pumped schemes; SFD takes care of ‘other technology’ schemes such as rainwater har- vesting; and SFD, UNICEF and NGOs take 2. In order to rebuild the institutional care of community mobilization, linkages with capacity, it is important to design emer- health and nutrition, and monitoring and re- gency activities with innovative service porting at local level and capacity rebuilding. delivery arrangements modalities and Security will be needed and government building, to the extent possible local and donors will need to be on board from institutions, NGOs, private sector (for- the outset. The approach and programs will mal and informal) and communities or need to be agreed with government as far rebuilding the lost capacity. In a con- as possible, at both central and local levels. text of fragility, the WDR (2011) indicates Donors will need to be ready to appraise the the need to factor the time needed to re- programs as they are prepared and to provide store/rebuild the institutional capacities. financing and to support procurement as soon As such, working on the water supply and as possible. Donors will need to make sure sanitation service delivery in both urban that actions in the short term are consistent and rural areas requires a combination with – and as far as possible contribute to – of localized efforts and central or decon- the longer term vision of rural water and sani- centrated technical and financial support, tation within NWSSIP. coupled with inter-basin and cross-sector resource cooperation. 5. Way forward: shirt to medi- Indeed, in Yemen water experience over- um term all demonstrates that the sector, like much Short-term and medium term for Recon- of the geography of the country, operates struction and Restoration most naturally at a local, decentralized lev- el. The central control has not often suc- 1. Working with UN agencies on the ceeded, and de facto, citizens have revert- ground (such as UNICEF that works in 10 ed to traditional, local solutions. This has of Sanaa city, Ministry of Water, and the been also observed during conflict with Local Corporation to move from informal people coping on lack of water and sani- individual tankers, to organized tankers, tation by using the informal private sec- trained to become in the medium to long- tor and NGOs for the ones that had less term providers of water services for areas ability to afford service. However, local unserved by the LWCs and GARWSP. capacity – both technically and financial- Building on this vision allows ensuring a ly – at which the emergency work would safer water quality delivered to citizens, be conducted is not sufficient. Therefore, and an optimized selection of pumping once the central level is restored, it can areas to avoid polluting the groundwater play again to role of technical and finan- resources (with untreated wastewater and cial support of the local level. Before the other sources of pollution). central level is restored, the UN agencies can be a proxy for the local agency on the Box 3: working with (informal) private technical and through donors and projects sector to deliver service financial ability to support and contribute A number of projects (Bank funded and to maintain the capacity of local level. The other donors) in the water sector have UN agencies are already working with the explored various ways to work with tank- keys actors such as the growing local pri- ers, for example Sierra Leone, Liberia, vate sector (tankers),NGOs, local institu- West Bank-Gaza, etc. These provide tions, communities and users group, and useful lessons on how to be inclusive in the case of Yemen it is important to en- of the private sector/market oriented sure the most efficient use of water given services in the supply chain of deliver- the water scarcity and need to reduce the ing water. Steps that could be taken in mining of water resources. the short-term: (i) LCs/GARWSP could ease a registration process, thereby 3. Need to contribute to restore the so- stopping the operators from harass� - cial contract: moving from informal pri- ing government staff; (ii) LC/ GARWSP vate sector to an organized private sec- could provide an enabling framework to tor working in coordination with formal encourage the private sector to invest institutions to provide improved water in tanks, cars, and pumps; (iii) LC/GAR- quality to citizens and protection of the WSP/NGOs/partners could help develop resource. Given the reality that the pri� - water markets by creating competition vate sector is already involved in provid- for buying and selling water; and, em- ing water services to thousands of house- power water user associations to nego- holds, it is imperative to integrate it into tiate water transfers from rural areas to water planning by making it easy for tank- urban areas for the best price that they er trucks to cooperate with the regulatory can negotiate. agency. Create a partnership with private tanker trucks to deliver water from LWCs wellfields and offer them to the customers 4. On the infrastructure type of activi- at affordable cost. Under the now closed ties, the urban water supply and sani- Bank funded project Water Sector Support tation services could focus to some Project (WSSP), a pilot intervention was target areas to restore basic service planned to be implemented in Sana’a un- delivery and keep public health threats der the leadership of the deceased Mayor in check. A combination of actions would 11 support the first steps of reestablishing ba- could focus on rehabilitating community sic urban service delivery and greatly re- water project, including wells, pipes, water duce the risk of public health threats such tanks, connections, etc. Job creation proj- as cholera spreading. The actions need ects are among the most effective means also to be designed to generate short-term of stabilizing communities and keeping job opportunities through both labor-based peace immediately after conflict, and they works and the semi-skilled labor require- buy time until private sector activity returns ments for software activities such as cus- to absorb the labor supply at stable, mar- tomer enumeration. Possible actions: (i) ket-clearing wages. Possible activities: (i) Short-term revenue support for staff, Rehabilitation of