Document of The World Bank Report No: 30994-JO IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (SCL-42150 TF-26801) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$30 MILLION TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN FOR A COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DECEMBER 22, 2004 Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Middle East and North Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective March 10, 2004)) Currency Unit = Jordanian Dinar 1 JOD = US$ 1.41 US$ 1 = JOD 0.71 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS = Country Assistance Strategy CIC = Camp Improvement Committee CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency CIP = Community Infrastructure Project CVDB = Cities and Villages Development Bank DFID = Department for International Development DOA = Department of Antiquities DO = Development Objective DPA = Department of Palestinian Affairs EIA = Environmental Impact Assessment ESPP = Enhanced Social Productivity Program GDP = Gross Domestic Product GNP = Gross National Product GOJ = Government of Jordan GTZ = Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit HUDC = Housing and Urban Development Corporation IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICB = International Competitive Bidding IDA = International Development Association IFC = International Finance Corporation IP = Implementation Progress IS = International Shopping KfW = Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation MOMA = Ministry of Municipal Affairs MOPIC = Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation NAF = National Aid Fund NCB = National Competitive Bidding NGO = Non-Governmental Organization NS = National Shopping O&M = Operation and Maintenance POC = Program Objective Category PMU = Project Management Unit SC = Steering Committee SOE = Statement of Expenditure SPP = Social Productivity Program SSU = Social Survey Unit UK = United Kingdom UNDP = United Nations Development Program UNRWA = United Nations Relief Works Agency WAJ = Water Authority of Jordan Vice President: Christian J. Poortman Country Director Joseph P. Saba Sector Manager Hedi Larbi Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Rosanna Nitti JORDAN COMMUNITY INFRA.DEV. CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 10 6. Sustainability 11 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 12 8. Lessons Learned 14 9. Partner Comments 15 10. Additional Information 15 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 16 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 18 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 20 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 21 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 23 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 24 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 25 Annex 8. Project Outcomes: Evidence from Selected Case Studies 26 Annex 9. Distribution of expenditures by type of settlement and infrastructure 29 Annex 10. Client's Contribution to the ICR 30 Annex 11. Highlights from the Borrower's Report on Pilot Projects 41 Project ID: P049581 Project Name: COMMUNITY INFRA.DEV. Team Leader: A. Amir Al-Khafaji TL Unit: PA9SS ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 22, 2004 1. Project Data Name: COMMUNITY INFRA.DEV. L/C/TF Number: SCL-42150; TF-26801 Country/Department: JORDAN Region: Middle East and North Africa Region Sector/subsector: Health (24%); Housing construction (24%); General water, sanitation and flood protection sector (24%); Roads and highways (24%); Central government administration (4%) Theme: Access to urban services for the poor (P); Participation and civic engagement (P); Other urban development (P); Water resource management (S) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 03/03/1997 Effective: 11/25/1997 03/16/1998 Appraisal: 04/04/1997 MTR: 09/15/1999 Approval: 08/21/1997 Closing: 06/30/2001 06/30/2001 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN/HUDC & CVDB Other Partners: Arab Fund/KfW/Islamic Bank/Italian Gov./GOJ STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Christiaan J. Poortman Kemal Dervis Country Director: Joseph P. Saba Inder K. Sud Sector Manager: Hedi Larbi Nemat Shafick (Actg.) Team Leader at ICR: Rosanna Nitti Mario A. Zelaya ICR Primary Author: Rosanna Nitti 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: HS QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S S Project at Risk at Any Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: As stated in the Project Appraisal Document, the primary objective of the Community Infrastructure Project (CIP) was to improve the living conditions of poor (defined as households with income below the absolute poverty threshold, as estimated in the Poverty Assessment of October 28, 1994, i.e. JD97/family/month for families owning their homes and JD119/family/month for families renting their homes) through the provision of essential physical and social infrastructure. The secondary objective was to improve the capacity of selected central and local government agencies to deliver infrastructure services to the poor in an effective, efficient and targeted way. Since the CIP was intended to reduce the hardship of poverty through infrastructure provision, it therefore clearly recognized that it could not by itself reduce poverty. The objectives were clearly stated and consistent with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 1995, which focused on improving infrastructure provision, reducing poverty and unemployment, and improving the living conditions of the poor. The CIP objectives are still relevant with respect to the CAS of 2002, which advocates a new generation of investments aimed at improving the capacity of the governorates and municipalities to undertake participatory planning, budgeting, and implementation, addressing the basic infrastructure needs of poor communities through demand-driven community development and building on the achievements and lessons of the Community Infrastructure Project and the Jordan Social Productivity Program. The CIP was designed as one component of the Social Productivity Program (SPP), a comprehensive strategy to address poverty that was adopted by the Government of Jordan (GOJ) in late 1996. The SPP also provided a framework under which the GOJ solicited assistance from donors with three main thrusts: (1) social assistance, (2) physical and social infrastructure, and (3) employment generation. The CIP addressed the second of these thrusts and was intended as the first phase of a program of projects targeting undeserved poor areas to be prepared and appraised for Bank and other donors. The project was responsive to the objectives of the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) both in its objectives and its stated approach (consultative/participatory). Emphasis on the latter is particularly consistent throughout the CASes 1995, 1999 and 2002. The objectives were relevant to country priorities for improving the quality and quantity of services and the infrastructure in the poorest communities. 3.2 Revised Objective: The project objectives were not revised. 3.3 Original Components: The investments identified for the CIP during project preparation were estimated to cost about US$140 million (about JD 98 million) over a period of three to five years. The project was designed to be implemented with parallel financing, therefore investments were grouped in separate, self-standing packages to give donors options for financing subprojects in 14 out of the 28 known squatter settlements in the country, 13 refugee camps, and about 300 out of the 700 local councils (both municipalities and villages) that existed at the time. Out of the appraised investment amount, US$30 million was to be financed under the IBRD loan and the rest was available for co-financing by other donors, the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, KFW, the Islamic Bank, the Italian Government, and the GOJ. The CIP included three parts targeting different dimensions of poverty. Part A was designed to respond to the infrastructure and service needs of dense concentrations of poor inhabitants who mostly lacked formal property rights (squatter settlements and refugee camps). Part B focused on poor municipalities and villages throughout the kingdom. Part C aimed to test pilot approaches to integrated development in five different locations. Because of the diversity of these interventions, the project relied on separate implementation agencies, The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) and The City and Village Development Bank (CVDB) and different development partners (The Department of Palestinian Affairs for Part A, The Ministry of Municipal Administration for Part B, and NGOs for Part C). Table 1 summarizes the key players in project implementation by Component. - 2 - Co-financiers shared a common PMU located at MOPIC, which played a critical role in coordination, supervision of safeguards and fiduciary, and facilitation, maintaining the project on track. Table 1: summary of key players in project implementation Project Components Implementing Agency Co-financiers Estimated cost (US$ mil.) Part A HUDC IBRD, Arab Fund, KFW, 94 Islamic Bank, Italian Government Part B CVDB IBRD, Arab Fund 32 Part C MOPIC IBRD, Arab Fund 14 Project Parts and Component were as follows: Part A ­ (Appraisal estimate for the CIP multi-donor program: US$ 94.0 million, of which US$17.3 million from the IBRD loan): Upgrading of on-site and off-site infrastructure in about 14 squatter settlements and 13 refugee camps located in the central region. Some of the worse living urban conditions were prevalent in these areas of high poverty concentration with a lack of formal property rights, high levels of poverty and limited services. These areas were known prior to project preparation and easy to identify. The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) was selected as the implementing agency for this part of the program because of its prior experience in three Bank-assisted urban development projects. Part A of the project comprised three components: Component 1: Upgrading on-site infrastructure in squatter settlements in the Central Region (appraisal estimate: US$ 34.0 million, of which US$2.4 million from the IBRD loan). The Bank loan was to support the upgrading of five settlements out of the 14 urban squatter settlements in or around Amman, Zarqua and Russeifa. The upgrading of an additional settlement in Aqaba and the construction of an additional school were added in the last stage of implementation to use cost savings. The construction of one school and one community center was also financed under this component. Component 2: Upgrading on-site infrastructure in Refugee Camps in the Central Region (appraisal estimate: US$ 32.0 million, of which US$ 9.0 million from IBRD loan). The Bank loan was to support the upgrading of three refugee camps out of the 13 targeted by the CIP. The upgrading of a fourth camp, Irbid. was added in 2000. The project was implemented with strong collaboration from the Department of Palestinian Affairs at the central level and the Camp Improvement Committees at local level. Component 3: Upgrading off-site infrastructure in refugee camps in the Central Region (appraisal estimate: US$ 28.0 million). This included the construction of for wastewater treatment plants to serve four camps. The Italian Government participated in the financing of three. Subsequent studies demonstrated that the fourth plant as not economically viable, and it was replaced by a trunk line connected to the existing sewage system in Irbid and a lift station fully funded by the GOJ. All the treatment plants under this component are currently under design or at early stage of implementation. No IBRD funds were allocated to this component. Part B ­ Component 4: Upgrading municipal and village infrastructure (appraisal estimate US$ 32.0, of which US$11.3 million from IBRD loan). Part B was to upgrade essential infrastructure in about 300 poor municipalities and villages out of the total 700 existing at appraisal. Sub-projects under this component included infrastructure, which typically is under the responsibility of the municipalities e.g. access roads, drainage, retaining walls, small stream crossings, street lighting and solid waste collection equipment, in addition to the construction of 13 community centers, 19 health centers and a limited number of school rooms. The City and Village Development Bank (CVDB) was selected as implementing agency for this component based on its special financial relationship with municipalities and with the aim to strengthen its capacity to implement infrastructure projects. Part C ­ Component 5: Project Management, Consultancy, Training and Pilot Projects (appraisal estimate $14.0 million, of which US$2.2 million from IBRD loan). This component provided institutional strengthening for - 3 - HUDC (creation of environmental assessment unit) and CVDB (computer equipment and capacity building in project implementation). It also covered the implementation of small economic development projects in five pilot municipalities. A grant from the German government contributed to building the capacity of the agencies involved in the implementation of Part B, including creating an MIS system and institutional strengthening for CVDB. A well-managed PMU was created in MOPIC, supported by a grant from various donors to manage the multi-donor implementation of the CIP. 3.4 Revised Components: There were minor revisions of the components and some restructuring, without changes in objectives: An amendment to the Loan Agreement was signed in April 2000 to create a new Part D-Component 6 and a new category of expenditure to allow disbursement of 100% for pilot projects. This was done at the Borrower's request to encourage the participation of NGOs in the project by introducing CDD procedures. The closing date was extended from 2001 to 2004 to support a Government request to utilize the project savings, including an unallocated US$3 million, to expand the project to more municipalities and to implement urgent works in additional refugee camps and squatter settlements. The 300 local councils initially targeted by the CIP program had been selected out of the then 700 municipalities and villages. In 1998, the local councils were restructured and reduced to 328. The original 300 targeted settlements then coincided with 165 new municipalities. At that time the decision was made to extend the loan and utilize savings to target a total of 230 new municipalities (i.e. a larger number than the originally targeted, since the new municipalities were larger and comprising more villages). In 2002, when the municipalities were further amalgamated to 99 and the villages disappeared as administrative units, the decision was made to maintain the territorial target unchanged. 