Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR0963 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-41890) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$29.3 MILLION TO JAMAICA FOR THE INNER CITY BASIC SERVICES FOR THE POOR PROJECT June 25, 2014 Sustainable Development Department Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rates Effective March 29, 2006 and December 31, 2013) 1 Currency Unit = Jamaican Dollar (J$) J$1.00 = US$ – Board Approval US$ 1.00 = J$65.50 J$1.00 = US$ – Closing Date US$1.00 = J$106.38 FISCAL YEAR April 1 – March 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APL Adaptable Program Loan ALSD Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBA Cost Benefit Analysis CBC Community Based Contracting CPS Country Partnership Strategy CPTED Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CLO Community Liaison Officers CRP Community Renewal Program EA Environmental Assessment EMP Environmental Management Plan FM Financial Management GoJ Government of Jamaica ICBSP Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project IE Impact Evaluation ISO International Organization for Standardization IFR Interim Financial Report JPS Co. Jamaica Public Services Company JSDF Japan Social Development Fund JSIF Jamaica Social Investment Fund LA Loan Agreement MDA Ministries, Departments and Agencies (of the Government of Jamaica) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NCDP National Community Development Project NWC National Water Commission 1 Bank of Jamaica, Historical Exchange Rates NSWMA National Solid Waste Management Authority PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PIOJ Planning Institute of Jamaica PMU Project Management Unit WSS Water Supply and Sanitation WTP Water Treatment Plant Vice President: Jorge Familiar Country Director: Sophie Sirtaine Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein Project Team Leader: Angelica Nuñez del Campo ICR Team Leader: Valerie-Joy Santos JAMAICA INNER CITY BASIC SERVICES FOR THE POOR PROJECT Data Sheet .................................................................................................................................................... 2 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design............................................................................ 10 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................................................ 14 3. Assessment of Outcomes ....................................................................................................................... 20 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ....................................................................................... 27 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................................................................................... 27 6. Lessons Learned..................................................................................................................................... 29 7. Comments on Issues Raised By Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ......................................... 31 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing ........................................................................................................ 32 Annex 2. Project Output by Component...................................................................................................... 33 Annex 3. Cost Benefit Analysis ................................................................................................................... 38 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes............................................ 45 Annex 5. Borrower’s Report ........................................................................................................................ 47 Annex 6. Supporting Documents ................................................................................................................ 62 Annex 7. Map (IBRD 40992) ....................................................................................................................... 64 Data Sheet A. Basic Information JM Inner City Basic Country: Jamaica Project Name: Services for the Poor Project Project ID: P091299 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-48190 ICR Date: 04/22/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: JAMAICA Original Total USD 29.30M Disbursed Amount: USD 29.30M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 29.30M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Jamaica Social Investment Fund Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 10/06/2004 Effectiveness: 06/27/2006 07/28/2011 Appraisal: 02/27/2006 Restructuring(s): 11/8/2013 Approval: 03/29/2006 Mid-term Review: 02/08/2010 Closing: 12/31/2011 12/31/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any time Quality of Supervision Yes None (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual 2 Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 38 25 Micro- and SME finance 5 3 Other social services 35 53 Power 5 2 Roads and highways 17 17 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 13 13 Other social development 13 13 2 Since contracts were bid as integrated packages of multi-sectoral goods and services, these “Actual” numbers represent rough estimates of the sectoral breakdown. Other urban development 24 24 Participation and civic engagement 25 25 Urban services and housing for the poor 25 25 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Sophie Sirtaine Caroline D. Anstey Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein John Henry Stein Project Team Leader: Angelica Nunez del Campo ICR Team Leader: Valerie Joy Eunice Santos ICR Primary Author: Elizabeth Hunter Eiseman F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to improve quality of life in 12 Jamaican inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements through improved access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, enhanced community capacity and improvements in public safety. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) n/a (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Provide access to improved basic infrastructure and financial services and security of Indicator 1: tenure for 60,000 inner city residents Value quantitative or 0 60,000 61,953 Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 06/30/2010 12/31/2013 Achieved (103%). The Project supported a range of interventions in the 12-targeted Comments communities. The indicator measured the number of households that have access to any of the following: (i) improved basic services; (ii) microfinance; or (iii) security of (incl. % tender. To avoid double counting, the numbers of beneficiaries from the intervention achievement) with the furthest reach in each community (roads and for some communities waste skips) were used. Indicator 2 : % of beneficiaries who feel safe or very safe Value quantitative or 27.75% 75% 91% Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 06/30/2010 12/31/2013 Achieved. Following the structure of the household baseline survey finalized just after Comments the Project’s launch, the Project’s Impact Evaluation included a survey of 700 residents (incl. % from the Project’s 12 communities. The baseline number reflects an initial estimate, as achievement) the baseline survey was not complete until after the Project’s approval. The actual baseline was 60.4%. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target approval Completion or Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Km of paved road surface rehabilitated and maintained Value (quantitative 0 TBD 10.36 22.30 or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (215%): Approximately 80% of the road network in need of rehabilitation Comments across the twelve communities (approximately 60% of the entire network in these communities) was rehabilitated under the ICBSP. In the 2013 Citizen’s Report Card, (incl. % 86% of community residents surveyed thought that the quality of road network service achievement) was fair or better. In 2005, 75% of community residents described their roads as poor or problematic. Indicator 2 : Number of households with new or improved access to water 3 Value 0 NA 4 2,490 3,576 3 The World Health Organization defines access to drinking water as follows: “Access to drinking water means that the source is less than 1 kilometer away from its place of use and that it is possible to reliably obtain at least 20 liters per member of a household per day” http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/mdg1/en/ (quantitative or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (144%): Improved access to water provided for households in ten communities. The Project financed the construction of renovated water mains in Project Comments areas. JSIF handed the works over to the National Water Commission (NWC), which is responsible for the households’ connection to the system. The NWC informed JSIF that (incl. % it intends to finalize household connections by October 2014. Fire hydrants were also achievement) provided for the same ten communities. The original indicators relied on survey data (% of residents report access with good pressure and % of residents satisfied with the quality and pressure of water services). Indicator 3 : Number of households with new or improved access to sewer networks Value (quantitative 0 NA 364 478 or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (131%): The Project financed improvements to five sewage pipelines in Federal Gardens that were tied to existing pipe infrastructure. Of these five pipelines, Comments one is in use and 95 households are benefiting from its use. JSIF has handed over the remaining four pipelines to the NWC, who is responsible for activating the lines. All (incl. % households are already connected to the lines. As with Indicator 2, this indicator achievement) measured improved access to sewer networks. The original indicators relied on survey data (% of households in project areas with in-house sanitation facilities and % of households satisfied with the quality of the sanitation facility). Indicator 4 : Number of formal microfinance loans approved and disbursed Value (quantitative 0 NA 171 402 or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (235%): The indicator reflects only the first phase of the micro-finance sub- component. The second phase was canceled given, among other reasons, that the microfinance institutions were already working in the communities in a limited manner Comments and thus did not need added financial incentive to enter. In this phase, the micro-finance (incl. % institutions received more applications for loans than expected. The contracted achievement) microfinance institutions have also continued lending in the ICBSP project areas and other inner city areas, following the close of the official contracts. The original indicator relied on survey data - % of households in which members have accessed loans from a formal lending organization. Indicator 5 : Number of applications for land registration made to the National Land Agency 4 The intermediate indicators were remodeled after the October 2009 supervision mission. The majority of the original intermediate indicators were overly ambitious and based on household surveys. Until that time, many of the Project indicators had not been updated or monitored. The Bank team and JSIF agreed on a list of simpler and easier-to-measure implementation progress indicators. Value (quantitative 0 TBD 200 753 or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (276%): The actual value achieved represents applications for splinter (sub- division) titles made to the National Land Agency (NLA). The Project financed a land survey service and sub-division work to facilitate the residents’ application for titles. Comments This activity was piloted in Flankers; residents were living on publicly owned land, (incl. % which required coming to an agreement with the Ministry of Housing. The Project achievement) originally foresaw carrying this pilot out in two communities, but given the complicated process and the limited human resource at JSIF to devote to the process the scope of the activity was reduced. The original indicator, number of titles provided to beneficiaries, was revised because the power to award titles falls under the NLA’s responsibility. Number of subprojects in which Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Indicator 6 : (CPTED) principles are applied in infrastructure design Value (quantitative 0 NA 15 55 or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (367%): CPTED principles were applied in road works, community center Comments constructions as well as general community space subprojects (including the (incl. % construction, rehabilitation, and expansion of parks, sporting facilities and schools, as achievement) well as the substitution of zinc fence (which do not block bullets and limit the eyes on the road as well as neighbor-to-neighbor communication) with concrete block walls). Number of persons who participated in the programs or activities for community-based Indicator 7 : crime and violence prevention and reduction Value (quantitative 0 NA 3,270 37,140 or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (1136%): The success of the implementation of the public safety activities, especially mediation and conflict resolution activities, led to an increased demand, Comments participation and scope of the activities. This indicator reflects the number of people who attended each program and activity – community members who attended several (incl. % events were counted multiple times. Another factor that contributed to the high rate of achievement) achievement was JSIF’s partnership with various on-the-ground organizations that committed resources towards these activities. An in-depth description of these activities can be found in Annex 2. Number of persons who participated in education and employment programs or Indicator 8 : activities Value 0 NA 4,785 32,691 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (683%): As with the public safety activities, there was high demand for education and employment programs. This indicator reflects the number of people who Comments attended each program and activity – community members who attended several events (incl. % were counted multiple times. Another factor that contributed to the high rate of achievement) achievement was JSIF’s partnership with various on-the-ground organizations that committed resources towards these activities. An in-depth description of these activities can be found in Annex 2. Indicator 9 : Number of persons who obtained certificates as a result of the programs Value (quantitative 0 NA 220 815 or Qualitative) Date 05/18/2006 10/28/2009 12/31/2013 Achieved (370%): The Project integrated lessons learned to adapt training and certification programs to the communities’ needs throughout implementation. This flexibility enabled higher retention and graduation rates than anticipated. For example, Comments the subcomponent responded to market demand by entering into new areas of training (incl. % (videography, photography, computer animation, and landscaping) as the Project achievement) progressed. Thus far, 91 people have full-time employment as a direct result of training received under the ICBSP. Additionally, 18 ICBSP-trained environmental wardens are expected to receive full-time employment through the World Bank’s Jamaica Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) after Project close. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 05/19/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 10/10/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.85 3 05/02/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.23 4 12/15/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.23 5 06/20/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.35 6 12/06/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 5.37 7 05/17/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.88 8 11/30/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.69 9 06/11/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 11.39 10 02/19/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 13.75 11 12/18/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 17.53 12 06/22/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 20.30 13 01/26/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 23.08 14 08/18/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.06 15 12/28/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 29.30 H. Restructuring (if any) The Project was formally restructured in July 2011 to extend the closing date by two years from December 31, 2011 to December 31, 2013. The Project underwent a second formal restructuring in November 2013 to re-allocate disbursement categories given cost overruns in infrastructure subcomponents. I. Disbursement Profile 5 5 Disbursement profile chart is automatically generated by World Bank Operations portal, and includes a $2.65 million Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) grant awarded February 2009. 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1. At inception, the Inner City Basic Services for the Poor (ICBSP) Project offered a then- innovative multi-sector design that integrated investments in small-scale infrastructure with interventions to reduce risk factors for crime and violence. The Project was prepared from 2004 to 2006, approved by the World Bank Board on March 29, 2006 and declared effective on June 27, 2006. The original closing date of the Project was December 31, 2011. The Project was restructured in July 2011 in order to extend the closing by two years to December 31, 2013. 1.2. Context at Appraisal 2. Country and sector issues. At the time of Project preparation and appraisal, the Jamaican economy was undergoing a structural shift: manufacturing, which had dominated the economy since the 1960s was declining, whereas the service industry, specifically tourism, was increasing its share of the economy. Urban centers, such as Kingston, saw business and industrial activities -- including associated urban employment opportunities -- migrate to the urban periphery. This transition particularly impacted under-educated, inner-city 6 residents who did not have the skill sets required to find alternative employment. Increasing unemployment rates in the inner cities correlated with an increase of crime. At appraisal, Jamaica reported one of the highest homicide rates in the world. 7 In 2005, homicides reached a record high of 1,650, or 60.4 homicides per 100,000 people, with the majority of the violence concentrated in the inner cities. 3. The inner city communities’ physical characteristics enabled criminal activity to flourish; for example, roads were in poor condition making access for police, service providers and taxis difficult, houses were encircled by zinc fences, limiting the number of “eyes on the road”, 8 and street lighting was minimal. The ability of service providers such as the National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA) and the National Water Commission (NWC) to access these inner city communities was hampered by poor infrastructure and outbreaks of violence. At the time of appraisal, exact data on the state of service provision in the inner cities was limited, but an analysis of aggregate data and studies suggested that service coverage and quality was poor and that there were pockets of extreme deprivation. For example, sewerage systems in many inner city communities 9 did not exist or were in need of major repair, and solid waste collection was irregular. 10 Overall, the presence of the state was minimal. This environment enabled gangs to maintain control over many of the communities. 4. High rates of crime and violence also limited human and social capital development. Inner city residents had limited access to training, employment, and capital resources that would enable them to 6 In Jamaica, inner cities are characterized by decaying physical infrastructure, poor service provision, high population densities, and environmental hazards. The term is assigned to communities in or bordering urban centers as well as communities on the periphery of towns that suffer from similar lack of access to services and social fragmentation (Project Appraisal Document). 