Rural WVater Supply & UND-Wrl BnkSanitation in Bolivia: Water and Sankitamo "roram - j From Pilot Project to National Program A 9 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- .4--- .e1~~~~. .; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 Caoin vano Water Bergy UNDP*World Bonk 1 Sa n itation i n Bol ivia Water and Son/4. * Rural Water Supply & UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Sanitation In Boiia Program From Pilot Project to National Program Jennifer Sara Alexandra Gross Caroline van den Berg © International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 May 1996 This document is an internal working document, published informally by the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program. Copies are available free from the World Bank. Contact Ms. Mari Dhokai, Room S4-001, Telephone: (202) 473 3970, Fax: f202f 477 0164. The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein, which are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the results of research supported by the Bank. The designations employed and the presentation of the material are solely for the convenience of the reader and do not imply the expression of any legal opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Bank or its affili- ates concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitations of its boundaries or national affiliation. Acknowledgments The material for this study is the outcome of the joint efforts by the staff of the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, the Yacupaj pilot project, and the Latin America, Region 3, Envi- ronment and Urban Development Division (LA3EU) This study draws on the Staff Appraisal Report for PROSABAR. A special thanks is extended to Mike Garn, Abel Meiia, and Philippe Auffret for their considerable contributions. The study was carried out under the general direction ofJohn Briscoe and Brian Grover. Publication was made possible by financing from the government of Norway. Cover photo: Curt Carnemark Printed on recycled paper Contents Foreword 1 Executive Summary 2 Part 1: Introduction 4 Part 2: The Pilot Project 6 Project Design 6 Project Rules 8 Project Implementation 10 Project Results 12 Lessons from the Pilot Project 24 Part 3: The Evolution of a National Program 26 Institutionol Arrangements 28 Establishing the Rules 31 Sustainabilily 36 Adoptive Project Design 38 Lessons from PROSABAR 39 Conclusion 41 Bibliography 42 Foreword Since 1991 the water and sanitation sector in Bank projects that are translating this new pro- Bolivia has undergone radical reform. The ject cycle approach into practice. Yacupaj pilot project described in this report The Yacupaj-PROSABAR approach is client was both a manifestation of this reform process oriented in several respects. It ensures that and a contributor to it. The project led to a large investments reflect consumer demand, and it investment program, PROSABAR, expected to focuses on the borrower, not the requirements benefit more than 800,000 people throughout of the assistance agency. It emphasizes institu- the country This study documents the results of tional development and capacity building as a the pilot project and the path to a national central goal rather than as a side component of program. the project. It encourages and builds on stake- Within the development community (includ- holder participation to ensure project owner- ing the World Bank) there is an ongoing ship. And it embodies a learning culture in debate about moving from an old blueprint- which adjustments are made as lessons emerge type project planning process to a "new" four- from initial experience in the project. stage project cycle: listening, piloting, demonstrating, and mainstreaming. The Yacu- John Briscoe poj-PROSABAR experience documented in this Chief report is one of a new generation of World Water and Sanitation Division Executive Summary Bolivia has a long history of building water 1 980s. These new approaches were based on and sanitation systems in rural areas. In con- the following principles: structing these systems, project planners have * Community participation at all stages of a focused almost exclusively on their technical project is essential to its sustainability. merits, with little consideration given to eco- * Nongovernmental organizations and the nomic efficiency or sustoinability of services, private sector are able to implement rural The basic premise underlying these projects water and sanitation projects effectively and has been that economic demand for water ser- efficiently. vices is too low for the rural population to be * A wide range of technologies and adequate willing to pay for the services provided. Pro- financial policies are essential to project success. jects have therefore been primarily supply * Training in operations and maintenance and driven, with community "needs" being deter- sanitary education are crucial project compo- mined by officials from a central government nents, and operations and maintenance are agency. highly dependent on project design and imple- The Yacupaj project was initiated as a pilot mentation. project in the Department of Potosi in 1991. Its The Yacupaj project also introduced an objective was to design and test strategies for adaptive approach and encouraged stake- delivering services to the dispersed rural popu- holders to develop project rules and processes. lation of the Altiplano and to use these lessons The results of the Yacupaj project have been to prepare a national project. The project built essential in the preparation of the IDA-funded on experiences in the numerous countries in Proyecto de Soneamiento Basico Rural, or which the UNDP World Bank Water and Sani- PROSABAR. But scaling up the pilot project to tation Program was active and introduced inno- a national program has presented new chal- vative approaches to sector development lenges, not only because of the weaknesses of based on the results of the International Drink, nationol sector strategies and policies, but also ing Water Supply and Sanitation Decade of the because of the need to ensure ownership of the 2 project by a much larger number of stakehold- A key lesson of the Yacupaj project was that ers. The PROSABAR project greatly benefited government participation in rural water and from the community-level implementation sanitation service expansion in Bolivia requires process developed by Yacupaj, which included a sector-specific approach in order to strategies for addressing economic demand by strengthen policies and build institutional link- negotiating levels of services and financial ages between communities, local govern- options with communities, and supporting sus- ments, sector agencies, and private and tainability through the applicotion of training nongovernmental actors and hygiene education programs The larger Before PROSABAR, the government had project had to be defined in a broader institu done little analysis of the costs of service deliv- tionol, financial, and political context, however ery, or the sustainability of the investments it Complicating the process was the fact that dur- had made in the sector. The Yacupal experi- ing project preparation Bolivia was undergoing ence brought more rigor to the analysis of costs major reforms, including the creation of rural by providing realistic figures and encouraging municipalities, decentralization to departmen- other sector actors to do the same This finan- tal governments, and the restructuring of the cial analysis had important implications for the executive branch. sector, as its results not only determined finan- The Yacupaj project provided important cial policy for PROSABAR but were also lessons, from which PROSABAR benefited: applied as national policy for the sector * Poor beneficiaries are willing to select and The lessons documented in this report are make a substantial contribution to water and applicable to the development of large-scale sanitation services; economic demand for ser- rural water and sanitation projects in general. vices does exist. The overarching lesson is that demand-driven * Cast reductions can best be achieved and sustainable investments require a coherent through incentives rather than through strictand set of project rules that constitute the framework expensive administrative control mechanisms. for all activities These rules determine such crit- * Sociol and community development ical elements as financial policy, eligibility cri- processes need to balance a participatory teria, levels of service, and responsibility for approach with clear objectives and outputs. service delivery and operations and main- - Efficiency is significantly increased if com tenance. The rules must create the right incen- munity-level projects are grouped together for tives to ensure that beneficiaries choose implementation. services they want and for which they are will- * Although communities are willing to assume ing to pay. This study offers an illustration of responsibilities for operations and mainte- how these rules can be tested through a pilot nance, they require additional backslopping to project and developed through the preparation achieve long-term sustainability. of a large investment program 3 Part 1: Introduction The main objective of this case study is to doc- The second section focuses on how ument the results achieved by the Yacupaj pilot PROSABAR integrated the lessons from Yacupaj project and the process followed in the prepa- in formulating a national sector policy (figure ration of Proyecto de Soneamiento Basico Rural 1 -1). it documents how PROSABAR established (PROSABAR), a national program. The case the project rules and institutional arrangements, study also assesses the contribution of both pro- including the eligibility criteria, technical jects to reforming the rural water and sanitation options, and financial policy. The ways in which sector in Bolivia. PROSABAR tackled new challenges during the The case study is divided into three sec scaling up process-including the new role tions. The first section analyzes how the insti- played by the municipalities and the absence of tutional arrangements established in the a national sectoral policy leading to conflicting Yacupaj project generated a set of behavioral approaches to the delivery of rural water supply incentives that led to demand-driven invest- and sanitation services-are also examined.The ments and long-term sustainability. it third section draws lessons for project planners describes the project's rules, processes, and and World Bank task managers. The experience implementation strategy and presents results with Yacupaj and PROSABAR is significant not on the impact of the project at the community just because it reformed the water and sanitation and institutional levels. In addition, it shows sector in Bolivia, but because it provides a model how working through nongovernmental org for implementing water and sanitation projects anizations (NGOsj and existing agencies led in rural communities. This model is the project's to the institutionalization of the project. contribution to the sector. 4 Figure 1.1 The model for scaling up Yacupaj: The pilot project PROSABAR: The national program 1e (I e1 S ˘1 r1 Ir v r s r ImplOmrning --I rIOr pobcy for * BL Fs d8 F 11 sjsla.rrble arge rural warer suppip and * .1 1,0e, .r onirarlon invenimeol rnroughoor the . *'F'I 'F''''1'L( i ]| country * ii, F [,, , I . 1>1' Bene-.ciarier 800,000 rurol comm-rrry renidenir Pril Ieil.,. n )' , ,r( Projeul ccsl US$48 rrrII on P . F I LI,,, Pl; C1 :,. 1 t15zP2 d r P.I.,[ r US48 d Investment tifeline 5 Part 2: The Pilot Project Faced with a severe economic crisis during the liable, and sewage is often discharged into mid-I 980s, Bolivia adopted a far-reaching eco- the natural drainage system without any con- nomic program aimed at stabilizing and trol. Throughout the country, most water restructuring the economy. The economic sources are polluted. growth achieved since the crisis has not led to The dismal state of water and sanitation ser a significant reduction in poverty, however: vices is responsible for endemic waterborne according to the Nalional Statistical Institute, diseases, which remain the most frequently about 70 percent of the population lived below reported and widespread illnesses in the coun- the poverty line in 1992 (table 2.1). In the try. Intestinal disease is the second largest water and sanitation sector, Bolivia has the low- cause of death among all age groups and the est service levels in South America, with only leading cause of infant mortality, which 5B percent of the population receiving water remains very high in Bolivia 175 per 1 000 live services and only 43 percent receiving soni births). In rural Bolivia lack of adequate water tation services according to the 1992 census supply facilities forces most households to In rural areas, where 42 percent of the pop- devote substantial amounts of time to fetching ulation lives, only 24 percent of the population water from distant sources-a burden that falls is served by safe drinking water systems and mainly on women and children. only 17 percent has access to adequate sani- tation. Most of those served in rural areas live Project Design in larger settlements, most people living in communities of less than 250 inhabitants (rep In 1990, when the pilot project was designed, resenting 80 percent of the rural populationl the rural water and sanitation sector in Bolivia lack adequate water and sanitotion facilities, faced numerous constraints. Severe financial Even in small towns with water supply systems, constraints limited the size and scope of invest- service quality is poor and sanitary standards ments. Institutional responsibility for the sector are not enforced. Seweroge systems are unre was unclear, with activities divided among the 6 Table 2.1 Sociaeconomni inickaars for BorMvia and Paosi Indicator Bolivia Poto5i Population 6,420,792 645,889 Rural popuIation (percent) 43 66 Population density (population per square kilometer) s 8 5 5 Population growth rate per year (percent) 