Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00003623 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-48890 IDA-H6570) ON A GRANT/CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 16.3 MILLION (US$25 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD FOR A LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUPPORT PROJECT 2 December 20, 2015 Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice Country Department AFCW3 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 20, 2015) CFAF 1.00 = US$0.0020 US$1.00 = CFAF 497.8 FISCAL YEAR ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APL Adaptable Program Lending CBO Community-Based Organization/Organisation Communautaire de Base CDD Community Driven Development/Développement Communautair CDP Communal Development Plan/Plan de Développement Communal ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework/Cadre de Gestion Environnemental et Social (CGES) ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment/Evaluation de l’Impact Environmental et Social (EIES) EU European Union / Union Européenne (UE) FA Financing Agreement / Accord de Financement (AF) FCFA Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (Franc of the African Financial Community) FDA French Development Agency/Agence Française de Développement (AFD) GoC Government of Chad/Gouvernement du Chad (GoC) ii IDA International Development Association/Association Internationale pour le Développement (AID) LDPSP 1 and 2 Local Development Program Support Project 1 and 2/Projet d’Appui au Programme de Développement Local (PROADEL 1- 2006 - 10 and PROADEL 2 - 2011-15) LDSP Local Development Support Program (APL) LDP Local Development Plan MCD Ministry Charged with Decentralization/Ministère Chargé de la Décentralisation MDG Millenium Development Goal/Objectif de Développement du Millénaire MG Matching Grant/Subvention à Frais Partagés (SFP) MAI Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation/Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Irrigation (MAI) MEF Ministry of Environment and Fisheries/Ministère de l’Environnement et des Ressources Halieutiques (MERH) MEP Ministry of Economy and Plan/Ministère de l’Economie et du Plan (MEP) MLMUH Ministry of Land Management, Urban, and Housing/Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme et de l’Habitat (MATUH) MPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation/ Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale (MPCI) MTR Mid-Term Review NGO Non-Governmental Organization/Organisation Non- Gouvernementale (ONG) NPRS National Poverty Reduction Strategy/Stratégie Nationale de Réduction de la Pauvreté (SNRP) ORAF Operational Risk Assessment Framework/Cadre Opérationnel d'Evaluation des Risques (COER) iii PAPAT Agricultural Productivity Support Project/Project d’Appui à la Productivité Agricole PMU Project Management Unit/Unité de Gestion du Projet (UGP) RPMU Regional Project Management Unit/Unité de Gestion Locale (UGL) Regional Vice-President: Makthar Diop Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Sector Manager: Jan Weetjens Project Team Leader: Bleoue Nicaise Ehoue ICR Team Leader: Bleoue Nicaise Ehoue iv REPUBLIC OF CHAD LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUPPORT PROJECT 2 CONTENTS B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................. vi C. Ratings Summary ...................................................................................................... vi D. Sector and Theme Codes ......................................................................................... vii E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................. vii F. Results Framework Analysis ................................................................................... viii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................................................... xi H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................ xi I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................ xii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................ 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ........................................... 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes ....................................................................................... 14 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...................................................... 19 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .................................................. 19 6. Lessons Learned..................................................................................................... 23 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/ Implementing Agencies/ Partners ..... 24 Annex 3 - Economic and Financial Analysis................................................................ 29 Annex 4 - Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ........... 31 Annex 5 - Beneficiary Survey Results .......................................................................... 34 Annex 6 - Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................. 35 Annex 7 - Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR .................... 36 Annex 8 - Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders...................... 37 Annex 9 - List of Supporting Documents ..................................................................... 38 MAP IBRD 33385 ........................................................................................................... 39 v A. Basic Information Local Development Country: Chad Project Name: Program Support Project II IDA-48890,IDA- Project ID: P113030 L/C/TF Number(s): H6570 ICR Date: 12/22/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: CHAD Original Total XDR 16.30M Disbursed Amount: XDR 7.49M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 16.30M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Chad - Ministry of Land Management, Urban, and Housing Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 10/04/2010 Effectiveness: 09/30/2011 10/19/2011 Appraisal: 12/16/2010 Restructuring(s): 05/28/2015 Approval: 03/18/2011 Mid-term Review: 10/13/2014 02/17/2015 Closing: 06/30/2015 06/30/2015 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Unsatisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Performance: Performance: vi C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Quality at Entry Project at any time No None (QEA): (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Unsatisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 50 50 Health 15 15 Primary education 15 15 Public administration- Financial Sector 5 5 Water supply 15 15 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Decentralization 25 25 Rural policies and institutions 25 25 Rural services and infrastructure 50 50 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Paul Noumba Um Mary Kathryn Hollifield Practice Jan Weetjens Karen Mcconnell Brooks Manager/Manager: Project Team Leader: Bleoue Nicaise Ehoue Soulemane Fofana ICR Team Leader: Bleoue Nicaise Ehoue ICR Primary Author: Jean-Claude Balcet vii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objectives (PDO) are to assist the Recipient in: (i) improving access to basic infrastructure and social services in target districts, and (ii) improving the planning, management and monitoring by local communities and communes of decentralized investment. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Students enrolled in built/rehabilitated schools or classrooms Value quantitative or 17500 8270 Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 47% achievement) Indicator 2 : People provided with access to improved water resources under the project Value quantitative or 690,000 210,850 Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 31% achievement) Indicator 3 : People in project areas with access to health facilities Value quantitative or 200000 105650 Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2015 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 53% achievement) Indicator 4 : Targeted communities have adopted their LDPs Value quantitative or 75% 45% Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments 60% viii (incl. % achievement) Indicator 5 : Community-based micro-projects properly maintained one year after completion. Value quantitative or 90% none Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 6 : Direct project beneficiaries (% of women) Value quantitative or 2000000 (50%) 350,000 (18%) Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Covered districts where decision committees are in place Value (quantitative 75 45 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 73% achievement) Project beneficiaries at both local and communal levels trained in community- Indicator 2 : based procurement and financial management Value (quantitative 20500 8409 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 41% achievement) Indicator 3 : Legal texts on decentralization approved by council of ministers Value (quantitative 12 0 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments 0% ix (incl. % achievement) Indicator 4 : Community micro-projects completed Value (quantitative 938 127 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 14% achievement) People in project areas working in renovated / constructed livestock production Indicator 5 : facilities under the project Value (quantitative 500 0 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 0% achievement) Indicator 6 : Land area restored and protected Value (quantitative 1300 ha 0 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 0% achievement) Additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from Indicator 7 : project intervention Value (quantitative 350 111 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 32% achievement) Indicator 8 : Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project Value (quantitative 600 87 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 15% achievement) Indicator 9 : Health facilities constructed, renovated and / or equipped Value (quantitative 40 23 or Qualitative) x Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % 58% achievement) Satisfaction of beneficiaries with the results of the Community micro-projects in Indicator 10 : targeted local area Value (quantitative 80% 0 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/19/2011 06/30/2015 Comments (incl. % achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 09/20/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 05/01/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.31 Moderately Moderately 3 01/05/2013 5.08 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 4 10/27/2013 7.06 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 5 06/06/2014 9.44 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 6 12/17/2014 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 10.69 7 06/18/2015 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 11.46 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions 05/28/2015 U U 11.46 xi I. Disbursement Profile xii REPUBLIC OF CHAD LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUPPORT PROJECT 2 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Poverty. At project preparation in 2010, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries listed in the United Nations Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). At project completion in 2015, it ranked 184 out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2014). Government spending has increased significantly since 2003 owing to rising oil revenues, but the impact in terms of poverty reduction has been negligible. Constraints have included a lack of strategic planning, imbalances in sector spending, high unit costs, weak budget management, weak transportation infrastructure and an unfavorable business environment. They have included also, prominently, the insecurity that Chad has had to confront due to growing tensions in the region. Chad has been involved in fighting the Islamic rebellion in the Sahara and the frequent incursions of Boko Haram on its territory from Northern Nigeria; it has been affected by the civil disturbances in the Central African Republic; and it has had to contend with its own persistent internal civil strife arising notably from the refugee situation in the Darfour. 