rural water infrastruc- electricity and chemicals – To address ture – including rehabilitation of compo- immediate cash-flow issues, a tapering nents of water supply systems that have recurrent-costs interest free loan would be been damaged during conflicts; (ii) Provi- made to LCs/AUs over a period of a year. sion of communal water storage tanks LCs/AUs would be individually assessed – especially in the areas of IDPs gathering for their needs; (ii) Cost recovery man- and camps; (iii) Provide short-term fuel agement – Support for reestablishing cost assistance to rural water projects; (iv) recovery would be initiated through low- Water Trucking for conflict-affected com- cost short-term actions targeting commer- munities/ displaced people IDPs; (v) Pro- cial losses (e.g. customer enumeration, vide assistance of spare parts and O&M improving billing systems), and followed costs to local water corporations/projects; up with medium-term works program to (vi) Provide chlorination and disinfect- address technical losses (emergency ing service for water sources in rural ar- repair of critical infrastructure – wells, eas ; (vii) Provision of replacement water pumps, pipes etc.); (iii) Tanker filling sta- pumps or pipe networks damaged by tions and management – Tankered wa- conflicts; and (viii) Completion of un com- ter has become a wide-spread alternative pleted water supply schemes. provision mechanism. In order to improve the quality of water provided by tankers LC’s would be supported to set up tanker filling stations and a system of regulating private tankers in towns and cities; and (iv) Back-up power – With widespread dam- age to the electricity production facilities small high-speed diesel generators are being used for water pumping and waste water treatment. Analysis of short- and medium-term lower cost alternatives will be assessed and supported; for example, options to use solar pumping in selected areas will be assessed. 5. Rehabilitating damaged rural water supply systems to prevent disease out- breaks in rural communities and rebuild- ing of rural livelihoods. The interventions 12 Annex 1: Description of the institutional arrangements •• Two main ministries at the national •• Civil society is somewhat represent- level: Ministry of Water and Environment ed by a broad range of nongovernmental (MWE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Ir- and nonprofit organizations that are in- rigation (MAI), and a water authority at the volved with water industry including: Water intermediate level, the National Water Re- User Associations (WUAs) for the sub-ba- sources Authority (NWRA), which some- sin level; Water User Groups (WUGs) for times manages water resources at the wells; community and indigenous groups; country level. and, professional associations. Water User Associations have not been empow- •• The implementation agencies at gov- ered to make and enforce rules and collect ernorates/regional level include branch fees which make community water man- offices of NWRA, NWSA, GARWSP (be- agement more efficient and sustainable longs to MWE), and MAI. The Basin com- (Bruns & Taha, 2009). Many of the WUGs mittees are cross-cutting institutions to co- were established without a unified man- ordinate the works of all water authorities date and clear scope of works. pertaining to basins and to implement ac- tion plans. •• According to law, the MWE/NWRA are jointly responsible for organizing and •• About 23 Local Water Corporations developing water resources, plans and (LWCs) and 10 autonomous water utili- policies. In consultation with the MAI and ties serve about 95% of urban house- Ministry of Local Administration (MLA), the holds, working alongside the Local Coun- MWE/NWRA are entitled to prepare the cils of the Ministry of Local Administration National Water Strategy (NWSSIP) and to (MLA) for urban and rural districts. form water basins and water zones com- mittees. At the sectoral level, the MAI is responsible for formulating policies and •• Private sector is mainly represented legislation which regulates the use of the by owners of wells and tanker trucks irrigation water in line with the national wa- who pump and transport water resources. ter policies and plans. The MWE also has The private sector is still not well organized a responsibility to supervise LWCs (pub- and has no formal structure. No major lic utilities) and all water supplies to the progress has been achieved by MWE and domestic and industrial sectors. At basin LWCs in creating a partnership with the level, the water law authorizes NWRA to private sector to provide water services in divide the countries into water basins and urban areas. There are also legal condi- water zones. tions to retain current staff, a widespread perception that people’s ability to pay a fair price is weak, and an expectation of •• Some overlapping and duplication: government interference in imposing rates the MWE has a formal responsibility to to protect low-income earners (ESCWA, allocate water resources among all us- 2011); (Sahooly, 2013).   ers and to formulate all water policies via 13 the NWRA (100% of water resources); have the power to hire staff and to impose conversely, the MAI has a specific re- a tariff, which needs to be approved by sponsibility to formulate water policies the MWE. In theory, the LWCs and their related to water for irrigation through the branches are currently serving 95% of the Irrigation and Land Reclamation Sec- total urban population (Ward, et al., 2009). tor. In theory, the MAI is only a recipient However, the level of coverage is still rela- of what the MWE/NWRA will allocate to tively small because the expansion of ser- them, but since irrigation accounts for vice does not keep pace with urban popu- 90% of total water use, the MWE’s over- lation growth (World Bank, 2006a). sight remains merely theoretical (Alharithi, 2010:4); (Zeitoun, 2009:19); (Ward, et al, 2007); (Al-Ghorbany, 2014:38 & 150);  •• The branches of LWCs with non-au- tonomous principles affiliate to the main Urban water and sanitation LWCs in their governorates and they re- •• Before 1997, the municipal water ceive financial support from the main supply in cities and towns across the 22 LWCs. Furthermore, the government kept governorates was managed by