2 3 -0 1 Shore of households below th. poverty line (perce-t) 70 80 Per capita a nnua income (US$) 804 434 Life eopmtency (years) 59 52 Infant m-otity (per 1,000 lie births) 75 118 Illiteracy rate (perce-t) 20 38 Access to electricity, water, ond sanitation (percent) 54 40 Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Urban The Yacupaj project operated in more than Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the 520 communities, training rural teachers, Regional Development Corporations. There health workers, masons, and water syslem was little coordination between the activities of operators. The project installed waler systems, the more than 400 NGOs and other agencies handpumps, and sanitalion facilities that pro- that were active throughout the country Gav- vided 31 000 people with water services and ernment agencies involved in the sector had a 30,000 with sanitation services. tradition of directly constructing services them- The prolect design was based on the follow- selves, with little private sector involvement ing principles, which emerged from numerous Finally, Bolivia lacked a sector policy that projects implemented by the Program in Africa, determined which communities would be Asia, and Latin America served first, how much subsidy the government a Community responsibility and participation would provide, and how the responsibility for in all stages of project planning, construction, operations and maintenance of the systems and operations and maintenance is essential. would be assigned Women should be involved with the project at The Yacupaj project was conceived as a every stage pilot project to develop and test irmplementation a Low-cost technologies (handpumps, gravity strategies to provide water supply and sanita- flow systems, ventilated improved pit latrinesj tion services to dispersed rural communities in should be promoted to make facilities afford- the Altiplano Yacupaj means "for the water" in able to low-income communities Quechua. The project was implemented in four a Cost recovery mechanisms that are realisti- provinces of the Department of Potosi between cally geared to family incomes should be used 1991 and (994 ata cost of US$2 8 million. It to ensure sustainability of the services. was funded mainly by the Government af the a Water supply and sanitation services should Netherlands. The UNDP-World Bank Water be linked with health, hygiene, environmental and Sanitation Program (the Program) served education, and income-generating activities. as the executing agency The Regional Devel- a Planning and implementation should be exe- opment Corporation of Potosi served as the cuted by local and national people to the great- implementing agency est extent possible 7 . Local capacity to deliver services, particu- on their institutional presence and community larly by NGOs and the indigenous private sec- demand for services. Creating these subregions tor, should be strengthened. improved efficiency in project implementation, . In-service and more formal types of training monitoring, and supervision, and strengthened should be used to develop sector agency the capacity of the local private sector to deliver capacities, technical support and spare ports on a com- mercial basis. All communities in the subregions Project Rules with populations of 50-250 inhabitants were eligible to participate if the community asked to During the first nine months of the Yacupaj pro- participate, if the beneficiaries accepted the ject, staff focused on developing the rules for financial policy of the project and assumed project implementation: community selection responsibility for long-term operations and criteria, technical design criteria, financial pol- maintenance, and if service provision was tech- icy, and the responsibility for operations and nically feasible. maintenance. These rules were based on the fol- lowing three objectives: Technical options and levels of service * to improve service coverage and the effec In order lo reduce costs and ensure mainte tive use of the services by the beneficiaries; nance by users, the project promoted the use of * to strengthen existing institutions at the com- technologies that were within the technical and munity, provincial, and departmental levels; financial reach of the community (table 2.2). and The project offered technical options that were * to develop a model for replication in other appropriate for the physical and hydrological areas of the country. The goal was to design conditions of the area and took into account the rules that would give families choices. degree of dispersion between communities and The staff built in measures to ensure a flexi- the large distances between houses in those ble and adaptive approach to the project. All communities. staff and representatives of counterpart agen Project staff promoted these technologies by cies met annually to analyze the rules and constructing demonstration facilities of hand- processes and agree on modifications. They pumps and latrines in each province and pro- produced a detailed strategy document that ducing a variety of educational materials to was distributed to all project staff, and modified outline the options. Project staff presented at it twice during the four years of implementation. least two technical and their corresponding ser- Simple promotional flyers were distributed to vice level options to each community and communities throughoui the region outlining eli- guided the decisionmaking process with cost gibility criteria and rules for participation in the estimates. Decisions on latrines were made on project. a household basis. Communities chose to par- ticipate in the project and selected water Community selection criteria and/or sanitation services based on a full Most inhabitants of Potosi live in very small com- knowledge of costs. munities that ore isololed by difficult terrain, making the population difficult to reoch. Faced Financial policy with such a dispersed population, Yacupaj The Yacupaj financial policy was a critical ele- decided to group communities into subregions ment of the project's success. Although the pro- to reduce administrative costs. The project del ject served Bolivia's poorest residents, more egoted responsibility for community selection to than 50 percent of its funding was provided by three agencies, which chose subregions based the community-a significantly higher level of 8 contribution than that of any previous water menu of technical options and specific costs and sanitation project in the country. based on a percentage of investment cost. The The financial policy had three main objectives: project also placed restrictions on the length of * to ensure a sense of ownership by requiring gravity-fed water distribution networks. the community to contribute in both cash and The financial policy for latrines was modified kind to investment cost, during the third year of project implementation * to lower cost by using appropriate tech- in response to demand for more latrines. The nologies in order to reduce government subsidy project agreed to add more latrines to its imple- and extend coverage to more people, and mentation plan, but increased the community * to ensure that the cost of investment and contribution from 30 to 50 percent of invest- operations and maintenance was within the ment cost. Demand for additional latrines con- community's financial capacity. The financial tinued even after the increase. policy was based on socioeconomic and will- ingness-to-pay studies of a sample of communi- Responsibility for operations and ties (table 2.3). maintenance Since the project adhered to a policy of strict The project gave beneficiaries full responsibil- financial control through standard design fea- ity for operation, maintenance, and replace- tures and fixed costs, no per capita cost ceilings ment of facilities, and insisted that communities were established. Communities chose from a agree to this responsibility before construction Table 2.2 Technical options and corresponding levels of service Type of service Technical option Levels of service Water supply Spring protection Protection olone Standpipe at source Distribution system Public stondpipes House connections Dug well and handpumps Direct action Yaku pump Communal pump Rope and washer pump Family-level pump Bucket pump Deep well with IMIII pump Sanitation Latrines Ventilated improved pit Family (single pit) Communal (double pit) Pour-flush Family (single pit) Communal (double pit) Table 2.3 Breakdovwn of responsibilities for the Yacupa; project Responsibility Community's contribution Yacupaj's contribution System design Choice of level of service Technical assistance Local materials (sand, rock) 1 00 percent 0 percent Other materials (pumps, pipes) 30 percent of cash cost 70 percent of cash cost 1 00 percent for house connections 0 percent for house connections Skilled labor Choice of contractor 1 00 percent 9 began. The project provided training to local At the departmental level, a project imple- masons and water system operators in simple mentation unit was formed in Potosi. This unit operations and maintenance tasks. Ownership was responsible for designing the project rules of the focilities was officiolly" transferred to the and implementation strategies, technical assis- community, although the assets were not for- tance, training of provincial staff, production of mally registered by the government or training materials, supervision of provincial community. implementation, and monitoring and evalua- The project worked closely with provincial tion. The unit included a project director and a stores to encourage them to sell materials and subdirector, a social advisor and two assistants, spare parts. These stores now regularly buy a technical advisor and two assistants, a moni- equipment on a wholesale basis from manu- toring and evaluation assistant, an administra- facturers, and community members rely on this tor, and support staff. inventory to maintain their systems. Since the The project worked with one intermediary in project concluded, communities have been each of the three provinces: two NGOs and able to rely on their own resources or on the pri- one integrated regional development project. vate sector to undertake operations and Each intermediary hired a director, a commu- maintenance. nity development advisor, a sanitary engineer, a hydrogeologist, five to seven extension work- Project Implementation ers, an administrator, and a driver. The provin- cial director and administrator were contracted Responsibility for implementing the project was directly by the Program during the first two divided among the different stakeholders. A years; subsequently, these responsibilities were steering committee met every three months to assumed by the intermediary. The intermedi- review project progress and approve new work aries were selected on the basis of their institu- plans. The committee was made up of repre tional presence in the province and their sentatives from the National Director of Water willingness to pursue an experimental and Sanitation (DINASBA), the National Direc- approach to the project (box 2. 1) torate of International Cooperation (DICOPRE), The terms of the contracts with the interme- the Netherlands Technical Mission in Bolivia diaries were elaborate and required strict (MCTHf, the Regional Development Corpora- adherence to the Yacupaj rules and implemen- tion of Potosi (CORDEPO), the Potosi office of tation strategy. The intermediaries were, how- the Ministry of Health (MSP), the United ever, encouraged to become part of a "pilot Nations Development Program (UNDP), and process" and motivated to be creative and anoa- the Program. lytical. They were asked to prepare quarterly A program coordination unit based in La Paz and annual budgets, and to analyze their work- focused on building consensus in the sector, plans for review and approval by the steering applying lessons from Yocupaj at the national committee. level, and supporting national sector policy development. The unit's international staff held Implementation model regular seminars to exchange ideas and expe- The project's implementation model at the com- riences on global issues in the sector. Partici- munity level depends on wo main assumptions pants included representatives of the national (figures 2.1 and 2.2). First, it assumes that the and departmental government as well as the project is a temporary provider of technical U.S. Agency for International Development assistance and finance; by means of contracts, (USAID, the United Nations Children's Fund it delegates responsibility for project imple- (UNICEF), CARE, and local NGOs. mentation to intermediaries and privote enter- 10 Box 2.1 The Yacupal intermcd[iries The Yocupoj strategy was to work through existing institutions. At the provincial level, the Yacupoj project formed strong partnerships with three agencies in Potosi to implement the project: Instituto Politcnico Tupac Katari (IPTK) Created in 1975, IPTK is an NGO that works in the province of Chayanta to help rural communities develop agriculture, microenterprise, infrastructure, health, and education facilities. The Ministry of Health has delegated responsibility for management of all public health facilities and personnel in the province to IPTK. At the community level IPTK works through farmers unions and seeks community participation in its projects, mainly through the provision of labor. It has more than 200 employees and has received bng-term funding from European donors. Before working with Yacupaj, IPTK did not include water and sonitotion in its work program. Centro de Investiigoi6n y de Apayo Campeesino (aAC) CIAC has worked in three provinces in the Department of Potosi since 1988. By working through traditional community leadership structures, CIAC helps improve ogriculturad production, promots culturol events, and provides legal assistonce. It has experience in implementing water and sonRation projects other then Yacupaj. It receives funding from European donors and international NGOs. Proyetdo