Document of the World Bank Report No: ICR2591 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-40700 TF-58222) ON A CREDIT IN THE INITIAL AMOUNT OF SDR 12.1 MILLION (US$ 18.2 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND A RESTRUCTURED AMOUNT OF SDR 10.34 MILLION (US$15.55 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE Government of Cameroon FOR A EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT February 26, 2013 Human Development: Education Central Africa (AFCC1) Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective 09/01/2012) Currency Unit = FCFA 1.00 CFA = US$ 0.00192 US$ 1.00 = 521 Central African Franc FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy CIP Project Intervention Area (Circonscription d'Intervention du Proj CIRD Inter-University Resource Documentation Center (Centre Inter- Universitaire des Ressources Documentaires) CITI Inter-University Information Technology Center (Centre Inter- Universitaire des Technologies d 'Information) CSR Country Strategy Report DCA Development Credit Agreement EFA Education for All (Fast Track Initiative) EMP Environmental Mitigation Plan ESS Education Sector Strategy FM Financial Management GDLN Global Development Learning Network (Réseau Mondial de Formation pour le Développement) HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country IDA International Development Association MINEDUB Ministry of Basic Education (Ministère de 1 'Enseignement de Base) MINESEC Ministry of Secondary Education (Ministère des Enseignements Secondaires) MINESUP Ministry of Higher Education (Ministère d'Enseignement Supérieur) MOD Delegated management arrangement (Maitrise d’Ouvrage Délégué) NGO Non Governmental Organization (Organisations Non Gouvernementales) OMU Operational Monitoring Unit PAD Project Appraisal Document PAFAM Project Accounting, Financial and Administrative Manual PASE Projet d’Appui au Système Educatif PCU Project Coordination Unit (Unité de Coordination du projet) PDO Project Development Objective ii PPR Post Procurement Review PTR Pupil-Teacher Ratio QALP Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio RESEN State Report on National Education UPE Universal Primary Education UNESCO/UIS UNESCO Institute of Statistics ZEP Priority Education Areas (Zones à Éducation Prioritaires) Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Gregory Binkert Sector Manager: Peter Nicolas Materu Project Team Leader: Shobhana Sosale ICR Team Leader: Simon Thacker iii Cameroon EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT CONTENTS 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1  2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 9  3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 17  4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 26  5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 26  6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 34  7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 35  Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 37  Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 38  Annex 2a. INITIAL Project Result by Component ...................................................... 38  Annex 2b. REVISED Project Result by Component .................................................... 44  Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 49  Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes................. 53  Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 55  Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 60  Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 63  Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders.......................... 68  Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 69  Annex 10. Analysis of Project Procurement Activities .................................................... 70  Annex 11. Beneficiary Assessment: Questionnaire Used for Survey..... Error! Bookmark not defined.  MAP .................................................................................................................................. 77  iv v A. Basic Information Education Development Country: Cameroon Project Name: Capacity Building Project Project ID: P075964 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-40700,TF-58222 Intensive Learning ICR Date: 02/25/2013 ICR Type: ICR REPUBLIC OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: CAMEROON Original Total XDR 12.10M Disbursed Amount: XDR 8.99M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 10.34M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept 11/25/2003 Effectiveness: 10/28/2005 10/28/2005 Review: 04/20/2010 Appraisal: 11/29/2004 Restructuring(s): 08/23/2012 Mid-term Approval: 05/31/2005 03/28/2008 03/25/2008 Review: Closing: 09/01/2010 09/01/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory vi C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Quality of Moderately Implementing Moderately Supervision: Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Unsatisfactory Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Moderately Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance: Unsatisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Quality at Entry Project at any time Yes Moderately Satisfactory (QEA): (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Unsatisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General education sector 55 45 General public administration sector 10 25 Health 10 5 Primary education 25 25 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Child health 14 5 Decentralization 14 20 Education for all 29 30 Gender 14 15 Public expenditure, financial management and 29 30 procurement vii E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani Country Director: Gregor Binkert Ali Mahmoud Khadr Sector Manager: Peter Nicolas Materu Laura Frigenti Project Team Leader: Shobhana Sosale Mourad Ezzine ICR Team Leader: Simon Thacker ICR Primary Author: Simon Thacker F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the proposed project is to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The objective of the revised project was to develop and apply management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target approval Completion or Values documents) Target Years ORIGINAL PROJECT development outcome indicators: Indicator 1 : 1. Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group). Value quantitative or 56% 80% 83% Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % Target exceeded. achievement) Indicator 2 : 2. Lower Degree of Randomness in Teacher Allocation (primary education) Value quantitative or 45% 25% 42% Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments Target not met. This indicator was picked up in the "Cameroon: Education for All-Fast (incl. % Track Initiative support to the Education Sector" project. achievement) viii Indicator 3 : 3. Reduced Primary Repetition Rates Value quantitative or 25.8% 15% 20% Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments Target partially met by project restructuring and met one year later: the rate being 14.9 % (incl. % for primary school for SY 2010/2011 (Country Status Report, 2012, p.88). achievement) Indicator 4 : 4. Improved female to male enrollment rates in target areas Value quantitative or 0.58 0.9 0.82 Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % Target likely to be met. achievement) REVISED PROJECT development outcome indicators: Indicator 5 : 1. Preparation of budgets at the primary, secondary and higher levels of the education system based on statistical analysis Budgets are fully Target partially met. Budgets are prepared aligned with Value Data verification and without accurate and strategic goals of the quantitative or cleaning exercises relevant statistical data and sector and based on Qualitative) have been analyses relevant statistical undertaken. data. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments Target partially met. The development of a methodological guide providing guidelines to (incl. % better align budget with strategy continues to be a work-in-progress after the closing of achievement) the restructured project. 2. Biennial update of the ESS based on analytic work conducted during preceding two Indicator 6 : years. The revision of the ESS, based on The strategy is updated analytical work The updated strategy Value every 2 years but no reliable launched over is informed by quantitative or statistical data or analytical preceding months, reliable data and Qualitative) products are available to was underway at relevant analytical inform policy makers. project close and work. will inform the 2013 budget cycle. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments (incl. % Target met. achievement) Indicator 7 : 3. Improved efficiency and equity in teacher deployment. Only 25% of Government states 45% of teachers in the teachers in the that as a result of teaching cadre at the Value teaching cadre at the addressing the teacher primary education level are quantitative or primary education deployment issue deployed arbitrarily and not Qualitative) level are deployed through the hiring of according to schooling arbitrarily and not contract teachers at needs. according to primary schools level, ix schooling needs. the deployment issue is being progressively resolved. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments (incl. % Target partially met. Equitable teacher deployment remains a challenge. achievement) 4. Beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected Indicator 8 : schools in the ZEP. No or very little beneficiary Rehabilitation Value participation is noted in the accomplished for 405 quantitative or Active participation. Education Priority Areas in classrooms in 57 Qualitative) the Far North. schools. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments Rehabilitation of 25 school sites was undertaken by other development partners, and (incl. % MINEDUB through the BIP (Budget d'investissement public). achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target approval Completion or Values documents) Target Years ORIGINAL PROJECT Intermediate Outcome Indicators Indicator 1 : 1. Reduce standard deviation between the average number of teachers per school in the provinces from 1.0 to 0.5 Value (quantitative 1.0 0.5 N/A or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 2 : 2. Repetition rates decline in Anglophone and Francophone areas 28.1% in Value Francophone areas; (quantitative 25% 15% 17.4% in Anglophone or Qualitative) areas. Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments Target partially met by project restructuring and met one year later: the rate being 14,9 % (incl. % for primary school for SY 2010/2011 (CSR, p.88). achievement) Indicator 3 : 3. Improved female to male enrollment rates in target areas Value (quantitative N/A 1 0.82 or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments Target was close to being met. (incl. % x achievement) Indicator 4 : 4. Classrooms built or rehabilitated Value (quantitative N/A N/A N/A or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 5 : 5. Teachers trained pre-service to minimum qualifications and certification requirements Value (quantitative N/A N/A N/A or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 6 : 6. Teachers recruited into education system Value (quantitative N/A N/A N/A or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 7 : 7. Textbooks purchased Value (quantitative N/A N/A N/A or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 8 : 8. Textbooks distributed Value (quantitative N/A N/A N/A or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/31/2005 09/01/2010 04/20/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) REVISED PROJECT Intermediate Outcome Indicators Indicator 9 : 1. Regularly updated documentation used to support the development of the sector Up-to-date documentation is The education sector lacks produced and used to Value relevant and up-to-date inform the strategy, Target met after (quantitative analytical studies to guide including the project closing. or Qualitative) the development of the following studies: education sector strategy. Analysis of the post- basic ed. system; xi Review of the impact of contract teachers program on the quality of education; Country Status Report (RESEN) Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Target met. Although the work commenced prior to project closing, due to the Comments complexities of: (i) government's focus on preparing a program budget for a three-year (incl. % period; and (ii) coordination between multiple education ministries resulted in the process achievement) taking long. Indicator 10 : 2. Production of updated action plans for the education sector strategy. Action plans are Value Action plans are updated updated and validated Target to be met after (quantitative every three years. annually for all 4 project closing. or Qualitative) sectors. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments Target partially met. The preparation of action plans is underway and will be completed (incl. % after project closing. These are being based on the Education Sector Strategy soon to be achievement) completed for the GPE project. Indicator 11 : 3. Production of analytical tools (ex. simulation models). Analytical tools are There is a lack of capacity to Value developed and used develop and use simulation Target to be met after (quantitative for budget models or other budget project closing. or Qualitative) preparation in each supporting tools. sub-sector. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments (incl. % The work commenced prior to project closing and will be completed after project closing. achievement) 4. Production of tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges and participation in the Indicator 12 : international dialogue on education through CITI and the GDLN. Activities of CITI, CIRD, Value 1,000 documents and GDLN are started but Target not met before (quantitative consulted via these the centers are not project closing. or Qualitative) centers. operational. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments The production of tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges and participation international (incl. % dialogue are yet to be instituted. The GDLN is operational, but not functioning yet (decree achievement) awaited). Indicator 13 : 5. Annual publication of statistical yearbook for three levels of education Delayed production of Annual publication of Value statistical data, sometimes statistical yearbook The target has been (quantitative not accompanied with for three levels of met. or Qualitative) analytical reports. education. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments The target has been met. Challenges remain for MINESEC where some years of the (incl. % publication are missing. achievement) xii Indicator 14 : 6. School health card published for primary and secondary education. Value School health card (quantitative No school health card finalized and Target not met. or Qualitative) validated. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 15 : 7. System of learning assessment at the primary education level. The target has been met: a summative Value Fully functioning evaluation of student (quantitative No system exists. assessment is used achievement in or Qualitative) annually. primary education exists. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments The target has been met: early grade reading assessments are being administered through (incl. % financing from other partners. These are proposed to be regularly administered over time. achievement) Indicator 16 : 8. Institutional audits prepared and evidence of the implementation of recommendations. Action plan for Value No evaluation of the implementing The target has been (quantitative implementation of the recommendations has partially met. or Qualitative) recommendations. been implemented. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments The target has been partially met: the action plan for implementing recommendations is (incl. % under preparation. achievement) Indicator 17 : 9. Institutional audits disseminated to a large audience. 5 original workshops Value Audit realized but report not organized to (quantitative finalized and results not Target partially met. disseminate the or Qualitative) disseminated. results of the audits. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments Target partially met: the audits have been completed and finalized though not yet (incl. % disseminated. achievement) Indicator 18 : 10. Percentage of subsidies allocated to private schools. Subsidies allocated to Value Operations manual for the private schools in (quantitative allocation of subsidies compliance with the Not achieved. or Qualitative) developed but not enforced. criteria laid out in the operations manual. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments (incl. % Target not met. achievement) xiii 11. Number of projects implemented with the participation of beneficiary communities in Indicator 19 : the ZEP. Value All projects should (quantitative None Target met include this approach. or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments (incl. % The community sensitization work began in April 2012. achievement) Indicator 20 : 12. Direct project beneficiaries. Value (quantitative 0 75,000 93,761. or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments Target exceeded. Number of direct project beneficiaries (students, teachers, parents, (incl. % communities, education administrators) was exceeded, and is estimated to be at least achievement) around 93,761. 13. Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting Indicator 21 : from project interventions. Target met. 405 Value 430 classrooms in 57 classrooms in 57 (quantitative None school sites. school sites or Qualitative) rehabilitated. Date achieved 04/20/2010 09/01/2012 08/15/2012 Comments The estimate was 430. Through the project 405 schools were rehabilitated. The remaining (incl. % 25 were completed through financing from other development partners. These 25 had been achievement) double counted in the original target set for IDA financing. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 07/12/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 Moderately 2 01/17/2006 Satisfactory 1.19 Unsatisfactory 3 06/06/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.37 4 10/30/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.63 Moderately Moderately 5 04/20/2007 1.91 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 6 12/20/2007 2.94 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 7 06/18/2008 3.69 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory xiv Moderately Moderately 8 08/31/2008 4.38 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 9 05/06/2009 5.23 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 10 12/28/2009 6.47 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 11 06/27/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.83 12 02/16/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.20 Moderately Moderately 13 10/11/2011 8.02 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately 14 05/27/2012 Unsatisfactory 9.24 Unsatisfactory Moderately 15 09/09/2012 Unsatisfactory 9.65 Unsatisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings Amount Board at Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring Approved Restructurin Restructurin Date(s) & Key Changes Made PDO Change g g in USD DO IP millions To streamline implementation to adapt to 04/20/2010 N MU MU 6.76 new operating environment of multiple ministries of education. Reallocation of Credit proceeds across the eligible 08/23/2012 N U MU 9.65 expenditure categories to facilitate final disbursements for the project. xv I. Disbursement Profile xvi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1. Context at Appraisal Country Issues 1. After having experienced substantial economic growth up until the early 1980s, Cameroon suffered an economic crisis that lasted nearly ten years and resulted in a decline of its GDP until1994. From a social point of view, difficulties reached a climax when the salaries of civil servants were cut by one-half in 1993 and when the FCFA was devalued in early 1994. After that, the situation gradually improved: between 1994 and 2002, GDP increased regularly at a fairly strong rate of 4.6%, while the GDP per capita increased by 2% per year in real terms. Yet, in 2002, the GDP per capita was still 15% lower than that of 1990 when holding price constant. 