Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Helene Grandvoinnet Margaret Chasara Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Helene Grandvoinnet Margaret Chasara Design: Claudio Mendonca (ccmdesign.ca) AUTHORS Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Helene Grandvoinnet is Lead Governance Specialist at the World Bank, with two decades of experience in research, policy dialogue, and project design and management on a range of governance issues (transparency and accountability, decentralization, public finances, justice reform, anti-corruption and civil service reform) in fragile and low-capacity environments. Margaret Chasara (Ph.D.) is currently a consulting Governance Specialist at the World Bank. She also worked with the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) and the FCV Group. She holds a Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University and a Master of International Development Policy degree (specializing in Applied Economics) from Duke University. Her areas of expertise include applied economics, impact evaluation and conflict analysis and resolution in LICs, FCSs, and MICs. She has vast experience working on research, project design and management, impact evaluation, M&E, and training on various projects involving public sector reform, citizen engagement, human rights, forced displacement and gender. This paper was prepared by Helene Grandvoinnet (Governance Global Practice, World Bank) and Margaret Chasara (Governance Global Practice, World Bank) as part of the Governance Global Practice’s programmatic analytics and advisory service (ASA) “Citizen Engagement: Re-building the State and Citizen Social Contract”. The ASA aims to help provide analytical insights, knowledge, and learning to support implement the next phase of the World Bank Group’s Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in World Bank Group Operations. The authors are grateful to peer reviewers Abel Bove and Deborah Isser as well as Camilla Lindstorm for their very helpful comments, Asmeen Khan and Saki Kumagai for their guidance and comments on various drafts, and Barbara Rice for editorial support. 3 Table of Contents Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A Necessary yet Challenging Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Significant Potential for Positive Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The Need to Overcome Significant Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Operational Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Some Principles of Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Supporting the Three Levers: Information, Interface, and Civic Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Types of Fragility and Windows of Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Fragile Situations: Deep Fragility and Elevated Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Active Conflict and Violent Situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Subnational Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4 ABBREVIATION LIST Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Citizen Engagement CE Civil Society Organizations CSOs Development Policy Financing DPF The Development Policy Loan DPL Fragile and Conflict Situations FCSs Fragility, Conflict, And Violence FCV Governance Global Practice GGP Middle East and North Africa MNA National Action Plan NAP Non-governmental Organizations NGOs Open Government Partnership OGP Public Financial Management PFM Reconstruction and Peace-building Assessments RPBA Risk and Resilience Assessments RRA Third-party Monitoring TPM Village Community Support Projects PACV World Bank WB World Development Report  WDR 5 Introduction Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence The twin goals of the World Bank Group—ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity—make a strong case for creating an inclusive society, with strong government accountability: “A sustainable path toward ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity would also involve creating an inclusive society. . . . An inclusive society must have the institutions, structure, and processes that empower local communities, so they can hold their governments accountable” (World Bank Group 2014a, 33). Aligned with these goals, the Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in World Bank Group Operations defines citizen engagement as the two-way interaction between citizens and governments or the private sector within the scope of the Bank Group’s inter- ventions—policy dialogue, programs, projects, and advisory services and analytics. These interactions give citizens a stake in decision making with the objective of improving an in- tervention’s intermediate and final development outcomes. The strategic framework’s five principles stress focusing on results, engagement throughout the operational cycle, the im- portance of strengthening country systems, the need to be context specific in supporting cit- izen engagement, and projects that operate in gradual, interactive, and scalable. Beneficiary feedback is a subset of citizen engagement applicable to the World Bank’s Investment Project Financing (IPF). It refers to engagement—consultation, collaboration, and empowerment— with those citizens who are clearly identifiable, direct project beneficiaries during IPF prepa- ration, implementation, and evaluation. The World Bank Group’s commitment to citizen engagement applies in all countries. Howev- er, those affected by FCV present specific characteristics that may make citizen engagement both more relevant and more challenging. Understanding better not only the challenges, but also the opportunities is crucial in an environment where FCV is on the increase. World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law (WDR17) defines conflict as an ac- tive disagreement or dispute that arises when two or more individuals or groups believe their policy choices, interests, preferences, or concerns are incompatible (World Bank Group 2017). Conflicts are not inherently negative and can be a constructive force for social change. They can be violent or nonviolent as well as fluctuate between these two states. WDR17 high- lights the role of governance, including sanction and deterrence institutions, power sharing, wealth redistribution, and dispute resolution, to prevent or mitigate violent conflict. In the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (WDR11), a conflict is con- sidered violent when it involves the “use or threat of physical force by groups” (World Bank 6 2011). Overwhelming evidence in the literature shows that violent conflicts are detrimental to growth and development. Lack of accountability together with lack of capacity and le- gitimacy are considered key elements of fragility, which prevent states or institutions from mediating relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence vulnerable to violence. As noted in the World Bank report, the Societal Dynamics of Fragility, fragility can best be un- derstood as a continuum spanning a vast range of contexts—extending from violent conflict at one end and varying degrees of fragility at other points along the continuum (World Bank 2013). The caveats and limitations of assessing citizen engagement in the FCV “archetype” are obvious. This paper attempts to look at some common characteristics where FCV has an impact on citizen engagement, while recognizing the need to adjust support depending on the type of fragility and its causes. To provide more operationally relevant guidance, it uses an imperfect typology of FCV: fragile situations (denoting elevated risks), active conflict and violence, subnational conflicts (limited to a portion of their territory), and transitional sit- uations, knowing that these categories are not mutually exclusive nor static along the FCV continuum (World Bank 2013, 2018; ADB 2012; Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010). Societies do move along the continuum as they respond to threats, shocks, or opportunities, or are able to achieve the transition on a sustained basis, whereas others suffer the consequences of long- term decline, though not necessarily in a linear fashion (World Bank 2013). This paper provides insights for World Bank staff to support a stronger understanding of the challenges, opportunities, and entry points to mainstreaming citizen engagement in fra- gility, conflict, and violence (FCV) contexts. It does not promise comprehensive solutions, rather a more nuanced view of citizen engagement in FCVs, and it suggests operational re- sponses. First, it summarizes what makes citizen engagement a necessary but challenging agenda. Second, it summarizes operational implications and suggestions for supporting cit- izen engagement using various FCV archetypes and examples of approaches to citizen en- gagement as a primer for the future direction of this agenda within the Governance Global Practice (GGP). The paper builds on the analysis conducted for the World Bank’s flagship report Opening the Black Box: The Contextual Drivers of Social Accountability, incorporating ad- ditional insights from the past few years (Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha 2015). It is one in a series of four papers from the GGP on citizen engagement in the areas of FCV situations, open government, trust, and emerging technology. 