50907 DEVELOPMENT Outreach P U T T I N G K N O W L E D G E T O W O R K F O R D E V E L O P M E N T O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 WORLD BANK INSTITUTE L E A R N I N G F O R D E V E L O P M E N T MARY MCNEIL ABOUT THIS ISSUE FOUNDING EDITOR EDITORIAL BOARD F ragile and conflict-affected states are not SWAMINATHAN S. AIYAR new, but the challenges they pose have moved ECONOMIC TIMES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI, INDIA to the top of the development agenda in MICHAEL COHEN NEW SCHOOL UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, USA recent years. Experience has shown that the task of PAUL COLLIER moving a poor, conflict-affected state out of fragility OXFORD UNIVERSITY, OXFORD, UK is a complex, difficult and long-term project. In JOHN GAGE many cases, like in Afghanistan, gains have been SUN MICROSYSTEMS, PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA, USA hard-won, slow and uncertain. JOSEPH K. INGRAM PERUGIA, ITALY Nonetheless, recent history offers grounds for KWAME KARIKARI optimism. Mozambique and El Salvador, once stuck SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, GHANA in a downward slide of violent conflict and economic ruin, are now democracies enjoying growth and rela- VIRA NANIVSKA NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, tive stability. Rwanda, Liberia and Angola have made KIEV, UKRAINE rapid progress, especially given the conditions they PEPI PATRON CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, LIMA, PERU faced when their conflicts ended. But Timor Leste and the Horn of Africa, while very different, remind J. ROBERT S. PRICHARD TORSTAR, TORONTO, CANADA us that progress can also be marred by setbacks. RAFAEL RANGEL SOSTMANN Paul Collier, who contributed an article to this MONTERREY TECH UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, MONTERREY, MEXICO issue of Development Outreach, has helped us under- VIVIENNE WEE CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT, SINGAPORE stand the forces that keep states fragile, and how that fragility undermines development prospects. Development OUTREACH is published three times a year by the World Bank Institute and reflects issues arising from the World Bank's many External assistance is essential to help solve the learning programs. Articles are solicited that offer a range of viewpoints problems of what Collier calls the "Bottom Billion" from a variety of authors worldwide and do not represent official positions of the World Bank or the views of its management. states, many of which are fragile, conflict-affected or both. But this aid must be complemented by local CHRISTOPHER NEAL EXECUTIVE EDITOR The photos by Keiko Miwa (page 5), Anand leaders who fill the institutional voids that created the Rajaram (page 32), Joel E. Reyes (page 38), and ANNA LAWTON Homira Nassery (page 39) were among the win- vulnerability in the first place. One of their first tasks MANAGING EDITOR ners of the Photo Contest, "Imagining Peace: The World Bank Contribution to Peace-Building & is to build capacity in the public service and in key MOIRA RATCHFORD Prevention of Violence" (March 2009), sponsored institutions of civil society. Sanjay Pradhan and PUBLICATION DESIGN by the Social Development Department at the World Bank, and organized by Benjamin Petrini. Alastair McKechnie, respectively World Bank Vice President for the World Bank Institute, and Director PHOTO CREDITS Cover: Naylor Design, Inc.; page 2: Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures; of the Bank Group's Fragile and Conflict-Affected page 5: Keiko Miwa; page 6: Curt Carnemark/The World Bank; States Unit, outline the challenges on these fronts. page 8: WBI; page 10: Thony Belizaire/AFP/Getty Images; page 11: Jennie Matthew/AFP; page 12: Wang Ying/Xinhua/Sipa Elsewhere in this issue--which was developed Press/0708131553; page 13: Eitan Abramovich/AFP/Getty Images; with guidance from Henriette von Kaltenborn- page 14: Daniel Mihailescu/AFP/Getty Images; page 17: Newscom/Kyodo; page 18: Newscom; page 20: Elvis Barukcic/AFP; page 22: Lionel Stachau and Erik Caldwell Johnson--analysts and Healing/AFP; page 21: Jennie Matthew/AFP; page 23: Les world leaders offer lessons. Timor Leste's Finance Stone/AFP/Getty Image; page 26: Newscom; page 28: Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures; page 29: Newscom; page 30: Lionel Healing/AFP/Getty Images; Minister Emilia Pires underlines the importance of page 32: Anand Rajaram; page 33: Aimable Twahirwa/AFP; page 37: long-term commitments by donors. At the same Newscom; page 38: Joel E. Reyes; page 39: Homira Nassery; page 42: Zabi Tamanna/Newscom; page 41: Splash News and Pictures, Newscom; time, she cautions governments in fragile settings page 44: Reza Shirmohammadi/AFP; page 45: Newscom; page 50: not to take on everything at once. Nicholai Libow; page 53: Bill Lyon/The World Bank; page 54: Eric Miller/The World Bank. Perhaps the most decisive element in success or failure is the kind of leadership that emerges in This magazine is printed on recycled paper, with soy-based inks. fragile situations. Harvard Professor Matt Andrews, ISSN 1020-797X © 2009 The World Bank Institute WORLD BANK INSTITUTE defines this as, "individuals connected in networks L E A R N I N G F O R D E V E L O P M E N T [who] intentionally mobilize people, ideas, meaning and resources toward achieving a purpose." World Bank Institute www.worldbank.org/wbi Sanjay Pradhan www.worldbank.org/devoutreach Vice President devoutreach@worldbank.org The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Christopher Neal Washington, DC 20433, USA EXECUTIVE EDITOR DEVELOPMENT Outreach VOLUME ELEVEN, NUMBER TWO OCTOBER 2009 PAGE 2 PAGE 29 PAGE 44 SPECIAL REPORT 29 Sexual Violence Extends Beyond Conflict FRAGILITY AND CONFLICT K A R I N WA C H T E R 2 Drawing on Experience: Transforming 32 Building Leadership out of Conflict fragile states into effective ones M AT T A N D R E W S Editorial E D I T O R I A L B Y A L A S TA I R M C K E C H N I E 35 Parliaments as Peacebuilders RASHEED DRAMAN 6 Building Capacity to Move Past Conflict and Fragility: An agenda for action Dilemmas of State Building in Afghanistan: S A N J AY P R A D H A N 36 Three Views 10 A Worldwide Pact for Security and Accountability in Fragile "Bottom Billion" 37 Building a Viable State: A delicate balance States M O H A M M A D M A S O O M S TA N E K Z A I PA U L C O L L I E R 42 An Accountable State with Strong 13 Placing Security and Rule of Law on the Civil Society Development Agenda SEEMA GHANI MARK L. SCHNEIDER 44 How the International Community 16 Disarm, Demobilize and Reintegrate: Can Support State Building Transforming combatants into citizens to WILLIAM BYRD consolidate peace MARIA CORREIA 46 A UN Architecture to Build Peace in Post-Conflict Situations 17 Timor Leste Ten Years After: EJEVIOME ELOHO OTOBO What have we learned? EMILIA PIRES 50 Evaluating Community-Driven Reconstruction: Lessons from post-conflict 20 No Development without Peace Liberia GARY MILANTE AND PHIL OXHORN J A M E S F E A R O N , M A C A R TA N H U M P H R E Y S A N D J E R E M Y WEINSTEIN 23 From Civil War to Special Economic Zones: Djibouti Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority 53 A Way to Effective Service Delivery in A N I N T E R V I E W W I T H A N A N D C Y PA R S A D E B Y R O B E R T K R E C H Fragile States: Public-Private Partnerships A N O O P S WA M I N AT H 26 Bottom-Up State Building: Preventing violence at the community level 56 KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES E R I K A L D A A N D A LY S M . W I L L M A N 58 BOOKSHELF 60 CALENDAR OF EVENTS SPECIAL REPORT A woman watches in dismay the wreckage of her village caused by ethnic violence. DRAWING ON E X P E R I E N C E transforming fragile states into EFFECTIVE ONES Guest Editorial BY ALASTAIR McKECHNIE W H E N T H E WO R L D B A N K was founded almost 65 years ago, financing the reconstruction of Europe and Japan after the Second World War was its defining purpose. Now, with World Bank-supported programs in countries such as Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Sudan, Timor Leste, and West Bank/Gaza, rebuilding from the ruins of conflict is once again high on the Bank's agenda. Indeed, fragility and conflict are among the institution's six strategic directions. This concern with fragility and conflict emerges, in part, from the Bank's mission to fight poverty. Poverty, fragility and conflict are, in many countries, elements of a vicious circle; to break it, all three must be addressed. After conflicts have ended--and, in many cases, even as they rage on--the international community has called on the World Bank and other development institutions to support reconstruction. While this is necessary, of course, a better option would be for these institu- tions to become engaged to prevent fragility from degenerating into conflict in the first place. The cost of conflict is high. Aside from the lives lost and damaged due to conflict, and the scale of human suffering it creates, with women most often carrying the brunt of it, conflict also destroys assets and institu- tions. Recovering and rebuilding them can take many years. As econo- mist Paul Collier, author of The Bottom Billion and Wars, Guns and Votes-- among others--has shown, civil conflict often spills across borders. Conflict thus not only undermines and slows down development and poverty reduction in the country where it finds a host, but also in that country's neighbors. It provokes and sustains movements of refugees and displaced persons, crime, disease, narcotics and extrem- State-building ist violence, in the region and sometimes beyond. Given the complexities of fragility and conflict, the World is about creating institutions that are effec- S TAT E - B U I L D I N G Bank's approach to addressing them is constantly evolving in tive in the eyes of their beneficiaries, and which can be self-sus- the light of experience. In postwar Europe and Japan, the taining within a reasonable timeframe. Indeed, state-building focus was on rebuilding damaged assets. While the devasta- includes "capacity building" but goes further. It is about govern- tion was huge, the countries in question were, for the most ments deciding on the scope of services they will provide--and a part, already industrialized, with many established, recover- government short of educated people, money and a tradition of able institutions, as well as skilled populations. In low- good governance cannot be too ambitious--as well as how those income countries coming out of prolonged insurgency, how- services should be delivered, drawing on capacity that already ever, the challenge goes beyond fixing broken infrastructure. exists, including that found in humanitarian agencies and NGOs. It often entails nothing less than building a sustainable state. It is about how to structure government, how to align organiza- tions to achieve desired results, and how to establish rules for Securing development efficiency and accountability without bureaucracy. It is about people, and includes nurturing the skills that exist, providing I N C R E A S I N G LY, rebuilding and development is taking training, selecting on the basis of merit, and rewarding perform- place amid ongoing conflict. With chronic wars, widespread ance. It also involves providing space for learning by doing, while use of terrorist tactics, and on-again off-again violence, the expanding the supply of skills for the long term, by revitalizing humanitarian space that once allowed international actors to the education system, particularly at higher levels. provide support, has shrunk. On the positive side, our under- Building a state also involves creating the "plumbing" of standing of the role of the state in building peace and laying the administration, that is, establishing systems to manage public foundations for development has deepened. The example of finances and human resources. Most importantly, it is about countries that have achieved reductions in poverty, however providing incentives and delivering accountability, giving modest, suggests that development depends on an effective voice to citizens, providing checks and balances for perform- state that delivers core services such as security, rule of law, ance and against abuse of power, developing centers of coun- and public goods such as control of contagious disease. tervailing power like legislatures, judiciary and commissions Countries at the end of conflict often do not have an effec- with independence for audits, stamping out corruption, and tive state. They need help to build one, but this is a huge and transparent elections. enormously complex task. Experience has taught us that it An organization like the World Bank can assist countries by requires integration of security, diplomatic and development laying out solid technocratic advice on best practices in state- support. This is challenging enough when a single donor seeks building. But the reality on the ground is more complicated and to achieve it through a "whole of government approach." It is often messier. Max Weber's definition of a state as having a legit- all the more complicated when numerous international actors imate monopoly of violence, the concept of merit-based bureau- with different mandates and capacities are involved. As World cracy, and the state's role in establishing conditions for compet- Bank President Robert B. Zoellick said recently, itive markets are all useful principles and guidelines. But their application is not always easy in situations dominated by war- "This is not security as usual or development as usual. lords, ethnic divisions, traditional hierarchies, patrimonial sys- Nor is this about what we have come to think of as tems, and business people who are often profiting amidst the peace building or peacekeeping. This is about violence and lawlessness of a wartime economy. To improve the `Securing Development'--bringing security and state's effectiveness under such conditions, practitioners must development together first to smooth the transition draw on local traditions, take into account political conditions from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so and find the support that local political leaders can muster. The that development can take hold over a decade and international community can help, but the basic design, speed beyond. Only by securing development can we put and direction of reform, and the amount of change that a society down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility can accept must be determined by the country itself. and violence."1 What can outsiders do? Securing development depends on building an effective state. What constitutes an effective state? One useful way of W H I L E W E H AV E L E A R N E D M U C H about helping defining it is offered by several OECD countries: an effective countries rebuild after conflict, we know less on how to address state has both the capacity and willingness to mobilize fragility or to help societies prevent war. Recent academic work resources, exercise political power, control its territory, man- has presented fragility in terms of deteriorating legitimacy, a age the economy, implement policy, and promote human wel- widening gap between the rules that government sets and what fare in an inclusive manner, including delivery of vital servic- society will accept. A government may be regarded as legitimate es such as justice and security, health care, education, water by its people if it sets rules and laws that are socially acceptable, and sanitation. delivers services effectively, and is consonant with the combina- tion of traditions, myth, religion, history and identity that 4 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE defines the nation. How can development institutions understand this process of legitimacy more deeply, especially when legitimacy may be grounded in tradi- tional hierarchies or charismatic leaders, and develop differentiated modes of engagement? How do we avoid political interference and violating the "do no harm" principle? Understanding how development assistance contributes to statebuilding and reinforces legitimate authority, even whether assistance designed to support statebuilding is seen as legitimate itself, are important areas that require future explo- ration to help us address the difficult challenges of providing effective assistance in situations of fragility. This school building was constructed by the community through the "Community Grant for Academic research, combined with the work of School Development" financed by the World Bank Group's International Development Agency. the OECD DAC International Network on Conflict The school is located at about a 2-hour drive from the city of Bamyan, Aghanistan. and Fragility, among others, has produced draft guidelines for those helping countries secure peace and build an effective state. The OECD principle in which those who seek to assist, must seek first to "do no harm," merit and paid higher compensation. Complementing these may appear self-evident. But applying this principle is often reforms was a program of technical assistance in which individ- challenging: it presupposes a deep understanding of the polit- ual experts, often from the diaspora, were contracted to help ical context, and precludes creating parallel delivery structures establish financial management and human resources systems, that undermine the nascent state. It requires that outside and to provide training for existing employees. helpers focus on building core state functions such as person- While such incremental approaches offer advantages, they al security of the population, and on establishing the centrality also present challenges. Returning diaspora members are some- of the government budget for priority-setting. It also means times resented for having been abroad during the conflict, only promoting a vibrant and law-abiding private sector that creates to return to a senior position after it. Some existing staff mem- jobs. All of these efforts must be supported by staff members bers may not have the needed skills to do their jobs; in some on the ground who understand the country, and have the lati- cases, former combatants have been appointed for patronage tude to take decisions quickly enough to respond effectively to reasons, and have neither the knowledge nor the vocation to changing conditions. contribute to a transparent and effective administration. The record of technical assistance in these situations has Capacity building requires patience and persistence, and been mixed. Indeed, Serge Michailof, formerly of the World pragmatic interventions that deliver some short-term state Bank, has coined the "paradox of technical assistance": being effectiveness while laying a solid foundation for the future. that those organizations in most need of technical assistance Institutions are created through "learning by doing," that is, are least able to absorb it. In seeking to build capacity in a accepting accountability for delivery and finding ways to over- fragile state, a comprehensive approach, predicated on realis- come the problems that arise along the way. tic goals and expectations, is essential. It must include multi- It is sometimes tempting for the international community ple strategies to address skills gaps, including recruitment of to jump in and deliver services itself, bypassing legitimate skilled national staff from diasporas, training of existing staff, national authorities. This not only prevents state organiza- and development of tertiary education facilities in the coun- tions from learning from their mistakes, it can hollow them try. But it must also take stock of the government's initial con- out as accountability for delivery shifts to donors and as the dition, and provide guidance as to the scope of services the best staff are attracted to work for parallel donor programs. government is able to provide and deliver itself, as well as Capacity building is at the heart of state-building which in those it needs to contract out for delivery by third parties. turn is linked to building peace and creating the conditions that lead to sustained reductions in poverty. Outside organiza- Comprehensive, but sequenced tions like the World Bank can help, but ultimately, countries-- even those whose states are fragile--have to build their own B U I L D I N G C A PAC I T Y usually depends on a reform of institutions, and tailor them to their own needs. public administration, at least in the departments responsible for core services; such reform must strengthen incentives, Alastair McKechnie is Director of the Fragile and Conflict-Affected organization, staffing and accountability. Implementing this Countries Group at the World Bank Group. kind of reform across the entire public administration is typical- ly complex and slow. In Afghanistan, for example, an incremen- Endnotes tal approach was adopted to reform key ministries, or depart- 1 Robert B. Zoellick speech at US Institute of Peace, "Securing ments within ministries, where there was committed leadership Development" (January 8, 2009) and ownership. Staff were appointed to redefined positions on http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/RBZUSIPSpeech010809.pdf O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 5 SPECIAL REPORT Building Capacity to Move Past Conflict and Fragility An agenda for action BY SANJAY PRADHAN C O U N T R I E S T H AT A R E E M E R G I N G from conflict face many challenges, but lack of capacity is at the fore- front. Unless it is addressed, fragili- ty is likely to persist. Paradoxically, intense pressure for "quick wins" and results-on-the-ground, espe- cially in post-conflict situations, often pushes the capacity develop- ment agenda to the margin. Capacity gaps can undermine early progress in reconstruction, as local administrators lack the knowl- edge, skills and experience to sus- tain or replicate successful out- comes. And although some fragile and post-conflict countries receive huge and unforeseen aid inflows, these can dry up quickly if the gov- ernment is unable to absorb them and demonstrate progress. In some cases, a vicious cycle can take hold: governments cannot secure aid because they haven't the capacity to use it, and they haven't the capacity because they don't have the resources to develop it. Local authorities in most fragile states face urgent demands for food, water, housing, health care and schools. Their legitimacy, and even survival, depends on meeting at least some of them. In practice, this means that reconstruction, service delivery and capacity building must be undertaken all at once, albeit with A bookstore in Liberia. strategic focus to deliver targeted results in key areas. 6 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE A Liberian experience five key priorities can be identified: (i) focusing leadership capacity-building to achieve rapid results; (ii) choosing LAST APRIL, Liberia's Finance Minister Augustine Ngafaun strategic entry points and forging multi-stakeholder coalition outlined the stark realities facing decision-makers in a post- building around these; (iii) rebuilding professional associa- conflict situation. Speaking at a World Bank seminar devoted to tions; (iv) building local institutions for sustainable capacity capacity-building in fragile settings, he said that when Liberia's building; and (v) integrating crucial aspects of cohesion and years of civil conflict finally ended in late 2003, the government inclusion in leadership capacity and coalition building at dif- faced a situation in which three-quarters of the country's edu- ferent levels. cational facilities were completely destroyed, and most of the country's roads in disrepair. Meanwhile, a massive and sus- Achieve rapid results tained brain drain meant the country was left with "very few doctors, teachers, and hardly any engineers." He added that C A PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G in post-conflict and fragile states pres- Liberia, a country rich in minerals, has only five geologists. ents three unique challenges, at least in the short run: every- This compelling sketch summarizes the challenge facing thing is a priority, existing capacity is weak, and visible results states like these: how to manage reconstruction, while simul- must be achieved quickly. Building capacity in these states is taneously delivering basic public services, and building like living through history in a hurry: long-term capacities capacity, inside and outside government, almost from scratch. and institutions are needed, but there is only a short time in In addressing it, Minister Ngafaun emphasized the need for which to deliver results. So in such settings, this capacity donor partners "to understand the whole operating environ- building is not about traditional training or education alone ment, including its social and political dimensions," and to which will take years to deliver results, but it is about on-the- make capacity building of central importance in the national job engagement, in which we draw out and inspire and ener- development strategy. gize latent capacity to achieve rapid results in targeted areas. This testimony, while describing a single country, has ele- To meet these challenges, capacity building efforts must ments in common with others that are similarly fragile, whether define goals and results that matter and that people will strive the fragility is due to recent conflict or to chronic conditions, or to reach. Since capacity is limited all around, emphasis should both. One of these is that, in almost all such states, there is an be placed on forging coalitions to leverage scarce capacity in urgent need to build the basic capacity of key state as well as state and non-state sectors, as people working together can non-state institutions to themselves design, implement and expand capacity. The leaders must also inspire pride and con- monitor high priority policies and programs, rather than rely- fidence, spreading a "can do" attitude, while also setting goals ing on imported technical assistance. The key, Minister that are achievable in view of the constraints. Ngafaun said, "is transferring capacity from externals--expatri- Accordingly, WBI has facilitated workshops for homoge- ates--to staff in our public service." He added, however, that this neous and diverse groups in several African countries to help capacity transfer must reach senior leaders, not only the lower them define agendas for change, identify priorities, and draft and middle ranks of the public service; leaders need capacity implementation plans that are securely grounded in local building too, he said, to motivate those who rely on them for realities. Workshops for cabinet ministers have employed a guidance and direction. "rapid results" methodology to build capacity. In Burundi, for These observations echo a recommendation in a recent example, this approach resulted in improvements in govern- study by the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group, ment performance: 250,000 textbooks were distributed to the Engaging with Fragile States: "If foreign experts are brought in country's primary schools in 60 days, an exercise which, hith- to provide technical assistance, it must be ensured that this erto, had taken the entire year. Another workshop led to the will not compromise the long-term development of local adoption of a plan that resulted in a 600-percent increase in capacity." This point was reiterated at the same seminar by visits by pregnant women to health centers for HIV/AIDS James Musoni, Finance Minister of Rwanda, a country often tests. This approach can be applied in the public sector, in cited for its impressive progress in overcoming fragility and community settings, or where public-private partnerships are conflict. Capacity development, Musoni said, should be an being developed. integral part of a country's poverty reduction strategy. Strategically select a few entry points Key implications for capacity building I N V I E W O F L I M I T E D C A PAC I T I E S , it is important to strate- in fragile settings gically select a few feasible and visible entry points. Two such areas are: (i) governance of resources use, including extrac- W E N E E D TO A P P R OAC H C A PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G in fragile and tive industries, budget management and procurement; and post-conflict settings, at least in the short run, very different- (ii) delivery of basic services. ly from other settings. An overarching objective is to foster Extractive industries are a case in point. For countries and focus leadership capacity and multi-stakeholder coali- endowed with oil and other high-value natural resources, tions to achieve tangible results in the short run, while these resources are often at the root of the conflict. This rebuilding longer-terms institutional capacity. Specifically, implies a need to foster multi-stakeholder capacity-building O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 7 Build local training institutes and capacity for South-South exchanges I N S T I T U T I O N S D E V O T E D T O C A PA C I T Y - B U I L D I N G should also be established and sup- ported. Ultimately, this is the only sustainable approach, as the demand for public adminis- trators is ongoing. Training institutes have been developed with donor support in numer- ous countries, but many of these have fallen into disuse. WBI's emerging program for fragile states has developed curricula in areas such as rapid results, monitoring and evaluation, budget management, and procurement. Following its recently-developed renewal strategy, WBI will focus on building the capacity of local insti- tutes by sharing experience and developing plans with them to train trainers and broker South-South experience sharing between China and Africa. relationships with other learning institutions. In addition to building the capacity of train- ing institutes, it is important to facilitate just- in-time practitioner-to-practitioner exchanges of both state and non-state actors (including civil society, pri- for pragmatic sharing of "how-to" experiences that have vate sector, parliamentarians and media), to build credibility, worked in other challenging settings. Many countries strug- trust and transparency throughout the value chain. The goal is gling with fragility look to one another for information and to build capacity to transform the resource into a source of best practice. South-south knowledge exchange and peer-to- income and livelihood for society as a whole, rather than sim- peer learning often yield relevant and effective capacity- ply a rent appropriated by a small group. Similarly, in view of building outcomes. The Global Development Learning limited financial and implementation capacities of public, Network (GDLN) can provide a powerful network of knowl- private and civil society institutions, multi-stakeholder part- edge and learning platforms connecting fragile states through nerships for improving service delivery, including creative video technology, and can thereby facilitate just-in-time public-private partnerships, are needed. exchanges, wholesale learning and help overcome challenges posed by distance and access in fragile settings. To this end, a Rebuild professionalism and coalitions after conflict R E B U I L D I N G P R O F E S S I O N A L C A PA C I T I E S should begin with public administration and the civil serv- ice. Over the long term, however, professional standards and practices can be restored, or strengthened by professional associations such as those of accountants, auditors, lawyers, and engineers. It is the profession that helps to set standards, establish and regulate the ethics from within. But professions are hard to develop and take lots of time, especially if countries take international best practice professions as a basis. In this context it is better to develop professionalization "tracks" for post conflict countries that give enough legitimacy to the idea of a "profession" but that have realistic entry standards, perhaps with a set path to converge with international stan- dards in the future. The idea of creating a Liberian Association of Accountants with loose affiliation with the international association is an example, where a Liberia- specific training and access exam were developed. Field visit to projects in China's provinces. 