2. In 2000, the high level of external debt had qualified the country to become a “Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)� and eligible for corresponding financial provisions. Since that time, macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment served to improve the fiscal situation and provided a framework for development. From 1996 to 2003, poverty declined by 13 percentage points; nevertheless, an estimated 40 percent of the population was below the poverty line. Cameroon graduated from the HIPC program in 2007. Sector Issues 3. The education system performed well in the 1980s and then deteriorated significantly in the 1990s as a consequence of the economic crisis. This crisis caused significant erosion in teachers’ salaries and resulted in a failure by the Government to invest adequate resources in infrastructure and materials. This then played a role in generating widespread corruption among teachers and administration officials and led to a significant decline in enrollment in primary education. 4. In 1999, taking advantage of the HIPC initiative and in a bold effort to reverse this downward trend, the Government of Cameroon decided to remove primary education school fees and to implement an action plan to revitalize the sector. This action plan was described in an official paper entitled, Stratégie du Secteur de l’Education 2000, which called for a substantial increase in public funding to education, the stepping up of government efforts in the Zones d ’Education Prioritaire (ZEP: North, Far North, East, and Adamawa and slums around Yaounde and Douala) and a crackdown on corrupt practices to which the loss of as much as 30 percent of the total sector resources had been attributed. 5. These measures allowed for significant progress as suggested by the following indicators. Government recurrent expenditures on education. After reaching an all-time low of CFAF 21,000 in 1995, expenditures per primary education student had increased to 1 CFAF 45,000 in 2001 (in 2001 CFAF). Gross enrollment rates: The primary education Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) increased from 87.7% in 2000 to 105.4% in 2002, signifying over-age students enrolling in the system. The elimination of primary education school fees in 1999 was partially instrumental in achieving this progress. Regional equity. The action plan in favor of the ZEP has contributed to a rapid increase of enrollment in the North, Far North and Adamawa, where virtually all 6 year old children currently start school. 6. Despite this encouraging recovery and despite the fact that universal access to grade 1 had virtually been achieved, only 63% of students completed six years of primary education.1 This poor completion rate was attributable to repetition rates which, depending on the grades, hovered between 15% and 30%. This in turn resulted in high drop-out rates among children. These repetition rates were much higher than the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) average. Further, the national ratio of girls to boys, that had been improving, slowed, and stabilized at about 85% in 2002.2 7. To meet the related Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the education system had to take three important steps to address existing challenges. It had to: (i) increase internal efficiency by reducing repetition and dropout rates, (ii) narrow social disparities between regions and gender in education outcomes, and (iii) strengthen administrative capacity and governance to ensure better and more transparent use of limited public resources. Moreover, the Government had become increasingly aware of the need to diversify post-basic education and make it more responsive to labor market demand by improving the quality and relevance of instruction and by further developing the capacity of local universities to generate knowledge. 8. The United Nations Development Indicators for Health revealed that Cameroon’s Health Index (defined as life expectancy at birth expressed as an index using a minimum value of 20 years and observed maximum value over 1980-2010) for 1990, 2000, and 2005, was respectively .525, .475, and .464, and so was worsening, even if figures for infant mortality were improving (results for 1990, 2000, 2005 show that the deaths per 1000 were 90, 84, 80, respectively). Given this, action was needed to improve child health, so the project included School Health Cards which would be one way to act through schools. 9. Also of note here is that sector governance became fragmented at the time the project was being designed. Following the elections in December 2004, the Ministry of Education divided into three ministries: the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB), the Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC), and the Ministry of TVET (MINEFOP). The Ministry of Higher Education (MINESUP) remained unaffected. The consequences of this division will be discussed in detail in paragraphs 88 and on below, but it is enough to 1 In comparison, completion rates for 2010-11 are 88.4 % (from RESEN 2012). For more information, see the RESEN 2012. 2 In comparison, this ratio for 2010-11 remains at 86% (from World Bank Data). 2 mention here that coordination requirements, and therefore risks, increased as a result of this new configuration. 10. Finally, there was an FTI project prepared and launched (the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (P116437) of 08/25/2010 concurrently with the present project under review. Rationale for Bank assistance 11. The rationale for IDA’s involvement in the education sector resided in its capacity to help prepare sector analyses, develop new policies and improve coordination among donors. With respect to sector analyses, IDA played a key role in the development of the 2003 education sector Country Status Report (CSR) by a national team, which received technical assistance from France. The CSR became a key reference in policy decision- making and enabled the national team to gain a better understanding of sector-related analytical methods and to develop financial simulation and medium-term budget frameworks. With respect to policy development, IDA facilitated policy dialogue (from the year 2000 on) by organizing and funding workshops that brought together various branches of the Government, key stakeholders and donors. These activities contributed to the adoption of new policies and laws such as the private education law, the textbook publishing and distribution policy, and the school management and decentralization decrees. With respect to improving coordination among donors, in February 2005, IDA initiated a dialogue between the Government and the key donors which aimed to harmonize aid procedures in the education sector and coordinate future aid, with a view to move to a Sector-Wide Approach in the following years. As a result of this process, the Government launched the preparation of a long term sector strategy and investment program, which would build on the results of the CSR and would develop collaboratively all technical and financial partners in education. By adding a lending operation to its activities at that time, IDA believed it would be in a better position to pursue the above-mentioned activities, while focusing on capacity-building and assisting the Government in implementing reforms that had already been adopted. 12. At the same time, the Bank had not worked in the basic education sector in Cameroon for some time before this project (though it was working in tertiary education). By all accounts, corruption was acknowledged to be a major challenge in the country, one that would threaten the success of projects. To understand the rationale for Bank assistance, despite this threat, it is also important to see the project within the context of a ‘new beginning’: at the time, Cameroon had accepted to carry out a number of structural adjustments to obtain debt-relief in the context of the Highly Indebted Poor Country program (HIPC), a joint venture of the World Bank and the IMF. Some of these changes were in the education sector, where the elimination of school fees was perhaps the most notable. The Government’s commitment to reform signaled to the donor community a ‘new beginning’ and provided the Bank with the assurance it sought to begin an education project in good faith. 3 1.2. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators The objective of the project was “to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and to increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education� (from Project Appraisal Document (PAD) dated May 5, 2005). Key Indicators A. Lower degree of randomness in teacher allocation from 45% to 25%; B. Primary repetition rates reduced from 25% to 15%; 3 C. Female to male primary enrollment ratio in the Project Intervention Area increased from 0.58 to 0.90. 1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 13. The objective of the revised project was “to develop and apply management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector.� (from Restructuring Paper dated April 6, 2010). Key Indicators A. Preparation of budgets at the primary, secondary and higher levels of the education system based on statistical analysis; B. Improved efficiency and equity in teacher deployment; C. Biennial update of the ESS based on analytic work conducted during preceding two years; D. Beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected schools in the Zone à Education Prioritaire (Priority Education Areas). Reasons for change 14. The revised PDO aimed to support strategies and actions of the new Education Sector Strategy (ESS) the objective of which was aimed at reinforcing management of the education system. The ESS, established by the Government in 2006, had four objectives, improvements in: (i) access and equity, (ii) quality and efficiency; (iii) private sector and partnership; and (iv) management and governance. The ESS aimed to reach this fourth goal through improved strategic management, evaluation capacity and planning of the education 3 These include primarily Education Priority Areas in the country (zone à éducation prioritaire (ZEP)) found in Adamaoua, the North, the Far North, and the East where most educational challenges, in terms of access, retention, equity and quality, are confronted. 4 system. The original project was restructured to better align the PDO with the new ESS, and to contribute to the fourth objective of the ESS. 15. Specifically, the restructured project aimed to provide tools, training and other forms of support to various key stakeholders including but not limited to education authorities, communities and the general public to: (i) continually hone the strategic vision for the education system through analysis, knowledge sharing and dissemination; (ii) improve the education information system to ensure greater accountability and better decision making; (iii) improve sector monitoring by education authorities, the government and the public; and (iv) provide opportunities for greater participation of beneficiaries in education decision making, thus increasing accountability. 1.4. Main Beneficiaries Project Beneficiaries (by Component) Comp. 1 All key Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB) officials at the central, provincial and departmental levels, and those officials working within each of these levels, who will have been trained to utilize and apply the manuals and guides intended to reinforce the capacity of the internal auditing division (Inspection Générale des Services - IGP) and the Observatoire de la Governance. Comp. 2 Those staff in the MINEDUB HR unit, at the central and decentralized levels, concerned with teacher management who will receive training in improved teacher allocation methods. Indirectly, beneficiaries are also those who benefit from the improved allocation of teachers to available posts: that is, teachers, students and the communities concerned. Comp. 3 Those in the planning department who will receive training in improved planning methods. Comp. 4 The practitioners in the public sector, scientific professionals, especially those who operate between academia and the public sector, and those working for the private sector and NGOs. Project Beneficiaries (Revised, by Component) Comp. 1 Those who will benefit from the improved management of the education sector, through: regularly updated documentation used to support the development of the sector; updated action plans for the education sector strategy; analytical tools; and tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges and participation in the international dialogue on education (CITI and GDLN). Comp. 2 Those benefitting from regular data collection that will lead to improved monitoring of the system at every level via strengthening of the information systems and improved planning capacity, notably through the annual 5 publication of statistical yearbook for three levels of education and through school health cards for primary and secondary education.4 Comp. 3 Those benefitting from improved internal monitoring from the preparation and dissemination of institutional audits. Comp. 4 Beneficiaries in 86 identified Priority Education Areas who will gain from improved participation in the education sector. 1.5. Original Components Comp. 1 Reinforcing administrative management The objective of this component was to improve the administrative management, personnel management, and planning of the education system. These planned improvements are founded on the Government’s orientation in favor of decentralization in the sector. Comp. 2 Reinforcing pedagogic management The objective of this component was to improve pedagogic management in order to make the teaching and learning process more efficient. The key outcome was to reduce repetition from 25 percent to less than 15 percent, in addition to renovating the structure and curricula of secondary education. Comp. 3 Supporting enrollment and reducing the gender inequity in the Education Priority Areas (ZEP) This component aimed at increasing the demand for primary education and promoting gender equity in the Adamawa, Far-North, East, and North provinces. The main outcome of this component was to increase Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) from 84.4% to 100% and the Gender Parity Index from 0.58 to 0.90 in the target areas. Comp. 4 Building the Capacity of the higher education institutions The objective of this component was to raise the overall quality and relevance of teaching, research and professional development by improving the system’s ability to internally generate a critical mass of high quality academics, researchers and professionals, particularly in disciplines critical to the country’s development. 4 School health cards were introduced at the school level to help begin to counter the worsening health of the student population. See section 1, Sector Issues. 6 1.6. Revised Components 16. The project was restructured twice. On April 6, 2010, the project was restructured significantly, as explained below; secondly, on August 23, 2012, a level II restructuring took place to re-allocate funds across eligible expenditure categories. No other changes were made, and the closing date of September 1, 2012 also remained the same as the original project closing date. Revised Project 17. The revised PDO focused on supporting the Education Sector Strategy (ESS) that aimed to strengthen and improve management of the education system. The restructured project included four components that target four key areas of education planning and management. All existing activities in the original design were reorganized under the restructured components to facilitate coherence in project design and to improve project monitoring. The revised project objective resulted in a significant shift in focus from the original project. Comp. 1 Develop and update the strategic vision for the education sector. Specifically, this Component aimed “to create capacity for continuous development of Cameroon’s Education Sector Strategy by supporting knowledge exchange and the production of relevant studies.� The activities planned under Component 1 include: (i) the preparation of studies relevant to the improvement of the education sector’s strategic vision; (ii) capacity building activities for the sector; and (iii) establishment of the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) and the Inter-University Resource Documentation Centers (Centre Inter-Universitaire des Ressources Documentaires, CIRD). The intended outcome of these activities is the capacity to continuously update the education sector strategy, based on the most recent qualitative and quantitative data and enhanced by international knowledge sharing. Comp. 2 Strengthening the education information system and planning capacity. The objective of Component 2 was: “to improve management of the education system at all levels by reinforcing the information systems and planning capacity for the production of timely and accurate statistical data and the production of sector action plans.� The activities under Component 2 include the development of management that improve the collection, compilation, analysis and dissemination of statistics to support decision making and accountability of the primary, secondary and higher education levels of the education system. This includes the acquisition of equipment and training in relevant technical areas. The intended outcomes are the improvement in the efficiency of the education sector’s information system, production of education monitoring tools of current education status, and a school health map to inform the preparation of a new school health policy. Comp. 3 Reinforcing sector monitoring. The objective of Component 3 was: “to reinforce sector norms, improve capacity to monitor compliance with norms and 7 regulations and to improve education resource management at the primary and secondary levels.� This component includes activities that reinforce the capacity to evaluate management reforms. They include training, workshops, and technical assistance. The component will also provide tools and instruments in the form of technical support to improve the implementation of the new private education law. Comp. 4 Improving public participation. The objective of Component 4 was: “to increase the public accountability of the education system.