7 A Necessary yet Challenging Agenda Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Significant Potential for Positive Outcomes While citizen engagement in FCV contexts is inherently challenging and complex, its potential to address dynamics underpinning fragility and conflict are also recognized as potent, especially when lack of accountability is perceived as a major driver of fragility. Legitimacy and social co- hesion are high-level FCV issues, which citizen engagement might help address. Lack of access and supervision limitations are practical problems that citizen engagement also can help solve. CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT CAN HELP BUILD STATE LEGITIMACY Most guidance on how to build trust and legitimacy are based on three principles: achiev- ing quick visible wins, constructing a shared purpose through a consistent narrative, and fostering citizen engagement. Most important, legitimacy outcomes expected from citizen engagement include increases in political, performance, and procedural legitimacy (World Bank 2011; World Bank Group 2017). Increase in political legitimacy (accountability) and inclusion. This entails the use of cred- ible political processes in reaching decisions that reflect shared values and preferences, and above all, give equal voice to all citizens and require accountability for these decisions. Po- litical settlements and policy reforms generated through an open, consultative multi-stake- holder process have a greater probability of success (World Bank 2011; Menocal 2015; Craig and Porter 2014). Studies find that when citizens are engaged in governance processes, es- pecially when they relate to distribution of resources, they deem the process to be fair, which in turn increases state legitimacy. Providing citizens with information and mechanisms for legal recourse to resolve disputes and air complaints, including complaints against the state, is another requirement for legitimacy. This often needs to be done if steps are taken to make sure the judiciary is not susceptible to political interference and corruption, and its effective- ness is supported by adequate resources and qualified staff. Increase in performance legitimacy (capacity). Performance legitimacy is earned through the effective discharge by the state of the duties assigned to it, particularly about security, economic oversight, public services, and justice (World Bank 2011). Service delivery is the primary point of contact between the state and its citizens, which makes the state visible to citizens (Brinkerhoff, Westerberg, and Dunn 2012; Van de Walle and Scott 2011). In doing so, services give content to the social contract between states and citizens (Rotberg 2004) and 8 act as the glue that binds state and society together (Miliken and Krause 2002). Research Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Photo by Charlotte Kesl / World Bank points to the fact that besides delivery of services, how services are provided shapes whether they will indeed have a legitimating effect. This also points to the importance of increasing the visibility of the state’s role in service provision at the point of delivery, including by re- ducing branding by donors (Teskey, Schnell, and Poole 2012). Increase in procedural legitimacy. A consensus is emerging among scholars that state legitimacy is enhanced not by service delivery in and of itself but by the opportunities the process provides for citizens to interact with the state positively. Studies show people are likely to think more positively about the government when genuine and functional mech- anisms to make complaints or address grievances are embedded within the instruments of service provision. Even if they do not use them, their presence alone accounted for the effect (Denney, Mallett, and Mazurana 2015). CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT CAN POTENTIALLY STRENGTHEN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT As citizens’ demand accountability from the government and government provides citizens with spaces to make these demands, a relationship is reinforced in which the state is answer- able to citizens for its actions, and citizens can sanction it for not fulfilling its obligations. 9 When citizens engage with government officials, the state becomes visible, and citizens gain more knowledge about government processes as well as constraints that affect government performance. In doing so, they also gain skills that help them better negotiate and commu- nicate with the government in presenting their demands more coherently. Such interactions Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence often tend to strengthen the vertical link between the state and society. In many FCV contexts, support to reestablish social contracts often emphasizes the local lev- el as the starting point, since contacts at this level are often the most tangible for the popula- tion. Because issues that citizens face daily are largely local in nature, the local level is where citizens learn what the state can and cannot do, as it is the entry point for service delivery and conflict resolution. The local level is the most immediate point of contact between citizens and the state as well as others in positions of authority, especially in a fragmented society where collective action at a higher level (provincial or national) is limited, or in low autho- rizing environments. In low authorizing environments, there might be more maneuvering room to engage citizens at the local level, as citizen engagement is often perceived as less threatening for the national political settlement at this level. For these reasons, one can argue that government legitimacy ultimately takes shape or unravels at the local level. However, it is important to paper that supporting the social contract at the local level is highly context specific, depending on the diversity and strength of traditional models of local governance within the country, the level of state presence across the territory (or concentration in the capital city), and the level of decentralization (i.e., autonomy of elected local governments). SOCIAL COHESION Citizen engagement in FCV contexts can potentially strengthen social cohesion, by increas- ing face-to-face interaction among community members, which can build trust and ulti- mately improve social cohesion. Citizen engagement initiatives can also provide the oppor- tunity to community members to undertake collective projects, thereby engendering a sense of community and facilitating collective action. Through participation and the process of engagement, citizens may also learn the norms of inclusion. Through engagement, citizens learn to develop a broader perspective, recognize and respect diverse and opposing opinions, and develop a capacity for cooperation and reciprocity—a process scholars call “social iden- tification” (Paxton 2007; Putnam 1993; Warren 2001). It should be noted, however, there is little evidence of such links. This is partly because social cohesion is not easily measured, and because it is not generally an explicit expected outcome of citizen engagement (thus not part of impact evaluation on citizen engagement). Especial- ly given the cleavages that exist in many FCV contexts, whether processes that are often of short duration can produce such cohesion is an open question. Citizen engagement initia- tives can also run the risk of exacerbating existing tensions rather than resolving them. 10 BENEFICIARY FEEDBACK COMPENSATING FOR LACK OF ACCESS At a more pragmatic level for the World Bank Group, when open violence restricts access to supervision teams, beneficiary feedback can be supported to compensate for lack of access. Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence To ensure transparency and the proper management of projects, independent nongovern- mental organizations (NGOs), or companies are sometimes enlisted to monitor the work of implementing partners throughout the project cycle. Third-party monitoring allows for a minimum level of accountability and can be used in geographic areas that are difficult to access. Involving both an international and a local NGO (or consulting company) offers the benefit of having two “watchdogs” against elite capture, to further guard against the possi- bility that beneficiaries and local governance structures will be intimidated or manipulated. The ideal third party should be recognized as “above the fray” and not linked to specific in- terests. This entity could support dialogue, mitigate tensions between and among communi- ties, and ensure that beneficiaries and activities are selected through a transparent process. An international NGO may be more easily recognized as neutral than a local one, but whether this will be acceptable to state actors may differ according to the project. To further enhance citizen engagement, fiduciary oversight, project monitoring, and accountability in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS), the GGP has been facilitating feedback loops with us- ers of the services provided through “SMART” fiduciary solutions. The Need to Overcome Significant Challenges The notion that citizen engagement can address some drivers and manifestations of fra- gility is accepted. However, the challenges of supporting citizen engagement in fragile and conflict-affected environments are significant. This section builds on the framework pro- posed in Opening the Black Box (Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha 2015). Its contextual factors of social accountability conceptualize citizen engagement as the interplay of citizen action and state action, supported by three levers—information, interface, and civic mobilization. The framework also summarizes the important characteristics of macro-contextual factors impacting citizen engagement, namely political society, state-society relations, and civil so- ciety, together with global factors and political settlement. Figure 1 summarizes what this looks like in FCV contexts. 11 Figure 1. Citizen Engagement in a Fragile Environment Political Settlement Highly exclusionary, predatory, unstable or entrenched political settlements limiting accountability Political Society But: Low Capacity Transition time act as flashpoints to support enabling environment for No full or exclusive authority over citizen engagement territory State competing with other groups for legitimacy to exercise powers State Society Relations But: “Social contract” in in flux Informal accountability relationships outside state structure can be models Expactations differ across social groups for rebuilding formal institutions Citizen Engagement can be particularly controversial and sensitive Civil Society But: Low individual capacity to participate in Presence of civil society or community collective action -based groups who served the public good before and throughout conflict can Space for participation when it exists fill in capacity gaps risks reproducing existing inequalities and exclusions, bonding rather then bridging social capital Global Factors Aid dependency may flip accountability relationships toward external actors; yet Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence international pressure can support more 12 accountable systems POLITICAL SOCIETY A divided political society. Political society is often divided, and the state has limited capac- ity to deliver basic services, respond to demand, and impose sanctions. The state’s ability to Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence engage with citizens’ demands can be curtailed because it often does not have full or exclu- sive authority over its