8 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE network of GDLN facilities in fragile settings will prove very useful for capac- WBI'S NEW STRATEGY ity building. ON FRAGILE STATES Foster leadership, national identity and The World Bank Institute (WBI) has developed an array of tools for cohesion strategic and operational planning that can be applied in fragile contexts. These include the Rapid Results Approach (RRA), once cru- T H E F I N A L C H A L L E N G E --at leadership programs, and participatory governance diagnostic cial and difficult--is to support leaders processes that can be used to build consensus and coalitions for in their efforts to rebuild a new social change. Such tools and approaches help countries set priorities, compact and trust between the state and build workable results chains, and break down complex, multiyear citizens, and between different factions challenges into shorter initiatives focused on achieving measurable results. and ethnicities that risk reigniting con- flict. The underlying breakdown of Building on its experience, WBI is developing a strategy to trust, ethnic fragmentation and narrow increase its engagement in fragile states. The strategy will identification, and resulting patronage include a menu of support programs to be offered at both the systems are the main challenges of post- global and country levels, and designed in close collaboration with other units in the conflict reconstruction. In this context, World Bank Group. Programs will be developed with world-class it will be important to support leaders by partners that have leading expertise in specific areas, and with integrating cohesion and inclusion in multilateral and bilateral donor partners. A key element of the capacity and coalition-building initia- strategy will be to partner with regional and country institutions tives, for instance, through "win-win" for customization, delivery, and sustained capacity-development impact. Possible areas of supporttailored to the realities of fragile common cause projects in rapid results LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS include the following: workshops, inspirational cases of states, supporting leaders at national and local levels of government, parliamentarians, and future agents of rebuilding cohesion and inclusion in change, such as youth and women; other fragile settings, and helping insti- tute positive mechanisms such as CAPACITY BUILDING for ministries of finance and awards and recognition. These features planning, focused on budget management, procurement, can be integrated in leadership capacity and the associated monitoring and evaluation; building initiatives at different levels of SERVICE DELIVERY, for instance by scaling up the government--cabinet workshops in capacity-development impact of ongoing projects central government, line ministries, in health and education; local governments--and also in empow- ering agents of change that can be PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, including transparency in the extractive industries value chain, and public-private important forces for cohesion and partnerships, in collaboration with partners; and inclusion, such as women and youth leaders. In fragile states, these "softer" STRUCTURED LEARNING AND SOUTH­SOUTH KNOWLEDGE aspects of changing attitudes and EXCHANGE, using information technology,such as behaviors, and fostering consensus and distance-learning through the Global Development Learning Network to connect fragile states and cohesion are at least as important as share knowledge. more technical aspects of skill building. While the task of capacity building in fragile states is formidably challenging, a strategic and targeted program can Leading experts from the World Bank Group and the broader start to build leadership capacity, multi- development community exchanged experiences and highlighted stakeholder coalitions, and trust in critical considerations in a day-long workshop, Capacity Building focused areas, and thereby generate in Fragile States, on July 16, 2009 (see story at: www.worldbank.org/wbi). rapid results that lead to feasible and sustainable pathways out of conflict. Participating organizations working on issues relating to fragile states were: Sanjay Pradhan is the World Bank Group Overseas Development Institute (ODI)--www.odi.org.uk Vice President who heads the World Bank Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)--www.oecd.org/fsprinciples Institute. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 9 SPECIAL REPORT A Worldwide Pact for Security and Accountability in Fragile "Bottom Billion" States BY PAUL COLLIER nance. To help Europe, the U.S. government completely reversed its pre-war protectionist trade policy, opening its I N THE BOTTOM BILLION, I argued that a group of around sixty, markets to European goods and committing itself to openness small, low-income countries with a combined population of through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which around a billion people had missed out on global economic has now evolved into the WTO). Similarly, it completely development and so had diverged from the rest of mankind. reversed its pre-war security policy of isolationism, stationing Helping these countries to catch up has become the central over 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe for over 40 years. Finally, challenge of development. Aid is one way in which we can help, it completely reversed its approach to the governance of other but aid alone will be insufficient: a good model for how the rich countries: before the Second World War, it had refused even to world can effectively help the countries of the bottom billion is join the League of Nations, whereas post-war it co-founded the how the United States helped to rebuild Europe after the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation Second World War. It combined a large aid program, the and Development and the International Monetary Fund, all Marshall Plan, with trade policy, security policy and gover- institutions for mutual support of good governance. Brazilian soldiers of the UN Peacekeeping Force re-establish order in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, after people were killed by gunfire. 10 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE Post-war Europe was a fragile mess of impoverished and resort to them. Statistically, the characteristics that tend to politically weak countries that needed this integrated make illicit tactics feasible are a low-income, a small popula- approach to assistance. The countries of the bottom billion tion, and large resource rents. Unfortunately, these are the need a similar approach now: their problems are even more structural features of the bottom billion. acute than those of Europe 60 years ago. In particular, there This analysis suggests explanations for why governments of are two fundamental public goods which they are structurally India, not one of the bottom billion countries, have been bet- ill-equipped to supply internally: security and accountability. ter able to provide security and accountability to citizens than Without these public goods development is far more difficult: have governments of Africa. India's population is many times insecurity discourages investment, and a lack of accountabili- larger than the typical African country, enabling it to reap ty breeds corruption and policies that serve narrow elite scale economies, and India does not have large resource rents. interests instead of the society as a whole. Security and accountability: Security and accountability: Internationally supplied Internally in short supply I F S E C U R I T Y A N D AC C O U N TA B I L I T Y are critical public goods for development, and if the countries of the bottom billion are is the classic example of a T H E P R OV I S I O N O F S E C U R I T Y structurally unable to supply them internally, then some form public good. Yet security is often hard to provide in the coun- of international supply is necessary. One approach is for the tries of the bottom billion. The structural characteristics of countries in a neighborhood to pool sovereignty so as to form these societies, poverty, stagnation, the presence of valuable larger entities that are better able to reap scale economies. natural resources, and ethnic diversity, all make rebellion The pioneers in the neighbourhood pooling of sovereignty easier. Further, security is characterized by strong economies have been the United States, Australia, and Europe. of scale: with small populations and tiny economies govern- California, New South Wales, and Germany, each have far ments cannot reap these scale economies and so cannot afford larger economies than the typical society of the bottom bil- effective security. Indeed, governments face a dilemma: a lion, but their governments have chosen to retain far less sov- large and well-equipped military might help to discourage ereignty. Unfortunately, although the societies of the bottom rebellion, but it might also increase the risk of a coup d'état. billion need the benefits of pooled sovereignty far more than Many more governments are toppled by coups than by rebel- lions. Hence, governments often prefer to keep the army weak, an example being the late President Mobutu of Zaire, who maintained a policy of undermining and dividing his country's military. He made himself safe against coups but was instead toppled by a rebellion. The provision of accountability is more difficult than security because, unlike other public goods, it cannot be provided simply by the government. Accountability depends not just upon the institutions built by government, but upon active and effective scrutiny by citizens. The standard "tech- nology" by which citizens can hold government accountable is elections, and they have indeed become much more com- mon in the bottom billion countries. However, elections only achieve accountability if they are properly conducted. It has proved disturbingly easy for incumbents to win elections by resort to illicit tactics: bribery, intimidation and ballot fraud. New research finds that where governments face well- conducted elections they indeed deliver improved econom- ic policies as measured by the World Bank's "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment." Ordinary voters appear to want the sort of policies that the World Bank has tried to encourage. But this benign effect of elections only holds when the elections are well-conducted: illicit tactics let gov- ernment off the hook. While illicit tactics are bad for economic policy, they are very good for incumbent rulers. Where they are used, the chances of electoral victory increase so much that the Peacekeeping soldiers of the hybrid United Nations African Union expected duration of a ruler in office is tripled. So, where Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) go on a patrol in the Nyala area. illicit tactics are feasible, incumbent politicians are likely to O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 11 these rich societies, their governments have clung to power. national resources spent on peacekeeping are not counted as Indeed, since governments are often not very accountable to development assistance, and there is no coherent budgetary citizens, what is being treasured is better described not as framework in which its value is compared and evaluated against national sovereignty but as presidential sovereignty. aid. Developing ways of making such decisions is an example of Given the very limited neighborhood pooling of sovereign- how better to coordinate the range of policies--aid, trade, secu- ty, the only alternative is to have a phase of international rity and governance--that will need to be deployed. assistance in providing security and accountability. Recall that in respect of security this is what the U.S. did for Europe for Elusive accountability over 40 years. International provision may raise the spectre of a return to colonialism, but such fears would be misplaced. of accountability to citi- I N T E R N AT I O N A L S T R E N GT H E N I N G Manifestly, there is no appetite among the former colonial zens is probably more difficult than security. At a minimum, the powers for a return to empire: they are democracies and their international community can develop voluntary standards and citizens would not countenance it. Indeed, international pro- codes which governments can then choose to follow. An example vision need not rely upon the former colonial powers. For is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative which many example, in Haiti, a classic country of the bottom billion, for governments are now accepting as a reasonable benchmark. the past five years security has been ably maintained by 9,000 There is also a good case for conditionality, not in respect of eco- Brazilian peacekeeping troops serving under the authority of nomic policies but of governance. Policy conditionality detracts the United Nations, and with the support of the government. from the accountability of government to citizens because it tries Decades of global economic growth have switched many coun- to deprive government of responsibility for some economic tries such as Brazil from being recipients of international decisions. In contrast, governance conditionality seeks to insist assistance to being participants in providing it. only that government is accountable to its own citizens. Peacekeeping and over-the-horizon guarantees are effective The most radical suggestion in Wars, Guns and Votes is to ways of providing security. In post-conflict situations which, use the provision of security as an incentive for accountabili- historically, have faced high risks of reversion to conflict, ty. Governments that came to power through elections recog- peacekeeping succeeds in bringing risks down. Indeed, despite nized as free and fair would be protected from the threat of a its high financial cost, peacekeeping is good value for money, coup by international military force where this was feasible. It given the enormously higher cost of conflict. Currently, inter- is hard to see how the suppression of a coup and the restora- tion of a rightful government could be misconstrued as colonialism. When President Bill Clinton used the threat of American troops to put down a coup in Haiti, and Prime Minister Tony Blair used British troops to restore the legitimate president of Sierra Leone, their interventions were welcomed. But, of course, if a government stole an election this protective cover would be withdrawn. With four African governments hav- ing been overthrown by coups within the past year such protection would surely be an attractive incentive for keeping elections clean. Paul Collier is Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre of African Economies at Oxford University. He is also Professorial Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford. His book, The Bottom Billion, Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can be Done About It won the Lionel Gelber, Arthur Ross, and Corine Prizes for 2008. Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places was published in March 2009 by HarperCollins in the USA, and by Bodley A woman casts her vote at a polling station in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in August 2007. Head in the UK. 12 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT Placing Security and Rule of Law on the Development Agenda BY MARK L. SCHNEIDER Crisis Group analysis development and security can rein- I F D O N E C O R R E C T LY, of post-conflict T H E R A N G E O F C R I S I S G R O U P A N A LYS E S force each other. Conversely, if either is ignored, particularly efforts to establish or reconstruct competent, legitimate mili- in post-conflict countries, reconstruction can be crippled. tary, police, and courts encompasses the good, the bad and the This was the message that World Bank President Robert ugly. For example: Zoellick delivered in his January 2009 speech to the United I In Afghanistan, seven years after the Taliban government States Institute of Peace. He underscored the need for simul- was removed and $6 billion spent to train, equip and fund taneity rather than sequencing in security and development. a police force, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Over the past 14 years, the International Crisis Group has Government Accountability Office classifies just 18 of the arrived at similar conclusions in seeking to contribute to con- country's 433 police units as operation ready, a third of the flict prevention, end conflict where it exists, and help ensure 82,000 registered police are unaccounted for, and 40% of the success of post conflict reconstruction and stabilization. the guns they've been given are missing. Hundreds of police officers, backed up by the army, took to the main streets of Guatemala City to provide security. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 13 I In the Democratic Republic of Congo, security sector citizen safety and to organize competent, respected police and reform has yet to produce an effective military force capa- an independent judiciary. The continued existence of ble of defending the country's borders or a competent impunity, corruption and insecurity led former warring par- police force trusted to enforce the law. The daily assaults, ties back down the road to renewed conflict. rapes and chaos inflicted by marauding militias in the Recognition of the importance of the rule of law in fragile Eastern Congo--and by government troops as well--are a states and post-conflict reconstruction has grown substan- reflection of those failures. tially, including in statements by the United Nations General I In Liberia, a competent, elected president is working with Assembly and Security Council, as well as in the speech cited donors to rebuild the war-torn country. Significant above by the World Bank president. Crisis Group board mem- progress has been made in reconstituting an army after ber Lord Paddy Ashdown, as UN High Representative in scrapping the previous force, but a non-corrupt police Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated, "In hindsight, we should have force remains a work in progress. put the establishment of the rule of law first, for everything I In Haiti, after years of trying to recruit, train and equip a else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair non-corrupt National Police force, 9,000 police are at political system, the development of civil society, public con- work and earning relatively high public confidence. fidence in police and the courts." However, one thousand others have failed vetting and are in limbo. Building rule of law and security I In Guatemala, a decade after the end of a civil conflict that capacity claimed 200,000 lives, most people assume that entire national police units are corrupt. N E V E RT H E L E S S , T H E R E I S S T I L L a woeful absence of capac- I In Kosovo, the Kosovo police force has the potential to ity on the part of the international community in the areas of become a promising multi-ethnic institution, but rule of law and security sector reform. Interestingly there has Belgrade's insistence that Kosovar Serbs leave the force been greater success in structuring military forces, such as in poses one of the single greatest concerns in advancing rec- Liberia, than in building civilian police forces, promoting onciliation for an independent multi-ethnic Kosovo. respect for the rule of law, requiring accountability of security forces and constructing impartial judiciaries able to act with- out regard to the traditional impunity of powerful elites. Importance of the rule of law was Neither the United Nations, the African Union, the OAS or underestimated the EU--nor individual nations--has built an independent capacity to manage the full range of post-conflict security IN EXAMINING POST-CONFLICT EXPERIENCES in the requirements, from enforcing the law during the immediate Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America, aftermath of conflict to assisting countries in constructing the Crisis Group initially found a pro- found lack of awareness by the inter- national community about the impor- tance of the rule of law in post-conflict situations. For too many donors, working with police, criminal justice and jails--let alone the military-- meant getting your hands dirty. The security sector task was left for others to clean up. Fortunately that position has changed profoundly--in part thanks to findings by Paul Collier, showing that a lack of security is responsible for the failure of nearly half of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and that fighting has resumed within a decade. Among the promi- nent causal factors was the inability to manage disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and then to build new security and rule of law institutions within a legitimate gov- ernment. Even where DDR was con- Several hundreds former Serbian army reservists attacked Kosovo police in a series of violent ducted successfully, the more persist- incidents on the Kosovo-Serbia border at Merdare to protest Kosovo's independence. ent flaw was the inability to address 14 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE legitimate security institutions. The demands encompass their engagement in post-conflict security and rule-of-law institutional management of military forces; separation of operations. The current European Rule-of-Law Mission in military from police and law enforcement functions; recruit- Kosovo (EULEX) is calling, in effect, for replacing the UN's gov- ing, vetting, training, equipping, deploying and mentoring ernance and rule-of-law support activities with the European police forces; assisting in developing criminal codes; agree- Union (although they will still operate under the general frame- ment on mechanisms for the transparent selection of judges; work of a UN Security Council Resolution 1244). Even before training and support of prosecutors; and creating corrections this 3,000-strong staff investment, European police have dom- staff and facilities. inated international police missions in the Balkans. It is unlikely that any single entity will develop the stand- Thirdly, the OECD and individual donor nations, including alone capacity to meet all of these needs. The World Bank's Canada, the UK, and the U.S., are reviewing their own capabil- Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) is used ities in this area. The Obama international affairs budget for by the Bank's concessional-lending arm, the International fiscal year 2010 proposed more than $500 million across the Development Association (IDA), the United Kingdom's State Department and USAID for civilian stabilization. This Department for International Development (DFID), and oth- includes a rapid response capacity and civilian standing ers, to identify approximately 35 to 45 fragile and failing reserve in such areas as rule of law, with experts from inside states. They include post-conflict countries and countries and outside the government ready to assist failing states and where NGOs such as Crisis Group use qualitative and quanti- post-conflict reconstruction. There is a growing consensus tative indicators to identify risk of conflict in the near term. In that accountability and the rule of law are necessary to many of these countries, the rule of law is absent, security strengthen citizen safety, trust and legitimacy, both in the forces act independently of civilian control, they abuse rather short term peace-building scenarios and in the longer term than protect citizens and fail in the most fundamental task of state-building context. There is a growing understanding that defending the national territory against armed occupiers. if all groups in society are treated equally under the law, by the The good news is that there are reformers gathering force, police and in the courts, the likelihood of conflict drops and experience and resources in nooks and crannies of the inter- the environment for development is vastly improved. national community attempting to build international capac- ity to help those countries build security and justice institu- Challenges facing the World Bank tions. Pooled in a coherent and coordinated network with flexible resources, there is light at the end of the tunnel--dim F I N A L LY, I N T E R N AT I O N A L F I N A N C I A L I N S T I T U T I O N S , in but visible. particular the World Bank, are increasingly aware that they First, the UN was forced to recognize huge gaps with respect possess core competencies that permit--indeed require--their to its ability to fulfill its peacekeeping mandates during the involvement in security sector reform and establishing the rule 1990s. Current Crisis Group board member Lakhdar Brahimi, of law in fragile and post-conflict countries. The World Bank, in his 2000 report, after his own experiences as head of one of as president Zoellick stated, has come to realize that it can con- the five UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti, called for "a doctri- tribute importantly to securing development by "bringing nal shift" to increase a focus on rule of law in the use of civilian security and development together first to smooth the transi- police and "parallel arrangements" with respect to judicial, tion from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that penal, human rights and other specialists. Today there are 18 development can take hold over a decade and beyond." In fact, post-conflict countries in which more than 113,000 UN there is little chance Bank efforts to promote development, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) forces are economic growth and poverty reduction can succeed without deployed, including more than 10,300 UN Police. The 2005 UN greater attention to governance, justice and security. General Assembly endorsed a standing police capacity and a The challenge facing the Bank is how to build on what it has rule-of-law coordinating capacity and a new Assistant Secretary already accomplished. It must find a way to interact even more General now runs the Office of Rule of Law and Security with partners in post-conflict situations, go further in helping Institutions within DPKO. However, the doctrinal, planning, them support civil society, provide legislative oversight and operational and evaluation capacity of that office is thin. create domestic mechanisms for accountability. It should The mandates assigned to the DPKO by the UN Security consider its own special fund for security and rule of law insti- Council for post-conflict peacekeeping usually span DDR to tutions that would marry with the UN and others to encourage security sector and police reform and the rule of law. Now, there holistic investments in "securing development" in fragile is an office with coordinating responsibility but without the states and