� This component includes (i) public awareness campaigns and governance workshops to increase public accountability of the education system; and (ii) a school rehabilitation program in the Priority Education Areas (ZEP, Zones d'éducation prioritaires) regions aims to increase accountability of government financed actions to beneficiary communities 18. The restructured project was to have the following new outcome indicators: (i) preparation of budgets based on statistical analysis at every level of the education system; (ii) improved efficiency and equity in teachers’ allocation; (iii) biennial update of the ESS on the basis of analytical studies; (iv) increased beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected schools in the Priority Education Area (Zone à éducation prioritaire (ZEP)). 1.7. Other significant changes 19. Three other complementary changes because of restructuring were also made: First, coordination structures were streamlined and strengthened. Two changes were made in the institutional arrangements of the project to improve the coordination between Ministries and the Project Coordination Unit (PCU). First, a representative of the Presidency was added to the Project Steering Committee. Second, the membership of the Operational Monitoring Unit (OMU) in each Ministry was streamlined. Second, new implementation arrangements for School projects under Component 4 came into effect. School projects under Component 4 were to be implemented through a delegated management arrangement (Maîtrise d’Ouvrage Délégué – MOD) in form and substance satisfactory to the Bank. Third, the project was required to follow/adhere tothe provisions of the new Anti- corruption guidelines (“Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants�, dated October 15, 2006). 8 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1. Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Lessons of earlier operations taken into account for the original project design 20. A health project in Cameroon that closed in 2001 (Health, Fertility and Nutrition Project (P000411)) provided some relevant lessons: (i) that it is important to be realistic concerning expectations and that systems must be in place for measuring performance; (ii) project design should be simple, especially in sectors without prior experience with Bank operations; and (iii) institutional assessments must be carried out on implementing bodies. The Higher Education Technical Training Project (LIL-Credit 3110), that was completed just prior to this project under review, also provided some worthy lessons: first, legal and institutional reforms can be derailed at the last moment, even when consensus exists and when they are technically sound. Consequently, major decrees -- such as those related to the creation of autonomous institutions under component 4 of the current project -- should be enacted before the start of the Project. Second, replication of high-quality technical institutions is hampered by the system’s inability to replace human resources which are regularly lost through brain drain and lack of cost-efficient alternatives to studying overseas. All lessons above were considered useful and reflected in project design. Quality Enhancement Review 21. The recommendations of various specialists were also sought during a Quality Enhancement Review (QER)5 in order to gather lessons relevant to the issues of repetition and dropout. Most OECD countries did not believe that repetition improves education outcomes and so have adopted automatic, or quasi-automatic, promotion policies. In Africa, there is a consensus among specialists that students who repeat a grade tend to drop out of school earlier than those who don’t. However, while there are strong technical arguments in favor of curbing repetition rates (as most developed countries have), such policies are controversial in Cameroon. They tend to be rejected by both parents and teachers. The teachers worried that they will be sending students forward who are unprepared and will not succeed later. 6 In this project, a compromise approach was adopted whereby only within-cycle repetition would be eliminated at first. More extensive changes were to be envisaged once a broader sharing of research evidence had been carried out, and parents and teachers were convinced of its validity. 5 Undertaken during project design period. 6  Note that this is also used as an excuse to charge students additional tuition for extra classes. It becomes a source of corruption, in other words.  9 Risks and mitigations 22. In the original project design, critical risks and possible controversial aspects (identified in the PAD) were the following. 23. Political risk. Although the government was already putting in place an impressive reform agenda, the concern was that the pace of the reform process would decline following the elections in December 2004, which had divided the Ministry of Education into three ministries: MINEDUB, MINESEC, and MINEFOP. The MINESUP existed as a separate entity. Coordination requirements, and therefore risks, increased as a result of this new ministerial configuration. However, steps were being taken to improve coordination, in essence through workshops associating donors and the government and the launch of the preparation of a sector-wide strategy. 24. Economic risk. The Government had increased its education expenditures from 1.7% of GDP in 1995 to 2.7% in 2002 and was planning for further increases reaching up to 4.0% by 2010. At the time, it was believed that it was perhaps not possible to reach this goal for expenditure if economic growth slowed as a result of exogenous risks, such as adverse terms of trade shock or lower-than anticipated levels of external financing. This risk was analyzed in the PRSP, and a scenario was developed. In it, the policy framework remained unchanged but the sector goals were no longer consistent with the MDG 2015 targets. 25. Weak implementation capacity and shortcomings in financial management. This risk was to be mitigated by ensuring that the PCU staff and the implementation manuals were in place before the project implementation commenced. 26. In the revised project design, no new risks were identified.7 While it seemed that no ‘new’ risks were identifiable because the risks identified in the original project appraisal document (PAD) continued to be pertinent, a reevaluation of the risks in the context of institutional changes was necessary, as were new measures to mitigate them in light of the critical assessments during the mid-term review, early aide-memoires, and the Quality Assessment of the Lending Portfolio (QALP). Adequacy of participatory processes 27. Much emphasis was put into developing the Logical Framework for the original project and its translation into a Monitoring and Evaluation framework. The indicators were developed in a participatory manner with Government units and other stakeholders and were put in place early on to give each team an opportunity to revisit and change their targets if necessary. 7 see p.13, Restructuring Paper 10 2.2. Implementation 28. The original project was approved on May 31, 2005. Implementation was slow to begin. Although the first ISR ratings were optimistic, it became evident that there were difficulties in implementation of the project.8 The implementation rating in the second ISR of January 2006 was rated MU. Over the next year, disbursements rose very timidly, reaching just a little over 10% by Q2 2007, almost two years into the project implementation period. However, the ISRs 3 and 4 registered MS as the implementation rating.9 Disbursement continued on sluggishly, nevertheless, reaching just 36% by Q4 2009 – two and a half years later. As a result, both DO and IP ratings remained MU throughout that time (in five ISRs, #5-#10). 29. A significant restructuring of the project was approved on April 6, 2010, 10 (discussed at greater length in section 5.1 below) which altered the PDO and revised the components, with the underlying idea of streamlining implementation and strengthening project monitoring. Outputs and targets were revised and there was a new results framework. The overall project cost remained, nevertheless, the same. 11 Despite the restructuring, the next two years, July 2010 – July 2012, saw an increase in disbursement of just 16.2%. However, with implementation picking up significantly over the April- September 2012 period, disbursements surged by 30 percent in the four months of grace period, finishing at 86.97%. 30. A hard line was taken as the project neared closing: no further extension was 12 given, although construction activities (notably latrines and wells) remained incomplete.13 Instead, these activities were transferred to another project in the portfolio that could accept them. It should also be mentioned that the CMU had to become involved at this point in the project. 8 These were due in large part to the suspension of the first project coordinator and the time required in replacing him, all of which created delays in project execution. 9 In ISR #3, the IP was upgraded from MU to MS due to completion by Government of a major strategy document and the launch of a large number of bids after March 2006. In ISR#4, the rating remained unchanged (MS) because there was evidence that disbursement would increase substantially when the bunching at the procurement level would have been cleared. 10 Even if restructuring was discussed as early as 2008 (see ISR #7), the decision to move to restructuring and the process of designing a new project took some time. This was because the Government was reluctant to entertain the idea at first, after having invested so much, politically, into the initial project design. 11 Principally because the government was reluctant to give up any donor funding and, more particularly, because the different Ministries concerned were unwilling to allow any of their original funding to be reallocated to another Ministry. 12 This refusal to extend was to demonstrate that the project could not drag on. It could be argued that the WB could have shown a little more flexibility here and offered a limited two month extension to allow just these construction activities to be finished. There may be good reasons why it didn’t: it needed to send a firm message to Government that the project could not go on and on. 13 Misinformation from Plan Cameroon regarding the actual state of implementation of latrines and wells forced the team to hire a consultant to travel to the sites to establish the facts of the matter. 11 31. Weak disbursement characterized the project in its initial and restructured forms. 36 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively, are shown on the datasheet to have been disbursed in these two phases, for a total of approximately US$10.2 million out of US$18.2 million. In addition to this, however, approximately 34.7 percent not captured in the datasheet or the final ISR, was disbursed in the four month post-project close grace period, bringing the post-restructuring disbursement to approximately 51%. In all, the total project disbursement amounts to approximately 86.97 percent (as of Jan 24, 2013). Government agreed to cancel US$2.65 million or approximately 14.6 percent of total funds. 32. Project disbursement delay flags were raised on several occasions (more than 5 times) during the life of the project. These implementation difficulties and delays can be explained in large part by three sets of factors, some subject to government, some to implementing agency, and some to World Bank control. A brief summary is given here, but these are also developed in other sections of the ICR. 33. First, in terms of factors subject to government control, endogenous ones of several kinds stand out. There was: (i) little or no unified de facto leadership of the project; (ii) poor ownership and commitment; and (iii) weak functional capacity caused by difficult inter-ministerial coordination, onerous administrative structures and procedures, and inefficient procurement and disbursement processes. These are discussed in section 5.2. 34. Another important confounding factor, subject this time to Implementing Agency Control, was weak project management.14 The first two project coordinators were replaced, due essentially to non-performance, while the mandate of the third cannot be characterized by proactive project management. Indeed, when the World Bank found that actively managing the execution of project activities on a week by week basis was helpful, this was still not adopted by the project management unit. It is not clear why. Rather, an in-country World Bank intermediary had to pursue project implementation serving as a de facto assistant to the PCU coordinator. 35. The factors the World Bank might have better controlled include project design (and re-design) and, arguably, project management and supervision. The project design had not anticipated, at least not realistically enough, the challenges of working with a newly fragmented Government (one with four newly created Ministries dealing with education) in a new sector-wide approach. Then, the project restructuring design did not manage to find a corrective measure for the challenges of working in this new administrative context and so disbursement continued to be slow and implementation difficult. In addition, there was high task team leadership turnover -- five in seven years – which did not lend itself to finding the best approach to supervising the project. What was found to work, at the end of the project, was intensive hands-on supervision, with a focus on strict adherence to set deadlines, follow-up, and careful monitoring of implementation activities. This involved 14 Even the costly recruitment of an international procurement specialist did not lead to decreases in procurement delays. 12 significant effort on the part of the World Bank task team, which signaled ultimately an absence of adequate government commitment to and ownership of the project. 15 2.3. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Original Design 36. The Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP) rated the original project as Unsatisfactory with the most important criticism being that it was poorly designed, without clear links between activities, indicators and objectives and thus making the PDO unlikely to be met. The results framework was not appropriate for a project concerned for the greater part with technical assistance (TA) whose main objective was capacity-building. There were two additional confounding factors: (i) data were unavailable or unreliable (Plan Cameroon, for instance, as mentioned in footnote 15, furnished misleading information); and (ii) the distance from Headquarters made it difficult to obtain actual implementation progress. Revised design after restructuring 37. The restructuring needed to pay significant attention to (i) improving project management; and (ii) ensuring that the project objectives and associated indicators were realistic, clear, and aligned with activities as well as ensuring appropriate linkages between activities to ensure synergies. The revised project’s results framework was more in line with a TA project, although not all activities in it were purely TA-related and, because many activities were qualitative in form, they did not lend themselves to sharp monitoring and evaluation. Capacity-building 38. An important intended outcome of the components of this project devoted to capacity-building was a more streamlined education administration better able to manage its mandate through more efficient procedures and a more effective agenda. While this was a crucial objective at the heart of the project, it is not clear how the capacity building program was organized logically- and pedagogically- speaking so that the numerous activities within it would work together to achieve the objectives. The absence of a coherent plan was apparent. There were a huge number of workshops, 114 in all, but it is unclear how these were meant to advance the capacity-building agenda. The training plans 15 The process also revealed that during the final three months of the project implementation period, with the growing certainty that the project would be closed as originally envisaged on September 1, 2012, project staff (especially fiduciary staff—financial management specialist and the accountant) resigned to take on longer term and more secure assignments. The attrition weakened the project secretariat’s ability to ensure full compliance with the financial management and accounting requirements in a timely manner. 13 (‘plan de formation’) that were submitted to the World Bank 16 list workshops of various sorts, but it is unclear to what extent these would be productive. For instance, it is difficult to know what could be accomplished in a ten-day workshop on language. The point is that these activities, perhaps of some importance in capacity building, needed to be monitored (over and above attendance being taken) to show what impact they have had in concrete terms. 17 Otherwise it is not clear how they would result in behavioral change leading staff to work differently because of the new knowledge gained, and how capacity would have in fact been strengthened. During the last year of project implementation many of the activities were reviewed and rejected as being unnecessary. This came at a significant cost in terms of repeated negotiations to keeping versus eliminating activities. 2.4. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Safeguard Compliance 39. The initial project triggered safeguard policy OP 4.0 1 Environmental Assessment (with the safeguard screening category being S2, and the environmental screening category B). These ratings were due to the construction of the CITI and the provision of water wells and latrines within the compounds of existing, active schools. Potential safeguard-related issues also included soil and water pollution, soil erosion, noise, air pollution, loss of vegetation, and crop losses. An Environmental Mitigation Plan (EMP), prepared to address environmental and social impacts under components 3 and 4, was made available in Cameroon on November 19, 2004, and at the Bank’s Infoshop on November 22, 2004. It was also determined that OP 4.12 would be triggered, even though there would be very limited social impact of the CITI construction. At restructuring, the proposed changes were deemed not to change the environmental category of the project or trigger new safeguard policies. A supplemental EMP was prepared to clarify actions needed to be taken to ensure compliance of school projects financed under Component 4, such as school rehabilitation, latrines and water wells. 40. The project was rated ‘satisfactory’ in these two areas -- compliance with the safeguards OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement -- a rating that did not waiver over the course of the project. No other safeguard was triggered by the project. Fiduciary Issues 16 Submitted as Excel worksheets, these list the objectives of each workshop, their date and time, number of participants, costs and the per-diem expected, but no M&E of the activity. 17  The capacity development plans were not carefully directed to link up with specific outputs and outcomes that would pave the way for real change in the Ministries. The fragmentation in the plans clearly indicates that the activities were intended to placate individual Ministries and their staff to get a fair share of the external financing support. It is impossible to carry out impact evaluations on myriad small value capacity development activities. The sum of the parts does not add up to the whole.   