3.5 Quality at Entry: With regard to project design, the components recognized the different types of poverty in the country (some concentrated in urban areas and others dispersed in rural settings). The focus on poverty alleviation was appropriate. The programmatic design of the project incorporated enough flexibility to accommodate other donors using parallel funding. The project had a broad scope that aimed to integrate the largest squatter settlements into formal service networks, while for municipalities it realistically targeted a narrow set of infrastructure, mostly access and distribution roads, retention walls and culverts, which simplified implementation. The project design also relied on consultation of and coordination with local institutions (e.g. camp improvement committees and local councils) to identify needs and later to implement the project. Detailed assessments of the infrastructure needs of all targeted squatter settlements, camps and local councils were carried out at the beginning of the project. For example, under Part B, more than 4,500 households of potential beneficiaries were interviewed as part of the needs assessment and almost 1,700 interested parties attended the project decision meetings of local councils. This facilitated the targeting of infrastructure investments to the poorest and most underserved communities in accordance with the poverty alleviation objective of the project. For Part B, the project design process could have gone beyond the beneficiary consultation during to develop more formalized mechanisms to consult and prioritize interventions through active citizen participation in decision-making. While this would have been difficult to achieve in the initial stages of project implementation due to the weak capacity of a number of small municipalities, it could have been done in the later stages of implementation (when municipalities were amalgamated in 1999), as is now done by GOJ with Bank assistance under the new Municipal Development Project. Both the PAD and the Operations Manual provided an accurate assessment of potential risks and mitigation measures. In particular, the economic analysis in the PAD identified moderate risks concerning: (1) accurate targeting of the poor with appropriate infrastructure investments, (2) possible misperception in municipalities that the CIP was a new funding mechanism for infrastructure investments rather than a supplemental mechanism for very poor communities, and (3) using the selection procedures to minimize investment costs. The only risk that materialized without having been identified was the institutional change when municipalities were amalgamated. - 4 - Moreover, particularly for Part B, the appraisal report could not clearly identify up-front the potential trade-off between the political objective of achieving a wide distribution of sub-projects in municipalities throughout the country and the longer term benefits of more intensive work at municipal level to ensure sustainable operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. With regard to Safeguards, the project relied on rigorous Environmental screening and related Assessments, regularly carried out as part of the design of subprojects by the Environmental units established under each implementing agencies. In addition, with regard to Part A-Component 1 (Upgrading of Squatters), resettlement was minimized through efficient site planning and design. Eventually, only 22 households were resettled under the Bank project, following a detailed Resettlement Plan and compensation packages based on the Jordanian system, confirmed by the project team to be up to the Bank standards. Implementation arrangements were well conceived, which was evidenced by the high level of performance throughout the life of the project of both the PMU at MOPIC and the selected implementing agencies. Quality at entry is rated satisfactory. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The ICR rates the overall achievement of objectives and outcomes under the CIP satisfactory. The main objective of improving the living conditions of the poor in low-income settlements was substantially met by project. Living conditions in the settlements were much improved through the provision of essential physical and social infrastructure in squatter settlements, refugee camps and municipalities. Such positive outcomes were also confirmed by evaluation surveys conducted by HUDC and CVDB at the closing of the project. These surveys recorded high levels of beneficiary satisfaction. More than 85% of the households interviewed by HUDC in the targeted squatter settlements and camps were either highly satisfied or satisfied with the water networks, roads and storm water drainage that comprised about 75% of the investments. The survey also recorded an increase in home improvements and in the number of small business established in the settlements. Similarly, 90% of the sample of beneficiaries interviewed by CVDB in the targeted municipalities believed that the infrastructure built under the project had had a positive impact on their living environment. Eighty-eight percent reported that the new solid waste disposal equipment had improved the living environment. Providing improved infrastructure has also been largely achieved. The ICR team and the implementation agencies collected data from sector agencies and conducted rapid beneficiary assessments, which demonstrated that improved access to infrastructure services resulted in tangible improvements in the lives of the poor. In particular, the data showed that the project had succeeded in improving vehicular access to the targeted settlements, including emergency vehicles and solid waste disposal trucks. The project also increased the efficiency of water systems, with dramatic reductions of water loss (up to 24%) and significant health improvements. The project protected houses from floods and improved the urban environment by increasing the frequency and quality of solid waste disposal and by providing new garbage compactor trucks. Detailed data on project outcomes under Parts A and B are provided in Annex 8. Less than 3% of the Bank loan was dedicated to improving the capacity of central and local government agencies. Most of the capacity building of HUDC and CVDB was carried out "on the job", in conjunction with work on Parts A and B. However, the overall CIP multi-donor program did invest directly in building the capacity of government agencies to deliver infrastructure services. Some of the key outcomes are: strengthening of MOPIC's capacity to manage multi-donor projects, increased capacity of local councils to manage infrastructure projects, and improved capacity of both CVDB and HUDC to implement projects at local level. Section 4.5 provides a more detailed account of these achievements. Finally, the five pilot projects (equivalent to almost 5% of the IBRD loan) produced important outcomes: direct employment generation in economically depressed areas (about 105 new jobs created), indirect benefits to local farmers, herders and women who joined local cooperatives created to manage the new economic infrastructure - 5 - (about 692 new cooperative members), and income-generating loans under the micro-finance scheme integrated into the pilots (about 150 small loans with an average repayment rate above 90%). With support from GTZ, the pilot project in Waqqas created new partnerships between local communities and the municipal council. This led to the creation of a new tool for municipal budgeting, which has been adopted by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and is being adopted in other municipalities. Annex 11 provides more details on activities under this component. 4.2 Outputs by components: Components under Parts A and B successfully generated temporary employment for the poor using labor-intensive technologies, particularly for roads. In addition, contractors were requested to employ a minimum of 50% local labor (increased to 100% in Stages 2 and 3 of Part B), which alleviated unemployment temporarily in the targeted poor areas. The project generated about 300,000 work days under Part A and about 313,780 work days of temporary jobs under Part B (costing US$2.8 million or 12%-15% of the total cost of investments). On generating permanent employment, excluding transfers of civil servants in schools and health centers, about 100 new permanent jobs were created under the project (particularly in new economic facilities of the pilot projects and the community center). The following summarizes the main physical outputs of the project by component and how they compare with the initial targets. This covers all outputs of the multi-donor effort under the CIP, but this ICR focuses in more detail on the Bank supported investments, because the investment packages were designed to be self-standing and can be evaluated independently from components financed by other donors (except for the construction of three off-site sewerage treatment plants financed by the Italian Government, which affected project implementation in three related refugee camps). A summary of project output indicators is provided in Annex 1. Part A: Upgrading of on-site and off-site infrastructure in squatter settlements and refugee camps. The initial overall target was to upgrade 12 squatter settlements and 13 refugee camps. By the end of the project, 15 squatter settlements and 10 refugee camps had been upgraded. Three camps could not be serviced due to a delay in the disbursement of funds for off-site sewerage treatment plants by the Italian Government, which affected the implementation of complementary components. The initial target for Bank funded investments was to upgrade five squatter settlements and three refugee camps. By the end of the project, the Bank had supported the upgrading of six squatter settlements and four refugee camps, with a total target population of about 330,000. The increase in physical output was possible due to the project savings and efficient project management. A list of sub-projects by settlement and type of infrastructure financed is provided in Annex 9. This also shows how that in squatter settlements most of the funds were used for water supply (largely rehabilitation), electricity and roads and footpaths, while in the refugee camps the priorities were roads and footpaths, water supply and sewerage. Table 2 summarizes the physical outputs of Part A of the project. Output of this part of the project is rated satisfactory. Table 2: Physical Outputs for Part A Type of infrastructure Unit Component 1 Component 2 (squatter settlements) (refugee camps) Asphalted roads sq m 137,400 257,600 Paved sidewalks sq m 3,300 102,070 Paved footpath sq m 4,800 298,500 Replaced and/or installed water networks and house ml 273,300 212,600 connections Replaced and/or new water connections No. 330 3,200 Sewerage system ml 77,150 35,800 On-site storm water drainage ml 6,230 2,000 Off-site storm water drainage ml 2,140 Part B: Upgrading of municipal and village infrastructure. This component was implemented in three stages. The first one (1998-99) was fully funded by the Bank and targeted 14 high-priority municipalities. The second one (late - 6 - 1999-2001) targeted 151 new municipalities (23 of which with Bank funds), exhausting the original list of priority localities. The third stage (2002-04) targeted 65 relatively less needy municipalities (50 of which with Bank funds) to use savings under the project. The distribution of sub-projects funded by the Bank loan in the three stages of implementation by type is provided in Annex 9. This shows that the majority of investments supported the construction of roads (63% of total investments) and retaining walls (25% of total investments) to improve accessibility to economic and social services, reduce transport costs to the poorest communities and protect the environment. The average investment per municipality varied significantly among the three stages, decreasing from about US$165,000 in the first stage to about US$120,000, and US$ 106,000 respectively in the second and third stages. This was consistent with the selection criteria, which gave priority to the neediest municipalities in the first stages. Compared to similar projects by line ministries, the unit cost under the CIP was low. The average cost per square meter of roads built under the project was about US$4 for finished roads and US$1.7 base layer-gravel, which compares favorably with US$5.5 and US$2.5 respectively for similar projects implemented by the Ministry of Transport. Despite these lower costs, the quality of workmanship was not adversely affected mainly because of: (i) the use of labor-intensive, high-quality technologies, (ii) close supervision and monitoring; and (iii) transparent and expedited procurement procedures, efficient contract management, and quick payment procedures. The reduction in the unit cost (which reached 25% in some cases), combined with the increased labor content (labor content was increased from about 5% in standard roads to about 15-20% in the labor-intensive roads) enabled the project to deliver more than the targeted quantity of basic infrastructure, while also generating short-term employment. Output of this part of the project is rated satisfactory. Table 3 summarizes the physical output of Part B of the project: Table 3: Physical Outputs for Part B Group Roads Retaining Storm Storm Served of (m2) Walls water water Population municipalities (m3) drainage: drainage: (2001 Culverts(ml Canals (ml) estimations) ) Phase 1 320,723 17,572 4,046 3,179 196,986 Phase 2 563,190 21,777 3,999 6,108 169,509 Phase 3 1,037,021 17,873 2,103 2,142 234,421 Total 2,010,934 57,222 10,148 11,429 600,916 Output under this part of the project is rated satisfactory. Part C: Capacity Building of Implementing Agencies (Project Management). HUDC, originally assessed as a strong implementing agency, developed a new and well functioning Environmental Management Unit. CVDB benefited from computer equipment and expert support to develop computerized management information systems. It built capacity to use participatory methods to prioritize projects, target beneficiaries, introduce least-cost methods, and collaborate with local governments to implement projects at local level. Prior to its involvement in the CIP this municipal development bank did not carry out direct supervision of projects, but under the CIP it successfully initiated a new technical implementation and supervisory function that can be further developed in the future to serve the needs of the municipalities. The increased capacity of CVDB to supervise sub-projects is reflected in the quality of works, the lower cost and savings under its component of the project. Output under this part of the project is rated satisfactory, since the project implemented the physical targets in the PAD and institutional capacity was enhanced. Part D: Pilot Projects. Five pilot projects were implemented to test the integrated approach to social, infrastructure and economic development of the Social Productivity Program of the GOJ. The targeted five new economic - 7 - activities were successfully implemented in partnership with local NGOs and other civil society organizations, using participatory methods. Important lessons learned from these pilots provided the basis for the design of the Rural Community Cluster Development Program launched by MOPIC in 2002 as part of the new Enhanced Social Productivity Program (see Annex 11 for more details). 