in post-conflict countries in transition to peace, financial and human resources to do the job. It requires an justice and poverty reduction. The option for the World Bank expanded standing police capacity, a comparable standing rule- and others is not whether to do more but how to harness the of-law capacity, a designated and trained UN police reserve and Bank's full range of human and financial resources to make a senior reserve roster of retired judges, prosecutors and jailers "securing development" a Bank priority. to be available for UN missions, ideally not only for post conflict but to help fragile states from falling into conflict as well. Mark L. Schneider is Senior Vice President of the International Crisis Secondly, the regional inter-governmental organizations, Group. particularly the European Union, are rethinking the extent of O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 15 SPECIAL REPORT Disarm, Demobilize and Reintegrate Transforming combatants into citizens to consolidate peace BY MARIA CORREIA peace negotiations and agreements, results on stated targets are difficult to predict. But there is evidence to support the S U P P O RT BY T H E WO R L D B A N K G R O U P for the demobiliza- contention that DDR programs supported by the Bank in tion and reintegration (D&R) of ex-combatants in fragile MDRP countries and others such as Sierra Leone have been countries is still in its infancy, with its regulatory framework central to consolidating fragile transitions to peace following to address this challenge having been revised in March 2007. the conclusion of civil wars. A few visionaries pushed this agenda in Africa in the late It should be clear that DDR programs are not THE answer 1990s, however, which resulted in the creation of the Multi to post-conflict situations. They are only one small but critical Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) part of peace consolidation. Basically, by breaking up armed in early 2002. This program was designed to provide a frame- groups and command and control structures, DDR buys time work for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration so that the root causes of the conflict can be addressed and (DDR) activities in Africa's Great Lakes region, with $260 peace strengthened. And DDR programs must be comple- million to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants chan- mented by other recovery activities, which together can rein- neled through a multi donor trust fund, and parallel force security and stability and pave the way for development. International Development Association(IDA) grants totaling Successful DDR projects can also facilitate the reallocation $193 million, as well as disarmament activities managed by of public expenditures from defense to social sectors, either in MDRP partners. The program initially targeted over 400,000 the context of public expenditure restructuring, security sector combatants from regular and irregular armed forces. reform, or post conflict transitions. Examples of this shift are After seven years of implementation, the MDRP closed evident in countries such as Ethiopia and Sierra Leone where down in June. It leaves behind an unquestionable legacy of DDR programs have been successfully completed. success--over 280,000 ex-combatants demobilized and Disarm-Demobilize-Reintegrate programs have not 260,000 having received reintegration support--as well as always enjoyed the support needed to sustain budget and many remaining challenges and unanswered questions. human-resources allocations from international develop- The MDRP was the first attempt to implement a regional ment organizations, including the World Bank. Some have DDR program on such a large scale. Instead of support direct- questioned whether or not this work is within the Bank's ed at one country, the architects of the program purposely remit. The answer to that question may have been ambiguous established a regional approach as an incentive for countries a few years ago, but it is no longer. Recent studies show that to disengage concurrently from interconnected conflicts and the involvement of the international community in post-con- to allow the program to tackle the cross border issues in the flict situations has had a clearly positive impact in these coun- region. tries, and this despite the inherent difficulties associated with One of the program's unique characteristics was the agree- the implementation of these programs. ment by all partners--13 donors, seven country governments The question is not whether or not the Bank should support and over 40 UN agencies, NGOs and other international DDR, but rather what can the Bank do to adjust its policies to actors--to adopt a true partnership model, pooling their provide leadership in post-conflict reconstruction, alongside resources into a common pot and coordinating their efforts the United Nations. Support to fragile countries right after through regular exchanges and joint supervision missions. their most troubled times is vital if the Bank is to "secure The program also focused heavily on national ownership and development" as the institution's President Robert Zoellick implementation of DDR activities. In all but two recipient has stated. Disarm-Demobilize-Reintegrate programs must countries, the local governments were at the helm of the DDR be part of this support. programs. For the first time also, partners agreed to ask the World Bank to lead the partnership. Maria Correia is the former Program Manager of MDRP, with the The Bank has learned a great deal from this experience. Fragile States, Conflicts and Social Development Unit (AFTCS) at the Experience has shown that disarm-demobilize-reintegrate World Bank. programs have high risks, but also high returns. Because they hinge on processes beyond the control of the partners, www.mdrp.org including political processes, international consultations, 16 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT Timor Leste Ten Years After What have we learned? BY EMILIA PIRES directly what did or did not work. This kind of direct experi- ence is often denied to post-conflict societies like the East A CRITICAL DIMENSION of the development challenge in Timorese and, as a result, most people simply do not under- post-conflict East Timor is making the transition from a mili- stand why the solutions they are offered are any better than tary environment focused on conflict with a common public the alternatives. enemy to a civilian administration facing complexity and People who spend a long time in a resistance movement uncertainty. develop finely-honed skills based on solidarity and the sur- The international community may insist on the immediate vival instinct of their leaders. Disparate groups can be united adoption of best practice. Indeed, why should we not learn by a common enemy. In peacetime, areas of shared interest from the mistakes of others? However, in most countries must be found to prevent a splintered, fractious, and poten- these practices were adopted by iterations and trials in a com- tially confrontational political environment. In East Timor, munal learning process, and each time the people learned we tried to build common ground by creating Vision 2020, An election official shows a ballot paper to residents in Dili, Timor Leste. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 17 which allowed over 40,000 citizens to articulate their aspira- But this can alienate the local population who may resent that tions for the country on the eve of independence. those who have learned to play the "western game," are now able This process is complex and painful, even for a country as to position themselves to take advantage of the power vacuum. blessed with resources as East Timor. Although the former The Western democratic model is based on opposition, a vertical political power structures are no longer viable, transi- luxury which is not affordable in times of conflict. Therefore, tion to new systems takes time. Conversion must be gradual; after conflict, there is a need to dedicate resources to civic the old structures cannot be ignored while the new ones are education programs that inform the general population on the being built. principles and values of democracy. Such "governance educa- Similarly, building new leadership takes time. Often fol- tion" interventions are often not made available, because lowing a conflict, a power vacuum emerges as military leaders donors seem to generally assume that people will automatical- step aside to allow civilians to rule. Such a vacuum can be eas- ly choose western-style democracy. But people emerging from ily exploited by peace-spoilers. This highlights why political conflict situations may never have experienced democracy. transition, rather than money, is the main challenge in post- conflict environments. Leadership continuity can help transition Externally educated elites have an advantage LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY from the conflict to the post-con- flict period may be helpful. East Timor has greatly benefited I T I S N OT U N U S UA L to see members of a diaspora return after from having had a unifying leader, Prime Minister Xanana years in exile to take up senior government posts in post-conflict Gusmăo, whom enjoys respect and admiration from all sectors countries. They have the advantages of high-quality education, of society--from the military and police to ordinary citizens. along with an understanding of modern government systems. His ability to play the role of respected arbitrator has consid- erably eased the management of political and social conflicts in lieu of functioning legal institutions, Money should be spent quickly H AV I N G F U N D S is always helpful; how- ever, the key issue is the speed at which they are disbursed. In the post-conflict period, sensitivities and suspicions can run high. To ensure stability government needs to be able to act fast and quickly disburse funds to agencies, civil society groups and even directly to the citizens whenever possible. This is not an easy task, given fledgling administrative structures. Some external observers may claim that this type of disbursement does not follow the rules of "best-practice financial management," yet in post-con- flict situations a government needs to strike a balance between best-practice financial management and the need to ensure social stability. In East Timor, where we rely on oil revenues, the introduction of cash trans- fers proved to be a valuable tool. In sec- tors such as health and education, where building systems takes a long time, cash transfers help improve both social cohe- sion and direct poverty alleviation. In the immediate post-conflict period the Voters walk to a polling station in Dili to elect Timor Leste's new president. poorest people are the most exposed to misinformation, corruption and disillu- 18 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE sionment wilfully brought on by players interested in captur- many institutions were still fledgling, or did not exist at all. This ing the aforementioned power vacuum. Direct cash transfers lack of national governance capacity resulted in an extreme to the most vulnerable groups can play a key role in counter- reliance on foreign advisers, with a vested interest not to devel- acting those negative forces and securing stability. op local capacity in order to maintain their healthy salaries. Many people do not realize how quickly the most vulnera- In Timor Leste, we faced the unrealistic notion that every- ble in society can lose hope, and how potentially destabilizing thing should be fixed at once. For example, the belief that one this is. Public expectations in the immediate post-conflict cannot move ahead with economic development until the period are high, and often unrealistic. If in the post-conflict "land" issue is fixed. This type of `holistic' solution-making period those expectations are not managed and hope is some- may work in theory but is simply unrealistic in the political how kept alive, people become disillusioned and disruptive. It sphere. One cannot fix all the problems simultaneously. It is this critical importance of a quick peace dividend that ren- makes no sense to elaborate all encompassing "master plans" ders some of the long-term solutions offered by donors, no if nobody reads and uses them. Larger problems must be bro- matter how sound, impractical to a government. ken down into smaller ones, and those must be fixed as best It is ironic that the donor community spent nearly US $3.7 they can with the participation of all interested stakeholders. billion in East Timor immediately between 1999 and 2007, to One has to be pragmatic and take it step-by-step. little effect, while the new East Timor government that In the private sector it is common to see two businesses fail recently increased its spending to US$500 million, giving sig- for every one that succeeds. In the development world, on the nificant sums to the most vulnerable in society, received other hand, officially, there are no failures! This inability to scathing criticism from the international community. accept potential failure leads to an inability to take risks and, Sadly, in East Timor there is now a perception among the in turn, to poor and non-innovative solutions. Donors, and general population that the donor community is riddled with especially their officers on the ground, should have the flexi- complex rules that only allow them to "talk" and not "do." This bility to make decisions and take risks in line with govern- perceived failure consequently places more pressure on the gov- ment needs. Although this may result in a few failed projects, ernment to "do"--i.e., to initiate activities that have an immedi- it will also produce more successes. ate, direct and tangible impact on the lives of the people. The decision of the East Timorese government to resolve the issue of 120,000 internally displaced people through the use of The importance of dignity cash transfers is an excellent example in this regard. We arrived at this solution through consultation and negotiation with the Even though P OV E RT Y I S A B O U T P R I D E A S W E L L A S M O N E Y. groups concerned. Our approach was derided by some in the people may be poor and uneducated, they still need to be donor community who advocated for a solution involving an treated with respect and dignity. Even with little or no educa- eight-year program and foreign NGOs. However, we went ahead tion, rural communities often can come up with solutions to and within one year we had returned nearly 100,000 people to their problems that are faster and more viable than those pro- their homes, all but one of the camps had been closed, and the posed by international development experts. This is partly risk of developing permanent "slums" which could become a because the communities understand best the "underlying" breeding ground of future conflict had been averted. This is not drivers of their economy and society. Donors often end up to say that we solved every problem. We know that there will be supporting ideas expressed by counterparts who may have a reintegration challenges, but waiting for an all-encompassing good command of English but a low support base within the solution that addresses every problem before taking action community. Tapping into local knowledge and getting to would have been a far more dangerous strategy. understand the social, cultural and political drivers of a soci- ety is essential to be effective in sustainable development. Working together Often very little time is dedicated to skills development, capacity building and, more importantly, building up govern- we all make mistakes. I N P O S T - C O N F L I C T S I T U AT I O N S , ment systems in the proper way. In East Timor, we faced a sit- Nobody has a magic solution to every problem. This is why com- uation in which donors were willing to sponsor a program that munication, friendship and understanding among those inter- would last a maximum of three years though they had been ested in genuine development are important. We have been advised that it would take at least a generation to build a pub- lucky in East Timor. As in any good marriage, we often disagree lic service. A concrete example in Timor Leste is the schooling with our partners, but at the end of the day we overcome our dif- system; many donors were keen to improve it, but few were ferences in the interest of building an institution which is willing to provide teachers with scholarships that would train greater than each individual partner--the East Timor nation. them to teach. Emilia Pires is the Minister of Finance of Timor Leste. Nation building takes time L O C A L P E O P L E A R E O FT E N not given the opportunity to develop the skills needed to run a modern government. In East Timor, the UN pulled out after only two-and-a-half years, when O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 19 SPECIAL REPORT No Development without Peace BY GARY MILANTE AND PHIL OXHORN from conflict C O U N T R I E S R E C OV E R I N G face unique challenges to development. They frequently have pressing humani- tarian concerns. Infrastructure has often been destroyed or at least neglected dur- ing the conflict. Countries can face changes in demographics due to migra- tion and displacement. Also, citizens of post-conflict countries may face a legacy of conflict in the form of landmines or unexploded ordnance, high crime rates, interrupted education or continuing negative health effects. In many ways, the years lost to conflict amount to a period in which human or economic development is suspended or, in some cases, even reversed. For governments of post-conflict countries, these multiple challenges mean there may be trade-offs between addressing specific urgent problems that can result in quick wins and focus- ing on the longer-term policies needed to put the country on a path to sustain- able development. When peace finally is secured, the post-conflict country must address all of the challenges outlined above with limited resources, in corrupt environments, with weak capacity and institutions, and possibly amid a climate of distrust or fear. At the same time, donors and the international communi- ty often rush in to these environments when the peace is secured, overwhelm- ing the recovering country with pledges of aid, a plethora of development proj- ects and a lot of advice. In this chaotic situation, it is no wonder that the inter- national community and the people of these countries are often disappointed or frustrated when little changes or con- A memorial service for the victims of the massacre of Srebrenica, Bosnia, twelve years after the war flict resumes. ended with the Dayton peace agreement. Ultimately, all this suggests that there still is much we don't understand about 20 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE post-conflict development, described they increase patronage and clientilism abused if peace is to be sustainable. In loosely as the nexus of development, (as in Papua New Guinea or Nigeria, or the immediate post-conflict period, the defense and diplomacy (the "3Ds" of perhaps even the new peace in Somalia). state must build up the capacity to working in fragile and conflict-affected Meanwhile, there is good reason to enforce the rule of law, however, it often countries). Much of this uncertainty is believe that established democracies are must build up legitimacy with its citi- driven by the inherent trade-offs that better able to provide voice to the zens to demonstrate that it can be trust- governments, donors and citizens face aggrieved, thus reducing the likelihood ed with this capacity. This suggests that in these countries. Should humanitari- of civil conflict and securing the civil there are again two possibly counter- an relief be provided quickly at the peace. Still democratization is not a vailing effects, a trade-off between expense of government capacity? panacea against civil conflict if post- strength and credibility, which must be Should the international community conflict elections simply move the risk balanced for sustainable development emphasize security or service delivery? of conflict to a future date. Indeed, and a lasting peace in fragile and post- Should governments democratize or research in this project suggests that any conflict states. In our research we focus build up their bureaucracy and institu- sustainable development that follows this discussion on how peace agree- tions? Does state security always coin- may have as much to do with the quality ments, intervention strategies, demo- cide with human security? Should of the government as the type. New bilization strategies and post-conflict donors help to build the capacity of the democracies are unlikely to have collec- justice can contribute to both securing state to provide public goods or should tively organized politicians with the the peace and economic development. they provide them outside the state incentive and ability to provide public apparatus? These critical questions goods. Leader-centric autocracies may Post-conflict economic must often be answered quickly. To help exhibit similar tendencies, suggesting policy fill this lacuna, the World Bank launched that it is not the type of government, but a Peace and Development research the quality. P R E V I O U S R E S E A R C H produced theo- project with partners at the Institute for These effects suggest a trade-off for retical and empirical evidence that the Study of International Development the post-conflict or fragile state, most of countries emerging out of conflicts at McGill University, focusing on what which are autocratic. Democracy and experience certain structural shifts that were identified as three pivotal compo- participatory governance might help to affect aid effectiveness and fiscal policy, nents of post-conflict development: secure the peace (if elections are prop- as well as exchange rate and monetary Democracy and the provision of public erly timed and executed), but even policy. Papers from the Post-Conflict goods, power-sharing and sustainable fledgling democracies are likely to be Transitions research project suggested peace, and macroeconomic policy. clientelist. Our research seeks to identify when countries should make Democracy and public the effort to democratize, as an goods investment in a peaceful future, and when they should maintain and even PA RT I C I PATO RY SYS T E M S like democ- reinforce existing systems of govern- racy can often lend legitimacy to post- ment, autocratic as they might be to conflict countries and may be a prereq- provide stability and efficiently pro- uisite for a long and lasting peace. Yet, it vide public goods. is not altogether clear that democratic or participatory systems have any natural Powersharing for advantage in the delivery of public sustainable peace goods. There may be an efficiency trade- off in moving from autocratic to more C O N V E N T I O N A L W I S D O M holds that democratic governance due to switching a modern state enjoys the monopoly costs associated with institutional on violence within its borders; howev- reform ­ there is evidence that estab- er, post-conflict countries, by defini- lished autocracies with developed tion, have had this monopoly chal- bureaucratic institutions are just as lenged by active rebel and criminal capable if not more capable than fledg- groups. Even if the post-conflict state ling democracies in the provision of manages to secure a monopoly or near public goods. Also, some literature sug- monopoly on the use of force, they Children watch as peacekeeping soldiers of gests that while more participatory sys- may not be able to credibly commit to the hybrid Unted Nations African Union tems in socially fractionalized societies using that monopoly responsibly, Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) stand guard at a camp for internally displaced persons in the with strong identity politics may confer making peace tenuous at best. Nyala area of South Darfur. legitimacy necessary for peace, such sys- It is vital that the state's monopoly tems might sacrifice accountability as on violence be ensured and not O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 21 that the post-conflict cycles tend to affect aid absorptive capacity and aid tends to be most effective two to four years after the end of conflicts (though, currently, most aid is THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL WAR PROJECT rushed in immediately after conflict and drops precipitously in the third and fourth years). Other research on macroeconomic policy suggests that exchange rates must be competitive for aid effectiveness. In The influential ECONOMICS OF CIVIL WAR project turn, exchange rate competitiveness is likely to be influenced at the World Bank brought much-needed by the extent to which monetary policy and the exchange rate attention to the unique development challenges faced by conflict-affected countries. Although regimes accommodate the structural shifts in the transaction "one size does not fit all" and the challenges in demand for money associated with the end of conflicts, sug- each conflict country are unique, Breaking the gesting that our usual prescriptions for monetary policy do Conflict Trap by Collier and Sambanis was a first not apply for post-conflict states. Indeed research suggests "textbook" that has influenced much thinking that demand for money in post-conflict can justify post-con- on development in conflict-affected countries. flict aid as an agent for "monetary reconstruction," by push- In the World Bank's Development Economics ing the economy toward a "good" equilibrium of stable infla- Research Group we continued this research tion as countries rebuild. agenda by convening a large team of scholars to These results imply that post-conflict countries face anoth- contribute to our POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS er important trade-off between austerity (often prescribed by research project, resulting in 30 working papers international financial institutions due to the weak monetary on issues relevant to post-conflict development, including the risk of conflict relapse, the quality policy that prevailed during conflict) and expansionary mone- of peace agreements and peacekeepers, and tary policy that might stoke economic recovery during rapid the importance of sound and informed post-conflict growth. Additionally, donors face a trade-off in economic policy in these environments. Many of their decision between channeling aid through the government these papers were published in two special of the recovering country which may often lack the capacity to editions of the World Bank Economic Review and properly manage the resources or sidestepping the country, the Journal of Peace Research in 2008. Today, reducing the resources and incentives for government to we continue to push the frontier of economic reform and develop the institutions for proper governance. thinking on conflict and development through our PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT research project. http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict Research approach O U R R E S E A R C H A P P R OAC H is multi-disciplinary and draws upon expertise in the North and South. The research team con- sists of economists, political scientists and other social scien- tists to provide strong theoretical underpinnings for the research. In addition, we have commissioned research teams from seven countries--Bosnia, Colombia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Sudan--to challenge the theory papers and test them through case studies based on each of these post-conflict countries. These country case studies provide a variety by region and peace outcome for testing the models developed in our research papers. As a result we hope to produce a final product that is sustained by both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, informed by viewpoints from the South and the North and integrated across disciplines. Gary Milante is a Lead Economist in the Development Economics Rwandan women celebrate the return of soldiers, in February 2009, in Gisenyi, on the border between Rwanda and the Democratic Research Group at the World Bank. Republic of Congo. Phil Oxhorn is Director of the Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University. 22 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT From Civil War to Special Economic Zones Djibouti Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority AN INTERVIEW WITH ANAND CYPARSADE in development, is characterized by quality infrastructure BY ROBERT KRECH close to sea or airports, significantly reduced red tape for business registration and licensing, and incentives such as works for JAFZA International, a sub- A N A N D C Y PA R S A D E zero percent charges on capital and profits. Robert Krech, of sidiary of Dubai World. JAFZA International plans, builds and the Special Economic Zones team in the Investment Climate manages economic free zones, starting in Dubai in 1985 with Advisory Service of the World Bank Group interviewed Mr. the Jebel Ali Free Zone. The Jebel Ali Free Zone in Dubai is Cyparsade about a new 40-hectare Free Zone he is managing considered one of the world's largest and most successful free in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, between Ethiopia, Eritrea, zones. The JAFZA International "brand" of economic free and Somalia. Djibouti is at peace today, but it was torn by a zones, applied to four completed operations, with another 10 civil war in the early 1990s; although a peace agreement was A security guard checks for explosives under a truck at the gate to the Port of Djibouti. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 23 concluded between the government and the main faction of AC: You are right, the Djibouti project was not just a JAFZA the rebel Afar group, Front for the Restoration of Unity and project. It involved a number of Dubai World sub- Democracy, a more radical FRUD faction maintained small- sidiaries coming together in an integrated develop- scale resistance until 2001. ment package. DP World rehabilitated the Port of Djibouti and now manages the port. It has constructed RK: JAFZA in Djibouti is proving to be a successful free zone project in a dif- a new deepwater port that has been operational since ficult environment. What is the source of its success? January 2009, and is also managing the airport which will be rehabilitated. Djibouti Customs and Dubai AC: We see Africa as the next region that is about to take Customs World operate the customs service. Nakheel off. Costs in Asia are increasing and Africa is resource built a new Five Star hotel and assigned its manage- rich. The commercial potential of the continent is only ment to Kempinsky as well as some real estate devel- going to increase. Djibouti's location is what made it opment. Jafza International constructed and manages our choice for the project. The country is positioned on the special economic zone and is at planning stage for the Horn of Africa where 50 percent of the world's sea the development of a second special economic zone. trade passes by, linking Europe to Asia and the Gulf. As well, we saw an opportunity to make Djibouti a trans- RK: Is this part of the business model you mentioned? shipment base for regional trade, both sea-based and inland to Africa. AC: Yes. By bringing in these different businesses under Dubai World, we took control of risk and could catalyze RK: How did the free zone project start in Djibouti? a critical mass of business activity that we were confi- dent would only grow given the location features of AC: In 2000 DP World took over the management of the Djibouti and the proximity of markets in the region. Port of Djibouti. As we studied the potential in Djibouti, the Government of Dubai began to have a RK: In an economy like Djibouti's, where the Dubai World brand is not well high-level discussion with the Government of Djibouti known locally, how is this critical mass of business activity to grow? on what vision each side had for the country and that part of Africa. The agenda of the Government of AC: Well, I won't agree that the brand is not known. But, the Djibouti to develop the country and the agenda of concept of an economic zone was a new concept and we Dubai World to create global business opportunities had to communicate and spread this business model were compatible. At that time, Dubai World was begin- locally. Our global strategy is to create a network of proj- ning to act on its strategy to go global and seek invest- ects. Starting with our flagship project in Dubai, the ment opportunities outside of the Gulf. Jebel Ali Free Zone, we would like to cross market our brand across our network of free zone projects. The RK: Djibouti's history is interesting. It was French territory until 1977, when Jebel Ali Free Zone has about 6500 companies from 120 the Afars and Issas joined to form the independent state of Djibouti countries, 125 of which are Fortune 500 companies. Our under one-party rule. It experienced a civil war from 1992-2000, from network of projects asks how our infrastructure and which it recovered and held presidential elections. It currently has a business services can fit into the supply chains of our border dispute with Eritrea, which was violent last year. Culturally, it is investors. By replicating our success outside of Dubai, similar to Somalia, with ethnic Somalis on both sides of the border. we want companies to move with us to new sites, both Also, the economies of northwestern Somalia and Djibouti are deeply taking advantage of opportunities offered by our proj- connected. How did the Djibouti government support the project? ects and contributing to these opportunities to make them even better. By this means, we create investment AC: The higher-level discussions between the inflows to our international project locations. Governments of Dubai and Djibouti helped form the relationship on which we could base our project, and RK: The clients that move with you to new project sites can be large com- the Government of Djibouti has remained consistent- panies. How do local companies fit into your projects? ly committed to it. In 2003, we did a feasibility study jointly with our in-house SEZ team and consultants we AC: SEZs offer liberal business environments with high serv- hired for the project. The feasibility study detailed the ice standards. In fact, I would say that local companies in commercial case for the project and gave us tangible particular draw benefits from locating in a SEZ. There is requirements for success that we brought to the increased efficiency, guaranteed incentives, and a pre- Government of Djibouti. The Government endorsed dictable operational and legal environment that can our requirements, which were essentially that we have enable these companies to grow. Also, it creates opportu- the freedom to implement our business model. nities for them to partner with international companies that are tenants in the free zone. One way we enable this RK: This brings us to an important question. The project in Djibouti involves in our zones is through Gazeley, a UK company that more than just an economic free zone. Economic Zones World acquired that specializes in ware- 24 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE housing logistics. They bring to our free zones a build- RK: The creation of a new regulator is very interesting, even a bit unusual. to-suit approach for customized logistics solutions, and Can you tell me more about this? also parcels business spacing and logistics for smaller companies whose needs as growing businesses are AC: Djibouti did not have an existing free zone regulator at smaller and based more on trade than manufacturing. the start of the project, so we had to create one. Initially we acted as both regulator and operator of the RK: I wanted to go back to the aspect of the business model that takes con- free zone, but in a planned separation the regulator trol of risk. In projects the size of the one in Djibouti, it seems that became independent. We obviously still work closely obtaining land would have been an important challenge, as well as how together, but the independence followed a period of to interface with the local regulatory environment. How did the project capacity building around what is a regulator and what meet these challenges? skills its staff should have to be effective and business- friendly. AC: Obtaining sufficient land on a free-hold basis was one of our requirements that we put to the Government early RK: In a way, this too is part of internalizing risk that is part of your busi- on in our high level discussions. We worked directly with ness model. the President rather than with ministerial and adminis- trative parts of the Government of Djibouti. AC: That is right. To attract investment, it is crucial to have investor confidence, and this can be helped by a well- RK: But you would have had to deal directly with ministerial and adminis- structured, empowered and business-friendly regulato- trative parts of the Government when working out how the free zone ry body. We had no intention of keeping control of the would interface with the business registrar, licensing bodies, and cus- regulator, but we needed to build it up once we created it. toms, for example. In our experience (that of the Investment Climate As we are building a second special economic zone, the Advisory Service of the World Bank Group) the ministry level and regulator will work with more than one free zone. The administrative units of Governments can be a bit resistant when they regulator therefore has to be a governmental body and perceive their authority to be challenged. not an in-house specialized regulator, and we also have to ensure that it is efficient since this is key to our project. AC: That is correct, and we did work directly with a wide range of administrative departments. We see the issues RK: In addition to what you learned about how to make your business model of land and the physical build-up of the free zone ­ work in Djibouti, what else would you say has been a good outcome for such as installing the power and water supply, the this project? office and warehouse space, and IT connectivity ­ as important but secondary to creating the right business AC: As you know, the SEZ in Djibouti is not just a project, but environment. When we started the Djibouti Free Zone, a new economic pillar in a country that has traditionally we created a new Special Economic Zone law for been rent-driven and until recently conflict-affected. Djibouti, established a free zone regulator that did not The SEZ creates an environment conducive to foreign exist, and set-up a one-stop-shop for all business pro- direct investment with the outcome of tangible job cre- cedures inside the free zone. The one-stop-shop is a ation, a return of the Diaspora, and in general a key part of our business model. We brought the model dynamism that fuels the economy. Our objective is to we use in Dubai to Djibouti: the same documents, the transfer knowledge and skills so that there can be a same procedural steps, nearly everything was lifted potential cross movement of talents in our network of from Dubai and planted in Djibouti. projects. As you know, we are developing a new project in Senegal, which is nearing its operational start date RK: A new one-stop-shop is a difficult reality to harmonize with an existing and DP World is already managing the port of Dakar. Key system, especially when the one-stop-shop comes as a package. How positions in Senegal are being staffed with Djiboutians did the existing bureaucracies respond to the creation of a new who learned our business model in Djibouti, and know Government institution and parallel regulations? how to operate free zones and a port to our standards that upholds our global brand. The opportunity to lever- AC: This goes back to our relationship with the age capable people from Djibouti to work in Senegal is a Government. Anytime we arrived at a bureaucratic great way to leverage African talent--I myself am from block that we could not work out with a governmental Mauritius--which is for us another aspect of the success administrative unit, we had recourse to appeal to the story that Djibouti has become. highest levels of Government. We found a way to har- monize the information flow between the Djibouti Robert Krech is Operations Officer with the Investment Climate Free Zone and outside Government offices. To avoid Division of the World Bank. any ongoing administrative conflicts, the one-stop- shop is separate from existing related ministries and is directly accountable to the President's Office. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 25 SPECIAL REPORT Bottom-Up State Building Preventing violence at the community level BY ERIK ALDA AND ALYS M. WILLMAN Violence, then, is not a cause of fragility, but it is an important indicator of a fragile situation. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, "We are our own officials in this neighborhood. We are our own there is a positive, significant relationship between fragility authority. [The local and national authorities] only show up when and homicide rates. This observation holds not only for coun- they want something from us! For us, they don't exist." tries involved in formal conflict or recent post-conflict, but --Focus group participant, Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, Haiti1 also in countries that have made the transition to peace. Violence and fragility reinforce each other in several ways. a sentiment that is increas- T H E Q U OT E A B OV E E X P R E S S E S On the most basic level, violence erodes governance by creat- ingly familiar: in many places across the developing world, the ing fear that limits mobility and participation. In more state simply does not exist. In these contexts, we speak of a intense situations, high levels of violence can create under- "failed state," in the sense that the state fails its citizens by not governed areas where state institutions are unable to enter providing them with the most basic services. Among these-- and provide services, further undermining state legitimacy. and perhaps the most fundamental--is the provision of secu- In the most extreme cases, fragile contexts offer safe havens rity. Where there is no security, violence can have free rein. for organized criminal networks to operate freely. These net- Cartoonish gang violence depicted on a wall in Cité Soleil, Haiti. 26 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE works may grow strong enough to com- lence, many of which coincide with state exemplified by the resignation of Prime pete with the state in the provision of failure to adequately respond to political Minister Edouard Alexis in April, fol- core public goods, especially security, and social unrest. For example, the lowed by further unrest as the state strug- thereby undermining state legitimacy. spikes in violence from mid-2004 to late gled to respond to the impacts of the four The identification of a strong rela- 2006 stem from the state's indecisive- hurricanes that hit the island last fall. tionship between fragility and violence ness in dealing with urban gang activity Communities in Haiti continuously clearly implies that reducing violence is in certain "lawless zones" of the capital, list basic security as a top concern and a essential to reducing fragility. Only when culminating in the UN military interven- precondition for strengthening the a minimum level of security has been tion in Cité Soleil at the end of 2006. The weakened state. In Port-au-Prince, a established can the state perform its peaks in 2008 coincide with a weak insti- hot spot for violence, a strong UN pres- function as service provider. In addition, tutional response to rising food prices, ence has reduced violence in recent a basic situation of security is necessary to provide the space for citizens to safely and constructively engage with the state. FIGURE 1: VIOLENCE AND STATE FRAGILITY In sum, a minimum level of security is essential for rebuilding a strong relation- 4 ship between citizens and the state. Yet establishing security is only one element Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (log) in reducing violence. As we will argue 3 here, it is necessary to go beyond basic security to address the real economic and social exclusion faced by many residents 2 of fragile states, in order to secure devel- opment in the long term. The question for development prac- titioners, then, is how to contribute to 1 violence prevention that will allow for institutional strengthening in fragile situations? There is a growing consen- 0 sus that violence-affected communities themselves are an important part of the 40 60 80 100 120 answer. Below we present two distinct Index of State Fragility examples--Haiti and Kenya--that illus- R-Squared: 0.1193 trate the relationship between state fragility and violence, and the impor- Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Fund for Peace Index and WHO homicide rates. tance of community level interventions in reducing both. FIGURE 2: INSTITUTIONAL FRAGILITY AND VIOLENT DEATHS IN HAITI 2003-08 Building institutions HAITI: NATIONAL HOMICIDES 2003-2008 Series 1 from the community up: Aristide's Perspectives from Departure Urban gang Port-au-Prince 160 violence, Weakness of police indecisiveness response, growing 140 in state response political instability THE EXPERIENCE OF HAITI illustrates 120 Inadequate response to the ways state fragility and violence can 100 hurricanes mutually reinforce each other. Figure 2 80 charts homicide rates, the most reliable UN intervention 60 indicator for levels of violence, and notes 40 the periods of social and political unrest 20 that have accompanied different surges in violence. With the institutional vacu- 0 Dec 03 Mar 04 Jun 04 Sep 04 Dec 04 Mar 05 Jun 05 Sep 05 Dec 05 Mar 06 Jun 06 Sep 06 Dec 06 Mar 07 Jun 07 Sep 07 Dec 07 Mar 08 Jun 08 Sep 08 um following the departure of President Jean Bertrand Aristide in early 2004, the country witnessed alarming rates of vio- Source: National Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace quarterly reports. Data include lent crime. The following years were traffic accidents. marked by periodic outbreaks of vio- O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 27 lasting ongoing conflicts--Sudan and Northern Uganda--and total state failure as is the case of Somalia. However, despite its economic progress, Kenya has been faced with capacity problems to deliver basic services to citizens, in particular, to those living in the poorest areas. The eruption of the post-election vio- lence in 2007, in which more than a thou- sand people were killed in a matter of days and thousands more forcefully displaced shattered Kenya's image as a stable democ- racy. The extreme brutality of the violence committed during the much contested elec- tion was triggered by underlying structural factors, including rising inequality, mount- ing poverty, limited access to basic resources by the poor, high unemployment--particu- After disputed election results, in February 2008, supporters of the opposition Orange Democratic larly among youth--, persistent insecurity, Movement (ODM) form a roadblock in a village near Eldoret, Kenya. and widespread corruption. These factors exacerbated the magnitude and brutality of violence during these elections, the most years, yet residents see this relative calm as temporary and severe since Kenya's return to multi-party politics. tenuous. In Cité Soleil, one of the most violent neighborhoods These underlying issues created a fertile ground for vio- in Haiti and the focus of UN peacekeeping efforts, violent lence to erupt and therefore, raise questions about Kenya's crime victimization remains high, with 33 percent of resi- institutional and political stability. Failure by intelligence dents reporting having been victimized. Although gangs are agencies to recognize early warning signs on increasing ten- less active than before, their presence is still visible, and their sion in some areas of the country and poor coordination with power latent. As one focus group participant remarked, "[The security agencies such as the Kenya police and Administration UN mission] has decapitated some of the gangs but the roots police also contributed to the rapid spread of violence. remain. Many young people are waiting for the opportunity to State institutions have generally been weak in Kenya, par- get involved." ticularly in the poorest communities, where most of the vio- The response from Cité Soleil residents has been to call, lence took place. For example, in Nairobi, the vast majority of first, for a stronger police and UN presence, followed by the population lives in slums, with poor physical infrastruc- stronger justice institutions to promote rule of law and, finally, ture, limited access to water and poor sanitation. Other basic more economic opportunities to secure the peace.2 services such as access to justice and provision of safety and But beyond a stronger police presence, Cité Soleil resi- security by the police force are weak in urban settings and dents felt that ensuring security depends on promoting rec- practically nonexistent in rural areas. The latter is important onciliation and rebuilding community relationships. The because the lack of effectiveness of these institutions has release of former gang members from prison without any for- spurred the growth of non-state security actors who, in most mal reconciliation process has raised tensions in the commu- cases, provide the security needed in these areas. Some of nity. Even though it is not explicitly aimed at violence preven- these groups such as the Mungiki and others that operate freely tion, a World Bank community-driven development project in in these areas have strong political ties. In fact, according to Cité Soleil has been an important step in helping to rebuild the "Waki report," they were used as politically motivated relationships by bringing community members together to vehicles for violent acts during the post-election period.3 identify priorities collectively, and implement development Most of the violence and insecurity that emerged during projects. Stronger support to these community-driven the 2007 national election had been brewing for years in these processes is one of the more promising avenues to securing poor communities. Despite experiencing formidable levels of the peace in the long term. growth, the sudden surge of violence in 2007 did signal that institutional performance in Kenya is still weak. Recent work on crime and violence in poor urban areas in Nairobi reveals Perspectives from Nairobi that citizens in these communities demand more state K E N YA , U N L I K E H A I T I , is a country that ranks in the middle of many of the fragile state index classifications. Kenya has experienced strong economic growth in recent years and was B o t t o m - U p S tat e B u i l di n g considered by many to be a good example of peace and demo- continued on page 31 cratic stability in Eastern Africa, a region known for long- 28 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT Sexual Violence Extends Beyond Conflict BY KARIN WACHTER Rape as an obstacle to development sexual violence has been accepted T H R O U G H O U T H I S TO RY, that sexual violence escalates I T I S N OW W I D E LY AC C E P T E D as an unfortunate but unavoidable aspect of warfare, and only dramatically during times of instability, insecurity, conflict and recently has the seriousness and enormity of the problem displacement. The systematic use of rape has many purposes, gained the attention of the international humanitarian com- including control and domination of target populations based munity, criminal courts, the media and academic researchers. on ethnicity, political affiliation or geographical location.2 Similarly, it is only recently that policies have been developed, Survivors of sexual violence are exposed to debilitating and resources dedicated, to address the consequences of sex- short- and long-term social, physical, emotional and eco- ual violence during conflict and, in vague terms, attempt to nomic consequences. A common scenario of how these con- prevent it. However, to address sexual violence only during sequences are experienced is that after being gang-raped and humanitarian emergencies is to ignore the endemic nature of impregnated, a woman is often abandoned by her husband violence against women on a global scale and neglect its and left to care for their children. She can no longer rely on adverse impact on the development of a country.1 the support of her community, some of whom think of her as "unclean." She often feels sick and, due to a debilitating sense The mother of a seven year-old rape victim at her daughter's bedside in Lahore, Pakistan. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 29 NUMBER OF WOMEN AND GIRLS RECEIVING SERVICES THROUGH IRC SEXUAL reporting mechanisms or population-based prevalence data ASSAULT AND REFERRAL CENTERS IN SIERRA LEONE FROM 2002-2009 on violence against women should not be, by itself, the new YEAR INCIDENT WAS REPORTED Jan-April, definition of action. Considerable progress has already been 20023 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL made to demonstrate clearly that women and girls are target- 3 417 523 714 703 805 758 214 4,134 ed for, and suffer the impacts of violence.5 Today's challenge, rather, is to focus data collection on contributing to a nascent Source: IRC. but growing body of evidence on what interventions effective- ly address women's needs, reduces their vulnerability to vio- lence and improves their overall status. of fear and shame, she is limited in her ability to participate in One such research initiative has been undertaken by the community events. Nevertheless, she forces herself to return International Rescue Committee (IRC), which has invested to the fields where she was attacked in order to feed her chil- resources into developing practical systems to monitor the dren. She can no longer pay her children's school fees; she quantity and quality of services provided to survivors of sexu- had hoped they would go further in school than she did. al violence. The initiative was aimed at demonstrating a causal Take the example of this one woman and multiply her by link between services provided and a change in the psycholog- 10,000, or 200,000, or 800,000, as one can do in the ical well-being and social function of clients. Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia, East Timor, Rwanda, In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Dr. Paul Bolton of Liberia, or Darfur. The consequences of sexual violence are John Hopkins University, and the IRC collaborated to develop devastating for the individual and far-reaching for the family, a tool that seeks to measure change in the psychological and community and society as a whole. Sexual violence destroys social well-being of survivors based on their own priorities. the fabric of a community in a way that few weapons can by The tool measures the extent to which clients are able to carry tearing apart families, generating fear and mistrust, and cre- out everyday activities important to them, as well as locally- ating a public health crisis. described mental health problems. The tool is administered Sexual violence also further diminishes the status of by the counselor before services are provided, at varying times women and girls and their perceived value within their com- during services, and upon discharge.6 munities, which in turn contributes to a cycle of violence and Baseline data from approximately 300 survivors of sexual vulnerability. One example of this is illustrated by the rates of violence seeking services was collected in 2008, revealing a women and girls continuing to seek assistance for the assault, high level of symptom severity and dysfunction. All 300 exploitation and discrimination they continue to experience clients were then provided with a variety of basic services after the fighting ends. based on their individual needs and requests (i.e. basic coun- What was traditionally considered a private matter, or an seling, referrals to medical and legal services, family counsel- inevitable part of a women's life, is now understood as an obsta- ing and group activities). Preliminary analysis of data collect- cle to development. The experience and threat of violence, ed upon client discharge indicates that both depression and especially in an environment that does not promote gender function indicators showed improvement.7 equality, limits women's potential to be active and contributing Upon further analysis, the IRC intends to continue to use participants in society. To assume that violence against women and girls starts and ends with war ignores the fact that it inhibits a country's progress and development.4 Smoke and mirrors: What data are really needed? T H E R E I S A S H A R E D G OA L in the international community to improve data collection and analysis in the field of humanitarian assistance and post-conflict policy and practice. But when it comes to the subject of violence against women and girls, a meaningful debate on the learning priorities, purpose and modalities of data collection is too often obscured by an overwhelming demand for A woman covers her face in a center for rape victims near Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo. simply "more data." The call for 30 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE the tool to complement program monitoring. The next phase of research would focus on producing data that would allow the B o t t o m - U p S tat e B u i l di n g continued from page 28 IRC to make the causal link between specifically developed services and program impact. This would include testing new approaches to service provision and measuring their impact, something which has yet to be done in eastern DRC. presence and more access to basic services such as water and This research initiative is part of a program that has been sanitation, better housing infrastructure and decent access to serving and advocating for thousands of conflict-affected justice and the rule of law. Building resilience in these com- Congolese women and girls since 2002. The intent is to offer munities to reduce the probability of the viral spread of vio- this process and learning to the wider humanitarian and lence experienced during the post-election period can be development community. It is just one contribution to a grow- achieved through broader development policies at the level of ing list of learning priorities that requires continuous analysis the community. As long as there is abject poverty, increasing and careful scrutiny. levels of inequitable growth, high unemployment, and limit- In conclusion, experience has demonstrated that practition- ed institutional presence, poor communities will continue to ers, researchers and policy makers need to promote data collec- be breeding grounds for surges of violence, such as the one tion within the context of taking action to concretely improve the experienced during the post-election period. lives of women and girls. These efforts must focus on producing a practical assessment of those actions, evaluation of their effect Policy orientations and strategy for how to take them to scale. S O M E B A S I C I N S I G H T S can be gleaned from these experi- Karin Wachter is a Gender-Based Violence Technical Advisor with the ences. First and foremost, there is a strong relationship International Rescue Committee. between state fragility and high levels of violence. The inca- www.theirc.org pacity of the state to ensure basic security of its citizens undermines governance and creates opportunities for non- Endnotes state criminal groups to supplant the state. Thus, reducing 1 Secretary-General's In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against violence is an essential aspect of reducing fragility overall. Women, pg. 22, July, 2006. Communities represent a key entry point for these efforts. 