14 41. Financial and procurement assessments were conducted as the initial project was prepared. All issues and risks related to procurement were identified and corrective measures were agreed upon. The overall project risk for procurement was considered high. A series of corrective measures were agreed on and included the recruitment of an additional part-time procurement expert, the provision of adequate procurement trainings to the members of the procurement commission of MINEDUB, MINESEC and MINESUP, improvement of procurement record-keeping and preparation of a procurement plan prior to negotiations. The project financial management risk was considered substantial. Financial management arrangements satisfied the World Bank’s minimum requirements under OP/BP10.02 and an action plan to further improve these arrangements has been agreed upon, including the elaboration of an accounting procedures manual, the reinforcement of internal controls and the purchase of an integrated accounting and financial reporting software. 42. An intensive Post Procurement Review (PPR) was conducted in May 2009 to determine what needed to change in terms of procurement practice to process the government’s request for restructuring. In October 2009 an assessment mission concluded that all major recommendations had been implemented, except for the recruitment of a new procurement specialist (who was hired in January 2010). A number of key changes 18 were made to improve procurement.19 Furthermore, the government drafted a new procurement plan, which was approved by the task team. 43. Project supervision has shown that the (original and restructured) project’s financial management arrangements, when found inadequate, were made to be compliant with the Bank’s financial management requirements. There were nevertheless ongoing concerns regarding weak procurement. This weakness was due to a number of factors: (i) as discussed later in section 5.2(a), procurement was a complex and onerous affair 20; (ii) poor inter-ministerial communication and coordination caused delays and bottlenecks (dossiers sent between Ministries, for instance, were not easily traceable); and (iii) complications caused by missing staff or staff turnover hampered efficient procurement execution. The World Bank and the Project Secretariat teams remained flexible in the face of these challenges by restructuring the project substantively once and by reallocating funds across eligible expenditure categories a second time to try and refocus the project on essentials 18 The April 2010 mission included a senior procurement officer in order to improve procurement. The mission proposed significant changes in procurement processes, and some indicators linked to quality control inside the PIU. However, while these changes seemed logical, they have not been able to deeply improve the situation. 19 These included: (1) Better and more transparent processes for requesting price quotations from potential suppliers; (2) Regular publication of the results of bidding processes; (3) Implementation of a system for receiving and validating reports produced by consultants; (4) Recruitment of an internal auditor; (5) Acceleration of payment of overdue bills; (6) Better filing of documents, particularly with regards to cross filing of procurement and financial management documents. 20 There was much back and forth between agencies, because National and Bank procedures seemed to those working with them in Government to be sometimes irreconcilable. 15 and to extend deadlines so that the implementing agencies could overcome accumulated delays. Audits and Disbursements 44. Four kinds of audits were used in this project: internal, technical, external, and a final transactions-based audit. Internal. Following conditions laid out in the restructured project, an internal auditor, a private consultant, was hired to work with government. In rare cases where projects are at risk, like this one, the terms of reference call for internal audits to include recommendations to help improve the financial management of the project within government.21 These audits were late in 2012, judged to be unsatisfactory by World Bank review (as they too closely resembled external, not internal audits), and their recommendations were never acted upon by the project secretariat. Technical. Technical audits, used to ensure that construction projects were in fact completed, were undertaken by the World Bank team that closed the project within the framework of the restructured project. The technical audit was not part of the restructured project design. For reasons linked to difficulties in the procurement process, contracts for these kinds of audits had never before been signed. External. External financial audits were carried out throughout the project. As the record in the ISRs reveals, these were often qualified, occasionally having accounting issues, though in the last three ISR, no problem was highlighted. Transactions-based audit. In addition, as more than three times as much disbursement took place as the project ended than usual, the task team took steps to mitigate the risk of inefficient and/or inappropriate use of resources by having a third party transactions-based audit of project activities take place. 2.5. Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 45. The follow-on project is not an IDA project. It is a Global Partnership for Education (GPE) project. It is the follow-on to the EFA-FTI project mentioned in paragraph 13 above), which closed on December 31, 2011. The link between the two projects is that the fiduciary due diligence for the EFA-FTI project was being undertaken by the EDCB Secretariat. 46. Preparation for the follow-on GPE project will commence around February or March 2013. The lessons from the EDCB project and the EFA-FTI ICRs, as well as the lessons from the design and implementation experience of the projects recently financed or in progress by other development partners (specifically, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD)), will be taken into consideration in designing the new GPE operation. 21 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this audit arrangement was largely unsuccessful. The internal auditor was ineffective in passing recommendations on in a manner that elicited positive action from the project secretariat. Further, there appears to have been a clear lack of willingness in the project secretariat to act upon the recommendations of the heavily qualified internal audits. 16 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1. Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Original Project Relevance of Original Objectives 47. The original project was expected to contribute to putting Cameroon back on track to reach the MDG of ensuring that by 2015, all children, boys and girls alike, would be able to complete a full course of primary education (100 percent completion rate). It was grounded in the country Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that was presented to the Board in July 2003, which emphasized the dual role of human development as an engine for broader social development and a pillar for capital formation and growth. It was also consistent with the first pillar of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS): “strengthening the institutional framework for improved pro-poor economic management and service delivery.� The Education Sector played a prominent role in this CAS, which covered the period from 2004 to 2006, and showcased policies intended to promote better governance and the sound use of public resources. The objectives were, in short, clear and important for the country and sector and furthered the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and MDG goals. And, it should be added, these remain important goals for the sector.22 Relevance of Original Design 48. The project design exhibited several strong points. After arguing convincingly for the need to improve the management of the education sector, the design put forward a coherent framework that focused on a series of key objectives that, if successful, were likely to contribute in a significant way to the greater PDO (see below). In this sense, it was very ambitious. The PDO, however, was articulated quite broadly, which left room for interpretation. Being so defined in fact, it focused on an outcome for which the operation could not reasonably be held accountable. In addition, the design, being so ambitious, included numerous and, to some extent, diffuse activities and so was not responsive to borrower limitations. 22 The latest education sector CSR (2012) argues as much, repeating lessons put forward by its authors eight years earlier in the technical background report for the original project. 17 Relevance of Original Implementation 49. There is no doubt that it would have been difficult to anticipate how changes in governmental structure – the dividing up of the Ministries of Education -- would affect the project’s implementation capacity. The functional capacity of the government was known to be weak, so working with one that was newly restructured must have been challenging. The Government and the Bank must be commended for tackling this project in this new context. Revised Project Relevance of Objectives 50. The PDO of the restructured project focused on those strategies and actions of the Education Sector Strategy of 2006 that aimed to improve the strategic management, evaluation capacity and planning of the education system, which was an excellent initiative as it concentrated on the central underlying problem confronting the sector. More specifically, it was expected to provide tools, training and other forms of support to education authorities, communities and the general public to: (i) continually hone the strategic vision for the education system through analysis, knowledge sharing and dissemination; (ii) improve the education information system to ensure greater accountability and better decision making; (iii) improve sector monitoring by education authorities, the government and the public; and (iv) provide opportunities for greater participation of beneficiaries in education decision-making, thus increasing accountability. Relevance of Design 51. The strong point in the revised design is found in its introduction of strong financial management measures. What confounded the design however was the commitment to the restructuring of the project on the part of the Borrower. As explained elsewhere (see section 5 on Borrower Performance), the Government, having made pledges to several sets of stakeholders, was averse to changing the project and so, as a consequence, the revised design retained almost all the original design’s activities, though classifying them differently under new components. It was inconsequential in reducing their burden, in other words, and since the restructured project was planned to be only two years in length, this left a questionably short period for so much activity. And indeed Government did take some time to change stride in order to find adequate traction to engage with the new contours of the project. Nevertheless, what the restructured design did achieve -- and this is something that should be underlined – is that it led to improvements in project execution, thanks to its insistence on focusing on accomplishing only the essential in the project. Proof of this comes finally at the end of the project when disbursement finally surged to 87 percent. Relevance of Implementation 18 52. The revised design attempted to streamline the original project, but did not adequately assess the country’s existing institutional capacity, most notably, the ministries’ inability to effectively implement the project activities. Knowing what had already transpired in the initial phase of the project before restructuring, this was some oversight. 3.2. Achievement of Project Development Objectives Original Project 23 53. The last measures of the PDO and Intermediate Indicators of the Original Project were taken in March 2009, revealing the following. PDO Indicators 54. The Development Objectives of the original project – “to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education� – were achieved to some extent. Progress had been made in the sector. 55. In terms of retention, the target was exceeded. The primary completion rate attained 83 percent as of March 2009, already bypassing the September 2010 end of project target of 80 percent. The abolition of school fees at project onset most probably contributed significantly to this result. Primary Repetition Rates, which at baseline were 25.8 percent, had dropped to 20 percent by March 2009 and may have just reached the 15 percent target at end of project. 56. In terms of equity, the target was close to being met. Improvements in female to male enrollment rates in target areas were noted: from a baseline of 0.58, the rate had climbed to 0.82 by March 2009, 8 points shy of the end of project target of 0.9, and so it is likely the target would have been met. 57. In terms of improved management, the randomness in primary teacher allocation, estimated at baseline to be 45 percent, had dropped just three points to 42 percent by March 2009 (after four years), but was unlikely to attain the end of project target of 25 percent the next year, suggesting either that: (i) project interventions were having limited success in rationalizing the baroque process of teacher deployment; or (ii) the project target was too ambitious. For a more in-depth discussion of the teacher deployment issues, see the Implementation Completion and Results report (World Bank document No.00002369) for 23 see ISR #9 for a summary. 19 the “Cameroon Education for All-Fast Track Initiative support to the Education Sector� project. 58. Intermediate outcome indicators. Only two of the eight intermediate indicators had been measured by March 2009. First, repetition rates, recorded at 25 percent at baseline, were expected to descend to 15 percent by project end. Instead, the rate climbed to 28.1 percent in Francophone areas, while it declined to 17.4 percent in Anglophone areas, by March 2009, (for an average of 20%), a reflection perhaps of differing interpretations and responses in these sub-systems of the policy changes related to repetition. Second, the ratio of girls to boys, targeted to be at .9, reached .82. Revised Project 59. The Development Objectives of the revised project – “to develop and apply management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector� – were achieved in some measure, most markedly in the last stages of the project. Revised PDO Indicators (There are four indicators) 60. Preparation of budgets at the primary, secondary and higher levels of the education system based on statistical analysis. The target was partially met. While the final target was for budgets to be fully aligned with strategic goals of the sector and to be based on relevant statistical data, challenges persisted in respect to the availability of reliable data, even if the data verification and cleaning exercises had been undertaken. The development of a methodological guide providing guidelines to better align budget with strategy continues to be a work in progress after the closing of the restructured project. The process, however, commenced prior to project closing. 61. Improved efficiency and equity in teacher deployment. The target is partially met. Government states that as a result of addressing the teacher deployment issue through the hiring of contract teachers at primary school level, the deployment issue is being progressively resolved. Equitable teacher deployment remains a challenge. Again, for a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see the Implementation Completion and Results report (World Bank document No.00002369) for the “Cameroon Education for All-Fast Track Initiative support to the Education Sector� project. 62. Biennial update of the ESS based on analytic work conducted during preceding two years. The target has been largely met. The revision of the ESS, based on analytical work launched over preceding months, was underway at project close and will inform the 2013 budget cycle. 63. Beneficiary participation in school functioning and school accountability in 86 selected schools in the ZEP. The target has been met. The activity was partially completed by the executing agency Plan Cameroon, though it is important to note that, 20 while the number of schools initially envisaged was 86, 29 were either being already rehabilitated by other development partners, or by the government through the BIP (Budget d'investissement public). The IDA project financed the sensitization program and rehabilitation of works in the remaining 57 schools. Intermediate Indicators 64. There are eleven indicators: five of which were met or exceeded, three were expected to be met after project closing, while four were partially met. (Please note that in the datasheet at the beginning of this ICR, these indicators are given in the order found in the restructuring paper; here, they are grouped by achievement, so as to give a clearer idea of what has been accomplished). Those that were met include: 1. The publication of annual, statistical yearbooks for three levels of education. This target has been met. However, some years of the publication for MINESEC are missing and challenges concerning data credibility and validity remain to some extent. 2. System for learning assessment at the primary level. The target has been met: a summative evaluation of student achievement/assessment system after primary education exists. Further, early grade reading assessments are being administered through financing from other partners. These are proposed to be regularly administered over time. 3. The target number of direct project beneficiaries (students, teachers, parents, communities, education administrators) of 75,000 was exceeded. As of project close it was estimated to be 93,761. 4. Number of projects implemented with the participation of beneficiary communities in the PEA (ZEP). The target number of 57 projects was met. The number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions was targeted to be 430. This was achieved to the extent that 405 were completed through the project while the remaining were completed through other partner-financed projects, and had been double counted towards the project target. 5. The setting up of the infrastructure for GDLN. Target met. The GDLN will be a means to facilitate higher education learning and policy dialogue. Those expected to be met after project closing: 21 1. Regularly updated documentation. The work is ongoing and will be completed after project closing. Although the work commenced prior to project closing, due to the complexities of: (i) the government’s focus on preparing a program budget for a three-year period; (ii) efforts being placed by government to complete a sector strategy linked to their vision document; and (iii) coordination between multiple education ministries resulted in the process taking far longer than anticipated to be completed. 