............................................................................................................................................................ 10 .................................................................... 13 ................. 27 .............................................................................................. 33 .................................................................................... 34 ............................ 35 .......... 36 ...................................................................................... 37 .............................................................................. 38 ................................................................. 39 ......................................................................................... 39 ................................................................................... 41 ......................................................................................................................... 44 ................................................................................................................................................... 44 ....................... 45 ..................................... 45 ......................................... 46 ........................................... 47 ................................................ 3 .......................................................................................................... 4 ..................................................................................... 4 ................................................................................. 5 .................................................................................. 5 ................................................................................................. 19 ...................... 20 .............................................................................. 21 ........................................................................ 23 ......................................................................................................... 23 ......................................................................... 24 ................................................................................................................. 24 ................................................................................................................................................ 26 ................................................................................................................................... 26 ......................................................................... 28 ............................................................................................................................................ 29 ............................................................................................................................................... 29 .................................................................................................. 19 ................................................................................... 21 .................................................................................................................. 27 1 Perceptions of Tax Implementation (PoTI) Survey, was conducted by World Band in June 2013 and is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The PoTI survey was undertaken because despite the many positive attributes of the tax regime, there were indications that many firms perceived corruption and tax evasion to be widespread, with the two often linked. The survey aimed to shed some light on the extent of these beliefs and to make a preliminary estimation of the costs of tax evasion, if the perceptions reflect reality. The survey therefore questioned 100 randomly selected firms from the Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) and an additional 81 randomly selected medium-sized (MS) firms about their views on their competitors’ tax paying behavior. The sample size for medium -sized firms was small but nearly a quarter of firms in the LTU participated in the survey. Chapter 2 provides results for the full sample and notes any differences between medium and large firms. A. KEY MESSAGES     2 Chapter prepared by Munawer Khwaja and Sandeep Bhattacharya. This chapter is reproduced from the Kosovo Public Finance Review: Fiscal Policies for a Young Nation, World Bank, 2014. 3 Fuel and construction materials present a large share of overall imports and any price changes for these commodities is reflected in total border revenues.   4 Perceptions of Tax Implementation (PoTI) Survey, was conducted by World Band in June 2013 and is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 5 The same survey as the above. B. TAX POLICY IS JUDICIOUS BUT THERE ARE RISKS AHEAD C. STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC REVENUES IN KOSOVO – A HIGH DEPENDENCY ON BORDER TAXES 6 This great result is also because revenue collection started from very low levels in 2000. TAK was established only in second half of 1999 after the 1998-99 war in Kosovo. D. METHODOLOGIES APPLIED TO MEASURE INFORMAL SECTOR AND REVENUE POTENTIAL 7 This level of labor participation is substantially below the average among all transition economies (65 percent). 8 Grote, M, D. Benedek and Selcuk Caner. Kosovo: Reform Proposals Toward a More Balanced and Revenue Productive Tax System, November 2011, IMF, Washington, D.C. 9 Disposable income without time adjustment. 10 Tax productivity is the actual tax collected as a percent of the tax base divided by the standard tax rate. For VAT, consumption is usually taken as the tax base since GDP excludes imports (which are subject to VAT) and GDP includes export (zero-rated under VAT) and investment (for which input credit is given under VAT). For income taxes, GDP is typically used at the tax base. 11 The tax gap analysis was done by the Bank team together with Sandeep Bhattacharya, Associate Professor at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. 12 In Kosovo national accounts are not estimated on the income side. 13 This section is based on: World Bank (2014). “How my competitors avoid paying their taxes: Perceptions of tax evasion among firms in Kosovo”. 14 Khwaja, Munawer S. and Indira Iyer (2013) “Revenue Potential, Tax Space and Tax Gap in ECA Countr ies: A Comparative Analysis, World Bank, Working Paper (draft). See Appendix I for the results from this study modified to include Kosovo by using a shorter time period (for which Kosovo data are available). E. A TAX POLICY REFORM FRAMEWORK FOR KOSOVO 15 The monthly minimum wage at the time of writing in Kosovo was €170 (for people aged over 35), which is an annual income of a little over €2,000. 