2 See the IASC Guidelines for Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Citizens' confidence in the security and justice systems as the Humanitarian Settings, September, 2005. Over a thousand survivors of sexu- principal means for dispute resolution creates an important al violence (women and girls) received services through IRC's program in the opportunity for interventions in those sectors. Central African Republic over seven months in 2007. One incident of vio- Beyond basic security, the root causes of violence and lence reported went back as far as 1983, but the majority reported spanned the period of instability, fighting and mass displacement between 2002 and fragility, that is,the social and economic marginalization resi- 2007. dents face, must be addressed.Promising approaches include 3 In January 2002, the war in Sierra Leone was declared over. By 2004, the World Bank Community Driven Development processes, which disarmament process was complete. can serve as a forum for community reconciliation and consen- 4 Data shows that discriminatory practices against women prevail in almost sus building on local development. Also, support for basic serv- all parts of the world. Progress of the World's Women 2008/2009, pg. 72. ice provision in violence hot spots can be a means to bring the http://www.unifem.org/progress/2008/media/POWW08_Report_Full_Text.pdf state presence back into under-governed areas, helping to "A wide range of research highlights the serious social and civil conse- rebuild state legitimacy in violence-affected communities. By quences of violence against women. In many societies, women provide emo- linking violence prevention and institutional strengthening, tional and financial support for families and communities. Studies have development institutions can go a long way toward arresting the shown that violence and the social stigma of violence negatively affect the cycle of violence and poverty that holds vulnerable communi- ability of women and girls to participate fully in and contribute to their com- ties back from sustainable development. munities." (pg. 7) International Violence Against Women: U.S. Response and Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2008. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34438.pdf Erik Alda and Alys M. Willman are members of the Conflict, Crime 5 In addition to reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and and Violence team, Social Development Department, The World DCAF, see work by the World Health Organization and collaborators on bring- Bank. This paper has greatly benefited from the constructive ing together research conducted in over ten countries that highlights the comments from Alexandre Marc, Coordinator of the Conflict, Crime prevalence of violence against women across countries. Ellsberg, Mary and and Violence team. Heise, Lori, Researching Violence Against Women: A Practical Guide for Researchers and Activists, Washington DC, United States: WHO, PATH; Endnotes 2005. 1 This quote and those that follow are taken from a focus group conducted 6 Based on an abstract written by Sarah Mosely (IRC), Karin Wachter (IRC) in Cité Soleil in August 2008 by the Interuniversity Institute for Research and Paul Bolton (John Hopkins University), March, 2009. and Development (INURED). 7 Ibid 2 Fieldwork is part of a global study of urban violence being conducted by the Conflict, Crime and Violence team (SDV) to be published later this year. 3 http://www.cipev.org/home.asp O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 31 SPECIAL REPORT Building Leadership out of Conflict BY MATT ANDREWS From leaders to leadership its absence--like a N OT H I N G S H OWC A S E S L E A D E R S H I P --or S O C I A L , L E G A L , P O L I T I C A L A N D E C O N O M I C institutions crisis. This is perhaps why leaders are so well known in coun- are important buffers of crisis. Strong institutions help get tries that have emerged from conflict with some success. things done in ways that are sanctioned by society. They Many identify Nelson Mandela as the reason South Africa enable a dynamic equilibrium vital to growth and develop- avoided bloodshed after apartheid and Paul Kagame as having ment and ensure this equilibrium is maintained or restored in made the difference in Rwanda after the genocidal killings the face of crisis. But countries face major problems where of1994. Defining moments of Middle-East peace are repre- institutions are absent, deficient, hotly contested, or them- sented in vivid pictures of Israeli and Palestinian leaders selves a source of inequality and oppression. Crises can brew embracing or shaking hands. But do these individual "lead- for long periods of time under such conditions. When the ers" provide the source of leadership? Do these handshake crises mature, stability slips away and conflict erupts. moments define it? What opportunities exist to promote lead- Conflict is itself an ongoing deepening of crisis. It ampli- ership in fragile and post-conflict situations? fies the effects of calamitous problems such as chronic unem- Adults in the village of Gashaki, Rwanda, are leveling the ground for the construction of a local school building. This community has achieved impressive results under the Vision 2020 Umurenge Program launched by the Government of Rwanda. 32 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE ployment, disease, lawlessness and corruption. Leaders often play a big role in defining steps at this juncture, and provide emerge from such situations, resolving conflict and apparent- crucial support for social and financial stability, often with both ly re-establishing stability. But stability may be short-lived money and military presence. The donor community's agendas when leaders are really just victors in a high-stakes "winner often place a high priority on building the long-term institu- takes all" scenario that fuels continued conflict. The experi- tional fabric that is seen as deficient and contributing to the ences of many of Africa's "Big Men" tell this story. Thankfully, conflict. Most conflict-affected countries thus allocate lots of this stands in contrast to other accounts, in countries such as capacity to writing procurement and civil service laws needed to Mozambique and Rwanda, where leaders have emerged as secure funding from external partners. brokers of peace, guarantors of stability and even catalysts for While these steps are no doubt valuable in the long-term, post-conflict growth. and earn the countries' legitimacy in the eyes of their interna- These leaders fill the institutional voids that created vul- tional supporters, this may do little to ensure continued nerability in the first place. They find opportunities for lead- domestic support and legitimacy in the short term. It is quite ership in the deepened crisis of conflict, much as the manage- common for a President in these circumstances to receive ment and political science literature suggests they should, and international accolades as a great leader, only to face increas- emerge as champions of change for their people. But not only ing opposition at home, and ultimately lose office. Why? (or even) because they are victors, authoritarians or charis- One explanation is simply that the re-building process is matic stand-outs. More than any of these characteristics, largely internally-focused. The goal is to make the country which usually come to mind when hearing the word "leader," better for its citizens, but the resources and support for the stories of successful leadership in these contexts and others process must come from the outside. This splits the attention, center on the how individuals helped build coalitions around time and capacities of leaders, often leading them to devote common desires to overcome conflict and crisis. insufficient attention to the home-front. A second explana- Often these coalitions were built by many parties, from tion is that, while post conflict reconstruction is treated as a within and outside the country, stretching beyond the media- technical challenge requiring specific technical capacities and acclaimed leaders we may ultimately see shaking hands in the inputs, it is actually an adaptive leadership challenge, requir- lasting images. The importance of broad and engaged net- ing the kinds of networked leadership solutions used to deal works of players is universal, where different parties bring with the earlier conflict resolution challenge. When these different elements of a final leadership solution to a larger solutions fail to emerge, and local issues and players feel constituency and together they achieve their purpose. under-served in the new governments, old crises may begin to Prominent players like Mandela or Kagame helped to estab- accumulate and the potential for conflict resurfaces. lish the common vision and set the tone for the climate of trust and dialogue that proved so vital to building coalitions. But others built the bridges and persuaded recalcitrant parties to cross them. They helped find the resources, conduct the nec- essary meetings, and otherwise connect nodes in the complex social and political webs that characterize countries emerging from conflict. Together, individuals connected in networks thus provide leadership: they intentionally mobilize people, ideas, meaning and resources toward achieving a purpose--in the best instance choosing the path towards peace and stabil- ity after a conflict. The challenge beyond conflict resolution I N M A N Y R E S P E C T S , the real work begins once the conflict is resolved. However, governments may then face devastating weaknesses in their social, economic and political institu- tions, including destabilizing problems like unemployment and an inability to deliver basic services. With scant capacity, these governments must take steps to produce peace divi- dends in the short term, while at the same time building sus- tainable institutional structures that can provide a buffer against crises in the future. President Paul Kagame (L) stands with wife Jeanette as they preside The problems post-conflict governments face are often seen over a ceremony commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Rwandan as technical, in contrast to the adaptive challenge of dealing with genocide at a mass-burial site in Nyanza, near Kigali. the conflict itself. International development organizations O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 33 Promoting leadership in post conflict deal with a legacy of crises in service delivery by ensuring the development safe delivery of school text books with the help of a rapid results project. Rwandan authorities dealt with the judicial SOME COUNTRIES have dealt with these problems better than and representation crises that helped destabilize the country others, and offer lessons about continued leadership that prior to 1994 by creating local courts and Imhigos (indigenous ensures adequate fertile space for engagement and results, performance contracts), clearly demonstrating a new approach allowing short-term dividends to emerge while simultane- to governance, and achieving development results. ously building an institutional framework for better develop- The second lesson centers on the importance of building ment outcomes in the future. Rwanda is an example of this, as coalitions to deal with manageable crises. Coalitions emerge are Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic. when players concerned about achieving a similar purpose Specific interventions in these countries focused on develop- know that they cannot do it alone, and seek support from oth- ing leadership to solve urgent problems ranging from poor ers. Often these relationships are brokered in broad social service delivery to an inadequate justice system to environ- networks by bridging parties not even in the formal coalition, mental degradation and even disputes around land reforms. including, for example, the clergy, or even donors. The vari- The Global Leadership Initiative (GLI), a multi-donor ous parties to the coalition have different roles, which the working group led by the World Bank Institute, has been fol- coalition arrangements clarify, and these relate across formal lowing these and other leadership support activities in boundaries in a horizontal manner, creating organizational Afghanistan, Kenya, Kosovo, Rwanda, Timor Leste and structures that are quite different to the usual hierarchies Uganda. Observations to date suggest that leadership can be found in developing-country governments. broadly developed in fragile and post conflict states--and oth- A third lesson is that parties involved in these interventions ers--as fostering development more generally. Lessons are tend to identify multiple rather than individual leaders, empha- emerging from the GLI about exactly how leadership works, sizing the idea that it is the process of "leadership" that matters what it looks like, and why it matters. more than the "leaders" themselves. It follows that leaders are The first lesson is that leadership is facilitated by a sense of identified more often for what they do to achieve the common shared purpose, especially in response to a crisis. The tendency purpose, than who they are. Three main roles center on (i) cre- in many post-conflict situations is to focus on moving beyond ating acceptance for the purpose at hand, (ii) building authori- the crisis, taking a sigh of relief that the fighting is over, when in ty to achieve this purpose, and (iii) enhancing the coalition's fact the underlying factors of the crises may still fester below the ability to achieve the purpose, by mobilizing funds, people and surface. However, leadership can be developed around these even information. The connections among multiple players crises, making them opportunities for social reconstruction. thus manifests itself in leadership. This creates the space to This is especially the case where crises have been de-con- achieve a purpose, even in post-conflict countries where the structed into smaller chunks, and tackled in ways that produce capacity to achieve results is scant on the ground. clearly demonstrable and achievable goals and solutions. For A final and concluding lesson coming out of the Global example, officials in Burundi proved their ability to gradually Leadership Initiative is: Outside interventions can help to facilitate, motivate and stimulate leadership in conflict affected states-- especially in the period fol- lowing the initial euphoria over conflict resolution. In this endeavor, a manage- able crisis may prove invaluable, along with a commitment to working broadly across networks and in unconventional structures, and a desire to really get things done. Matt Andrews is Professor and Academic Advisor for the Global Leadership Initiative at the Kennedy School, Harvard University. 34 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT Parliaments as Peacebuilders BY RASHEED DRAMAN Cambodia and Sudan--through the platform for dialogue cre- ated by their democratic processes, parliaments are playing a S TAT E S T H AT A R E E X P E R I E N C I N G or coming out of conflict vital role in conflict prevention, resolution and management. are embroiled in fragility for two main reasons: first, because They are serving as venues where groups that have been fight- of the breakdown of civil mechanisms of dialogue; and sec- ing each other in the past now sit at the table and attempt to ond, because they are unable to manage the disputes with resolve their differences with words instead of bullets. groups of citizens who voice their grievances. Democracy is But these countries are experiencing difficult transitions central to conflict management. The democratic peace thesis, to democracy, where their parliaments are weak, poor, misin- widely accepted among international relations theorists, formed, with low capacities, and understaffed. In fact, some of posits that democracies rarely go to war with other democra- those parliaments lack the most rudimentary infrastructure of cies and, by extension, have non-violent methods of resolving a democratic institution--they do not have proper meeting internal disputes. Today, democracy is synonymous with places, or offices for the MPs; or even the facilities to make tea peaceful conflict management. and coffee. Conflicts occur in all societies but when managed peace- This situation is exacerbated by one common trend: the fully, they can sometimes spark positive social and economic Executive dominates the management of state affairs. In most reforms. Societies are confronted daily with conflicts of all fragile states, the Executive hides behind the cloak of "peace- kinds, but only those societies that subscribe to the democrat- building" to pursue policies that are dictatorial. These policies ic ethos are able to manage conflictual situations within their tend to take the country back to instability. borders and resolve them peacefully. The heavy hand of the Executive can be neutralized if parlia- Fragile states share this predicament: 1) either the govern- ment is strong and effective. Therefore, supporting parliaments ment, by its repressive nature, does not create the space for in fragile states is a peacebuilding imperative. One of the key negotiation/dialogue; or 2) it completely stifles dissent in a priorities in fragile states is the need to get the security sector violent way. People with grievances are thus left with only one under firm civilian control, and it takes a strong and well-func- option to make their case: the use of force. In such states, par- tioning parliament to accomplish this crucial task. Parliament liaments provide an important venue where differences are also provides an avenue to healing and reconciliation. Most resolved. In fact, in such situations, parliaments are able to importantly, parliament, when properly constituted and repre- substitute the resort to physical violence with dialogue, and sentative of the people, gives a stake to all citizens in the demo- the rule of force with the rule of law. Thus, in the nascent cratic process, and ultimately helps to consolidate peace. democracies of the developing world, which are fragile, the To sum up, democracy is perhaps the best vehicle for role of parliaments in the national security dialogue is critical, establishing stability in fragile states. A leading advocate of as these countries wade through the messy period of consoli- democracy once remarked: dating democratic governance. democracies must vigorously mobilize their legitimate But despite the critical role parliament could play in ensur- instruments of law enforcement to counter this growing threat ing peace, in most peace negotiations and subsequent peace- to their security. But a more fundamental and enduring building efforts, parliament is ignored. This is further com- assault on international terrorism requires political change to plicated by the fact that most donors are often unwilling to bring down zealous, paranoiac dictatorships and to allow support democratic development in fragile states. The main aggrieved groups in all countries to pursue their interests argument they advance is one of insecurity and lack of demo- through open, peaceful, and constitutional means. cratic structures. They forget that in those societies, every- And there is no better way for citizens to pursue their thing must be done from scratch. Institutions have to be interests than through their representative institution--the reconstituted and trust has to be rebuilt and, above all, people parliament. have to start life all over again. In our work at the Parliamentary Centre (PC), we continue Rasheed Draman is Director, Africa Programs, Parliamentary Centre, to see an important causal link between the role of parliament Ghana. and peacebuilding efforts. In some of the fragile states where the PC works--Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 35 Dilemmas of State Building in Afghanistan T H R E E V I E W S BUILDING A VIABLE STATE Afghanistan presents complex and, IN AFGHANISTAN: A DELICATE BALANCE in some respects, unique development by Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai challenges. Despite considerable progress since 2001, enormous challenges remain, and in some AN ACCOUNTABLE STATE WITH STRONG CIVIL crucial aspects, like insecurity SOCIETY and corruption, the situation has by Seema Ghani deteriorated in recent years. State-building is at the heart of the agenda but presents many difficulties HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN SUPPORT and dilemmas. These are sketched out STATE BUILDING by William Byrd in the following articles from three different perspectives by influential voices inside and outside of Afghanistan. 36 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE STATE BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN Building a Viable State A delicate balance BY MOHAMMAD MASOOM STANEKZAI The role of history and tradition AFTER 25 YEARS of conflict, a political process launched in 2001 gave Afghanistan an opportunity to restore its lost political stability, build a functioning state and launch an economic recovery. Much has been achieved since then, but challenges lie ahead. To meet them, the international community needs to help build Afghan gov- ernment capacity in a way that strengthens Afghan leadership, respects Afghan tradi- tions and values, and is ultimately account- able to the Afghan people. With many social and economic indica- tors still placing Afghanistan among the world's poorest countries, and conflict still a fact of daily life, this will not be an easy task. Still, the progress Afghanistan has made since the 2001 Bonn Agreement offers grounds for hope. Millions of refugees have returned. State executive, legislative and judiciary pillars have been built, although the progress is uneven. A constitution has been drafted. Presidential, parliamentary and provincial council elections have been held. Seven million children have gone back to school. The Afghan National Army has been trans- formed into a credible and trusted national institution. Basic health care coverage has expanded from just eight percent of the population to an estimated 80 percent. A well-organized public-private partnership has delivered communications services to 75 percent of the country, connecting peo- ple from the most isolated areas to each other, and to the rest of the country and to the world. The National Solidarity Program A band of Taliban at the onset of the war in 2001 in Jalalabad. is bringing small-scale development to over 32,000 villages, while also building or O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 37 upgrading road networks access to services, trade and transit progress. When the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan in This rapid progress is one side of the story. 1989, divided Mujahideen factions and militia groups fought a There are also daunting constraints. Intensifying cross- civil war. The ensuing vacuum was filled by the Taliban and Al border insurgency and terrorist activities create insecurity, Qaeda. Despite the Taliban's removal from power, violence obstruct development and provide space for illicit activities remains endemic. The Taliban have regrouped in Pakistan, that weaken the rule of law. The opium industry deepens where they have found some support as well as foreign existing corruption and fuels the insurgency. The country's recruits. They continue to terrorize the population, destroy institutions remain weak, giving donors an excuse to move schools and other infrastructure, deepening insecurity as they outside government channels, thereby further weakening the challenge the state's monopoly on the use of force. government's authority and increasing public frustration. The political instability has stymied the state-building High expectations prompted by the commitments of the process, leading to the disintegration of state institutions, and international community have not been met, or have been coinciding with a brain drain, and a whole generation of undermined by ineffective management. Afghans born and raised during the war who lost the opportu- The legacies of leftist and religious radicalism that deep- nity for education. It will take decades and substantial invest- ened tension in the Afghan society are also impediments to ment to fully recover and restore these missed opportunities. Despite this bleak panorama, other factors offer hope that Afghan efforts, backed by the international community, will eventually achieve stability and build a state that is responsive to the people's needs and able to deliver on its core functions. These include the resilience of the Afghan people, and a culture that has helped them to survive the turbulence of the past 30 years. Also, Afghanistan's strategic location endures and can help restore its histor- ical role as a land-bridge and a hub for trade and transit in the region. Despite the negative impact of migration, it has also produced a diaspora of educated and skilled Afghans, some of whom are returning to the country. Geography shapes development ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS of Afghanistan is covered by mountains. The Hindu Kush range stretches from the northeast to the southwest, where it borders with the Kohi Baba, Feroz Koh, Terbandi Turkistan and some smaller ranges, sur- rounded by a belt of deserts. It divides the country into northern and southern regions, further subdivided by topogra- phy, national and ethno-linguistic set- tlement patterns, or historical tradition. Settlement patterns have traditionally depended on access to land, water, graz- ing areas, forest cover, protection against rivals and aggressors. To these, have been added rapid population growth, com- bined with under-development of agri- Under the majestic mountains that surround Kabul, reflected on Qargha Lake, peace, harmony and life continue. culture, years of drought and the devasta- tion left by war. These have determined 38 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE economic opportunities, jobs, public services such as health and education, access to markets including roads, communication, electricity, trans- portation, and housing. Most urban settlements have grown along the main roads. The most populous cling to the main river basins in the north, the western region, the Southwest and the eastern Kabul basin. With sources of most rivers in the mountains, sedentary farmers live mostly in villages near irrigated land in the major river valleys, while semi-sedentary farmers who raise livestock and a few crops, live in high alpine valleys. A third group, the nomadic Kochais--mainly Pushtun herdsmen, some Baluch in Nemroze Filling up the donkey? Actually this man is filling up barrels with gas to be sold later. Farhah and Helmand, and Kyrgyz scattered in Pamir--move in clans by tradition, but war and drought have led some to settle. Many lost most of their herds or have clashed with farmers over access to grazing land during the Kochais' sea- deforestation and excessive use of underground water for irri- sonal movement to the central highlands. Many on both sides gation has spread alarm in many parts of the country. have been killed. Functional and responsive state institutions are essential to meet these challenges. The state must have the capacity to Road links key to development articulate its own development agenda under rule of law and in partnership with the international community; it must also A F G H A N I S TA N C A N N OT B E C O M E a viable hub for regional live in peace with its neighbors. Achieving depends on a bet- trade, transit and economic cooperation until the highways ter understanding of Afghanistan's geography, history and crossing it are secured and kept open year-round, with neces- society. Imported models for the state must be adapted and sary services and safety measures. Also, needed investment in integrated into Afghanistan's traditional systems of gover- the country's mineral deposits depends on completion of nance, in a way that promotes inclusion. These models must regional rail networks. With the rugged terrain, this will cost a build on unifying factors that strengthen the national identity great deal of money. However, such investment will eventual- of Afghans, while protecting the rights of minorities. ly generate good returns in the long term. To date, donors have hesitated to support this work but there is increasing realiza- How can the international community tion that they understand the importance of such investment help push forward state building? Military strategists observe that the insurgency begins where the roads ends. Farmers need easier access to water, F R AG I L E A N D FA I L E D S TAT E S threaten regional and global and to learn new techniques to increase and improve