2. Production of updated action plans for the education sector strategy. The work is ongoing and will be completed after project closing. In keeping with the intermediate indicator assessment above, the action plans will be produced after project closing since the analytical work has already commenced. These plans will be developed based on the completion of the revised education sector strategy in the context of preparing the follow-on Global Partnership for Education (GPE; formerly EFA-FTI) project. 3. Production of analytical tools (ex: simulation models). The work is ongoing and will be completed after project closing. This is due to the fact that the preparation of the program budget for three years took precedence over the completion of the simulation model for education. Through the project interventions, a team of representatives drawn from each ministry has been trained to produce and use this tool, and the preparation of the simulation model exercise continued after project closing. These tools will be used to inform the budget preparation in each sub- sector during the 2014 budget cycle, and towards preparing the follow-on GPE project. Those partially met or not met include: 1. Production of tools that facilitate knowledge exchanges and participation in the international dialogue on education (CITI and GDLN). The target of having 1,000 documents consulted has only been partially met. Following some delays in the procurement of the GDLN equipment, the tools have now been received and are installed and await a Government decree putting the center into operation. With respect to the CITI, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the achievement of the target. 2. Institutional audits prepared and evidence of the implementation of recommendations. The target has not been met: the action plan for implementing recommendations is still under preparation. These institutional audits were to be disseminated to a large audience through 5 workshops. 3. Percentage of subsidies allocated to private schools in compliance with the criteria laid out in the operations manual. Target not met, because there is limited evidence on the percentage of subsidies allocated to private schools. 22 4. The publication of school health cards for primary and secondary education was not initiated. 3.3. Efficiency 65. Unit costs. Before the 2000/1 school year, fees were abolished for all students in primary school, leading to a surge in first grade enrolment. Fees were replaced by block grants paid to schools. However, these were insufficient to cover costs: parents had to pay for additional teacher recruitment, school functioning, and frequently contributed to school- related construction projects. Further, they still had to pay for textbooks, and sometimes for uniforms. 66. The CSR of 2012 offers a comparative perspective of unit costs for figures recorded in 2002 with those recorded in 2011.24 Relatively significant changes are observed with an overall pattern moving downward over the period. Within that trend, however, primary education unit costs increase by +18% over the period. This appears to be the result of the removal of locally hired temporary teachers and their replacement with better (contractually) paid teachers. In general, this is a promising sign of reform because the Government has recruited i) better paid ii) better trained and iii) state-paid teachers instead of parent-paid teachers. In comparison, the first years of lower secondary education (post- elementary) saw a decline in unit cost of as much as 42% over the period, while there is a 17% increase in the unit cost of upper secondary schooling. This can be explained, ironically, by the massive recruitment of locally hired (parent paid) teachers in lower secondary school. 67. Internal efficiency. At project outset, the overall internal efficiency coefficient for the whole education system was estimated to be 0.7125, indicating a waste of education resources of close to 30%. 26 It is the primary education system that is most severely inefficient, notably in the French speaking sub-system. Overall internal efficiency coefficient per level of studies (Project Outset) Primary Lower Secondary Upper Secondary Overall internal efficiency coefficient 0.63 0.81 0.75 French-speaking subsystem 0.79 0.89 0.84 English-speaking subsystem 0.80 0.91 0.90 0.63 0.81 0.75 24 Education sector CSR (2012), p.60 25 Estimates given in the PAD. 26 The coefficient compares the number of years all students graduating from a cycle would have needed to complete the cycle (assuming no repetition is necessary), with all the student-years produced by the system. 23 Overall internal efficiency coefficient Coefficient only taking into account repetitions 0.79 0.89 0.84 Coefficient only taking into account dropouts 0.80 0.91 0.90 Source: World Bank Project Appraisal Document (PAD), 2006 68. At project outset the frequency of class repetition (25.8% in the primary schools, 15.3% in lower secondary education and 26.2% in upper secondary education) was very high and was at the root of the inefficiency. Class repetition was much more noticeable in the French-speaking subsystem (28% in the French-speaking primary schools against 17% in English-speaking schools). 69. Meanwhile, at project end, estimates for internal efficiency are given in the latest education sector CSR 27: taking into account the cumulative frequency of repetition and drop-out in the current situation (for primary education in the school year 2010-11) leads to an estimate of the overall index of efficiency being 79.8 per cent. This means that about 20% of the resources mobilized for this level of education are in fact wasted. In terms of international comparisons, the waste in resources observed in Cameroon is more favorable than that observed on average in the francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa (33%). In terms of change over time, we note that the situation in the country has improved quite substantially. The internal efficiency coefficient, which stood at only 63% in 2003 and 71% at project outset, is now at project close, 79.8%, even if the comparability of the three figures is probably not perfect. 70. To what extent the EDCB Project contributed to these results is an important question. The objective of the original project was ‘to increase the efficiency and equity of primary and secondary education, with a focus on disadvantaged areas, and increase capacity for high quality training in targeted disciplines in higher education.’ However, as we saw in section 3.2, while progress was made on several counts (in terms of retention and equity), in terms of improved management, the target for reduced randomness in primary teacher allocation was not attained by project end. In the restructured project, the targets of ‘developing and applying management and learning tools for use by government and communities to improve efficiency and accountability of the Cameroon education sector’ were met to some measure, though not altogether. 71. Conclusion. Over the project period, it is true that (i) the general pattern seen in unit costs is one that decreases (though the unit cost of primary has in fact risen28); and that 27 CSR, 2012, p. 84. 28  Though, as we saw, this is a promising sign of reform because the Government has recruited i) better paid ii) better trained and iii) state-paid teachers instead of parent-paid teachers. 24 (ii) the internal efficiency of the system had improved. While the EDCB had contributed to this net positive effect, the full attribution of the results to the EDCB project alone would not be an accurate assessment. Therefore, the efficiency of the project can only be rated conservatively as having been modest. 3.4. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 72. The overall outcome rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory is meant to reflect contrasting aspects of this project: (1) The original and revised project were relevant because they were aligned with the Government’s overall education program, a fact borne out by the positive reactions found in the Beneficiary Survey (see Annex 5); (2) the PDOs were achieved to some extent; (3) project efficiency was modest -- due to two factors: (i) the improvements in internal efficiency of the system could not be wholly attributed to the project, while (ii) implementation, that was slow to begin, surged in the last year of the project. Project Achievement Efficiency Overall Rating Relevance of PDO Substantial Moderately Modest Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 3.5. Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 73. Satisfactory progress towards gender equity was seen in the Northern areas (the education priority areas) under the project through: (i) the sensitization of parent-teacher associations regarding girls’ attendance in school. The sensitization program was successfully implemented. The social development element was fully achieved. Parents have become more actively involved in the school management process in the project regions. A good proxy for measuring gender equity is access to latrines. The design of the restructured project, however, had not included the construction of latrines and wells. Therefore, these sub-activities were included in the school rehabilitation component about 6 months prior to project closing. However, by the end of project implementation, although the contract for the latrines had been signed, the Works was not completed by the executing agency. A fraction of the envisaged 37 wells had been completed by that time. As a result, the gender impact of the project cannot be fully measured. (b) Institutional Change / Strengthening 74. Institutional strengthening was only modestly achieved. As seen in section 2.3, an important intended outcome of this project was capacity-building, the objective being to 25 create a more streamlined education sector administration better able to manage its mandate through more efficient procedures and a more effective agenda. While this was a crucial objective at the heart of the project, it is not clear to what extent it was successful. One important point to underline is that this project did help to bring four newly-formed Ministries of Education together to work in a Sector Wide Approach. For instance, the activity of constructing the simulation model, like other activities in the project, seems to have had a net positive effect as it brought many governmental players together on a regular basis and so helped them coordinate their approaches. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 75. Combined with the positive impacts of the EFA-FTI project that resulted in financing contract teachers, the schools rehabilitation and the supply of school desks and chairs undertaken through the EDCB project is beginning to have some positive impact. School directors and teachers are reporting that classrooms are less crowded, students are attending schools more regularly, and that the overall schooling environment has improved. 3.6. Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Please refer to Annex 5. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 76. The greatest risk to development outcome has been internal, related to the suitability of the operation’s design to its operating environment. This operational context, characterized by imperfect Ministerial coordination and fluctuating project management by the implementing agency, has not been one in which the project could easily succeed. In the last eighteen months of the project, this environment began to improve through various initiatives, most notably through better governance offered by the selection of the Ministry of Economy, Planning, and Territorial Activities (MINEPAT) to help lead sector strategy. This will most likely have some impact on the operation’s development outcomes materializing, and so the risk to development objectives is rated as moderate. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 77. As this project was significantly restructured, both in terms of PDO and components, Bank and Borrower performance will be assessed in the project’s initial and restructured phases with each period being weighted following the calculations in Appendix B of the ICR guidelines. As 36% and approximately 51% were disbursed before 26 and after restructuring, respectively, the initial period will receive a weight of 3 while the restructured period a weight of 4.29 5.1. Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 78. While it is more usual in an ICR to assess just the Quality at Entry at project inception, in this project it will be valuable to evaluate the Quality of Entry at restructuring as well because of the scope of that restructuring. The rating is calculated in the following way: as we will see, the Quality of Entry of the original project is determined to be Moderately Unsatisfactory (with weight of 3), while the Quality of Entry of the Revised Project is Moderately Unsatisfactory (with weight of 4), which together combines to give a final Quality of Entry rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory. 79. Original Project. As examined in detail in section 2.1., the Bank ensured quality at entry in the original project in the following four ways: Soundness of background analysis. The background analysis supporting the project was generally good, lessons learned were incorporated into the project, and the rationale for Bank intervention was sound. Assessment of project design: it could be said that the project design was and was not relevant in the following senses: while it was aligned with World Bank country and Government of Cameroon (GoC) strategy, it was not perfectly designed given the project context: it is true that in the original project, the choice of the four project components seemed logical. However, the design could not easily anticipate what the effect of the newly divided Ministries would be. With hindsight, the project now appears to have been ambitious: it was complex, calling on many actors to work in coordination on many activities carried out in a short implementation period of, initially, three years. Adequacy of government commitment. The Government worked closely with donors to prepare the project, demonstrating evident commitment in doing so. Assessment of risks. Three risks were identified in the PAD (see section 2.1). Although none were rated as substantial, two have proved to have been detrimental to the project (i) the political risk of poor government coordination (arising from the Ministerial restructuring) was meant to be mitigated by holding dedicated workshops; and (ii) the risk of weak implementation capacity and shortcomings in 29 The ratio of 36 to 51 being roughly 3 to 4 (36 to 48). 27 financial management was to be mitigated by ensuring that the PCU staff and the implementation manuals were in place before the start of implementation. 80. For these reasons, the rating for Quality of Entry of the Original Project is Moderately Unsatisfactory. 81. Revised Project. The Bank, proactive in urging the Government of Cameroon to restructure the project,30 ensured quality at entry of the restructuring in the following four ways: Soundness of background analysis. The restructuring paper reveals that (i) some background analysis was undertaken to support the restructuring, (ii) lessons learned from the original project implementation were presented, which were to be incorporated into the new project design, and (iii) the rationale for Bank intervention continued to seem sound. Despite this, the greater question is why the project was restructured at all, given that implementation of the original project had proceeded so slowly. Why not close it? It took a long time to restructure the project because the Bank procurement and financial management staff expressed a number of concerns that required clearance from their managers before the project team could move to the next step. There were in addition some compelling reasons that resulted in the restructuring, not closing, of the project: (i) this was the only project the World Bank had in the basic education sector and the new design was intended to strengthen relationships with the different education Ministries; (ii) the government was putting into place an education council headed by the Ministry of Planning that was supposed to work on education strategy and planning (a key part of the project); and (iii) it was up to the Government to decide to restructure or to close. Given that the Ministries concerned all had stakes in the project, both material and political, there would have been considerable difficulty for the Bank project team to convince them to in fact close. Assessment of project design: it could be said that the project design continued to be more or less relevant in the following senses: (i) while it continued to be aligned with World Bank country and Government of Cameroon (GoC) strategy, it was not perfectly redesigned given the new and emerging project context; (ii) the new design attempted to streamline the project, but it did not fully succeed in overcoming what were by then known difficulties, most notably the weak functional capacity of the Borrower; and (iii) it is also unclear why the restructured project did not take into account the procurement advances initiated through the Investment Lending reforms. 30 As early as 12/20/2007, this was brought up (in ISR #6). 28 Adequacy of government commitment. Each Ministry worked to retain its original share of the project, but the Ministries did not re-engage together on this project in a unified and coherent manner; their commitment had in effect become diffused among the Ministries. There were no incentives for inter-ministerial cooperation. Assessment of risks. No new risks were identified in the restructuring paper, as most of the risks had already been identified in the original PAD. Nevertheless, in hindsight the restructured project would have benefited from a re-articulated focus on risks and related mitigation framework given the new context of the restructuring and new measures introduced to help mitigate these. Nevertheless, and in spite of these issues, project implementation was managed successfully, resulting in the disbursement of a significant amount in the final stages of the project. For these reasons, the rating for Quality of Entry of the Revised Project is Moderately Unsatisfactory. (b) Quality of Supervision 82. The Quality of Supervision is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, which is calculated by combining the quality of supervision of the original project (Moderately Unsatisfactory) with the quality of supervision of the revised project (Moderately Unsatisfactory) and attributing to each the appropriate weights (of 3 and 4 respectively). 83. Original Project. In the Implementation Status and Results (ISR) reports covering the original project, comments about project supervision are of two sorts: (i) those that commend the Bank team for having addressed the various minor challenges to the project that cropped up; and (ii) those that encourage the Bank team to place particular emphasis on the supervision of certain aspects of the project. These latter comments, from Bank Management, are repeated occasionally (in four out of nine ISRs), but this is not to say that supervision was found wanting. The Bank proactively identified and resolved difficulties related to the achievement of the project development outcomes, as both the ISRs and the aide-memoires clearly demonstrate. Comments in these reports about poor project progress do not typically implicate project supervision as a single cause, but rather cite other factors to do with administrative procedures, the implementing agency or government. Seen within this logic, supervision was acceptable. 