7 Caribbean Human Development Report, United Nations Development Report, 2012. 8 Zinc fencing also has implications for community cohesiveness (i.e. one can’t interact with one’s neighbor), may jut out into the road, further preventing vehicle and pedestrian access; and also doesn’t stop bullets – criminals may shoot through zinc fencing at the police without being seen and residents may have bullets pass through their fencing, into their homes (JSIF). 9 Only 51.1 percent of the population in the target areas reported having access to in-house sanitation facilities. Project Baseline Survey. 10 Health hazards and environmental risks. 10 break the poverty cycle. The difficult social environment contributed to the placement of students 11 in poor-quality secondary institutions, including those that end at Grade Nine. The lack of state investment and opportunities to earn a livelihood through traditional employment created an environment ripe for increased criminal activity. 5. Recognizing the urgent need to re-invigorate and re-integrate these communities into the fabric of broader society, the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) prioritized community development and crime and violence reduction. In 1996, the GoJ established the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) as a quasi- government agency with a mandate to reduce poverty and create an environment for sustainable development. In 2000, the Prime Minister of Jamaica established a committee of senior officials to oversee and coordinate all inner-city renewal interventions. In 2002, the GoJ designed a Community Renewal Program (CRP) that aimed to provide a framework for integrating human, social, economic and environmental development in the inner cities. 6. Rationale for Bank involvement. In response to the spike in violence in Jamaica, the GoJ began investigating innovative ways to promote peace in the inner cities. Prior to the Jamaica Inner City Basic Service for the Poor (ICBSP) Project, the GoJ had largely approached violence through increasing police presence or utilizing armed forces. The Minister of Finance was interested in implementing an innovative approach that combined infrastructure investment with community-based interventions and sought the Bank’s assistance. 7. The Bank was well positioned to support the Project given its experience working with JSIF through the National Community Development Project (P076837, NCDP), which aimed to provide basic services and promote temporary employment opportunities in Jamaica’s poorest communities, the Bank’s significant background in integrated urban upgrading projects and its growing expertise in crime and violence prevention. In addition, the Project was closely in line with the World Bank’s Jamaica Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), 12 which focused on three pillars: (i) accelerating inclusive economic growth; (ii) improving human development and opportunity; and (iii) crime prevention and reduction 1.2 Original Project/Program Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators 8. Project Development Objective. The PDO was to improve the quality of life in twelve of the Borrower’s inner city areas and poor urban informal settlements by improving access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, and enhanced public safety and community capacity. 9. Key indicators The PDO outcome indicators are: (i) provide access to improved basic infrastructure and financial services and security of tenure for 60,000 inner city residents; and (ii) percent of beneficiaries who feel safe or very safe. The Project also had 16 intermediate outcome indicators at the time of appraisal. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators 11 Upon leaving primary school, Jamaican students take a standardized exam that determines their placement at secondary institutions. 12 Report #31830, Discussed by the Board on April 20, 2005. 11 10. Neither the PDO nor its PDO-level indicators were revised. The intermediate indicators were revised given their reliance on survey data, which presented data collection challenges, including faulty design of initial baseline survey and respondent fatigue. The intermediate indicators are detailed in the Data Sheet. 1.4 Beneficiaries 11. The Project’s target beneficiaries were the 60,000 poor and vulnerable people living in the 12 selected inner-city communities. The Project aimed to benefit these inner city residents through: (i) increasing access and improving the quality of water, sanitation, solid waste collection, electricity, roads, drainage and related community infrastructure; (ii) increasing access to micro-finance; (iii) promoting land tenure; and (iv) enhancing public safety. The Project also aimed to build community capability and social cohesion through technical assistance, training and workshops. 1.5 Original Components 12. The Project’s original components are as follows: Component 1. Access to Services 1.1. Community Basic Infrastructure (a) Development of on-site and community-based infrastructure in twelve select inner city communities (“Project Communities”) including: (i) construction and rehabilitation of integrated network infrastructure for water, sanitation, drainage, and secondary and tertiary roads; (ii) installation of street lighting, extension of the Borrower’s electricity network, and regularization of illegal electricity connections; (iii) construction of multi-purpose, community centers in seven of the Project Communities; and (iv) enhancement of basic infrastructure through community-based subprojects (“Community-based Subprojects”), implemented by registered legal entities of the corresponding Project Communities, including extension of household water and sanitation connections, removal and substitution of zinc fencing, improvement of neighborhood and recreational facilities, and installation of community garbage receptacles. (b) Improvement of solid waste collection systems in Project Communities through the provision of technical assistance and the procurement of solid waste collection equipment and compactor trucks. (c) Rehabilitation and construction of offsite network infrastructure necessary for the maintenance of water, sanitation and drainage services in Project Communities, including: (i) rehabilitation of the water reservoir and trunk mains in Kingston, bordering the Federal Gardens and Jones Town communities; and (ii) upgrading and rehabilitation of the wastewater treatment facility in Tawes Pen. (d) Building of capacity of parish councils to operate, manage and maintain basic infrastructure works (including secondary and tertiary roads, drainage infrastructure, community recreation facilities and other basic community infrastructure) in Project Communities through the provision of technical assistance, training, basic computer equipment and office supplies. 1.2. Access to Financial Services (a) Facilitating of access to micro-financial services within the Project Communities for use towards developing and promoting small and medium-sized businesses and incremental housing improvements, through the provision of performance-based service contracts to financial institutions that will offer to 12 beneficiaries within Project Communities, micro-financial services and technical assistance in areas including credit counseling, business plan preparation, financial management and related business support. (b) Orientation of financial institutions that are potential bidders for the contracts referred to in Part 1.2(a) above, and training of Project Implementing Entity staff to evaluate bids and monitor and evaluate micro-financing activities. (c) Carrying out of independent technical audits of the loan portfolios of the financial institutions contracted under Part 1.2(a) above. 1.3. Land Tenure Regularization (a) Carrying out of: (i) a cadastral audit of all Project Communities, consisting of approximately 13,000 parcels of land; and (ii) an assessment of the number of parcels eligible for titling. (b) Development of a land titling and strategy program, including: (i) design and implementation of informational campaigns and public consultations; and (ii) examination of the field, legal and administrative procedures and costs required for the transferring of titles. (c) Provision of technical assistance to the Borrower for the development of a broader land tenure regularization policy and program for urban and peri-urban squatter areas. (d) Implementation of a land titling program on public lands in the Project Communities, including: (i) completion of register and cadastral searches and land surveys; (ii) verification of occupancy information including names, addresses, leasing and sub-leasing arrangements; and (iii) provision of technical assistance to beneficiaries in the processing of title applications. Component 2. Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building Enhancement of public safety in Project Communities through the provision of technical assistance in areas related to crime and violence prevention, including: (a) mediation and conflict resolution; (b) alternative livelihoods and skills development; (c) family support programs; (d) youth education and recreation programs;(e) community- based organization capacity building, including the assignment of community liaison officers to serve as full-time community facilitators in each Project Community; and (f) social marketing and public awareness campaigns. Component 3. Project Management 3.1. Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation Building of capacity of the Project Implementing Entity through the provision of:(a) technical assistance and training (including study tours for resettlement training) in the areas of project management and administration, including environment, resettlement, social development, crime and violence prevention, engineering, micro- finance, financial management, procurement, technical monitoring and evaluation, international quality standard certification of the Project Implementing Entity’ s management framework, community satisfaction surveys, and annual financial audits; (b) three motor vehicles; and (c) office equipment and furniture. 3.2. Operating Costs and Other Services Provision of: (a) training to community-based organizations in core organizational management practices; (b) basic operating and maintenance costs for community peace and justice centers; and (c) operating costs of the Project Implementing Entity including costs related to office space rental, utilities, 13 basic office supplies, maintenance of motor vehicles, and travel, per diem and salaries of administrative staff. Revised Components 13. In November 2013, the Project underwent a level two restructuring to reallocate loan proceeds and scale down sub-component 1.1, Integrated Network Infrastructure, sub-component 1.2, Access to Financial services, and sub-component 1.3, Land Tenure Regularization. The funds were used to scale- up sub-component I.1 (A) III Community Centers, given significant construction cost increases since preparation, and Component 2, Public Safety Enhancement, given its high level of success and community demand for the activities under this component. These adjustments are discussed in further detail in the Implementation Section. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 14. Comprehensive background analysis. The Bank design team performed a comprehensive background analysis that included incorporating lessons learned from the NCDP Project, World Bank projects from across the globe (e.g., how zinc fence removal contributed to increased citizen security in South Africa) and Bank best practices (e.g., inclusion of an impact evaluation) in the Project’s design. Prior to the Project’s start, JSIF, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), the Ministry of National Security (MNS), and the Social Development Commission (SDC) conducted a thorough community selection process – independent of Bank involvement – based on geographic location (the design sought to include all parishes with major urban centers), poverty rates, access to water, and crime levels. The political affiliations of the 12 communities were also considered to ensure support for the Project through political turnover; the two dominant political parties were equally represented in the selected communities. 13 Given the size restraints of the Project and the desire to have a wide reach, the Project targeted sections of these communities as opposed to the entire communities. 15. Strong Community Buy-in. With the exception of the design decision to focus on sections of communities, which resulted in tension between community beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the Project design fostered community buy-in. During preparation, JSIF engaged in an extensive process of consultation with the residents of the 12-targeted areas of the selected communities (from here forward referred to as the communities). Four phases of consultation, whose results guided the design of the Project’s initial activities, took place during preparation: (i) public awareness-building, diagnosis and needs assessment; 14 (ii) an assessment of current community environments and infrastructure needs with community stakeholders; (iii) infrastructure planning focus groups; and (iv) focus group discussions on potential designs for integrated neighborhood plans. JSIF met with over 1,000 community members 13 The communities were selected based on the following quantitative measures: percent of households in the community in the lowest poverty quintile and the percent of households without access to piped water and the following qualitative measures: one community from each of the five parishes with big city, balanced political party allegiance, and high priority based on the MNS’ public safety criteria. 14 JSIF has a comprehensive social screening process in place for projects financed by ICBSP and other sources. This process includes a review of the demographic and social characteristics of the beneficiaries, the capacity and status of the community based organization responsible for the project, participation by community members in needs identification, potential employment impact, and the accessibility of the project to people with disabilities. These topics are captured in the social appraisal report prepared by the social officer (with technical officer input) following multiple field visits. This report then becomes the basis for subsequent reviews within JSIF. 14 through over 120 formal meetings and focus groups. To ensure continued relevance throughout implementation, activities were adjusted based on community demand on an annual basis. In the December 2013, Citizen Report Card 15 Survey, 84 percent of respondents answered “yes” when asked, “Do you believe the best projects were chosen for the community?” 16. Broad PDO. The Project’s PDO to “improve the quality of life” in the twelve selected communities “through improving access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, and enhanced public safety and community capacity” captured all of the Project’s activities. Nevertheless, the PDO could have been strengthened through maintaining focus on the core objectives - improving the sense of public safety, building community capacity to participate in the formal economy and improving access to basic services. While improving the quality of life encompassed the ultimate objectives of the Project, its enormous breadth and consequent vagueness as an objective (difficulty to measure), limited its capacity to orient, guide, and direct the Project. 17. Complex Breadth of Activities Strained Implementation The Project was designed to be comprehensive, but the number of activities (over 30) and entities involved (five government agencies, parish councils, community committees and civic organizations among others 16) in implementation added complexity and stretched financial and human resources thin. JSIF had past experience implementing World Bank projects and a high capacity to implement social capacity building projects, but lacked staff with technical expertise in micro-finance and land titling. Another capacity limitation that was not fully explored in the design was the ability and willingness of the service providers to fully engage in the Project’s implementation and assume responsibility for the works financed through the Project. JSIF’s political pull to motivate action on the part of the service providers was weak, and beyond the MoUs, the service providers had limited incentive to actively engage. 18. A Model for a Multi-Sector Approach to Address Risk Factors for Crime and Violence in Jamaica. The Project’s fusion of small-scale infrastructure and community-based social interventions was innovative for the World Bank and JSIF at the time of design. Many public service agencies were not entering the communities because of the high levels of crime and violence and the difficulty associated with collecting tariffs. The Project’s design proposed a solution to this hurdle through focusing on measures that would visibly increase safety in the neighborhoods. In addition, the Project design sought to facilitate the communication channel between the agencies and the residents to build confidence between the groups. The Project also included performance-based mechanisms for micro- finance, which was cutting edge for both the Bank and JSIF. 19. Utilizing Borrower’s System for Environmental and Social Safeguard Management. In an innovative move, the Project utilized the Borrower’s systems for safeguard implementation (O.P. 4.00 Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental and Social Safeguard Issues in Bank- Supported Projects). An Equivalence and Acceptability Assessment was carried out by the Bank team. To fill identified gaps, JSIF developed an Environmental Management Framework and a Land 15 Citizen report cards are “participatory surveys that provide quantitative feedback on user perceptions on the quality, adequacy and efficiency of public services.” http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTPCENG/0,,contentMDK:20507680~pageP K:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:410306,00.html. For the ICBSP Project, a random sample of 1,439 beneficiaries were selected to participate in the report card survey. 16 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed with all of these agencies (National Water Council, National Solid Waster Management Authority, Rural Electrification Program, Jamaica Public Sevices Company, Ltd. and the Parish councils) during preparation. The ICBSP Project also had strategic partnerships with: the Benevolent Society, the University of Technology, the National Works Association, RADA, National Environmental Planning Agency, Sandals Resorts, Social Development Commission, JN Small Business, and HEART Trust/NTA among others. 15 Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework that were integrated into the operational manual and became standard policy for all JSIF-funded projects. 20. Solid internal fiduciary capacity with external obstacles. JSIF’s past experience implementing Bank projects revealed substantial capacity for managing financial and procurement17 aspects of implementation. The Project design could have further evaluated external procurement issues, such as the low willingness of firms to enter communities because of violence (and the subsequent risk premiums charged), the exclusion of many local firms from international bidding processes given little or no experience implementing contracts of over US$1.5 million 18 as well as the extended timeline associated with the required cabinet approval for all bids over approximately US$400,000. 19 21. High level of Government commitment. The GoJ illustrated a high level of commitment to the Project during preparation. The Ministry of Finance requested the Bank’s support to prepare a project that integrated infrastructure with crime and violence prevention. Jamaica was suffering from a spike in violence and prevention was at the top of the national agenda. The Project was closely in line with the GoJ’s high-level objectives to improve the living situation and reduce violence in the inner cities. In illustration of the high level of commitment, by Project approval JSIF had 18 months of bidding documents prepared by Project approval. 