Cotagaito San Juan del Oro (PCSJO) PCSJO is a government-executed rural development project that began in 1985. It implements nine components of the project, ranging from roads to agricultural credit and erosion control. Before working with Yocupcj, PCSJO followed a technically oriented approach to development with little emphasis on beneficiary participation It hod limited experience with water and sanitation projects before Yacupaj. prises. Second, the model assumes that ers, and community leaders). In addition, pro- demand is generated in communities and that ject staff were trained on a systematic basis they request improved water and sanitation through shortterm consultancies and visits by facilities. The intermediary and rural promoters the staFF of the Potosi office (table 2 4). help communities meet demand by planning their works, purchasing materials from local Training at the community level stores, and hiring masons to assist with The project adopted the SARAR methodology construction. for training at the community level (box 2.2) This method develops the capacity to evaluate, Training project staff select, plan, create, organize, and undertake The Yacupal strategy requires that the imple- initiatives by encouraging collective responsi- mentation teams consist of multidisciplinary bility for decisions and by respecting the staff members. Engineers and technicians must cultural, social, and economic environment of know how to negotiate service levels with com the community It pays special attention to the munities and train system operators, and social development and use of support materials staff must be familiar with latrine siting, con (visual and audiovisual educational techniques, struction, and the operations and maintenance sociodramas, comic books, and so on) These of the systems materials can play an important role in the edu All project staff participated in three one- cation process week training events held at the provincial The Yacupaj experience showed that the level. The fieldworkers then replicated this train- application of participatory methodologies ing for rural promoters (teachers, health work- must be balanced with a clear understanding 11 Figure 2.1 Implementation model Dem-nd -sesaton .P,.5 s on ol goods and htoith ed-ofion, and pro ecC piomol on \ oo Iino emdir lioa sdo NGOs oe Health -ok-r uidl of expected results. Participatory exercises stration facilities in public areas to help benefi- should focus on helping communities determine ciaries understand their choice of technical their development priorities, implementing the options. Investment and recurrent costs mere project, and acquiring new skills for the sus- discussed for each option and serice level. The tainability and effective use of facilities. After community then decided what they wanted and two years of project implementation it became how much they were willing to pay. evident that coherent objectives and activity and performance indicators were required to Project Results monitor the activities of the field workers to ensure a result-oriented approach. Boxes 2.3, Communities showed a strong preference for 2.4, and 2.5 illustrate how the implementation gravityfed systems over wells and the Yaku model was executed in different communities. handpump over other handpumps. Although beneficiaries expressed a preference for house Technical options connections, hardly any chose house connec- Each community was offered a choice of tech- tions at first because they would have had to nical options and a range of possible service pay the full incremental cost above the cost of levels. The project originally allowed for 1,250 a public standpipe. Only 30 percentof the com- wells with handpumps and 1 250 ltirines, but munities went on to expand their water systems, in response to demand exparided the range of suggesting that many are content with public choices to include more handpump options, as standpipes and also that they are able to well as gravity systems. It also increased the expand their systems on their own. number of latrines. Communities chose BeneFiciaries also showed a clear prefer- between hand-dug wells with handpumps and ence for family-owned pumps over shared gravity systems, and determined the number of pumps. The project was able to provide these beneficiaries per water point. Project staff by using low cost Yaku handpumps. The Yaku is developed visual materials and built demon a public domain handpump originally imported 12 IE~~~~~~~~~~~~~e 0E E2 g E E~ 0 0 o~~~~~~~~~I l- I L ,,v.< ! 0E21i W i , 1 ' i ) Table 2.4 Basic elements of the training program First phase Project strategy and rules Participatory methodology Project promotion in communities Women's participation Community self-diagnosis Health education I (water-related illnesses) Second phase Community organization Planning Technical options, levels of service, and costs Health education 11 (hygiene and illness prevention) Third phase Basic sanitation (cleaning and disinfection, garbage handling, environmental protection, and so on) Health education IIl (water transport and storage, treatment of illnesses) Operations and maintenance Monitoring and evaluation Box 2.2 The SARAR methodology The term SARAR stands for five attributes and capacities-self-esteem, associative strength, resourcefulness, action planning, and responsibility for follow-through-necessary if community participation is to be dynamic and self-sustaining. This technique helps to level the hierarchies within a group, opening the way for all members of a community, including the poorest, most disadvantaged, and least articulate, to participate on a peer basis. UNDP/PROWWESS (Promotion of the Role of Women in Water and Sanitation Services) adapted the SARAR method for use in the rural water supply and sanitation sector in some twenty developing countries on the assumption that a program's success largely depends on enhancing the contribution of community members, particularly rural women. Trainers present participatory methods and tools at SARAR-based village workshops to create effective learning experiences that help residents conceptualize and carry out specific projects. By getting involved in new ways, participants discover new talents and abilities. This discovery can provide an enormous boost to individual self-confidence and increase trust in the group process. The quality of participation in needs assessment, planning, and creative problem solving steadily improves through the cumulative effect of a series of such experiences. The SARAR approach emphasizes the extensive use of training materials to achieve its goals. It focuses on five methods: * Creative: to promote fresh viewpoints, new ideas, and solutions e Investigative: to demystify research and involve participants in gathering and processing data * Analytic: to engage participants in problem solving * Planning: to develop skills in systemotic action planning * Informative: to access information in an enjoyable way. Monitoring and evaluation form an integral part of all five methods. Source: 'Tools for Community Participation', by Lyra Srinivasan. 14 Box 2.3 Community profile: El Tambo Total populaion 150 Number of children aged 5-18 52 Number of familie 33 Number of children younger than 5 24 Number of momeu 45 Number of hauses 36 Number of moo 29 Average distnce betwee. houses (meters) 10-200 Setting. The village of El Tambo is situated in the arid Altiplano, 3,400 meters above sea level and 45 kilometers from the border with Argentina The climate is cold, with temperatures ranging from 10 degrees Celsius at night to 18 during the day. Background. All families own their houses, which are constructed out of adobe brick with straw-thatched roofs Most houses have two or three rooms. There is no electricity or other services. The land is communally held. Principal economic activities include raising livestock (such as cows and sheep) and c.gricultural production (potatoes and beans) Most men in the community migrate to Argentina during the summer and return ta the village in the winter, bringing in cash incomes above the subsistence level The community has a political leader appointed by the Department, as well as a traditional leader who is democratically elected each year. The community has a mothers club, a school association, and a health committee. There is a school in the village with two teachers and thirty-three students. The community has a very high literacy rate, with only two illiterate adults. The village has no health post. As perceived by the residents, primary health problems include scabies, parositosis, respiratory infections, and Chagas disease. Before the Yacupa) project, approximately one-third of the people used the river and two-thirds used unprotected wells for their water supply. The river is dry for several months of the year. The community felt that the quality of the water they consumed before the project began was good. Each family used an average of 30 liters a day. Children and women collected the water once a day in plastic jugs, which were also used to store the water inside the house. Clothes were washed once a week in the river. Both adults and children washed their hands and faces twice a week, the adults in the river and children in the house. Project interventions. The Yacupa) project staf first approached El Tambo for a promotional visit and were invited back by the community leader the following week to meet with the entire community. During this meeting project staff introduced the community members to the SARAR participatory methodology and prepared a community map. After four visits by the project staff to analyze community hygiene and health practices, the community formed a water committee and requested the construction of demonstration latrines and Yaku handpumps at the school. Tests of the existing wells in El Tambo showed a high level of fecal coliform contamination. This knowledge helped motivate the community to invest in improved water supply for households. The community requested the construction of eight communal Yaku handpumps and eleven latrines for those who did not already have access. Families paid about US$60 for each handpump and provided all the local materials and labor. A few members of the community chose not to participate. During an eight-month period project staff held sixteen social development events (training sessions for self- analysis, planning, and health education) and nineteen technical interventions, which included organizing the community for construction, training in handpump installation, operations and maintenance, construction supervision, and water quality control. The community hired a mason who had been trained by the project to undertake the construction. Separate committees for each handpump have created their own rules for administration, operations, and maintenance. The community constructed washing and bathing facilities close to the pumps with its own resources. 15 Table 2.5 Physical works constructed under Yacupoi Water Yaku handpump with hand-dug well 664 Rope and washer pump with hand-dug well 55 Bucket pump with hand-dug well 24 IMIII handpump with deep well 26 Small gravity system (less than 100 beneficiaries) 101 Medium gravity system (100-250 beneficiaries) 71 Large gravity system (more than 250 beneficiaries) 19 Simple spring protection 24 Total 984 Number of beneficiaries 30,253 Latrines Ventilated improved pit (VIP) 1,201 Pour-flush 1,266 Total 2A67 Number of beneficiaries 30,671 from Bangladesh. The project promoted local degree of dispersion of communities and people manufacturing of the handpump and the devel- within those communities, typical of the Altiplano opment of an international standard. It is now region. In contrast, the number of people per produced in Bolivia and Guatemala. latrine was relatively high, because many public The project built both private and public facilities were built at schools or health centers. latrines, including pour-flush and ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrines. The demand for Human resource development and latrines was greater than anticipated. At first capacity building this demand was attributed to the financial pol- The Yacupaj project focused on human icy, in which families paid only 30 percent of resource development and capacity building to the cost. However, even when the policy was ensure sustainability. It trained a wide range of changed and families had to pay more than 50 individuals to participate in project implemen- percent of the cost, the demand for latrines tation (table 2.6). remained large. The anti-cholera campaigns by Community members were the primary recip- the Ministry of Health during the years of ients of the project's training efforts. The project project implementation may be partly responsi- helped form 209 water committees, at least one ble for this high demand. for each system constructed. It also trained 596 Only a few people were served by each operators, who operated and maintained com- water point (table 2.5). This was due to the high munal systems and family-level handpumps. 