2. Governance. Governance, coupled with a lack of government commitment and leadership in pursuing necessary reforms, have remained a problem. The key governance challenge faced by Chad has been the need to better manage government revenues and the overall reform agenda in a manner that can leverage the petroleum revenues for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction. In April 2008, the Government adopted a second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). But public spending has never been adequately aligned with the PRSP. Actual expenditures in many key social sectors (including health, education, and rural development) have lagged behind and fallen short of budget targets. 3. Decentralization. The project under review (Local Development Program Support Project 2 – LDPSP 2) corresponds to Phase 2 (2011-2015) of the Bank-funded Local Development Support Program (LDSP) approved in 2004. LDSP was meant to support the Government’s decentralization agenda. Decentralization had been mentioned in the 1996 constitution. It called for the creation of decentralized, territorial bodies that could benefit from some degree of administrative and financial autonomy. In 2000, the Government undertook a comprehensive review of all legislation and regulations relating to decentralization, including a blueprint for implementation and guidance for further legislative work which was supported by LDSP. LDSP was structured as an APL, due to the complexity of the needed institutional reforms and the timeframe required to cover the entire national territory taking into account Chad's size. The APL approach was designed to allow for a flexible, long-term intervention through three phases spread over 12 years, with Phase 2 and Phase 3 triggered by intermediate results. The program was meant to 1 evolve from pilot activities in a few areas to a full-fledged national program within a clearly established framework of decentralization. The geographical coverage was planned to be progressively expanded during the three phases of the APL, with full national coverage envisaged during Phase 3. 4. Community-Driven Development. A distinctive feature of the LDSP APL was its use of a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach. Under this approach, communities were given the capacity to identify their key development problems, and mobilize the funding to implement the corresponding sub-projects to address these problems. The most common of the community problems at the time of LDSP design included: (i) health, arising notably from high maternal mortality due to lack of family planning and qualified assistance to pregnant women; (ii) sanitation and water, with only a small fraction of the rural population estimated to have access to improved potable water supply; (iii) education, with large regional differences in terms of access to education, as well as important gender inequalities; and (iv) agriculture and rural development: despite its importance in terms of food security and rural incomes, agriculture was experiencing a negative growth; it also faced increasingly serious risks arising from climate change, including desertification, soil degradation, deforestation and overexploitation of water resources. 5. First Local Development Program Support Project - LDPSP 1. LDPSP 1 (US$23 million) met with numerous challenges, including management difficulties. But, in fine, it resulted in some tangible progress and was rated moderately satisfactory at completion stage. Significant results were achieved, particularly in preparing the legislative and regulatory framework for decentralization. It set the stage for local elections, and the restructuration of the country into 22 regions, 62 districts (‘départments’), and 252 sub- prefectures. Key government bodies supporting the decentralization were created, notably the High-Level Committee on Decentralization (HCD) chaired by the Prime Minister. At the same time, it was recognized that establishing the institutional and legal provisions represented only the first step for decentralization. Rural communities needed to be educated about their new rights and responsibilities, and given the required implementation capacity and funding resources. In that respect, LDPSP 1 supported the development and adoption of Local Development Plans (LDPs) and capacity-building of the local administrative bodies. It funded community-driven micro-projects responding to community needs: 405 micro-projects were implemented under the project with emphasis on drinking water supply identified as the major problem, education, health and training facilities, as well as agricultural intensification and livestock production. Of the eight triggers specified as conditions for proceeding to LDPSP 2, seven were met 1. 1 Triggers for LDPSP 2: (i) decentralization work had been launched in all 19 districts targeted; (ii) targeted communities had prepared and adopted a LDP; (iii) communities had implemented at least one micro- project from among those identified in the LDP; (iv) decentralization committees were in place; (v) legal texts on the decentralization process had been prepared; (vi) the applicable texts were available to the public; and (vii) the date for local elections had been set. Trigger 8 related to the percentage of oil revenues allocated by the Government to support poverty reducing micro-projects had not been met. But it was no longer directly relevant at completion time. Indeed, significant disagreements had arisen between the Bank and the authorities concerning the use of oil revenues, resulting in Bank support no longer being formally tied to expenditures in key sectors expressed as a proportion of oil revenues. 2 6. Rationale for Bank assistance. The project objectives and design were consistent with Chad’s Interim Strategy Note (ISN) approved by the Bank in July 2010. LDPSP 2 was strongly aligned with the ISN 2nd axis focused on improving livelihoods and access to key social services. Areas of intervention envisaged under LDPSP 2 included improving the rural population’s access to drinking water, education and health services, and funding of rural income-generating activities. The proposed LDPSP 2 was also meant to foster governance and participation at the local level, thereby supporting the ISN 1st axis. Through LDPSP 2, the Bank was also keen on supporting its dialogue with the Government on the use of oil revenues for poverty reduction, even though this was not a formal condition of Bank lending. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDOs) and Key Indicators 7. The project was intended to support government efforts to: • Improve access to basic infrastructure and social services in targeted districts; and; • Improve planning, management and monitoring of decentralized investments by local communities and communes. 8. The key performance indicators for the achievement of the PDOs, and assigned target values at projection completion, were as follows: • Indicator 1: Number of students enrolled in built/ rehabilitated schools or classrooms (17,500) • Indicator 2 (core indicator): Number of people provided with access to improved water resources (690,000) • Indicator 3: Number of people provided with access to health facilities (200,000) • Indicator 4: Percentage of targeted communities having adopted their LDPs (75%) • Indicator 5: Percentage of community-based micro-projects properly maintained one year after completion (90%) • Indicator 6 (core indicator): Number of direct beneficiaries (2 million) of which female beneficiaries (50%) 1.3 Revised PDOs (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 9. Both the APL and project development objectives, as well as the corresponding indicators remained unchanged throughout the project life. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 3 10. The main project beneficiaries were expected to be (i) the local community members who were to benefit from the Government’s decentralization program in project targeted districts nationwide, as the project was meant to promote their participation in the local development process; (ii) the local community members who were expected to be granted support for investment micro-projects; and (iii) the local leaders and administrators of the decentralized structures who were to benefit from training and capacity building activities. Overall, the project was expected to benefit about 2 million people, including 690,000 who were to be provided with improved drinking water supply, 200,000 provided with access to improved health facilities and 17,500 being enrolled in constructed/ rehabilitated schools and classroom. 1.5 Original Components 11. The project included two major technical components: (i) capacity building of local communities and communes 2 and support to decentralization; and (ii) decentralized financing of micro-projects. The project also included a project management component to support project implementation activities. LDPSP 2 was to be implemented over a period of four years, with June 30, 2015 as the closing date. Its cost was estimated at $77.25 million to be financed as follows: (i) IDA funding: US$25 million equivalent, consisting of a Credit of SDR 9 million and a Grant of SDR 7.3 million; (ii) government counterpart funding: US$50 million; and (iii) beneficiary contribution to the micro- projects: US$2.125 million. The IDA grant was approved by the Board on March 18, 2011; its effectiveness was pronounced on October 19, 2011. The official launch of the project was organized in February 2012 in N’Djamena, on the occasion of the first project supervision mission. At that time, local elections had been held. This was a condition for the implementation of the Component 1 related to the strengthening of grassroots communities. 12. Component 1: Capacity building of local communities and communes and support to decentralization (US$12 million, of which IDA US$4 million). The objective of Component 1 was to strengthen the staff technical and fiduciary skills at the different decentralized levels and within the national institutions responsible for decentralization. It included two sub-components: • Sub-component 1.1: Strengthening capacity of local communities and communes (US$4.64 million, of which IDA US$2.22 million): This sub- component was expected to finance capacity-building of communes and local communities, including: (i) participatory identification and prioritization of capacity-building needs, and participatory diagnosis for the preparation of Local Development Plan (LDPs) and Communal Development Plans (CDPs); (ii) identification, submission, implementation and monitoring of local and communal micro- projects as defined in the LDPs and CDPs; and (iii) strengthening of civil society organizations, the Departmental Action Committees (DACs) and the Local Action Committees (LACs), in participatory 2 In Chad, the term ‘communes’ refers to urban communities, while in rural areas the term used is ‘local communities’. Local communities are generally found at ‘sub-departmental’ (or ‘sub-prefectoral’) level. 4 local development management; and • Sub-component 1.2: Support to decentralization (US$3.36 million, of which IDA US$1.78 million): Under this sub-component, the project was to provide technical assistance to strengthen staff capacity within the national institutions responsible for decentralization, with a focus on newly elected leaders. 