87703 CONFIDENTIAL EDS2001-0037 January 29, 2001 Statement by Franco Passacantando Date of Meeting: January 30, 2001 Indonesia: Country Assistance Strategy Overall Assessment 1. We share the Bank's assessment of the considerable uncertainties and challenges faced by the Indonesian economy. We welcome the candid discussion of governance issues and of the risks of continued Bank involvement in the country. We agree on the need to remain engaged in the country during this transition period. Nevertheless, we are concerned by the suitability of the CAS scenarios and triggers, the appropriateness of moving to a programmatic approach, and the possible disengagement in the financial sector. Suitability of triggers and sustainability of the base case scenario 2. The CAS identifies the "muddle-through" scenario as the base case scenario. We commend the transparency of the staff's assessment that this constitutes the most likely scenario at this time. However, we question the lack of any meaningful trigger for the proposed level of Bank support in the base case. Specifically, even the base case scenario should require sustained macro stability and no slippage in structural reforms. We know that the sustainability of the macroeconomic situation requires progress in the areas indicated in the high case triggers. We believe, in particular, that the country should be very cautious in managing and in further increasing Government debt and should make an additional effort to accelerate bank and corporate restructuring. 3. We also wonder why the base case does not envisage concrete actions to implement a broad-based poverty reduction strategy. This is in contrast with the CAS explicit message that poverty reduction is the focus of continued IBRD and IDA involvement in Indonesia. 4. Our concerns are highlighted by the IBRD exposure to Indonesia. Given the high level of Indonesia's outstanding debt to the IBRD ($11.8 billion by end-FYOO) and its status as a blend country, the financial risks to the Bank are severe. We believe that the guiding principle for continued IBRD financial involvement should be one explicitly linking continued high exposure levels to substantive reforms leading to improved creditworthiness. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without the consent of the Executive Director concerned. 2 Appropriateness of moving towards a programmatic approach 5. The CAS anticipates a move towards programmatic lending in support of governance and sectoral programs as capacity and fiduciary controls improve at the sub-national level. The document, however, highlights (in Box 1.1.) that the decentralization process and the associated regulations issued by the Government on financial management and procurement of the regions pose the risk of a weakening of the country's fiduciary environment. The report also notes the impossibility of fully insulating Bank-financed projects from the country environment (Box 2.1). The CAS is also very transparent in its assessment that the current "muddle-through" situation will continue, with some slippage in structural reforms. 6. As we have stressed in other occasions, this Chair believes that the programmatic approach is not suitable for all borrowers; this instrument should be used selectively and only for the more mature reforming countries. We do not believe that the programmatic approach would be appropriate for Indonesia, at least in the short-term. Prior to supporting such an approach, this Chair would want to see the high case reforms implemented, the decentralization process advanced, and fiduciary controls at both the national and sub-national level strengthened. Continued involvement in the financial sector 7. Macroeconomic stability will not be sustainable unless fundamental reforms in the financial sector are implemented. We commend the leadership role taken by the Bank in this area to date. Going forward, we have three concerns. First, the reform agenda remains daunting, particularly in the area of bank and corporate restructuring. The Government should soon implement a medium-term strategy to strengthen the entire fmancial sector. Consequently, we believe that the base case should include actions to accelerate reforms in these policy areas. Second, we would have liked to see in the CAS a deeper analysis of and involvement in the development of non-bank fmancial intermediaries, such as insurance and contractual savings and the deepening of securities markets. Third, we understand that financing for the bulk of World Bank technical advice to the financial sector will terminate in July 2001. World Bank presence in the financial sector must be maintained. We would welcome management efforts to further explore avenues to continue financing technical support in this critical area. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without the consent of the Executive Director concerned.