16 Box 2.4 Community profile: Lucas K'ahua Total population 154 Number of children aged 5-18 53 Number of families 40 Number of children younger than 5 25 Number of women 34 Number of houses 40 Number of men 42 Average distance between houses (meters) 10-500 Setting. Lucas K'ahua is locoted in a mountainous region of the province of Choyanta at an elevation of 3,300 meters above sea level. The population within the community is very dispersed, distributed over four ranchos (hamlets). About 30 hectores of land are cultivated, and the community has access to an additional 50 hectares of pasture. It receives about 300 millimeters of precipitation a year. Background. All families own their houses, which are constructed out of adobe brick with straw-thatched roofs. Most houses have one or two rooms. There is no electricity or other services. Most community residents are bilingual in Spanish and Quechua, with the older residents speaking only Quechua. Principal economic activities include agriculture (corn, potatoes, barley, wheat, sweet potatoes, and beans) and livestock (sheep, llamas, and pigs). Lucas K'ahua has one school with a single teacher for thirty-three students in three grades. The community has a very high illiteracy rate-69 percent. There is no health post in the community, and the closest one is 7 kilometers away. The residents report that the major health problems are diarrhea, scabies, and parasitosis. At the time of the survey there had been twenty cases of diarrhea in the community during the previous month. Before the Yacupaj project, the residents used a stream as a water source. Each family used an average of 20 liters a day. Women collected the water in tin cans and ceramic jugs and stored it in these containers inside the kitchen. None of the families had latrines, but there was one latrine in the school. Garbage was disposed of in the open close to the houses and the organic waste was used to feed domestic animals. The community had worked with IPTK, a locol NGO, to improve agricultural production during the past several years. Project interventions. The community became interested in Yacupaj after the schoolteacher attended a training event on the project and its policies. The community's first request was to construct two latrines at the school. The community provided all of the labor and locally available materials (about 40 percent of the cost). The latrine construction was delayed because of heavy workloads in the fields and end of the year festivities, and as a result many people lost interest during the first four months. But once the latrines were finished, the teacher organized a school health day and brought the community together with the idea of constructing spring protection and a water distribution system. Project staff assisted the community in collecting topographical data and designing the water system. The community contribution to the cost of the project was significant: unskilled labor, locally available materials, and 30 percent of the value of the materials purchased. The total cash contribution was about US$1,000. Each family contributed the equivalent of Bs 254 (US$53) in cash and in kind. The works consisted of a spring protection, a 4.8 cubic meter storage tank, 1,300 meters of pipe main, and a 1,200 meter distribution network to serve four public standpipes. The community elected a six-member water committee that received three days of training and established a monthly tariff of Bs 1 (US$0.20) per household. 17 Box 2.5 Community profile: Huancarani Total population 55 Number of children aged 5-18 19 Number of families 11 Number of children younger than 5 9 Number of women 17 Number of houses 11 * Number of men 10 Average distance between houses (meters) 100 'Seven houses together and four dispersed. Setting. Huacarani is located 3,800 meters above sea level in the most arid area of the Bolivian Altiplano. All of the men migrate seasonally to the valley. Background. All families own their houses, which are constructed out of adobe brick and rock with straw- thatched roofs. Most houses have one or two rooms. There is no electricity or other services. Every family in the village raises llamas and alpaca. The other principal economic activity is agriculture (potatoes and quinua). The 86 hectares of land are communally held and are used for animal grazing. The community has a traditional leader, a government-appointed deputy, and a school association. Huacarani has a school with one teacher and twenty students. Thirty-two percent of the adult population is illiterate. There is no health post in the community, but there is a midwife. As perceived by the population, the major health problems include respiratory infections, diarrhea, scabies, and parasitosis. There is a strong evangelical presence in the community, and the priest from a nearby town is always consulted before decisions are made. Before the Yacupaj project people used a single unimproved, hand-dug well 70 meters from the village and a spring 100 meters from the village. The community felt that the quality of the water they consumed before the project began was average. Women and children collected about 20 liters of water per family each day in a tin bucket. Clothes were washed once a week in the river, and adults bathed once a week in the house. Children's faces and hands were washed daily. The community had no latrines. Project interventions. Yacupaj was the first outside agency that had ever approached the community besides the school and the church. The project trained two promoters selected by the community to undertake participatory analyses of water sources, water uses, and health needs. Community members expressed an initial interest in latrines and constructed three latrines in the school and six household latrines. Two additional latrines were built by the community without assistance from the project. The water situation was more difficult because more than half the community lives in the valley for a considerable part of the year and also because some community members did not want to tap the spring for religious reasons. Although the well had a good recharge rate, its water was quite saline and no one in the community used it for drinking. It therefore made little sense to place a handpump on the well. In the end some fomilies decided to dig a new well close to the school and purchased a Yaku handpump. The families that did not participate were not allowed to use the pump. A year after the construction, the community believed that there was more water available for their animals and therefore felt the investment was justified. 1 8 Table 2.6 Human resource development People trained Number trained Project and NGO staff 56 Health workers (Ministry of Health) 199 Teachers (Ministry of Education) 189 Community leaders and promoters 247 Masons (private sector) 288 Store owners 8 Total 987 Table 2.7 Cost breakdown for materials, labor, and transportation (percent) Item Yacupaj Community Total Nonlocal materials 52 21 73 Local materials 0 8 8 Subtotal materials 52 29 81 Unskilled labor 0 8 8 Skilled labor 10 0 10 Subtotal labor 10 8 1 8 Transport 0 1 1 Total 62 38 100 More than 4,200 community development activ- Dutch government, US$1 20,000 by the Boli- ities took place with more than 1 25,000 par- vian government, and US$240,000 by the ticipants, of whom 35 percent were women, 43 beneficiaries. percent men, and 22 percent children. The beneficiaries contributed 30 percent of The project developed thirty-nine participa- the cash cost of nonlocal materials, all locally tory techniques for the four stages of social inter- available materials, and all labor for con- vention: organization, planning, training in struction and transportation (table 2.7). The operations and maintenance, and hygiene edu- direct cost of the works was US$600,000, of cation. Fieldworkers were given training and which 60 percent was provided by the project support materials for all techniques and could and 40 percent by the community. These costs decide which ones to use. The fifteen most fre- do not include taxes, technical assistance, or quently adopted techniques were incorporated administrative or logistical support.The aver- into a mass-produced "toolkit," which the pro- age per capita cost for water systems was ject distributed to institutions throughout Bolivia. US$ 12-1 8. Demonstration units cost less per capita because they were constructed as pub- Detailed analysis of project costs lic facilities.The total direct cost to beneficia- The total project cost was US$2.8 million, of ries of different technical options is shown in which US$2.44 million was provided by the table 2.8. 19 Table 2.8 Cost of technical options for water supply (us$) Well with Yaku handpump 252 17 15 Well with rope pump 165 9 18 Well with bucket pump 153 9 17 Well with IMIII pump 708 60 1 2 Small gravity system 272 30 9 Medium-size gravity system 1,060 100 11 Large gravity system 2,946 240 12 Spring protection 138 33 * Not a representative sample. Table 2.9 Recurrent costs and the life of different water supply options Well with Yaku handpump 6 15 Well with rope pump 5 8 Well with bucket pump 5 8 Well with IMIII pump 5 20 Small gravity system 9 15 Medium gravity system 13 15 Large gravity system 21 15 Spring protection 4 15 The sanitation options cost US$77 for each and technical support. Administrative and tech- ventilated improved pit latrine and US$94 for nical assistance costs were also high and each pour-flush latrine. The project paid 62 per- included the cost of the regional offices in La cent of these costs and the community 38 per- Paz and Potosi and the three provincial offices, cent. Sixty-five percent of the cost was for as well as evaluation, dissemination, training materials, 33 percent for labor, and 2 percent material production, technology development, for transport. Although infrastructure costs were and so on. However, these costs were justified very low (table 2.9), the cost of social invest- by the experimental nature of the project and ment in community development was nearly 90 its long-term institutional and policy develop- percent of the total investment cost. Technical ment objectives. Per capita costs were still lower support (project design and construction super- than for most other projects in the country. By vision) was an additional 60 percent. For every region, 3 percent of the project costs were spent US$1 invested in infrastructure, the project in La Paz, 48 percent in Potosi, and 49 percent spent an additional US$1.50 on social work in the provinces. 20 Table 2.11 Latrine use and condition one year after project conclusion In use - Ventilated improved pit 70 29 30 69 Pour-flush 71 3 62 12 Total 141 32 92 81 . Not a representative sample. Table 2.12 Summary of water source and use (percent) Water Unimproved Unimproved Does not Use system River spring well opply Other Drinking and cooking 99 0 0.6 0 0 0.2 Hygiene and bathing 92 6 1 0 0 0.4 Construction 46 22 4 6 20 2 Irrigation (gardens) 13 9 3 1 67 7 Irrigation (greenhouses) 4 0.2 0 0.4 94 1 Irrigation (fields) 0.2 29 6 1 23 40 Livestock 8 60 8 3 15 7 Where communal facilities were built, the ject completion (Soto, July 1995). The Castrillo project promoted standardized water commit- study conducted knowledge, attitudes, and prac- tees comprising a president, a treasurer, a tice surveys of families and water committees in secretary, and members. However, many com- ninety communities. More detailed rapid assess- munities preferred to use existing leadership ment procedures were carried out in forty-two of structures. The project also initially tried to pro- these communities: open-ended questions, semi- mote community tariffs. However, rural com- structured groups and group interviews, and munities in Bolivia traditionally collect money direct observation. The Soto study assessed sus- only for special occasions such as construc- tainability in 1 20 communities (29 percent of tion, marriages, or funerals. Because there is project communities) and consisted of surveys, no banking system, communities shied away interviews, and field observations. Both studies from tariffs. The few communities that did showed that more than 90 percent of the water establish a tariff system collected systems and 82 percent of the latrines continue US$0.20-$ 1 .00 a month for each member of to function, and that communities have financed a household. and carried out repairs. However, the studies also indicate that few communities practice pre- Project evaluation ventive maintenance, such as water disinfection Two external studies evaluated the quantitative and replacement of wearing parts. and qualitative results of Yacupaj at the commu- nity level. The firstwas completed during the final Sustained use of water systems months of project implementation (Castrillo, The 1995 study showed that 93 percent of water August 1994) and the second a year after pro- systems and 91 percent of handpumps were 21 Table 2.10 Sustainability of water system and handpumps Type of M lajor Not in infrastructure Good Fair defects Optimal Functional service Good Fair Poor Water systems 1-3 41 1 1 4 37 1 8 1 12 34 10 (73%) (20%) (7%) (66%) 132%) (2°%) (21%) (61%) ( 18%) Handpumps 1-4 134 28 17 103 16 7 29 29 1 1 (56) (75%) (16%) (9%) (82%) (13%) (5%) 142%) (42%) (16%) Note: One water system and seven handpumps were out of service. The major defects were mainly due to faults during the construction. functioning (table 2.1 2). Since the project had percent were in average condition, and 1 7 per- ended, thirty-seven percent of the systems hod cent were very poorly maintained or out of broken down twice and 91 percent of these sys- service (table 2.1 0). The main problems were tems had been repaired. The most common caused by poor construction and improper problems were leakage in the water mains and operations and maintenance. Problems faulty taps.Communities carried out 80 percent included deterioration of the plaster siding (59 of repairs themselves and sought external assis- percent), the odor of ventilated improved pit tance for the other 20 percent from a mason, a latrines (29 percent), and clogging of the schoolteacher, a field worker, or a neighboring siphon (1 2 percent) for pour-flush latrines. Pour- community. In addition, 72 percent of the com- flush latrines are better used and maintained munities spent money to repair the system. An than dry pit latrines because people have to use average of Bs 17 (US$4) was spent. Only 6 per- water to flush them. cent of community operators were paid for their Effective use of water systems. Domestic work. Downtime between breakdown and water consumption in the Altiplano is extremely repair averaged three days, although 72 per- low because of the cold climate and traditional cent of repairs were made immediately by the hygiene practices (table 2.11). The project has community. The need to travel long distances to had little impact in increasing water consump- purchase spare parts contributed to delays: 44 tion from 1 0 liters per capita per