13. Component 2: Decentralized financing of micro-projects (US$56.25 million, of which IDA US$18 million, and beneficiaries US$2.125 million). The bulk of the project funding (73%) was earmarked under Component 2 for decentralized investments at local level. Component 2’s objective was to increase the availability of basic infrastructure in targeted districts. The related funds were designed to finance demand-driven micro- projects based on LDPs and CDPs. Like those approved during the APL Phase 1, all micro- projects were to be identified through participatory processes. The project was to channel funds to communes and local communities, through a Matching Grant (MG) mechanism, to support investments for: (i) socio-economic infrastructure (education, health, water supply, etc.); (ii) environmental and natural resources management (acacia plantations, sustainable land management, Sahelian gardens, etc.); and (iii) income-generating activities (improved seeds, agricultural equipment, drying facilities, small transformation and storage facilities, etc.) 14. Component 3: Project coordination and management (US$9 million, of which IDA US$3 million). Component 3’s objective was to support, through the national Project Management Unit (PMU) and the seven Regional Project Management Units (RPMUs), all project management and coordination activities, including: (i) technical execution; (i) administrative management; (ii) fiduciary activities (financial management, procurement and disbursement); (iv) safeguards compliance; (v) Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E), including the establishment of an M&E platform between the Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Housing (MLMUH) overseeing project implementation and the Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation (MPIC) in charge of monitoring the portfolio of public investments projects; and (v) institutional support to MLMUH. The PMU was meant to coordinate all the national institutions involved in project implementation, especially those charged with decentralization, environmental stewardship and natural resources management. 1.6 Revised Components 15. The components were left unchanged throughout the project life. The project design structured in two components, was felt adequate to capture the nature of the activities required to finance the CDD approach successfully pioneered during the APL Phase 1. In the context of lack of counterpart funds, the priority was gradually given to capacity building activities. This was the right decision in view of the funding constraint, as it contributed to build the institutional framework and capacity for future decentralized investments at the time when funding would become available for these investments. But this was done to some extent at the expense of micro-projects. This left a large unmet demand for local investments on the part of grassroots communities. As explained earlier, several attempts were made to restructure the project in the course of project 5 implementation in view of the lack of disbursement. But the restructuring could not be concluded until just before project closure, in great part because of the limited government responsiveness. 1.7 Other Significant Changes 16. The work schedule was delayed and activities were downsized in the course of project implementation due to a variety of causes both external, such as the security situation that negatively affected the Sahelian region, and internal due to the Government’s inability to implement a wide ranging and complex project and to disburse the required counterpart funds. In view of the above, the project should have been restructured. The Mid-Review Review (MTR) that had been agreed as part of the financing agreement should have been the opportunity to proceed with the restructuring. The MTR was to be organized at project mid-course or CY2013. At the March 2014 supervision mission, it was re- programmed for late CY2014. But it never took take place in the course of project implementation. 3 The restructuring was eventually done based on desk work and approved on May 27, 2015 just a month before project closing primarily as due diligence. It involved cancellation of SDR 8.7 million of the IDA funding and reallocation of SDR 364,000 of the remaining funds from Component 1 ‘Capacity Building of Local Communities and Communes’ to Component 3 ‘Project Coordination and Management’ with corresponding revision of the disbursement estimates. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 17. Project Preparation. As the APL Phase 2, the project was expected to scale up the activities undertaken during the APL Phase 1 taking into account lessons learned from that phase and previous Bank-assisted projects in Chad and elsewhere. One of the main lessons was that implementation of CDD was complex in a country such as Chad and subject to various binding constraints. It required ownership, preparedness and capacity-building on the part of local populations. Hence, it appeared wise to count on an extended timeframe to have an impact. Based on these lessons, LDPSP 2 was originally envisaged to cover only a fraction of the national territory with the extension nationwide envisaged only for Phase 3. 18. Project Design. LSPSP 2 design was modeled after LDPSP 1 (the APL Phase 1 project). One major hurdle that the preparation and appraisal team had to contend with was GoC’s request that the project be implemented nationwide during the APL Phase 2. Indeed, the Government was adamant that the project would cover the entire national territory (62 districts), including consolidation of activities in the 19 districts covered under Phase 1 and extension of project scope to the new districts. This denoted strong ownership 3 One of the reasons was the difficulty to schedule missions due to the prevailing insecurity in the country. In this regard, missions were not allowed to go to the field. The project team had to rely on secondary information, including information collected from project beneficiaries invited in N’Djamena to conduct interviews in lieu of the actual the field visit of their micro-projects. 6 on the part of Government for the project concept. Achieving project extension nationwide, called for the establishment of a large operational set-up consisting of the PMU that had operated under LSPSP 1 and would be reinforced, and seven Regional Project Management Units (RPMUs) (consolidation of three initial RPMUs established during Phase 1 and creation of four additional ones in the districts not yet serviced by the project). 19. GoC decided on the expansion of the project scope nationwide based on two determinant factors: (i) there was a strong unmet demand for grassroots support and micro- projects throughout the country, as evidenced during LDPSP 1 in its own area of intervention; and (ii) during LDPSP 1 implementation, there was evidence of a rapid increase in the number of local service providers available to work with the PMU to implement micro-projects, i.e., what was previously a binding constraint to rapid expansion seemed to have been removed. Through an extension nationwide GoC expected to get maximum results quickly. It backed up its request by committing additional co-financing, bringing the total amount of co-financing to US$50 million. It was recognized that, although national coverage would be achieved during LDPSP 2, project resources would be modest compared to the enormous demand coming from grassroots communities. Hence, the full scaling-up of investments would be achieved only during LDPSP 3, building on the nationwide institutional capacity and first round of micro-projects realized as part of previous phases. 20. Quality at entry. Going nationwide represented a quantum jump in project scope that seemed difficult to achieve. The difficulty in meeting this challenge, in the context of the fragility of sector institutions upon which the PMU/ RPMUs relied, was insufficiently recognized. The Government’s tight fiscal constraint, should also have been heeded since it clearly constituted a hurdle for project implementation. Additionally, in spite of the fact that it built partly on the Phase 1 operational set-up, it is clear that the project was not at the required state of readiness at appraisal. Operational details had not been completely thought through in view of the lessons arising from Phase 1. One important detail that was missing was the lack of formalized simplified procedures for procurement of goods and services for micro-project implementation. The weak state of readiness was another reason why nationwide expansion would be difficult to achieve under Phase 2. Furthermore, the four year implementation timeframe was unrealistic. The project was complex and its implementation was predicated on the adequate staffing and full operational status of both the new national PMU which had to be strengthened, and the new local RPMUs (regional project management units) which had to be created. The attendant activities were clearly hard to complete in the relatively short project implementation period. 21. The design considered the risk factors and attendant mitigation measures related to the nationwide scope of the project. However, the fiscal constraints stemming from the Government’s war effort in the Sahelian region and the significant drop in oil revenues, as well as the unstable conditions and difficult security context prevailing in the country and region, were not sufficiently assessed in terms of the actual priority the Government would give to fund social-type expenditures. Given that there had been a past trend of difficulty in securing Government funding for social development, it was overly optimistic to design a project with about 2/3 counterpart funding (US$50 million). One clear mitigation 7 measure for this risk would have been a more limited geographic scope for project implementation with less counterpart funding required. 2.2 Implementation 22. The project had a difficult implementation history. For different reasons, including the external environment, all components experienced significant delays. The overwhelming reason for the delays was the lack of availability of the agreed counterpart funds from the Government. Supervision missions repeatedly flagged this problem, and the Government was committed to providing these funds; however, these were late and did not fully materialize because of: (i) the country’s tight budget situation arising from the prevailing adverse security context in the country and the region, and the need for more resources to address the security threat, in the face of diminishing oil and gas revenues; and (ii) fiduciary issues surrounding project financial management that arose as early as the second year of implementation (CY 2012), led the Government to become more reluctant to disburse its funding. But there were other factors explaining the slow pace of project implementation. One such factor was the delay in procurement of goods and services, particularly the recruitment of regional service providers. The underlying causes were to be found in the weak institutional capacity, complex government procedures, and difficulties encountered by the PMU in managing Bank processes. 23. Regarding Component 1, a positive factor was that local elections had taken place at project inception. This was a condition to proceed with capacity building activities of local entities earmarked under this component. However, capacity building plans were not always adapted to local circumstances and training activities were at times not implemented in the right sequence. Considering the low literacy prevailing in rural areas, basic training should have been emphasized prior to proceeding with more elaborate training. Also, major difficulties were experienced in preparing the Local Development Plans (LDPs) which were to be prepared on a participatory basis with the facilitation of ‘local operators’. They were meant to serve as framework on which micro-projects were to be predicated, hence their critical importance for implementation of the micro-projects. However, by the 2nd supervision mission of November 2012 no LDP had been prepared. Eventually, 45 LDPs were approved and only by project closure in June 2015. This constituted a major flaw in project implementation, as it ran counter to the APL strategy that micro-projects should be based on LDP priorities. One of the reasons reported for the late preparation of LDPs was the delay in recruiting local operators charged with provision of technical assistance to local communities and beneficiaries. 