16 Grote, Martin, D. Benedek and S. Caner. “Kosovo: Reform Proposals Toward a More Balanced and revenue - productive Tax System”. IMF, Washington, November 2011 . 17 This number has gradually grown from 165,000 employees and 18,675 self-employed in 2004. 18 Data suggest that during a local election year the collection of property tax is weakest. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments are not making enough efforts to collect taxes during those years to avoid/reduce tax pressure to potential voters. F. RECOMMENDATIONS   19 The PoTI survey found that 90 percent of firms agreed that “all the information I need about tax compliance is easily available” and 84 percent agreed that “tax procedures are clear and simple”. Three quarters of firms agreed with the statement “tax legislation is sufficiently clear and precise to be easily understood by taxpayers and to avoid legal ambiguities in its application”. 20 Global Integrity Report 2011, Washington, DC.      A. KEY MESSAGES     21 Chapter prepared Jiashan Cui, Simon Davies and Agim Demukaj. 22 Inclusion in the LTU is based on VAT, PIT and CIT contributions but there is not an automatic threshold that determines inclusion. Once a company is in the LTU it remains there for a minimum of three years. 23 There were 483 firms in the LTU in 2012.    B. TAX AND CORRUPTION IN KOSOVO 24 World Bank, 2013. 25 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012. 26 Except domestic excise which is administered by Customs and property tax which is administered by Municipal Administrations. 27 Transparency International, 2013. 28 Kaufmann et al., 2013. 29 Freedom House, 2012. 30 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013, “Business, corruption and crime in the western Balkans: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise”. 31 Prishtina is the capital city and the main economic zone in Kosovo. 32 In 1990 former SFRJ became a market economy and many private firms were therefore created then. In addition many new firms were created in 2000, after the Kosovo war. C. THE COST OF TAX EVASION 33 The standard rate of VAT is 16 percent. There are minimal reduced rates. 34 Calculation on VAT evasion: Respondents were asked to estimate how many firms in their sector evade VAT tax, among four classes “0” “1-25%” “26-50” “>50%”. To calculate the average percentage of firms evade VAT, we first use lower boundaries for each class (“0%” “1%” “26%” and “51%” ) and the observed frequency to calculated the weighted average share of firms considered to underreport their VAT to the tax office. This method gives a lower bound of 8.5 percent, a linear average of 18.1 percent (using mid-points in each class) and an upper bound of 27.7 percent (using highest values from each class). .015 .01 Density .005 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 estimated percentage of VAT evaded 35 5 percent of 34 percent is around 15 percent. .03 .02 Density .01 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 estimated percentage of CIT evaded 36 The upper rate of CIT is 10 percent. 37 Steps for calculation on CIT are as steps for calculating VAT footnote [x]. The lower bound is 10.7 percent. A linear average of 20.7 percent (using mid-points in each class) and an upper bound of 30.7 percent (using highest values from each class). 38 40 percent versus 25 percent for question C2a and 60 percent versus 43 percent for question C2b. 39 Steps for calculation on PIT are the same as steps for calculating VAT stated above. The lower bound is 4.9 percent. A linear average of 11.6 percent (using mid-points in each class) and an upper bound of 18.3 percent (using highest values from each class). 