22. Underestimation of Inter-Institutional Risks. For the most part, the design team identified the main risks to Project implementation and proposed concrete, highly implementable mitigation measures that were integrated in the Project’s activities. For instance, given the moderate risk for environmental management, the Project supported the implementation of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14000 Environmental Management Certification. The certification process helps organizations develop and utilize tools to identify potential and control actual environmental impacts to improve environmental performance. The risk that violence would halt implementation was mitigated by a host of short and medium term initiatives, including public safety sensitive infrastructure planning, mediation initiatives and job training and skills development, targeting vulnerable groups. The risk that partner, service-provider agencies would not have the capacity or commitment to extend service to these areas, however, was underestimated. The mitigation measures were highly implementable (in addition to establishing and signing MoUs with the service providers, the Project proposed financing tools, such as a waste pick-up truck for the NSWMA, and works in line with the agencies’ strategic growth plans to build commitment), but they did not build vested interest from the service providers to ensure their commitment. Implementation 23. The Project’s ambitious multi-sector design, the Jamaican economic crisis and the difficult procurement environment led to initial delays in implementation (only 10 percent of the loan had been disbursed after two years of implementation), but JSIF’s high implementation capacity and the Project’s flexible design enabled the Project to overcome these challenges and successfully meet its objectives. 17 The Procurement Capacity Assessment conducted at the time of appraisal rated JSIF’s capacity as ‘average’ and noted an increased capacity to manage a larger project load. 18 To involve local firms, JSIF broke contracts into smaller segments, slowing overall contracting processes and complicating supervision. 19 The threshold is currently JMD40 million, which was raised during the life of the Project from the previous threshold of JMD30 million. 16 24. Strong Readiness by Implementation Agency. Project implementation benefited from JSIF’s extensive experience implementing Bank projects as well as its expertise in community interventions. JSIF’s model of conducting extensive pre-project consultations, introducing contractors to the community prior to the start of works, utilizing Community Based Contracting (CBC) throughout the life of the Project, 20 giving community committees 21 the responsibility to monitor and coordinate Project progress as well as providing consistent hands-on assistance through assigning JSIF Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) to each community were key to successful implementation. In addition, JSIF had a recognized brand in the communities that enabled safe physical access to carry out the works. 22 25. Initial infrastructure design process not well supervised. During implementation, the Project overcame a series of challenges that delayed progress. First, to ensure an efficient start to implementation at the outset of the Project, the Bank leveraged a Japan Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) trust fund grant to hire an international consulting firm 23, UK-based HTSPE, to produce designs for all of the infrastructure works. That firm produced the designs from abroad with limited knowledge of the terrain and environment in Jamaica and utilized a “one size fits all approach” even though the communities had a variety of terrains. The designs had significant flaws, such as over- design with respect to the level of seismic and hurricane risk, which “plagued” the Project throughout implementation. 24 Project funds had to be diverted to re-design works (over 50 percent of the designs had to be re-done), causing initial delays in disbursements, delays in overall implementation and an increase in costs. 25 26. Complicated contracting environment. Disbursements were also delayed because of the initial design decision to tender large contracts (that few local contractors could bid on), the reluctance of contractors to work in the Project’s crime-ridden communities and consequent no-bid contracting processes, onerous risk premiums in bids, as well as overloading of the few contractors willing to work in the communities. The increase in costs and delays limited the capacity of the Project to maximize reach and focus on post-Project sustainability. 27. Economic upheaval. Another challenge the Project faced was the 2009 to 2010 fiscal crisis. During the life of the Project, the economy contracted by 4.8 percent and employment fell by 5.7 20 Within JSIF financed sub-projects, a unique arrangement has been developed to ensure employment benefits from construction works are maximized and equally shared within the community. This involves the community appointing an employment coordinator to liaise with the contractor, in sourcing the necessary labor and skills within the community. The employment coordinator also works to resolve disputes regarding wages and on the rotation of workers every two weeks so that opportunities are shared throughout the community. This has proved to be a very effective model that should be continued in the second phase of the project 21 The Project’s community committees have been instrumental in the implementation and maintenance of physical as well as social interventions. Community engagement guided the placement, use and structures of built environment projects, which incorporated principles of CPTED and reclaimed public spaces, such as desolate lots, where delinquency and violence were common, into public spaces for the common good, such as playing field, and community centers, strategically located for outreach and natural surveillance. 22 In the December 2013 Citizen Report Card survey, 98% of respondents answered yes to the question, “would you welcome the JSIF team again in your community?” 23 Given the large size of the contract, an international bidding process was held. Jamaican firms did not have adequate experience executing contracts of this size, limiting their ability to compete in the bidding process. 24 Interview with JSIF staff during ICR fact-finding mission (February 18 to 23, 2014) 25 For example, in Knollis the foundation of the community center had to be adjusted because of base and sub-base soil conditions; comprehensive soil tests were not reflected in the design. The drainage designs were also fraught with error. For instance, in Flankers, the design did not sufficiently reflect the underground pipes and cables. In Africa, the slopes of some of the drains went in the wrong direction. The re-design required resulted in delays and cost increases. Trevor Hamilton & Associates Center for Excellence Impact Evaluation, March 2014. 17 percent. 26 In response to the economic upheaval in Jamaica, the International Monetary Fund imposed fiscal targets that required the GoJ to cut public expenditures. The tightening policies led to limited Project disbursements and delayed contracting of several major infrastructure works in 2009 and 2010. The GoJ, however, illustrating its commitment to the Project, ensured that the Project had enough funds to move forward. 28. Reliance on service providers with limited resources and vested interest. The complex implementation arrangements also posed implementation challenges. Despite having signed MoUs guaranteeing service provider commitment to extend services to the Project areas, some public service providers lacked the financial capacity to extend service into the Project areas and perform routine maintenance as promised. In addition, service providers were hesitant to extend their services to the communities given the communities’ low capacity to pay for services. For instance, the NWC highlighted that people in the target communities illegally tap into the system and that it does not have the capacity to monitor connections and target payment collections, especially in light of the levels of violence in the communities. As a result, the service providers did not prioritize service connections in the target communities. This resulted in delays in the hand-over of works to the service providers. 27 29. Responsive implementation and supervision. The JSIF and Bank teams adapted the Project to the changing circumstances to enable successful implementation. For example, during the February 2010 Mid-Term Review (MTR) JSIF and the Bank team recognized the need to reduce the scope of the micro-finance and land tenure activities. The micro-finance activity had suffered long delays from lack of interest by microfinance providers as well as hesitation from JSIF Board members to give financial incentives to private financial institutions. There was also cultural hesitation in the communities towards accepting a loan. The land tenure activity involved a complicated and time-consuming process with the Ministry of Housing, and JSIF did not have ample human resources to devote to continuing the process beyond one community. Funds from these activities were re-allocated to public safety enhancement and capacity building activities as well as community centers (which had experienced a surge in construction prices). This re-allocation was formalized in the November 2013 Restructuring. 30. In response to the fiscal tightening and overall delays in disbursement and procurement, the Project was formally restructured in July 2011 to extend the closing date by two years to December 31, 2013. The extension enabled the completion of key infrastructure works. During the fiscal crisis, JSIF and the Bank worked together to pro-actively prioritize feasible investments (smaller scale, capacity building activities under Component 2 were more feasible to implement during this time given their relatively low costs) and continue ongoing activities. JSIF and the Bank also continually updated activities throughout implementation to respond to the operating environment and the priorities of the communities. For example, given NWSMA’s capacity limitations, the Project incorporated new approaches to solid waste management that focused on reinforcing community efforts in collection, cleanup, awareness and neighborhood beautification. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 31. Weak M&E at Design. In addition to designing the preliminary infrastructure plans, HTSPE was responsible for conducting the baseline household survey. HTSPE neglected to properly survey the four control communities, weakening the capacity of JSIF to measure the overall impact of the Project. 26 Trevor Hamilton & Associates Center for Excellence Impact Evaluation, March 2014. 27 The NWC has assumed responsibility for all of the water mains the Project supported and has advised JSIF that it intends to connect households by October 2014. The handover process was completed in May 2014. 18 As it turned out, the control communities would not have served as ideal controls because they were not isolated from other government and non-governmental organizations’ interventions. 32. The Project’s two results level indicators – i.e., number of people with access to improved services and percent of residents who feel safe or very safe -- capture the key results of the Project. Given the difficulty associated with measuring the direct impact of crime and violence prevention work in communities (records on crime are not very robust, making crime measurements unreliable), the Project relied on perception analyses to capture the impact of the Project’s crime and violence prevention activities. The original 16 intermediate indicators relied heavily on periodic surveys of the households and proved difficult to implement on a yearly basis given personnel requirements and respondent fatigue. The Bank and JSIF revised the indicators in 2009, and the resulting intermediate indicators were straightforward, easy to measure and captured the Project’s key outputs. The M&E design included various data collection tools, such as focus group discussions, citizen report cards, and a pre and post-Project household baseline survey and an impact evaluation study. JSIF also had a management information system in place from the NCDP that was updated for the Project to monitor material inputs, number of beneficiaries and additional indicators among other data points to promote efficient and transparent M&E. 33. Hands-on M&E Implementation. The M&E framework became ingrained in the Project communities. Community committees collected data, and JSIF’s CLOs verified the data through regular on-the-ground checks, during sub-project implementation and at the end of every month. In addition, regular focus groups 28 were conducted and a citizen report card was used in the final year to assess residents’ satisfaction with the Project. JSIF also prepared semi-annual progress reports to monitor and evaluate activities. A baseline survey was carried out at the Project’s outset and an impact evaluation study was carried out after the Project’s completion. 34. Agile M&E Utilization. The data generated from the M&E process was used to adapt project activities to each community’s needs on an annual basis. For instance, communities’ high demand for assistance in obtaining birth certificates resulted in a second phase of “Operation Certification.” JSIF had an established channel through which indicator information and progress reports were discussed at various levels of the organization and sent to the Managing Director. 35. The Project also received a grant from the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) to support the Ministry of National Security (MNS) in building a crime observatory to monitor crime levels throughout Kingston. At the time of completion of this Project, the observatory was tracking crime and violence data for four key incidence types in five parishes and was beginning to cross validate the data. The ICR team was easily able to request and receive information on homicide rates for the Project’s target communities as well as the control communities. Prior to the development of the observatory, the government was unable to quantify crime details at the community level and therefore unable to factor that data into crafting a more effective prevention strategy. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 36. Exemplary Social and Environmental Safeguard Management. In many ways, the social performance of the Project was exemplary. JSIF fully complied with the provisions of the Land 28 JSIF organized community focus groups in 2007, 2009 and 2011, as well as during the impact evaluation. JSIF hired consultants to conduct the focus groups in 2007 and 2011. A JSIF staff member conducted the focus groups in 2009. 19 Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework, successfully screening for cases of land acquisition and preparing abbreviated resettlement action plans acceptable to the Bank. JSIF also conducted the necessary due diligence regarding donation of land to the Project, ensuring that all land transfers were properly documented and witnessed and had un-encumbered titles. Beyond issues of land acquisition and resettlement, the Project successfully implemented a grievance redress system, a system for maximizing employment on works contracts within the local community, as well as a process to screen projects for a range of other social impacts, including gender relations. As part of this Project JSIF received ISO 14001 certification for environmental management; JSIF was the first organization in the English-speaking Caribbean to receive this certification. In 2013, JSIF was named winner of the 2013 Jamaica Environmental Action Award in the waste management category. JSIF demonstrated highly satisfactory institutional capacity to manage both environmental and social safeguards. 37. Financial Management Shortcomings. The main shortcoming was the identification of undocumented expenditures from 2007 to 2009. JSIF carried out a reconciliation exercise to clarify these expenditures and identified an overdraft in several infrastructure sub-categories. The Project was restructured in November 2013 to reallocate funds between Project categories to compensate for the overdraft. JSIF also experienced high levels of financial management staff turnover during implementation, which disrupted financial management continuity. In regard to procurement, despite the many challenges associated with contracting works in the Project, JSIF demonstrated high capacity to manage procurement processes. In general, procurement activities were carried out in compliance with arrangements agreed on in the Project financing agreement and the Operations Manual. No major procurement compliance issues arose during implementation. Post-Completion Operation / Next Phase 38. The World Bank Group’s Board recently approved a second phase of the Project, the Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP, P146460), which aims to maintain the Project’s core focus on public safety enhancement and improved access to basic services in inner cities. The ICDP focuses on 18 different communities but includes activities to enhance service providers’ capacity to operate in inner city communities. The ICDP will also continue to support the development of the crime observatory. GoJ programs, such as the CRP, and local non-governmental organizations will continue to operate in the ICBSP’s 12 communities. 3. Assessment of Outcomes Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: High 39. The Project’s objectives, design and impact of its implementation responded to Jamaica’s key inner-city challenges and supported the GoJ’s Medium Term Socio-Economic Framework Plan. The Project continues to be very relevant today. Inner city violence, poverty rates, access to basic services and unemployment rates continue to pose challenges to sustainable and inclusive urban growth. Youth unemployment is particularly high; 33 percent of young (age 15 to 24) women and 25 percent of young men were unemployed in 2010. The Project also continues to be highly relevant in terms of the GoJ’s policy priorities. The GoJ developed and is implementing a National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy, whose first pillar is crime prevention through community development. In addition, the GoJ launched the CRP, which focuses on enhancing the delivery of government services to 100 vulnerable communities in the most violent parishes through supporting initiatives in the following 20 priority areas: (i) governance; (ii) youth development; (iii) safety and justice; (iv) socio-economic development; and (v) social development. Furthermore, the GoJ’s “Vision 2030” highlights the need for a holistic approach to reducing crime and violence and sustainable urban and rural development. 40. The structure and implementation arrangements of the Project also still have high levels of relevance. As mentioned in the Context section, the ICBSP Project represented a change in ethos on how to approach crime and violence prevention in Jamaica. Given the ICBSP’s successful implementation, the integrated, two-pronged approach to crime and violence prevention developed in the ICBSP Project is being extended to new projects in Jamaica and has shaped new crime prevention initiatives. For instance, the recently approved ICDP Project builds upon the design of the ICBSP Project (incorporating infrastructure with skill- and capacity-building exercises) and employs very similar implementation arrangements (JSIF will lead and utilize the same on the ground approach, including CLOs, CBOs, CBC). 41. The Project is also still very relevant to the Bank’s strategy. The Jamaica Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for FY2014 to 2017 (No. 85158-JM) emphasizes promoting more sustainable and inclusive growth including, among other foci, capacity building to strengthen social and climate resilience. The strategy scales up successful interventions aimed at protecting the poor, creating opportunities for the vulnerable, and helping communities to reduce poverty and address crime and violence. The strategy also places an increased emphasis on helping improve the enabling environment for private sector development and growth, as part of fostering sustained improvements in shared prosperity. 