24. Regarding Component 2, in order not to delay execution, it had been envisaged that the first micro-projects (MPs) would be self-standing and selected on their own merits based on a rapid participatory diagnosis, without the requirement of being aligned with the 8 LDPs. In fact, no MP could be predicated on LDPs because, as noted above, these latter had not been ready in the course of project execution. Therefore, this requirement was waived. Another requirement that was waived is the contribution from beneficiary communities. The communities were expected to contribute around 5% of the cost of investments, either in cash or in kind. It is unfortunate that they would not have been requested any contribution since it was meant as a tangible proof of ownership of micro- project operations. Despite the waiving of the two requirements, Component 2 implementation suffered major delays. The MP implementation timetable is shown in Table 1 below. The first batch consisting of 39 MPs in extension areas and 14 MPs in consolidation areas was approved only in late CY2012, more than 14 months after the IDA funding had become effective. Subsequently, a second batch of 60 MPs was approved in CY2013 and a third batch of 14 MPs in CY2014, bringing the total number of micro- projects to 127 or only 14% of the targeted number. The delay was also due to the lack of mobilization of local operators who were to provide technical assistance for micro-project preparation. It is interesting to note that the lack of counterpart funds affected Component 2 disproportionally more than the other components, hence constituting a major difficulty in responding to the pressing demand of communities for local investments. Table 1 – Micro-Projects Implementation Schedule and Cost IDA GoC Total Nb. Of CFAF Nb. Of CFAF Nb. Of CFAF MPs million MPs million MPs million 1st batch (end-CY2022) · Consolidation 14 193.8 - - 14 193.8 · Extension 39 903.4 - - 39 903.4 2nd batch (CY2013) · Extension 31 1,713.9 29 1,067.0 60 2,780.9 3rd batch (CY2014) · Extension 9 172.1 5 92.7 14 264.8 TOTAL 93 2983.2 34 1,159.7 127 4,142.9 25. In addition to the delays in MP preparation, supervision missions noted serious technical and managerial deficiencies in MP execution, to the extent that it was suggested in March 2014 to conduct a bona fide technical audit of the entire portfolio. According to supervision mission reports, a prominent implementation difficulty reported by project management was insufficient financial allocations for certain types of MPs. This was the case of health centers: CFAF 40 million was reportedly insufficient in many cases for 9 completion 4. Another difficulty was that RPMUs and collaborating decentralized entities were not equipped to provide adequate support for income-generating and environmental MPs even with the assistance of service providers. It was recommended during the March 2014 supervision mission that the income-generating MPs would be passed over to the Bank-financed Agriculture Productivity Project (PAPAT). The environmental MPs were dropped. For there on, LDPSP 2 focused only on social-type micro-projects. 26. Regarding Component 3, the lack of progress in project implementation overall was largely attributable to the PMU/RPMUs’ insufficient management performance due to understaffing and lack of staff qualifications and expertise. In fact, since project inception the PMU grew overwhelmed by the large expansion in project scope to nationwide. It never adjusted well to the scale of its work, in all its facets, whether it concerned financial management, M&E activities or support to micro-project activities. The PMU was particularly affected by the lack of funding, since counterpart funds were insufficient and disbursed late. 27. The PMU also suffered from internal management issues as evidenced by high staff turnover and lack of good communications between the central PMU and the Regional PMUs. The high staff turnover affected key positions such as the PMU’s Project Coordinator and Administrative and Financial Manager (AFM) positions. The Project Coordinator changed three times during the life of the project. For close to the entire PY3, there was no full-fledged AFM, only an acting AFM. The frequent changes in government composition, as well as changes in project management, explain in part this situation. Other sector-specific factors played a role, as did the dearth of good expertise in Chad in specialized areas such as financial management, procurement, environmental and social safeguards and statistical analysis, is one these factors. As a result, qualified staff often moved around being lured by better paying jobs. Finally, there were several cases of contractual conflict between project staff and the PMU/RPMUs. The former argued that they had been summarily dismissed without respect of contractual obligations. These cases were eventually settled on an amiable basis as supervision missions suggested, but they speak to what appears to have been a difficult working environment. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 28. M&E design. The project was to be carried out by the PMU in accordance with an implementation schedule that included the actions to be undertaken, the target dates and monitorable performance indicators. It was envisaged that the PMU’s Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) section would establish the reference situation for both (i) the ‘consolidation’ zones (19 departments) where activities during the APL Phase 1 had taken place and were to be further strengthened, and (ii) the ‘extension’ or new zones (all other country departments or 43 new departments) to be covered by the project. The M&E section was to establish a data collection system to inform the indicators of the project 4 However, comparator data from other projects suggest that such amount of funding was greater that normally required (see ‘efficiency’ para 40). 10 results framework. This system was to be modeled against the system that had been established under Phase 1. In addition, the project was to establish an M&E platform jointly with the MLMUH and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MPIC) so that the two ministries would be informed in real time about project implementation, and could therefore take action as required. This platform was meant to be a model that other projects would emulate, so that the technical ministries in charge and the MPIC would have full information on the status of project implementation. The PMU was to submit to the Government and to IDA quarterly reports summarizing progress in implementation, procurement, financial commitments, and the achievement of the performance indicators. 29. M&E implementation. Since it built on the experience gained by LDPSP 1, M&E implementation was expected to be relatively straightforward. However several factors stood in the way of smooth M&E implementation. One factor was the substantial delay incurred in conducting the baseline studies, which were only completed at the end of the project. Similar delays were incurred in establishing the new computerized system (including use of the specialized software) for collecting, processing and reporting data on project implementation, and the attendant staff training. The setting up of the new system and the required staff training only began in September 2013, i.e., about 2 years after grant effectiveness. This delay meant that an incomplete dataset was available prior to that date to assess project performance and quantify the major indicators particularly those related to sub-project execution. The March 2014 Bank mission noted that the software package for data processing had not yet been used to its full potential. It suggested that a Consultant be recruited to calibrate the package and make it fully operational. The Consultant was indeed recruited by end-2014. This assistance allowed the project to finally achieve some progress in data processing, resulting in aggregate data with some degree of reliability being made available for project management, but this came too late to have substantive impact. 30. M&E utilization. The M&E indicators, although the corresponding data were not complete, did point out major deficiencies in implementation progress. However, as mentioned above, the system suffered from a lack of baseline data and a fully operational data system for the greater part of the project duration. This led to delays in submitting the data required for proper measurement of indicators. Hence, the M&E system fell short of providing the PMU and the Bank supervision teams with accurate and up-to-date data on project implementation. The M&E platform to be established with the MLMUH and the MPIC to capitalize on the results of the project M&E never materialized. Overall, the M&E results were not adequately reflected in the progress reports. These reports were neither submitted on time nor contained full and accurate information about project implementation (including quantification of performance indicators). This created major difficulties in assessing project performance and outcomes, particularly as part of this report (see paras 41-43 regarding the lack of data for completion of the ex-post analysis). 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 11 31. Safeguard compliance. LDPSP 1 was classified as environmental category B. Hence the micro-projects being financed under the project required a brief environmental and social impact assessment using simple procedures. As a general rule, this assessment was undertaken as part of micro-project preparation. However, for lack of financial resources, the remedial plans typically were not implemented in the course of micro-project execution. The corresponding training of beneficiaries was not conducted either. The Bank missions repeatedly suggested that (i) the safeguard documents, i.e., CGES, PGPP and CPR, be duly disseminated amongst the project staff, including field staff, (ii) the corresponding staff training be performed regarding social and environmental matters, and (iii) micro-project mitigation plans be duly taken into consideration as part of micro-project execution and strictly implemented. The project overall failed to translate these recommendations into appropriate actions. 32. Fiduciary compliance. All financial management (FM) missions underscored the weakness of financial management arrangements. These missions included action plans to improve the situation. But these plans were rarely heeded and acted upon by the PMU. As a result, the project FM performance was rated unsatisfactory. Recurring financial management weaknesses, of a serious nature, concerned prominently the lack of a fully functional accounting and financial management system. The accounting software provided as part of the project was never fully calibrated. It was not used efficiently as revealed by the many inconsistencies found in the project accounts. The PMU was never able to prepare a fully accurate aggregate situation of the project. During the last supervision mission of March/April 2014, it was recommended that technical assistance should be recruited to help the project overcome this situation. As flagged repeatedly by the supervision missions, the financial problems related to other factors as well: (i) asset inventories were not kept in a timely fashion, and, in many instances, were not fully accurate; (ii) there was no systematic verification of project transactions as they were reflected in bank accounts; and (iii) some of the expenditures, related in particular to mission expenditures, were not thoroughly checked for their eligibility under the project financial procedures. The supervision missions underscored that the above constituted not only a breach of compliance with the Bank fiduciary conditions, but also a substantial risk of misuse of funds for purposes not related to project execution. Actions plans were drawn up but decisive remedies, like suspension of disbursements, were never taken, the reason being to avoid creating additional obstacles to project implementation, and to progress on substantive issues at the heart of the Bank-GoC dialogue like poverty mitigation. 