40 74 percent of firms that knew of non-competitive practices won government contracts, compared with 63 percent among firms that were unaware of such practices. D. EVADING TAXES AND ESCAPING PENALTIES E. CONCLUSIONS    A. KEY MESSAGES          41 Chapter prepared by Sandeep Bhattacharya, Munawer Khwaja and Simon Davies. B. SHADOW ECONOMY 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Underground Disposable 14.0% 14.0% 15.0% 17.0% 15.5% 18.8% 17.1% 16.7% Income as Proportion of DI no Time Adjustment Underground Disposable Income as Proportion of DI - 7.5% 7.6% 8.3% 9.3% 8.5% 10.3% 9.5% 9.1% Time Adjustment C. VALUE-ADDED TAX net of tax consumption share including below above taxable total exempt due threshold below threshold Item Total threshold proportion to threshold tax base plus tax excluding exempt tax value exempt taxable total2 Total FOODS 1,621,676,011 95% 1 5% 1,621,676,011 1,407,704,870 213,971,140 70,385,244 1,621,676,011 Alcohol & tobacco 251,500,859 98% 1 2% 251,500,859 217,410,839 34,090,020 4,348,217 251,500,859 Clothing & footwear 252,528,355 85% 1 15% 252,528,355 222,296,087 30,232,268 33,344,413 252,528,355 Imputed rentals of owner- occupiers (S) 419,204,200 0 419,204,200 419,204,200 water and fuel 266,291,533 99% 1 1% 266,291,533 229,878,740 36,412,792 2,298,787 266,291,533 Furnishing 5 399,711,768 95% 1 5% 399,711,768 346,972,021 52,739,747 17,348,601 399,711,768 Health 107,662,325 0 107,662,325 107,662,325 Transport 608,447,510 97% 1 3% 608,447,510 526,703,177 81,744,333 15,801,095 608,447,510 Communication 135,836,393 98% 1 2% 135,836,393 117,424,268 18,412,125 2,348,485 135,836,393 Recreation and culture 134,681,404 85% 1 15% 134,681,404 118,557,574 16,123,830 17,783,636 134,681,404 Education 10 46,324,810 0 46,324,810 46,324,810 Hotels and restaurants 65,497,562 70% 1 30% 65,497,562 58,900,685 6,596,877 17,670,205 65,497,562 Miscellaneous 118,840,569 85% 0.5 15% 118,840,569 55,636,971 7,566,628 55,636,971 8,345,546 118,840,569 4,428,203,299 3,301,485,232 497,889,760 628,828,306 189,674,230 4,428,203,299 below exempt IC w/o tax incl IC BASE threshold services below threshold tax below threshold exempt tax base 370.8 5% 2% 322.7614684 48.0 16.13807342 6.455229367 300.1681656 GFCF w/o tax below exempt incl below GFCF base threshold services threshold tax below threshold exempt tax base 580.9 5% 25% 522.3745455 58.5 26.11872728 130.5936364 365.6621819 total IC + GFCF 951.7 845,136,014 106,532,856 42,256,801 137,048,866 665,830,347 IC w/o tax incl below exempt below below IC BASE threshold services threshold tax threshold exempt tax base tax 14222066 5% 2% 12379932 1842134 618997 247598.6 11513337 1842134 D. PERSONAL INCOME TAX AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF PERSONS FROM ALL SOURCES (in NUMBER cash) POPULATION SHARE OF OF TAX PER SHARE OF INCOME CLASS IN THIS CLASS FROM SAMPLE = TOTAL WEIGHT FOR MTR TOTAL TAX TOTAL INCOME ATR TOTAL PERSONS PERSON TOTAL TAX INCOME OF PERSONS OF THIS CLASS PERSONS INCOME IN SAMPLE IN SAMPLE / NUMBER OF PERSONS IN THIS CLASS IN SAMPLE 0-960 eur/year 952 672 155707 0% 0 104,582,111 0.00% 8% 0% 961-3000 1318 2214 160183 50 4% 8,034,779 354,645,162 2.27% 26% 15% 3001-5400 1112 4091 148656 169 8% 25,101,261 608,104,639 4.13% 44% 47% 5401+ 302 8153 36973 549 10% 20,295,826 