42. The Project directly supported the Bank’s twin goals of promoting shared prosperity (the Project included an array of activities to build the capacity of community residents to formally participate in the economy) and eliminating extreme poverty (the Project extended access to basic infrastructure services to the country’s poorest residents). Given the continued high relevance of the Project’s objectives, the Bank and JSIF have prepared the Second Phase, ICDP Project. 29 Achievement of Project/Program Development Objectives Rating: High 43. The Project surpassed its two outcome-level indicators, providing basic infrastructure services to 61,953 residents 30 in inner city communities and increasing residents’ sense of security in their communities by 30.6 percent. 31 The Project also achieved its nine intermediate indicators. The Project was oftentimes the single largest investor in the communities. Prior to the Project, the communities had minimal or no state presence. The Project’s objective “to improve the quality of life in twelve of the Borrower’s inner city areas and poor urban informal settlements” was met primarily through improving access to basic services, enhancing public safety and strengthening community capacity to participate in the formal economy. Table 1 reflects the combined impact of these activities and illustrates the overall improvement in the community environment post-Project. The results captured in Table 1 compare the household baseline survey that was conducted at the outset of the Project with the survey data from the impact evaluation conducted immediately prior to the Project’s close. The survey captured the responses of 700 households living in the targeted communities. 29 Project Information Document, Second Inner Cities Basic Services for the Poor Project. 30 See Annex II for detail on how these 61,953 community members benefited from infrastructure investments. 31 91% of respondents felt safe or very safe, exceeding the Project’s target of 75%. Trevor Hamilton, March 2014 report. 21 44. Table 1: Key Results from the Impact Evaluation Survey Question Post-Project (% increase over baseline) Percentage of respondents that +30.6% felt safe or very safe Percentage of households that +18% would like to stay in the community Percentage who would like to +19% start a business 45. Improving access to basic urban infrastructure. The impact of improving access to basic services was felt far beyond the work itself. As described in the Implementation section, the communities were involved in the construction of the infrastructure works, generating jobs and community ownership. CBC was used whenever possible, 32 and the placement of works resulted from consultations with communities and contemplated Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The infrastructure works also helped increase residents’ sense of security and improved relationships with state agencies. 46. The paving of roads (22.30 km total) in the communities enabled greater economic activity, 33 solid waste collection, and taxi and fire truck access among other benefits. The strategic placement of skips and drums (30 in total) 34 in the communities and the provision of a collection truck enabled regular solid waste pick-up. Prior to the Project, solid waste collection was not taking place consistently given the NSWMA’s hesitance to enter the communities because of violence, poor roads, the lack of skips and the lack of trucks to service the communities. To compensate, materials were oftentimes burned, posing environmental risks. 35 The construction of water mains and rehabilitation of the sewer network enabled new or improved access for 3,576 and 478 households respectively. Prior to the Project, most residents had access to debilitated water mains. The NWC had not maintained its formal operations in many of these communities given the level of violence and the difficulties associated with payment collection. As of this writing, all the households are still pending connection to the networks and four of the five improved sewage pipelines are pending activation; connecting households to the systems and activating sewage pipelines is a responsibility of the NWC and outside JSIF’s control. 47. The Project also engaged in smaller-scale infrastructure adjustments to enhance citizens’ sense of security on the street. Prior to the Project, tall, non-porous zinc fences encircled homes, which inhibited the number of community members’ “eyes on the road.” Adopting a lesson learned from projects in South Africa, the Project supported a community initiative to remove zinc fences and build block walls 32 Over 40 contracts, including four works contracts, were carried out using the CBC methodology. Over US$340,000 was received as in cash and in kind community contribution for all ICBSP subprojects over the course of the ICBSP. 33 JSIF anecdotal evidence: the presence of paved roads led to an increase of non-community residents at local businesses. 34 Due to the narrowness of community streets and the lack of suitable locations (in terms of proximity to community residences and businesses), the number of skip sites had to be reduced from 50 to 30; the placement of the skips was decided upon through consultations with both the communities and the NSWMA. 35 The Project supported an environmental warden program in which community members were trained and given the right to fine people who liter. 22 of lower height. Over 13,000 residents 36 benefited from this initiative. In addition, to improve the physical environment, the Project supported the construction of sports fields and five community centers that included offices for the community committees, rental spaces for small businesses as well as a hall for community wide-events. 37 48. Given the Project’s limited financial and human resource and expansive scope, the goal of involving the NWC, NWSMA, JPS Co, Ltd. and other state agencies was not to extend access to 100 percent of the community members, but to re-introduce the state’s presence in the communities. As a JSIF staff member commented, the Project could have solely been focused on water, drainage, roads, or electricity given the enormous quantity of work pending in these communities. The Project took the first step towards laying the groundwork for improved and continued services through re-introducing the service agencies, enhancing access and improving public safety. 49. Results Table 2: Improving Access to Basic Infrastructure, Source: Citizens’ Report Card, December 2013 Survey Question Post-Project Response Maintenance and construction of community roads 73% “much better” or “better” since the Project Improved feeling of safety because of improved 46% yes roads Improvements of the community center 48% “much better” or “better” since the Project Fencing around home/yard 40% “much better” or “better” since the Project Improvement in trash collection 67% cited improvements since the Project Better relationship with the NSWMA 49% yes 50. Enhancing public safety. The Project took a two-pronged approach to promoting security – investing in physical improvements that fostered security (described above) and enhancing community capacity to prevent crime and violence. The Project supported numerous capacity building exercises, including a series of mediation and conflict resolution programs, family support programs, mentorship activities, summer camps, sports programs and parental training among others (See Annex II for more detail). Cumulative participation reached 37,140, 38 far surpassing the Project’s target of training 3,270 residents. These community capacity training activities improved community members’ perception of safety in the neighborhoods. Given that this Project was the first of its kind in Jamaica and that there was no baseline information for the control communities, the ICR team was unable to identify precise objective measures from which to compare the relative effectiveness of the capacity enhancement activities. Nevertheless, the percentage improvements in the communities demonstrate that the Project positively impacted community members’ perception of public safety. 51. Results Table 3: Enhancing Public Safety, Source: Citizens’ Report Card, December 2013 36 The over 13,000 figure represents the number of residents (covering 3,260 households) whose homes had zinc fence substituted with block wall. 972 residents participated in certification initiatives and participated in the construction of the walls, and other residents participated only in construction. 37 In addition, the Project financed four mobile community centers. 38 This number includes double counting for those residents that participated in more than one activity. 23 Survey Question Post-Project Response Do you believe the community is less crime prone 52% yes since the Project? Have JSIF’s corner talks, level the vibes session or 32% yes other mediation and conflict resolution activity improved your feeling of safety within your community? How would you rate the changes in how your 89% “better” or “much better” family members managed conflict situations since your exposure to the Project? Since the Project do you have a better relationship 32% “agree” or “strongly agree” with the police? 52. Strengthening community capacity to participate in the formal economy. The Project supported an array of education and employment programs, including GSAT classes, recreational activities, homework classes, remedial education, youth engagement, computer training, apprenticeship training among others, that promoted residents’ active involvement in Jamaica’s formal society and integration in the economy (See Annex II for more detail). Cumulative participation reached 32,691, 39 far surpassing the Project’s target of training 4,785 residents. As a result of the training courses, 815 residents obtained certificates affirming their expertise and 91 residents received full-time employment offers. The Project also supported 91 trainings for parish councils and CBOs, surpassing the Project’s target of 20 training sessions. 53. Results Table 4: Strengthening Community Capacity, Source: Citizens’ Report Card, December 2013 Survey Question Post-Project Your educational opportunities (including 46% “much better” or “better” since the Project vocational training) Since the Project do you think you are able to 43% “strongly agree” or “agree” work things out better with your neighbor? Since the Project do you have a stronger 43% “strongly agree” or “agree” community spirit? Efficiency Rating: Substantial 54. At appraisal, two approaches were used to evaluate the investment: (a) a cost benefit analysis for water and sewerage that used willingness to pay to estimate the benefits; and (b) a cost effectiveness analysis for all other interventions. The cost effectiveness analysis was completed with a “reverse” economic analysis, in which willingness to pay at a 12 percent economic rate of return was estimated. Results showed that: (a) water and sewerage interventions were expected to be economically viable; and (b) the least-cost alternative was selected for each of the interventions. 39 This number includes double counting for those residents that participated in more than one activity. 24 55. For this evaluation two approaches were used as well: (a) a cost benefit analysis for interventions on road, education, and training; and (b) a comparison of the results of cost effectiveness approach at appraisal to actual costs for all interventions. To compare the results at appraisal and at closing, actual costs in nominal prices were transformed to 2006 prices taking out the effect of inflation and exchange rate fluctuation. The cost benefit analysis for water and sewerage analysis was not used for the closing evaluation given that the households are still pending connection to the system. 56. Results of the cost benefit analysis show that interventions on roads, education and training yielded returns of 12, 16, and 39 percent 40 respectively. 57. Results of the comparison analysis of expected to actual costs show that interventions had higher impacts than expected at appraisal, positively affecting the socio-economic development of the inner city areas where investments were made. This conclusion is drawn from three facts: (a) real costs of interventions (at 2006 prices) were 24 percent lower than foreseen at appraisal; (b) the number of actual beneficiaries (about 62 thousand) was 3 percent higher than expected (60 thousand) bringing the unit cost per beneficiary 27 percent down; and (c) the Project achieved its two PDO-level results indicators. 58. Although the Project generated positive economic benefits and was executed more efficiently than had been foreseen at appraisal, there were minor efficiency shortcomings. Namely, the Project did not accrue benefits from the water and sewerage household connections during the lifetime of the Project as originally anticipated in the cost benefit analysis. The cost benefit analysis’ original design, however, was overly ambitious given that connecting households to the network fell outside JSIF’s responsibility. Evaluation of Actual Cost versus Foreseen at Appraisal ACTUAL ACTUAL/ Actual PAD (2006 prices) PAD reduction (%) Total Project (000 USD) 32,757 24,828 0.76 24% Unit cost (USD/person) 546 401 0.73 27% Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory 59. The ICR rates the overall outcome of the Project as Satisfactory based on “high” ratings for relevance and efficacy and “substantial” rating for efficiency. 40 The return on training was calculated by projecting the earnings (over ten years) of the community members who obtained jobs after participating in the certificate programs. The analysis assumed that 77 percent of the salaries for the target ICBSP beneficiaries consists of external leakages and transfer payments The Project can also not take full credit for the attainment of these jobs given that variables outside the scope of the Project undeniably assisted or limited the job attainment rate. The employed community members may also not retain the jobs for the projected ten-year period. 25 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 60. Screening to Promote Gender Parity. One of the topics addressed through the social screening process was an analysis of the Project’s impact on gender relations. During the social screening process, social officers recorded how many men and women participated in project planning meetings. Social officers and members of the Project sought to promote the role of women as workers in construction contracts, challenging women’s traditional role in the workplace. Prior to the approval of each sub- project, a gender breakdown of identified beneficiaries was provided. Although construction-related work is traditionally seen as a “male” activity in Jamaica, women were successfully hired on ICBSP construction sites. To accomplish this, JSIF used a community employment liaison and stressed the need for gender parity among those employed (both to the employment liaison and to the wider community, most significantly during subproject information meetings). Contractors also received gender- sensitization training. 61. Gender-Specific Interventions In Jamaica, female-headed families tend to be poorer and have more women and children as part of the household. With this in mind, the Project piloted the Bridge Jamaica program in partnership with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and other agencies. The Bridge Jamaica program provided focused social services to ten female-headed families over the course of two years. The program also facilitated a Bridge Jamaica teen club (23 members in May 2011), which successfully worked to build resilience of the program’s teenagers to manage a range of risks, including teenage pregnancy. 41 JSIF has expanded on this pilot version and is currently carrying out the Bridge program with 28 families outside the Project’s communities. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 62. Increased Capacity to Identify Crime-Prone Areas. The crime observatory, which is housed in the MNS, is beginning to supply the GoJ and agencies such as JSIF with quantitative, community- specific information on homicide levels. The crime observatory is still in its initial phase but will help the GoJ target investments towards communities with high levels of crime. The Statistical Institute of Jamaica, which undertakes censuses and other in-field demographic data collection, and the SDC, which also undertakes in-field demographic data collection and creates community profiles, are conducting a boundary rectification process. The boundaries formerly used by PIOJ and the SDC for the communities differ. In addition to supporting the ‘formalization’ of these communities, the established boundaries will help service providers, police and other government and non-government entities coordinate their services and interventions. 63. Increased Community Committee Capacity. The community committees have also been strengthened through their high level of involvement in coordinating and supervising implementation of various community infrastructure projects as well as their involvement in the Project’s various community programs. The community centers have provided formal office space for the committees as well as a potential future income source through space rentals for events and leased space for community businesses (e.g. a hair salon owned by a community resident). 41 JSIF 26 64. Strengthened Country Systems Capacity with respect to Safeguards. As part of the Project, JSIF became the first organization in the English-speaking Caribbean to receive an ISO 14001:2004 certification. JSIF’s ISO certified environmental management systems helped instill a culture of environmentally positive practices. Approximately eighty percent of contractors working with JSIF comply with the environmental safeguards. JSIF developed a method to quickly identify non- compliance with safeguard policies by employing environmental officers, technical officers and external supervisors to monitor the civil works projects weekly. JSIF applies environmental and social safeguards regardless of the funding source. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 65. JSIF’s Strategic Role as a Community Liaison. JSIF substantially improved its screening process for identifying at risk children and youth in inner city communities and has increasingly acted as an intermediary, connecting at-risk youths in inner cities to NGOs, the private sector and other organizations that provide preventive social and youth development services. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 66. The risk to the development outcome is Moderate. The Project supported training for community maintenance committees as well as the development of a maintenance plan for the infrastructure works. The committees have the capacity to do minor repairs themselves and engage the relevant authorities should major repairs be necessary. The community centers are also projected to provide the communities with a source of income (through space rental) to perform maintenance operations and carry out community initiatives. In the 2013 Citizen Report Card Survey, 85 percent of respondents answered “yes” to the question, “Do you believe the interventions will be sustainable?” Nevertheless, service delivery sustainability is closely linked to the capacity of the service providers to recover their costs and to enter the communities. The capacity of the communities’ ability to pay for services, however, is questionable and hinges on employment opportunities and broader economic trends in Jamaica. In addition, it is unknown whether financing to continue many of the violence prevention, youth education and recreation and alternative livelihood programs will be secured. One of the takeaways from the Project’s impact evaluation was the need for project design to plan for post-Project sustainability – perhaps through developing public-private relationships or through helping communities establish funds for ongoing maintenance of the infrastructure improvements. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 67. The Bank team performed a comprehensive analysis of the NCDP and other related Projects and integrated lessons learned in the Project design. The innovative combination of promoting community based intervention and extending access to basic infrastructure was thoroughly developed in the Project Appraisal Document. The design was ambitious and highly relevant both to the Bank and the Borrower. The Bank design team could have more robustly assessed the complexity of the Project in terms of the scope of the activities relative to the size of the loan and the timeframe as well as the risks associated with the number of (and capacity of) the organizations involved in implementation. The Bank team also 27 could have, as part of the procurement plan, better facilitated the engagement of local firms. In addition, the Bank team could have more closely anticipated the extended timeframe associated with the land tenure and micro-finance subcomponents, as well as the practicality of the original M&E framework. Bank Performance in Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 68. The Bank team closely monitored Project progress and identified and responded to major implementation challenges. For instance, the Bank supervision team worked closely with JSIF to prioritize works when the national economic crisis prompted a tightened fiscal framework. During the MTR, the Bank team adjusted the Project’s scope, identifying the need to stop the microfinance and land tenure works. JSIF also highlighted the value of the Bank’s assistance in the development of the crime observatory. JSIF noted that financial management support from the Bank could have been strengthened through more consistent feedback from the FM specialist and participation of the FM specialist as an integrated member of the team conducting supervision missions. JSIF also noted that the Bank could have provided more hands-on technical support on the microfinance and land titling activities during their initial phases given JSIF’s limited experience in these areas. Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 69. Given the Bank’s Moderately Satisfactory preparation and Satisfactory supervision of the Project, the ICR team rates the Bank’s overall performance as Satisfactory. Borrower Performance Government of Jamaica Performance Rating: Satisfactory 70. The Project benefited from a high level of commitment from the GoJ during preparation and implementation. The GoJ complied with all covenants and agreements, and the Project became a pillar of the GoJ’s CRP. During the fiscal crisis, the GoJ ensured that the Project received enough funds to move forward. The GoJ also supported the Project through providing additional funds for personnel, electricity and other expenses incurred by JSIF. The GoJ’s commitment to the goals of the Project is highlighted by its solicitation of the ICDP Project. Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Satisfactory 71. The Project successfully implemented sub-projects based on genuine community need because of JSIF’s extensive community consultation process during the design of the Project and hands-on supervision during implementation. JSIF went above and beyond Project expectation in the quantity and range of capacity building exercises. JSIF also disseminated results from the Project by sharing various results stories with local newspapers and radio talk shows. In addition, JSIF played a significant role in connecting community residents with other government, non-profit and private sector projects of interest. In the 2013 Citizen Report Card survey, 62 percent of respondents felt that the JSIF Project team was organized/well-prepared. JSIF faced minor shortcomings in terms of financial reporting (see the Implementation section). 28 6. Lessons Learned 72. Community engagement in project design during preparation and implementation helps ensure relevance and builds community capacity. JSIF conducted a comprehensive, hands-on community consultation process that included focus groups and rapid needs assessments to determine the activities included in the Project. The community committees monitored the activities and based on resident and committee feedback, JSIF adapted the activities each year to meet each community’s needs. This flexible and highly participatory approach resulted in activities that were in line with community needs: 84 percent of community members agreed that the best projects had been chosen for the communities. 42 In addition, the involvement of the community committees in implementation helped develop their capacity to independently orchestrate community-wide activities post-Project. For instance, after the Project stopped financing summer camps, communities had the capacity to apply for funds from the GoJ, administer costs and carry out the camps on their own. The Project’s use of CBC was also key to successful implementation and building community capacity. CBC enhanced JSIF’s relationship with the community, increased community ownership of the works, built community member’s skill set to find future work opportunities, and provided community members with short-term employment. 73. Ensure service provider commitment at the outset for long-term sustainability. One of the main implementation and sustainability challenges the Project faced was attaining the service providers’ commitment to assume responsibility for the works and to provide service to the areas. The service providers were reluctant to enter the communities based on internal financial and technical constraints as well as the communities’ low capacity to pay for services. The service providers had signed MoUs, affirming their commitment to the Project, but this proved too weak of a measure to guarantee their active involvement and commitment to the Project. This challenge could have been lessened had the Project promoted further engagement at the sector and ministry levels to ensure that the investments were tangibly supported by the sector and further analyzed cost recovery mechanisms. 74. Adopt a community-wide approach as opposed to a partial community approach. To maximize the reach of the Project and to catalyze change in communities, the Project targeted sections of twelve communities. The “sectionalized” approach caused tension within the communities given that at times houses along one side of the road were receiving access to a new service and houses on the other side of were not. Community members and JSIF highlighted the importance of increasing sensitivity to this issue in future projects to limit community conflict. 75. Extended timelines for multi-sectoral urban development projects, particularly those that incorporate crime and violence risk mitigation activities. The value of continued and consistent engagement with clients such as JSIF cannot be underestimated. The GoJ sought the Bank’s assistance with this innovative, multi sector project given successful past experience working together. The Bank had the confidence to finance a highly ambitious project given JSIF’s demonstrated capacity to implement. In addition to JSIF and the Bank’s past experience working together, the Project benefited from having a seven (as opposed to a “typical” five-year) time frame. Not unlike other innovative multi- sectoral projects, the Project had a slow launch due, in part, to the complexity of coordinating various sector agencies and the novelty of the Project’s approach to crime and violence reduction; however, once the Project gathered momentum with respect to community buy-in, the Project strongly performed and achieved its various objectives. 42 Citizen Report Card Survey 2013 29 76. Take into account local market capacity when designing procurement approach. The Project confronted several procurement challenges that delayed implementation. Most local firms did not have enough prior experience to bid on large contracts (over US$1.5 million), limiting their participation. The British firm, HTSPE, that won the Project’s initial, large contract (to prepare designs for the infrastructure works and to carry out the baseline survey among other activities) did not conduct a thorough, on-the-ground assessment of each community and, as such, developed designs that did not appropriately reflect the needs of the communities. The Bank team could have facilitated the participation of local firms with a better on-the-ground understanding of the communities by breaking the initial contract into smaller contracts. Making the contracts accessible to local firms, however, would not have offered a golden solution. Many local firms were hesitant to bid for works in the 12 communities given the small scale of the individual projects and the security risks the firms foresaw in entering the communities. The few firms willing to enter the communities became overburdened with work during the implementation of the Project, leading to overall delays. The procurement plan could have more thoroughly assessed and strategized how to effectively engage local and international firms. 77. Ensure M&E approach takes into account latest best practices as well as local context. The Project’s initial baseline survey was not well-designed in that, among other problems, it did not include data from control groups or sufficiently large sample sizes, which rendered the baseline survey significantly less useful in assessing the impact of project activities. The intermediate indicators were largely based on household surveys, which made subsequent data collection difficult given the time and cost associated with conducting the surveys and respondent fatigue from frequent surveys. When JSIF and the Bank revised the intermediate indicators, JSIF had not been consistently collecting survey data from households (in part because some works were still pending execution and also because the information required was challenging to collect). Once the indicators were revised, JSIF began actively collecting information on the progress of the Project. One mechanism JSIF used successfully for data collection, verification and real-time feedback on progress was employing CLOs, who had a consistent presence in the communities. 78. Take political balance into account in project design. One design decision that played a key role in the success of the Project was the decision of the community selection committee to include a criterion on party of the local government administration. In Jamaica, political allegiance can be a polarizing issue. The ICBSP communities had an even balance between the two leading political parties and support for the Project did not waiver between administration changes. 79. Leveraging activities with multiplier affects. The Project’s Operation Certification helped 3,550 community residents obtain birth certificates. Resident’s demand for the certification program exceeded JSIF’s initial expectations, and 100 percent of participating residents reported satisfaction with the activity. 43 Having a birth certificate formalizes citizenship and, in Jamaica, enables access to a range of support programs. A birth certificate allows one to access civil registration documents (e.g. passport, Tax Registration Number, National Insurance Scheme Number), which are needed for employment and for other non-governmental services like the issuing of visas. In addition, citizens without birth certificates cannot take standardized tests or be enrolled in a skills training program. Although there is no direct link, since the Project’s implementation of the birth certificate program, the GoJ has mandated that all Jamaicans receive birth certificates regardless of their ability to pay. 43 Trevor Hamilton & Associates Center for Excellence, Impact Evaluation, May 21, 2014. 30 7. Comments on Issues Raised By Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners 80. The Borrower was in agreement with all of the ratings in the ICR. The ICR Team incorporated the Borrower’s feedback on the ICR; there were no points of disagreement. 31 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) 44 Appraisal Actual Percentage of Estimate (USD Appraisal Components (USD millions, millions) (Actual) May 31, 2007) December 31, 2012 Component 1- Access to 21.85 21.36 97.76% Services Component 2 – Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity 3.9 5.65 144.87% Building Component 3 – Project 6.33 7.10 112.16% Management Total Baseline Cost (including physical and 32.13 34.11 106.16% price contingencies) PPF cost .65 .65 100% Total Project Costs 32.78 34.76 106.04% Front-end fee IBRD .07 .07 .07 Total Financing Required 32.8 34.83 106.03% (b) Financing Appraisal Actual Percentage of Estimate (USD Appraisal Source of Funds (USD millions, millions) (Actual) May 31, 2007) December 31, 2013 Counterpart financing 3.5 3.06 87% International Bank for Reconstruction and 29.3 31.77 106% Development Total 32.80 34.83 106.03 44 Data provided by JSIF and includes counterpart funding. 32 Annex 2. Project Output by Component Component 1 - Access to Services Roads 22.30 km of road rehabilitated and maintained. Roads had a transformative effect on the communities. In the CRC survey, 46% if respondents said that the roads works have improved feeling of safety within the community. Roads works were also the most cited activity in the “Project strengths” section of the CRC survey. Water Mains The mains provide access for 3,576 households. The NWC will begin a sensitization and installation program in June 2014 to regularize water service in the communities. Connections for residents who have applied during and immediately following the sensitization period should be finalized by October 2014. Sewerage The Project financed the rehabilitation of five sewage pipelines that correspond to 478 households. One of the five pipelines is now in use, benefiting approximately 95 households. Solid Waste The Project financed the purchase of a waste collection truck for NWSMA for Collection exclusive use in the 12 communities. The Project also financed the purchase of 51 skips. Thirty skips (or the capacity equivalent in drums) were positioned with community consultation/CPTED techniques. On a whole, community members have expressed satisfaction with waste collection (67% of respondents in the CRC survey noted an improvement in trash collection), but solid waste is still accumulating rapidly in the communities. NWSMA has limited resources to conduct more frequent collections in the communities. Microfinance Microfinance agencies approved and disbursed 402 loans over the course of the Project. Security of tenure The land titling activity was only conducted in Flankers due to the lengthy and complicated process as well as limited human resource at JSIF to oversee the implementation of this activity. The Ministry of Transport, Works, and Housing has received 710 Splinter titles, to be later awarded to Flankers residents upon payment. Community The Project financed nine community centers, four of which are mobile. The fixed Centers community centers have space to rent for stores as well as a large event space. The revenue generated from these community centers is expected to help the community committees maintain the centers and promote community wide activities. In the CRC survey, 77% of respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with the community centers. Crime prevention CPTED techniques were applied in the: (i) lighting for community center; (ii) the through construction of football fields, multipurpose courts and other recreational spaces; environmental (iii) fencing of both residential (zinc-fence substitution) and community design recreational facilities; and (iv) road rehabilitation, including the repair of manhole covers located in the roadway. Component 2 - Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building 33 All Component 2 subcomponents benefited from the mobilization and community outreach strategies employed by the Project. These included the use of community liaison officers, mobilization through the community committees, and national media publicity. JSIF also tapped into partner networks to publicize and mobilize community residents. There was particularly high demand in the communities for education, skills training and mediation/conflict resolution interventions. 45 Mediation and Conflict Resolution Activities Mediators training 87 people were trained as mediators. An additional 35 people did not finish the practicum and were thus not certified. Level da vibes 9,154 participants. Level Da Vibes sessions originally focused on violence session prevention and developmental issues through informal discussion, role play and cultural events. In 2010, it was adjusted to include a wide range of activities focused on life skills development to: (i) inculcate positive values and attitudes; and (ii) enhance talent and skills for upward mobility, provision of income and sustainable development. Activities included inter alia: (i) pycho-social initiatives (which included pre and post psychological/knowledge, attitude, practice and behavior assessment, life skills training and individual/group psychotherapy sessions by psychiatrist/psychologist/clinical social workers); (ii) a counseling and mediation center; and (iii) sessions with rival gangs for the establishment of Community Stabilization Youth Alliances and Community Stabilization Agreements. Conflict resolution 2,382 participants. In the 2013 CRC, 89% of respondents felt that they manage and anger conflict much better since the intervention, and 43% felt that since the management intervention they can work things out better with neighbors. sessions, Code of Conduct Sessions, and Behavior and Attitude Change Sessions Operation 3,550 participants. The initiative aimed to help residents obtain their birth certification certificates. Having a birth certificate formalizes citizenship and, in Jamaica, enables access to a range of support programs. A birth certificate allows one to access civil registration documents (e.g. passport, Tax Registration Number, National Insurance Scheme Number), which are needed for employment and for other non-governmental services like the issuing of visas. In addition, persons without birth certificates cannot take standardized tests or be enrolled in a skills training program. Since the Project’s implementation of the birth certificate program, the GoJ has mandated that all Jamaicans receive birth certificates regardless of their ability to pay. BRIDGE Jamaica 10 households. Bridge Jamaica program provided focused social services to ten female-headed families over the course of two years. The program also facilitated 45 JSIF 34 a Bridge Jamaica teen club (23 members in May 2011), which successfully worked to build resilience of the program’s teenagers to manage a range of risks, including teenage pregnancy. 