day, suggest- percent of beneficiaries purchased the parts in a ing a weakness in the hygiene education provincial store and 11 percent in the city. Thirty- component of the project. It also shows that four percent of the beneficiaries did not know behavior change is difficult to achieve and where the parts were available. occurs only over a long period of time. Asked where they would seek help if the system The project encouraged women to partici- broke down, 78 percent of beneficiaries said pate in all phases. Women made up 35 percent the community, 6 percent said the mason, 8 per- of participants in all community development cent said elsewhere, and 8 percent did not activities but only 7 percent of the members of know. This shows that on the whole communi- water committees. This low level of participation ties have accepted their responsibility for was apparently due to cultural biases that limited system management. women to 'behind the scenes" participation. In Latrine use. The 1 995 study showed that 57 an effort to overcome such biases and directly percent of latrines were in good condition, 24 involve women in planning, the project required 22 Table 2.13 Water storage hygiene comparison of beneficiaries with nobeneficiaries Sample Total Clean container Dirty container Beneficiaries 463 55 45 Nonbeneficiaries 242 34 66 Table 2.14 Water quality breakdown and definitions E. Coli Total coliform Type of water Percentage count count Turbidity tested Number of total per 100 ml per 100 ml pH net unit Taste Water Systems Good 12 21 0 0 6.8-7.4 <5 None Acceptable 34 61 1-9 1-12 6.2-7.7 <5 None Unacceptable 10 18 10-50 13-63 7.8-8.2 >5 None Handpumps Good 29 42 0 0 6.8-7.4 <5 None Acceptable 29 42 1-9 1-15 6.2-7.7 <5 None Unacceptable I1 16 10-99 16-99 7 8-8 2 >5 None Note: According to World Health Organization standards. that women cosign all project-related contracts number of water points with the same level of with their husbands. Women signing the con- contamination in both handpumps and water tracts on their own would have been unaccept- systems. able to communities, although women draw 89 Results of strategy. The project clearly sat- percent of the water used by households. The isfied demand: the substantial community con- project also focused on improving hygiene prac- tributions to the cost reflected a need for the tices of carrying and storing water. Although services. In addition, only communities that beneficiaries' hygiene practices improved, 45 wanted to improve their water system sought percent still use a dirty container (table 2.13). out the project.The Yacupaj project served The 1995 study shows, however, that project approximately one-third of the 11 5,000 peo- beneficiaries store much less water, because ple eligible to participate. The studies found they do not need to walk as far to fetch it. This that 85 percent of the communities that did not improvement should help avoid contamination participate knew about the Yacupaj project of drawn water and lead to health benefits. but did not consider water and sanitation a The water quality breakdown makes a strong priority. These communities reported that their case for the application of chlorine to water water source was too far away for the project sources to prevent contamination (table 2.14). to provide support, or that they were satisfied Although all communities were trained to apply with the services they already had. Only 7 locally available chlorine, few did so because percent of the respondents said that they did they were not convinced of the need. The 1995 not build a latrine because they could not study found bacterial contamination in a small afford it. 23 The Yacupaj project motivated the private . The social component should be simple and sector to provide goods and services on a com- not obscure the project's objectives. It was often merciol basis after it was completed. The 1995 difficult to maintain a balance between apply- study showed that 47 percent of the communi- ing participatory methodologies and imple- ties hod expanded iheir water systems by menting the project efficiently. The project must adding new connections (an increase of 17 per- clearly establish the goals of its social compo- cent over the previous year). Five stores in three nent: community participation, women's partic- provinces stock spare parts, and four stores ipation, training for operations and have purchased new spare parts directly from maintenance, and hygiene education should be the Yaku hondpump manufacturer in the Depart- a means to specific project objectives, not ends ment of Cochabamba. in themselves. . Projects must be grouped in order to Lessons from the Pilot Project increase efficiency. The dispersed rural commu- nities of Bolivia require projects to be grouped The lessons from the Yacupaj pilot project, sum- to increase efficiency and achieve economies marized below, provide a sound basis for of scale. Grouping projects reduces the number national policy development. of intermediaries and simplifies preparation, . Poor beneficiaries are willing to select and appraisal, procurement, and implementation. It pay for water and sanitation services. The Yacu- also generates momentum, as new communities paj project demonstrated that even the poorest see projects work in neighboring communities communities are willing to make a substantial and ask to participate. contribution to investment costs. Communities do * Institutional support is essentiaL Most rural not always choose the cheapest option, nor do water supply and sanitation projects aim to they necessarily select water and sanitation deliver services managed by the community together. However, it is difficult to convince pro- without further government intervention. How- ject staff and the government that poor commu- ever, the Yacupaj experience shows that com- nities can select and pay for desired service munities need long-term technical and levels. This must be overcome through upfront institutional support. Communities rarely under- staff training. Project staff mustfullyadhere to the take preventive maintenance or monitor water concept that a project must be demand driven, quality. Although the private sector can provide . Incentives and control measures should be skills and spare parts, communities continue to used to reduce investment cost. Because most need training and technical assistance to solve rural water and sanitation investments in Bolivia some problems, especially when water commit- are highly subsidized, beneficiaries do not con- tee members leave the community. Yacupaj tribute the majority of costs, and a financial demonstrated the need for local governments to policy solely based on cost sharing does not play a role in rural water and sanitation projects. provide an incentive to reduce costs. The Yacu- * Institutional linkages ot the national level paj project obtained high levels of community ore needed to ensure replicotion of the pilot contribution and demonstrated that costs can project. The pilot project should share its expe- be reduced with the use of low-cost technolo- rience of both successes and failures. Although gies, standardized technical designs, simpliFied often costly and time-consuming, regular work- project preparation procedures, and strict con- shops and seminars on major sector issues are trols. Since these measures involve additional essential for the development of a national administration and supervision costs, they may policy. be too expensive to replicate in a national The scope of the pilot project should be lim- program. ited. Staff must resist the tempahtion to test too 24 many elements-if a pilot project becomes too resources designing a large number of com- complex, it will not be replicable The Yacupaj munity denelopment exercises Technology staff reinvented many aspects of the project development should also be left to better quali- where they should have used proven method- fied institutions The project must focus an a few alogies In particular, they wasted time and well-defined and measurable activities. 25 Part 3: The Evolution of a National Program In 1991 Bolivia initiated a major institutiona Regional Development Corporations. They will restructuring of the water and sanitation sector assist municipalities and local communities in to improve service delivery to the poor in rural designing and implementing investment pro- and urban areas. The government declared jects, and provide support to local organiza- improvement in water and sanitation coverage tions in the operations and maintenance of a national priority and reorganized the sector's water and sanitation facilities. institutional structure. Most activities related to In 1992 the government published the construction, human resources development, 1992-2000 National Water and Sanitation and service administration previously under the Plan as parl of the "Water for All" initiative pro- Corporaciones de Aguas and the Directorate of moted by the President of the Republic. This Environmental Sanitation of the Ministry of plan aimed to improve sector coverage, giving Health were transferred to the private sector, priority to rural areas for the first time. It called local communities, and NGOs. for public investment of US$769 million over As part of these reforms the government the eight-year period (about US$ 100 million a made the National Directorate for Water and yearf, of which 70 percent was to be funded Sanitation (DINASBAI responsible for prioritiz- by external sources, Institutional and resource ing water, sewerage, and solid waste projects constraints, however, have made achieving at the national level, preparing national invest these objectives difficult. ments, coordinating regional and local pro In 1994 the government launched a second- grams, implementing government financial generation reform program by passing the Pop- policies, and promoting institutional develop- ular Participation Law, which decentralized ment. The government also created water and Financial resources and political power. The sanitation units (UNASBAs) responsible for law has created about 300 new municipalities planning and technical assistance at the deparr in rural areas and assigned legal status to the mental level. The UNASBAs are part of the Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTB), departmental governments that replaced the community-based groups organized according 26 to their social background and culture Before backs. Its considerable autonomy has led to the reform there were only 100 municipalities poor coordination with sector authorities. Its in Bolivia, and they had no jurisdiction over institutional incentives favorthe disbursementof rural communities. The new law allocated sub funds over the quality or sustainability of invest- stontial Fiscal resources to the municipalities ments, and it has often responded to demands and gave them responsibility for the provision of contractors instead of communities Its admin- of water and sanitation services istrative costs are high, at 14 percent of invest- ln April 1993 the government asked the ment cost, and it has a very centralized World Bank to fund a large rural water and son decisionmaking structure Generally large pro- itation project, Proyecto de Saneamiento jects are funded. Basico Rural (PROSABAR), to increase cover Before the government initiated the PROS- age ona sustainable basis The project has two ABAR project, DINASBA was institutionally main components: an infrastructure program of weak and did not assume its full role in the sec- US$35.7 million and an institutional strength- tor Government investments were mainly chan- ening component of US$8 3 million Project neled through the Social Investment Fund or the preparation was funded through three Project regional development corporations The Preparation Facility loans totaling US$1 7 mil- absence of a sector policy had severe implica- lion. UNDP contributed an odditional tions for increasing coverage and the sustain- US$150,000 ability of investments Most water and The government decentralization reforms sanitation investments were made by interna- require PROSABAR to work with Bolivia's tional NGOs, bilaterally funded projects, and Social Investment Fund Estabiished n 1990, other external support agencies, with little sec the fund grew out of the highly successful Emer tor coordination The government had little influ- gency Social Fund, a temporary agency ence over where or whal type of investments designed to create employment opportunities were made. In addition, there was no formal In contrast, the Social Investment Fund has transfer of assets to the communities and no become a permanent institulion It serves as a institutional backstopping mechanism to ensure financial intermediary that mobilizes donor and the sustainability of investments. For these rea- government resources and channels funds to sons the governmenl used PROSABAR to estab- projects carried out by a range of public or pri lish rules for sector policy and to develop vate agencies. Its high degree of institutional institutional capacily at the regionol level to autonomy within the Ministry of the Presidency work more closely with municipal governments is intended to prevent political interference in and communities. the process of appraisal and approval The Social Investment Fund does not imple- Beyond the Pilot Project ment projects, but appraises, finances, and The Yacupai experience set the stage for PROS- monitors proposals submitted by municipalities ABAR. First, PROSABAR adopted the Yacupaj By working through existing organizations, it is strategy of working through existing inslitutions. able to concentrate on the quick disbursement Yacupoi relied on intermediaries for project of funds. The agencies proposing the projects promotion, hygiene education, selection of absorb the bulk of the costs of identifying pro- technical options, construction, supervision, jects, organizing communities, and preparing and monitoring and evaluation, and worked and submitting proposals with regional and national governments