33. External audits were not received on time. The last audits on file concern PY1 and PY2 (2011 and 2012). Their submission was late because of the delay on the part of the project in recruiting the internal auditor and the corresponding delay in establishing financial statements. Comments to the Borrower on the 2011 and 2012 audits were sent as part of the follow-up to the supervision mission recommendations on April 2014. The 2011 audit was unqualified. In contrast, the 2012 audit had serious qualifications, inter alia: (i) non-alignment of December 31, 2012 closing statements, with 2013 opening statements for a cumulated amount of CFAF 95 million; and (ii) ineligible expenditures for a total amount of CFAF 267,376,923 of which CFAF 68 million were not yet refunded to 12 IDA. The deadline for remedial action was set at June 30, 2014. At the time of the project restructuring in May 2015, there was no evidence showing that GoC had taken remedial action on these qualifications, and the 2013 and 2014 audits had not yet been received. These audits were still expected at the time of the writing of this report. 34. Supervision missions repeatedly reminded project staff that procurement activities were to be done with outmost care since they would have to be audited by the Bank, external auditors and the Ministry of Finance’s Court of Audit. Procurement of goods and services experienced difficulties and delays due the lack of expertise and high turnover on the part of PMU/RPMUs’ staff. Staff recruitment under Component 3 proved difficult because of the lack of adequate local expertise. This was particularly acute in early 2012 for the recruitment of local operators who were to help prepare the LDPs and provide support to beneficiaries for preparation of their micro-projects. The supervision mission suggested at that time that the PMU, given its lack of capacity in procurement, would rely on the MLMUH Procurement Commission. Although the suggestion was appropriate, it led to further delays. The PMU’s capacity was subsequently reinforced so that procurement activities under Components 3 could be undertaken with better efficiency. In contrast, fewer difficulties were experienced with procurement activities under Component 2 since procurement was performed using simplified community-based procedures for micro-projects. However, as earlier indicated, these procedures were never compiled and codified systematically in the form of a Manual to guide the work of local entities. Therefore it proved difficult to ascertain compliance with these procedures. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next 35. The current Bank Country Partnership Strategy under preparation continues to emphasize projects with immediate poverty reduction impact, and, when feasible, greater involvement of communities and non-governmental actors in project implementation. In that sense, local level community based development approaches remain relevant and a follow on, or third phase project may be considered justified even though overall project results have been poor and the triggers have not been met 5. Any future project would have to be built on the lessons of experience of the first two phases to avoid the implementation issues flagged earlier. In addition, the remaining fiduciary issues would have to be resolved. It should be noted that the PMU has not been maintained by Government in anticipation of a third phase project. Most likely a newly designed project, more limited in scope, would be the most appropriate approach to community level development work in Chad. 5 The triggers for Phase 3 were as follows: (i) 75 percent of targeted communities have prepared and adopted their LDPs; (ii) 50 percent of targeted communities have at least one micro-project whose last tranche has been disbursed; (iii) 75 percent of decision committees are in place and have met at least once; (iv) at least 47,000 students are enrolled in built/rehabilitated schools or classrooms; (v) at least 940,000 people in project areas have access to an improved water source; and (vi) at least 250,000 people in project areas have access to health facilities. 13 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 36. Relevance of Objectives. The primary project rationale was to support the decentralization process, and promote development at the grassroots through the empowerment of decentralized bodies. This was considered a major factor in poverty reduction. This overall objective remains extremely relevant today. However, the expectations were set too high with regard to the pace at which improvement in decentralized services and their scaling-up nationwide could be realistically and sustainably achieved. During implementation, the project continued to rely on the operating capacity of the PMU put in place during the APL Phase 1. Hence, even though there was a high staff turnover, there was no major implementation hiatus between the two phases. However, in the face of the decision to go nationwide, the fact that the limited implementation capacity of the PMU would represent a major impediment to maintaining a reasonable quality of implementation was not fully recognized; the fact that the Government, given its perennial fiscal problems, would find it hard to keep its pledge to finance two thirds of project expenditures was also not recognized. 37. Relevance of the design and implementation. The project design mirrored the design successfully used for implementation of APL Phase 1. It was highly relevant as it involved both strengthening the capacity of decentralized institutions and implementing local level investments predicated on participatory local planning to strengthen social services and support income-generating activities. At an operational level, the existing Project Management Unit (PMU) from Phase 1 of the APL continued to provide its services for Phase 2. It included a Project Coordinator, a Financial Management Specialist, a Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, and a Central Accountant and an Internal Auditor. In addition, all seven RPMUs included a coordinator, an accountant and an M&E specialist. However this operational set-up, even though substantive, proved to be spread too thinly on the ground as the project went nationwide. Even though it had been strengthened, the PMU management capacity proved grossly insufficient. This resulted in project implementation delays, at a time where the overall country context required more efforts due to prevailing insecurity in many areas. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 38. Project Development Objectives. The PDOs were met only partially (see Table 2 below). Direct beneficiaries who benefited from the project activities numbered about 350,000 or only 18 percent of the PDO target. They included those who benefited from the micro-projects in the main three fields: (i) schooling: 8,270 students or 47 percent of the students targeted to be enrolled in project schools, (ii) health: 105,650 inhabitants of the project zone or 53 percent of the total number expected to benefit from project health facilities, and (iii) water supply: 210,850 people or 31 percent of those expected to access water sources under the project. The direct beneficiaries comprised as well the 8,409 14 persons trained by the project at local and communal level (see Results Framework in Annex 2). The remaining number of direct beneficiaries are those who benefited from the other types of micro-projects (community storage, pastoral wells, village wells, etc.), as well as other training activities. They are estimated at about 16,000 people. Additionally, 60% of the targeted communities came to prepare their Local Development Plans (LDPs). However, as indicated earlier, this result was only achieved at project end, hence defeating the purpose that micro-projects be predicated on LDPs as required under project design. Finally no data were available at the time of the writing of this report on whether or not communities had adequately maintained their micro-projects one year after completion. 39. The methodology used by the project M&E unit to compute the number of direct beneficiaries benefitting from micro-projects is based on the estimated number of people likely to benefit from the different types of micro-projects, using the data made available by technical ministries/ projects in the different sectors and on the experience of LDPSP 1. The number of people trained is the simple tally of attendance to the project training sessions. It is to be noted that there is somewhat of a discrepancy between the very low number of micro-projects (18% of the target) and the percentage of people benefiting from the main types of sub-projects which is much higher (47 percent for schools, 31percent for water supply and 53 percent for health centers). The latter percentages should have been lower unless the targets set at appraisal were too low. Given the data limitation, it was impossible to pass judgment on whether or not these indicators were fully accurate. In hindsight, assuming that the project M&E estimates are accurate, two remarks may be in order concerning the targets set at appraisal: (i) the total number of direct beneficiaries may have been overestimated; whereas (ii) the targeted beneficiaries per type of micro-project may have been underestimated. Table 2 – PDO indicators Unit of Project Development Objective indicators Target Achieved % of target Measure PDO 1: Students enrolled in built/rehabilitated schools or Number 17,500 8,270 47% classrooms PDO 2: People provided with access to improved water Number 690,000 210,850 31% sources under the project PDO 3: People in project areas with access to health facilities Number 200,000 105,650 53% PDO 4: Targeted communities have Strategic Development % 75 45 60% Plans (Local and Communal) prepared and adopted PDO 5: Community- based micro-projects properly % 90% n.a n.a maintained one year after completion PDO 6: Direct project beneficiaries Number 2,000,000 350,000 18% 15 40. Project Intermediary Results. Intermediate Results were similarly partially attained. Concerning Component 1 regarding Capacity Building the two major results were as follows: (i) the number of the districts covered were Decision Committees had operated under the project was lower than 73 percent 6 vs. the target of 75 percent; (ii) only 41percent of the targeted communal and local staff received training in procurement and financial management; and (ii) no legal texts on decentralization were approved vs. the target of 12 texts. Concerning Component 2 relating to micro-projects, only 127 micro-project were implemented or 14 percent of the target. 41. Although the targets were not attained, these results are nevertheless significant in absolute value on average in view of the fact that the project used only 50.6 percent of the IDA funding and received only 20.5 percent of the agreed counterpart funds. But specific results were considerably below targets. A case in point is water supply micro-projects. Only 15 percent of the estimated number of wells/ boreholes was constructed. This result is extremely poor in view of the fact that clean potable water is a huge development priority and one of the most pressing demands of rural populations. It is to be noted also that no soil protection and conservation micro-projects were implemented (vs. a target of 1,300 ha to be covered by such micro-projects). Evidence shows that soil protection and conservation, especially in the context of prevailing climate change, is a critical issue. Also they were no livestock-related projects (vs. a target of 500 beneficiaries to benefit under such micro-projects) when there is evidence that livestock facilities are a major priority especially in the North of the country. The indicators regarding the degree of satisfaction with the micro-projects overall have not been quantified since no beneficiary survey was conducted. 