46 JSIF has expanded on this pilot version and is currently carrying out the Bridge program with 28 families outside the Project’s communities. Community 3,388 participants. The original fair was a one-off project implemented by the information fairs community group in Whitfield Town to gauge community interest and to introduce them to services available to enhance community and personal development. Later, this model was used in all the communities, particularly during the Operation Certification registration periods. Mentorship 431 relationships established. The mentorship program was piloted in seven communities. In 2013, the final program was conducted only in Federal Gardens. Cultural animation 943 participants. In 2009, a series of community groups participated in a national cultural festival. In 2010 and 2011, the focus was on training select persons (animators) to administer and train other community members in the cultural animation strategies. Summer camps 9,708 participants. After the Project stopped financing summer camps, communities continued hosting the camps, given the popularity and the new ‘know-how’ to apply for funds from the GoJ, administer funds, register and manage the camps. Parenting training 2,194 participants. Sports program 5,203 participants. This project sought to engender violence-free interaction and healthy competition between communities. Youth engagement and recreation activities were oversubscribed due to community mobilization, high demand for the services, and interest in a program that offered a space for persons from various community sectors (i.e., across boundaries) to integrate safely. GSAT classes and 3,283 participants. clinics Recreational 6,976 participants. Activities included: dancing, arts and crafts, drama and activities computer classes. Reading, arts and 930 participants. craft, and poster competitions Homework classes 3,513 participants. Remedial education 622 participants. Transition seminars 2,583 participants. These seminars targeted students who were about to complete 46 JSIF 35 their primary education and move on to the next stage of their education. The goal of the seminars was to inform these students about the new expectations that would be placed on them in their secondary institutions and to engage the students in figuring out how to manage these and become more active in their own educational outcomes. Guidance 976 participants. The counseling was two pronged: (i) guidance counseling for counseling behavior changes as well a grief; and (ii) psychological counseling based on assessments and referrals done by the teachers in the classes. Special Youth 627 participants. This figure represents students who were engaged in the Special Employment Youth Employment Apprenticeship Training (SYEAT) program operated by the Apprenticeship Ministry of Labor as well as, following the program’s termination, Training apprenticeships and vocational training akin to what would have been provided under the SYEAT program. The Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development activities benefited from the numerous partnerships with both community-based and national training institutions, as well as the community- based organizations that managed the projects on the ground. General results from these activities in the CRC survey included 46% of respondents citing job creation as better or much better and 46% of respondents citing educational opportunities as better or much better. Youth engagement 1,788 participants. This program was developed in conjunction with the communities who said that they would prefer a program that specifically targeted unattached youth 17-25 years old who would not have been able to benefit under the previous youth summer employment programs because of their low skill and literacy levels. Zinc fence 972 participants participated in certification initiatives. Initially, low literacy removal/block wall levels in the communities prevented this certification initiative from moving construction & forward. Later, changes to the ALSD program allowed for the simultaneous construction on site enrollment of students in construction certification programs and remedial certification literacy/numeracy classes. Through this methodology, 81 persons were able to receive certification. Over 13,000 residents (representing 3,260 households) benefited from zinc fence substitutions. Residents who did not participate in the certification course also provided labor. Ornamental fish 104 participants. The Ministry of Agriculture implemented this training. JSIF rearing training facilitated the participation of individuals from the ICBSP communities. SANDALS training 30 participants from Flankers (close to Montego Bay resort area). initiative 36 Hospitality, auto 742 participants. The HEART Trust facilitated and certified these programs and mechanic, JSIF facilitated the participation of residents from Flanker. computer, and tile laying training 37 Annex 3. Cost Benefit Analysis Jamaica Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project 1. The objective of the Project was to improve the quality of life of about 60,000 residents in twelve inner city areas and poor urban informal settlements by improving access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, and enhanced public safety and community capacity. Methodology 2. At appraisal, two approaches were used to evaluate the economic impact of the investment: a) Cost benefit analysis for water and sewerage; using willingness to pay to estimate the benefits; and b) Cost effectiveness analysis for all other interventions. The analysis of these interventions was completed with a “reverse” economic analysis, which had the objective of finding the willingness to pay that would have provided a 12 percent economic rate of return. Results showed that: a) water and sewerage interventions were expected to be economically viable; and b) the least-cost alternative was selected for each of the interventions. 3. This evaluation used two approaches as well: a) Cost benefit analysis; and b) Comparison of least-costs options selected at appraisal to actual costs. Cost benefit analysis was conducted for road, education, and training. It was not used for water and sanitation interventions, given that only 95 households have been connected to the sewer system, and no households have been connected to the water system. Eight water mains were installed and have been gradually handed over to the NWC. JSIF is working very closely with the NWC to get households to connect to the main pipes. The NWC is responsible for helping residents connect but has been hesitant to extend service to the communities given their low capacity to pay. The NWC highlighted that people in these communities illegally tap into the system, and that the NWC does not have the capacity to monitor connections and target payment collection. 4. Comparison of cost between least-cost alternatives selected at appraisal to actual costs of interventions. The method was applied as follows: expected costs of interventions were compared to actual costs. If actual costs were lower than expected, the Project yielded higher benefits than expected; the contrary occurs when actual costs were higher than expected. For the comparison, actual costs in nominal prices were transformed to 2006 prices and inflation and exchange rate fluctuation were taken out. To make an accurate comparison, the number of beneficiaries was included and a unit cost was estimated. Cost Benefit Analysis 5. JSIF hired Trevor Hamilton & Associates Center for Excellence, a consultancy firm, to evaluate the Project from an economic point of view. They conducted a cost benefit analysis for interventions on road, education, and training interventions. Given the limited information available, they made 38 assumptions based on their knowledge and experience. The assumptions and results are presented below. Road Intervention 6. Many of the contracts for road rehabilitation included other infrastructure in what is called an “integrated infrastructure” contract. It was not possible to identify the cost for the roads by themselves. There was no information of traffic counts, to estimate the impact on the interventions. 7. The Consultants used the following assumptions: 8. Table 1. Road Intervention Assumption and Benefits (Source: Trevor Hamilton Associates Center for Excellence, Impact Evaluation). Assumptions No. of km of roads 22.3 rehabilitated Average cost of J$24,432 rehabilitation per meter Total investment costs J$544,8333,600 Annual maintenance J$10,896,672 costs – 2% of capital Benefits Average Daily Traffic 5,000 Count (motor vehicles) No. of persons moving 56,250 per day Annual inflation rate 9.8% Annual growth rate of 2.2% traffic Without Project With Project Net Benefits Per motor vehicle .158 0.146 0.012 Fuel usage in liters per 3.5234 3.2558 .2676 km Fuel usage in liters per J$482.71 J$446.04 J$36.66 22.3km Fuel usage per 22.3 km at $137/liter Typical wear per 22.3 J$10.22 J$9.02 J$1.20 km Oil usage per 22.3 km J$1.74 J$1.71 J$0.03 39 Spares, Maintenance J$3.02 J$2.88 J$0.14 Total vehicle operating J$38.03 costs benefits per motor vehicle Travel time for 22.3 .637 . 587 .050 km/hrs) Average value of J$56.25 time/hour/commuter Valuation of time J$2.81 saved/commuter 9. Results showed return of 12% Education Component 10. The objectives of the intervention were: a) to increase access to literacy and numeracy programs to 600 students in the 12 targeted communities of ICBSP, thereby improving their mastery level by 40 percent by June 2011; and b) to increase GSAT preparation assistance for 550 students in the twelve communities. 11. Evaluating the achievement of these two objectives was very challenging as there was no common test done at any of the centers, and there was no instrument to evaluate this group of students. The consultants were able to match only a limited number of pre-tests and GSAT scores for the same cohort of students, and so many of the children remained unaccounted for. Results showed that out of 210 students, 24 would have entered a traditional high school compared with just 8 before the project. Based on this, the benefits were calculated as the incremental earnings for those students. 12. Results show return of 16% of this intervention. Skilled Training 13. The skills areas offered under the ICBSP included building construction, food preparation, plumbing, electrical, and welding. The Consultants’ findings on the Skills Certification program were as follows: a) focus groups indicated that demand exceeded supply by about 40%; and b) those who secured certification and gained employment were likely to earn higher income than if they were uncertified or unskilled. The Consultants estimated that the daily rate for skilled labor in construction was about 60% higher that it was for unskilled labor. Out of 4,450 people receiving training, 815 received certification. Of the certified beneficiaries, approximately 204 beneficiaries (18%) received jobs. For determining the net economic benefits for the table below, the Consultants assumed that 77% of the salaries for the target ICBSP beneficiaries consisted of external leakages and transfer payments. 40 14. The following assumptions were used for levels of employment of the 544 participants and the income level: Category Unemployed Underemployed Employed With the Project ICBSP Beneficiaries 3,115 1,131 204 Average weekly wage $1,500 $2,500 $10,200 for various categories of employment Without the Project Number of People 3,500 930 20 Average weekly wage $1,400 $2,400 $9,500 without the Project 15. Results show return of 39 percent. Cost Comparison Analysis 16. Actual costs of implemented works were USD31M, 5% lower than the expected USD32.7M. This comparison is not accurate as actual costs are expressed in nominal prices during the implementation period, while the expected costs were expressed at 2006 prices. Actual costs had to be adjusted in nominal prices to 2006 prices taking out the effect of inflation and exchange rate fluctuation. 17. According to the Statistics Institute of Jamaica the consumer price increased 123 percent from 2006 through 2013. At the same time, depreciation of the Jamaican dollar has been persistent during the period; according to the Bank of Jamaica, it depreciated 65% against the dollar. The annual average exchange rate went from J$ 65: 1USD at time of appraisal to J$ 109: 1USD in 2013 (Figure 1). Figure 1. Fluctuation of Jamaican Dollar. Exchange Rate and CPI 2006-2013 41 Source: Bank of Jamaica for the exchange rate and the Statistics Institute of Jamaica for the CPI 18. Depreciation helped the Project, as the GoJ received more money for each disbursement of IBRD funds; while inflation did the opposite, making the project costlier and so disadvantageous for the Project. To measure the impact of these fluctuations, actual costs were transformed on a year-by-year basis to 2006 prices. The results show the difference explained by: a) fluctuation of the Jamaican dollar; and b) real variation of costs of the interventions. 19. Impact of the exchange rate fluctuation was estimated transforming the yearly USD disbursements to local currency using the annual average exchange rate reported by the Bank of Jamaica. The result was compared with the amount obtained using the exchange rate at appraisal. The average exchange rate obtained from the disbursed funds was J$92.96:1USD, which compared to the exchange rate at appraisal of J$65.5:1USD, translates into a 42% gain for the Project. Impact of inflation was estimated adjusting the actual costs expressed in Jamaican dollars with the inflation rate during the implementation period. Results shows that the Project was affected on average 43% due to inflation. The net effect of fluctuation of the Jamaican dollar was only 1%, as the 42% gain obtained by depreciation was offset by the 43% loss due to inflation. 20. Results show that actual costs at 2006 prices were 24% lower than expected at appraisal (Table 1). Table 2. Comparison between Expected and Actual Costs Actual Costs Variation Nominal PAD and Appraisal prices 2006 prices 2006 prices Total Project Costs (000 USD) 32,757 31,049 24,828 -24% Average Exchange rate 65.50 92.96 42% Inflation rate -43% Variation of real costs -25% 21. Intervention in each of the components had a lower cost than expected (Table 3). Only two interventions show higher costs: 79% for community centers, and 13% for Component 2 (Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building). However, as table 3 shows, achievements were higher than expected and so the unit cost was lower (Table 4). Table 3. Expected and Actual Cost per component (000 USD) ACTUAL ACTUAL/ PAD 2006 Prices PAD Component 1. Access to Service Integrated Network Infrastructure 11,606 7,364 0.63 42 Community Centers 2,637 4,714 1.79 Zinc Fence removal and substitute 1,227 1,143 0.93 Community Basic Infrastructure/Services 4,936 3,457 0.70 Access to Financial Services 1,278 73 0.06 Tenure 613 223 0.36 Total Component 1 22,297 16,973 0.76 Component 2. Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building 3,988 4,517 1.13 Component 3. Project Management Project management unit 4,836 3,337 0.69 Operating costs and other services 1,636 - - Total component 3 6,472 3,337 0.52 Total Project 32,757 24,828 0.76 22. Actual beneficiaries were higher than expected in every component. (Table 3) Table 4. Target and actual achievement Expected at Actual/ appraisal Actual PAD Component 1. Access to Service (people) 60,000 61,953 1.03 Number of Community Centers 3 9 3.00 Component 2. Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building # Persons who participated CBO related crime, violence, and prevention activities 20,211 37,140 1.84 # Persons who participated in youth education and recreation 21,958 28,428 1.29 # Persons who participated in alternative livelihoods program 25,084 32,691 1.30 # Persons who obtained skills certification as a result of a project program 678 805 1.19 12training workshops delivered to Parish Councils and CBO 91 91 1 43 23. When costs are divided by the number of beneficiaries the result show that unit cost was 27% lower for Component 1, and 22% lower for Component 2. The community center unit cost was about 40% lower than expected. Table 4. Unit cost (USD) Expected at Actual/ appraisal Actual PAD Component 1. Access to Service (USD/person) 546 401 0.73 Community Centers (USD per center) 879,065 523,745 0.60 Component 2. Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building1 (USD per person) 59 46 0.78 1 The calculation was made with total number of persons attending one of the programs. The same person could have attended more than one.. Results. 24. The results of the cost benefit analysis shows that intervention on roads, education, and training were economically viable, yielding returns of 12%, 16%, and 39% respectively. 25. The result of comparing expected to actual costs show that interventions had higher impact than expected at appraisal, positively affecting the socio-economic development of the inner city areas where investments were made. This conclusion is drawn from three facts: a) real costs of interventions (at 2006 prices) were 24% lower than foreseen at appraisal; ii) number of actual beneficiaries (about 62 thousand) was 3% higher than expected (60 thousand) bringing the unit cost per beneficiary down by 27%; and c) the Project’s objective was achieved as it provided basic infrastructure service to about 62 thousand residents, plus additional improvements to their quality of life. According to the survey conducted after implementation, 52% of respondents felt safe or very safe, 18% households would like to stay in the community, and 19% would like to start a business. Table 6. Results of cost comparison ACTUAL ACTUAL/ Actual PAD 2006 prices PAD reduction (%) Total Project (000 USD) 32,757 24,828 0.76 24% Unit cost (USD/person) 546 401 0.73 27% 44 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit LendinglLending Abhas Jha Sr. Urban Specialist FPSI Taimur Samad Urban Specialist LCSUW Bernice Van Bronkhorst St. Urban Specialist LCSUW Asger Christensen Lead Social Development Specialist SASDI Emmanuel Njomo Consultant LCSFM Norma Rodriguez Procurement Analyst LCSPT Daniel A. Hoornweg Lead Urban Specialist FEU Supervision/ICR/ ICR Angelica Nunez Sr. Urban Specialist LCSDU Valerie Joy-Santos Eunice Sr. Urban Specialist LCSDU Anjali Acharya Environmental Spec. ENV Asger Christensen Lead Social Development Specia SASDI Katherine M. Shafer Coleman Consultant LCSHE Leanne Farrell Junior Professional Associate LCSSA Michael J. Goldberg Sr Private Sector Development LCSPF Ellen Hamilton Sr Urban Planner LCSUW Daniel A. Hoornweg Lead Urban Specialist FEU Panneer Selvam Regional Safeguards Adviser EAPCO Lakshminarayanan Patricia E. Macgowan Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT Emmanuel N. Njomo Consultant LCSFM Norma M. Rodriguez Procurement Analyst LCSPT Taimur Samad Urban Specialist LCSUW Heinrich K. Unger Consultant EAPCO Bernice K. Van Bronkhorst Sr Urban Specialist LCSUW Sunita Varada Consultant LCSPF Evelyn Villatoro Senior Procurement Specialist EAPCO Jessica Wurwarg Junior Professional Associate LCSUW Elizabeth Eiseman Consultant LCSDU Patricia Acevedo Program Assistant LCSDU 45 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY05 22.02 150.64 FY06 55.46 328.11 Total: 77.48 478.75 Supervision/ICR FY07 26.96 151.00 FY08 18.33 99.24 FY09 23.26 155.88 FY10 25.68 116.98 FY11 19.51 72.94 FY12 7.18 66.03 FY13 10.83 89.92 FY14 17.72 17.72 Total: 149.47 250.24 46 Annex 5. Borrower’s Report Borrower’s Assessment 1. The following comments serve as an assessment of the Government of Jamaica’s achievements regarding the project design, implementation and operational experience in the execution of IBRD loan agreement no. 7148 – JM. These comments will reflect on the lessons learned throughout the implementation of the project. Project’s Context 2. In 2004, the year in which project design began, the major crime and murder rates both reported significant increases. The murder rate continued to rise in 2005. Much of the criminal activity was concentrated in certain urban and peri-urban areas considered ‘inner city communities’. Among other common characteristics, these communities tended to exhibit increasing levels of public insecurity and suffer from poor access to basic services, low educational attainment and consistently high structural unemployment (due to low educational attainment, dearth of proper training, skills mismatch, few nearby employment opportunities and hiring discrimination against community residents). Project’s Relevance at the Time of Design 3. The project was very relevant to the Borrower (Government of Jamaica; GoJ). It supported the GoJ’s efforts to meet Millenium Development Goal targets and contributed to national poverty-, crime- and violence-reduction initiatives. The ICBSP also incorporated lessons learned under the implementation of other inner city urban renewal programmes. Project’s Design (PDO, Components) 4. The ICBSP was designed on the basis of a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach and financed small- and medium-scale infrastructure and social projects. The selection of project communities was led by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and involved the Ministry of National Security, the Social Development Commission (SDC) and JSIF. Hence, the project design was aligned to national priorities and reflected a multifaceted understanding of the needs of the targeted communities. 5. The Project was structured with three components, each with subcomponent activities reflected in the indicators and aligned to the PDO. The components were adequate and were largely clear in content, organised, and implementable. 