territory and is competing with other groups for legitimacy to exercise state powers. In some cases, the state itself might be the key problem, especially when it is seen to lack legitimacy among large, or some important part, of the population. Dependence on rents. Many FCV countries receive a significant portion of their revenues from rents (i.e., natural resources management and donor funding), which fosters a macro- cephalic state bureaucracy and removes the need for the government to fund itself through taxation, thus upending the traditional state–citizen relationship based on rights and re- sponsibilities. Citizens have no mechanism to hold the government accountable for how it spends money, and in turn, the government does not have to offer anything to its people. These rents tend to isolate government officials from public accountability. STATE AND SOCIETY RELATIONS Weak state-society relations. The social contract tends to be in flux and have different meanings depending on one’s group identity. Both the expected role of the state and the re- sponsibilities of citizens may differ across groups, making citizen engagement approaches particularly controversial and sensitive. Multiple and fragmented accountability relationships. Multiple, fragmented, and compet- ing sources of authority—including armed groups, faith leaders, and traditional authori- ties—are commonly found in FCVs. Consequently, multiple accountability relationships exist not only between states and citizens, but also between citizens and informal power- holders, and between informal powerholders and the state. Lack of state capacity to control parts of its territory or to deliver public services often prompts civil society to fill the vacu- um, delivering services and emergency relief or supporting displaced populations. In some cases, accountability for service delivery is then blurry, as it is not always clear from the user perspective which entity is responsible for basic service provision, and which channels are open to advocate or give feedback. Unaddressed grievances. Discord, conflicts, and disputes over resources and the role of the state in mediating these are often the basis for fragility and conflict. Because of unaddressed grievances, different groups have had different relationships with the state, and their con- ception and expectations of the state tend to be path-dependent (Collier 2000). 13 Corruption and rent-seeking. Commonly rampant in FCV contexts, corruption reflects poor state legitimacy and is maintained when there are no voice and accountability mechanisms. Corruption often escalates by creating pervasive mistrust of the state and its institutions as Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence well as between citizens, which erodes the social fabric. CIVIL SOCIETY Low human capacity. Baseline educational levels in FCSs tend to be poor. Most countries in conflict have low human capital and face brain drain as many civil servants may have been displaced or have emigrated to safety and basic and advanced training facilities have been destroyed. In many cases, institutional memory is lost through the destruction of data. High levels of fear and uncertainty. Most countries in conflict are characterized by high lev- els of fear and uncertainty arising from the generalized sense that the normal rules of human interaction have ceased to operate, and that violence could re-emerge at any moment. This uncertainty, in turn, contributes to pervasive insecurity, the inability to have a longer-term perspective, and an ever-present risk that small problems, which could otherwise be easily managed, escalate into something much more problematic. Intra-society conflicts and constraints on citizen action. Conflict and fragility divide civil society in two ways: they hamper an individual’s capacity to participate in collective action, and they damage the collective, weakening its ability to coordinate collective action when individual agency might exist. Space for participation, when it exists, risks reproducing ex- isting inequalities and exclusions. Exclusion and marginalization, whether real or perceived, can further foment conflicts. When social networks exist, they usually strengthen bonds within groups (e.g., ethnic or social) rather than “bridging” existing tensions between such groups in society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) and community organizations. Formal CSOs and non- governmental organizations may have low capacity and legitimacy in FCVs. When external aid represents a significant share of revenues, formal CSOs tend to comprise a multiplicity of small organizations with limited membership and representativeness, and upward account- ability to the donors, with somewhat opportunistic, aid-dependent agenda. Indigenous lo- cal associations and, in some cases, traditional or customary institutions can be very active and can play an important role as channels for information and civic mobilization, but they might be characterized by entrenched exclusionary or patriarchal patterns. The closing of civic space. In many fragile and conflict-affected settings, externally pro- moted accountability carries inherent risks for local staff and CSOs, and citizen voice can be 14 constrained by the fear factor (Fox 2014) as well as by the trauma resulting from violent con- flict. When this is the case, CSOs may be forced to limit themselves to promoting transpar- ency and “soft” accountability measures, rather than “hard” enforceability aspects (McGee and Kroesschell 2013). These risks are exacerbated where there are limited means for citizen Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence protection and voice, high factionalism and weak security (Schouten 2011). CROSS-CUTTING OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS The creation and development of a state is primarily shaped by its elites and citizens, how they interact, how a social compact is formed, and how it evolves. However, external influ- ences can have a constructive or debilitating impact on state-building, depending on the circumstances. Therefore, the World Bank and other donors can have a supporting role to play in citizen engagement initiatives to help states overcome fragility and become resilient. 15 Operational Implications Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence This section provides some pointers around the operational implications of supporting citi- zen engagement in FCV contexts. Some Principles of Engagement DO NO HARM The “do no harm” principle should govern any external support to citizen engagement in FCV contexts. In some situations, the minimum requirement for citizen engagement may be lacking. If conflict is particularly intense and no end is in sight, supporting citizen engage- ment is probably premature. The basic structures of local governance, for example, need to be in place for citizens to engage with them. There should be some notion of a social con- tract or at the least the possibility of negotiating one. Basic infrastructure is also necessary to disseminate information. This does not mean nothing can be done, and some building blocks may be supported to make space for meaningful citizen engagement. There is a risk citizen engagement can create expectations on the part of citizens that the state is unable or unwilling to respond to, putting the legitimacy of the state at further risk. Expectations that cannot be met may arise not only in connection with citizen engagement, but also through the actions of the state, particularly if it touts transparency and accountability but fails to deliver on its commitments (McGee and Kroesschell 2013). As a result, frustration and griev- ances often increase. Ultimately, citizen engagement may become a destructive force if ex- pectations outpace institutional change especially during political transition, as shown in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. It is therefore important to assess the trade-offs between the importance of citizen engage- ment to improve services or trust in the state and the high risks that accountability interven- tions will fail given “macro” contextual constraints. Additionally, there is a risk for citizen engagement to lead to elite capture, exacerbating existing power asymmetries and aggravating perceptions of injustice among certain groups. Because efforts geared toward strengthening state legitimacy and state capacity in FCS are often contro- versial and sensitive, citizen engagement may reignite conflicts. In a situation where differenc- es between groups are a source of friction, redistribution of social and political power because of citizen engagement can be confrontational. If the process and impact of citizen engagement are perceived to be excluding a group, this can create or revive tensions within groups or be- 16 tween certain groups and the state. Hence, citizen engagement initiatives need to be sensitive Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Photo by Natalia Cieslik / World Bank to opposing values, interests, and perceptions, which may matter more to individuals or groups at times than reality. Supporting a stronger understanding of relevant fault lines within society and ensuing that relevant groups are included and encouraged to provide feedback are necessary to mitigate potential tensions. This means collecting qualitative data and analyzing critically. Further, in many FCV situations, the state is in the process of consolidating power. There is a risk that interventions aimed at supporting certain actors and institutional reforms may also inadvertently lead to an overly powerful state and close off the space for citizen engagement. ADAPT INTERVENTIONS AND PROJECTS Citizen engagement in FCV contexts needs to be sequenced, adapted, and adjusted con- stantly to the complex and fluid local environment, perhaps more so than in any other con- text. Interventions may need to be small and to proceed gradually and iteratively, given the inherent instability within political society, civil society, and state-society relations. Sim- ilarly, working with the grain of existing imperfect institutional structures might be more cost-effective and sustainable than advocating for a best practice option. The challenges in getting to know the local context need to be acknowledged, as this is even more acute since most violence-affected countries have high turnover and confinement of staff. Working at scale is necessary, but partly for lack of time and resources. Projects then tend