84. And yet, there could have been greater awareness and execution of collective responsibilities among the actors (the government, project implementing agency, the task team and Bank management). A set of factors can be cited for weak project performance in the absence of the right conditions for a successful operation. Supervision held a central place in this. So, for instance, there had been limited efforts up to 18 months prior to project closing to use the procurement plan as the principal tool to manage the number of project activities and, indeed, it is unclear if the procurement plans were systematically reviewed and approved. Further, project implementation delays were due in part to the 29 significant lag time in the provision of non-objections by the Bank for the myriad activities of the project. At any given time there might have been no less than 20 ongoing activities, both big and small, in various procurement stages. These needed to be reviewed and re- reviewed by procurement staff. In addition, there was high task team leadership turnover -- five in seven years – which did not lend itself to finding the best approach to supervising the project. 85. Revised Project. After the slow disbursement rate following restructuring, during the final 18 months of the project implementation period there was recognition of the need to: (i) revise the procurement plan to retain only those activities relevant to address component objectives and action was taken to implement the activities; and (ii) supervise the project extremely closely in order to ensure greater project execution. It was understood that keeping track of all the procurement activities alone required dedicated staff. Commendably, the task team expended significant energy to devise innovative approaches and to enter into time-sharing agreements with the other Bank project TTLs who had hired the education project secretariat FM Specialist and the Project Accountant. What was found to expedite project execution at the end of the project -- the proactive daily management of the project through active and proactive support from full-time Bank staff members, and an in-country operations officer -- augmented the cost of supervision. However, this was a trade-off that the final Bank teams had to make, given the circumstances. (The amount the World Bank allocated to project supervision in the last year bears testimony to this. See Annex 3, the economic and financial analysis). (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 86. The rating for Overall Bank Performance is therefore Moderately Unsatisfactory, which is calculated by combining the rating for Quality at Entry of Moderately Unsatisfactory with the rating for Quality of Supervision of Moderately Unsatisfactory. 5.2. Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 87. The rating is given for the following reasons. Aside from the back-loading of disbursement before project close, a post-project evaluation of implementation suggests several plausible explanations for the slow rate of project disbursement. Chief among these are the leadership, commitment, and functional capacity of the government. 88. Before 2004, there were two Ministries of Education: the Ministry of Education (Ministère de l’éducation nationale) and the Ministry of Higher Education (MINESUP). In 2004, a Presidential decree split the former into three to become the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB), the Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC), and the 30 Ministry of Vocational Education and Training (MINEFOP); the MINESUP remained unaffected. 89. The EDCB project, which was designed to encompass the education sector in its entirety (all education sub-sectors), included transversal activities concerning two or more (or all four) of these Ministries. In such a case, the administrative procedure would call for three administrative levels in government to work together. In order of importance, these were (i) the Steering Committee, (ii) the Technical Steering Sub-committee, and (iii) the Subcomponent Management Unit. It also entailed the implementing agency, the Project Management Unit, which also added a fourth layer of bureaucracy to this. 90. For the project, leadership of the steering committee was given to the MINEDUB, as the project focused to a great extent on basic education. For other matters, a Ministry seen to be external to the four education Ministries, the Ministry of Economy, Planning, and Territorial Activities (MINEPAT) was chosen to lead the steering committee. So, for example, it is MINEPAT’s Secretary General who leads the technical steering committee on questions of sector strategy. This demonstrated the readiness to take action and a commendable problem-solving attitude on the part of the Government. 91. For each transversal activity in the EDCB project, one unique set of terms of reference had to be agreed upon by all Ministries concerned. The inter-ministerial coordination required (at the various implicated administrative levels) did not lend itself to celerity – just convening meetings where every central actor was present was time- consuming. If a complication of some kind arose, which was quite possible and quite common, this already onerous process could then involve even greater delays. In addition, inter-ministerial meetings were at first very infrequent, as little as once a year at the beginning of the EDCB project, though with much encouragement from the Bank, they became more regular. 92. The division of the sector between four Ministries did not favor the adherence to and implementation of strategic directions for education policies,31 and the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the administration was often unclear. There was little accountability. This partition led to another significant consequence: weak government 31 Another serious consequence was the direct impact this state of affairs had on the drive for reform itself. Consider the hypothetical causal chain, on which reform was based: the Government’s needs were expected to be translated into terms of reference meant to define an activity that would have an effect on a set of beneficiaries and in so doing produce the desired reform. However, given the project’s ineffective modus operandi, the relevance of each of these steps became adulterated. For instance, if the Ministries had to negotiate the terms of reference of each activity, there was already some loss of exactitude in those terms. If the beneficiaries had to be picked by consensus, they, too, may not have been exactly the right ones, and so on, to the point where the intended reform may not have been accomplished fully, but only partially and out of sync with the initial conception of the reform. This, it could be claimed, occurs in all projects; but in this project, the desired impact was particularly out of line. In addition, the onerous character of the procurement process also led to a loss of greater vision because the project was lost in the details of the procurement procedure to a very significant extent and very often. 31 ownership of the project. The numerous project activities were perceived to be scattered across the Ministries and as little leadership was apparent -- even if some came from MINEDUB -- the project activities were not actively managed in each Ministry and so there was no clear alignment across Ministries. Put another way: had government commitment been greater, some way forward would have been found to drive all these activities forward in a concerted manner in all concerned departments. Procurement 93. As Annex 10 (An Analysis of Project Procurement Activities) reveals, procurement assumed a significant place in this project. Not only did it cause fundamental delays, but the procurement-centric nature of the project itself, since it caused almost all stakeholders to be lost in some detail or another to do with procurement, caused them to lose sight of the bigger picture – the impact the project was meant to have. In the original project phase, there were numerous procurement activities of varying values ranging from small to large procurement that were all being undertaken at the same time, such that each activity was at a different procurement stage. This was challenging for all parties to follow-up consistently and in a timely manner. In addition, the elapsed time for each procurement activity was inordinately long. The agreed procurement plan could have been used as an effective tool to streamline implementation, but it was not. Rather than being an education project, the project became a set of procurement-centered activities (see foot note 33 for consequences). In the revised project phase, if the restructuring was ineffective at first in terms of improving disbursement, in large part due to weaknesses in procurement having not been addressed at restructuring, the approach of the final two Bank project TTLs – to lessen the onerous character of procurement procedures and to refocus only on the essential in project activities – led to a surge in disbursement in the run up to project close. Other delays 94. Administrative delays also arose because of the technical weakness of evaluator’s chosen by Government, a fact which can only be explained by the prevalent political economy in force. Some technical activities required particular kinds of expertise (for instance post-basic or education sector CSR studies), and yet the government frequently committed directors of government units to be these evaluators instead of true specialists, which lead to incoherent or low quality evaluations, systematically rejected by the Bank TTLs with critical comments.32 95. By all accounts, the administrative procedures described here, combined with weak government ownership, and excessive procurement-centric activities slowed implementation significantly in the initial and restructured project. If this last point is 32 For instance, after a first poor evaluation for the CSR study, the World Bank had no choice but to insist on having an external evaluator from another development partner agency sit on the evaluation committee. The evaluation was thus reorganized. The PIA team received guidance, and a clear evaluation was eventually rendered to the Bank for Non-Objection. 32 underlined, it is to stress the fact that the nature of the project design itself (suggested by the World Bank) contributed much to the delays on the part of the Borrower. 96. The successive Bank teams’ attempts to reduce the numbers of small value and largely tangential activities to the PDO demonstrate this. These attempts were, however, met with resistance from the Borrower. This was particularly the case for the capacity- development activities because these included per-diems, which were seen as supplemental income, an incentive of no small measure, for undertaking project implementation. Indeed, they largely served as a reason to multiply the number of capacity building activities (there were 114 in all). Consequently, the Project Secretariat made significant efforts to include small-value procurement that went around formal Bank non objection requirements for this reason. The TTLs were inundated with requests for non-objections; in addition, improving disbursements was not in the overall interest of the project secretariat that had assured counterpart financing. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 97. In the original phase of the project, this agency’s commitment to achieving development objectives seemed to depend too heavily on the staffing challenges it was facing. As noted previously, the first two coordinators were replaced due in essence to non-performance. In addition, there were persistent fiduciary difficulties: supervision missions 33 indicated that the project unit should have been more diligent in terms of reporting, record-keeping and following procurement and financial management practices acceptable to the Bank. Indeed, it was recommended that a financial or a procurement specialist be hired. Another reason for delays was also given; there was a lack of communication and coordination between the agency and the various departments in the Ministries of Education. 98. At restructuring, the PCU significantly strengthened its implementation capacity by (i) streamlining the coordination structures to improve the coordination between Ministries and the PCU, (ii) hiring additional qualified personnel, in the areas of financial management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation and putting in place better tracking systems for procurement and financial reporting; and (iii) adopting new procedures to simplify the implementation of training activities (which represent a significant share of the project activities). However, despite these measures, disbursement remained extremely feeble. Of course, the government, project coordination team, the task team and Bank management all share a responsibility to ensure that the right conditions are brought together for a successful operation. Nevertheless, an assessment of this agency’s commitment to achieving the PDOs remains guarded. It was only when project execution 33 See ISR #7 & #9. 33 was closely monitored by the last two project teams towards the last year of the project that disbursement rose significantly at the end of the project. 99. Finally, a lack of transparency within the Project Implementing Agency was noted by its own members, a fact which also contributed to its relative inefficiency. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 100. As discussed in greater detail in earlier sections of this report, borrower performance was affected by issues to do with commitment, management, administrative procedures, procurement and disbursement, and M&E. In the PCU, these included questions to do with commitment and project management. However, that said, the multifaceted character of the project design itself contributed to the challenges faced by the Borrower, a design that compromised their effectiveness to some extent. 6. Lessons Learned 101. A systematic assessment of the political economy environment for project development and implementation is a sine qua non in countries where political decisions are likely to lead to the creation of multiple Ministries of Education resulting in weakening government commitment to full engagement with project implementation. The preparation of a risks and mitigation framework to accompany the political economy assessment is also important. 102. The rationale, timing, and the imperative to restructure rather than close a project need to be more closely examined. Criteria could be put in place for this. The World Bank should have reacted more forcefully, to the challenges encountered at project onset caused by Ministerial fragmentation, by insisting that restructuring take place rapidly. 103. The World Bank must find ways to deal with the challenges of implementing projects in contexts where multiple Ministries are involved, like those that will be found in Sector Wide approaches. This project did not know how to respond to this institutional landscape. The design should be simplified when the administrative context is complex. 104. In the future, a Permanent Technical Unit equipped with a minimum amount of resources and appropriate human resources should be put in place in country for the implementation of similar projects. 105. Adhering to an agreed-upon procurement plan is indispensable for the success of the project. 34 106. More prominence must be placed on the supervision of projects by the Bank. TTLs should be commended for designing projects but also in equal measure for staying with a project and seeing that its implementation is successful. Further reflection on how this might be carried out is required. The Bank could establish an “Exemplary Supervision� Award like VPU Team Awards, for instance. 107. Institutional capacity-building requires a coherent plan with measurable indicators. It must be pedagogically relevant in terms of learning objectives, designed in comprehensive, cumulative sequences over the life of the project, be output and outcomes based, and must include a robust monitoring system. Best practices and lessons learned from other projects should be sought. 108. Lending Instruments in relation to Project Context. Undertaking pilot interventions prior to instituting full-fledged lending would be most cost efficient in environments with political economy challenges. Further, disbursement linked indicators (DLI) bolstered with specific investment lending (SIL) for technical assistance would likely be the most appropriate instruments. Finally, appropriate governance and anti-corruption measures to accompany the lending instruments would enable timely and efficient monitoring of fiduciary challenges. 109. Using the private sector to execute certain activities may make good sense for two reasons. First, they may be more efficient. For example, the CMAs (MOD) used for construction activities in this project demonstrated that they have greater regional reach and experience than government, and so can do things quickly and cost-effectively. A second more general lesson is that they may be much more cost-efficient from a transactional point of view, as well. If, as we have seen, transactions between the World Bank and Government (especially when this involves working with more than one Ministry) have been onerous from a procurement point of view, it makes sense to avoid these whenever feasible. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Borrower/implementing agencies 110. Towards January 2012 it had become apparent that project implementation was not progressing well. Decisions had to be taken to review the possibility of implementing the remaining activities within the very short time (8 months) prior to project closing in end- August 2012. The decision to include the construction of latrines and wells in the project was intended to serve a proxy for the outcome measure on improving gender equity. Extensive discussions had been held with the PCU to include or exclude them, timelines had been reviewed, and the feasibility within the remaining timeline for implementation 35 had been carefully assessed. It was on the basis of the assurances provided by the PCU and the executing agency that the activities were finally included in the project. Regretfully, the combination of delayed signing of contracts with decentralized agencies in the regions and more importantly, the onset of uncharacteristically inclement weather during the final month of project implementation that led to flooding in the project areas prevented the full implementation of the construction activities. Efforts were undertaken to accommodate the remaining activities as part of an ongoing World Bank sanitation project. 111. The Bank team's hesitation to provide non-objections during the final eight months of project implementation was directly related to: (i) the complexity of the project with myriad procurement activities, having to acquire a full understanding of the significant implementation problems that the project had suffered in the preceding six years; (ii) determining the best way forward to: (a) ensure that the remaining project financing could be disbursed fully based on a thorough assessment of what activities were feasible or not in the run up to the project closing date of August 31, 2012; and (b) ensure that sufficient due diligence was exercised in providing non-objections. The delays in granting non-objections were directly linked to these aspects. 