6. The Project’s design was innovative because it was the first in the country to take an integrated approach to crime- and violence-prevention. Instead of hard policing and paramilitary force, the ICBSP used infrastructure and public safety methodologies to address crime and violence in the target areas. The addition of the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) Grant allowed for innovation through the development of a national crime observatory to present timely and reliable crime statistical data with coverage for the 12 ICBSP communities and the five major parishes where crime is deemed to be highest. The inclusion of this component was intended to facilitate the disaggregation of crime data for the monitoring and evaluation of the ICBSP and by extension other crime prevention Projects being 47 undertaken by the government of Jamaica and other donor agencies. The Grant also provided support to the 12 communities under its public safety component through community action planning and small soft projects for implementation. This subcomponent helped to enrich and increase the reach of beneficiaries within the ICBSP communities that the ICBSP would not have otherwise been able to achieve on its own. 7. The pre-selection of the ICBSP communities was another innovation; the JSIF feels this is most appropriate to interventions focusing on inner city communities (in contrast to rural communities). Pre- selection allowed the ICBSP to provide a focused approach over multiple years on the selected communities, which is necessary to break the cycle of crime and violence in the inner city context. One gap of this approach was the lack of complementary funds to provide for interventions along a more demand-driven methodology to both inner city communities peripheral to those selected and rural communities in general. These funds, had they been provided, would have helped to reduce the feelings of resentment and alienation from residents of communities neighbouring those of the ICBSP, for whom interventions could not be provided. Such funds, in the case of rural communities, would have also allowed for the assuaging of the feeling that inner city communities were benefiting due to their ‘badness’ – a moral hazard of providing funds solely to communities with severe crime and violence problems; other poor communities with better crime and violence outcomes may feel that they have to become ‘bad’ to benefit from development assistance. 8. The use of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) techniques was also innovative. CPTED considerations have subsequently been incorporated into the JSIF’s Management Information System (MIS) and Technical Review Committee, to ensure that all of JSIF’s relevant infrastructure interventions, regardless of donor, may benefit from the guidelines. Risks 9. The ICBSP PAD identified five critical risks. Of these, four were largely successfully mitigated. Crime and violence was sporadic and affected infrastructure implementation minimally, in only two communities. The ICBSP successfully built community capacity to allow for community engagement and ownership of project investments, which mitigated the major risks to the project posed by crime and violence. Environment and involuntary resettlement frameworks were used effectively. Ultimately, the microfinance and land tenure subcomponents were not limited by demand. 10. Although the project did suffer from limited breakdown of Memoranda of Understanding with service providers and local authorities, the extensive consultations during project preparation resulted in partners’ responsibilities being undertaken as far as was practicable (given resource constraints). 11. Other risks included the use of CBC, particularly for basic infrastructure investments and the ability of the project to establish a culture of service provider payment given limited income flows. CBC investments are comparatively low value individually, but cumulatively significant. The limited initial capacity of the community groups made necessary capacity building and limits on the number and value of CBC works contracts. Regarding bill payment, although there is evidence of payment following the electrification project in Bucknor, beneficiaries still found it difficult to pay given their income. This 48 limitation further makes it difficult for the project to persuade utility providers of any difference in cultural change, even if one exists. Project’s Implementation 12. Factors that contributed to successful implementation included: • Community and wider stakeholder involvement in subproject selection: provided clear evidence of the relevance and demand for project investments. • Community Liaisons: Social Officers and CLOs were engaged in outreach and capacity building activities with project beneficiaries. This was instrumental to improving intervention relevance to needs and community ownership and participation in planning, construction and maintenance activities. • Flexibility of indicators: allowed for project activities to be reviewed and adjusted according to changes in demand and economic growth industries. • Communication at the national and parochial levels: helped to raise awareness of project activities, highlight successes and promote results. This helped to expand participation and ownership by community residents. • Synergies with JSDF Grant: allowed for a more coordinated and targeted approach donor fund expenditure within the same geographic space, with similar development objectives. This optimised beneficiary coverage and subproject intervention scope and thus allowed for greater innovation and flexibility in sub project designs. • Partnerships: the establishment of linkages and coordination with other providers of services within targeted communities assisted with expanding and deepening impact of project activities e.g. Digicel Foundation, Citizen Security and Justice Programme, SDC, CHASE Foundation, Food for the Poor, etc. 13. The most significant delay to project implementation was the lack of suitability of the pre- formulated infrastructure designs. Over 50% of the designs had to be redone. Each design took about 6 weeks to 3 months to complete, resulting in a cumulative delay of at least 1 year, with some designs being done concurrently. Monitoring & Evaluation 14. The project’s original baseline survey was weak; the Bank-hired consultant did not report survey results for the control communities and used sample sizes (to which the Borrower agreed at the time) that produced margins of error of 10% or higher in some communities and may have resulted in inaccurate baseline measurements of community indicators. Subsequent consultants hired under the project expressed unwillingness to use the same methodologies. The selection of only four controls for the project’s twelve communities and the non-reporting of the control baselines reduced the strength of the project’s final impact evaluation by rendering a robust difference-in-differences approach impossible. 15. The project’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) design assumed that regular surveys of the project population would be carried out; if not, proper reporting on original project indicators would be impossible. Due to accuracy concerns, informal surveys were not heavily used for project indicator reporting. This led to higher M&E expenditures per survey than the design anticipated. Additionally, where interventions are concentrated over many years in communities with small populations, regular surveying is highly likely to result in respondent fatigue, particularly when delays in implementation 49 occur and respondents feel as if they are getting more surveys than benefits. This is also a particular concern for control community surveying. The revision of the indicators to rely more heavily on administrative data was crucial for project M&E success. 16. The project had two results-level indicators. Both were able to provide a method for measuring the main impact of the Project and were complementary in their ability to do this. Even so, they each suffered from intrinsic measurement drawbacks. Quantifications of access to improvements under ICBSP Component 1 were hampered by concerns of overstatements due to double-counting. To minimise this, the project chose to use the beneficiary figures for the intervention type in each community with the highest beneficiary count. This method, therefore, was unable to take into account beneficiaries from other non-overlapping infrastructure intervention types, nor persons who had benefited from microfinance loans who might have otherwise not considered themselves beneficiaries from infrastructure interventions. The measurement of the second indicator, which tracks the perception of public safety in the communities, was impeded by the inability to measure that indicator through administrative data. 17. The original intermediate-level indicators were numerous and required extensive surveying to measure: they were not able to be measured passively through the use of administrative data collected through implementation of project interventions or by the state. They were formally revised in 2009. The revised indicators did provide a clear method for measuring the project’s key outputs, as a whole. 18. The project’s M&E indicators were used regularly throughout implementation to evaluate project progress and determine areas of weakness in need of focus. 19. Due to the revision of the project’s indicators, a formula was recommended for calculating the target total of the indicators, to include work done in the years prior to the change as both targets and actual progress. The World Bank ISRs’ calculations of the targets do not, however, seem to take these years into account, possibly due to differentiating approaches / loss of knowledge following personnel changes in the Bank and at JSIF. For ease of comparison, the World Bank-recognised targets have been used in calculating the achievements of the project. Project’s Outcome Rating: Satisfactory 20. The project was still relevant to both GoJ and wider Jamaican interests at the time of completion. The project was effective in its outcomes. Both PDOs were met. The communities were generally satisfied with both project outcomes and project implementation. In 2013 Citizens’ Report Card, 98% of respondents said they would welcome the JSIF back into their communities, 84% of respondents said the best projects were chosen for the communities, and 76% of respondents believed that the project got value for money. The project indicators paint a reasonable picture of project implementation success. 21. The efficiency of the project can be measured in terms of implementation efficiency, through the ratio of administrative to subproject expenditure, and development efficiency, through the cost of the investments in comparison to their benefit to the communities. As at 31 December 2013, JSIF had spent USD 1.62M in Recurrent Costs and Other Services (under the Project Management component) to 50 provide 27.3M in infrastructural and social investment to the communities. This suggests high administrative efficiency, with recurrent costs and other services totalling 6% of direct investment expenditure. If all Project Management and Evaluation expenditure is considered (including the cost for providing major evaluations), then this represents a very reasonable 19.7% of direct investment expenditure. The cost-benefit analysis provided through the Impact Evaluation suggested a positive economic rate of return on the roads, education and skills training investments. Additional Impacts 22. JSIF institutional capacity was widely and positively affected by the ICBSP. JSIF gained significant experience in inner city project implementation, which also positively affected wider national capacity in this regard, due to knowledge sharing and the movement of former project staff to other government agencies. For example, an academic paper that focused on ICBSP best practices (alongside that of one other project implemented in inner city communities) was presented at a national conference. 23. JSIF’s capacity to implement infrastructure projects was generally increased under the ICBSP, but particularly increased due to the mandated use of CPTED techniques and the process of improving the waterlogged soil at Knollis prior to construction of the community centre, since both of these were new to the organisation. The land tenure intervention also significantly improved JSIF’s capacity to undertake these sorts of interventions and suggest policy improvements based on the experience. 24. The design and development of the national crime observatory made JSIF a pioneer in crime and injury surveillance through its product and partnership agreement with its major stakeholder, the Ministry of National Security, and the wide cross-section of other government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) which contribute to and benefit from the observatory. Sustainability – Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 25. The ability of the relevant government MDAs to absorb and maintain the infrastructure investments, particularly where community maintenance is not possible (e.g. for underground sewage pipelines) presents a risk to the communities’ development outcomes. Although MoUs were developed with and signed by all relevant MDAs, fiscal constraints and internal prioritisation exercises may limit the ability of these entities to regularly carry out maintenance. 26. In terms of social investments, although JSIF successfully piloted a number of programmes under the ICBSP and the community committees received significant experience in managing these, the sustainability of these programmes may be limited by the ability of the communities to access funds, given the limited funding disbursed by NGOs, Foundations, etc. and the continued economic hardship experienced by these communities. Additionally, where programmes relevant to a specific government MDA have been piloted, these have yet to be scaled up and institutionalised. Rating of the Bank at Design Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 27. The Bank’s input into the concept of the ICBSP, particularly in terms of its PDOs and the integration of the two main components, helped to make the project a success. Unfortunately, other 51 elements of the design worked to the project’s detriment – in particular, the hiring of a single foreign consultant to undertake infrastructure pre-formulation and baseline data collection. 28. The Project Appraisal Document’s balance in terms of providing specificity as to what sort of interventions should happen under the project, as well as some latitude for change given changing conditions on the ground, allowed JSIF a clear framework for implementation. Some of the restrictions placed on the project did provide difficulties, however, due to the project’s and the country’s particular circumstances. The detailed and multi-layered structure of the budget categories hampered project implementation: during implementation, the needs across budget categories varied and the structure as imposed made it difficult to adjust and respond. Additionally, the initial decision to tender very large infrastructure projects proved to be a challenge: there were few contractors in the higher cost categories and fewer still willing to undertake the work given the location of the project communities. However, the Bank’s acknowledgement of these and other design difficulties during implementation helped to ensure that lessons learned were acted upon: in the case above, the infrastructure projects were eventually broken into smaller packages, which allowed for their successful implementation. Rating of the Bank During Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 29. The frequency of the Bank’s supervision missions and the willingness of Bank staff to respond to expressed concerns were commendable. The JSIF found the support provided generally for the subcomponents of the project were good, but the project could have benefitted from additional Technical Support and input in new implementation areas (particularly microfinance and land tenure regularisation), given the Bank’s extensive worldwide experience. Although the focus of both the JSIF and the Bank during the first two years of implementation largely rested on the need to redesign the basic infrastructure subcomponent, the provision of technical assistance for the relatively novel elements during this time might have helped to speed up implementation and improve final results. Additionally, changes in Bank personnel, templates and reporting formats during the life of the project made for occasional disruptions to consistency. 30. In 2006, when ICBSP implementation began, the Bank had recently instituted its Client Connection system. Client Connection increased the transparency of the project’s financial data and improved the efficiency of the JSIF’s ability to manage the project’s finances. However, the relative novelty of the system on both ends contributed to errors that, even after discussion with Bank support staff at the time, were not properly resolved until years after the fact. During the push toward resolution, the support of the Bank’s team was crucial to the successful outcome. 31. The commitment of the Bank to see to the successful development and implementation of the crime observatory is highly commendable. The Bank’s responsiveness to allowing the reallocation of funds to facilitate the hiring of the best technical expertise in the field, has helped in the development of a more useful and optimal tool that can be measured against other observatories in the region. Rating of the GoJ Rating: Satisfactory 32. The role and mandate of the JSIF was clearly established in the national poverty reduction strategy. The Government was highly supportive of ICBSP’s innovative approaches furthering 52 community-driven development through access to basic infrastructure services, associated employment, training, land tenure and social services. GoJ provided over USD 3M of counterpart funding to ICBSP in a timely manner, even when facing major fiscal constraints in managing macro-economic indicators. Government representatives on the JSIF’s Board of Directors ensured that JSIF’s operations were transparent and efficient, which resulted in JSIF continuing its operations through changes in Administrations. The Government could have better mediated the difficulties between the JSIF and National Water Commission (NWC) but, in the end, the NWC was unable to facilitate flat rates and wholesale household connections in the communities because of the magnitude of the investment and returns on same. 33. The Government of Jamaica and the JSIF implemented the ICBSP with due diligence and flexibility in responding to needs and implementation issues as they arose. The core objectives of the ICBSP were met and in many areas targets were surpassed. Rating of JSIF Rating: Satisfactory 34. The JSIF effectively implemented ICBSP. JSIF staff took on the challenge of transferring greater control and responsibility to community groups, which represented a departure from usual practice and increased their workload and implementation complexity. Administrative and investment costs compared favourably with both national and international benchmarks. The JSIF maintained procedural transparency and ISO 14001:2004 status and was recognized nationally for its innovative efforts to protect and preserve Jamaica's natural environment. The pairing of the JSDF’s Crime Observatory with ICBSP subproject interventions has allowed JSIF to carry out ground-breaking work in the field of crime prevention. JSIF also undertook gender mainstreaming in implementing its project interventions, although this was not specifically required of the project. See Sub-Annex B for further information on JSIF’s approach and commitment to gender mainstreaming. 35. The JSIF made significant progress in developing the MIS as an effective management tool during the course of the project. Between 2006 & 2013, this MIS benefited from over 25 rounds of mid- to major improvements, to include: server and hardware updates, numerous updates of general project management software, and an upgrade to the general financial management software of the organisation.. Although there is still progress to be made, JSIF continues to make improvements to the MIS, from which other projects run by the organisation also benefit. 