3.3 Efficiency 42. No overall net present value (NPV) and financial/ economic rate of returns (F/ERRs) were computed as part of this ICR. This was not done either at appraisal stage. The justification for not doing such a full ex-ante analysis in the PAD has to do with the nature of activities supported by the project: on one hand, capacity building for decentralized communes and communities the benefits of which are qualitative in nature, and, on the other hand, the decentralized investments at local level which could not be programmed specifically as they were demand driven using the CDD approach. The justification for not doing an ex-post analysis as part of this ICR is that the data provided by the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit regarding micro-project implementation 6 The Decision Committees are a standard feature of the district institutional set-up in Chad. These committees are used at ‘cantons’ level to vet the Local Development plans (LDPs). 45 of these committees were established under the project, i.e., covering 45 ‘cantons’ and the same number of LDPs. However, typically more than one LDP was approved per individual district as it contains several ‘cantons. Hence the figure per district is lower. The figure given in the Results Framework has been computed as if there was one canton/ LDP per district, or 45 of the 62 districts of the entire country covered by the project. This is therefore an upper estimate of the result achieved per district. 16 was insufficient. Neither detailed micro-project impact evaluations, nor beneficiary surveys, were available. 43. Data limitations have only permitted to perform a least cost comparison scenario to assess project efficiency. The M&E data only covered overall micro-project costs (see Annex 3), and was insufficiently detailed to do any other type of analysis. For example, regarding water wells, data on the decrease in time spent by beneficiaries for fetching water were not available. Since this is the main benefit accruing to beneficiaries, it was impossible to estimate a rate of return. In the absence of this kind of detailed data for any type of micro-project, it was neither possible to go beyond a least-cost analysis, nor even to qualify the analysis with qualitative information. 44. The least-cost analysis was performed by comparing LDPSP 2 micro-project costs with comparator data from the Bank-financed PREBAT, PRPME and PRSSMI projects 7 as well as other projects. The comparison gave the following results regarding unit costs for typical micro-project types: (i) water supply unit (boreholes, fencing and pump): CFAF 8.8 million vs. CFAF 4.6 million under PRPME (boreholes and pump only); (ii) school construction/ rehabilitation (3 classrooms, latrines and borehole): CFAF 29.4 million vs. CFAF 28.8 million under PREBAT; and (iii) health center (buildings only): CFAF 27.8 million vs. CFAF 26.2 million under the PRSSMI. Based on these results, it can be inferred that LDPSP 2 was less efficient than other projects in terms of cost-effectiveness for micro- projects, particularly for water supply. In the course of project implementation, as opposed to what was planned originally, neither income generation micro-projects nor environmental micro-projects were undertaken. Therefore it was not possible to prepare any cost-benefit or least cost analysis for either type of micro-projects. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Unsatisfactory 45. The overall project outcome is rated unsatisfactory based on the fact that: (i) neither the PDOs nor the intermediary results were fully achieved; and (ii) the project failed to attain a sufficient degree of efficiency as regards micro-project implementation, especially regarding the prominent area of water supply. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 7 Projet de Revitalisation de l’Education de Base du Tchad (PREBAT, Annual Report 2013), Projet de Revitalisation des PME (PRPME 2013-2016) and Projet de Renforcement des Services de Santé Maternelle et Infantile (PRSSMI FY15). 17 46. Poverty impact and social development. The project unquestioningly had direct and indirect effects on poverty reduction and social empowerment. The project built the capacity of local communities to plan and execute investments thereby empowering population at the grassroots, and it provided access to social services to a large number of people, including safe water supply, primary education and primary health centers. However, much more could have been achieved if the volume of activity would have been commensurate with the targets. Another issue is the question of sustainability of these achievements. 47. Gender aspects. For Component 1, the project fell short of the 50% gender target, as the tally is that only 17% of the beneficiaries targeted for training were women. Under Component 2, precise quantified data are not available. 8 Based on a qualitative assessment, however, the project M&E indicated that the outcome is a mixed one in terms of gender impact. The following outcomes were noted: (i) the water supply micro-projects benefited mostly women mostly since fetching water is traditionally a burden shouldered by women; (ii) the health and education micro-projects benefited male and female beneficiaries alike since no reported overt discrimination exists in terms of access to health and education; and (iii) in contrast, several other types of micro-projects in lesser numbers targeted mostly men (e.g., pastoral wells since men are traditionally in charge of livestock). For Component 2 overall, weighting the outcome per type of micro-project, the impact is likely to be favorable to women. Overall, given the greater weight of Component 2 vs. Component 1 in terms of impact on beneficiaries, it is likely that the project may have attained or even exceeded its target of 50 percent of women benefiting from project activities. However, a dedicated survey, tracking access to services based on disaggregated data for men and women, would have been needed to inform the gender impact more precisely. Such a survey, unfortunately, was not conducted. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 48. The project supported the capacity building of urban communes and rural communities in all the 62 districts of the country, through operational support, training and provision of equipment. The enhanced capacity of decentralized communities is of major importance, as it has allowed these communities to identify their needs and plan their own investments. These investments have been financed partly under the project. They have also been financed, or can be financed, by other donor-funded projects as the donors have adopted a similar grassroots/ CDD approach and taken advantage of the strengthened capacity of local entities, including the existence of already prepared LDPs, to implement the planned local investments. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts: N/A 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops: N/A 8 The data are planned to be made available as part of the Government’s ICR (in preparation). 18 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High 49. The sustainability of the project capacity building activities, as well as micro- project investments, is predicated on the existence of decentralized entities that are given adequate staffing and operating resources to operate efficiently. The major factor in the sustainability of the project support is therefore clearly whether or not the Government will prove able to provide minimal staff and continued budgetary resources to decentralized entities. This is required in view of the fact that these entities will find it very hard to recover their costs directly from users owing to their poverty level (even though their services may well be greatly appreciated), let alone generate fiscal revenues to support their operations (the track record of revenue generation by decentralized bodies is extremely poor in Chad except for larger cities). Another factor is whether or not private operators enlisted during project implementation to support local communities will be able to sustain their activities following project closure through direct payment by the local entities themselves. A ‘willingness to pay for basic services’ by end-users would have been useful in that respect. But no such study was conducted and data are lacking to provide a definite answer on the above two counts. However, evidence suggests overwhelmingly that the resources for decentralized entities and/ or private sector services providers are unlikely to be forthcoming to the level they are required, particularly in the face of the poor track record of the Government to allocate oil revenues to social development activities. Hence, the project development outcome is unlikely to be sustainable, and the corresponding risk therefore is rated as high. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Unsatisfactory 50. The Bank preparation team modeled the project design on the institutional arrangements and investment strategy for decentralization predicated on the CDD approach successfully tested in the Chadian context under APL Phase 1. However, it was overly optimistic the Government could implement a project that would be nationwide in scope. It failed to recognize that the project would over stretch PMU implementation capability given the nationwide scope of intervention, and that the Government, owing to its recurrent fiscal problems, would be hard pressed to deliver on its pledge to fund two thirds of project expenditures. The Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry is therefore rated unsatisfactory. (b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies) Rating: Unsatisfactory 19 51. There were only four full-fledged supervision missions during implementation. This is explained in great part by the difficult security status of the country 9. Because of the security situation, it proved difficult most of the time to field local missions in the interior of the country. The Bank team had to rely on second-hand information provided by project staff and beneficiaries as they were invited to meet in N’Djamena. It is to be noted that the project was supervised fairly regularly during the first year and half of project implementation (2011-2012). Thereafter there was a hiatus of more than one year between beginning of CY2013 and March 2014. This hiatus is explained by the late re-assignment of the project TTLship to a new TTL on the Bank side. On the Government side, there were three changes in project coordinator and counterpart funding was not available. In view of these difficulties, it was not justified that the Bank would field full-fledged supervision missions any longer. 52. Although they were only four official supervision missions, there were significant support efforts on the part of the Bank throughout the life of the project. The supervision missions were complemented by more focused supervision interventions on FM, procurement, or technical issues, and supported through constant communications and audio-video conferences 10. The supervision teams were forthright and candid in pointing out issues. This is corroborated by their ratings of DOs and IPs in ISRs that started by being satisfactory in PY1, to become moderately unsatisfactory in PY2 and PY3, and fully unsatisfactory in PY4. The mission put forward solutions, including action plans to redress the situation; it was also forceful in raising the question of social and environmental safeguards compliance to be carried out in accordance with relevant Bank policies. During the full-fledged supervision mission in March 2014 following take-over by the new TTL, it was still envisaged to hold a Mid-Term Review (MTR). This review was planned for October/November 2014. It was to be preceded by a technical mission. At that time, the Bank team envisaged two options (i) either a restructuring of the project to align activities more closely with the implementation capability and availability of the counterpart funding; this would have involved limiting the scope from nationwide level to regional level; or (ii) proceed to an early closing of the project. In the event, no final decision was reached between Management and Government on the timing of the MTR and it was not carried out. Ultimately, the project restructuring was decided to keep the books in proper order, but it came only shortly before project closing. 