the Na- 16 branches of the NWSA to supply water tional Water Supply Authority (NWSA). for seven more governorates and towns The NWSA was a highly centralized man- that have no LWCs, which cumulatively agement system with many branch offices cover only 5% of the total urban popula- scattered around the country, but it was tion (Ward et al., 2009). hampered by poor infrastructure, intermit- tent services, unclear rules and regula- •• The National Water Sector Strategy tions, and highly subsidized tariffs (Kalber- and Investment Program (NWSSIP, 2004, matten, 1996); (Ward, et al., 2007). updated in 2009) has the following objec- tives for UWSS: •• In 1997, the government issued a 1. Increase access for the entire cabinet resolution based on a technical urban population, through investment and by involving the private sector in advice from the World Bank to decen- both service provision and outsourcing tralize the urban water sector (ESCWA, of functions 2011); (Sahooly, 2013). Accordingly, the 2. Put utilities on a business foot- government gradually established public ing whilst keeping services sustainable utilities at governorate level called Local and affordable Water Corporations (LWCs) which by 2011 3. Ensure affordable access for covered the major capital cities/towns of the poor 15 governorates and with 30 branches covering 30 small towns within these 15 Rural water and sanitation governorates (13 branches with autono- •• Several government authorities are mous principles and 17 branches with responsible for rural development, in- non-autonomous principles) (Ward, et al., cluding constructing water projects for 2009). domestic use in rural areas. These au- thorities are the General Authority of Ru- ••A Board of Directors chaired by each ral Water Supply Projects (GARWSP), the governorate’s Governor oversees the Social Fund for Development (SFD), the autonomous utilities of LWCs, which Public Works Project (PWP), and the Min- 14 istry of Local Administration (MLA) Some success was achieved: in some via the Local Council of districts.  Several cases, the community even offered to donors are also involved in developing share 40% of total project costs. However, water resources in rural areas including the GARWSP still suffers from many chal- the World Bank, UNICEF, The Nether- lenges, including overstaffing of unskilled lands, Germany, and Japan.  The respon- employees, interaction with local councils sibility of the GARWSP is to coordinate which lack experience and capacity to im- the efforts of the SFD, PWP and the do- plement any project, and reliance on HQ nors to work together in a cooperative and for financing and expertise (JICA, 2007). complementary manner toward achieving But notably, where GARWSP often used a sustainable rural development (Heun & to support stretched out and fragmented Vulto, 2008); (JICA, 2007); (World Bank, approaches (e.g. communities received 2006a).  drilled wells one year and pipes another year, pumps and services in the third or fourth year etc.), GARWSP more recently •• The GARWSP consists of a Headquar- followed the Bank’s (others?) advice to ter (HQ) in Sana’a with 10 branches in ten shift and focus on turn-key projects that governorates.  It has 525 staff, of which deliver water services and ensure suitabil- 280 are at HQ while the remainder is in ity of investments. the branches (JICA, 2007). Over the past decade, the GARWSP received a broad range of technical assistance from donors •• With donor funds, the PWP focuses to enhance its functions and to transfer on constructing water projects using some of its duties from HQ to governorate local resources,  especially labor. To branches. Under the supervision of GAR- equip water projects with pumps and water WSP, hundreds of water projects financed pipes, it coordinates with GARWSP to pro- by government and donors have been ex- cure them; after that PWP assumes the ecuted in coordination with local councils, responsibility to install them and then train the PWP, and the SFD (MAI, 2013). local beneficiaries to operate and manage the projects.   The SFD follows the same procedures of the PWP in implementing •• In its efforts to increase the access of water projects, and it has also recently rural residents to clean and sufficient water engaged in building small projects for har- supplies, the government reoriented GAR- vesting rainwater and constructing small WSP under the MWE to focus on devel- water schemes by drilling wells and equip- oping water schemes for the countryside.  ping projects with the necessary pumps The primary function of the GARWSP is to and pipes. build water projects for domestic use in ru- ral areas based on a demand-responsive approach (DRA) and on a cost- sharing •• Providing and ensuring water supply mechanism through community-based or- for rural areas is one of the top priori- ganizations.  It fosters the establishment ties of the NWSSIP. The goal in 2004 was of water user groups (WUGs) so as to en- to provide water services to more than 5 gage communities in choosing the most million inhabitants of rural areas by 2015. appropriate technology, to participate in The NWSSIP Update (2009-2015) set a the execution of the project, and to man- target for rural water supply to reach to age them afterward in a sustainable way. 62.5% by 2015. The objective is to provide 15 sustainable water supply at an affordable tives for RWSS: rate with suitable sanitation system which 1. Rapid expansion of coverage should be fair and equal. An aim was also with increased investment and a pro- to develop a decentralized mechanisms poor bias, and with a transparent in- system that fits the rural society and to vestment application process and de- enhance community participation through centralized approvals a demand responsive approach (DRA) to 2. Making services inclusive, af- implement projects, and they chose the fordable and sustainable appropriate technology that meets the 3. Improving implementation needs at lower cost. - GARWSP to be reformed and decentralized to governor- ate branches ••The National Water Sector Strategy - Common approaches amongst the and Investment Program (NWSSIP, 2004, three public sector providers (which to- updated in 2009) has the following objec- gether put up more than 90% of schemes) 16