to provide one model across one country, yet local dynamics can vary significantly. Ways need to be found to be more granular, rather than assume there is linear and consistent progress, and constantly redesign. Repeated adjustments might, however, be at odds with the custom- ary design and implementation of World Bank projects. In many cases, projects in FCS are 17 emergency ones, which need to be launched quickly, leaving little time for a thorough anal- ysis of context. World Bank operations tend to lack the flexibility needed to adjust rapidly to changes in the environment or community dynamics, for instance, by shifting among Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence activities and redirecting financing. KEEP EXPECTATIONS REALISTIC Expectations of what can be achieved in FCS in a given time should be realistic. Achieving ambitious institutional goals in a short period of time is as unlikely as it is unrealistic. Inducing rapid change may be counterproductive. To induce change in behaviors (for ex- ample, discourage exclusionary behavior), it is necessary to work through the social norms that sanction a mode of behavior, not against them. Doing so does not mean abandoning some minimum of standards or expectations, but instead calibrating them so they are not artificial or unrealistic. Evaluations of citizen engagement initiatives should also take this reality into account. There is a need to identify intermediate outcomes, set modest goals, and think about what citizen engagement can realistically achieve. EMPLOY COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIES Confrontational strategies may create discord among stakeholders. Citizens may be re- luctant to take a confrontational stance and more willing to take part in a collaborative action. Collaborative strategies may simply be more productive. For example, government officials who are accountable to the community might need the support of the community to make improvements in service delivery. In such cases, providing venues through citizen engagement initiatives that encourage cooperation will benefit all concerned. PROACTIVELY USE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES BUT BE MINDFUL OF THEIR RISKS When using modern information and communication technology (ICT) for citizen engage- ment, it is important to be mindful of the risk of further widening the digital divide by us- ing hybrid strategies to avoid excluding the most vulnerable groups.1 In addition, there is a risk that information collected through ICTs could be misused by the state, and a careful risk diagnostic should precede its deployment. See table 1 for a summary of opportunities and risks. 1  Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha (2015) notes that because of specific constraints to access linked to low literacy, local languages, and poor infrastructure, multipronged strategies need to be put in place to support 18 communication flows. Table 1. Information Communication Technologies for Citizen Engagement— Opportunities and Risks Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Constitutive Element: INFORMATION Opportunities  Accessibility: (i) reduction of time and cost to disclose and distribute information; (ii) State action availability of direct citizen-state information sharing channels for personalized or cus- tomized messaging and contents; and (iii) reduction of time and cost for data and infor- mation entry, management, and storage Opportunities  Accessibility and inclusiveness: (i) reduction of time, cost, and distance to gain access to Citizen action information; and (ii) reduction of information asymmetries  Independent generation of information (thus bypassing the government control)  Faster, easier, and cheaper transmission of information (e.g., data visualization, photos, videos, audio recording)  Better informed citizens Risks  Digital divide  Credibility and accuracy of information, which may turn into a cause of fragility and conflict  Limited awareness and means for citizens to fact-check information  Information silos created by algorism  Surveillance of citizen-generated information  Mismatch of information needs between state and citizens  Possible breach of privacy and sensitive information Constitutive Element: CIVIC MOBILIZATION Opportunities  Intergovernmental coordination: easier, faster, and cheaper coordination within State action government agencies and across different levels of government (in the mid and long term as upfront investment is required) Opportunities  Horizontal coordination: (i) facilitation of virtual communities of like-minded citi- Citizen action zens; and (ii) cyber-coordination for collective action  Collective voice and action: instantaneous and asynchronous crowd voicing  Civic mobilization of nontraditional actors (e.g., youth, farmers, women) Risks  Digital divide  Surveillance of voice and civic mobilization on cyber space  Participation and representation asymmetries  Weak or no sustainability; short-lived enthusiasm  Diffusion of collective voice and action  Manipulation of information, voice, and collective action by governments, interested parties, and elites  Diffusion of government responsibilities and accountability 19 Constitutive Element: CITIZEN-STATE INTERFACE Opportunities  An intrinsic value: democratization of information flow State action  Evidence-based decision making for citizen-centric governance and service delivery: Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence additional data-point for management decision making  Accessibility and inclusiveness: (i) reduction of time and cost for instantaneous citizen-state interaction; and (ii) availability of direct citizen-state interaction chan- nels beyond geographic barrier  Co-planning, co-creating, and co-delivery: (i) improved quality of participation and decision making as citizens are better informed; (ii) facilitation of joint decision making; (iii) facilitation of participatory and independent monitoring and co-management of public resources; and (iv) facilitation of timely and appropriate state response to citizens Opportunities  An intrinsic value: democratization of information flow Citizen action  Availability of public and transparent citizen-state interface (e.g., social media) that allow personalized citizen-state interactions  Accessibility and inclusiveness: (i) reduction of time and cost for instantaneous citizen-state interaction; and (ii) availability of direct and leveling citizen-state inter- action channels beyond geographic and social barriers  Co-planning, co-creating, and co-delivery: See “state action” column Risks  Digital divide  Fear of voice and participation because of privacy, internet security, and surveillance issues  Participation and representation asymmetries  Weak or no sustainability; short-lived enthusiasm  Proliferation of engagement platforms  Lack of actionable citizen feedback because of limited awareness or capacity  Lack of timely and accurate responsiveness because of lack of capacity or willingness, which may lead to further distrust in government or fragility  Limited or differing quality, type, and effect of participation in comparison to face-to-face participation  Mismatch of interest areas for collaboration between citizens and state Source: Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha 2015, table 4.1. 20 ENSURE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT To effectively operationalize citizen engagement, the government must endorse the agenda. Ensuring the government’s support is essential. Educating all stakeholders about citizen en- Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence gagement processes and the expected outcomes and promoting trust are equally important. In many cases, citizen engagement entails a redistribution of power, and the uncertain result of this reapportioning of power may make a government reluctant to cooperate. Highlight- ing the advantages for the government by choosing the terminology carefully and using the right language to describe the participation of citizens for improved accountability is crucial, as is choosing appropriate entry points. One effective initiative leading to FCV governments supporting citizen engagement is the Open Government Partnership (OGP). This trend to- ward open government is characterized by increased disclosure and access to information on the use of public resources as well as heightened citizens’ expectations and demands for open data. Because OGPs are centered on increased transparency, citizen participation, and collaboration between government and citizens, they are improving the level of trust be- tween the government and citizens, allowing for effective operationalization of citizen en- gagement. (See box 1 for examples.) Multiple and fragmented accountability relationships that characterize FCV can create a challenging context for citizen engagement, as they make identification of state responsibil- ities unclear and state action tentative. Without a clear framework for engagement and some clarity on the compact between the state and citizens within which engagement takes place, there is the risk that citizen engagement will not yield the desired outcomes. This risk can be worsened if projects run by external partners become the main providers of public services. Anchoring citizen engagement activities to clarified responsibilities and organizational an- chors within existing state structures is needed for impact. 