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: The appraisal report pointed out that most of the subprojects would not have an easily quantifiable benefits, and are therefore better suited for a cost-effectiveness analysis. Selection would rely on eligibility/selection criteria designed to screen subprojects in various sectors. Investments under the project were selected to raise infrastructure service and performance levels to a minimum standard in deficient areas with low-income levels. Minimum standards were defined for the levels of service or the performance necessary for safe and healthy habitation. This reflected a political decision that the benefits of reaching the minimum level of service were sufficient to justify the cost (minimized by a least-cost design procedure). Least-cost investments under Part A were localized in settlements with high concentrations of poor households. As part of the feasibility studies, technical alternatives were considered and cost minimization techniques used to evaluate all proposed investments. Therefore, sub-projects were cost efficient by design. Investments under Part B were selected by local governments and tested against project and beneficiary criteria. Cost-minimization measures were applied to each proposal. An assessment was carried out by the ICR team and CVDB in the 23 municipalities and villages targeted in Stage 2, comparing the cost of infrastructure investments under the project with the cost of the same investments outside the project. The project scored particularly well with roads, where unit costs were reduced up to 25%, and retaining walls were reduced by average of 12%. The project lowered costs due to a combination of factors, including the use of minimum design standards, efficient management, and low supervision costs. Because most of the subprojects did not have easily quantifiable benefits, the appraisal report did not propose quantification of benefits for most types of investments under the CIP. Using qualitative analysis and, when available, quantitative data, the effectiveness of investments in achieving expected benefits can be summarized as follows: Roads. No quantification of benefits was proposed. As already highlighted in Section 4.1, beneficiaries reported (1) improved vehicular access for cars, public transport, emergency vehicles and solid waste disposal trucks, (2) reduction of mud and dust, (3) increased value of land and properties, (4) improved connections to utilities, (5) reduction in transport cost and (6) increases accessibility. Municipalities also reported a reduction in the maintenance cost of new roads due to the high quality of construction. Even though the actual saving could not be quantified, it was reported that standard roads require regular annual maintenance and the roads built under the project need maintenance every 2 to 3 years, even those without paving. Water supply. Extension and rehabilitation of water supply networks was carried out mostly in densely populated camps and squatter settlements. The main benefits of these investments were increased efficiency of the water system, dramatic reduction of water losses (up to 24% reduction), reduced time necessary to fill house water tanks and related energy savings, and health improvements. Drainage, culverts and Flood Protection. No benefit analysis for these small and scattered investments. This was particularly true for Part B, where municipalities simply reported a reduction in the flooding and improved accessibility to areas that had previously been isolated during heavy rains. With regard to Part A, drainage had more evident benefits in densely populated areas, particularly for property protection and reduction of the cost of repairing damage from annual floods as in the case of Baqa Camp. Solid-waste disposal equipment. The replacement of open, non-compacting trucks with compactor tracks with greater capacity produced visible benefits: increased service areas and frequency (in some cases the frequency of collection rose from every 3 days to daily), less impact on the environment due to the reduced spilling of garbage en route dump sites and reduced odor and more efficient disposal at the damp due to compaction. Another important benefit reported by local council representatives was an increased awareness of residents of the need for - 8 - safe garbage disposal. 4.4 Financial rate of return: Not Applicable 4.5 Institutional development impact: The project helped to improve the capacity of selected central and local government agencies to deliver infrastructure services to the poor. The strengthening of project management capacities of implementing agencies was also largely accomplished. There was good coordination with co-financiers that greatly increased the effectiveness of all parts of the project. This was evident also under Part C (later Part D), where the coordination with GTZ and local NGOs increased the integration of activities in five pilot projects. Key institutional development achievements are summarized as follows: · MOPIC has been strengthened to manage multi-donor projects. This is evident in the level of external resources mobilized under the CIP and the newly created Enhanced Social Protection Program (ESSP), a multi-donor development program that will build on key lessons of the CIP program; · Capacity has been built in both CVDB and HUDC, particularly with the establishment of an environmental impact assessment unit in HUDC and the creation of a fully staffed and equipped new project implementation unit in CVDB. This latter implementing agency has also benefited from the introduction of procedures for beneficiary consultation to prioritize investments; · Improved rapport between CVDB and MOMA, due to the increased capacity of the municipal development bank to operate throughout the country that was gained by implementing small-scale services in poor municipalities. The project also strengthened the relationship of CVDB with MOMA through the collaboration of their respective offices at provincial level and by CVDB's enhanced reputation with municipalities as a development agency; · Strengthening the capacity of local councils, which saw an increase in citizens' trust in their capacity to deliver services. While most of implementation capacity gained by CVDB stayed at the agency level and was not transferred to municipalities, local governments reported that the project improved their capacity to design and supervise new projects. Local governments also improved their capacity to coordinate with other agencies and private sector actors involved in infrastructure delivery (e.g. MOMA, other line ministries, the governor's office and contractors). Capacity building was supported by the provision through the CIP program (not only with Bank funds) of computers, and municipal budget management programs and training to all municipalities in the country. · Increased credibility and capacity of the Department of Palestinian Affairs to deliver services to Refugee Camps. The partnership with MOPIC, which helped DPA to produce a model process for Camp upgrading, is considered an international best practice. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: Complex Donor Coordination: The Bank played a positive role in increasing the number of donors and facilitating the implementation of the multi-donor project. However, donors had different administrative and financial procedures, which led to delays in securing financing for some components and added to the complexity of project implementation. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Government Counterpart Funding: Government made a commitment to finance about 30% of project cost which it provided on timely basis through the strong effort of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. Suppliers and contractors were assured of full payment of their invoices irrespective of the source of financing. This played a major role in the quality and cost effectiveness of the project achievements. One PMU for Project Coordination: The Borrower established one coordinating PMU at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to serve as the focal point for all donors and to ensure a unified approach for project implementation. This decision contributed significantly to the smooth and cost effective implementation of this - 9 - relatively complex project that involved a number of donors. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Fully Staffed Implementation PMUs: The PMU at HUDC was staffed from the start with qualified technical and financial personnel with experience in the implementation of similar projects. An Environmental and Social Assessment Unit was added following the mid-term review to ensure adherence to Bank and national standards. The PMU at CVDB was gradually built up through the recruitment of technical staff to complement existing financial staff. GTZ provided assistance in staff training through the provision of experts to support the PMU. The infrastructure needs assessment study of all municipalities was carried out with the support of GTZ. Adherence to Procurement Standards: All contracts were awarded using the transparent guidelines of the Bank and other donors. Only a few complaints from contractors and suppliers were received by the Bank and they were resolved in a timely fashion. Prompt Payment of Contractors/Suppliers: The three project PMUs made good use of their Special Accounts to pay for approved invoices promptly and sought timely reimbursements from the Bank. For large ICB contracts for solid waste vehicles, the direct payment method was used with minimum delays. The same approach was followed for disbursements from other donors. These transparent and effective practices contributed to lower costs under the project compared to costs of goods and works procured by other Government agencies. Working effectively with Partners: HUDC established excellent rapport with organizations representing the refugee camps and squatter settlements and worked closely with them to incorporate their contributions to the planning, design and implementation of sub-projects. Numerous meetings were held with all stakeholders and fair compensation was paid in the few cases were resettlement was unavoidable. CVDB was equally successful in establishing good working relationships with the large number of municipalities that benefited from the project. Following the determination of the infrastructure needs of municipalities throughout Jordan, CVDB worked closely with mayors and municipal councils to agree on priorities for subprojects that met established poverty targeting criteria. Use of Local Consultants: Both HUDC and CVDB made effective use of local consultants, selected competitively, to design and supervise the larger sub-projects. CVDB also cooperated with the local offices of the Ministry of Municipal Administration as well as local staff of the municipal councils and municipalities to design and supervise the construction of small sub-projects.. 5.4 Costs and financing: The CIP was intended to help the government to attract additional funding (estimated US$ 64.1) from the donor community and other financing agencies. The government was successful in raising about US$70 million from other donors (Arab Fund, Islamic Bank, KfW, Italian Government) disbursed as parallel financing across the three parts of the project. The design of the project in packages, and the Bank's strategic decision to finance sub-projects under each component avoided creating a perceived bias towards any particular component and facilitated the fund-raising process. The breakdown of the parallel financing (by source) is provided in Table 4 below: Table 4: Project Financing Component IBRD Arab Fund KfW Islamic Italian Gov. GOJ Total Bank Est. Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Est. Act. Part A 17.8 13.4 10.1 2.2 12 11.7 10.0 8.3 30 0.3 14.1 21.9 94 57.8 Part B 10.0 13.4 8.1 15.0 - - - - - - 13.9 11.5 32 39.9 Part C and D 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.5 - - - - - - 9.8 14 2.7* TOTAL 30 29.0 20.2 17.7 12 11.7 10 8.3 30 0.3 37.8 33.4 140 100.4 *: most of the management and engineering costs are included in Part A and Part B - 10 - 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: The project design required that all the recurrent costs to maintain and operate the investments made by CIP would be covered by GOJ. However, it was recognized that existing mechanisms would not necessarily be satisfactory. It was assumed that the light urban infrastructure implemented under CIP would require low recurrent maintenance costs (1% to 2% of investment cost per year). By the end of project implementation, all the implemented subprojects were handed over to the respective competent agencies, which committed in written to allocate funds from their respective budgets to maintain and operate the new infrastructures. In particular: l for squatter settlements and refugee camps, most of the sub-projects were handed over to the concerned municipalities (Greater Amman, Zarqa and Russaifa) and Camps Improvements Committees, while the new water and wastewater networks were transferred to the Jordan Water Authority. l for infrastructure subprojects in local councils, consisting mostly of small civil works, the subprojects were handed over to the concerned municipalities, which committed to bear the O&M costs of the newly acquired assets. l for schools and health centers, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health staffed the new facilities and operated them as by the sector standards of the country. l for community centers and income-generating Pilot Projects, new assets were entrusted to local NGOs, selected by the Ministry of Social Development, and specialized Cooperatives. In retrospect, particularly with regard to municipal assets such as access roads, solid waste tracks and street lighting, the issue of recurrent costs should have been considered more carefully during preparation and implementation, as part of the project's institutional development objective (improving the capacity of local government agencies to deliver infrastructure services to the poor). Even if understandably problematic due to the ongoing municipal reform program, this could have contributed to the sustainability of municipal investments. It is expected that the upcoming Regional and Municipal Development Project supported by the Bank will focus more on sustainability issues, municipal budget constraints, improved municipal finance management, and the introduction of Asset Management Plans. Both HUDC and CVDB strengthened their capacities under project. Both agencies are now capable of implementing similar government projects in the future. While HUDC already had strong implementation capacity, considerable improvement was achieved in CVDB. CVDB is now a viable institution in a much stronger position to contribute to the proposed Bank-assisted Regional and Municipal Development Project now under preparation. The sustainability of the accomplishments under CIP is also evident in its in preparation of the new ESPP program and the related new CIP program. The overall sustainability of the project is likely. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: All physical structures built under the project have been handed over to the competent authorities for operation and maintenance. Community centers and income-generating projects have been successfully handed over to well motivated NGOs that are strengthening their activities related to the project. - 11 - 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Preparation and appraisal of the project was based on studies of the physical and social needs in a sample of squatter settlements, refugee camps and municipal and village communities. The PAD and the Operational Manual documented the project well, including its background and the assessment of risks and proposed mitigation measures. The project was based on extensive consultation with beneficiaries and stakeholders at different levels. The flexible project design with self-standing components facilitated GOJ efforts to secure funding from other donors while maintaining the overall project framework. While focusing almost exclusively on the provision of infrastructure (more than 95% of investments), the project design maintained a link with national Social Productivity Program (SPP) through five small pilot projects and a few limited interventions under both Part A and Part B involving NGOs, schools and community centers. These relatively small interventions provided important lessons that GOJ is currently using as a basis for the design of the upcoming new Enhanced Social Productivity Program (ESPP). Bank performance in lending is satisfactory. 7.2 Supervision: Satisfactory. Following initial delays to finalize donor financing and procedures, project implementation moved smoothly with minor problems. Initial Bank supervision ensured that other project partners and stakeholders were properly consulted on the selection of sub-projects, the preparation of designs and tender documents, and adherence to Bank procurement guidelines. Bank supervision teams worked closely with HUDC and MOPIC on designs for the refugee camps and squatter settlements that minimized the need for resettlement and ensured that adequate compensation from government when temporary or permanent resettlement was necessary. For CVDB, the focus was on setting up a well-staffed PMU and launching baseline surveys with assistance from GTZ to identify the infrastructure needs throughout Jordan and to agree on the priorities and eligibility criteria. For MOPIC the early supervision effort focused on the selection of qualified NGOs to implement pilot projects. Bank teams supervised the project on a regular basis. Implementation progress was reported adequately. Regular site visits were conducted and issues concerning implementation, quality of work, stakeholders participation, etc., were resolved through discussion with the PMU. Bank experts on environmental issues, social aspects and MIS requirements joined regular supervision team. A mid-term review was carried out in 2001 that led to the addition of a new disbursement category, Category D, to disburse 100% of loan funds to selected NGO projects. Two ex-post procurement assessments were carried out which covered more than 20% of contracts below the prior review thresholds and concluded that the procedures were in accordance with Bank procurement guidelines. Audits of the three project Special Accounts by independent auditors were carried out in a timely fashion and were all unqualified. The substantial project savings resulting largely from transparent and efficient procurement procedures, provided an opportunity for GOJ to expand the project to areas not initially included: badly needed infrastructure under Part A to one additional refugee camp (Irbid camp), one additional squatter settlement in Aqaba, one school, and one community center, and under Part B for small infrastructure improvements in 50 additional municipalities and villages. Bank supervision is rated satisfactory. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Based on the careful preparation of the project and the continuous follow-up on supervision, including expanding the scope and achievements of the project, the overall performance of the Bank was satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The borrower, represented by the MOPIC, prepared the project with the Bank as an important component of the - 12 - national SPP. The decision of the borrower to establish only a coordination PMU at the MOPIC and to delegate most facets of project implementation to HUDC and CVDB was appropriate because of the multi-sector nature of the project, the considerable expertise of these organizations with infrastructure rehabilitation and financing and their rapport with all types of local authorities. Performance by the borrower in preparation was highly satisfactory. 7.5 Government implementation performance: The MOPIC and its PMU provided continuous guidance and implementation support to the PMUs both at the policy and operational levels. A simple MIS system was established by the PMU to monitor project activities, track disbursement flows and prepare quarterly and annual monitoring reports. Coordination with all donors was carried out effectively by the PMU and timely availability of counter part funds was assured by the MOPIC. Decisions to allocate project savings to needy communities were taken promptly, although implementation of the additional investments led to extensions of the closing date. In hindsight, the appraisal estimate of an implementation period of three years was too optimistic considering that the historical implementation profile of similar projects in Jordan was more than six years. Government performance during implementation was highly satisfactory. 7.6 Implementing Agency: HUDC and its PMU were effective in establishing procurement plans, adhering to the procurement standards of different donors, ensuring active participation of stakeholders and supervising the implementation of sub-projects in densely populated areas. Realizing the need to augment their units with environmental and social experts, they established an environmental unit and staffed it with qualified experts. CVDB and its PMU made prompt decisions to recruit qualified technical staff and to seek technical assistance from GTZ for training and initial assessments. They built upon their special relationships with municipalities and local councils to implement investments quickly and cost effectively. Given the need to support the creation of temporary jobs, they placed a priority on labor-intensive projects. When they realized their financial control systems and communication with local branches were insufficient, they decided to use funds allocated for capacity building to procure MIS equipment and software and to provide training for their financial staff. Implementing agency performance was satisfactory. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Considering the project complexity and the involvement of several donors, and the satisfactory outcome of the project the overall performance of the Borrower is rated satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned · Programmatic approach to project coordination. The coordination by MOPIC of a multi-donor project was crucial to the success of the CIP. The fact that the Bank took the lead in designing the CIP program and MOPIC took the lead in coordinating it helped the management of multi-donor funds of different types (both grants and loans) which otherwise could have been competing with each other to the detriment of the collaborative, programmatic nature of the project. · Transparent and reliable procurement and payment processes. The transparent procurement process and the timely payments to contractors led to substantial savings. The good reputation built by the procurement process managed under the project contributed to build contractors' trust and increase competition for CIP contracts. This helped to reduce costs. · Performance Indicators and Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) System. Selecting clear performance - 13 - indicators for both outputs and outcomes from the onset of the project would have helped to monitor the targeting of activities and re-focus them when circumstances required. The large amount of information regularly collected by the implementing agencies was often not usable for rigorous analysis, because baseline and subsequent ex-post evaluation surveys did not produce comparable data. Based on the experience of the CIP, it would be advisable to expand these systems to include appropriate indicators to capture the socio-economic impacts of investments on beneficiaries. · Capacity to target poor communities in municipalities across the country. Under Part B, sub-projects were implemented throughout the life of the project based on the initial needs assessment. This, together with the limited menu of infrastructure improvements financed under the project (mostly roads), created some rigidity during the final stages of implementation, somehow reducing the ability of the project to target the poorest communities. A reassessment of the needs and possibly a review of the eligibility criteria for fund allocation before Stage 3 could have improved the targeting in this final phase of the project. · Sustainability of investments at municipal level. CIP provided models of two types of Bank project assistance: the clearly defined, pre-set menu of infrastructure investments for the upgrading squatter settlements and refugee camps, and the demand-driven approach under component B. Both are important and both can benefit the poor, but the latter could have been used more effectively as an opportunity to strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their assets, including budget allocations for O&M. · Realistic implementation schedule. The Bank-wide implementation profile for similar infrastructure projects is substantially in excess of the project period of three and a half years. It is important to make realistic on the experience of comparable projects and the country situation. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: (b) Cofinanciers: (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): Here follows partners' comments to the CIP as provided by GTZ: Drawing on the substantial local development experience accumulated during 1999-2002, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), in close cooperation and coordination with Government of Jordan various central (MoPIC, MoMA, CVDB) and local (mainly Municipalities of Waqqas & Muath Bin Jabal but also several other municipalities receiving aid within the context of CIP/B) agencies, arrived at several major conclusions that were central to shaping the profile of GTZ's present project, i.e. Poverty Alleviation though Municipal Development ­ PAMD: l While municipalities were generally weak and lacking in financial resources, they were ideally placed and geographically distributed within local communities throughout Jordan. l Municipalities had good knowledge of their local situations (social, economic, environmental...etc) and community profiles. l Local communities considered municipalities their first `port of call' re. any service delivery or local development issues. l But, inspite of all the above attributes, municipalities were not playing any role in facilitating, coordinating or encouraging local development. Coupled with international knowledge and experience confirming the vital role municipalities SHOULD play in local development and supported by Jordan's explicit national policies targeting poverty alleviation at all levels (including the local, municipal level), GTZ along with its various Jordanian partners launched PAMD in Jan 2002 - 14 - with the overall aim of allowing `poor sections of population in local communities to play an active role in economic development' through enabling `selected municipalities to facilitate local development with consideration to the needs and interests of local population'. 10. Additional Information - 15 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Indicator/Matrix Units Target at Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate Variance Project Development Objective (1): Improve living conditions of people in poor communities. 1.1 Improvement of basic infrastructure No.s of · 12 squatter (5 under Bank · 6 squatter settlements 120% in selected squatters, camps and poor upgraded Loan) settlements; villages and municipalities. settlements · 13 camps (3 under Bank · 4 camps 133% loan), and · 300 villages and · 87 villages and 235% municipalities (37 under Bank municipalities loan). Project Development Objective (2): Improve the capacity of Central and Local government agencies to deliver infrastructure services to the poor. 2.1 Establishment and implementation Yes/No Procedures for beneficiary · By 1999 HUDC 100% of procedures for beneficiaries consultation consultation for HUDC and established and started with respect to infrastructure and other CVDB to be established by implementing procedures investments 1999 and implemented soon for beneficiary after. consultation · By 2000, CVDB established and started implementing procedures for beneficiary consultation 2.2 Timely execution of CIP compared Original program to be CIP actually closed in with agreed implementation schedule completed by 2001 June 2004 (due to included in the Operation Manual externalities, rather than to the capacity of implementing agency) - 16 - Output Indicator/Matrix Units Target at Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate Variance Project Output (1): Improved safety and health conditions for residents of very-low-income areas. Indicators used to measure performance in attaining this output include: Roads: Number of squatters with safe access No. 5 6 120% roads Number of Camps with safe access roads No 3 4 130% Number of municipalities with safe access roads Sqm 37 87 235% Quantity of road paving in camps Sqm 250,000 257,630 103% Quantity of road paving in squatters Sqm 16,500 137,400 830% Quantity of road paving in municipalities Sqm - 2,000,000 Decrease in of flood damage in municipalities/villages Not available NA NA Water: Meters of replaced pipes in squatters and ml 107,000 485,000 450% camps Number of new connections in squatters No. 5,850 3,500 60% and camps Walls: Meters of retaining walls built ml 57,200 Total number of temporary jobs created (Combined Parts A & B) No. 614,000 Project Output (2): Enhanced economic activity in pilot areas. Indicators used to measure performance in attaining this output include: Number of pilot villages benefiting from No. 5 5 pilot projects implemented 100% pilot activities and completed by the closing of the project Relatively higher growth of jobs in pilot No. Not available Not measured - areas as compared to control areas Relatively higher growth of income in pilot No. of direct Not Available (NA) Not measured - areas as compared to control areas; jobs created No. of indirect NA Not Measured jobs created Relatively higher growth of investments % NA NA in pilot areas as compared to control areas. - 17 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million A.1 Upgrading On-site infrastructure in squatter 27.90 settlements A.2 Upgrading On-site infrastructure in refugee camps 25.60 A.3 Upgrading On-site infrastructure in refugee camps and 23.20 adjacent areas B. Upgrading Municipal and Village Infrastructure 22.70 Kingdom-wide C. Pilot Projects (five) 2.40 Consultancy and Training 2.40 Project Management 1.60 Project Design and Implementation 6.00 Total Baseline Cost 111.80 0.00 Physical Contingencies 11.30 Price Contingencies 16.90 Total Project Costs 140.00 0.00 Total Financing Required 140.00 0.00 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 0.00 66.00 0.00 20.00 86.00 (0.00) (23.00) (0.00) (0.00) (23.00) 2. Goods 5.00 0.00 4.00 17.00 26.00 (3.00) (0.00) (2.10) (0.00) (5.10) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 3.00 25.00 28.00 (0.00) (0.00) (1.90) (0.00) (1.90) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 5.00 66.00 7.00 62.00 140.00 (3.00) (23.00) (4.00) (0.00) (30.00) - 18 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 0.79 16.58 0.00 0.00 17.37 (0.53) (8.85) (0.00) (0.00) (9.38) 