301,454,336 6.73% 22% 38% TOTAL 53,431,866 1,368,786,249 3.90% 100% 100% E. CORPORATE INCOME TAX 42 CIT not realized during the year increase the balance of tax payment arrears, while some arrears may be realized during the year from past audits, and some of this year’s arrears may be written off or rejected by courts in later years. Either way we do not take them into account to calculate this year’s tax gap since we have data for total receipts of CIT and we do not have data required yet to convert receipts to revenues as data in columns 8 and 9 requested were not available. Weighted Number of Additional Average Proportion Proportion of Weighted average Audits tax (no Additional Potential realization Total revenues CIT not of firms audit detection potential realization Region Nr of firms CIT 2012 initiated interest CIT tax realization from audit 2012 collected audited for not collected in realization from audit covering CIT nor collected from audit as % age of CIT 2012 from audit as % age of firms penalties) revenue revenue 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 10 11 FERIZAJ 387 36,346 1,146,327 11 3,354 755 2,598 2.8% 77% 26,579 73% 13,290 37% GJAKOVË 350 48,779 721,887 2 54,564 54,564 0.6% 100% - - GJILAN 407 44,408 887,908 12 146,481 2,636 143,845 2.9% 98% 89,406 201% 44,703 101% MITROVICË 277 219,951 898,992 4 5,423 5,027 395 1.4% 7% 348,147 158% 174,073 79% MICRO PEJË 359 32,598 1,011,600 3 4,847 1,711 3,136 0.8% 65% 204,807 628% 102,404 314% PRISHTINË 1 1,248 474,961 22,128,755 6 143,025 7,183 135,842 0.5% 95% 1,494,043 315% 747,022 157% PRISHTINË 2 567 139,644 1,032,649 5 116,804 4,360 112,444 0.9% 96% 494,424 354% 247,212 177% PRISHTINË 3 1,262 497,911 5,614,812 5 37,858 17,654 20,203 0.4% 53% 4,455,897 895% 2,227,949 447% PRIZREN 516 82,602 1,690,252 8 71,257 71,257 1.6% 100% - - - TOTALI: 5,373 1,577,199 35,133,182 56 583,612 39,327 544,284 1.0% 93% 7,113,304 451% 3,556,652 226% 31 15 FERIZAJ 22 20,045 645,210 2 424 - 424 9.1% 100.0% GJAKOVË 32 33,425 533,225 - - - - NO TAX COLLECTED NO TAX COLLECTED NO TAX COLLECTED NO TAX COLLECTED GJILAN 22 11,234 601,104 1 142 - 142 4.5% 100.0% MITROVICË 7 7,779 646,849 - - - - SMALL PEJË 19 11,950 743,596 - - - - PRISHTINË 1 71 77,440 1,204,766 - - - - PRISHTINË 2 46 55,678 629,365 - - - - PRISHTINË 3 64 66,321 843,141 - - - - PRIZREN 35 21,423 1,337,339 - - - - TOTALI: 318 305,297 7,184,596 3 567 - 567 0.9% 100.0% FERIZAJ 106 148,229 1,741,037 6 8,403 6,901 1,502 5.7% 18% 121,922 82% 60,961 41% GJAKOVË 81 119,471 1,003,239 2 188,357 188,357 2.5% 100% - - GJILAN 113 222,395 1,485,558 6 922 922 5.3% 100% - - MITROVICË 54 98,831 1,151,765 1 20,156 20,156 1.9% 100% - - MEDIUM PEJË 96 197,276 1,655,127 3 10,033 3,082 6,951 3.1% 69% 98,624 50% 49,312 25% PRISHTINË 1 310 960,744 6,080,315 2 1,809 1,529 280 0.6% 15% 236,930 25% 118,465 12% PRISHTINË 2 209 545,161 3,417,815 1 1,144 793 350 0.5% 31% 165,825 30 82,912 15% PRISHTINË 3 284 848,528 4,907,956 10 68,699 68,699 - 3.5% 0% 1,951,052 230% 975,526 115% PRIZREN 179 300,041 3,310,186 13 6,267 817 5,451 7.3% 87% 11,244 4% 5,622 2% TOTALI: 1,432 3,440,677 24,752,998 44 305,789 81,821 223,968 3.1% 73% 2,585,596 75% 1,292,798 38% FERIZAJ 45 323,735 1,479,781 8 24,103 11,856 12,247 17.8% 51% 66,693 21% 22,008.61 7% GJAKOVË 36 200,978 1,082,489 - - - - GJILAN 45 328,942 1,496,023 9 54,837 6,305 48,532 20.0% 89% 31,526 10% 10,403.55 3% MITROVICË 26 136,351 1,227,376 - - - - LARGE PEJË 31 131,252 1,445,453 