21 Supporting the Three Levers: Information, Interface, and Civic Mobilization Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence The contextual factors of social accountability in the framework proposed by Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha (2015) conceptualize citizen engagement as the interplay of citizen action and state action. This interplay is supported by three levers—information, interface, and civic mobilization. SUPPORTING INFORMATION ECOSYSTEMS Lack of accurate information is a common issue in FCV contexts. Limited accessibility to ac- curate and unbiased information, either because the infrastructure needed to disseminate information is lacking or limited to certain areas and groups or because vertical flows of in- formation are biased (reflecting a one-sided interpretation of history), is a common reality. Even when private media outlets exist, the government may control them, and when there is no overt control, intimidation and violence may force journalists to censor themselves. It is important to recognize the role of informal networks and relationships in how informa- tion is shaped. In certain cases, rumors and informal information may be more trusted than that emanating from official sources. Existing fault lines within local communities or so- cial groups can be aggravated through citizen engagement interventions, and rumors spread quickly in such environments. Supporting access to information needs to be based on a good understanding of channels of information used by citizens (disaggregated by relevant group or individual characteristics). Accessing, producing, and disseminating accurate and neutral information in a transparent way is essential for rebuilding trust between citizens and the state and for supporting efforts to restore peace in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Thus, it is important to both iden- tify areas where the government seeks information generated by citizens and to know the different media on which citizens rely for information. In the absence of an enabling frame- work, working with lower level regulations and maximizing the use of information that is available (i.e., information about public policies, budgets, and administrative processes) may open spaces for citizen-led accountability demands (see box 2). 22 BOX 1 Open Government Partnership Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence in FCV Contexts Fourteen OGP members are on the FCS harmonized list: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kiribati, Liberia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Togo. Two more are on the accession list: Guinea and Haiti. Despite challenges, these governments and partners are identifying key policies and measures to foster transparency and accountability. The Nigeria and Tunisia examples provide interesting insights on these initiatives. NIGERIA’S NATIONAL ACTION PLAN In response to growing corruption, facilitating openness, transparency, the 2016 economic recession, internal accountability, citizen engagement, macroeconomic disruptions, and security and empowerment at national and challenges (especially in the North East subnational levels. Under the citizen and Niger Delta), Nigeria committed engagement thematic area, NAP will itself to the Global Open Government lead to the development of a permanent Partnership Principles. To this effect, dialogue mechanism between citizens Nigeria adopted a National Action Plan and government; review of legislation (NAP) targeting the transformation around transparency and accountability of Nigeria’s governance indicators by issues; and adoption of a technology- 23 based citizen feedback mechanism making and horizontal communication on projects and programs. To ensure among government agencies; reducing effective deployment of these tools duplication and wastage of resources, Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence across all the thematic areas, three strengthening relationship with civil working groups have been set up to society; and building stronger bonds of develop implementation strategies and trust with citizens. Many government to articulate action plans to support the agencies, such as the Budget Office of work of these groups. These activities the Federation, the National Bureau of are being operationalized in part through Statistics, and the Office of the Auditor a Program-for-Results operation General of the Federation, have leveraged which creates incentives for state-level the political will of openness to deliver implementation of OGP commitments on more promptly on their respective budget and procurement transparency mandates. The country has also as foundations of subnational fiscal witnessed the application of technology transparency. and innovation in enhancing an open government as is evident in the adoption So far, Nigeria’s participation in the of financial management systems, OGP has provided opportunities for Treasury Single Account, and bank improving inclusiveness in decision verification number. TUNISIA’S BOOST INITIATIVE BOOST, an Open Budgets Portal and greater transparency, inclusiveness, and budget transparency initiative, was better governance in general. one of 20 commitments made by the Through Mizaniatouna (presented in Tunisian government in the context of its Arabic and French), all citizens can now participation in the OGP. To better respond view budget data—from the most general to the demands of citizens, the Ministry and simplified to the most detailed of Finance, in collaboration with the and specific. All financial information World Bank and with the support of civil dating back to 2008 on state revenue society, launched the Mizaniatouna Open and expenditure, treasury funds, and Budget Portal, with the aim of facilitating public administrative entities is open to access by citizens to budget information everyone. This information was, for the and supporting the government policy most part, extracted from the financial of transparency and open governance. management information system of the The creation and launch of this website, Ministry of Finance, using the BOOST tool which is open to the general public, came methodology designed by the World Bank. 24 in response to a call from Tunisians for SUPPORTING LEGITIMATE INTERFACES FOR CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT In FCV contexts, interfaces to allow constructive citizen engagement with the state may be absent or lack broad-based legitimacy. When an interface exists, its credibility can be ques- Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence tionable, and it might not be uniformly deemed legitimate across all groups. It may, in fact, be systematically biased in favor of certain groups and inaccessible to some. It is important to learn if existing interfaces are uniformly credible among all groups in society and based on assessment, support expanding their reach, or create additional or alternative channels for engagement. The World Bank Group’s convening power can be used to support nation- al- and local-level spaces for engagement and dialogue that bring state and nonstate actors together to discuss core development priorities. The space and nature of the interface may differ greatly depending on the sector or government level. At the local level, interventions may help create citizen interfaces through which constructive citizen engagement can occur. Empowered communities could articulate their demands to local government and monitor outcomes. Local governments that are ruled by a citizen-centric legal and regulatory frame- work are more likely to be able and incentivized to implement demands. SUPPORTING CIVIC MOBILIZATION In some FCS, the role of local associations that remain strong is crucial. In transitional post- war societies, CSOs or community-based groups that served the public good before and throughout the war may be well placed to build and train networks of change agents, with careful consideration of political and economic incentives (Schouten 2011; Gaventa and Bar- rett 2010). Using clear selection criteria with emphasis on the internal governance of the CSOs might help in working with effective, legitimate partners. Formal, capital city-based CSOs in some cases are geared toward donor’s priorities at the expense of local issues; they may also be discredited. Local organizations and community-based organizations are, by necessity, particularly strong in some fragile contexts and can play an important role in strengthening citizen engagement. Traditional and customary institutions can serve as alternatives to CSOs and can potentially be used to anchor citizen engagement in FCS. Hagmann (2007) and Eu- bank (2010) point to the important role of clan elders in parts of Somalia and maintain that in the absence of a central state and significant international assistance, efforts by Somali clan elders to broker peace and build institutions were instrumental in resolving conflict, main- taining security, and providing basic services. However, the reliance on traditional institutions has its limitations. First, in some cases, these institutions may lack legitimacy, and they may not be fully representative of society. Second, reliance on traditional institutions may perpetuate existing patterns of exclusion and reinforce a strong in-group identity, while harming bridging ties. Third, reliance on them 25 BOX 2 Budget Transparency Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence in FCV Contexts Budget transparency—the extent and P1-18.2 (legislative procedures for budget ease with which citizens can access scrutiny) is somewhat lower. information about and provide feedback Although the disclosure of government on government revenues, allocations, and fiscal and budgetary information is expenditures—has been central in GGP’s essential and becoming more common efforts to booster citizen engagement in citizen engagement initiatives, the at multiple levels of government— information can often be complex, national, provincial, and local—and in inadvertently reducing transparency and service delivery facilities. Because of lack accountability. Because people in FCSs are of capacity, an incremental approach generally undereducated, they are easily that starts with the basics (e.g., capacity intimidated by technical language and the building, simplifying, disclosing, and volume of budget information presented disseminating local-level budgets) is more to legislatures or confused by the role likely to succeed in FCS. and extent of extra-budgetary activities. Existing Public Expenditure and Financial Furthermore, when it comes to budget Accountability (PEFA) assessments show transparency, the influence of fragility lower scores in key budget transparency and weak institutions manifests itself in a dimensions between fragility, conflict, variety of ways, including a lack of access and violence (FCV) and non-FCV contexts to budget data, low technical capacity (see figure B.1). Indicator P1-9 (public of CSOs and the state, and inaccurate access to fiscal information) and P1-31.4 information, which is challenging for both (transparency of legislative scrutiny of implementing and monitoring budget 26 audit reports) are significantly lower; transparency. PEFA Score Public Access of Information PI-9 Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Legislative Procedures for Budget scrutinity PI-18.2 Transparency of legislative scrutinity of audit reports PI-31.4 D Either less than the basic level of performance or issuficient information to score C Basic level of