2. Goods 0.00 7.29 0.00 0.00 7.29 (0.00) (5.68) (0.00) (0.00) (5.68) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.87 (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.26) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 0.79 23.87 0.87 0.00 25.54 (0.53) (14.53) (0.26) (0.00) (15.32) 1/Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2/Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. - 19 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Not Applicable - 20 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 12/20/96 2 SR. SANITARY ENGINEER(1); PRINCIPAL ECONOMIST(1) 02/20/97 1 FINANCIAL ANALYST(1) Appraisal/Negotiation 04/09/97 5 SR. SANITARY ENGINEER (1); PRINc. ECONOMIST (1); COUNTRY OFFICER (1); MUNICIPAL ENGINEER (1); SOCIAL FUND SPEC. (1) 06/16/97 Supervision 10/02/1997 3 SR. SANITARY ENGINEER S S (1); DISBURSEMENT OFFICER (1); SOCIAL DEV. SPECIALIST (1) 10/17/1998 3 SR SANITARY ENGINEER (1); S S SOCIAL SCIENTIST (1); SR. FINANCIAL SPEC (1) 05/07/1999 3 SR. SANITARY ENGINEER S S (1); SR. ECONOMIST (1); SR. FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) 05/04/2000 3 SR. SANITARY ENGINEER(1); S S SENIOR ECONOMIST (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) 10/02/2000 1 ENGINEER(1) S S 12/18/2000 3 ENGINEER (1); ECONOMIST S S (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) 07/03/2001 3 FINANCIAL ANALYST(1); S S FINANCIAL MGT SPECIALIST (1); ENGINEER(1) 02/16/2002 1 ENGINEER (1) S S 05/21/2002 3 ENGINEER (1); S S PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); SR. FIN. SPECIALIST (1) 05/24/2004 3 ENGINEER(1); PROCUR. S S SPEC. (1); FIN. MGT. SPEC. (1) ICR 08/07/2004 2 URBAN SPECIALIST (1); S S URBAN PLANNER (1) - 21 - (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation Appraisal/Negotiation 226,000 Supervision 67.5 479,000 ICR 8.0 32,000 Total 75.5 745,000 $226,000 is the total direct costs from Identification to Board approval. - 22 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA - 23 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 24 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents l Project Appraisal Document l Credit Agreement l Jordan, Community Infrastructure Project - Operations Manual l Project Supervision Reports l Socio-Economic Beneficiary Assessment l CIP-A: Project Completion Report, HUDC l CIP-B: Project Completion Report, CVDB l CIP Final Project Completion Report, MOPIC l ICR of Second Public Works Project - Republic of Yemen l Guidelines for Preparing ICRs issued December 24, 2003 - 25 - Additional Annex 8. Project Outcomes: Evidence from Selected Case Studies For Component 1, Al-Hashmi was selected as representative example of upgraded squatters as it provided a combination of infrastructure investments and some targeted resettlement. For Component 2, the case of Al-Baqa'a Camp was selected for detailed analysis, as it represented the largest of the Camps targeted by the project and proportionately the largest share of investments. While this was the only case of resettlement in upgrading supported by Bank funds, resettlement was used in numerous other interventions funded by other donors; therefore it was selected as a case for in-depth analysis significantly representative for the whole CIP multi-donor program. The following table summarizes some examples of improvements in the lives of poor communities as they materialized in these two settlements targeted by the project. Table 2: Outcomes and improvements in the lives of the poor Project intervention (Output Indicators) Quantitative Outcome Indicators Qualitative evidence Al-Hashmi Squatter settlement Provision of about 1,800 m2 of new asphalted 250% increase in the per-capita 68.0% of people interviewed in the access roads (4.5m wide or more, including ratio of area of roads 4.5 m wide or baseline survey complained about roads parking areas) in addition to the already more (from 0.44m2/capita to and paths condition, while in the existing 800 m2 1.54m2/capita) evaluation survey 67.8% and 77.5% of families confirmed that the project had contributed significantly to improve roads and foot paths conditions respectively. In particular, beneficiaries reported improved quality of life in the health, safety, economic and social dimensions, like: easier access to garbage collection points both by people and municipal tracks; improved settlement safety thanks to easy access by fire tracks and ambulances; and easier car and bus access to houses. Construction of Community Center ·More than 400 women members Representatives of the NGO Family attended different training (e.g. Development Association managing the sewing, beauty care, micro-enterprise center reported that the Center is the and small business management, etc) only one serving Al-Hashmi and over the last 3 years; surrounding low-income settlements. ·Estimated 50% of trained women are Over the last 3 years it has been making an income working from particularly successful in (1) helping home; women to find jobs outside the ·Creation of one child-care center settlement and become economically (age 3 to 6). self-sufficient, (2) increasing awareness of the community on how to request services from the municipality, and (3) providing guidance to community members on how to access citizens' services throughout the city (from legal advice, to government agencies, to healthcare and support for handicapped family members). Al-Baqa'a Camp New storm water drainage system (about 4km) Decrease in flood-related In addition to the reduction in the number of and renovation of roads, sidewalks and emergency cases recorded by civil emergency cases, people in the camp reported footpaths (about 360,000 m2) implemented defense in Baqa'a Camp: 9 cases in reduced economic burden on household budget (e.g. between April 2000 and August 2001. 2000, 1 case each in 2001 and no furniture replacement due to flood damage), less 2002, 0 cases in 2003 (Source: pressure on community organizations (Camp Operation Management Department Improvement Committee - CIC) to cope with flood of the Civil Defense). emergencies, and overall improvement of quality of - 26 - life in the camp (quick drainage of roads means improved access and circulation in the camp during rain, improvement of storm water canals with creation of closed culverts reduces collection of garbage and create new public areas in the settlement). Installed and/or replaced water networks ·4 recorded cases of official 90.4% of respondents in the beneficiary (about 145km) complaints for water pollution in the survey attributed improved efficiency of year 1999 were reduced to 0 by the the water system to the project. In year 2000 (source: Water Department particular, they reported that before the at Ein Al-Basha district); project it would take an average of three ·Between the years 2002 and 2003, a days to pump enough water in the home 24% decrease in water loss was water tanks, while now it takes about ˝ recorded in the Camp. The water hour. Similarly, people attribute the authority attributes a remaining 35% overall health improvements in the camp water loss mostly to illegal (reduction of water-borne diseases) connections and poor quality of valves mostly to the to improved water and used in individual house connections, drainage networks, and partly to a rather than to the network itself builtchlorination system implemented by under the CIP. WAJ. Installed more than 1000 new lamp posts Not Available People reported overall increased security of the electrical system in the camp (less cases of accidental electrocutions due to poor electrical system) and in the safety of the settlement by night Similarly, direct observation in the field, interviews of representatives of local councils and an in-depth analysis by CVDB of the 23 municipalities targeted under Stage 2 of implementation confirmed that the project did target poorest villages and municipalities, and resulted in improved the living conditions of the beneficiaries by increasing the overall access to remote areas, reducing the vulnerability of roads to flooding events, facilitating the subsequent delivery of additional services, like water networks, street lighting and sewer connections, and increasing the land value of targeted areas. In addition, particularly highlighted and welcomed by the local council members was the capacity of the project to create temporary employment for local people. The later is estimated at about 313,000 labor days. With regard to the pilot projects, the cases of Waqqas, Al Natheef and Al Shamieh were selected for in-depth analysis of outcomes. Key findings are summarized as follows: In Waqqas: l The dairy processing center is managed by a local NGO and employs 11 full-time staff to process 2 tons of milk daily. l About 25 milk producers benefit from the service of this center by selling their milk at a relatively higher rate than they would in the market, benefiting from some of the savings due to the elimination of middlemen. l The dairy products of the Waqqas center are of high quality and are gaining a good reputation in the Amman and Irbid markets, contributing to the overall sustainability of the project. In Al Natheef, l 28 women were trained on industrial sewing, of which 13 managed to secure a permanent job with one of the local factories. l The Production Kitchen currently employs 5 permanent staff and works with 6 other part time ladies. l The Nursery currently employs 3 permanent staff and offers day care services for 22 babies for 12 working women. l The IT Training Center currently employs 1 trainer and contracts 5 more on temporary basis. It has provided training for more than 217 trainees in less than 18 months; l The JRF Design center currently employs 36 workers and 120 home-based producers and 180 short-term. In Al Shamieh: - 27 - l The CIP projects created short-term employment in more than 10000 day opportunities; l The well built to support income- generating activities serves more than 250 local farmers with an indirect impact on their respective families l The micro finance scheme has served 38 borrowers, who now have their own new businesses l 15 women benefited from business management training program. - 28 - Additional Annex 9. Distribution of expenditures by type of settlement and infrastructure Expenditures expressed in JD (JD1=US$1.4) PART A: Infrastructure: Type of Investment CAMPS SQUATTER AREAS Roads (*) 4 003 146 426 160 Footpaths 60 095 Sewerage 1 911 730 355 038 Water Supply 3 447 553 869 099 Storm Water 801 417 85 315 Electricity 242 132 563 447 Pedestrian Bridges 86 244 0 Site Works 171 574 211 545 TOTAL 9 892 373 2 570 699 (*) This amount includes Roads & Footpaths Community Building for Squatter Areas: Wadi Abdoun School 344746 Safh Al Hashimi Community Center 40101 PART B: Amounts and Costs (payments) of Work Done Within different Groups of (Part B ­ CIP) ­ Funded By World Bank Roads Culverts Retaining Walls Canals Total Total Amounts Amounts Group Amounts/ Costs/ Amounts/ Costs/ Amounts/ Costs/ Amounts/ Costs/ of of m2 JDs m JDs m3 JDs m JDs Tenders/ Payments/ JDs JDs 1 320723 755747 4046 295552 17572 588049 3179 83527 1722762.6 1643293 2 653190 1598816 3999 247678 21777 745186 6108 152234 2726142.9 2671608.8 3 1037021 2359508 2103 105937 17873 557630 2142 31880 3358145.1 3252865.1 Total 2010934 4714071 10148 649167 57222 1890865 11429 267641 7807051 7567767 - 29 - Additional Annex 10. Client's Contribution to the ICR - 30 - SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT The Government of Jordan, concerned with rising poverty and unemployment, has launched the Social Productivity Program (SPP), with the support of donors to improve the conditions of the poor and unemployed. The Social Productivity Program was introduced in 1997, with four components, to be implemented in parallel at the local level, namely: 1. Improving the National Aid Fund's welfare programs to better target and increase the coverage of the poor including the unemployed (Reform NAF) 2. Creating employment opportunities through demand driven skills training (Training and Employment Support Program, TESP) 3. Facilitating credit and services for small and micro enterprises (Small and Micro Enterprise Program, SMEs). 4. Improving the living conditions of the poor through the provision and upgrading of essential infrastructure (Community Infrastructure Project, CIP). The Social Productivity Program was planned for implementation over two phases; the first phase would be for three years, where the GoJ would launch the basic activities including the pilot projects, which were introduced originally as part of the Community Infrastructure Project and became later separate fifth component of SPP, with the aim of testing the principle of integrated development in selected rural and urban areas of Jordan. The performance of the program in phase I would provide guidance for improvement or abandonment during the next phase. In late 2001 and after more than three years of launching the first phase of the SPP, the GoJ decided to go on with its efforts to alleviate poverty and unemployment with a focus on productivity and income generation, when it decided to launch the Enhanced Productivity Program (EPP) rather than the Second Phase of the Social Productivity Program. The new program was designed in a way that capitalized on the achievements of SPP and incorporated the lessons learned in the design of its components that involved the private sector and a bigger number of NGOs as stakeholders and partners in implementing its programs. Development Objectives and Design The community Infrastructure Project (CIP) represents small-scale infrastructure improvements (sub-projects) to poor communities in Jordan. It was planned to be completed in about three years and to test opportunities for developing: (a) income-generating activates in economically deprived areas; (b) approaches to promote local participation in the identification of priority infrastructure needs; (c) criteria for eligible appropriate investment; and (d) detailed relocation planes in squatter settlements to enable upgrading basic infrastructure in subsequent phases of CIP. Project development objectives: The CIP's primary development objective is to improve the living conditions of the poor through the provision of essential physical and social infrastructure services. A secondary objective is to improve the capacity of selected institution to deliver infrastructure services to the poor in an effective, efficient and targeted way. Another secondary objective was to provide temporary employment, during the projects implementation, to the poor local labor from the targeted areas. The CIP intended to reduce the hardship of poverty through infrastructure provision, but it was recognized that it couldn't by itself reduce poverty. The objective was consistent with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 1995, which focused on amongst other issues, improving infrastructure extent and efficiency to relieve constraints to sustained growth, and reducing poverty and unemployment and improvement of living conditions. It was also consistent with the Government of Jordan's Three Year Plan (1999-2002); in fact SPP was one of Plan's main programs to address poverty and unemployment issues. The objective is also still consistent and relevant with the new development Three Year Plan (2004-2006) recently approved by the Government, which focused on, amongst other issues, the development of - 31 - infrastructure services in the deprived areas, and to continue the implementation of the initiatives addressing poverty and unemployment problems The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper launched by the Government in May 2002 confirmed the need to implement projects in the municipalities and the rural areas, as one of the means to create job opportunities and to address poverty problem. Revised Objectives: The original project objectives remained unchanged. Original Components: To achieve its objectives the project was to finance three components (parts): Part A, upgrading on-site and off-site essential infrastructure in about 14 squatter settlements and 13 refugee camps, this part would be implemented by the Housing and Development Corporation (HUDC): 1. Upgrading of squatter settlements: This includes 14 sites located in Greater Amman, Zarqa and Russeifa, one additional site in Aqaba was added later to the project. These developments are located in government and privately owned land, and privately co-owned land. These areas are densely built-up and have developed randomly without any consideration of zoning and building codes. The streets generally consist of narrow pathways. Water supply networks are generally above ground, undersized and leak excessively. They also have sanitary sewerage networks, which for the most part will need minor upgrading. There are no drainage systems to collect surface storm water. And there are areas without street lighting. In some areas, due to the high housing density, roads upgrading will require relocation of some families. Some areas will also need schools, health centers and community centers. 