crop security. They also spur migration, spread illicit trade, terror productivity and quality; their livelihood depends on mar- and impunity. They impede social and economic develop- ketable products they can get to market. This is the only viable ment, and fail to meet their international obligations, provide option to stem heroin poppy cultivation. At present, most basic services to their people, and remain prone to continuing business and reconstruction activity, as well as humanitarian cycles of violent conflict. aid, is concentrated around the main roads and highways, or Despite the urgency of these challenges, the need for inno- where economic infrastructure exists. The country's remote vative approaches, the extensive experience acquired and its areas--despite rich untapped resources found there--remain lessons, international community efforts in state-building in absolute poverty. generally show similar weaknesses. They have usually started Improved infrastructure would offer the isolated rural with rapid assessments, coupled with enthusiasm that often poor access to health, education, transportation and commu- goes with underestimating the problems, and resources need- nications. While such development offers promise, it must ed to address them. also be undertaken in tandem with careful management of Parallel administration systems are often set up to deliver natural resource extraction and the environment. Already, services, with double standards in terms of salary and other O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 39 privileges. Usually, these systems are too costly to sustain. Successful approaches in these sectors should be adopted Investment is often made in individuals rather than in the in agriculture, water management, skills development, recon- systems and procedures of the recipient state. International ciliation, local governance, public administration, the judici- organizations often press local officials to apply complex ary, and anti­corruption efforts. Indeed, the commitment international models to their internal procedures as a pre- expressed by donors for the National Agriculture condition for donor funding. Development Framework at the Joint Monitoring and Several lessons have emerged for the international com- Coordination Board is an encouraging endorsement of the munity's efforts to support the state-building process in NSP approach, even if late in coming. Afghanistan: I State-building is not a quick-impact project, especially Leadership and ownership are critical given the complex social, political and economic environ- ment of Afghanistan and its region. Afghan government also depend on committed R E F O R M A N D S TAT E - B U I L D I N G and international partners need to manage expectations and effective leaders, whose management of funds for state- and realistically consider the time horizon needed to build building must follow an Afghan agenda, not that of donors. effective state institutions. For example, many donors in Afghanistan earmark their I Afghanistan is unique in terms of its geography, social funding to locations where they are sponsoring Provincial structures and history. A cut-and-paste state-building Reconstruction Teams; once again, this skews distribution approach will not work if it is not understood and owned by away from the poorest and most isolated areas. the people. The international community should push Some so-called experts on Afghanistan demand full state-building in such a manner that provides a sense of decentralization, based on a shallow analysis that the coun- security and justice to all Afghans. The process of modern- try's social and political systems are fragmented. ization should not widen the gap between the rural and Afghanistan's governance needs to be consolidated within its urban population; this places rural communities at risk of borders to avoid foreign interference. This should be accom- being further disenfranchised, and thereby vulnerable to panied by a phased approach to build subnational administra- spoilers who oppose modernization. Earlier modernization tion. First, build capacity, and only then, delegate more efforts have failed as rural communities turned against so- authority to local administration, while still retaining central called reform perceived as promoted by foreigners. oversight. Third, it is essential to consolidate top-down and I Improving the systems and procedures of the recipient bottom-up initiatives to build local elected bodies (provin- country can be achieved only after thorough analysis of cial, district and village council) to ensure wider community existing systems and capacity both at central and subna- participation in the state-building process. tional levels. Too often, attention is paid to build capacity at the central level while doing too little at the subnational How to build the state without level. undermining it? I The budget must be used as the main tool for coordination to build effective state institutions capable of providing on the state's capacity to N AT I O N A L S OV E R E I G N T Y D E P E N D S leadership in the reconstruction process. Coordinating provide leadership and reduce its dependence on external international efforts will not materialize in the absence of sources. This depends, in turn, on a shared vision, long-term such a mechanism that can provide adequate information commitment and consideration of local traditions and on how the resources are committed and spent. national values. To be effective, state-building must work I The international community's approach to building state "with, through, and on" state institutions, without undermin- capacity must be consistent; donors cannot complain about ing them. What does this mean for state-building work the lack of state capacity and then draw the best staff from already underway? The following three points emerge: the existing system to serve a purchased parallel system of I The Afghan government and the international community administration. This only reduces further the state's are bound by the Afghan Compact. This should be comple- capacity to use the technical assistance it receives. mented by a third commitment, to be jointly accountable to Over the past seven years, progress has been unequal the Afghan people. Without mutual accountability, state- across sectors. Aid programs implemented through the building initiatives will be incomplete and conclude with a Afghan government's National Priority Program (NPP) have "blame game" that will undermine the investment in state- generally achieved better results, both in delivery of services building. and building up state capacity, than programs implemented I Conditionality must encourage such mutual accountability, outside the government structure. The National Solidarity not impose conditions that undermine state sovereignty. Program (NSP), a government-led rural community develop- I Long-term commitment to and consistency in carrying out ment program, has built capacity and delivered services to the state-building effort is crucial. Achievements in media people while providing a platform for coordinated support by freedom, democratic and women's rights, and widespread donors, public, and private-sector implementing partners. participation in the state-building process must be Other examples are the Afghan National Army, education, defended; at the same time, state-building that is misper- telecommunications and ICT, and health. ceived as occupation will fail. 40 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE How to address the risk of building a nance, including adequate salaries, is the third important ele- corrupt state? ment of a strategy that can reduce risk of building corrupt state. Procurement and contractual rules must be straightfor- C O R R U P T I O N I M P E D E S S TAT E - B U I L D I N G and stability in ward and accompanied by monitoring, reporting and over- Afghanistan. To address the risk of building a corrupt state, sight mechanisms. Complexity increases the risk of corrup- accountable leaders at central subnational levels is critical. tion, enabling profiteers to take advantage of incompetence, These leaders must serve as role models. To achieve this, their conflicting rules and regulations and nepotism. Poor asset leadership must be defined with clear roles and responsibili- management also creates fertile ground for corruption. A ties during the initial stage of state-building. This is essential recent report by the US Government Accounting Office found to strengthen coordination and information-sharing, without that some 76,000 weapons delivered to the Afghan National which the risk of corruption increases, as officials do not Security Force by the US unaccounted for. This is a warning know who is doing what, when, and with what resources. sign; these weapons are not necessarily all lost or sold, but The process of accountability should be driven internally there is no way of knowing, as the asset management system is and supported by the international community. This will gen- not reliable. erate political will at senior levels, enabling the Afghan state and the international community to take bold steps against Dilemmas in addressing the drug corruption. A few initial public actions against corruption will industry send a strong signal and improve discipline. It is important that government positions not be used by incumbents to gain it to become the A F G H A N I S TA N ' S T R I A L S H AV E P U S H E D access to material resources for personal gain. A second step is world's top opium poppy producer. Cross-border terrorism, to simplify procedures for monitoring and oversight, and build insurgency, corruption, poverty and injustice create a wel- an improved and credible public financial management sys- coming host for the illicit drug trade. Although poppy-free tem. Early investment in police, judiciary and local gover- provinces have doubled from 12 to 24, poppy cultivation remains intense in the insecure provinces of the south. This underscores the links between drugs, insecurity, while experience has shown that applying force to stop the country's 2.8 million poppy-growing farmers to stop culti- vation does not work and is, in fact, even counterproductive. The approach must be changed. Instead of investing in projects that do not deliver farm- ers a viable living, it would be better to invest heavily in agriculture and water. A new agri- culture strategy, properly implemented, can improve crop productivity, access to market, and nurture quality agro-businesses. Over time, these can replace poppies with other cash crops and marketable fruits; this is the only way to create lasting jobs for rural people and thereby weaken the recruitment base of Taliban. At the same time, there is a need to focus on drug dealers at national, regional and international levels. Afghanistan's state cannot be replaced by other actors. Building state institutions that respond to the needs of people, while showing themselves able to lead and articulate the country's own development agenda is the only way forward, the only way in which Afghanistan will be able to function on its own, without foreign assistance. Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai is an advisor to Hamid Karzai and a Jennings Randolph Fellow at A poppy field in the Pashtun tribal zone of Ghugiani, on the Afghani side of the border. the U.S. Institute of Peace. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 41 STATE BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN An Accountable State with a Strong Civil Society BY SEEMA GHANI aged to control the population and establish law and order. We even have a fairly successful taxation system that has been in The role of history place since the very old days. and tradition Geography shapes development had a government. At times even A F G H A N I S TA N H A S A LWAYS powerful ones, that conquered neighboring countries and man- A F G H A N I S TA N ' S H I S TO RY has been shaped by its geography. aged to go as far as Isfahan to the West and India to the East. Our It has been an important crossing point for conquest and history proves that establishing a good government in many of the neighboring countries' armies marched through Afghanistan is possible and that we can build a strong, capable our land be it from South to the North, or from the North to state in this country. the South and West. But at the same time, the particularities of Today--as in the past--the government is the only entity in our country have also denied victory to powerful military Afghanistan that has the power to mobilize people. The typical operations which failed to achieve their goals. jirgas and shuras for which we are famous have never actually Afghanistan's position as a landlocked country has been lim- managed to control the population. Their work has mainly iting its trade and international outreach options. Our natural been a temporary measure, limited to dealing with smaller resources were underused as a result and the lacking access to matters. It has been governments, however, that have man- markets hampered our economy. The Silk Road, once our main Afghan women attend an election campaign event of incumbent president Hamid Karzai in Kabul. 42 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE economic support, lost its importance when the region's markets For some countries, Afghanistan's future and state-build- were increasingly connected by sea lanes. ing are not the central objective. Their objectives are short- term and their priority is focused on the security of their own How can the international community homelands. Their help is self-motivated and, therefore, this help push forward state building? mindset has to change. Any development and military strate- gy should be designed with the good of Afghanistan in the of any state building agenda is to establish T H E TO P P R I O R I T Y short and the long term as the primary objective, and not as a security. The international community should either take a consequential aspect. sequential or parallel approach to the security-development nexus. These effort needs to take into account that some coun- How to address the risk of building a tries still provide support to terrorism directly and indirectly corrupt state? and support the restoration of the Taliban rule of Afghanistan instead of seeking development in this country. T H E P R O C E S S O F S TAT E B U I L D I N G requires the support of State building is costly, particularly in Afghanistan where civil society; without it the government's legitimacy will be all institutions were destroyed and no legal framework is in questioned. Without such broad based public support govern- place as a consequence of the 30 years of war. Infrastructure ments depend on a narrow power-structure, and patronage is suffered equal destruction. We expect the international com- the result. munity to support the rebuilding of institutions, such as the International funds can be misused. Without transparen- holding of democratic elections. It is an expensive process cy, accountability and the rule of law, corruption flourishes. and Afghanistan alone could never cover its costs. Corruption is prevalent at the central state level and patronage The financial support of the international community rules. Donor projects provide no corruption checks as they are requires accountability, which is unfortunately lacking so far. process and not result oriented. At present, there is not much international attention dedicat- At the sub-national level, many senior government repre- ed to project and program evaluation, monitoring or results sentatives facilitate drug production and trafficking. Political feedback. Few donors hold the government accountable for appointments are not merit based but a result of the central corruption associated with aid money. This is an area that state's patronage system. needs attention and the current approach has to change. In short, merit-based recruitment, a competitive election process, and accountability paired with the rule of law would How to help build the state without ensure a less corrupt state. To work towards this end the donor undermining it? community needs to call for accountability and dare to "name names." W H I L E S TAT E B U I L D I N G is a lengthy process, areas such as law and order should be a top priority and receive continuous Dilemmas in addressing the drug attention. Afghanistan had some judicial systems that worked industry even during the years of war. These systems did not receive attention once larger-scale work on legal institution building I Without an effective plan to address the issue of narcotics began. As a consequence the judicial system overall suffered trade, state-building will not be achieved in Afghanistan. and is now marked by high levels of corruption. I Without security in place, there will be further narcotics Civil society needs to be strengthened. Only when the gov- cultivation and trafficking. ernment feels there is a strong opposition or a strong public I There is no appropriate alternative livelihood program. The demand for the delivery of services will it be competitive and current approach, by the government as well as the interna- start performing. While supporting the government in the tional community, is superficial, both in scope and quality. delivery of services, donors should start a focused program of I Demand for the drugs remains high in the region and inter- strengthening civil society and demand for good governance. nationally. Many sub-national governments in this country The government needs to be in the driver's seat. At this have become mafia-like facilitators of the narcotics trade. stage, the international community should assume a helping The drug trade fuels the engine of terroristic agendas, mil- role and follow the guidance of the government. People should itary activities, political ambitions and personal gains. start feeling that their government is working and delivering. I The lack of a working judicial system provides those The National Solidarity Program is an interesting example wor- involved with impunity. thy of support: although the program has many flaws, it provides Afghanistan needs a comprehensive approach that tackles the government with some legitimacy. The international com- the economic, political and judicial aspects of the country's munity should steer clear of becoming a shadow government narcotic industry--without such a strategic approach the next to the Afghan government and provide all funding through international and national state building efforts will not the government or have the government monitor it. succeed. On the military front, increased coordination and infor- mation-sharing between international troops and the Afghan Seema Ghani is Director of Baawar Consulting Group, Afghanistan. army will help to reduce civilian casualties and damage. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 43 STATE BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN How the International Community Can Support State Building BY WILLIAM BYRD ment has been limited, historically and at present. Within the umbrella of a de facto unitary and centralized state, local gov- The role of history and tradition ernance has involved traditional community, kin, and tribal arrangements. Both these customary systems and the formal as a distinct politi- A F G H A N I S TA N H A S A L O N G E R H I S TO RY mechanisms of the state to a large extent broke down during cal entity than most of its neighbors. Moreover, Afghanistan several decades of conflict, supplanted by warlords and mili- has never spawned significant separatist movements with any tias--with a large element of rule by the gun. serious prospects for success. Still, the reach of the govern- An Italian soldier with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stands guard as a pile of opium is set afire on the outskirts of Herat, Afghanistan. 44 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE Geography shapes development and located along the fault- A F G H A N I S TA N I S L A N D L O C K E D lines between civilizations, empires, and regional and global powers. While sometimes it has served as a "land bridge," much more often it has been contested terrain, a backwater on the periphery of different regions, or itself a source of instabil- ity for its neighbors. From an economic development perspec- tive, Afghanistan's landlocked location is a significant handi- cap, and complicates relations with some of its neighbors. How can the international community help push forward state building? S TAT E B U I L D I N G I S A N I N T E R N A L , domestically-driven, and long-term process. In developed and successful develop- ing countries, it took intense periods measured in decades, in many cases a century or longer, to build the state. Countries Afghan drug addicts smoke heroin amidst war ruins in Kabul. such as Afghanistan do not have the luxury of time; there is an ever-present risk of relapse back into conflict if progress fal- ters. On the other hand there has to be space for domestic political processes to work and for the state to build its Fund is a notable example which has already channeled close domestic legitimacy. Thus the challenge is how can the inter- to $3 billion of coordinated financing for the government national community support and encourage what has to be a through its national budget. There is no reason why more aid domestic process, while helping keep it on track and moving cannot be channeled through this mechanism. forward in a reasonably timely manner. The timing of and support for elections is an important dilemma, but far from How to address the risk of building a the only challenge in this area. corrupt state? How to help build the state without and roles of the state, includ- BY D E V E L O P I N G T H E C A PAC I T Y undermining it? ing in service delivery, regulation, and security and rule of law, the state-building effort creates more opportunities for corrup- THE "DO NO HARM" PRINCIPLE is important for interven- tion. In the case of Afghanistan, the situation has been exacer- tions in fragile and conflict-affected countries like bated by large inflows of off-budget aid and illicit narcotics Afghanistan, but too often, the international community has receipts which provide great potential for corruption. A lesson been part of the problem rather than part of the solution. For from Afghanistan is that corruption issues cannot be ignored or example, the well-meaning efforts of donors and agencies to treated as second-priority in the early stages of state-building-- directly provide services in the early stages of post-conflict otherwise corruption can proliferate and put at risk the entire recovery, as occurred in Afghanistan, can make it more rather state-building and development agenda. than less difficult for the national state to build its capacity and credibility. Putting funds through the government budg- Dilemmas in addressing the drug et, for projects executed by the government, and with appro- industry priate financial controls and fiduciary safeguards, is an extremely important means of supporting state building with- is that it is by far the A U N I Q U E F E AT U R E O F A F G H A N I S TA N out undermining it. world's largest producer of illicit opiates, providing over 90 percent of global supply. While the drug industry clearly under- Can the international community mines the state including notably through narcotics-related cohere around effective state building? corruption, poorly thought-out counter-narcotics efforts can exacerbate the problem and further undermine the state. For PA RT O F T H E P R O B L E M is the sheer number and differing example, corruptly implemented poppy eradication campaigns mandates and processes of the various international actors can contribute to strengthening and consolidation of the drug with activities in Afghanistan. In principle, only the govern- industry, undermining the state and potentially increasing sup- ment can effectively lead and coordinate donors, but the size port for the anti-government insurgency. and complexity of the international community imposes a heavy burden. One promising way forward which can help William Byrd is Economic Adviser, Fragile and Conflict Affected reduce the burden on government is coordinated financing of Countries Group, Operations Policy and Country Services Vice development activities; the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Presidency, The World Bank. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 45 SPECIAL REPORT A UN Architecture to Build Peace in Post-Conflict Situations BY EJEVIOME ELOHO OTOBO Peacebuilding Architecture overview the internation- OV E R T H E L A S T D E C A D E , T H E U N P E AC E B U I L D I N G A R C H I T E C T U R E (PBA) is the latest al community has learned that the countries in a series of efforts to reform the way the UN supports con- most likely to lapse into conflict are those that have been there flict-affected countries, in particular those at the post conflict before. Studies have shown that about half of all countries that end of the spectrum. It consists of three components: the emerge from violent conflict relapse into violence within ten Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the years. Recognizing that much more effort has to be devoted to Peacebuilding Support Office. consolidating the peace after it has been won, leaders at the The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the institutional 2005 World Summit created the institutional arrangements of lynchpin of the architecture, is an inter-governmental advi- the UN Peacebuilding architecture. sory body to the Security Council and the General Assembly mandated to: I Bring together all relevant actors and to advise on integrat- ed strategies for post-conflict TABLE 1: PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIES IDENTIFIED IN THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS peacebuilding and recovery; I Help to marshal resources and COUNTRY PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES ensure predictable financing Promotion of good governance; comprehensive for immediate post-conflict Ceasefire Agreement between Government of Burundi activities and sustained finan- and PALIPEHUTU-FNL; security sector reform; justice, promotion of human rights and action to combat cial investment over the medi- Burundi (2007*) impunity; the land issue and socio-economic um- to longer-term; recovery; mobilization and coordination of I Extend the period of attention international assistance; subregional dimension; and by the international community gender dimension. to post-conflict recovery; Youth employment and empowerment; justice and I Develop and disseminate best Sierra Leone (2007*) security sector reform; consolidation of democracy practices in support of coun- and good governance; capacity-building; energy tries emerging from conflict. sector; Currently the PBC has four coun- and subregional dimensions of peacebuilding. tries on its agenda: Burundi, Sierra Elections and institution-building for the National Leone, Guinea Bissau, and the Central Electoral Commission; measures to jump-start the African Republic. There are five ways Guinea-Bissau (2008*) economy and rehabilitate infrastructure, in particular in which the Commission is putting the energy sector; security sector reform; into practice its mandate in these strengthening of the justice sector, consolidating the countries. rule of law and fighting against drug trafficking; public administration reform and modernization; and First, the PBC has brought together social questions critical for peacebuilding. in a single forum all major stakehold- Central African Republic ers relevant for each country's peace- (2009*) Reform of the security sector and disarmament, building process, i.e. the UN, interna- demobilization and reintegration; governance-- tional financial institutions, countries rule of law; and development poles. contributing troops, major donor * Year that the Strategic Framework was adopted between the PBC and the Country. countries, neighboring countries, regional organizations and institu- 46 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE tions, and the permanent members of the UN Security meetings which provide a forum for inclusive dialogue Council. amongst all partners. The PBC has also provided concrete Second, the Commission has articulated an integrated advice and recommendations to other UN organs, including peacebuilding approach between interventions meant to the Security Council and the Executive Boards of UN Funds restore peace and security and those aimed at reconstruction and Programs. The PBC has also played a key role in advising and development in these countries. operational actors on the necessary sequencing and prioriti- Third, the PBC is sustaining international political and zation of peacebuilding efforts in Central African Republic financial support to these countries well beyond the evapora- and Guinea Bissau, in which such strategies were adopted in tion of the "CNN effect." Fourth, the PBC seeks to ensure that the past nine months. all stakeholders engaged with these countries collaborate The Commission seeks to galvanize international support around an agreed upon integrated strategy, or a "roadmap" for for and improve coherence of peacebuilding efforts in coun- peace consolidation, developed jointly by national authorities tries on its agenda. For example, it convened the High-Level and the Commission. Table I shows the key peacebuilding Stakeholders Consultation on Sierra Leone in May 2008, at