2 10068.6 10068.6 - 6.5% 0% 156,063 119% 51,500.89 39% PRISHTINË 1 120 1,491,804 7,684,057 5 21281.42 21281.42 - 4.2% 0% 510,754 34% 168,548.85 11% PRISHTINË 2 111 1,223,667 5,690,493 2 13523.5 13,524 - 1.8% 0% 750,554 61 247,682.90 20% PRISHTINË 3 142 1,618,763 6,402,208 5 89680.11 13,184 76,496 3.5% 85% 374,426 23% 123,560.45 8% PRIZREN 73 363,789 3,134,856 9 49063.27 24,507 24,556 12.3% 50% 198,778 55% 65,596.86 18% TOTALI: 629 5,819,280 29,642,737 40 262,557 100,726 161,831 6.4% 62% 2,088,794 36% 689,302 12% NJTM 359 46,279,417 165,079,413 47 2,475,544 2,034,933 440,611 13.1% 18% 15,543,423 34% 5,129,330 11% LTU TOTALI: 359 46,279,417 165,079,413 47 2,475,544 2,034,933 440,611 13.1% 18% 15,543,423 34% 5,129,330 11% TOTALI: 8,111 57,421,870 261,792,926 190 3,628,068 2,256,807 1,371,261 2.3% 38% 27,331,117 48% 10,668,082 19% Probability Micro & Medium #### 33% 36% 39% 42% 45% 48% 51% 54% 57% 60% 63% 66% 20% 6,727,080 7,018,047 7,309,014 7,599,981 7,890,948 8,181,915 8,472,882 8,763,849 9,054,816 9,345,783 9,636,750 9,927,717 P L 23% 7,256,047 7,547,014 7,837,981 8,128,948 8,419,915 8,710,882 9,001,849 9,292,816 9,583,783 9,874,750 10,165,717 10,456,684 r a 26% 7,785,013 8,075,980 8,366,947 8,657,914 8,948,881 9,239,848 9,530,815 9,821,782 10,112,749 10,403,716 10,694,683 10,985,650 o r 29% 8,313,980 8,604,947 8,895,914 9,186,881 9,477,848 9,768,815 10,059,782 10,350,749 10,641,716 10,932,683 11,223,650 11,514,617 b g 32% 8,842,947 9,133,913 9,424,880 9,715,847 10,006,814 10,297,781 10,588,748 10,879,715 11,170,682 11,461,649 11,752,616 12,043,583 a e 35% 9,371,913 9,662,880 9,953,847 10,244,814 10,535,781 10,826,748 11,117,715 11,408,682 11,699,649 11,990,616 12,281,583 12,572,550 b 38% 9,900,880 10,191,847 10,482,814 10,773,781 11,064,748 11,355,715 11,646,682 11,937,649 12,228,616 12,519,582 12,810,549 13,101,516 i & 41% 10,429,846 10,720,813 11,011,780 11,302,747 11,593,714 11,884,681 12,175,648 12,466,615 12,757,582 13,048,549 13,339,516 13,630,483 l 44% 10,958,813 11,249,780 11,540,747 11,831,714 12,122,681 12,413,648 12,704,615 12,995,582 13,286,549 13,577,516 13,868,483 14,159,450 i L 47% 11,487,779 11,778,746 12,069,713 12,360,680 12,651,647 12,942,614 13,233,581 13,524,548 13,815,515 14,106,482 14,397,449 14,688,416 t T 50% 12,016,746 12,307,713 12,598,680 12,889,647 13,180,614 13,471,581 13,762,548 14,053,515 14,344,482 14,635,449 14,926,416 15,217,383 y O 53% 12,545,712 12,836,679 13,127,646 13,418,613 13,709,580 14,000,547 14,291,514 14,582,481 14,873,448 15,164,415 15,455,382 15,746,349 Probability Micro & Medium 0 33% 36% 39% 42% 45% 48% 51% 54% 57% 60% 63% 66% 20% 12% 12% 13% 13% 14% 14% 15% 15% 16% 16% 17% 17% P L 23% 13% 13% 14% 14% 15% 15% 16% 16% 17% 17% 18% 18% r a 26% 14% 14% 15% 15% 16% 16% 17% 17% 18% 18% 19% 19% o r 29% 14% 15% 15% 16% 17% 17% 18% 18% 19% 19% 20% 20% b g 32% 15% 16% 16% 17% 17% 18% 18% 19% 19% 20% 20% 21% a e 35% 16% 17% 17% 18% 18% 19% 19% 20% 20% 21% 21% 22% b 38% 17% 18% 18% 19% 19% 20% 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 23% i & 41% 18% 19% 19% 20% 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 23% 23% 24% l 44% 19% 20% 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 23% 23% 24% 24% 25% i L 47% 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 23% 23% 24% 24% 25% 25% 26% t T 50% 21% 21% 22% 22% 23% 23% 24% 24% 25% 25% 26% 27% y O 53% 22% 22% 23% 23% 24% 24% 25% 25% 26% 26% 27% 27% F. A FOCUS ON SIN TAXES 45 46 47 G. SUMMARY     