2. Upgrading of refugee camps. This includes 13 camps located near Greater Amman, Irbid, Jerash, Madaba and Zarqa. These camps will be upgraded to improve primarily water supply and sewerage, drainage, roads and footpaths, pedestrian crossings at major roads, street lighting and retaining walls. The project included the provision of off-site sewage disposal facilities to four refugee camps, which will be sized, with provisions to serve existing and future urban developments near the camps. Part B, upgrading or providing essential infrastructure in about 300 low-income municipalities and villages throughout the Kingdom, this part would be implemented by the Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB); Upgrading essential infrastructure in poor municipalities and villages in the Kingdom consisted generally of providing or upgrading drainage systems; safe access roads and pedestrian crossings; stream or ravine crossings; retaining walls; street lighting; and solid waste collection equipment. Some communities will also need health centers and community and youth centers. Part C, provision of consultancy services, some equipment and training to strengthen the capacity of implementing agencies and local councils in the delivery of the project; carrying out surveys and studies for preparation of sub-projects; and designing five pilot sub-projects to test opportunities of income-generation activities in economically deprived areas ­ it was agreed later with the World Bank to identify the pilot sub-projects as separate part of the project i.e. Part D. Revised Components: The Project main components were not revised, however, the following modifications were under taken on some of the constituents of these components: (a) On-site and off-site infrastructure projects of 3 refugee camps were postponed, due to problems related with other donors. One additional squatter site, one school, one community center and two health centers were added to the Project. (b) 65 new municipalities were added to the Project. - 32 - (c) Due to its importance and special nature, pilot projects were separated from Part C, and identified as Part D. Project Setup and Design: The division of the project into two components, Part A which focused on the upgrading of areas of dense concentration of poor inhabitants who are generally without formal land property formal rights (squatter areas and refugee camps), and Part B which focused on the provision of basic infrastructure services for the poor rural communities dispersed throughout the country, has helped very much in the rapid `start up' of the implementation, and served in assuring a more efficient management of the project. The selection of the executing agencies of the two main of the project, proved to be a right and logical choice. The previous successful similar experience of HUDC in upgrading squatter settlements, had saved time and effort that would be spent by any other agency just to be acquainted and prepared to deal with the complexities of implementing major projects in a very poor and dense populated areas which could require in some cases partial or full demolition of some houses. CVDB experience in fund management and in dealing with the municipalities, with five regional branches, has helped much in facilitating the implementation of part B. Project Management · A steering committee SC was established by Prime Minister decree, to be in charge of the steering of the whole program (Social Productivity Program) including CIP. SC was headed by the Minister of Planning and consisted of the Minister of Municipalities Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Public Works and Housing, Minister of Social Development, Minister of Labor, Minister of Industry and Commerce, Minister of Awqqaf, Minister of Health, Mayor of Greater Amman Municipality, and the Director General(s) of HUDC and CVDB. During the whole duration of the project, SC held only five meetings. · Overall CIP management was the responsibility of the Project Management Unit established in the Ministry of Planning MoPIC/PMU (Social Productivity Program Unit SPPU). Policy decisions were the responsibility of a Steering Committee, and the SPPU has functioned as its secretariat. Part A sub-projects have been implemented by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), and Part B sub-projects by the Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB). Pilot projects under Part C (Part D later) have been implemented by SPPU, and studies required for project preparation and implementation of parts A and B were done by both HUDC and CVDB, respectively. Each implementing agency and SPPU was responsible for implementing training programs for their own staff. · HUDC established a project management unit (HUDC/PMU) headed by a director and supported by qualified staff. HUDC departments provided administrative support to the PMU, and carried out studies, part of the design and implementation of sub-project under Part A of the CIP. HUDC/PMU was responsible for all procurement and ensured that payments to contractors and suppliers for services rendered were in accordance with the terms of contracts. · CVDB was responsible for fund management under Part B. in order to properly manage the program, CVDB established a Project Management Unit (CVDB/PMU), which was headed by a director and supported by qualified staff and consultants as needed. CVDB departments provided administrative and technical support to the CVDB/PMU in the management and implementation of Part B. CVDB/PMU conducted needs assessment surveys and studies, appraised funding requests received from municipal and village councils, and recommend those sub-projects, which met the projects criteria for approval by the concerned parties. CVDB signed implementation agreements with the concerned municipalities and local councils. These agreements specified: the roles and responsibilities of CVDB, local councils, and MoMA's engineering units; and the procurement and disbursement arrangements to be followed. Project Estimated Cost · The estimated cost of the project at appraisal was US$ 140 million (about JD 98 million). The total cost of - 33 - the actual implemented subprojects according to the latest estimates (as of September 30, 2004) is around JD 73 million only, most of the variation is due to the postponement of on-site and off-site infrastructure projects in three of the refugee camps. A cost breakdown by component is given below: Project Component Cost Estimate JD million Appraisal Actual Upgrading 14 squatter settlements 24 18.6 Part A Upgrading 13 refugee camps (on-site works) 22 22 Refugee camps & nearby areas off-site works 20 1.8 Part B Upgrading 300 municipalities and villages 22 28.3 Consultants (surveys and studies) 2 * Part C Five pilot projects 2 1.3 Project management units and training 2 1 Project design and supervision 4 * Total Cost 98 73 *: Included in the subprojects implementation cost. Project Financing · The Government of Jordan was supported by the donor community to launch the project by providing most of the needed funding, this includes a World Bank loan of US$ 30 million, a contribution from Germany of DM25 million in terms of direct grant and another DM115 million grant as debt swap, Arab Fund loan of 6.0 million Kuwaiti Dinar, Islamic Bank two loans of about US$ 10 million and a soft loan from the Government of Italy of 46.1 billion Italian lire. The GoJ contribution in financing the project is around JD25 million which represents around 30% from the total project cost. Funding Source Funding Type Value JD Equivalent World Bank Loan US$ 30 million 21.2 million Arab Fund Loan KD6 million 14.0 million Islamic Bank for Development-1 Loan US$ 5 million 3.5 million Islamic Bank for Development-2 Loan US$ 5 million 3.5 million KfW (Germany) Grant DM25 million 8.5 million Government of Italy Soft loan ITL 46.1 billion 21.0 million Government of Jordan 26.0 million Grand Total 98.0 million The financing provided by the donors to implement the subprojects were partial, the government had to provide the remaining amounts as counterpart funding. The World Bank financed 70% of the civil works, while the Arab Fund, KfW and Islamic Bank financed 80%, 78% and 67.5% respectively. In addition to its contribution in providing counterpart funding, the Government had financed 100% of the land acquisition, demolition compensation, management fees, engineering fees for the municipalities subprojects, subprojects design of 12 squatter sites & 9 refugee camps and the supervision of most of the subprojects. Management of Funds - 34 - The two loans provided by the World Bank and the Arab Fund covered all the components of the Project, many reallocations of the proceeds of these two loans were required during the implementation stage, this included shifting funds across the components of the Project as well as the categories of each component, the allocations were carried out to meet the need to finance new subprojects or sites, to utilize the unallocated funds and the savings in the allocations of some subprojects. The loans of the Islamic Bank and the German grant were fully allocated to Part-A of the Project. Distribution of the Proceeds of the World Bank Loan No. Category Amount of the Loan Allocated (US$) Loan Agreement Modified Utilized* (1) Civil works for: (a) Subprojects under Part A 15,000,000 13,800,000 13,300,000 (b) Subprojects under Part B 5,000,000 8,400,000 8,400,000 (2) Equipment and Vehicles: (a) Under Part A and C (1) 1,000,000 200,000 100,000 (b) Under Part B and C (2) 4,000,000 5,200,000 4,990,000 (c) Under Part C and C (3) 100,000 25,000 (3) Consultants services & Training (a) Under Part C (1) 300,000 400,000 380,000 (b) Under Part C (2) 300,000 300,000 300,000 (c) Under Part C (3) 1,300,000 25,000 (4) Sub-grants (a) Under Part D of the Project 1,650,000 1,500,000 (5) Unallocated 3,000,000 TOTAL 30,000,000 30,000,000 28,970,000 *: Latest estimates - 35 - Distribution of the Proceeds of the Arab Fund Loan No. Category Amount of the Loan Allocated (KD) Loan Agreement Modified Utilized* (1) Civil works for: (a) Subprojects under Part A 2.50 0.75 0.64 (b) Subprojects under Part B 2.00 5.08 4.41 (2) Technical Services & Capacity Building for the Implementing Agencies: (a) Hudc 0.20 0.02 0.02 (a) Cvdb 0.15 0.15 0.13 (a) PMU / MoPIC (SPPU) 0.15 (3) Unallocated 1.00 TOTAL 6.00 6.00 5.20 *: Latest estimates Project Implementation The Project was originally designed to be implemented in five years, however, implementation action plans, loans/grants agreements and agreements with the execution agencies were all prepared based on an implementation period of a three years. The duration of implementing each of the vast majority of the included subprojects did not exceed 24 months, however, it took around five years to finish all the numerous subprojects comprising CIP, this was attributed to many reasons among them are the following: · Studies and detailed design of many of the subprojects had taken more time than expected. · The increase in the number of the targeted poor municipalities in the Project by around 40%. · Solving issue related to preparing zoning maps for many of the squatter sites, had delayed the commencement of work in these sites. · The time spent in finding an arrangement with the Water Authority concerning the disposal of the wastewater of Al-Huson Camp. The Project was never at risk, apart from the issues related to the duration, the implementation was generally smooth, despite of the normal problems which usually associate with such major projects, the SPPU in cooperation with the other PMUs managed to solve these problems without affecting the objectives and the out comes of the Project. Due to the need to extend the implementation period, the World Bank approved the extension of the loan closing date three times from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2004; similar extensions were also approved by the other donors. Achievement of Objectives & Outputs: The Project substantially achieved its objectives and outputs as follows: · Upgrading the basic infrastructure in 15 squatter settlements and 10 refugee camps with a cost of about JD34 million. · Provision of basic infrastructure in (230) municipality with a cost of about JD29 million. · Construction, furnishing and operating 7 schools, 24 health centers and 21 community centers, with a cost of around JD11 million. · Provision of 104 solid waste collecting vehicles and 1400 related container with a cost of around JD3.5 million. · Provision of more than 500,000 man day for local labor. - 36 - · Implementing building capacity program for strengthening the capabilities of the implementing agencies, this included holding numerous training courses and workshops, in addition to the provision of necessary equipment and supplies, with a total cost of around JD2.0 million. Project implementation together with the achievement of the objectives are illustrated in detail in separate chapter for each of the major components of the Project i.e. Parts A, B, C and D. Bank's Performance: The Bank helped and supported the Government to define the broad out lines of the Social Productivity Program; the Bank utilized his previous experience in Jordan and abroad in upgrading squatter sites and in improvement projects in local councils, to assist in the design of the Community Infrastructure Project. After launching the Project and during implementation supervision missions were conducted on a regular basis by staff of the World Bank. Support and guidance was given as and when needed to PMUs staff. All issues of concern appeared, were addressed promptly, decisions and necessary actions were taken that supported and facilitated the smooth implementation of the Project, and this was clearly manifested in the following: - The very swift and positive