performance broadly consistent with good international practices B Sound performance above the basic level A High level performance that meets good international practices Fragile Countries Non Fragile Countries Note: Each dimension is scored separately and based on complete national assessment using the PEFA framework. Furthermore, in many FCS, citizens, improving public sector transparency. The especially the most marginalized who Timor-Leste Transparency Model aimed face cultural, economic, or other barriers to provide a chain of “360-degree” fiscal hindering their participation, may accountability from the point of resource not be easy to mobilize, nor do they extraction to the time of investment have to participate. And, without wide through reliable, public, and shared involvement, budget transparency will systems and information. Housed within not achieve transformative effects on the Ministry of Finance, the portals can economic and social inequality, nor gain be accessed online, and information is legitimacy. split across four fields—budget execution, overseas development assistance, The example of Timor-Leste shows government procurement, and project both the potential of this approach results with posted data on revenues, and the need to support it holistically. allocated budgets, and budget execution. Throughout 2011 and into 2012, the This is no small achievement. An government made significant advances assessment highlights the need for portals in the pursuit of its transparency and to focus on their potential users’ needs: good governance agenda by launching 95 percent of users interviewed on their 27 a series of online portals dedicated to experience using the website questioned over the use of public resources. Other its usefulness as they were unable to components focused on strengthening understand how to use it (data provided by macro fiscal coordination and central Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Lula Hamutuk, a CSO dedicated to budget finance functions and reinforcing the transparency). control system for improved service delivery. The various technical activities The Sierra Leone Integrated Public Financial undertaken contributed to three Management Reform Project (2009–13) platforms—credible and transparent adopted such a holistic approach. One budgets; improved allocation of all available component was aimed at supporting resources; and greater efficiency and probity capacity development of nonstate actors in resource use that leads to improved (NGOs and CSOs) for the monitoring and service delivery. oversight of public financial management functions and for exercising scrutiny Source: World Bank 2013 28 may lead to widespread distrust of initiatives aimed at strengthening the role of the state (Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha 2015). Promoting active consensus building across groups and extending legitimacy to larger groups than have traditionally existed may be helpful. Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Where traditions of self-organization are weak, and freedom of association is limited, the role of intermediaries is crucial to facilitate two-way communication and bridge cultural and power gaps (Fox 2014; Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha 2015). Effective intermediaries must be able to forge shared agendas in a deeply divided society, develop social bonds cutting across identity groups, and create and reinforce a sense of citizenship. In FCS, intermediar- ies may be targeted specifically because of their ability to encourage or generate collective action. CSOs, traditional organizations, and media institutions often serve as mobilizers for citizen engagement, but in fragile and conflict-affected settings, it is essential to analyze social networks carefully to identify legitimate intermediaries beyond their technical capac- ities for mobilizing citizens. Support for civic mobilization entails identifying mobilizers that can transcend identity lines and are considered trusted and legitimate within their commu- nities. The risks associated with local facilitation must be considered and managed. Local facilitators may be unable to put aside personal bias, the product of their interpretation or understanding of history, or their perspective on the causes and drivers of conflict. Wherever tensions among groups are dangerously high, a facilitator’s affiliation with one group may make communication with another difficult if not impossible. Although the World Bank Group, as evident by WDR17, is more openly analyzing politically development issues, the organization’s scope and comfort level for engaging with openly partisan groups (political parties, social movements) remains constrained. Yet they are pre- cisely the groups who might be championing citizen engagement. 29 Types of Fragility and Windows of Opportunities Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Opportunities for citizen engagement are likely to differ markedly depending on the type of fragility. This paper advances some operational recommendations for citizen engagement structured on four archetypes—fragile situations (denoting elevated risks), active conflict and violence, subnational conflicts, and transitions. These categories are not meant to en- compass all possible situations, nor do they reflect what is known of fragility’s continuum. These categories are offered as a useful way to help teams think through particular cases, with the assumption that a typology, however limitative, might be useful. Some concrete operational examples are summarized in boxes. Fragile Situations: Deep Fragility and Elevated Risks Countries in deep fragility, with elevated risks for violence, may be weak, potentially un- stable politically, and suffer from weaknesses in security and service delivery (World Bank 2011; Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010). Governance weakness are due to an inability to build what WDR2011 terms “inclusive-enough coalitions” that create incentives to invest trust, loyalty, and resources in public institutions (World Bank 2011; Schouten 2011; McGee and Kroesschell 2013). As a result, the state is unable to respond consistently and equitably to societal demands, increasing the risk of political instability and violence. They have limited opportunities for economies of scale and scope as well as human and financial resources and infrastructure. Capacity to perform core state functions—such as policy formulation, eco- nomic management, public financial management and procurement, revenue generation, and civil service management—is therefore limited and prospects highly uncertain. Unequal distribution of resource rents to and within communities accentuates underlying divisions and generates new inequalities. All of this tends to heighten social conflict and undermine citizen engagement. SUGGESTED ACTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS Citizen engagement interventions can focus on creating space for local participation and leadership, thus empowering weaker parties to actively engage, express their preferences, and achieve greater control over the policy arena. Strengthening citizen-state engagement in fragile settings requires a triangulated approach that simultaneously builds voice and “listen- ing capacity” within the media, government and civil society (von Kaltenborn-Stachau 2008). 30 Since grievances related to perceptions and reality of equity and fairness are at the source of Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Photo by Dominic Chavez / World Bank most grievances in fragile countries, the principal metric for citizen engagement interven- tions should assess how civil engagement will impact imbalances of power and thus the dis- tribution of costs and benefits of change between winners and losers. Because both capacity and accountability are weak in states with fragility and elevated risks of violence, it makes sense to make greater use of state and community, state and civil society, and state and pri- vate sector partnerships in delivering and monitoring early reform efforts (World Bank 2011). Box 3 features two examples of civil engagement projects in deep fragility contexts that are attempting to strengthen horizontal and vertical linkages among communities and public authorities. Focusing on strengthening the social contract and emphasizing the role of all parties and their collective responsibility for problem solving can be constructive in improving accountability (Fooks 2013). Developing a social contract in a fragile context requires ongoing explicit and implicit negotiation between different interest groups and a range of formal and informal powerholders, subject to renegotiation and changes in circumstances. This can help prevent a negative backlash from a state with authoritarian tendencies that may be nervous about the role of civil society and give each party a realistic expectation of what the other can do. Fur- thermore, in the context of a weak social contract, improving citizens’ knowledge of their en- titlements is necessary to achieve increased formal citizen engagement with service providers. Citizen engagement strategies for practitioners working in countries with deep fragility might be more effective if they:  Address both supply and demand, placing greater emphasis on mechanisms that address both sides of the equation (while being realistic about what can be offered by the supply side) in the civil engagement strategy.  Identify state and citizen interfaces where constructive citizen engagement at the local 31 level can occur. Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Photo by HUMA / World Bank  Support anti-corruption actions to demonstrate that new initiatives and revenues can be well-governed, drawing on external and community monitoring capacity.  Identify and engage internal champions for citizen engagement within government.  