112. Further, the request by the PCU to the Bank task team to make direct payments on the majority of the final activities forced the Bank team to exercise its due diligence responsibility towards making a sizeable payment. This included having to seek documentation, clarify complex spreadsheets with numbers that had significant errors in them, cross-checking information with the PCU and with executing agencies, and ensuring that a technical evaluation was undertaken for the school rehabilitation sub-activity. It was on the basis of the evaluation report that the direct payments were effected. The Bank task team's efforts were directed towards ensuring that the amount of ineligible expenditures was kept to a minimum. 36 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Initial Revised Allocated Disbursed Cate Category Allocation Allocation gory Description USD USD USD USD 1 Works 105,492 17,516 17,906.97 10,795.13 2 Goods & Vehicles 2,432,346 1,667,979 1,705,189.88 1,844,731.57 3 Consultants’ Services 4,242,289 3,204,130 3,275,609.86 3,274,720.24 4 Training, Workshops 4,766,736 3,430,906 3,507,445.33 3,438,553.19 5 Grants for Subprojects 0.00 0.00 Consultants’ Services 678,164 434,644 444,340.41 285,823.90 5A PART D Goods, Works 3,398,353 4,792,387 4,899,299.35 2,919,757.52 5B PART D 6 Operating Costs 1,900,365 1,261,574 1,289,718.17 1,320,139.95 7 Refund of PPF 678,164 678,164 693,292.50 456,793.03 8 Unallocated 33,155 93,605 95,692.85 0.00 DA-A Designated Account 0.00 1,371.04 DA-B Designated Account 0.00 300,243.91 Totals 18,235,063 15,580,904 15,928,495.33 13,852,929.49 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower Joint 4.00 0.00 0.00 International Development Joint 18.20 0.00 0.00 Association (IDA) 37 Annex 2. Outputs by Component (in detail) Annex 2a. Initial Project Result by Component Sub-component/ Principal Initial Target Date Progress Observations Result Activities of Situation Expected Indicators the Sub- (Year) Component Component 1 : Management Capacity Building 1.1 Technical No manual or Manuels and 2008 In progress Carried over to Strengthening assistance to guide exists guides 2010 the restructured monitoring and develop (2005) drafted project evaluation of manuals and administrative guides in services (increase place to satisfaction of manage and service users evaluate MINEDUB) service standards Training No training Manuals and 2008 In progress Carried over to programs for programs guides 2012 the restructured key (2005) available project personnel on from all the use of major manuals and officials at guides central, provincial and district frequent No internal key civil Throughout Test audits Followed up in internal audit is used servants have the project are piloted the restructured audits using (2005) been trained project rigorous in the use and methods, application of with the these manuals assistance of and guides private audit firms Awareness- No campaign Increased 2008 See survey building is used (2005) satisfaction results on campaigns expenses 1.2 Technical Organizationa Standards for Throughout The The training Capacity assistance to l decree of the the allocation project regulations was designed building for develop Ministry of of teachers to come into and conducted administrative methods and Education schools and play by HR staff (decrease of standards enacted in monitoring of managers the standard appropriate 2002 pupil-teacher deviation of the management ratios average number developed of teachers per school in the 38 provinces from Train 2005 Decentralized Throughout 715 officials Decentralizatio 1.0 to 0.5) concerned structures and the project in charge of n continues personnel processes of human teacher resource management management improved, have received Reduction in training on randomness reducing the in the arbitrariness allocation of of allocations teachers from 45% to 25% by the end of the project Develop Personnel Computerizat Throughout Management Appropriate appropriate management ion of staff the project structures software office guide (2005) management equipped at training technology at the central central and remains to be for central and regional regional put in place. and level levels decentralized levels of government. 1.3 Recruitment 2006 Establishmen 2008 Functional Improving the of a t of a data 2009 specifications performance of consultant collection developed the planning system in system at both each province national and Training of Limited Capacity 2008 Managers Deadline provincial levels planners in training in planning by 2011 trained in extended due (production of 10 information school maps competent planning and to the late annual provincial systems and exists (2006) technical school recruitment of stat brochures; databases personnel boards; a consultant production of 10 Managers provincial school trained in boards) information systems and databases Purchase of Technical Technical 2008 Central and appropriate structures not personnel 2011 regional technological equipped better structures equipment (2005) equipped equipped Purchase Operations Timely 2008 Statistical planning outsourced to publication of 2012 yearbooks software for individuals(20 statistical and analysis planning 05) reports to reports structures facilitate automatically planning generated 1.4 Hiring a Process Procedures 2008/2008 Grants Private Strengthening of consultant to uncodified manual distributed in Education Act private education support the (2005) developed, accordance of 2004 paves (public subsidies development validated and with the the way for the to private of a applied procedures provision of educational procedures manual various forms 39 institutions are manual of subsidies to transparent and the private based on sector mutually agreed Study tours 2005 Report on 2008 Activity not TTL decided criteria) to learn from Lessons carried out against it the Learned experiences of other countries Workshops Insufficient Participatory 2008 Increased Validated and consultation development frequency of documents consultations (2005) of the consultations after with the regulatory participatory private sector framework and consensual study Component 2 : Strengthening Educational Management National Repetition Reducing 2008/ The repetition Combined Develop new awareness rate of 25% repetition 2010 rate is 12% on effect of the procedures for campaign (2005) rates from average awareness assessment and targeting 25% to less campaign and review to reduce parents, than 15% application of the repetition students, new methods rate (the rate teachers and for assessment from 28% to other 15% or less stakeholders, to among prepare opinions Francophones for a change of and 17.4% to perception of 15% or less in repetition and English dropout speakers) Hiring a Evaluation Training of 2008 Capacity consultant to of sub- teachers and 2010 building of train teachers to systems inspectors actors improve relevant (2005) method of throughout methods in formative the chain of formative assessment educational assessment, and and management encourage the standardized - Completion use of tests as well of a study assessment as a as new tour to teaching tool for testing Canada the improvement instruments - of learning and Developmen Establishment not a selection t of new of an item tool procedures bank for for review exams and evaluation 40 2.2 technical 2005 all 2008 Programs in Due to the non- Implement new assistance to institutions 2009 this signing of texts structures and develop both English observation devoted to the pathways for programs and and French, sub-cycle are restructuring of secondary training will run the validated; cycles, education (the workshops for new programs programs are legal text on the teachers structure developed not introduced restructuring of and Sec. School introduce adopted in year new 1, the new programs programs are in consensus- 2005 secondary 2008 Communicati place in all seeking education in on plan schools of by consultations at Cameroon developed year 4 the national must include level, awareness two cycles campaign at of five plus national level to the first achieve including a consensus two year observation sub cycle and an orientation cycle of three years of general or technical education 2.3 Hiring a No Survey 2008 Investigative Improving the consultant to consultant conducted 2011 Report of the health of support the (2005) on the INS; primary school health survey, current state map and pupils and the development of health in school health secondary of the card and schools and policy school (school the school health on existing developed, health strategy is policy national validated and in place) strategies disseminated for health education, adoption and implementat ion of school health policy in primary and secondary education. Enrichment 2005 Workshop 2008 Numerous workshops, reports 2011 consultations dissemination were held at 41 and validation regional level The 2005 Map of 2008 Documents development and school health 2012 are duplicated dissemination of and school and diffused educational health policy materials duplicated relevant and disseminated Component 3: Support girls’ education and reduce the lack of gender equity in the ZEP (Priority Areas of Education) 3.1 Advocacy No No 2008/2012 Report on Increase the campaigns and campaign campaigns problems in demand for advocacy for conducted carried out enrollment primary parents and the (2005) carried out by education and wider a consultant promote gender community equity in Micro-projects 2005 A number of 2008/2012 Nothing done Carried out in Adamawa, Far that help micro- the restructured North and North communities to projects project (gross build latrines undertaken enrollment in and wells and CIP is to acquire increase from instructional 84.4% to 100%, materials, the repetition teacher guides, rate in the CIP offices and desks are reduced to and blackboards 15% and the Training to build 2005 Number of 2008/2012 Nothing Carried out in gender parity capacity for capacity accomplished the restructured index of 0.58 to planning and building project 0.90) management of sessions key members of conducted school boards. Component 4: Strengthen the capacity of higher education institutions 4.1 Technical 2005 Implementati 2008 Nothing The decree was The set up a assistance and on through accomplished not signed special fund to workshops systematic support research funding and university professionalizati research ; on (FARP) Developing local capacity to undertake high quality research ; Increase collaboration with the private sector in conducting research and 42 training 4.2 Developing First stages Support 2008/2011 Feasibility Operationalizati business plans of ICT capacity study on of the and marketing (2005) building for available Interuniversity CITI improving the Procedures Centre for Strategic plans management manual Information for ICT and use of developed Technology development in ICT in CITI staff (CITI) each university national trained and - Consultations universities Universities with stakeholders and dissemination activities Technical 2005 Conducting a 2008/2011 - Study tour assistance, study trip to Morocco workshops and Participatory Consultant- study tours development mission report of media with available the support of Consultant recruited 4.3 Technical 2005 Improve 2008/2011 -Feasibility Capacity assistance to access to study strengthening of analyze the legal documentatio available the Inter- status of the n and sources -Procedures University HRTC and of knowledge Manual Centre for develop its developed Research and business plan -Staff trained Documentation HRTC and (HRTC) Universities -Study Tour in Morocco Consultant- mission report available 4.4 Costs associated 2005 Site 2008/2012 100% Develop a with site developed developed Global development Development work GDLN Learning Cost of 2005 Equipment 2008/2012 100% Network - equipment purchased, developed GDLN installed and tested, and found functional Operation during 2005 Recruited 2008/2012 100% carried the first three staff, out over 2 years of the operating years Centre expenses provided 43 Annex 2b. Revised Project Result by Component Sub-component/ Principal Initial Target Date Progress Observations Result Indicators Activities of the Situation Expected Sub-Component (Year) Component 1: Development of a strategic vision of the education system. 1.1 CSR (Status (June Diagnosis backed (Sept 2012) Activity Implementation Development of Report of a 2010) by the DSCE underway envisaged by studies and National outside of the World Bank reflections Educational the project (regular studies to System) support the Analysis of (June Analysis validated (Sept 2012) Not realized development of technical and 2010) within the the education vocational project sector) training, framework Impact of the (June Production of (Sept 2012) Reports recruitment of 2010) reports and final available Inspectors on the diagnosis quality of primary education Report of the (June Periodically (Sept 2012) Reports annual review of 2010) updated reports available the sector strategy 1.2 Training of 25 (June Simulation models (Sept 2012) Training Development and officials in the 2010) have been updated conducted in application of implementation 3 sessions of analytical tools SAS in the 5 days each (production plans development and of action priority updating of ESS simulation simulation models models, standards Updating the state June Provide a status (Sept 2012) Activity and budget of the national 2012 report of the underway processes) education system education system outside of (CSR) updated project Assessment of June Have at hand (Sept 2012) Activity Student 2012 evaluation reports carried out Achievement of students' by the knowledge Cooperation française Analysis of the June Creation of a (Sept 2012) Not realized labor market 2012 labor market observatory Preparation of the June Have standards (Sept 2012) Activity budget on the 2012 and processes for canceled basis of statistics preparing budgets for each sector level based on statistics 1.3 -Acquisition, June The Centre for (Sept 2012) Centre is Implementation of installation and 2012 Distance 100% tools for the test of Education (CFD / functional education sector videoconferencing GDLN) is 44 (production tools equipment functional to facilitate -Site Facilities exchanges and -completion of a participation in feasibility study international -development of a dialogue on manual of education) procedures for managing -training of staff -Acquisition, (June CITI becomes (Sept 2012) Activity is installation and 2010) operational 100% test of complete videoconferencing equipment -Site Facilities -completion of a feasibility study -development of a manual of procedures for managing -training of staff Completion of a (June CITI is operational (Sept 2012) Activity is feasibility study 2010) 100% Development of a complete manual of procedures for managing Training of staff Component 2: Strengthening of the information system and in planning capacity 2.1 Recruitment of a (June Report 2011 End of Conducting Consultant 2010) 2011 mission studies of report information available system at all Realization of a Dec. Diagnostic report March Diagnostic levels diagnostic master 2010 of the existing 2011 report plan of system Jan. 2012 produced MINESEC’s information system Proposal for Jan. 2011 Master Plan of March Master Plan Master plan of MINESEC’s 2012 available MINESEC’s information August information system 2012 system Validation of 2010 Diagnosis and Throughout Completed various documents proposed process Masterplan 2.2 Staff training in (June The timely (Sept 2012) -Training Improving the techniques and 2010) publication of conducted at performance of methods of yearbooks and 100% the planning planning analysis reports for -More system primary, secondary regular 45 (Publication and tertiary publication timely statistical of yearbooks and yearbooks analytical reports and analysis for primary, reports secondary and Purchase of IT (June Planning structures (Sept 2012) Activity higher education; equipment and 2010) well equipped with completed Development of software for hardware and dashboards based planning software on data and structures analysis of EMIS) Technical (June Recruited (Sept 2012) Activity assistance to carry 2010) consultant who completed out studies produced a report at the end of mission Feedback (June Completion of (Sept 2012) Activity workshops and 2010) workshop, reports, completed training carried validation tools out and training beneficiaries 2.3 Technical (June Map of school (Sept 2012) Activity Improving the assistance for 2010) health in primary completed health of primary studies and and secondary school pupils and surveys performed on the secondary school basis of survey (school health results card issued to Feedback (June School health (Sept 2012) Activity primary and workshops, 2010) policy document completed secondary dissemination and validated by Policy document sharing MINEDUB and approved by the MINESEC. school health ministries) Component 3: Strengthening internal controls 3.1 Technical assistance to (June Manuals and (Sept 2012) Activity Dissemination Capacity building develop manuals and 2010) guides appropriate completed of audit reports (IGS prepared guides appropriate for audit produced to the public audit reports and Tracking the monitoring the implementation of implementation of recommendations recommendations; Training of key (June Capacity of (Sept 2012) Activity Regulatory audit reports personnel in the use of 2010) managers and completed texts are disseminated to audit manuals and executives of the submitted to the the general public) guides and Inspection service Heads of organization and reinforced departments methods Feedback workshops (June Validation of (Sept 2012) Activity 2010) documents completed 46 3.2 Feedback workshops (June The development (Sept 2012) Activity The training The and training on a 2010) of standards for completed was conducted rationalization of variety of topics. the assignment of by officials human resources teachers in schools from the management of ministries in MINEDUB and charge of MINESEC Human (tracking pupil- Resource teacher ratios). management Appropriate (June Improving the (Sept 2012) Activity equipment for central 2010) performance of completed and decentralized structures levels of government 3.3 Technical assistance (June The validation of a (Sept 2012) Activity Rationalization of for the development of 2010) manual of completed the management management procedures of state support to procedures and Allocation of private education manuals as state grants in (Grants allocated support to the private accordance with to private schools sector of education procedures manual in accordance with Workshops and (Juin Documents (Sept 2012) Activity the criteria consultations 2010 produced with a completed specified in the restitution participatory Manual of approach Procedures) Component 4: Strengthening public participation in support and monitoring of educational reforms 4.1 Conducting an (June in Reverse or at least (Sept 2012) Activity Recruitment Strengthening awareness and 2010) reduce the completed public mobilization campaign tendency of participation in the for those contractual absenteeism IC support and Teachers currently through the monitoring of working recruitment of a educational consultant and reforms (Number facilitator of advocacy contracts with the campaigns and media to produce a mobilization guide for teachers performed) and public posters 4.2 Advocacy and (June Number of (Sept 2012) Capacity building mobilization for 2010) advocacy and and participation parents and mobilization of beneficiary communities in campaigns for communities in general, (ii) training to parents and the priority education build capacity for community in zones (Number of planning and general on new school projects management of key policies and assembled and school board regulations of the made by school members, (iii) the educational system committees in a implementation of (ii) the number of participatory micro projects that school projects approach ZEP) help communities to mounted by ZEP rehabilitate and equip school committees 47 classrooms. in a participatory approach 48 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. The project design, consisting of four main components in both its initial and re-structured forms, does not lend itself to cost-benefit analysis. This is because, in the initial project design, while cost estimates for each component were allocated, the relatively timid disbursement levels and, correspondingly, the weak results in terms of achievement of PDOs, do not allow a systematic evaluation of costs against benefits of each of these components. In addition, in the restructured project design, the components are essentially qualitative in nature and so difficult to quantify. Despite this, some of the components can nevertheless be evaluated for their efficiency, as we will see below. Initial Project Design Component 1 – reinforcing the administrative capacity and improving the governance of the education system. 