responses to the requests of implementing agencies for the Bank's `no objection' on the tender documents of the various subprojects and activities. - The approval to launch local tenders for the construction subprojects in Part-A with values above the threshold limits. - The approval to add (Irbid Camp) to the package funded by the World Bank loan, and to utilize part of the savings in loan proceeds, to add Shamiya Site to the Project. - The approval to make several reallocations of the loan proceeds, between the different parts of the project, and the various categories of each part. - The provision of consultancy and experience to the PMUs when needed. - The approval to extend the loan closing date three times, one year in each. Borrower's Performance: The Government had provided all the resources, support and guidance to facilitate implementing the project and achieving the targeted objectives. Big efforts were made to mobilize the needed finance from donors, and counterpart funds were made available on time, Special Tenders Committees and a very high profile steering committee consisting of eleven ministers were formed. The Government agreed to provide funding for implementing additional necessary elements in the project, which was not included in the preliminary design and studies, such as constructing water reservoirs for three of the refugee camps, and to replace the electricity networks of four camps endangering the lives of the residents with new ones with insulated cables. Due to the bad financial conditions and the high indebtedness of most of the municipalities, the Government approved the relief of the municipalities where the subprojects would be implemented (except Greater Amman Municipality) from any cost recovery related to the implementation of these subprojects. The Government decentralized approving the selected subprojects ­ in the local councils­ and allocating funds by delegating this authority to the Local Technical Committees headed by the Governors. PMU Performance: The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation was in charge of steering the whole Program (Social Productivity Program) including CIP, this was done through the PMU/MoPIC (Social Productivity Program Unit SPPU) with specialized highly qualified and limited number of staff (6-8) persons. The Unit monitored the Project - 37 - implementation and the achievement of the of project objectives, and provide the Bank and the other donors with progress reports on quarterly and annual basis. The Unit worked closely with the Bank missions in reviewing the progress and the achievement of the Project objectives. The Unit successfully managed the available funds and made the necessary reallocations to utilize the savings occurred in these funds in including more needy and poor areas and in implementing additional subprojects. Around two thousands of payments to the contractors representing the Government funding contribution were processed by the Unit with out any delay. The Unit played a significant and pivotal role to maintain full coordination among the various parties involved in the Project implementation, and to resolve any conflict that would arise immediately. The Unit had ensured that the subprojects were designed and implemented according to the agreed upon guidelines, it had also carried out an awareness campaign regarding the CIP and the other components of SPP. The Unit managed to design the Pilot Projects, originally within Part-C of the Project, and later as a separate new part of the Project (Part-D), in addition to the direct supervision, the Unit provided all the support and assistance to the local partners selected to implement these projects. Implementing Agencies Performance: The selected implementing agencies i.e. HUDC and CVDB had succeeded in implementing their related Parts of the Project with the help and assistance of SPPU and the other related parties. They managed to work closely and in harmony with the operating parties and agencies in the different phases of the Project. They had, together with SPPU, initiated a model where several governmental and non-governmental organizations, work closely to get the Project implemented effectively and efficiently. They used to prepare monthly progress reports, with a briefing about the status of each project technically and financially. The two executing agencies as per the signed project agreements, agreed to get management fees equivalent to 4.25% and 3.5% of the actual implemented works for HUDC and CVDB respectively, these rates proved to be much less than any rate that could be charged by private sector firms for conducting similar services. This applies also to the rates charged for conducting consultancy services conducted by them, HUDC was given 3.18% from the actual implemented work for the design of squatter sites subprojects, CVDB and the engineering regional offices of MoMA got only 2.6% of the implemented work in the municipalities projects, for the design and the supervision services, in fact the later rates were far from covering the actual cost incurred by the two agencies to conduct the related services, the difference, could be in a way considered as an `in kind' contribution from the two implementing agencies in the financing of this national important Project. Performance of Consultants, Contractors and Suppliers Consultants: For Part-A, designs for all the camps and two small squatter areas were carried out by local consultants and were satisfactory. Detailed designs were prepared in coordination with PMU staff, and the government related agencies. Designs for Schools, Health Centers and Community Centers were tailored by HUDC according to the resident's needs and the requirements of the concerned operating agencies. Preparation of tender documents was carried out according to international and Jordanian standards. Supervision consultants worked in the camps and in one school, health center and community center i.e. on the sites not covered by HUDC. Their performance was satisfactory, reflected in prompt and wise handling of problems arising during construction. PMU staff was supportive to them and directly involved in the process. - 38 - For Part-B, consultants were mainly involved in the design and supervision related to the construction of the health centers and community centers, with the coordination and follow-up of the CVDB/PMU, and the cooperation of the concerned staff of the Ministries of Health and Social Development. The services provided by those consultants were satisfactory in general. Contractors: Generally, contractors' performance was good to very good in most cases. This was reflected in the good quality of work and management of projects during implementation. Most projects were completed on time or with minimum delays. Suppliers: The suppliers' performance was satisfactory. This was manifested in the good quality of the supplied equipment and furniture and the general adherence to delivery dates in most of the cases. Sustainability: The local communities, implementing and operating agencies were involved at the very early stages of sub-project identification and preparation; they participated also in the subsequent stages (detailed design, putting specifications, implementation and handing over). Written commitments from the operating agencies have been made, to receive the implemented subprojects and to allocate funds in their annual budgets to maintain and operate them. For squatter settlements and refugee camps projects: The projects were handed over to the concerned municipalities (Greater Amman, Zarqa and Russaifa), and the related Camps Improvements Committees, after committing to provide municipal services to these areas and the necessary maintenance when needed. The new water and wastewater networks were handed over to the Water Authority. For infrastructure improvement subprojects in local councils: The investments are small civil works requiring only periodic maintenance, which the concerned municipalities had committed to do, visits to some of the subprojects implemented during the first year of the projects, had shown that the constructed roads are still in good condition, and for those which were not, the municipality had carried out the necessary repair and maintenance work. For schools and health centers: The ministry of education and the ministry of health had already staffed and started operating them, not far from their houses, hundreds of students from the targeted site are being taught in a well constructed and equipped schools. Similarly, the inhabitants of these sites do not have to travel to the neighboring areas and some times to farther areas, just to visit a general practitioner. For Community centers: The centers are being operated successfully by the local NGOs selected by the Ministry of Social Development, many of these NGOs had managed to implement activities that benefit the local community in one hand, and provide necessary income for sustainability in the other hand. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome Factors outside the control of government or implementing agencies: 1. The `unprecedented' delay in finalizing related procedures of the Italian soft loan which is supposed to finance the construction of the waste water plants for three refugee camps, and the very long time consumed to approve the tender documents and the agreements related to these plants, which resulted in the postponement of the CIP subprojects in side these camps. - 39 - 2. Despite the intensive efforts made to increase the involvement of the local labor in implementing the subprojects in the squatter sites and the refugee camps, the percentage of local labor did not exceed 60%; this could be attributed to the fact that the construction sector in Jordan depends heavily on foreign labor especially in the urban areas. 3. The significant delay in the implementation of limited number of subprojects, due to the failure of their contractors. Factors generally subject to implementing agencies control: 1. The delay in completing designs related to Part ­A of the Project, and the identification of the subprojects in the municipalities related to Part-B of the 2. Cancellation of significant portions of the subprojects of the squatter sites funded by the World Bank. Lessons Learned: 1. Any development or upgrading have crowded and randomly developed squatter sites that did not result in sufficient wider roads and footpaths would have limited impact in improving the living conditions of the inhabitants. Fair compensations to households susceptible to relocation, that is sufficient to provide decent housing, together with well-studied relocation plans would minimize any related negative impact. 2. A very high profile steering committee, consisting of many ministers, would not help or facilitate very much implementing the related Project, as it would not be 3. External funding for interrelated subprojects should be from one single source, to avoid transferring the implications of funding problems of one subproject to the others. 4. Setting unrealistic squeezed project duration, in response to un-technical factors, would not result in shortening the needed actual time for Project implementation. CIP Phase II: It was planned that the Community Infrastructure Program CIP would be the first (pilot) phase of a longer-term program of small scale infrastructure improvements (subprojects) to poor communities in Jordan, in this phase all the 13 refugee camps, 14 squatter sites out of 28 and 300 municipal and village councils out of 600 were included, meaning that the second phase of CIP would include the remaining second 14 squatter sites and the other 300 local councils. In late 2001 the Government decided to cancel SPP Phase II, which means also the cancellation of the expected phase II of CIP. Despite the cancellation of CIP II, and due to the demands and the needs of most of the remaining local council, it has been decided to implement similar infrastructure subprojects in the remaining 140 areas / municipalities, JD8.0 million were allocated from budget of the Social and Economic Transformation Program SETP for this purpose, following the same methodologies and within the same institutional set up, CVDB started implementation in 2003, many of these subprojects were already w, all of them will be finalized by the end of 2004. Similarly, two squatter sites i.e. Al Tour in Ma'an and Ma'asoum in Zarqa are being developed by HUDC with a total cost of around JD2.0 million financed from SETP BUDGET. - 40 - Additional Annex 11. Highlights from the Borrower's Report on Pilot Projects Overview: The pilot projects were introduced under the CIP with the aim to test the principle of integrated development in selected rural and urban areas of Jordan. The Pilot Projects attempted to bring together, to the extent possible, the four components of the Social Productivity Program (SPP). In principle, the pilot projects would bring together in selected areas the community infrastructure component, the new initiatives being proposed for NAF, and the training and micro enterprise lending components. The objective of the pilot project would be to come up with productive economic activities, which would be of interest to the targeted poor and unemployed. The pilot projects would be designed in a way that would permit making adjustments according to actual implementation on the ground. The pilot projects would be designed for implementation over a period of no more than two years. A. Introduction Pilot Projects (PP) were identified under the CIP and designed as one of the components of the SPP, to be implemented in five pilot areas, simulative to SPPs overall framework. The intention was to create a controlled environment where all components of the SPP are integrated in the selected areas in order to evaluate concepts, methods and action of the SPP, and to provide analysis, which can assist in designing the second phase of the SPP. The effectiveness of SPP components in poverty alleviation and unemployment reduction as well as the efficiency of these programs in promoting comprehensive development in the selected areas through social productivity are the main measures of success in this endeavor. The five pilot areas were selected according to a set of criteria to ensure proper representation of the different social, economic, environmental and geographical considerations, and the presence of reasonable elements of success in these areas. The implementation of theses five Pilot Projects was carried out through local partners, who were selected according to a set of criteria to ensure the capability, willingness and satisfactory presence of these local partners in the selected area. PROJECT LOCAL ESTIMATED STATUS EXECUTING COST IN JDs PARTNER (LEP) 1. "Tal-Rmah Area" in Badia Research and 245000 Agreement signed on 15/1/2000. the Northern Badia of Development All activities under the agreement Jordan. The area consists Program were implemented, including of (11) villages, with a legalizing the local cooperative total population of 2784 society and initial operation of the income generating activities. 2. "Village of Lub" in Noor Al-Hussein 190000 Agreement signed on 15/1/2000. Madaba Governorate. Foundation (NHF) All activities under the agreement Total population in app. were implemented, including 3776 inhabitants. legalizing the local cooperative society and initial operation of the income generating activities. 