to The Social Investment Fund's long-term strengthen locol capacity. This strategy become involvement in the water and sanitation sector an important element of PROSABAR as well. has been accompanied by significant draw- The project preparation team worked with six- 27 teen NGOs at the municipal and departmental their particular institutional goals. This strategy levels to complete preparation activities. The was so successful that IPTK now requires a sim- activities followed a participatory process ilar cost sharing arrangement for all their involving regional authorities and local water projects. and sanitation units. Second, PROSABAR built on the Yacupaj Institutional Arrangenents approach of community participation to ensure project sustainability. Yacupaj had demon- The preparation team for PROSABAR, focused strated that beneficiaries should be actively on establishing institutional arrangements that involved in the decisions affecting their welfare would promote greater efficiency and sustain- and contribute substantially to the project. The ability. Scaling up the Yacupaj project to the project should provide adequate information national level required a new set of rules. on technical options and costs, service levels, and hygiene, but beneficiaries should make the Guiding principles of project design final decisions. Although PROSABAR did not In developing the rules of PROSABAR, the achieve the same level of community participa- prepartion team relied on a set of guiding prin- tion as Yacupaj, the approach remained the ciples of project design. The principles were same. developed by the Nordic donor community and Third, many sector professionals trained by endorsed at the 1992 International Conference the Yacupaj project have been hired by PROS on Water and the Environment in Dublin. The ABAR, including two of Yacupaj's four engi- following summaries are drawn from "An Insti neers. All the social advisors for PROSABAR tutional Framework for Community Water Sup- also worked on Yocupaj, and fieldworkers from ply and Sanitation Services," by M. Garn Yacupaj continue to work with NGOs in the Water as an economic good. Managing communities. This transfer of staff has con- water as an economic good requires attention tributed to sector consensus and has helped to to the principles that should guide allocation create a sense of ownership of policies among among users. These principles must be consid- staff. ered in decisions about the use of public and Fourth, Yacupaj demonstrated the impor private funds and investment in rural areas. tance of an adaptive project design and the Managing water as an economic good also merits of revising implementation strategies. In requires that projects provide incentives for the particular, Yacupaj changed its financial policy efficient and effective use of facilities. The price for latrines several times and sireamlined its charged for services must reflect the economic social process. The PROSABAR preparation value of water to users and the cost of providing team depended on the adaptive approach from services. In practice, the government usually sets the start, and sought to build on the experience prices that do not necessarily correspond to the of others. Yacupaj also gradually transferred value that users attach to the service. Policy- responsibility for implementation to the inter makers must establish rules to create more con mediaries. During the First year the intermedi sistent relationships between the value, price, aries were responsible for the sociol and cost of services. The overall aim is to create component. In the second year they became investments in which the value attached to a ser- involved in the social and technical project com- vice is greater than cost, and therefore, a service ponents, though they still lacked financial for which people are willing to pay autonomy In the third year they were given Full The PROSABAR finoncial policy seeks to authority for all aspects of the project. Each ensure that there is enough economic demand intermediary tailored the Yacupaj strategy to for projects in communities to make them sus- 28 tainable The requirement for communities to UNASBAs manages the institutional component. contribute to projects and select their own lev- The decentralization of the institutionol compo- els of service is intended to do this nent to the UNASBAs will ensure that all invest- Management at the lowest appropriote ments are accompanied by a rigorous leveL Manogement decisions should be made community developmentand training program It at the lowest appropriate level In other words, will also develop capacity for institutional support at a level that encompasses but does not go and backstopping at the municipal and depart- beyond the range of demands being mental levels. PROSABAR will also be responsi- addressed. Because demand for community ble for capacity building and monitoring and water supply and sanitotion services is local, evaluating overall project progress and results. responsibility for managerial decisions about The arrangements for project management levels of service, location of facilities, and cost allow communities and municipalities to make sharing should be kept local as well. High-level key decisions, ensuring that investments respond government agencies should establish institu- to local demand. The project also focuses on tional rules, regulations, and processes that long-term investment sustainability by address- encourage such local decisions ing the technical assistance and institutional sup- This concept is closely linked to that of stake- port needs of the community and municipality. holder participation Projects should work Efficiency is achieved through competilive bid- through existing institutions, by developing part ding processes and private sector participation nerships with national and regional governments and using NGOs and other intermediaries to Project implementation plan, implement, and monitor activities in the Implementation procedures have been designed communities Projects should also encourage the to ensure that the project responds to demand to private sector to play a role. The project will ben- the greatest possible extent. Communities, efit from the experience of local people and build municipal governments, and departmental gov national capacity at the same time This strategy ernments are involved at all phases, and deci helps to institutionalize policy and procedures sions are made at the lowest appropriate level. and leads to long-term sustainability Mass media campaigns are used to promote In PROSABAR primary responsibility for the project and its rules Communities that are management rests with communities and munic- fully informed of project policies request to par- ipal governments. The communities must initiate ticipate through iheir municipal government. the protects and work closely with the munici- Municipalities will cosponsor community requests pal governments responsible for rural water and include the projects in annual municipal and sanitation investments operating pans Under the Popular Participation Law, these plans require departmental and Project management national government approval. The plans will be Because PROSABAR is designed to strengthen forwarded to the UNASBAs, which will contract sector institutions, DINASBA is responsible for intermediaries to perform the preinvestment overall project management (figure 3 1 j. A work. Communities will receive support in orgo- small project unit within DINASBA, consisting nization, water committee formation, and ser- of a coordinator, a social advisor, a technical vice-level selection. Community-municipality advisor, and a monitoring and evaluation spe- relations will also be strengthened and agree- cialist will oversee day-to-day implementation menis will be reached on financing modalities. of PROSABAR The intermediares will produce engineering The Social Investment Fund manages the infra- designs, proposals for social interventions, and structure component of the project, and the training and cost estimates. The UNASBAs will 29 Figure 3.1 Flowchart of institutional arrangements Intermediary NGOs or contracts . Figure 3.2 Contracting arrangements far procurement S5uiol component Socia coponent Socio coponent Coc-c co UNASBA T.hnicol design Inf-tcturs -p-nt C-eo-cleh UNASBA Coo-tocIho±S-clloe,ecF-nd Co-truction supervisin CovI,oc,wlilc Socil --e1 F-d verify, that a participatary pracess was fallawea structure. Once subprajects are appraved, the and that the service aptians reflect cammunity municipal gavernment will thee be respansible demand. far paying the cammunity and municipal cantri- At the cammunity level, PROSABAR will sep butians inta the Sacial Investment Fund accaunt orate the sacial and infrastructure campanents as a prerequisite ta the bidding pracess. The af the praject during the bidding pracess and UNASBA will cantract an intermediary respan- cantract separately with NGOO and cnstruc- sible fo r cantinued cammunity suppart, training tian firms befare, during, and hoer canstruction in administratian, aperatinos and maintenance, (figure 3.2). and unvironmental and hygiene educatian. The Social Investment Fund mill appraise, In the Yacupa) project intermediaries were contract, and supervise the investments in infra- selected based on their experience in a region, 30 and contracts were often negotiated on a non imum number of people This objective has competitive basis. PROSABAR aims to increase several implications for the project's financial competition by creating bidding packages for a policy: larger number of communities and hence achieve savings through economies of scale. One large * A strong community contribution in cash and intermediary could receive the contract for the in kind is essential to give a sense of ownership, social component of an entire department and because communities are more likely to main- subcontract implementation to smaller agencies tain and repair systems that they have selected In addition, because PROSABAR involves some and built investments that are considerably larger than . Themunicipalities' contributionisalsoessen those in Yacupaj, the project demands the tial to project sustainability because it gives resources and technical expertise of specialized them partial responsibility and supports the construction firms. government's Popular Participation Law. The original design of PROSABAR included * Contributions from municipolities and com- two bidding processes: the construction compo- munities allow the government to spread nent was contracted by the Social Investment resources over a larger number of people Fund, and all other activities were contracted by * To reach the maximum number of people, the UNASBAs. This policy was later changed the project must establish a per capita subsidy because the Social Investment Fund wanted to ceiling for government investment. separate construction from consiruction supervi- sion. The social componentwasalso splitinto two During preparation the PROSABAR team parts (preinvestment and implementation) to asked NGOs and other sector agencies about accommodate the Social Investment Fund's for- their experiences with cost recovery and com- mal processes for appraisal and bidding. munity willingness to pay. The survey revealed Separating the technical and social compo- a wide range of financial policies. The Social nents of PROSABAR introduces the risk of work- Investment Fund required the lowest community ing with at least two intermediaries, making it contribution of those asked-20 percent of more complex than the pilot project. It may investment cost-and rarely enforced the pol- encourage more technically complex projects icy. Most projects required percentage contri- that will entice large construction firms It also lim- butions to the investment costand a contribution its opportunities for the communities to construct in kind of about 20-25 percent. projects themselves and may lead to a lack of The municipalities were also involved in coordination between the social and technical developing the Financial policy. The Popular processes. Participation Law, by giving municipalities sub- stantial new resources and the responsibility for Establishing the Rules water and sanitation sector investments, had underscored the need to foster the relationship During project preparation PROSABAR focused on between communities and municipalities developing a coherent set of rules defining the Because a subsidy ceiling provides the best financial policy eligibility criteria, and levels of incentive for communities to make choices and service that would make the prolect responsive to lower costs, the PROSABAR preparation team demand focused on defining the government subsidy as a fixed amount of money regardless of the level of Financial policy service chosen Communities would be required PROSABAR's objective is to provide sustain- to contribute a share of the investment cost up to able water and sanitation services to the max- the ceiling, and to pay full costs above it 31 PROSABAR staff looked at precedents to . The NGOs did not properly communicate help determine the subsidy ceiling. The Yacu the financial policy to the communities, who pa) project had a total per capita investment thus could not choose technical options based cost of US$46, of which a high percentage on costs. went to community development. The per * Communities did not value their contribu- capita costs of infrastructure were US$ 1 2-20. tions in kind and therefore selected more costly At the other extreme, most NGOs and govern- options without understanding the full cost impli- ment agencies, including the Social Investment cations. Fund, have historically accepted per capita investment costs as high as US$100-$1 20. Second set of rules: The recommended Firstsetofrules: Testing the rules. At first per rules. Faced with this situation, the prepara- capita ceilings were set at US$40 for projects tion leam conducted a study in January 1 995 benefiting fewer than 250 people and US$80 ro make