48     49 Tax space Tax gap Tax effort without Tax effort with Tax/ GDP Tax potential with with shadow shadow Differ SNo Country Region Income Sha dow shadow shadow ence Wi thout Wi th (% of (% of Economi c Lega l GDP) GDP) Economi c Lega l Economi c Lega l s ha dow s ha dow 1 Al ba ni a ECA UMIC 33.30 23.43 17.58 26.04 26.67 0.63 8.46 9.09 0.90 0.88 0.68 0.66 2 Argenti na LAC UMIC 23.83 29.12 23.51 25.28 29.60 4.32 1.77 6.09 1.15 0.98 0.93 0.79 3 Armeni a ECA LMIC 41.97 19.33 13.62 19.52 22.00 2.48 5.90 8.38 0.99 0.88 0.70 0.62 4 Aus tri a OECD HIC 9.63 42.10 38.40 37.89 38.62 0.72 -0.51 0.22 1.11 1.09 1.01 0.99 5 Azerba i ja n ECA UMIC 54.23 18.67 12.10 20.60 22.51 1.91 8.49 10.40 0.91 0.83 0.59 0.54 6 Bel a rus ECA UMIC 44.23 44.57 30.90 27.83 30.51 2.68 -3.07 -0.39 1.60 1.46 1.11 1.01 7 Bel gi um OECD HIC 21.50 44.10 36.30 40.11 43.59 3.47 3.82 7.29 1.10 1.01 0.90 0.83 8 Herzegovi Bos ni a a nd ECA na UMIC 32.97 37.57 28.25 29.73 28.95 -0.78 1.48 0.69 1.26 1.30 0.95 0.98 9 Bra zi l LAC UMIC 37.60 33.05 24.02 27.02 29.11 2.09 3.00 5.10 1.22 1.14 0.89 0.82 10 Bul ga ri a ECA UMIC 33.43 30.45 22.82 31.54 31.39 -0.15 8.72 8.57 0.97 0.97 0.72 0.73 11 Ca na da OECD HIC 15.37 32.47 28.15 36.45 28.43 -8.01 8.30 0.29 0.89 1.14 0.77 0.99 12 Chi l e LAC UMIC 18.70 21.93 18.47 30.03 29.13 -0.90 11.56 10.66 0.73 0.75 0.62 0.63 13 Col ombi a LAC UMIC 34.90 17.83 13.22 23.91 24.89 0.98 10.70 11.67 0.75 0.72 0.55 0.53 14 Croa ti a ECA HIC 30.83 34.25 26.18 31.84 34.25 2.41 5.66 8.07 1.08 1.00 0.82 0.76 15 Czech Republ ic ECA HIC 17.37 34.48 29.38 34.71 36.04 1.33 5.33 6.66 0.99 0.96 0.85 0.82 16 Denma rk OECD HIC 17.17 48.73 41.59 38.64 43.09 4.44 -2.95 1.49 1.26 1.13 1.08 0.97 17 El Sa l va dor LAC LMIC 43.77 14.77 10.28 22.12 17.35 -4.77 11.84 7.07 0.67 0.85 0.46 0.59 18 Es toni a OECD HIC 29.93 32.17 24.76 35.64 35.87 0.23 10.89 11.11 0.90 0.90 0.69 0.69 19 Fi nl a nd OECD HIC 17.17 43.05 36.74 35.96 38.28 2.32 -0.78 1.54 1.20 1.12 1.02 0.96 20 Fra nce OECD HIC 14.77 43.17 37.61 35.73 37.41 1.68 -1.88 -0.20 1.21 1.15 1.05 1.01 21 Georgi a ECA LMIC 63.60 23.70 14.49 27.41 27.74 0.33 12.92 13.25 0.86 0.85 0.53 0.52 22 Germa ny OECD HIC 15.63 38.63 33.41 36.33 37.23 0.90 2.92 3.82 1.06 1.04 0.92 0.90 23 Greece OECD HIC 26.60 31.70 25.04 34.72 36.28 1.56 9.68 11.24 0.91 0.87 0.72 0.69 24 Hunga ry OECD HIC 23.80 38.70 31.26 35.59 37.45 1.87 4.33 6.19 1.09 1.03 0.88 0.83 25 Indones i a EAP LMIC 18.27 17.28 14.61 17.23 14.26 -2.97 2.62 -0.35 1.00 1.21 0.85 1.02 26 Irel a nd OECD HIC 15.50 29.97 25.95 39.52 38.21 -1.31 13.57 12.26 0.76 0.78 0.66 0.68 27 Ita l y OECD HIC 26.93 42.05 33.13 32.76 35.54 2.78 -0.36 2.42 1.28 1.18 1.01 0.93 28 Ja pa n OECD HIC 10.47 27.79 25.16 33.11 24.24 -8.87 7.95 -0.92 0.84 1.15 0.76 1.04 29 Ka za khs ta n ECA UMIC 39.03 25.40 18.27 26.08 24.61 -1.48 7.81 6.34 0.97 1.03 0.70 0.74 30 Korea , Rep. OECD HIC 25.93 25.44 20.20 33.99 28.92 -5.07 13.79 8.72 0.75 0.88 0.59 0.70 31 Kyrgyz Republ ic ECA LIC 39.57 21.92 15.70 19.83 20.67 0.83 4.13 4.96 1.11 1.06 0.79 0.76 32 La tvi a OECD UMIC 27.77 28.60 22.38 34.48 33.69 -0.79 12.10 11.31 0.83 0.85 0.65 0.66 33 Li thua ni a OECD UMIC 30.37 28.97 22.22 33.63 33.25 -0.38 11.41 11.03 0.86 0.87 0.66 0.67 34 Ma cedoni a ,ECA FYR UMIC 35.93 27.25 20.05 29.81 28.71 -1.10 9.76 8.67 0.91 0.95 0.67 0.70 35 Ma l a ys i a EAP UMIC 30.00 21.56 16.58 28.07 22.52 -5.55 11.49 5.93 0.77 0.96 0.59 0.74 36 Mexi co LAC UMIC 29.30 18.40 14.23 26.34 24.36 -1.98 12.11 