3. "Al-Shamieh The Jordanian 220000 Agreement signed on 15/2/2000. All Neighborhood" in Ma'an Hashemite Fund for activities under the agreement were city. Located in the Human implemented. The water well have northeast of the city. Total Development been in production for over two years area of 4sq.km and (JOHUD) and all infrastructure activities have population 2500. been executed on time. - 41 - 4. "Waqqas Area" in Municipality of 185000 Agreement signed on 21/8/2000. All Northern Jordan Valley in Waqqas activities under the agreement were Irbid Governorate. Total implemented, including legalizing population is 6389 the local society and initial operation inhabitants. of the income generating activities. 5. "Al-Natheef Jordan River 220000 Agreement signed on 15/5/2000. Neighborhood" in East Foundation All activities under the agreement Amman. The total area is were implemented, including 87 Donums (87,000 m2), legalizing the local cooperation and the population is 7708 society and initial operation of the inhabitants. income generating activities and the production kitchen has been in production for more than two years. However, the SPP unit at the Ministry of Planning, through the Pilot Projects Coordinator has been in direct contact and working closely with the Local Partner in order to ensure the proper implementation and to obtain the required evaluation throughout the Project. Accordingly, the agreements were signed with the five partners at different times; three of these partners were local NGOs, one research institute and Local Council. Total Cost of Pilot Projects Distributed according to Funding Source (JDs) Project World Bank GTZ Government Total 1. Tal-Rmah 244,871 27,000 271,871 2. Lub 202,398 87,602 290,000 3. Al-Shamieh 218,074 218,074 4. Waqqas 180,000 30,000 39,000 249,000 5. Al-Natheef 224,967 17,500 242,467 Total 1,070,310 30,000 171,102 1,271,412 General Evaluation: The aim of the Pilot Projects was to test the principle and mechanisms of implementation of integrated development within the context of the SPP in selected urban and rural areas in the Kingdom and to assist in the revitalization of economically feasible traditional productive job creating opportunities, capitalizing on local know-how, acceptable traditions, and available human and natural resources. The outcome of PP assisted in creating a synchronized system of implementation, which activated all components of the SPP at the same time, with minimum duplication of effort and resources. Also, the accumulated practical experience of all involved parties in the process of PP, resulted in creating a practical training centre, that has been translated with time into appropriate practices in other communities. Pilot Projects were designed in a mission-oriented manner combined with an internal capacity for change, which allowed adjustments in accordance with the actual experience on the ground. The implementation of the PP relied to a great extent on the local participation, to insure that development will lead to the fulfillment of the target groups' needs, by allowing for expression, creativity and control over their own - 42 - affairs. Furthermore, participation in decision-making was an effective tool in promoting commitment and motivation among the concerned groups. Since participation was the essence of the program, Local Executing Partners from selected qualified NGOs were selected to implement the PPs. The designing and implementation of IDPP in each of the five pilot was conducted by the Local Executing Partners, through a mechanism of selection agreed upon with MoPIC. Economic activities were identified by the LEPs with direct involvement of the local community. Accordingly the LEP established a community credit scheme either directly managed by the community or by the LEP depending on the capacity and willingness of the community. The training was demand driven, with the LEP assisting in identifying the needs, and will cover the expenses of training in accordance with the system adopted by the SPP. Infrastructure projects related to the economic activities were also executed by the LEP. MoPIC provided the needed funding, from the proceeds of World Bank loan, for the project management, studies, surveys and the designing of the pilot projects. It also provided the needed funding for the infrastructure work, the credit scheme for micro-enterprise loans and the cost of training, which are associated with the economic activities. Since The Local Executing Partner (LEP) was a key success factor to the PPs, selection of such was done through a screening process based on the following: · Previous experience of the LEP in the field of community development, and in participatory methods of implementation. · Physical presence of the LEP in the area selected. · Capacity of LEP to execute the work required. · Accepted and respected within the local community. · Substantial in kind contribution to the various activities. The five pilot areas were selected in accordance with a set of criteria to insure mainly, proper representation of the different geographic regions of the country, as well as the various sectors of the society. In each pilot area, the local partner (implementing agency) conducted pre-implementation surveys and studies, in order to correctly assess the needs of the community as well as the present living conditions of the targeted group. The pre-implementation studies and surveys included the resource assessment studies including the type of services available in the area and the accessibility of these services to the targeted group, as well as a full Socio-economic assessment. A midterm review was required to provide evaluation of the performance in each pilot area. It included analyses of the methods of implementation and recommendations to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the program. The midterm review included progress reports with full analyses of the performance compared to the original schedules, as well as the quality of work and services compared to previous local standards. The midterm reports included short representative surveys to evaluate changes in all relevant variables. Subsequent to pilot project implementation, the local partners were required to conduct full-scale socio-economic surveys in the pilot areas, in order to measure and evaluate the effect of the various interventions in the area. The results of the studies and surveys conducted have been presented in the Final Report assessing the impact of the Social Productivity Program on the people within the pilot area, demonstrating whether living conditions have improved, and whether the interventions have resulted in a sustainable alleviation of poverty and reduction of unemployment, which are the main aims of the Social productivity Program. With regard to the income-generating project, the next stage should have seen the undertaking of detailed feasibility studies to ascertain whether or which income-generating project ideas could be turned into a self-sustaining (profitable) enterprise once the project assistance was removed. In the meantime, following an assessment of alternatives, an institutional structure has been selected and the legal paperwork and thence constitution of the organization carried through. The idea, in line with the general principle of the program to - 43 - involve the wider community directly in the project results, was that a range or community interests should jointly become responsible and also pay into the project by way of commitment (`ownership'). Internal and external evaluations have been conducted for PPs and the findings of the studies could be summarized as follows, especially the income generating activities: Relevance and Quality of Project Design: The pilot projects all followed the same procedure. A baseline survey was carried out which initiated engagement with the local community. One or more employment-generating projects were identified. Financial resources, generally around 220,000 JD, were made available by the MoPIC to implement these projects and relevant assistance of technical exerts and local institutions including municipalities were engaged to realize the projects. Institutions arrangements were made to operate the results of the projects ­ in all but one case being a cooperative involving a range of community interests and staff were recruited and trained to operate the results of the projects. Finally, sources of materials and markets for the products were sought and the resulting enterprise set in motion. Throughout the project interaction with local communities in various kinds of awareness raising and training was undertaken. In a sense these are `state of the art participatory projects' and it was noted that they were particularly novel for Jordan. Without needing to elaborate on the philosophy behind such projects, it might be stated that the structure seemed to have been accepted by all the LEPs as `the right way to go'. There is, however, an inevitable tension between, on the one hand, the desire to involve (`empower') communities and draw women into the mainstream and on the other to improve productivity. Income generating activities, in the form of businesses, generally require a business focus that is best motivated by private gain and hence `the private sector' can be guaranteed to have the edge on social enterprises of the kind produced by the pilot projects. It should be said in their favor that the compromise between the social and the profit making has generally been kept in balance. A further consideration is the time given to implement the projects. All the projects over-ran the two years within which they were supposed to be implemented and eight months after the official end of the projects, some are only now coming on stream. Perhaps the intention is to give a short implementation period in order to sharpen minds to act fast. On the other hand, community training is inevitably a long-term process and this seems only to have been recognized as the projects unfolded, resulting in the continuing involvement of the NGO LEPs ­ and the contracting of an NGO in the Waqqas case ­ over the coming years. The project communities are all in the region of 5-6,000 inhabitants. These are very small communities in which, presumably, it was thought that the resources available could make a real impact. The issue of scaling up ­ and particularly the notion that the broader SPP and then EPP would learn processes from these seems to have been thoroughly thought through. It is as if `integrated approaches' are fine for small community experiments but irrelevant for large scale programs. Efficiency of Project Implementation: Although most project components were completed within the project period, all the projects had some components that were incomplete and in a few cases components have run well beyond the period allocated for the projects. In some cases there are indications of unexplainable delays that could be traced to inefficiency by third party contractors and suppliers. However, the problem is probably explicable in many cases to problems arising that LEPs were not in a position to solve. Most problematic is, clearly, the hand-over of responsibility to local cooperatives that have no previous experience of running projects. Inefficiencies in implementation are in this respect difficult to avoid and have been recognized in the continuing support offered to the projects by the NGOs. This is where the MoPIC realized the need to launch a new program in 2004 to build the capacities of local NGOs and CBOs and enhance them to become real supporters of government development efforts in their areas. Effectiveness of Project Implementation: In terms of the terms of reference, none of the projects can be said to have failed outright. In all cases there are results that have been achieved through undertaking all the required steps that can be deemed to indicate a reasonable level of effectiveness. What remains somewhat in question is the effectiveness of the particular - 44 - employment generating projects. It has been noted in the descriptions above of almost all the projects that the enterprises created are either still short of being profitable or at best are breaking even. Perhaps, given time, they will prove themselves. And it is only under those circumstances that they will be effective as models, giving confidence to local communities to try again. While, there is great focus on income generating activities, it should be stipulated that other components of the PPs have been successfully delivered with efficiency, especially the infrastructure projects and interventions. The micro finance activities also had a great impact, especially in establishing back linkages with the main income generating activity of the PP and resulting in better economic opportunities. The training component, also helped in providing the local communities with skills that helped them in better seeking job opportunities and that increased the efficiency of the projects of borrowers under the micro finance scheme. Sustainability: This needs to be understood in two stages: the sustainability of the enterprises and the sustainability of a program that will continue on its own to generate further enterprises. Summarizing the across statements in all of the project reports concerning sustainability, it is evident that, without continued support from national NGOs, there is little confidence that the enterprises will be sustained. With continued support, there is good chance that most of the enterprises will reach a level at which they are self-sustaining (profitable and with a self-reproducing management). It is important, however, to note that this involves support that was not envisaged in the original project definition. The sustainability of the process of establishing local enterprises ­ or other employment-generating initiatives ­ in the villages participating in the program is not evident at this point. Three of the cooperatives interviewed indicated that they have plans for further initiatives and these may eventually realize these. They will not ­ indeed cannot - do this, however, unless the initial enterprises prove themselves to be sustainable. Replicability: It is necessary to refer to replicability of the pilot project experiences elsewhere. If the program were only able to replicate the experience in the villages involved, then it would have done little to answer concern of the program as a whole ­ improving social productivity across the country as a whole. Of course the Rural Community Cluster Development Program launched by MoPIC in the year 2002 as part of the Enhanced Productivity Program is intended as a mechanism to replicate the SPP pilot projects on a larger scale in a substantially greater number of villages. Indications are that here is great learning of the new program from the previous program and that this could be strengthened. On the other hand it must be clear that the first program has, in fact, shown an effective way to establish employment-generating enterprises or initiatives if this experience is to be used in support of the new program. It should be noted that some time is still needed before a real impact assessment could be conducted to measure the impact of the PPs on the livelihoods of the targeted communities, although the most important impact has been achieved in changing the attitudes of local communities and mobilizing them towards the better of their communities. - 45 - - 46 -