recommendations for a new financial for larger projects. These ceilings coire- policy and establish a single subsidy ceiling. sponded to government subsidies of US$26 A team of engineers and a financial analyst and US$52. These ceilings were set based on conducted a field study to determine the extent analysis and discussions with major sector to which the proposed projects had been actors such as CARE, UNICEF, the Social overdesigned by the NGOs. This study exam- Invesiment Fund, and departmental UNASBAs. ined forty proposals, revised the cost esti- The ceilings were intended to serve as the basis mates, and calculated a coefficient of for preliminary finoncial policy and to be overvcluation for each NGO equal to the ini- revised at a later date (iable 3.11. tial estimate divided by the revised estimate Initially it was assumed that smaller commu- (table 3.21. It soon became clear that in the nities would receive lower levels of service absence of national technical standards, (handpumps and standpipes) than larger com- agencies had adopted their own technical munities. However, this went against the basic parameters for project design and cost. These principle that communities should be able to included population growth rate projections, choose their levels of service The originol per capita water consumption rates, and fbc- financial policy also assumed that the bulk of tors of peak hours and daily flows. The prepa- community contributions would be in kind. ration team then applied the coefficient for In August 1994 sixteen NGOs were con- each NGO to all projects to determine the tracted to prepare proposals for the investment revised cost estimate. The team found that 70 and sociol components of PROSABAR. About percent of the projects had a per capita cost 300 proposals were submitted. However, these of less than US$71. proposals were found to be overdesigned and The preparation team decided that PROS- too costly, for the following reasons: ABAR should aim for coverage of 70 percent. This goal was ambitious given the current 24 . TheNGOsignoredthecostceilingsbecause percent coverage level in rural areas. The they did not believe they would be strictly investment ceiling was set at US$71 per capita, enforced. leading to a maximum subsidy by the central . Because the NGOs had been contracted on government of US$50 (US$71 per capita x 70 the implicit understanding that they would percent subsidy level). implement their proposals and receive a per- Because the Social Investment Fund was centage of the cost, they had a strong incentive opposed to having contractors assume the risk not only to overdesign the project but also to of community contributions in kind, the project increase unit costs. preparation team decided that the municipality 32 Taebl 3& rm leal polcy undr the fbe st of rules (subsiy eiling UH40 for comnawi with ls than 250 pepbl U$0 fetr oe mune with gret lheft 2WO pople) Prticipant contribftion to project cost PROSABAR 65°. up lv ye hrg Municipulities 10 Community 25s pluc 1 00% vr b-v -,Lg Table 3.2 Avgera coeffident of vnrvoaluoion fler proposak by de"prtment Deportment Coefficteot of o-ernolootin Choqois-a 20 Coc-h.bombo 24 L. P.z 27 Potosi 4 should guarantee the community's contribution projects. This analysis defined the financial pol- in cash and then negotiate cost recovery with icy ultimately recommended to the government the community. This arrangement was also and supported by the Bank (table 3.3). intended to strengthen the link between munic- The financial policy was effective in reduc- ipolities and communities ing costs (table 3.4) In Chuquisaca and La Paz Three possible options would allow the munic- per capita costs of the revised projects fell from ipality to recover the community's contribution. about US$100 to the per capita ceiling of The first is a simple credit scheme in which the US$71, which allowed these departments to community pays 5 percent up front and repays benefit from the maximum available subsidy In the rest over time In the second option the con- contrast, the Department of Potosi increased its tractor hires community members as unskilled per capita costs from US$4 1 to US$49 to ben- laborers, and the community members use their efit from the larger subsidy. earnings to repay the municipality The third Third set of rules: Consensus. The newly option lets communities construct facilities them- appointed task manager of PROSABAR rec- selves in cases where the contractor or NGO ognized that the lack of sector policy was a agrees to assume the risk of community labor. In major issue and encouraged the government all cases the community must make a contribu- to establish a national sector policy based on tion before benefiting from the prolect the second set of rules The Social Investment The NGOs were given the new financial Fund accepted PROSABAR rules until June rules and technicol design parameters and 1995, when ir officially changed hands and asked to reformulate the projects. They also no longer reported to the Secretary of Social returned to the communities to negotiate the Investment, but to the Minister of the Presi- new policy and to make it clear that contribu- dency. As a result PROSABAR suddenly had lions would be strictly enforced. A detailed to work with two separate ministries. At this financial analysis of PROSABAR's preinvest- point the Social Investment Fund asked for ment outcome was then conducted based on another review of the financial policy and data from approximately 200 reformulated decided to have the subsidy increased to 33 Table 3.3 Financial poicy under the second set of rides (subsidy CaIling 14419 per cctpitc) . PROSABAR 70% 0% Mnikipolifies I0O, p U5 IS; 5 r-eCOeod 0% homhe covo,o,ily Conmn,nity .5K up ho1- p ,s 15'; 1 00OO ,n vbu,ed I, he mun cipdlhy Table 3.4 Reductien in per capita pro cat cets V er the c on4 tt t of rulesI L. Pa 107 70 -34 Chqk.quc 99a -28 Cochab ba 63 54-14 Poftsi 1 49 42 Man 68 62- Table 3.5 Financial policy under the third set of rules (subsidy ceiling US$70 per capita for water prcts, US$65 per capita for sanitation, US$65 per unit for latrines) PROSABAR 70' 0 . M-nkcipliti., I 0% p U5 15 --e-eed 0' C.nn.nity 5U q, 1.-I pl., 15'% 100U i, vb-d he -, cp,,.Iy US$70 per capita for water projects because sanitation investments in Bolivia. Although the it believed that PROSABAR's costs were too per capita costs were higher than recom- low. All previous Social Investment Fund pro- mended by the Bank, the rigor brought to the jects had been larger and more expensive development and analysis of the financial pol- and had used high-level technology. A cost icy has had an important effect on the seclor. analysis showed that 70 percent of projects The national government will no longer assume without a grant cap policy had cost up to the financial burden of very expensive pro- US$ 100 per capita. jects. This was also the first time that the gov- The third set oF rules set subsidy ceilings of ernment addressed administrative and US$70 per capita for water projects, US$65 investment costs in a comprehensive manner. It per capita for sanitalion projects, and US$65 is anticipated that these rules will be adjusted per unit for latrines (table 3.5). The government during the annual review process, and ultimately adopted this third set of rules as the increased efficiency, lower costs, and better financial policy for all rural water supply and information will reduce subsidy ceilings. 34 Table 3.6 Eligibility criteria for participants and projects Communities * Total population is below 5,000. * The community has asked the municipality to include the project in its municipal operating plan. * The community has selected the technology and service level and is fully aware of the cost implications and its financial contributions. * The community is willing to contribute at least 20 percent of the cost below the ceiling and 100 percent of the cost above the ceiling. * Community leaders and municipal authorities have agreed on implementation, financial contributions, and responsibility for operations and maintenance. Municipalities * The municipality has proposed a batch of subprojects requested by at least ten communities to the UNASBA. * Subprojects have been included in the annual municipal operating plan following the participatory process. * The municipality agrees to contribute at least 10 percent of the cash cost and to guarantee 1 5% community contribution up-front. * The municipality makes a commitment to support investment sustainability at the community level. Departments * The department hos organized its UNASBA and appointed the minimum number of staff required to manage PROSABAR. * The deportment signs an agreement with DINASBA and the Social Investment Fund for project implementation. * The deportment commits at least US$ 100,000 of its annual budget to finance preinvestments. Subproject * The subproject follows the participatory process established by the Popular Participation Law * The subproject reflects the community's desires and willingness to pay * The subproject is accompanied by a community training and education process. . The subproject follows the DINASBA design manual for rural water and sanitation projects. Eligibility criteria order to apply the lessons from the Yacupaj PROSABAR established eligibility criteria to project. maintain equity and transparency, respond to After the first year of investment all munici- demand, and increase efficiency by grouping palities will be eligible for financing and will be projects by region. The criteria were designed responsible for consolidating community to ensure that all primary stakeholders, includ- demands. In addition, any department will be ing communities, municipalities, and depart- eligible for financing if its corresponding mental governments, were fully committed to departmental government demonstrates a com- the project (table 3.6). mitment to the project. Investment for the first year of project imple- mentation will take place in specific munici- Levels of service palities in Potosi, Chuquisaca, La Paz, and The Yacupaj project showed that an effective Cochabamba. These departments and munici- project requires the government to develop polities were chosen based on a large technical guidelines in order to guarantee qual- unserved rural population and a demonstrated ity and prevent overdesign. Because PROS- departmental government interest in the pro- ABAR will serve a larger and more diverse ject. The project will focus on communities in population than Yacupaj, it will offer a greater the Altiplano region during the first year in selection of technical options and correspond- 35 Table 3.7 Technical options for water supply Piped water supply Gravity-fed system Concentrated * House connection with or without water 2,000-5,000 Municipal Municipal government meter or regulator government or delegated * Multifamily standpipe Semidispersed * House connection 500-2,000 Municipal Community with or without meter government * Multifamily standpipe * Combination house connections and standpipe Dispersed * Multifamily standpipes 0-500 Municipal Community government Pump-fed system Concentrated * House connection 2,000-5,000 Municipal Municipal government with water meter or government or delegated regulator Semidispersed * House connection with 500-2,000 Municipal Community water meter or regulator 0-500 government Spring protection Semidispersed/ * Multifamily standpipes 5-25 Communal or Communal or family with multifamily dispersed family standpipe Non-piped water supply Manual pumps Semidispersed * Multifamily 5-25 Communal or Communal or family with vacated wells * Family family Spring protection Dispersed * Multifamily 5-25 Communal or Communal or family * Family family Rainwater Semidispersed * Family Not defined Communal or Communal or family * Communal family Dispersed * Family Not defined Communal or Communal or family family ing levels of service (table 3.7). Communities latrines will be offered to all communities, but select levels of service based on such criteria as simplified sewer systems only to larger commu- population density, willingness to pay, quality nities. The service levels outlined below were and quantity of water source, distance to determined by sector engineers, and may not source, use of water, and alternative water be those preferred by communities. sources. All options receive the same subsidy from the government, so higher levels of service Sustainability will require larger contributions from the com- munity. Levels of service for sanitation are The rules and processes for PROSABAR aim to closely related to levels of service for water sup- treat water as an economic good, creating ply (table 3.8). Pour-flush latrines and pit incentives for communities to choose options for 36 Table 3.8 Technical options for sanitation Population Service Number of Water service System density level people served required ownership Conventional Concentrated House More House Municipal Municipal sewerage system connection than 1,000 connection government government or delegated Reduced diameter Concentrated House More House Municipal Municipal sewerage system connection than 1,000 connection government government or delegated Pour-flush latrine Concentrated Family 2-0 House Family Family connection or standpipe house connection Semidispersed Family Dispersed Family Ventilated Concentrated Family 2-10 Standpipes Family Family improved pit latrine or pump Semidispersed Family Dispersed Family which they are willing to pay and for institutions Although municipal governments will to deliver sustainable services in an efficient receive an initial amount of training from the manner. Sustainability is further enhanced by contracted intermediary in facility administra- developing capacity for service delivery and tion, operations, and maintenance as part of operations and maintenance; determining clear the investment program, long-term linkages will responsibilities for asset ownership; and con- be established with the UNASBA to ensure sus- sidering cost recovery options for