53. Overall, the socio-political environment and attendant difficult security situation prevailing in Chad made it difficult for the team to address key technical and managerial problems for which decisive focus and actions were required on the part of the 9 The difficult security situation related to its involvement in the struggle against jihadist movements internally and in the Sahelian and Sub-Sahelian region (including the rebellion against the Government of Mali in 2013, the recurring turmoil caused by the Boko Haram movement in Northern Nigeria, etc.). Since 2014, the internal strife in the Central African Republic has also contributed to a heightened security status on the Southern part of Chad. 10 There was particularly an in-depth review of the project financial situation in October 2014 20 Government. The project inherent importance was clearly overshadowed in particular by the continued dialogue over the issues of allocation of counterpart funding and management of oil resources. Except for a hard stance on specific issues (regarding fiduciary matters), the Bank generally did not take decisive action. Hence the overall rating of unsatisfactory for the quality of Bank supervision. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 54. Sector and country management remained engaged and provided timely guidance to the task team during the entire project cycle. However, the country and region management were reluctant to take decisive action such as disbursement suspension or project closure. Of course, Bank’s, approach was explained in part by the larger implications of the project in terms of the Bank-Chad relationship and especially to the Bank engagement in the broader issue of poverty reduction through the use of oil revenues. It is also to be noted that there was always the expectation that GoC would eventually disburse its counterpart funds as it had continually promised. But this was a misjudgment on the part of the Bank in view of the poor track record of the Government. On account of the foregoing, the overall performance for the Bank is rated unsatisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 55. At the time of project implementation, the Government had prepared a solid strategy for decentralization. It was also committed to implementing the PRSP which required support at the grassroots. However, despite its stated intentions, the Government failed to channel sufficient resources to the project in support of decentralized entities, when the issue of funding decentralization was at the heart of the government’s poverty reduction and equitable socio-economic development as enunciated in the PRSP. The issue of funding decentralization was overshadowed by other political considerations. There was also considerable institutional instability, including a threefold change of ministers in charge of LDPSP 2 and high turnover amongst the project management team. The turn of events was unfortunate, as donors favored interventions in the area of decentralized grassroots development. Donor interest would have been enhanced by LDPSP 2 implementation, since the project was meant to support the strengthening of the institutional framework for decentralization hereby facilitating the interventions of other donors. But such strengthening fell short of expected outcomes. 56. The Government failed to (i) provide the required counterpart resources; it provided only about 20 percent of the resources it had committed itself to allocating to the project; (ii) act on the Bank recommendations, in particular as regards fiduciary matters; 21 and (iii) maintain a high-level committed team for project management. The Bank supervision missions repeatedly flagged these problems. GoC finally allocated CFAF 1.5 billion (equivalent to US$3 million) in December 2014. At the beginning of CY 2015 the project coordinator was replaced for a third time, but this came too late to have substantive impact. More seriously at the date of the writing of this report, some fiduciary issues remain unresolved. The ineligible expenditures flagged in the 2012 audit of project accounts were yet to be refunded to the Bank by the Treasury. Finally, at the time of preparation of this report, the PMU had been disbanded, meaning that there was no longer a direct interlocutor for project assessment. The absence of a minimum capacity for the project to continue operating reflects poorly on the Government’s possible engagement to pursue the APL into its 3rd phase. For all the above reasons the Government’s performance is rated unsatisfactory. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 57. On many counts – ownership of the project approach, technical capacity and staffing, proactivity in terms of taking supervision recommendations, quality of dialogue (openness/ ability to discuss technical issues and implementation challenges), etc. – the overall project governance arrangements, embodied in the PMU/RPMU set-up, proved weak. The PMU/RPMUs were plagued with continued staffing and management issues and gradually lost firm control over project implementation. There was insufficient institutional continuity in project coordination and management. There were frequent changes at the head and for key positions within PMU. Little time was given to any one of the coordinators and key staff to think or plan beyond the short-term. The financial audit for 2012, submitted by the PMU with a delay of close to a year, and issues raised by the audit were left unanswered; the other audits were yet to be submitted at the time of the writing of this report. The institutional and capacity issues that surfaced within the PMU were not resolved. The M&E section in particular proved unable to conduct the required impact studies, project completion study and beneficiary survey to inform the final project outcome. A restructuring of the project even if it occurred late in the implementation period – such as in end calendar 2014 as was planned at some point - would have permitted to address these deficiencies through a variety of means (training, secondment of specialists, material and technical support, etc.). But this did not happen. Overall, the PMU/RPMU set-up showed definite weakness right from early project implementation; it remained weak and unable to act decisively. Hence the rating of unsatisfactory given as part of this report. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 58. In view of the Government’s and PMU’s performance as discussed in section 5.2 above, the overall performance of the Borrower is rated unsatisfactory. 22 6. Lessons Learned 59. Development objectives (PDOs) and the scope of interventions for projects supporting decentralization need to be realistic. PDOs should be less ambitious and more realistic for countries with limited implementation capacity and a fragile political environment. In turn, the project scope and timeframe for implementation should be commensurate with PDOs and therefore also more realistic. Consideration should be duly given to the efforts and timeframe to build decentralized capacity and strengthen communities’ ownership of the local development process. This is a process that should be pursued over the long-term. There is so much that a project of limited duration can achieve on that front. One obstacle that LDPSP 2 clearly highlighted is that particular attention should be given to the risk of over commitment of funds on the part of the Government, meaning that the national budgetary resources for support of project implementation may not be forthcoming in agreed amounts giving the frequent tight fiscal situation faced by fragile states such as Chad. 60. CDD operations need to adapt to the capacity of national institutions. An important lesson emerging from both LDPSP 1 and 2 is that bottom-up development projects that use CDD approaches are challenging to implement and scale up, because they require extensive support with respect to capacity building. Projects that use CDD approaches involve multiple actors at multiple stages (e.g., for the purpose of sensitizing the target population, identifying and prioritizing community needs, formulating subprojects, managing the approval process, contracting service providers, constructing facilities, transferring money, making payments, and properly maintaining constructed facilities). Implementing such projects is particularly challenging in rural areas, where public services and institutions are often limited or nonexistent and where poverty levels are high. This is the case of Chad where the long-standing centralized form of government posed an additional challenge. Hence, due consideration should be given to the time and effort that are required to initiate and scale up this type of projects. 61. Multi-disciplinary expertise is required in support of decentralization. As they build on participatory mechanisms and reach out to all segments of the local population at the grassroots, decentralization programs are necessarily cross-cutting and therefore complex. Their design and implementation require the intervention of multi-disciplinary teams or task forces consisting of specialized experts with the required technical, financial, managerial skills, organizational, sociological skills, etc. Such teams/ task forces, from both government and private sector, typically do not exist in fragile states. Therefore they have to be purposely assembled and trained. Building such a cadre of experts with expertise in cross-cutting multi-disciplinary fields (administrative and financial management specialists, sociologists, safeguards specialists, technical specialists in different fields’ staff, etc.) should be the first step in undertaking decentralization programs. One aspect that should be especially emphasized as it is crucial to the success of decentralization is the participatory process. Hence the need for such expertise as trained 23 community facilitators on the ground. LDPSP 2 has done some headways on that front that need to be preserved. 62. Innovative procedures are necessary to work in the adverse context of fragile states. The context of fragile states where often time the security situation does not permit to undertake field work, requires that both the Bank and the Governments adopt innovative ways of doing business. For example, in lieu of detailed field visits and direct interviews of beneficiaries as this is typically done under supervisions in normal circumstances, specialized consultants could be recruited to assess project results on the ground, undertake in-depth beneficiary assessments, prepare impact studies, etc. These consultants would ask broadly the same questions that regular field supervision teams would ask, including focus on what kind of obstacles beneficiaries face in implementing project actions, whether they are satisfied with project support, what their thoughts and recommendations are about changing the project course of action, etc. This would be supported by pertinent data collection, video clips, sound bites, and all other relevant pieces of information, to be placed at the disposal of TTLs or government officers in charge. In the case of LDPSP 2 this would have been very useful to obtain the needed information (both quantitative and qualitative) on micro-project implementation for example that the project M&E section was unable to collect. 63. Project remedies should be clearly identified as different from overall dialogue between the Bank and the Borrower. The rules of Bank engagement should be clearly spelled out both internally and with the Government. I.e., it should be made clear what the Bank aims to achieve without compromising neither the individual project objectives, nor the broader dialogue with the Government. In the context of LDPSP 2, the lack of availability of counterpart funding should have implied immediate suspension of disbursements and restructuring. It would have been incumbent on the Bank to convey to the authorities that such a suspension was not to be interpreted as a suppression of overall country dialogue on such issues of national interest as poverty, but as a necessary administrative measure to salvage project operations, as required by Bank rules and procedures. 