10.13 0.70 0.76 0.54 0.58 37 Mol dova ECA LMIC 43.85 33.03 22.96 29.45 29.19 -0.27 6.49 6.22 1.12 1.13 0.78 0.79 38 MontenegroECA UMIC 38.05 31.88 28.51 -3.37 1.19 1.33 39 Netherl a nds OECD HIC 13.13 38.60 34.12 40.68 41.01 0.34 6.56 6.89 0.95 0.94 0.84 0.83 40 Norwa y OECD HIC 18.23 42.83 36.23 34.11 38.32 4.21 -2.11 2.09 1.26 1.12 1.06 0.95 41 Peru LAC UMIC 55.53 16.87 10.85 23.21 24.42 1.21 12.36 13.57 0.73 0.69 0.47 0.44 42 Pol a nd ECA HIC 26.43 33.13 26.21 32.85 36.02 3.17 6.65 9.82 1.01 0.92 0.80 0.73 43 Portuga l OECD HIC 23.17 31.98 25.97 34.56 36.74 2.18 8.60 10.77 0.93 0.87 0.75 0.71 44 Roma ni a ECA UMIC 30.87 28.43 21.73 29.16 29.96 0.80 7.43 8.23 0.98 0.95 0.75 0.73 45 ECA ti on UMIC Rus s i a n Federa 41.57 31.07 21.94 28.52 29.73 1.21 6.58 7.79 1.09 1.04 0.77 0.74 46 Serbi a ECA UMIC 37.43 28.19 25.72 -2.47 1.33 1.46 47 Sl ova k Republ ECAic HIC 17.20 29.23 24.94 35.78 37.10 1.31 10.84 12.15 0.82 0.79 0.70 0.67 48 Sl oveni a OECD HIC 25.27 37.93 30.28 36.50 38.01 1.51 6.22 7.73 1.04 1.00 0.83 0.80 49 South Afri caAFR UMIC 25.90 30.25 24.03 27.71 27.36 -0.35 3.68 3.33 1.09 1.11 0.87 0.88 50 Spa i n OECD HIC 22.33 34.23 27.98 34.47 34.71 0.24 6.49 6.73 0.99 0.99 0.81 0.81 51 Sweden OECD HIC 18.23 47.23 39.95 37.35 41.91 4.55 -2.60 1.96 1.26 1.13 1.07 0.95 52 Swi tzerl a ndOECD HIC 8.30 29.29 27.05 38.84 28.79 -10.05 11.79 1.74 0.75 1.02 0.70 0.94 53 Ta ji ki s ta n ECA LIC 41.23 18.18 12.87 14.65 16.81 2.16 1.78 3.94 1.24 1.08 0.88 0.77 54 Tha i l a nd EAP UMIC 48.57 19.95 13.43 26.15 21.17 -4.98 12.72 7.75 0.76 0.94 0.51 0.63 55 Tuni s i a MENA UMIC 36.00 27.73 20.39 28.59 32.01 3.41 8.21 11.62 0.97 0.87 0.71 0.64 56 Turkey ECA UMIC 29.53 24.53 18.94 28.26 27.89 -0.37 9.32 8.95 0.87 0.88 0.67 0.68 57 Turkmeni s ta n ECA LMIC 19.12 20.15 0.95 58 Ukra i ne ECA LMIC 47.30 36.20 24.58 26.71 30.88 4.17 2.13 6.30 1.36 1.17 0.92 0.80 59 Uni ted Ki ngdomOECD HIC 12.30 36.22 32.25 36.77 36.25 -0.52 4.52 4.00 0.98 1.00 0.88 0.89 60 Urugua y LAC UMIC 47.93 22.49 15.20 28.28 31.61 3.33 13.08 16.41 0.80 0.71 0.54 0.48 61 Venezuel a LAC UMIC 32.13 15.62 11.82 20.20 17.16 -3.03 8.38 5.34 0.77 0.91 0.59 0.69 62 Kos ovo ECA LMIC 39.00 25.13 18.08 26.74 23.53 -3.21 8.66 5.45 0.94 1.07 0.68 0.77 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 64 65 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 66 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 67 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 68 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 69 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 70 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 71 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 72 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 73 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 74 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 75 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 76 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 77 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 78 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 79 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 80 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 81 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 82 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 83 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 84 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 85 < 0.1. < 0.05. < 0.01. 86 87 88 89 90 91