Support the role of informal institutions in creating, mediating, or preventing grievances. Active Conflict and Violent Situations Active conflict and violent situations are characterized by serious civil unrest and or armed conflict, political instability with significant social and economic disruptions leading to weak state institutions and ineffective law and order; extensive damage to infrastructure; disrup- tion of service delivery and high dependence on rent (World Bank 2018; ADB 2012; Batley and McLoughlin 2009). There is frequently an upsurge in corruption and a lack of accountability, which often becomes entrenched during this time. The state often lacks the ability to build inclusive political settlements and mediate relations across various groups (Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha 2015), and it is not uncommon to find that informal networks and sources of information take precedence over formal ones. Active conflict and violence leads to increased oppression and narrows or nearly eliminates opportunities for political expression or opposition (World Bank 2011). The serious impacts of war and violence on civil society often mean that (re-)establishing trust and social cohe- sion remains an immense challenge for societies experiencing active conflicts and violence (BMZ 2013). Opportunities for engagement of the most vulnerable and marginalized are heavily influenced by fear and trauma (Fox 2014; McGee and Kroesschell 2013). Under these circumstances, mobilizing citizens or engaging them in formal accountability mechanisms 32 may be risky and can be viewed as a challenge to the state (Schouten 2011). BOX 3 Examples of World Bank Projects in Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Deep Fragility Situations SOLOMON ISLANDS COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE AND GRIEVANCE MANAGEMENT PROJECT Context: Results: The project’s development objective Progress to date based on FY17 beneficiary was to establish durable arrangements, survey results indicators: through community officers (COs), to  Indicator 1, coverage: 76 percent of assist communities in managing conflicts citizens reported direct benefits from that undermine community security, the project, with relative gender equity development, and social cohesion. Stresses (80 percent for males, 71 percent for arising from economic, political and social females). change were outstripping the capacity of public and community institutions  Indicator 2, horizontal relationships: to handle grievances and disputes, with 59 percent of citizens experienced adverse impacts on economic development, improvements in accessibility, and 77 welfare, and social cohesion. percent experienced improvements in effectiveness of community grievance Activity Scope: management mechanisms. The project supports COs in targeted  Indicator 3, vertical linkages: 68 per- communities in two provinces who cent of citizens perceived improve- work to strengthen horizontal linkages ments in linkages with government, between community members and driven primarily by improvements in community governance structures (i.e., linkages with police, but also by im- chiefs, religious leaders, and community provements in linkages with provincial organizations), and to strengthen authorities. vertical linkages between community members and state institutions (i.e., police, provincial authorities, and national 33 authorities). PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN GUINEA Context: community better understand public Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence A series of World Bank financed “Village spending and the council’s budgetary role. Community Support Projects” (PACV) aim As noted by one district representative, to build local governance and reinforce trust “Now we understand better what the in formal institution by strengthening the council does with the budget, and we have capacity of rural communes in developing identified what we wanted to see in our and managing local development plans and commune. But we learned that the council annual investment programs. did not have enough money, so we decided to contribute with our own money.” Scope: PACV supports participatory budgeting and Through these activities, citizens are monitoring and evaluation activities every finding they are part of good local quarter in 35 rural communes in Guinea, governance and can make positive with a plan to expand to all rural communes and concrete contributions to their by 2020. The Third Village Community communities. Local authorities are also Support Project supported the participatory learning that, by proactively sharing budgeting pilot activity in the 10 districts of information and engaging local citizens, the Molota commune. they can better mobilize financial resources and increase people’s willingness to Results: participate in the governance process, thus Following the pilot, a small but significant increasing their sense of ownership and increase in local revenue collection accountability. occurred (from 0 to about GF 1,600,000). Participatory budgeting helped the 34 SUGGESTED ACTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS In contexts of active conflict and violence, civil engagement interventions may need to start small and proceed gradually and iteratively. Furthermore, because both capacity and ac- Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence countability are weak and a source of tension during active conflict and violent situations, strategies need to focus on responsiveness to social accountability and grievance redress mechanisms (World Bank 2011). Working with the grain of existing imperfect institutional structures might be more cost-ef- fective and sustainable than advocating for a best practice option. Because both capacity and accountability are weak and a source of tension during active conflict and violent situations, strategies need to focus on responsiveness to citizens and act against abuses (World Bank 2011). Surveys of citizens’ attitudes and perceptions are important tools for assessing the relevance of operations in relation to local standards and expectations, and for targeting cit- izen engagement accordingly. In the context of active conflict and violence, helping to make information accessible to people can be vital for coping and can unleash civil society activism, even if success may be incremental. In some cases, international development partners have used their convening power to help bring different groups together to discuss core development priorities. Di- alogue on rights and responsibilities may need to start from less contentious areas, but it offers opportunities to engage authorities and civil society together. The security situation in countries with active conflict and violence often makes access particularly difficult, with a detrimental impact on project preparation and implementa- tion as well as their citizen engagement modalities. In some cases, civil engagement is limited to ensuring some channels for beneficiary feedback are meditated by “third-party monitors” such as supervisory agents, ICT tools, and community monitors (World Bank Group 2014b; World Bank 2018). See example in box 4. 35 Transitions Transitions include countries exiting fragility or conflict, or other significant social or polit- Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence ical upheaval. Some of these countries may no longer be identified as fragile or conflict-af- fected, but their fragility risk remains (Schouten 2011; ADB 2013). Countries in transition are often accompanied by heightened disputes as new sets of winners and losers appear. In- adequate service delivery, social and economic exclusion, and widening inequality can be ongoing concerns in such countries (World Bank 2018; Schouten 2011). Citizen engagement is needed even as the state struggles to effectively maintain peace and order amid a protract- ed and disruptive peacebuilding process. However, civil engagement is often constrained by weak state capacities or poor governance. SUGGESTED ACTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS Transitions are strong windows of opportunity for citizen engagement. They may provide opportunities not only to engage citizens in the fundamental negotiation of the new social contract, but also to establish building blocks for subsequent participation of citizens in the policy process. Citizen engagement can help support advocacy and the drafting of rules and legislation related to improving transparency, access to information and open data, budget transparency, and support for more independent accountability institutions. However, the success of civil engagement in transitional situations is often influenced by timing and the degree of political transitions, which can create challenges as well as oppor- tunities. If the timing is not right, interventions may not translate into desired outcomes. For example, the political transition in parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Region following the Arab Spring provided opportunities to position citizen participation as part of a sustainable approach to development interventions. The Development Policy Financing se- ries in Tunisia is an example of this financing instrument being used to support a transition government toward more transparency (see box 5). A recent flagship initiative of the World Bank involved mainstreaming citizen engagement in the MNA Region (Bousquet et al. 2013). MNA teams working with counterparts identi- fied several entry points and designed mechanisms for listening to citizens’ voices and in- corporating their feedback into policy reform programs and service delivery projects. Civil engagement mechanisms were identified to respond to citizen demands for greater voice. Participation in policy reforms, service delivery, and development programs included con- sultations, third-party monitoring, participatory decision making, and grievance reporting mechanisms. See box 6 for examples of projects from the MNA Region’s portfolio. 