64. Realistic implementation risk assessment should result in considering alternative institutional arrangements. The risk of failure or inadequacy of project arrangements was not flagged as ‘high’ as part of LDPSP 2 implementation, and, therefore, no particular alternative arrangements were considered to mitigate this risk should it happen. A candid and thorough assessment of implementation risks and mitigation measures may have permitted not only to better adjust the project scope and size, but, also possibly steer implementation away from state structures in some local areas. In this regard, based on recent international experience from fragile states, NGO participation in CDD projects should be considered. NGO participation may not always be feasible (in Chad NGOs have little operating capacity), but the establishment of the required legal/ regulatory/ policy reforms should be supported. This can represent first steps to improved social and infrastructure service provision through NGO participation. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/ Implementing Agencies/ Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 24 (b) Cofinanciers (c) Other partners and stakeholders 25 Annex 1 - Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (US$ million equivalent) Component IDA GoC Beneficiaries Total cost Component 1: Capacity building of local communities and communes 4.0 8.00 - 12.0 and support to decentralization Component 2: Decentralized 18.00 36.0 2.25 56.25 financing of micro-projects Component 3: Project coordination 3.0 6.0 - 9.0 and management Total 25.0 50.0 2.5 77.25 (b) Financing Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate (US$ (US$ million) Appraisal million) Government 50.0 10.24 20,5% IDA 25.0 12.65 50.6% Beneficiaries 2.25 0.00 0.0% 26 Annex 2 - Project Results and Outputs by Component Project Development Objective (PDO): (i) improved access to basic infrastructure and social services in targeted districts; and (ii) improved planning, management and monitoring by local communities and communes of decentralized investments Unit of Project Development Objective indicators Target Achieved % of target Measure PDO 1: Students enrolled in built/rehabilitated schools or Number 17,500 8,270 47% classrooms PDO 2: People provided with access to improved water sources Number 690,000 210,850 31% under the project PDO 3: People in project areas with access to health facilities Number 200,000 105,650 53% PDO 4: Targeted communities have Strategic Development Plans % 75 45 60% (Local and Communal) prepared and adopted PDO 5: Community- based micro-projects properly maintained one % 90% n.a. n.a. year after completion Number 2,000,000 350,000 18% PDO 6: Direct project beneficiaries (female) (50%) (n.a.) (n.a.) Intermediate Results (IR) indicators Component 1: Capacity building of local communities and communes and support to decentralization IR 1: Covered districts where decision committees are in place % 75% < 45 < 73% IR 2: Project beneficiaries at both local and communal levels trained in community- based procurement and financial Number 20,500 8409 41% management IR 3: Legal texts on decentralization approved by council of Number 12 0 0% ministers Component 2: Decentralized financing of micro-projects IR 4: Community micro- projects completed Number 938 127 14% IR 5: People in project areas working in renovated/ constructed livestock production facilities under the project Number 500 0 0% IR 6: Land area restored and protected Hectare 1,300 0 0% IR 7: Additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project intervention Number 350 111 32% 27 IR 8: Improved Community water points constructed or Number 600 87 15% rehabilitated under the project IR 9: Health facilities constructed, renovated and/or equipped Number 40 23 58% IR 10: Satisfaction of beneficiaries with the results of the Community micro- projects in targeted local area Percentage 80 n.a. n.a. 28 Annex 3 - Economic and Financial Analysis 1. No overall net present value (NPV) and financial/ economic rate of returns (F/ERRs) were computed as part of this ICR. This was not done at appraisal stage. The justification for not doing such an analysis ex-ante in the PAD has to do with the nature of activities supported by the project: on one hand capacity building for decentralized communes and communities the benefits of which are qualitative in nature, and, on the other hand, the decentralized investments at local level which could not be programmed specifically as they were demand driven using the CDD approach. The justification for not doing it ex-post as part of the ICR is that the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit provided incomplete data regarding micro-project implementation. 2. At appraisal, only typical micro-projects were subject to some quantitative economic analysis as follows: (i) water wells: the analysis was based on the time saved, valued at the opportunity cost of labor not counting the positive health and income impact; using reasonable, conservative assumptions, the internal rate of return (IRR) of a typical water well was found to be 32 percent; (ii) school construction/ rehabilitation: a least cost analysis was used; the results indicated that the cost compared favorably with costs incurred under other projects; and (iii) small-scale irrigation scheme (income generating micro-project): the resulting IRR was 14.9 percent. 3. In this ICR, data limitations have only permitted least cost comparison to assess project efficiency. The M&E data only covered micro-project costs (see table below). Neither detailed micro-project impact evaluations, nor beneficiary surveys, were available. A case in point are water wells. The data on the decrease in time spent by beneficiaries for fetching water were not available. Since this is the main benefit accruing to beneficiaries, it was impossible to estimate a rate of return. In the absence of this kind of detailed data for any type of micro-project, it was neither possible to go beyond a least-cost analysis, nor even to qualify the analysis with qualitative information. 4. The least-cost analysis was performed by comparing LDPSP 2 micro-project costs with comparator data from the Bank-financed PREBAT, PRPME and PRSSMI projects 11 as well as other projects. The comparison gave the following results regarding unit costs for typical micro-project types: (i) water supply unit (boreholes, fencing and pump): CFAF 8.8 million vs. CFAF 4.6 million under PRPME (boreholes and pump only); (ii) school construction/ rehabilitation (3 classrooms, latrines and borehole): CFAF 29.4 million vs. CFAF 28.8 million under PREBAT; and (iii) health center (buildings only): CFAF 27.8 million vs. CFAF 26.2 million under the PRSSMI. Based on these results, it can be inferred that LDPSP 2 was less efficient than other projects in terms of cost-effectiveness for these types of micro-projects. In the course of project implementation, neither income generation micro-projects nor environmental micro-projects were undertaken. Therefore it was not possible to make any cost-benefit analysis for either type of activity. 11 Projet de Revitalisation de l’Education de Base du Tchad (PREBAT, Annual Report 2013), Projet de Revitalisation des PME (PRPME 2013-2016) and Projet de Renforcement des Services de Santé Maternelle et Infantile (PRSSMI FY15). 29 Table A3-1 - Unit costs of micro-projects (MPs) under LDPSP 2 Unit cost Category Number CFAF million School (3 classrooms and 38 29.4 standard other facilities) Health centers 26 27.8 Water supply unit 40 8.8 (boreholes, fencing and pump) Other MPs 23 24.6 TOTAL / AVERAGE 127 21.3 Source: Project M&E data 30 Annex 4 - Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team Members Name Title Unit Lending Soulemane Fofana Rural Development Specialist/TTL AFTAR Michael Morris Program Coordinator AFTAR Nicolas Ahouissoussi Sr. Agricultural Economist ECSSD Nathalie Munzberg Sr. Counsel LEGAF Aissatou Diallo Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Ernst Lutz Economist, Consultant AFTAR Ibrahim Nébié Sr. Agriculture Extension Specialist AFTAR Victoria Gyllerup Senior Operations Officer AFTDE Bolormaa Amgaazabar Country Officer AFTDE Julien Bandiaky M&E Specialist, Consultant AFTAR Amadou Konaré Sr. Environmental Specialist AFTEN Abdoul Wahab Seyni Sr. Social Development Specialist AFTCS Talib Esmail Operations Adviser LCSDE Daniel Sellen Sector Leader AFTAR Valerie Layrol Senior Operations Officer AFRVP Charles Annor Frempong Senior Rural Development Specialist AFTAR Maurice Adoni Procurement Specialist AFTPC Ousmane Kolie Financial Management Specialist AFCFM Charles Donang Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Elizabeth Kleemeier Sr. Water and Sanitation Specialist TWIWA 31 Bruno Losch Sr. Economist/Consultant AFTAR Olivier Béguy AFTP3 Economist Hawanty Page Sr. Program Assistant AFTAR Anta Tall Diallo Program Assistant AFCF1 Mohammed A. Bekhechi LEGEN Legal Counsel and Decentralization Specialist Marie-Claudine Fundi Program Assistant AFTAR Désiré Coquillat Consultant/Implementation Specialist AFTAR Boubou Cissé Health Sector Economist AFTHE Edmond Badge Communications Officer AFREX Dingamhoudou Patrick Philippe Sr. Operations Officer LCSHE Ramanantoanina Lanciné Dosso Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Helen Taddese Giorghis Program Assistant AFTAR Paulette Zoua Program Assistant AFMTD Berthe Tayelim Program Assistant AFMTD Supervision/ICR Fofana Soulemane Sr. Agricultural Specialist GFADR Nicaise Ehoue Sr. Agricultural Economist GFADR Lucienne M’Baipor Sr. Social Development Specialist GSURR Serge Emeran Menang Sr. Environmental Specialist GENDR Celestin Niamien Sr. Financial Management Specialist GGODR Charles Amon Kra Sr. Financial Management Specialist GGODR Paul Martin Program Leader AFWC3 Paulette Zoua Program Assistant AFMTD Berthe Tayelim Program Assistant AFMTD 32 Fofana Souleymane Sr. Agricultural Specialist GFADR Josue Akre Financial Management Specialist GGODR Haoussia Tchaoussala Procurement Specialist GGODR Charles Donang Sr. Procurement Specialist GGODR Beth Mwangi Wangeri Financial Management Analyst BPSGP Arcy Djekorne Consultant - Olivier Beguy Economist GMFDR Edmond Badge Communications Officer AFREX Dingamhoudou Volana Andriamasinoro Administrative Assistant GFADR Salam Hailou Administrative Assistant GFADR (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle US$ ‘000 (including travel Nb. of Staff Weeks and consultant costs) Lending 100 340,000 Supervision/ICR 97 350,000 33 Annex 5 - Beneficiary Survey Results (n/a) No beneficiary survey was conducted by the project. 34 Annex 6 - Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) Several stakeholder workshops were conducted by the project team. However, no reports could be located in the project file. 35 Annex 7 - Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR No ICR was prepared by the Borrower. 36 Annex 8 - Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders No comments were provided by other donors. 37 Annex 9 - List of Supporting Documents Official Bank documents • LDPSP 1, ICR, Report No. ICR00001686, December 2010 • Minutes of Negotiations, PROADEL 2, Jan. 2011 • LDPSP 2, PAD, Report No. 58621-TD, March 1, 2011 • Financing Agreement, Credit No. 4889-TD and Grant No. H657-TD, May 11, 2011 • Critical Electricity and Water Services Rehabilitation Project, ICRR, Report no. ICR00001891, June 28, 2011 • LDPSP 2 Restructuring Paper, Report No.: RES19013, May 27, 2015 • Bank supervision Aide-Memoires: February 2012, November 2012, March 2014, In-depth review of financial management, October 2014 • LDPSP 2, ISR, Sequence 1 to 7, 2011-2015 Government documents • Projet de Revitalisation de l’Education de Base du Tchad (PREBAT), Rapport Annuel Conjoint, 2013 • Public Expenditure Review in the Agricultural, Rural Development, and Food Security Sector, Ministry of Agriculture and Environment (with support from the World Bank, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and CAADP), October 2014 • MATUH, PPT presentation regarding results obtained, PROADEL 2, June 2015 • MATUH, PROADEL 2, Situation de Référence et Appréciation des Bénéficiaires, Etudes Conseils et Formation, Sept. 2015 • Coordination Nationale du PROADEL, Cadre de Résultats et de Suivi des Indicateurs 2011-2015, October 2015 38 MAP IBRD 33385 39