challenges and priorities identified in the strategic frame- which senior representatives of member states, the UN, IFIs, works agreed upon by the PBC and the four countries current- the private sector and civil society gathered and thus broad- ly on its agenda. Finally, through its Working Group on ened the donor base for Sierra Leone. The Commission also Lessons Learned, the Commission seeks to capture and dis- played this role effectively in Burundi by keeping the spotlight seminate good practices from the experiences of post-conflict on the peace process and working with regional actors to countries for broader application to countries on the agenda encourage both sides of the conflict to adhere to prior agree- of the PBC and in similar situations. ments. The Commission was also instrumental in mobilizing The second component of the architecture, the resources to bridge the funding gaps for the November 2008 Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), is under the authority of the UN Presidential elections in Guinea Bissau and is actively work- Secretary General and is administered by the Peacebuilding ing to mobilize support for economic development and secu- Support Office. The PBF combines the scope of a global fund rity sector reforms in that country. Similarly, the commission with the country-specific focus of a multi-donor trust fund. It is currently engaged in promoting international support for is designed to quickly release resources needed to launch disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Central peacebuilding activities in countries emerging from conflict African Republic, as an integral part of sustaining national and to bridge funding gaps in pertinent areas. As of May 2009, political reconciliation and creating an enabling environment a total sum of $312.7m has been pledged to PBF against an ini- for growth and development. tial target of US$250m. To date, allotments have been made to PBC's approach of sustained attention is predicated on the twelve countries. Table II provides a summary on the key principles of national ownership, partnership and mutual aspects of the Fund. accountability. As Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Central African Both PBC and PBF are supported by a Peacebuilding Republic and Sierra Leone, have demonstrated, the PBC Support Office (PBSO) which is part of the UN secretariat. The engages in active partnership with national authorities, pro- PBSO is a small non-operational office headed by an Assistant viding a platform for incorporating and supporting their Secretary General who reports directly to the Secretary interaction with international partners. The Commission has General. The Office supports the work of the PBC, manages also fostered dialogues among national authorities and local the PBF and advises the Secretary General on UN system-wide civil society actors active in peace consolidation efforts, most peacebuilding strategies and policies. notably in Burundi. Despite these initial successes in sustaining international Peacebuilding Architecture-- attention for countries on its agenda, the PBC is cognizant of a promising beginning the challenges which must be addressed as it moves forward. One of such challenges for the Commission will be to S I N C E T H E P E AC E B U I L D I N G A R C H I T E C T U R E is only in its determine when a country "graduates" from its agenda. third year of operation, it may be too soon to make a definitive Emerging evidence suggests that peacebuilding results must assessment regarding fulfilling its mandate and meeting the be measured in decades or even generations, not years. The high expectations that led to its creation. However, it is fair to PBC has a valuable role to play in helping national and inter- say that the peacebuilding architecture has achieved some national partners build knowledge about the use of bench- successes. marks and milestones in the peacebuilding process. The sec- A commonly agreed element of the PBC's value-added is its ond challenge is strengthening its effort to mobilize resources contribution to developing integrated strategies for peace- for countries on its agenda, beyond allocations by the PBF. building, based on genuine partnerships between national As for the PBF, it has demonstrated its value not only as an and international actors. Such strategies have been completed instrument to support post-conflict peacebuilding but also as in all four countries on the agenda of the PBC. The strategies a tool to address problems that could lead to potential lapse or have provided the basis for "compacts" between the various relapse into conflict. Yet, we have also learned that the national actors, in particular the government, and the inter- Peacebuilding Fund may have been too slow in disbursing national community. These are monitored at biannual review funds. Some of its problems can be attributed to "teething," O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 47 TABLE 2: PBF KEY FIGURES: PEACEBUILDING FUND ALLOCATIONS AND PROJECTS APPROVED AS OF MAY 15, 2009 Projects Approved WINDOW COUNTRY Allocation USD # USD Burundi $35,000,000 17 $32,836,315 Central African Republic $10,000,000 12 $10,000,000 PBF WINDOW I Guinea Bissau $6,000,000 4 $5,686,889 Sierra Leone $35,000,000 14 $32,669,828 TOTAL PBF WINDOW I $86,000,000 47 $81,193,032 Comoros $9,000,000 - - Côte d'Ivoire $5,000,000 2 $5,000,000 PBF WINDOW II Guinea $6,000,000 - - Liberia $15,000,000 20 $14,287,394 Nepal $10,000,000 - - TOTAL PBF WINDOW II $45,000,000 22 $19,287,394 Projects funded in Burundi; PBF WINDOW III Central African Republic; Côte Emergency d'Ivoire; Guinea; Haiti; Liberia $6,353,903 8 $7,353,903 Projects and Kenya (more details) TOTAL PBF WINDOW III $6,353,903 8 $7,353,903 Emergency PBF WINDOW I, II & III $137,353,903 77* $107,834,329 *Note: These projects cover a wide range of areas such as supporting national peace dialogues, promoting community reconciliation, strengthening rule of law, rehabilitating military barracks and prisons, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, providing seed capital for entrepreneurs and addressing youth unemployment. but others are systemic, and related to implementing arrange- World Bank to engage with other stakeholders in determining ments in fragile post-conflict situations characterized by critical peacebuilding priorities, sequencing and coordina- weak implementation capacities. However, the Fund's great- tion of peacebuilding efforts. est potential is not that of a "main funder" of peacebuilding As a consequence of its unique composition and working projects but that of a "catalyst" for new approaches and com- methods, the PBC represents a major forum to coordinate mitments to peacebuilding. Another significant feature of the international support to countries emerging from conflict. It is Fund is the fact that funding decisions are decentralized to a also the most suitable forum to facilitate greater collaboration national-level steering committee which includes govern- between security, political and development actors, thus ment, civil society, private sector, the UN, donors and, in most advancing the World Bank's notion of "securing development." cases, the World Bank. In some cases, this has led to improved The PBC could also support the follow-up to and implementa- national ownership, forging new partnerships, and building a tion of the World Bank-UN Partnership Framework for Crisis common agenda for peacebuilding. and Post-Crisis Situations signed in 2008 by the Secretary General and the President of the World Bank. The PBA has taken the important first steps to achieve its key Strengthening partnership in support of objectives of supporting countries in transition from conflict to post-conflict countries sustainable peace, bridging institutional gaps in the post-con- flict reconstruction and development within the UN, and ENHANCED COLLABORATION and strategic partnership advancing the broader international community's peacebuild- between the PBC and IFIs, and other institutional donors, ing effort. Indeed, early experience suggests that the PBA is off holds much promise. From the inception of the Commission, to a promising start. it was agreed that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors should participate in all Ejeviome Eloho Otobo is Director and Deputy Head, PBC meetings. The PBC provides the best platform for the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. 48 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE PARTNERING FOR A HARMONIZED, ALIGNED RESPONSE IN FRAGILE STATES THE PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES (FS) EXHORT INTERNATIONAL ACTORS TO: harmonize their activities in fragile states through, for example, joint upstream analysis, assessments, shared strategies, and coordinated political engagement. take an integrated approach to politics, security, and development challenges. In the spirit of these principles, the Bank has catalyzed its partnerships with the UN (in a Partnership Framework), the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the African Development Bank and European Union (and International Monetary Fund) on budget support, and the United Nations Development Programme on state building. THE UN-WORLD BANK PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK The need to formalize a partnership framework with the UN arose from recognition that the Bank and the UN have complementary roles in fragile states, but that previous ad hoc working arrangements caused delays and inefficiencies. These retarded the speed and coherence of international response. These principles are operationalized through two documents: A UNDG-WB Operational Annex which anchors a common operational platform for coordinated post-crisis responses, including common methodologies and tools (such as the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment and the Post-Natural Disaster Needs Assessments) The Fiduciary Principles Accord (FPA) between concerned UN agencies and the World Bank. Any agency signing the FPA can use its own fiduciary rules when implementing projects financed under emergency trust funds administered by any other signatory. This should reduce implementation delays. THE OECD-DAC'S INCAF The Bank co-chairs the INCAF task team on Peace-building, State-building and Security and participates in the Financing and Aid Architecture task team. In the first case, co-chairing enables the Bank to bring its perspective to linkages between state- building and peace-building, and thus between security, institutions, and development. In the group on transitional financing, the Bank helps deepen knowledge on the availability of finance during a conflict- affected state's transition period to sustained peace. The group reviews donor instruments available during the transition, assesses financing gaps, and identifies risk management strategies to ensure delivery of rapid and flexible financing in context of fragility. JOINT WORK ON BUDGET SUPPORT WITH THE EC AND AFDB The Bank is working with the EU and the AfDB (with the IMF acting as "interested" peer reviewer) to review past experiences with, and recommend a set of common principles for, budget support in fragile situations. Five focus countries (Central African Republic (CAR), Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea- Bissau, and Haiti) have been selected, and a comparative analysis between them and budget support experience in non-fragile situations is being undertaken to draw out best practices. A "statement of principles" to harmonize budget support practice will be applied to the CAR case. JOINT INITIATIVE ON STATE BUILDING WITH THE UNDP BUREAU OF CRISIS PREVENTION & RECOVERY (BCPR) This initiative aims to support national actors and the UNDP and World Bank (WB) programs in their on-going efforts to support state-building processes in fragile states. Experiences with capacity development in support of state building, and how UNDP and WB inputs are furthering state building, will be reviewed. Two countries--Sierra Leone and Liberia--are being reviewed as case studies as part of this initiative. The review of past experience will be complemented by an action plan for additional measures to improve effectiveness of UNDP and WB efforts in this important area of international support to fragile states. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 49 SPECIAL REPORT Evaluating Community-Driven Reconstruction Lessons from post-conflict Liberia BY JAMES FEARON, MACARTAN are being employed in post-conflict situations around the HUMPHREYS AND JEREMY WEINSTEIN globe. They are a mechanism to disburse development funds rapidly and support the war-to-peace transition by strength- R E C O N S T R U C T I O N I N N O R T H E R N L I B E R I A presented ening local communities and rendering decision-making daunting challenges when the International Rescue more transparent and accountable. Committee launched a community-driven reconstruction That's the theory. In fact, although billions of dollars are (CDR) program there in 2006. The area had been racked by disbursed on community driven development programs, the civil war since 1989, when Charles Taylor's rebel group, the evidence that these programs are effective is quite thin. NPFL, launched its attack from Cote d'Ivoire. The conflict was Indeed, many social scientists might contend that the idea devastating, with 85 percent of the local population displaced that a short-term injection of funds coupled with an imported at some point during the fighting and over four percent killed model for collective decision making would alter local com- directly from war-related violence. The conflict was finally munity dynamics--as many aid organizations hope--appears brought to an end with Taylor's exile, a transition government, fanciful. Community cohesion and decision-making practices a UN peacekeeping mission and elections in 2005. reflect long histories and real distributions of power and The CDR project, financed by the British government's wealth; it is plausible that they are not sensitive to short-term Department for International Development (DFID), sought to external interventions. It is also possible that short-term cash improve material well-being, reinforce democratic political injections in a post-conflict setting could even exacerbate attitudes, and increase social cohesion. CDR projects like this existing social divisions. Liberia was devastated by years of conflict. 50 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE So which account is correct? Do CDR approaches actually handle the money. Communities were also told that the amount deliver the many benefits claimed for them? To find out, our of money they would receive (ranging from $0 to about $500) group partnered with the International Rescue Committee would depend on the results of a village-wide public goods game, (the IRC) to undertake a rigorous evaluation of post-conflict in which 24 randomly selected individuals could choose private- community-driven development in Liberia. ly to retain a sum of money for their own use or contribute it to a community fund (with an additional contribution supplied by The evaluation challenge us) to be used for the public good. We then gathered data on how communities selected projects and representatives and AT T E M P T S TO A S C E RTA I N whether CDR programs actually observed patterns of play in the public goods game. improve community cohesion and reinforce democratic prac- This behavioral approach has an important advantage over tices face two major challenges. The first concerns how com- traditional methods for measuring social cooperation. Unlike munities are usually selected to participate in CDR programs. with survey responses, there is a real cost in the games to tak- If pre-existing differences between communities are related ing an action motivated purely by a desire to please outsiders; both to outcomes and selection into the program, we face a instead the focus is directly on the question of interest, the problem of "confounds" which makes evaluation extremely willingness to make a private sacrifice for public gains. difficult. If, for example, communities are selected because they are especially easy to work with, then a simple compari- What we found son of outcomes between project and comparison communi- ties would lead us to overestimate program effects; if, howev- through our surveys and behavioral T H E DATA C O L L E C T E D er, the neediest areas are selected, then a simple comparison games suggest the following key conclusions: could lead us to underestimate the impact. I The CDR program had a measurable, positive impact on From an evaluation perspective, the best way to address the level of community cohesion. Communities exposed to these problems is to select the areas for the program so that the CDR program appear better able to act collectively after there is a control group that is similar to the treatment group the program's completion to improve their own welfare. in all respects except for the presence of the treatment. This is The evidence for this in the surveys is mixed, but our behav- best achieved through a "randomization" process in which ioral measures provide strong evidence that CDR commu- eligible communities are divided into treatment and control nities can significantly outperform control communities in communities by a lottery. Then we can know with confidence raising funds to implement a community project. that programs are not in operation in particular sites because I Exposure to CDR also appears to have increased social attributes of those sites and individuals were not exposed to inclusion in beneficiary communities, especially for the program. While it is possible (and to some extent marginalized groups. The behavioral evidence on this is inevitable) that there are differences between program and powerful, with greater knowledge and awareness of the control areas, there is no reason to expect there to be any sys- community project and faith in the representatives and tematic bias one way or another. This is the solution we adopt- projects chosen. Traditionally marginalized groups made ed in Liberia, where communities were selected into the pro- significantly higher contributions to the community proj- gram though public lotteries. ect in CDR communities. Survey evidence also supports The second major challenge concerns measurement. this conclusion, with individuals in CDR communities Democratic political attitudes and patterns of social coopera- reporting less social tension and exhibiting greater accept- tion are difficult to measure, much more so than outcomes ance of traditionally marginalized groups. such as educational attainment and health status. Moreover, I The CDR program reinforced democratic values and one might reasonably believe that communities exposed to practices. The evidence in the surveys provides some evi- CDR would be more likely to provide survey responses that dence for greater support for elections and participatory indicate support for democracy, less community tension, and processes in treatment communities. The behavioral greater collective efficacy even if there has been no underlying games demonstrate these values in practice, with a higher change in attitudes and behavior. If we observe positive effects likelihood of democratic selection processes for commu- of a CDR program, how can we be sure that these reflect real nity representatives and projects in communities that changes in attitudes and behavior, and not simply the fact that experienced CDR. Baseline support for these values and CDR treatment communities learned what to say and how to practices was already high, however, and there is no evi- act in order to please outsiders? dence that the program altered these values among our In response to this concern, we gathered behavioral measures sample of town chiefs. of political practices and social cooperation (to complement our I There is little evidence of positive improvements in standard household surveys) through a set of experimental material well-being related to the CDR program. While games. Six months after the CDR program was completed, all the data do suggest an improvement in local public goods-- treatment and control communities were given the opportunity consistent with the focus of communities on the construc- to raise funds from a Liberian NGO to implement a public goods tion of community facilities--this does not appear to have project. The only requirements were that the communities translated into household-level welfare improvement. The choose a project in advance and identify three individuals to main positive finding on welfare is that access to education O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 51 improves significantly. Evidence for gains in livelihoods infant mortality or to improve material welfare, the outcomes and asset holdings are, however, weak. in question usually have natural metrics that allow for cost- The findings were quite surprising to us. The program had benefit comparisons with other types of aid projects. This is a demonstrable effect on more abstract and difficult-to- much less the case for aid projects that seek to improve gover- measure outcomes, such as social cohesion. It had much less nance or to promote post-conflict reconciliation and we faced impact on material wellbeing. These results went against our real difficulties in assessing the magnitudes of the effects we expectations, but we were conscious of the weak empirical find. With time we hope that it will be possible to develop base that informed those expectations. In fact, to the best of more standardized governance and cohesion measures that our knowledge, this is the first time a CDR project of this type allow comparisons across programs. has been evaluated with a randomized control trial (though other trials are ongoing). The evidence of positive program Looking forward impact, and absence of evidence of any negative effects, is thus considerably stronger than in most previous evaluations EXERCISES IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION and done on community-driven reconstruction. local institution-building are increasingly common across the developing world. But despite major investments, few efforts What we learned about evaluation have been mounted to assess the efficacy of external interven- tions designed to alter local dynamics and patterns of social I N T H E C O U R S E O F T H I S WO R K , we found that we learned as cooperation. Our work with the IRC and DFID in Liberia much about the challenges of doing evaluation ­ and the link- shows that rigorous program evaluation is possible, even in ages between program design and evaluation ­ as we learned post-conflict contexts. We also learned that distributing pro- about the program itself. Three issues merit particular gram benefits through a public lottery not only facilitates emphasis: evaluation but may also increase the satisfaction of potential Program assumptions. Evaluations often focus on differ- recipient communities with the equity and transparency of ences between treatment and control groups and not on the the aid distribution process. Finally, we found that innova- levels of the outcomes of interest. Yet, we found in many cases tions in measurement can be used to demonstrate believable that the levels of outcomes such as cohesion, democratic atti- program effects on difficult-to-measure outcomes such as tudes, or social acceptance, were high both in treatment and social cohesion and a commitment to democratic practices. control communities. These findings are inconsistent with Strategies for post-conflict peace-building should be held some of the assumptions underscoring the CDR approach. up to the same evidentiary standards of efficacy now being Plausibly the really important divisions exist between com- applied to development efforts in health, education, and agri- munities rather than within them, but this was not the focus of culture. But this requires changes to current practice. the program. Having this information at the outset might have I First, we need to focus on substantive outcomes, not just shaped the design of the program, but in standard practice, process. Most evaluation still focuses on how well pro- baseline measures are taken only after the program design has grams are implemented and not on whether they have an been completed. Our results suggest that these data may be effect. This needs to change. even more useful if they are gathered earlier in the process. I Second, there needs to be early coordination between Ethics of randomization. From the beginning, we were practitioners and researchers. It was essential for our work conscious of the ethics of using randomization; in particular, that the evaluation process began before the program we worried that this strategy could give rise to jealousies started; but for many programs, evaluation is treated as an between communities that did and did not receive the pro- afterthought and implemented when it is often already too gram, thereby exacerbating conflict. At the same time, we late. were aware of ethical arguments suggesting the equitability I Third, researchers and practitioners will need to further and transparency advantages that derive from the use of lot- innovate in the measurement of outcomes such as social teries when insufficient resources are available for all needy conflict, social cohesion, and political values and beliefs. communities. Because of these concerns, we monitored the While attitudinal surveys remain standard, our results sug- lottery process. Reports from the field were encouraging: not gest that they may fail to pick up underlying behavioral only were there no conflicts resulting from the randomiza- change. Actual behavioral measures offer greater promise, tion, but communities actually viewed the process favorably but the twin issues of how to ensure comparability across and appreciated the equity of the procedure. Though random- contexts and how these behavioral outcomes can be assessed ization processes should continue to be monitored closely, in a cost-benefit framework are the critical challenges that our experience suggests that the potential for using lotteries is will shape the next generation of CDR evaluations. greater than many believe. Assessing the magnitude of program impact. The ran- James Fearon is Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. domized design and our behavioral measures allow us to con- Macartan Humphreys is Associate Professor of Political Science, clude with some confidence that the IRC CDR program had a Columbia University. positive impact, but how big are these improvements and were Jeremy Weinstein is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford they worth the cost? When an aid program seeks to reduce University. 