36 BOX 4 Example of a World Bank Project Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence in an Active Conflict and Violent Situation AFGHANISTAN THIRD-PARTY MONITORING Context: Since Afghanistan has been in conflict the need for accountability and civil for more than 30 years, ongoing conflict engagement in projects led by the World and insurgency have often challenged the Bank. In response these challenges, monitoring of project implementation and the World Bank employed third-party limited the ability of World Bank teams monitoring (TPM) in the form of to conduct field visits. Accompanying community monitoring and supervisory security challenges were weaknesses agents not only to facilitate the citizen in state structures, corruption, and engagement agenda, but also to monitor 37 displacement issues that heightened project implementation since 2011. Scope: Results: Third-party supervisory agents, First piloted for the Irrigation information and communication Rehabilitation Development Project, local Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence technology tools, and grievance redress monitoring enabled the assessment of mechanisms complemented by local some 13 irrigation canal construction monitoring were employed across several projects, affecting about 20 communities national projects. For example, the in 9 provinces. Furthermore, local National Solidarity Program introduced monitoring helped ensure better social voluntary community monitoring of its inclusion. The projects succeeded in subprojects through citizen or community increasing women’s participation by involvement during project planning, making incremental policy changes, implementation, and monitoring. To such as setting targets for women’s further exemplify, the World Bank representation in community also supported the Ministry of Mines development councils, school and Petroleum to pilot a small social management committees, and female accountability project in the Aynak office bearers in community councils. copper mine to foster trust between the Furthermore, TPM data enabled the ministry, mining company, and affected World Bank to identify and address communities. As a result, there is ongoing individual and specific project needs policy dialogue regarding community across sectors: community-driven development agreements in the extractive development, transport, irrigation, industries, which also contributed to the livelihoods, education, and health. recently amended Minerals Law. 38 Sources: World Bank Group 2014, 139; World Bank 2018. Subnational Conflicts A common defining feature of subnational conflicts is that the nature of governance and Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence state authority in affected areas is often contested. Oftentimes, violence is driven not only by cleavages between the central government and discontented minority populations, but also by rivalries between local actors in the conflict area (Parks, Colletta, Oppenheim 2013). Contested governance in subnational conflict areas involves the active struggle over the presence, role, authority, and legitimacy of government actors and institutions in local gov- ernance. Over time, the causes and texture of violence at the local level are typically shaped by local patronage networks of powerful elites and the distribution of resource rents within a specific locality. Factors associated with the exacerbation of subnational conflicts include the politicization of ethnicity; lack of access to political power, educational mobility, and economic opportunity; discriminatory or insensitive policies and practices by state or local authorities; collusive relations between national and local elites that marginalize some minority populations; and entrenched horizontal inequalities that concentrate power and resources in some groups at the expense of others (ADB 2013; Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013; World Bank 2011). In these situations, local control over alternative instruments of socialization and assimilation (the local media or education) becomes a central means of recruiting supporters for an eth- no-nationalist call for greater autonomy or separation. Vertical conflict between the state and nonstate actors frequently intersects with, and sometimes intensifies, highly localized forms of horizontal societal strife, such as clan-based conflict or criminal violence. 39 BOX 5 Tunisia’s Budget Transparency Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Initiative Tunisia’s Budget Transparency Initiative, mandate for overseeing the National supported through Development Controllers Body for Public Services Policy Financing, promoted improved (CGSP) through a joint government and transparency and accountability and civil society coordinating committee; greater public participation in policy (ii) the adoption of international making. In 2011, the interim government standards for participatory monitoring; introduced reforms aimed at improving (iii) the stipulation that all evaluations accountability in public service delivery, be published to reinforce access to for example, through participatory information and accountability; and (iv) monitoring of public service delivery clear emphasis on neutrality, objectivity, performance by third parties. and transparency of the CGSP’s mission. Institutionalizing participatory evaluation This reform was supported simultaneously of performance improvement aimed to by two others. The Law of Associations strengthen the mechanisms for holding was revised to remove any room for service delivery providers accountable. discretion in registration procedures. And, the adoption of a decree law gave The adoption of these policies is the public the right to access information, an important step forward. Their including economic and social data, held implementation needs to be equally by public bodies. The Development Policy supported and sustained to make them Loan (DPL) supported adopting a decree effective. The WDR17 framework is being to institutionalize the mechanisms for used in Tunisia to better analyze various participatory evaluation of public service interests and incentives among the performance improvement. stakeholders and support more effective implementation. The decree included four reform components: (i) the introduction of Sources: World Bank data; Tunisia DPL participatory audits as part of the program documents. 40 BOX 6 Citizen Engagement in a Period of Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Transition: the Tunisia example TUNISIA BUDGET TRANSPARENCY IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROJECT Context: stakeholders, to promote financial In 2011, as Tunisia transitioned from transparency and open governance. More its revolution, the interim government specifically, the committee was entrusted introduced measures to create openness with the task of ensuring detailed budgets in public administration and to allow of the state and state-owned enterprises the public to file complaints and access (and their execution) are made available for information. Accordingly, measures public scrutiny; preparing a citizen budget; for strengthening accountability, developing a tax culture; and publishing transparency, and participation were news about the recovery of stolen assets. At included in the series of Development the local level, municipalities implemented Policy Financing (DPF). a participatory planning process in which citizens were consulted on the overall Scope: budget allocation thereby enabling them to Measures were taken to create openness decide on the allocation of a portion of the in public administration and to allow investment budget of the local government. the public to file complaints and access information. In 2013, the Ministry of Progress to Date: Finance established a Transparency The Ministry of Finance started to post 41 Committee, including civil society documents related to the budget process. These actions have been complemented platform, providing real-time information by a substantial change in dissemination about financial transfers from central policies at the National Institute of government to local governments (past, Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Statistics (INS), which is now authorized approved, and planned). These examples to make detailed statistics and survey represent substantial progress to improve results publicly available on its website on voice, transparency, and accountability. topics such as unemployment, poverty, However, the pace of the progress of these regional disparities, consumption, and civil engagement initiatives has been the behavior and motivations of private slower than initially anticipated. companies. To strengthen governance through participation, transparency, and accountability, a national web portal was Sources: World Bank database; Tunisia DPL established to serve as a transparency program documents. 42 Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Photo by Allison Kwesell / World Bank SUGGESTED ACTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS The larger architecture of citizen engagement needs to be part of responses to social contes- tation in subnational conflicts. Strategies may involve supporting “inclusive-enough coali- tions” to bring together the critical actors needed to end violence and allow for reforms of key institutions (World Bank 2011). In communities with a strong need to rebuild social co- hesion and community trust, it may be more important to emphasize an inclusive process of deliberation on community needs, a fair process of negotiating priorities, and a transparent and accountable process of project implementation. The goal is to help the community benefit from having identified and implemented develop- ment activities cooperatively. In these cases, the actual deliverable—whether it be commu- nity infrastructure or a livelihoods initiative—may be less important than the way the project is delivered and who it targets. Where states have strong capacity, but inclusion is weak, re- form actions need to draw marginalized groups into decision making and ensure they benefit from national growth, service delivery, and welfare improvements (World Bank 2011). For example, in Myanmar, where various subnational conflicts have emerged, the World Bank’s community-driven development operation has incorporated consultations with beneficia- ries, grievance redress approaches, and mechanisms for oversight and accountability (social audits, community scorecards, and third-party monitoring) to strengthen the positive im- 43 pact of community investments (World Bank Group 2014b). Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Photo by Graham Crouch/World Bank Conclusion This paper provides a rapid overview of citizen engagement in FCV contexts, with some op- erational implications for World Bank staff. The discussion highlights areas where further research and attention is warranted, namely:  The role of nonstate actors in service delivery and the implication of their role in framing accountability relationships in FCV situations  The impact of the changing or shrinking civic space in fragile environments  The challenge and opportunities of inclusive citizen engagement in FCV (inclusion of marginalized groups and effect on legitimacy and conflict)  The challenge of national approaches when various groups in society might have very different perceptions of the state 44 References Engaging Citizens in Countries Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2012. 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