investment tainability. The UNASBAs will therefore provide replacement. long-term support to municipal governments in tariff setting, water quality control, system mon- Capacity building itoring, and replacement planning and financ- Institutions at all levels will benefit from capac- ing, and provide training and technical ity building through PROSABAR. assistance in administration, operations, and Government instifutions. Planners and deci- maintenance. sionmakers from DINASBA will be trained in Communities. Most capacity building at the sector problem analysis, problem solving, pol- community level will fund activities to ensure the icy formulation, and strategy development. quality, sustainability, and effective use of infra- Greater awareness of the critical role of women structure. Intermediary organizations will be con- will be promoted and dialogue initiated at the tracted by the UNASBAs to assistcommunities to: local level. Staffs of the UNASBAs, municipal . Ensure participation of all community mem- governments, and PROSABAR will learn about bers in the project community participation issues, participatory . Select the desired level of service methodologies, and communication and adult . Collect baseline socioeconomic and water education techniques. resource data 37 * Develop a financing plan for capital and The municipality will delegate its obliga- recurrent costs; tion to administer, operate, and maintain * Organize a water committee; basic infrastructure either to the community or * Undertake hygiene and environmental edu- to a third party (such as a private or munici- cation; pal water authority). Each community or third * Assist and supervise the contractors during party is responsible for the works. The com- construction; munity's operations and maintenance com- * Train community operators in operations mittee is expected to submit regular and water quality control; monitoring and follow-up reports to the munic- * Ensure linkages between the community and pality. Responsibility for handpumps and municipal government, latrines will be delegated to individual fami- lies. The UNASBAs will conduct long-term fol- These activities require interventions in the low-up. communities before, during, and after system construction, and require the establishment of Adaptive Project Design trust and confidence between the community and the intermediary Although the project's rules provide the frame- Water system operators. Although most rural work for all activities, the project must allow water supply projecis in Bolivia train community lessons from early phases to be used in later water committees and system administrators in phases. This adaptive project design, which simple operations and maintenance tasks, requires continuous review and modification, is these are usually short, intensive courses imple essential to the project's long-term success. The mented during construction. PROSABAR will project includes the following elements to implement a community-level operator certifi- ensure adaptability: cation progrom lo ensure that people being . Flexibledesign.Theprojectallowsforadjust- trained have developed the skills required to ments to the rules on financial policy, eligibility perform their tasks. criteria, and technological options. * Ownership of project policies. The project is Asset ownership and operations and using a participatory approach to ensure that maintenance major stakeholders gain a sense of ownership. In accordance with the Popular Participation It is essential that these stakeholders support Law, PROSABAR will transfer ownership of rules that respond to demand and are interested assets to municipalities in two stages. First, the in ensuring that the rules create the right incen- UNASBA and the Social Investment Fund pro- tives at the community level. visionally sign over completed works to the . Monitoring and evaluation. The system for municipality. The final transfer takes place once monitoring and evaluation will assess the pro- the six-month warranty period has expired, and jects physical and financial performance, the the intermediary is then paid the lost 10 percent process itself, and its impact, and will analyze of the contracted cost. The social intermediary the effectiveness of the rules. will continue training the community and munic- * Feedback mechanism. Funds have been allo- ipolity in system operations and maintenance cated for regional and national workshops. during thewarrantyperiod. Itwill alsoverifythe Regional stakeholders will meet regularly to quality of the works and ensure that they are review implementation procedures and experi- registered in the municipal cadastre so that the ence, and annual workshops at the national municipality has a record of all the water supply level will analyze policies and impact and rec- and sanitation systems in its jurisdiction. ommend adjustments. The International Devel- 38 opment Association and the government will and need to include baseline data collection at participate in the annual review. the household level, they will only be measured in a small percentage of communities. Monitoring and evaluation is essential at all stages, and the PROSABAR unit will have pri- Lessons from PROSABAR mary responsibility for it. The UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program will be The main questions are whether PROSABAR funded by the UNDP to assist with this task The responds to demand in communities and to objectives are to provide regular feedback on what extent the Yacupaj pilot project con- the project's progress and suggest improve- tributed to this achievement Although Yacupaj ments, estimate economic impact, and develop was essential to the overall preparation of ways for beneficiaries to measure and better PROSABAR, it could not address all the impor- manage changes in their own communities The tant issues. For example, PROSABAR's institu- monitoring and evaluation activities for PROS- tional setting is far more complex. It has to work ABAR have three main components, each of with two national institutions, the Social Invest- which are linked to monitoring indicators. ment Fund and DINASBA, and DINASBA itself is subject to intensive supervision from three Monitoring financial and physical higher administrative levels Community results requests for services must be channeled and Monitoring results regularly will provide infor- approved by three layers of government the mation needed for effective project implemen- municipality, the departmental government, tation and will assess the function and and the Social Investment Fund In addition, at performance of all participants Performance least three intermediaries intervene in each monitoring also includes tracking indicators community In contrast, the pilot project had that show the financial and physical progress in only one intermediary working at the commu- achieving project milestones. nity level and one institution at the departmen- tal level responsible for oversight. This added Monitoring the process complexity may jeopardize the demand-based Monitoring the process includes monitoring of approach. subprojects to provide feedback on project The pilot project also had much simpler pro- rules, especially financial rules, and on com- curement rules 11 did not require an open bid- munications between communities and other ding process, and contracts were negotialed participants. It assesses whether institutions are informally. Detailed supervision and adminis- cost-effective in carrying out subprojects, and trative control was possible. However, large seeks to refine institutional arrangements, train government and Bank-funded projects require ing materials, communications support, and formal procurement processes The technical operational guidelines Specific indicators content of projects becomes more complex as have been developed to evaluate project poli- well. Engineering designs must be prepared, cies and strategies (table 3 9j subprojects appraised, and specialized techni- cal contractors hired. Evaluating impact The PROSABAR experience also demon- This component analyzes the impact of the sub- strated the need to move quickly in scaling up projects on the beneficiary population in terms from a pilot project to a national program. Pro- of economic benefits, human resource devel- ject preparation was plagued by a series of opment, and community organization Because delays. First, the commitment to the participa these indicators need to be carefully planned tory approach took longer than expected, and 39 Table 3.9 Monitoring indicators for projet policies and strategies Eligibility and * Are communities with the highest demand being served? prioritization criteria * Are criteria applied uniformly and equitably? v Is the demand-responsive approach leading to greater sustainobility? Financial policy * Are community and municipal willingness-to-pay being fully captured? * Are some communities not able to participate because of cost? * What specific contributions are communities making to the project? * Do all participants know the cost-recovery policy for system replacement? Technical options and * Are these appropriate to demand and management capacity? service levels * Which service level has been most popular and why? * What are the most efficient techniques for negotiating with communities? Management at the lowest * Is the community participating in all steps of the project? appropriate level a Are beneficiaries aware of their long-term responsibility For sustainability? * Are institutional backstopping mechanisms in place to support community and municipal management? * Is intermediation and the community development process cost-effective? the decision to reform rural sector policy rather it had thoroughly tested the main elements of than just design the project complicated the pro- the social component. It developed training ject's preparation. Three major government materials for community work and methodolo- restructuring and personnel changes at the gies for offering technical options and negoti- World Bank added to delays during the prepa- ating levels of service that PROSABAR could ration phase. adopt. But there were also areas where the pilot The rules and policies for the pilot project did project proved essential to the preparation of not hove to be as well-defined as those for large PROSABAR. Yacupaj proved that costs could be projects subject to appraisal and preinvestment controlled and communities could make signifi- studies. Experiments were therefore easier, and cant contributions. It also brought more rigor to mistakes less costly. In addition, the pilot project the analysis of costs in PROSABAR and forced did not threaten other sector actors. This inclu- the preparation team to deal with realistic fig- siveness helped develop sector consensus and ures. This rigorous financial analysis was the drew in many local NGOs and international key to establishing a subsidy ceiling for gov- agencies that otherwise would have been left out ernment investment. In addition, it encouraged of the planning process. other sector actors, such as the Social Invest- The pilot project also promoted major invest- ment Fund, CARE, UNICEF, and NGOs, to ana- ment in the rural water sector. Both the govern- lyze their costs as well. ment and the Bank felt more confident The pilot project showed the need to focus developing a large program after the pilot pro- on capacity building rather than infrastructure. ject and the institutional presence of the It provided the details of how to generate UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Pro- demand and ensure sustainability. In particular, gram in Bolivia. 40 Conclusion This study has important implications for the The Yocupaj-PROSABAR story is far from com- development of large rural water and sanitation plete. Yacupaj brought new issues to the forefront projects. The main lesson is that sustainable, of policy development in Bolivia: cost effective- demand-driven investments require a coherent ness, demand driven investment, government set of rules that provide the framework for finan- facilitation, the use of intermediaries, the partici- cial policy, eligibility criteria, levels of service, pation of women, and hygiene education. By and responsibility for service delivery and oper- raising sector staffs consciousness on these ations and maintenance. The rules must create issues, Yacupaj helped lay the groundwork for the right incentives to ensure that beneficiaries development of a national policy. PROSABAR choose services that they want, and for which built on the success of Yacupal to establish rules they are willing to poy. for all government-financed rural water supply The reform of the water and sanitation sector and sanitation investments in Bolivia, taking into in Bolivia has demonstrated that a well-designed account government policy changes such as the pilot project can provide the basis for larger Popular Participation Law and decentralization investment programs. The pilot project must reforms. This has been a major step toward include stakeholders in the participatory reforming the sector as a whole. process and incorporate early lessons into later It is too soon to fully evaluate either project, phases and ultimately into the large program. however Yacupa; ended a year ago and PROS- This approach must include explicit measures to ABAR is just entering its implementation phase. ensure an ongoing review The rules and strat- Both projects must ultimately be judged by their egy must be tested and refined with the project success in delivering services to Bolivia's poor on in mind. a sustainable basis. 41 Bibliography Bu5tillo, Maria C. 1991. "Validaci6n y sistem del Projecto Yacupaj." UNDP-World Bank atizaci6n del proceso de capacitaci6n del Water and Sanitation Program, La Paz. Proyecta Yacupaj." UNDP-Warld Bank Water and Sanitation Program, La Paz. Picciatto, Robert, and Rachel Weaving. 1994. "A New Project Cycle for the World Bank?" Castrilla, Marcela. 1994. 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