52 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT A Way to Effective Service Delivery in Fragile States Public-Private Partnerships BY ANOOP SWAMINATH to E F F E C T I V E D E L I V E RY O F S E RV I C E S the public is a key test of legitimacy for any government, but especially those in fragile and conflict-affected states. Where multiple challenges such as eth- nic fragmentation, succession struggles and rebellion threaten to send a coun- try into a spiral of deterioration, failure to deliver water, health, education and other vital services can cripple a gov- ernment's chances of survival. By the same token, success and effectiveness in this area can establish the legitimacy of a fragile state's government, and thereby reduce its fragility. Public-pri- vate partnerships (PPP) offer a viable approach to achieving this goal. In most countries, citizens expect their governments to provide basic pub- lic services such as health and education, and utilities such as water and power. In fragile states, weak institutional capacity often results in poor performance, and failure to meet these expectations. The constraints are numerous, and constitute the primary reason for fragility. They include, among others: I Fragile states are often both cause and result of stunted human devel- opment among their people; there are simply not enough educated and capable people to help develop and run the country. Challenges at the individual level have translated into more pronounced difficulties at the institutional level. I The politics of patronage stymies development of a culture that would reward efficient public service Installation of water and sewerage pipes in the Yemeni town of Yarim along the Sana'a Highway. delivery. Fragile governments have been short-sighted in their views on O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 53 power, national self-interest, and "strong zones" amidst the chaos. cially important when engaging with investments in the country. With Practitioners have acknowledged multiple actors in overwhelming scenar- inadequate checks and balances or that interventions in fragile states must ios, such as the Central African Republic. political restraints in place, service deliver some "quick wins". What does Quick wins are about small-scale suc- delivery often takes a back seat this strange term mean? In some ways, cesses across dispersed geographic (Collier 2007). it brings us back to the quest for legiti- regions and diverse communities. I A combination of geographic chal- macy and effectiveness. "Quick wins" The actors perhaps most uniquely lenges and weak or destroyed nation- are visible displays of competence positioned to deliver success in such al infrastructure from conflict sce- which, so far, have been few and far cases are social organizations. They narios has cut off access to public between in most of these countries. often have the advantages of authentic services for many citizens in fragile Apart from public-private partner- intentions to deliver social benefits, states. Remote and isolated areas are ships in extractive industries, there has adept implementation capacity, and often wholly neglected, further exac- not been a systematic approach by inter- experience in cultivating change agents erbating fragility within the country. national organizations, enterprises, and at the grassroots level. These qualities I Fractured relations among ethnic governments to apply this tool in a coor- position them as effective potential groups and communities can impede dinated manner on fragile states. But advocates for the PPP model in tough provision of services. Delivery of with the rapidly-emerging consensus environments: services to preferred groups, and among development partners that fragile I Mercy Corps has been an active player their denial to others due to politics, states are a global priority, various eager in fragile states delivering interven- power, and conflict has caused egre- players have emerged looking for ways to tions from water infrastructure in gious divisions, particularly in Africa. make an impact. There is an opportunity Somalia to health and HIV/AIDS pre- These phenomena have resulted in here to apply some fresh partnership vention in challenged Chinese ethnic people living in fragile states growing models and schemes to implement minority states. Their efforts have exhausted with conflict, disgusted with effective delivery of public services. relieved many communities of various existing political culture, and desperate Managing expectations is a critical hardships (www.mercycorps.com). about their future. For these people, the factor in perceived success. This is espe- I The Gates Foundation has worked with highest priority is the return of the coun- various fragile governments on malar- try to some sense of normalcy. A hall- ia eradication and clean-water projects mark of this sought-after normalcy and that have saved many lives in Africa stability is the provision of basic health, (www.gatesfoundation.org). water, and primary school education. I The International Association for Public-private partnerships are Human Values has played a pivotal invaluable in driving an effective strate- role in delivering primary school gy towards better results in service- education to tribal children in delivery that helps pre-empt deteriora- India's Jharkand province, histori- tion. Such partnerships can offer a syn- cally one of the country's worst-per- ergy that overcomes weaknesses inher- forming states. Where previously no ent in having services delivered by a education services were available, single either public or private provider. the Foundation worked with the gov- But to succeed, they must be conducted ernment to create 18 certified under the right conditions, including: schools with free education, uni- I A recognition that strategic selectivi- forms and food for the students ty is a must; health, water, and edu- (www.iahv.org). cation are proven strong entry I The Ashoka Foundation has targeted points. fragile states in West Africa, empow- I A directed effort at nurturing micro- ering over 100 social entrepreneur- economies of agglomeration around ship fellows to work with countries on these core service themes can help health and human services. Tens of embed service clusters on a regional thousands of lives have been touched and national level. through different types of projects I Specific attention to points of (http://www.ashoka.org/africa). fragility, such as ethnic fragmenta- The common trend among these tion, will ensure that services reach organizations is their profound service previously alienated communities; a orientation at the individual level and special effort to reach difficult-of- Working on electrical power lines outside their ability to work collaboratively with access regions offers significant the town of Macia, Mozambique. existing, albeit weak, public sector chan- gains as well, creating de facto nels. Organizations operating in fragile 54 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE states need to be supported to scale up the size and scope of their impact. Likewise, it is important to craft new roles for public sector PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE entities to account for state fragility. One suggestion is to AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK reform the role of parliaments. Parliaments in fragile states have functions ranging from peacebuilding to ensuring rep- resentation, social accountability, gender mainstreaming, Contracting Out Core Government Functions and Services in and others. But many parliaments in fragile states are filled Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations, 8-9 June, 2009, Tunis, Tunisia. with inexperienced novices; during their electoral campaigns, they promised to improve service delivery, but quickly learn On the 8-9 June in Tunis, the Partnership for Democratic Governance held a conference on "Contracting Out Core that parliaments do not directly perform that function. At Government Services and Functions in Fragile and Post-Conflict most, they oversee budgets and through financial flows impact Situations." This event was co-hosted by the African Development service delivery (O'Brien, Stapenhurst 2008). Bank and benefited from financial support from Japan. Parliaments can, however, play a role in forming associa- The conference gathered around 100 participants from a wide tions with private sector entities to develop partnership models range of development aid stakeholders: OECD members, non-DAC donors (Brazil and Chile), international organizations to deliver services to citizens. Through stronger broad-based (UNDP, UNICEF, UNECA, ADB), NGOs and the private sector. coalitions, parliaments would be able to keep a closer eye on Fifteen partner countries from Africa and Asia were implementation, as well as the capacities of relevant ministries. represented at senior level, including the Minister of Finance Institutional strengthening of the ministries actually for Timor-Leste and the Minister of Health for Liberia. responsible for service delivery is another imperative. Fragile The objective of the conference was to examine how the contracting-out of government functions and services in fragile states are crippled by often non-existent capacities in service states can be compatible with local capacity development and departments. International actors, including multilateral state building. organizations, can respond by providing training and techni- cal assistance on building institutions, as well as policy advice. AREAS OF CONSENSUS Also, education programs focused on leadership, accountabil- There was strong agreement over the following points: ity, and the responsibility of public service have achieved Contracting out government functions and services should progress in many settings. Fragile states will stabilize only be preceded by a thorough assessment of existing national when their governments and leaders promote a return to pro- capacity. Where possible, joint ventures with local constructors (for example, road construction and fessionalism in public service (Pradhan 2009). A valuable maintenance in Papua New Guinea) should be preferred. byproduct that emerges from private-public collaboration is that some of the private companies' skills and knowledge Contracting-out requires a clear contractual agreement stipulating duration, services delivered and accountability seamlessly transfers to the state. mechanisms. In sum, the emphasis on public-private partnerships in The regulatory role of the government is key; therefore fragile states is not just about improving tactics. The objective regulation and management capacities should be one main of any intervention of this kind should be to protect against focus for donors' well-sequenced support. the destruction of precious and irreplaceable human capital, specifically that held by youth. Most fragile states have been FUTURE QUESTIONS stuck with their desperate status quos for decades. The only There was significant debate and interrogation on the plausible way out is to ensure that the future generations are following points: privy to fundamental public services. Public-private partner- What should be the appropriate timing and sequencing of ships offer a way to get there. contracting-out arrangements? How long does it take to exit? While much attention must be paid to country context, Anoop Swaminath is a Consultant working on Fragile States in the what lessons can be drawn to promote good practice? Africa Regional Coordination Unit of The World Bank Institute. While it was agreed that Governments (even the most fragile) should be the ones to decide on contracting-out References needs, even when those contracts are donor-funded, the weak capacity of many such governments presents a Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion. University of Oxford Press. New York, "chicken and egg" dilemma which is not addressed in New York, 2007. international documents like the Paris Declaration. O'Brien, Mitchell , Rick Stapenhurst. Parliaments as Peacebuilders in As a way forward, greater focus could be given to the Conflict-Affected Countries. The International Bank for Reconstruction and lessons from the broader contracting literature, rather Development. Washington, DC, 2008. than taking a sectoral or development approach. Specific Pradhan, Sanjay. WBI Talking Points for Spring Meetings. April 2009. questions here include: how can the outputs be specified? What is the appropriate allocation of risk between parties? How enforceable is the contract in practice? O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 55 KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP Second, it uses the knowledge and information it obtains (ICG) is now generally recognized to participate in debates and inform the public of the facts. as the world's leading independent, The Fund's primary task is to correct conditions that non-partisan, source of analysis threaten human survival through a combination of and advice to governments, and scholarship and active civic education. intergovernmental bodies like the www.fundforpeace.org United Nations, European Union and World Bank, on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Crisis Group's reports, and the advocacy UNDP/BCPR helps address the struc- associated with them, have had a very significant direct tural causes of violent conflict through impact on conflict prevention and resolution in regions development programs that promote across the world. participation, dispute resolution and www.crisisgroup.org gender equality. UNDP takes a three- pronged approach to conflict preven- tion: a) Integrating conflict prevention CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF into development programs; b) Building national processes CIVIL WAR (CSCW) aims to and institutions for conflict management; c) Building con- clarify the ways in which actors sensus through dialogue. respond to civil war, in all its www.undp.org/cpr phases from onset to post conflict, whether as primary participants, general citizenry or intervening powers. THE ARMED CONFLICT CSCW research seeks to strengthen the foundation for DATABASE (ACD) is to be preventive and conflict-resolving initiatives of found on the site of The governments and other public bodies that participate in International Institute for peacebuilding operations, and agencies assisting refugees Strategic Studies. The ACD has in war zones. See the Country Reports and the Datasets. a built-in-function which can CSCW is an autonomous centre within the International generate targeted reports on Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). conflict data back to 1997 and correlates reports from www.prio.no/cscw various years, conflicts, regions and topics. Variables can be isolated or combined and the results are easily presented, either on-screen in a table or when downloaded. THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database RESEARCH INSTITUTE (PRIO) has as its mission to conduct high- quality academic research on UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF questions relevant to the promotion PEACE is an independent, of a more peaceful world. PRIO contributes to theoretical nonpartisan institution and methodological development both within specific established and funded by academic disciplines, and through cross-fertilization Congress. Its goals are to help between disciplines. PRIO also engages in the promotion prevent and resolve violent of peace through conflict resolution, dialogue and international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and reconciliation, public information and policymaking development, and increase conflict management capacity, activities. tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does www.prio.no this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe. THE FUND FOR PEACE exerts two www.usip.org principal efforts to affect decisionmakers. First, it promotes scholarship to define problems and to provide competent answers. 56 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT Center for Global Development Research Fellow (MAR) is a university-based Stewart Patrick, the Index ranks and assesses 141 research project that monitors developing nations according to their relative and analyzes the status and performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, conflicts of politically-active security and social welfare. communal groups in all www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx countries with a current population of at least 500,000. The project is designed to provide information in a standardized format that aids comparative research and THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK contributes to the understanding of conflicts involving ON CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY relevant groups. MAR is hosted by the center for (INCAF) is a unique decision- international Development and Conflict Management at making forum which brings the University of Maryland. together governments and www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar international organizations in order to support peacebuilding as well as effective and legitimate state institutions in the world?s most challenging VISION OF HUMANITY groups development situations. INCAF helps donors, international together a number of interrelated organizations and partner countries to respond to conflict initiatives focused on global peace. and fragility by working on cutting-edge policy and It brings a strategic approach to programming and by acting as a dialogue facilitator between raising the world's attention donors and partner countries. See publications online. and awareness around the www.oecd.org/dac/incaf importance of peacefulness to humanity's survival in the 21st century. It is a collaborative enterprise bringing together a group of initiatives which enjoy the support of a THE NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE wide range of philanthropists, business people, OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS politicians, religious leaders and intellectuals. CLINGENDAEL is a knowledge www.visionofhumanity.org institute for international relations. In a constantly changing global environment, Clingendael SWISSPEACE is a practice- acts as a think-tank as well as a diplomatic academy in oriented peace research institute order to identify and analyze emerging political and social in the area of conflict analysis and developments for the benefit of government and the peacebuilding. We research the general public. The Institute acts in an advisory capacity to causes of wars and violent the government, parliament and social organizations, conflicts, develop tools for early holds conferences and seminars, maintains a library and recognition of tensions, and documentation centre, and publishes a Dutch language formulate conflict mitigation and peacebuilding monthly on international politics as well as a newsletter. strategies. Swisspeace contributes to information www.clingendael.nl exchange and networking on current issues of peace and security policy through its analyses and reports as well as www.swisspeace.ch HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH is dedicated to defending and protecting human rights. By THE INDEX OF STATE focusing international attention WEAKNESS IN THE where human rights are violated, DEVELOPING WORLD it gives voice to the oppressed was designed to provide policy- and hold oppressors accountable makers and researchers with a for their crimes. Our rigorous, objective investigations credible tool for analyzing and and strategic, targeted advocacy build intense pressure for understanding the world's most vulnerable countries. action and raise the cost of human rights abuse. Co-directed by Brookings Senior Fellow Susan Rice and www.hrw.org/en/about O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 57 BOOKSHELF WARS, GUNS, AND VOTES: work on their institutional effectiveness. Addressing the Democracy in Dangerous Places, performance of AAAs in emerging economies, Carlos by Paul Collier. Harper, 2009. Santiso pursues a political economy perspective that Paul Collier investigates the violence addresses the context in which audit agencies are and poverty in the small, remote embedded, and the governance factors that make them countries at the lowest level of the work or fail. world economy. He argues that the spread of elections and peace settlements in the world's most DEAD AID: Why Aid Is Not Working and dangerous countries may lead to a brave new democratic How There Is a Better Way for Africa, by world. In the meantime, though, nasty and long civil wars, Dambisa Moyo and Niall Ferguson. Farrar, military coups, and failing economies are the order of the Straus and Giroux, 2009. day--for now and into the foreseeable future. But he insists In Dead Aid, Dambisa Moyo describes that peace and stability can be achieved if the international the state of postwar development policy community intervenes through aid, democracy building, in Africa today and confronts one of the and a very limited amount of force. greatest myths of our time: that billions of dollars in aid sent from wealthy countries to developing African nations has helped to reduce poverty and increase THE GLOBAL DEAL: Climate Change growth. Provocatively, Moyo illuminates the way in which and the Creation of a New Era of overreliance on aid has trapped developing nations in a Progress and Prosperity, by Nicholas vicious circle of aid dependency, corruption, market Stern. Public Affairs, 2009. distortion, and further poverty. Debunking the current In 2006, Nicholas Stern made model of international aid, Moyo offers a bold new road headlines around the world with his map for financing development that guarantees a significant report on the costs and benefits of decline in poverty without reliance on foreign aid. dealing with global warming. Until the Stern Review, no one knew how much it would cost, and how to do it. Now, BUILDING STATES TO BUILD PEACE, Stern has transformed his report into a powerful narrative edited by Charles T. Call with Vanessa book for general readers. The Global Deal evaluates the Wyeth. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008. economic future, and the essential steps we must take to How can legitimate and sustainable protect growth and reduce poverty while managing climate states best be established in the change. The future Stern outlines is optimistic and aftermath of civil wars? And what role pragmatic; he believes we have the capacity and creativity to should international actors play in change. But we need the will to inspire our political leaders supporting the vital process? to drive a new global strategy. Addressing these questions, this volume explores the core challenges involved in institutionalizing postconflict states. The combination of THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF thematic chapters and in-depth case studies covers the GOVERNMENT AUDITING: Financial full range of the most vexing and diverse problems Governance and the Rule of Law in confronting domestic and international actors seeking to Latin America and Beyond, by Carlos build states while building peace. Santiso. Routledge Cavendish, 2009. This book addresses the elusive quest for greater transparency and FIXING FAILED STATES: A Framework accountability in the management of for Rebuilding a Fractured World, public finances in emerging by Ashraf Ghani. and Clare Lockhart. economies; and, more specifically, it Oxford University Press, 2008. examines the contribution of autonomous audit agencies The authors have taken an active part (AAAs) to the fight against corruption and waste. While in the effort to save failed states for the role of audit agencies in curbing corruption is many years, serving as World Bank increasingly acknowledged, there exists little comparative officials and UN advisors. In Fixing 58 Development Outreach WORLD BANK INSTITUTE BOOKSHELF Failed States, they offer an on-the-ground picture of why PEACE AND THE PUBLIC PURSE: past efforts have not worked and advance a Economic Policies for Postwar groundbreaking new solution to this most pressing of Statebuilding, edited by James K. Boyce global crises. Their state-building strategy, which assigns and Madalene O'Donnell. Lynne Rienner responsibility equally among the international Publishers, 2007. community, national leaders, and citizens, maps out a In the aftermath of violent conflict, clear path to political and economic stability. how do the economic challenges of statebuilding intersect with the political challenges of peacebuilding? UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR How can the international community help lay the fiscal (Vol. 1: Africa): Evidence and foundations for a sustainable state and a durable peace? Analysis Peace and the Public Purse examines these questions, lifting UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR the curtain that often has separated economic policy from (Vol. 2: Europe, Central Asia, peace implementation. Drawing on recent experiences in & Other Regions): Evidence and Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Guatemala, Analysis, Edited by Paul Collier Palestine, and Uganda, the authors bring to life a key and Nicholas Sambanis. dimension of how both peace and states are built. The World Bank, 2005. These two volumes build upon the World Bank's prior research on conflict and violence, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: The United particularly on the work of Paul Collier and Anke States and the Failure of Nation Hoeffler, whose model of civil war onset has sparked Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, much discussion on the relationship between conflict and Central Asia, by Ahmed Rashid, and development in what came to be known as the Viking Adult, 2008. "greed" versus "grievance" debate. The authors Ahmed Rashid, a prominent Pakistani systematically apply the Collier-Hoeffler model to 15 reporter, examines the region and the countries in 6 different regions of the world, using a corridors of power in Washington and comparative case study methodology to revise and Europe to see how the promised expand upon economic models of civil war. nation building has progressed. His conclusions are devastating: An unstable and nuclear- armed Pakistan, a renewed al-Qaeda profiting from a BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: booming opium trade, and a Taliban resurgence and Civil War and Development Policy, reconquest. Rashid argues that Pakistan and Afghanistan Oxford University Press, World Bank, are where the conflict will finally be played out and that 2003. these failing states pose a graver threat to global security This was the first book to identify than the Middle East. the dire consequences that civil war has on the development process and remains a seminal WAR CHILD: A Child Soldier's Story, text even today. It offers three by Emmanuel Jal and Megan Lloyd Davies. main findings: First, civil war has St. Martin's Press, 2009. adverse ripple effects. Second, some countries are more Shocking, inspiring, and finally likely than others to experience civil war conflict, due to a hopeful, War Child is a memoir by a country's characteristics including its economic stability. unique young man, who is determined Third, Breaking the Conflict Trap explores viable to tell his story and in so doing bring international measures that can be taken to reduce the peace to his homeland. In the mid- global incidence of civil war and proposes a practical 1980s, Emmanuel Jal was a seven year agenda for action. old Sudanese boy. His father Simon rose to become a powerful commander in the Christian Sudanese Liberation Army, and Jal was conscripted into that army, one of 10,000 child soldiers, and fought through two separate civil wars until he was adopted by a British aid worker. O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 59 CALENDAR OCTOBER 2009 8­10 India Economic Summit New Delhi, India 5 World Habitat Day ww.weforum.org Washington, DC www.unhabitat.org 11­13 African Economic Conference: Fostering Development in an Era of Financial and 6­7 World Bank/International Monetary Fund Economic Crises Annual Meetings Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Istanbul, Turkey www.afdb.org www.worldbank.org 20­22 Summit on the Global Agenda 15­16 UCW Seminar IV on Child Labour, Dubai, UAE Education & Youth Employment www.weforum.org Istanbul, Turkey http://go.worldbank.org/OV6J7EQ6W0 30­ Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference www.ucw-project.org Dec 2 Geneva, Switzerland www.wto.org 22 Y2Y Global Youth Conference Washington, DC DECEMBER 2009 http://go.worldbank.org/LSDT7VKLM0 7­18 United Nations Climate Change Conference NOVEMBER 2009 Copenhagen, Denmark http:/en.cop15.dk 4­5 The Fifth International Scientific and Business Congress on Protecting the Climate JANUARY 2010 Pretoria, South Africa http:/en.cop15.dk 27­31 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting Davos-Klosters, Switzerland www.weforum.org DEVELOPMENT Outreach Subscription Order Form SUBSCRIBERS FROM DEVELOPING NAME __________________________________________________________________________ COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THE MAGAZINE FREE OF CHARGE. 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It must deliver quality INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES This book presents an authorita- The information revolution, in tive guide to the principles and public services that match the needs of its recent years, has worked as a practice of participatory budget- citizens, foster private market-led growth catalyst to create a globalized yet ing, providing a careful analysis of while managing fiscal resources prudently, localized world with local govern- the potentials of participatory ments playing an ever-increasing budgeting in strengthening inclu- and be accountable to its citizens for all role in the domestic and global sive and accountable governance actions. This important new series provides economy. How these governments as well as risks associated with conceptual guidance and lessons in how to will be able to shoulder their responsibilities--espe- interest group capture of participatory processes. For reach these objectives. The series facilitates cially the delivery of local services--more effectively interested policy makers and practitioners, the book is the concern of this book. The book, edited by Anwar presents the "nuts and bolts" of participatory budget- learning from others' experiences with ideas ing. It provides a regional survey of such practices Shah, provides a comparative perspective on interna- and practices that promote responsive, tional practices in local governance and draws les- worldwide and draws lessons from seven individual responsible and accountable public sons from these experiences to to guide future country case studies. governance in developing countries. reform. LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TRANSFERS: PRINCIPLES AND How can government become This book provides a new PRACTICE more responsive to and compas- institutional economics The design of intergovernmental sionate towards its most vulnera- perspective on alternative fiscal transfers has a strong ble citizens? In developing coun- models of local governance, bearing on efficiency and equity tries, the public sector's perform- offering a comprehensive view of public service provision and ance in delivering public services of local government organization accountable local governance. to the poor and other disadvan- and finance in the developing world. The experiences This book provides a comprehensive one-stop win- taged groups--such as women of ten developing/transition economies are reviewed dow/source of materials to guide practitioners and and the elderly-- is particularly disconcerting. This to draw lessons of general interest in strengthening scholars on design and worldwide practices in inter- book provides tools of analysis to create a scorecard responsive, responsible, governmental fiscal transfers and their implications on the public sector's role in safeguarding the interest and accountable local governance. for efficiency, and equity in public services provision of the poor and disadvantaged. as well as accountable governance. Available wherever World Bank publications are sold, and at http://publications.worldbank.org/ecom merce/