36. Despite this overall success, the JSIF faced some challenges in implementing the ICBSP. These included: • Sporadic outbreaks of violence in the communities, despite the reductions achieved by the project, delayed project activities in the communities and posed obstacles to participation of community members in project activities that took place outside the communities (e.g. skills training) due to curfews, etc. • Turnover of technical staff working on the project, often times to national/regional agencies due to their high quality, was responsible for some loss of momentum in implementation. 53 • The challenge in procuring surveying services for land registration, due to surveyors’ unwillingness to work in the inner city, significantly delayed the land titling initiative. • The work done under the ICBSP is a testament to the JSIF’s ability to effectively partner with both public and private institutions. In spite of this, partnership agreements did occasionally fall through. This reduced the effectiveness of services such as electricity regularisation and resulted in the non-implementation of others, such as the household water connections and the sewage treatment plant for Tawes Meadows. Often, when these breakdowns occurred, the basic problem was often a mismatch between each institution’s timeframe for implementation and resultant funding prioritisation. Lessons Learned 37. The component- and subcomponent-specific lessons contained in this section are abridged: a full list of those lessons considered most critical by the Borrower are included Sub Annex A. • Where possible, project communities should coincide with nationally-recognised community boundary lines, to allow for ease of recognition of project boundaries on the ground and in partnership discussions, as well as ease of M&E of project activities. • Sector buy-in for community development projects must be tangible, established and measured throughout the project. While communities may see certain projects as priority, if the Sector support is absent, then sustainability will be difficult. At the level of the donor and country partner, some level of commitment must be structured to ensure that funds invested in communities receive the required support from the large Sectors. • Infrastructure investments must be balanced with and complemented by social services. Complementary social service provision is essential to improving and maintaining access to the infrastructural works and intervention sustainability. Complementary technical assistance and the capacity building of national institutions (in both government and non- government sectors) are also integral to project success: in the case of the ICBSP, the support from the JSDF Grant through the development of the Crime Observatory and the participatory Community Action Plans, as well as the capacity building of NGOs and NSAs, were all very important to the project’s capacity to achieve its development objectives. • Human capital development and capacity building is a prerequisite for successful project implementation in inner city environments. • In the case of projects with pre-formulated infrastructure components: depending on the type, size and volume of the intervention, a considered period for Design Review and Amendment should be included in the Project Design. • Management/Sustainability plans should be paramount in the consideration of: solid waste management initiatives, community centre design, and sewage treatment solutions. • The role of the liaison officers “on-the-ground”/interfacing with the community must be closely monitored from the onset to ensure that representatives of the various groups understand their role in the partnership. This sets the platform to attain community “buy- in” at large which is essential for the success of the intervention. • Communication/Training: Participatory approach in identifying needs, frequency in communication, and training are of high importance generally and are critical in empowering the CBOs to undertake their role in the maintenance of the infrastructure, educational-recreational, and mediation and conflict program. 54 • Coordination with other donors with complementing objectives will contribute to narrowing the needs gap, eliminate “overlaps”, and make for wider impact on the communities at large. • Coordination with Local Authorities/Agencies is crucial in avoiding conflict between existing/planned services and project investments. Without this coordination, the advancing of approval for work plans, and overall implementation of the project can be affected adversely. • A dedicated monitoring and evaluation coordinator would be an asset and help to ensure that M&E data is accurately, effectively and thoroughly collated, so that it can be produced in a timely manner. • The experience under the ICBSP has reinforced the importance of timely and accurate fiduciary management and reporting; the JSIF has added another layer of due diligence to facilitate this. Crime Statistics: • Community stigma against ‘informers’ results in under-reporting of crime statistics, even those collected through informal means. This creates a difficulty for projects that are expected to improve community trust in external entities (including the police), but are also being judged against their reduction of extant crime statistics. As social trust goes up, crime reporting may also go up, although no ‘additional’ crime is actually taking place. • Highlight for other projects: The project experienced difficulties disaggregating crime data at the community level during the first years of project implementation: this has been significantly improved by the Jamaica Crime Observatory, which was put in place through the Japan Social Development Fund’s grant funding for the establishment of an Integrated Crime and Violence Information System. COMPONENT- AND SUBCOMPONENT-SPECIFIC LESSONS (ABRIDGED): Access to Services : Basic Infrastructure: • Thorough site investigations, appropriate designs and realistic construction schedules (that take into account each location’s social and geographic peculiarities) are paramount. Access to Services : Access to Financial Services: • Consultation and educational processes must be extended to internal stakeholders, within the implementation agency, as well as to outside groups who will be necessary for project implementation. Technical assistance for implementing MFIs is also paramount. Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building: Building Community Capacity through Community-Based Contracting: • Community-based contracting is an important option to nurture and develop community capacity through “on-the-job-training. The ICBSP experience shows that the relevant question is not whether CBC is better than traditional methods, but rather in which circumstances and communities one method is preferable. CBC may require previous 55 capacity building to work and generally requires additional time built into project timelines. However, ICBSP experience has shown that this methodology can work well. Youth Education and Recreation: • There is continued need for: (i) the use of technology to deliver curriculum in centres and (ii) capacity building of schools to deliver remedial education by investing in school labs and software. Mediation & Conflict Resolution: • The multi-modal programme developed under this subcomponent increased the interventions’ interest to the various at-risk groups. 56 Annex A: Further Lessons Learned COMPONENT- AND SUBCOMPONENT-SPECIFIC LESSONS: Access to Services : Basic Infrastructure: • During Formulation stage – due diligence in a thorough site investigation, and appropriate designs are paramount to successful implementation of civil/infrastructure Works. • Construction schedule should be realistic to the specifics of some locations, and management/updating of same must be constant. • The provision of solid waste equipment and infrastructure was supported by the training of environmental wardens under the Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building component. However, incentivisation of all stakeholders – the wardens, the CBOs, the NSWMA and the community residents – through a combination of monetary and non- monetary incentives, is necessary to improve the quality of work and the sustainability of the solid waste gains made under the project. • Highlight for other projects: strong environmental management record: JSIF understands the potential impacts of its civil projects on the environment and its ISO-certified environmental management systems provide a crucial framework for encouraging environmentally positive practices. The JSIF has over 80% contractor compliance as regards the environmental safeguards that we have implemented. Breaches are quickly identified and reported and rectification takes place immediately. These environmental safeguards include: o Performing an environmental screening or baseline assessment prior to approval of any project for implementation. o Conducting a technical review of all project designs to ensure that environmental mitigation measures are included for any potential environmental issues identified during screening. o Employment of an environmental Scientist to monitor and report on projects environmental performance. o Weekly monitoring of projects by external supervisors, JSIF technical Officers, and environmental officer. o Provision of a copy of the JSIF’s Environmental Management Plan to each contractor as part of their contract document. Access to Services : Access to Financial Services: • The experience on this indicates the need for consultation and educational processes to be extended to internal stakeholders, within the implementation agency, as well as to outside groups who will be necessary for project implementation (e.g., the National Contracts Commission [NCC]). • Future initiatives will benefit if the staff member charged with project management has a thorough knowledge of microfinance best practices and is able to devote his or her full time to the administration of the subcomponent. 57 • Highlight for other projects: The provision for technical assistance should be included in future microfinance initiatives, particularly when they seek to expand microfinance to new areas in which MFIs currently have little exposure. Access to Services : Land Tenure Regularization: • Land tenure regularization is a long and tedious process, especially for informal settlements, and involves multiple MDAs of government with varying roles and inadequate synergy to facilitate efficiency in the process. • The establishing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the various agencies would provide for coordination, and awareness for all involved of the objective, and project-cycle of the intervention, and their responsibility/time-lines in this pursuit. Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building: Building Community Capacity through Community-Based Contracting: • Differences in “baseline” capacities require design approaches suitable to the needs and capabilities of the communities. Hence, for example in the Zinc Fence Removal and Substitution, the national competitive bidding (NCB) (i.e., “traditional”) method of procuring a Contractor was used in Shelter Rock, while in Flanker where there was a greater capacity, the CBC method was used for implementation. • Community-based contracting is an important option to nurture and develop community capacity through “on-the-job-training. The ICBSP experience shows that the relevant question is not whether CBC is better than traditional methods, but rather in which circumstances and communities one method is preferable. However, until confidence is built sufficiently within the CBOs, staff may be initially resistant to recommend this method of implementation for building capacity. • Some of the challenges noted in undertaking CBC are as follows: • Even though the CBC method is highly recommended for building community groups’ capacity, the methodology has negative impact on timely and efficient completion of subprojects. • Difficulties compelling stakeholders to produce necessary documentation in a timely fashion meant that budget estimates for the quarter were difficult to make/meet. • Many CBO members are volunteers and are doing the documentation in their spare time. Stipends to allow for the payment of administrative staff on the subprojects generally allow for more thorough documentation and more timely submission. • Additional administrative support for photocopying and filing of CBC documentation is needed. • Highlight for other projects: Other World Bank projects have experienced difficulties making sizeable impacts in urban environments. But in the urban environments in which the ICBSP works, CDD processes have specifically targeted poorer community residents, have reached sizeable numbers of beneficiaries, and have made gains in capacity building. • Highlight for other projects: CBC as a method builds capacity in the groups but also requires additional time built into project timelines to take into account the challenges described. Many sets of tranche documentation produced by the CBOs were returned, 58 sometimes (up to 4 times) before the required documentation is correct and complete. The experience of the ICBSP has triggered a number of changes to how CBC is handled, namely i) the administrative burdens on the community groups going forward will be reduced as template booklets for financial management will be provided with the grant ii) the former will also improve the quality of documents produced as greater consistency and conformance will occur and iii) the management of the tranche and how they are disbursed will be better tagged to activities and submission of documentation will be incremental as opposed to being submitted at the time of tranche request. • Highlight for other projects: The JSDF implemented a component using NGOs to support crime prevention activities in peripheral communities to the ICBSP. This allowed for increase in coverage to beneficiaries of like interventions to the vulnerable and it provided an opportunity for the NGOs to build their institutional capacity and profile in crime prevention and community development work. Youth Education and Recreation: • There is continued need for: (i) the use of technology to deliver curriculum in centres and (ii) capacity building of schools to deliver remedial education by investing in school labs and software. • Highlight for other projects: The education programmes run by the ICBSP have reported significant community-buy in—across urban, peri-urban and rural areas. In all ICBSP communities, these popular programmes consistently have more applicants than programme resources are able to support. Community focus groups indicate that the ICBSP’s education programmes are highly regarded by the communities; preliminary analyses have indicated high stakeholder satisfaction, particularly for parents and students. The high level of satisfaction and strengthened capacity of the Community Committees will improve likelihood of sustainability. Mediation & Conflict Resolution: • Highlight for other projects: The beneficiary numbers for the Mediation and Conflict Resolution programme have been significantly higher than expected, exceeding targets by over 400%. The variety of the activities that have been incorporated has increased the interventions’ interest to the various at-risk groups. These activities have included: psychosocial interventions, life skills training through sports, sensitization sessions that incorporate cultural activities, sessions with rival gangs for the establishment of Community Stabilisation Youth Alliances and Community Stabilisation Agreements, and income-generating activities, among other interventions. Individual interventions tend to be multifaceted, such as the psychosocial interventions, which have incorporated beneficiary assessments, life skills training and psychological counselling, and are expected to result in significant behavioural change. Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development: • Highlight for other projects: Through this component, over 1,500 beneficiaries have received access to skills training programmes (in both traditional and non-traditional fields) and income-generation opportunities. Some participants have advanced through the HEART Trust/NTA-NCTVET Level 1 certification to progress to the second level. 59 The vocational skills programme has also been a model of partnership with both public and private-sector institutions: in addition to its partnerships with numerous CBOs, the Alternative Livelihoods programme has partnered with nine skills-training institutions, including the University of Technology, to endow community residents with employment-ready skills. 60 Annex B: JSIF’s Commitment to Gender Mainstreaming The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) is among twelve Government of Jamaica Ministries, Departments and Agencies that have been gender certified by the Bureau of Gender Affairs, a Department that falls under the Office of the Prime Minister. The Gender Certification seeks to facilitate the implementation of the National Policy for Gender Equality (NPGE) and the process of gender mainstreaming. The purpose of the certification is to create greater gender awareness as well as strengthen the capacity of organizations to deliver equitable services both internally and externally. With this certification, the JSIF demonstrates that its operations are gender-compliant and that it recognises the value of gender mainstreaming as a vital component of its day-to-day operations. The stamp also demonstrates that the JSIF is committed to addressing obstacles to gender equality. The principles of the NPGE guides the Project Appraisal process, ensuring that the greatest needs of all beneficiaries are addressed, with special consideration given to gender-specific circumstances and needs. In following the guidelines of the Gender Certification, the JSIF is also aware of Millennium Development Goal #3, which speaks specifically to empowering women and tries to ensure that an appropriate gender balance is met in all interventions. 61 Annex 6. Supporting Documents “Beyond Developmental Rhetoric: Unearthing Best Practices for Sustainable Social Investment in Inner City Communities in Jamaica.” Conference Paper. Presented at Fifty-Fifty: Critical Reflections in a Time of Uncertainty in Kingston, Jamaica. August 20-25, 2012. “Bucknor Electrification Survey: Draft Report.” November 2012, Jamaica Social Investment Fund. Hughes, Wesley and the Planning Institute of Jamaica. ‘A Historical Perspective on Poverty’. Contributing to A Series of Panel Discussions Organised by the Prime Minister. The Transforming Landscape of Jamaica. Kingston, Jamaica: Office of the Prime Minister, 2006 “ICBSP Microfinance Subcomponent Analysis and Lessons Learned.” November 2013, Jamaica Social Investment Fund. All ICBSP Project Indicator Progress documents “ICBSP Household Socio-economic Baseline Study. Jamaica: Technical Studies and Preparatory Activities for the Development of the Jamaica Inner City Basic Services Project (4041427)”, HTPSE Ltd, UK, 2005. “Impact Evaluation of the Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project (ICBSP)”, Draft Final Report, Prepared for the Jamaica Social Investment Fund, Trevor Hamilton & Associates Center for Excellence, December 2013. “Inner City Basic Services For The Poor Project: Citizen’s Report Card (# 73005)”, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, 2013. Inner-City Renewal Programme: Rae Town Pilot Project. Dissemination Workshop Presentation, July 20, 2004. “Land Tenure Regularization: The Flankers, St. James Experience.” December 2013, Jamaica Social Investment Fund. Internal World Bank Documents: 62 • ICBSP Implementation Supervision Reports • ICBSP Aide Memoires • Project Appraisal Document Inner City Basic Services for the Poor • Project Appraisal Document Integrated Community Development Project • Aide Memoires • Restructuring Papers • Community Report Card Report 2013 63 Annex 7. Map (IBRD 40992) 64