2. At project outset, this component aimed to reduce randomness of teacher allocation in primary schools from 45 per cent to 25 per cent. Because teacher salaries represent 66 per cent of total expenditure in primary education, achieving this objective would represent significant economic benefits. Reducing the degree of randomness in the distribution of teachers would not only generate significant savings in terms of resources, it would also engender improvements in educational outcomes. Indeed, given that the degree of randomness in allocation in Cameroon is one of the highest of all Sub-Saharan African countries, it represents a major distorting factor in budget allocation.34 However, just prior to restructuring of the project, the actual value achieved (as of 03/09/2009) represented an improvement of only 3 percentage points in this ratio. Restructured Project Components 1 & 3 3. The project targeted to improve the internal efficiency of the primary and secondary education systems. At project outset, the PAD estimated an internal efficiency of 0.71 at the primary level, indicating a waste of education sector resources of close to 30 per cent.35 At the close of the project, the internal efficiency stood at 0.798, indicating close to a 10 per cent improvement in resource utilization, which represents significant savings. The benefits reaped from a more efficient utilization of resources are likely to be significant both in cost terms and educational outcomes. However, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the project contributed to these latter outcomes. 34 PAD, pp. 5. 35 PAD, pp. 60. 49 4. In its restructured format, continuous capacity building was a major objective of the project as evidenced through the establishment of the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) and the Inter-University Resource Documentation centers to enhance education sector capacity through international knowledge sharing. While this upfront expenditure represents significant investment at the outset (sunk cost), benefits are likely to accrue in the medium- to long-term in terms of enhanced capacity in the education sector in the future. Workshops and Seminars 5. Also as part of the capacity strengthening component of the project, workshops and seminars were organized, incurring a total cost of FCFA 1,239,475,825 (US$ 263, 158.00)36 over the course of the project cycle. A total of 114 training events and workshops were organized, bringing the approximate average unit cost for such workshops to FCFA 10,872,594.96 (US$ 23,041.50).37 6. The benefits for such workshops are difficult to assess empirically -- especially without good M&E to assess to what extent participants have learned skills that were meant to be acquired. With or without this, it should also be noted that capacity is likely to take a long time to build and costly to assess over a long period. The involvement of administration in terms of decision making capacity as well as planning for the sector could serve as subjective proxies for this purpose. For instance, staff from the Ministries could be assessed on the job to evaluate whether they were able to better execute program budgeting as a result over the course of the project. Restructured Project Component 4 -School Rehabilitation costs 7. The cost of school construction in Cameroon is expensive -- the highest in fact in comparison to costs in other Sub-Saharan African countries – to the point where it becomes a binding constraint. According to government estimates, the cost of constructing a classroom in the North-West and Adamaoua provinces 38 runs around US$ 16,000.00 whereas the average unit cost in neighboring West African countries (Chad, Togo, Mali, and Niger) is around US$ 10,250.00. As a result, the project opted for the alternative of rehabilitating some 405 schools in 57 different sites in Priority Education Areas (ZEP, Zones d’education prioritaires), which include the provinces of the North, Far North, East, and Adamawa as well as the slums around Yaoundé and Douala. 36 Exchange rate used: 471.87 FCFA (average for 2008-2012); source: WDI. 37 Ibid. 38 Unit costs vary according to provinces in Cameroon. 50 8. The approximate unit cost of school rehabilitation under this project of FCFA 2,400,000 (approximately US$ 5,086.00) 39 is similar to average unit costs of FCFA 2,500,000 (US$ 5,298) - 2,800,000 (US$ 5,934) for classroom rehabilitations carried out by the EU in the extreme north and north western provinces of Cameroon respectively.40 It should, however, be noted that the comparison is probably imperfect due to lack of comparable data on unit costs from the Bank and other partners – as well as differing standards for construction/rehabilitation. Benefits from school rehabilitation are likely to accrue from higher quality of learning environment as well as lower maintenance cost in the future. Project implementation/supervision Costs 9. Project implementation and supervision cost the bank a total of US$ 1,189,128.01 in BB expenditures and complementary trust fund expenditures of US$ 432,555.48, for a total of US$ 1,612,683.49. This corresponds to 205.27 staff weeks, US$ 612,119.71 in travel costs, and an additional US$ 254,438.85 in variable costs. Fixed Cost Variable Cost ($) Fiscal Year Staff Weeks Labor ($) Travel Other Total ($) Fiscal Years 2005 - 2012 174.41 618,918.38 288,308.39 78,605.87 985,832.64 Fiscal Year 2013* 9.86 39,602.51 100,483.45 63,209.41 203,295.37 Total BB 184.27 658,520.89 388,791.84 141,815.28 1,189,128.01 TOTAL for all TFs 30,058.68 1,277,462.31 765,478.32 385,103.96 2,271,335.11 Total for BB and TFs 205.27 746,124.93 612,119.71 254,438.85 1,612,683.49 * Note that FY13 costs are as of 01/26/2013 only. Source: RM databases 10. Disbursement levels prior to the restructuring of the project (i.e. in the first five years of the project) stood at 36 per cent and cost, in terms of supervision US$985,832.64. Two years post-restructuring of the project saw 16.2 per cent in disbursement and then 35 per cent during the four-month project grace period. This period cost US$203,295.37 in supervision costs. Financial Analysis 11. Public spending (current expenditures) on the education sector in Cameroon experienced strong growth from FCFA 178.9 billion (2011-prices) in 2000 to FCFA 348.2 billion (2011-prices) in 2011, which corresponds to 95per cent increase (a near doubling) in 39 Exchange rate used: 471.87 FCFA (average for 2008-2012); source: WDI. 40 Data from Government. 51 budgetary allocation. Furthermore, per capita current expenditures on the population group of 6-16 year olds has increased from FCFA 47.105 (2011-prices) to FCFA 65.537 (2011- prices).41 So, in aggregate terms, public spending on education has kept an upward trend over the project period. 12. Whereas resource allocation to the education sector in the year 2011 accounted for close to 2.7 per cent of GDP (2011-prices), it made up 16.3 per cent of government expenditure (2011-prices) in the same year. This compares with a resource allocation in the year 2000 of 2.7per cent of GDP (2011-prices) and a 22.9 per cent share of total government expenditure (2011- prices) in the same year.42 Table 2: Government Expenditure on Education   2000 2007 2009 2011  Billions FCFA (2011 prices)  178.9 311.3 344.7 348.2  per cent of total Govt. expenditure  20.8 per  16.3 per  22.9per cent  20 per cent  cent  cent   per cent of GDP    2.7per  2.7per cent  3.1per cent  3.3per cent  cent*    *GDP value is an estimation for the year 2011  Source: RESEN 2012 13. The decline in percentage terms should however be viewed in the context of the overall budgetary repositioning which could occur following the debt relief that Cameroon received under the HIPC initiative. Total expenditure for the education sector has increased from FCFA 75 billion in 1995 to FCFA 383 billion in 2011 – a three-fold increase in constant terms. Prior to debt relief, almost fifty percent of the government’s budget was used to service debt. 41 RESEN, pp. 15-16. 42 Sourced from forthcoming RESEN, ch. 1 52 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Lending Mourad Ezzine Lead Education Economist, TTL AFTH3 Gilles Marie Veuillot Counsel LEGAF Wolfgang M.T. Chadab Finance Officer LOAG2 Shola Aboderin Senior Education Specialist WBIHD David Tchuinou Senior Economist AFTP3 Myrina McCullough Operations Analyst AFTH3 Guro Nesbakken Consultant Education Specialist -- Henri A. Aka Procurement Specialist AFTPC Kouami Hounsinou Messan Procurement Analyst AFTPC Mwangi Wachira Senior Economist Agriculture WBIGD Marc Jean Yves Lixi Operations Officer AFTKL Richard Akoulouze Consultant Education Specialist -- Knut Vralstadt Consultant Economist -- Leif Jensen Lead Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Emile Louis Rene Finateu Senior Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Fridolin Ondobo Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt Environmental Specialist AFTS2 Mohamed Arbi Ben-Achour Senior Social Scientist AFTS1 Astania Kamau Language Program Assistant AFTH3 Lydie Yangouot Language Program Assistant AFMCM Anne Anglio Senior Program Assistant AFTH3 Supervision TTLs 1.Mourad Ezzine Lead Education Economist AFTH3 2.Jaap Bregman Lead Education Specialist AFTH3 3.Michel Welmond Lead Education Specialist AFTED 4.Fadila Caillaud Education Economist AFTED 5.Shobhana Sosale Senior Operations Officer AFTEW Norosoa Andrianaivo Language Program Assistant AFTEW Anne Anglio Operations Analyst CTRTF Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Prema Clarke Senior Education Specialist HDGPE Nestor Coffi Country Manager AFMNE Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt Consultant AFTTR 53 Laurence Hougue Bouguen Program Assistant AFCC1 Sekou Keita Consultant AFTME Josiane M. S. Luchmun Program Assistant AFTSW Myrina D. McCullough Consultant MNSED Kouami Hounsinou Messan Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Helene Simonne Ndjebet Yaka Operations Analyst AFCC1 Louis Steven Obeegadoo E T Consultant AFTH1 - HIS Fridolin Ondobo Financial Management Specialis AFTME Dung Kim Pham Associate Investment Officer CF1S4 Anselm Schneider Human Development Specialist AFTH3 - HIS Natalie Tchoumba Bitnga Team Assistant AFCC1 Mercy Miyang Tembon Country Manager AFMBF Gilles Marie Veuillot Consultant AFTTR Lydie Yangouot Language Program Assistant AFMCM - HIS (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including travel No. of staff weeks and consultant costs) Lending FY02 108.31 FY03 67.32 FY04 252.25 FY05 158.44 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00 Total: 586.32 Supervision/ICR FY02 0.00 FY03 0.00 FY04 0.00 FY05 1.63 FY06 132.38 FY07 144.01 FY08 175.05 FY09 128.76 FY10 112.55 FY11 145.32 FY12 146.14 FY13 203.30 Total 1,179.14 54 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results 1. Introduction. The objective of the survey was to collect the views of beneficiaries of the Education Development Capacity Building (EDCB) project in order to gauge its impact on them. Specifically, this evaluation sought to: (i) test the awareness of communities regarding the project; (ii) collate their reactions to the various project components; and (iii) gauge the impact of it on them. As will be seen, the results are positive. 2. Beneficiaries. Several sets of beneficiaries were surveyed: as section 1.4 of the main ICR document reveals, there were different groups of beneficiaries in the original and the restructured project – and indeed some of the same groups in both. More particularly, the groups considered in this survey, chosen because they represented a solid cross section of the beneficiary population, are the following: 1. Administrators in Government having participated in capacity-building workshops; 2. Administrators of the Global Distance Learning Network (GDLN) and the Inter- University Information Technology Center (CITI, le Centre Inter-universitaire des Technologies d'Information); 3. Communities in the Priority Education Areas (the ZEP) having benefitted from sessions that were part of the project’s awareness campaigns in these areas. 3. Methodology. The survey involved a mixed methods approach. To reach a wider sample, generation of statistical data through closed-ended questions was favored, complemented by limited open-ended questions, some in-depth interviews, complemented as well by records kept of awareness campaigns sessions. The results are as follows. 1. Capacity-Building Workshops. A link to an online survey was sent to more than seventy government officials known to have recently participated in one of the 114 workshops given in the context of the capacity building component of the project. In addition, the same survey was given in hard copy form to a focus group that attended a dedicated survey session at the World Bank offices in Yaoundé. These two sets of responses were compiled and the results are given here.  All respondents had participated in one or more EDCB workshop and had, in equal measure, been left with either a good or quite good general impression. Most (more than seventy per cent) felt it had been acceptably organized, if not well organized. Almost all felt the objectives had been met, except two who felt that few objectives were met and one that not enough objectives had been met at all.  The presenter was found by all respondents to have been motivated and taken enough time to present the material acceptably (although two 55 respondents found that there had not been enough time). For some, more time for discussion was needed because the subject was new and rich.  The majority of respondents (more than 64 percent) felt the workshop was very useful, while the rest felt it had been ‘quite useful.’ No respondent felt that it had not been useful or not useful enough. Almost universally, respondents felt that they had retained much from the sessions (though one said s/he had retained only ‘a little’).  When asked how they used what they had learned, responses were almost unanimously positive (except for two discussed below). To give an idea of their tenor, these included for example: “the session was useful for my work as a teacher trainer�; ‘useful for my auditing work�; ‘very useful material that I use daily�; “I use what I learned in the administration I work in�; “useful information for whenever we work on World Bank projects.� The two discordant voices explained that they were disappointed because one found the material uninspiring and found that s/he returned to her/his usual ways of working after the workshop, while the other felt that whatever was gained was lost because only a little time after the workshop s/he was transferred.  In general, almost all respondents had found the workshops useful professionally and one even added, “I found it satisfying professionally and personally, for are not the two domains linked?�  Finally, when asked about the per-diem received for attending the workshop, forty percent felt it was sufficient, forty percent felt it was more or less sufficient, while twenty percent did not feel it was enough. 2. GDLN and CITI. The directors and staff of these institutions, who were beneficiaries of the project, also received links to online surveys. Their responses were compiled and the results are given here.  In general, the capacity strengthening workshops for staff were appreciated when they were well organized and the presenter was dynamic and motivated. In most cases the objectives were attained and the respondents had the impression that the workshops had been useful since the takeaways continued to be of relevance after the sessions. This was not always the case. One respondent commented that the workshop s/he attended was poorly organized and few of the intended objectives were met, even if she/he did retain certain lessons from the session and continued to draw upon them in the work she/he did today. This respondent felt that the workshop was of some use, nevertheless. 56  In a side note, one respondent added that he appreciated the workshops and looks forward to putting to use what he learned with the true beneficiaries of the GDLN – those who will use and profit from it -- when the decree legislating its opening comes into effect. 3. Education Priority Areas (ZEP). The objective of the EBCD component in the Education Priority Areas consisted of: (i) the rehabilitation and equipping of classrooms with benches; (ii) mobilizing and sensitizing the local communities (Children, Parents, School Communities); the reinforcement of capacity; and (iv) putting in place the Environmental and Social Management Plan. It is all these objectives that interest here, but most particularly the second and third.  Two methodologies were exploited to gain an understanding of the impact on beneficiaries of the project in the Education Priority Areas (the ZEP). Given the imposing geographical area involved, (1) direct interviews were carried out with the twelve program facilitators working in the Education Priority Areas via email and/or telephone 43 ; (2) a comparative review of the facilitators’ reports (written and submitted monthly) was undertaken. Their responses were compiled and the results are given here. Interviews with facilitators 4. On average four meetings were held per month per school with the educational community (parents, school representatives, and students) with the objective of maintaining good relations, to carry out awareness within the schools and communities of the project goals, and to mobilize the community around the project. 5. Facilitators report that the communities as a whole were informed of everything that was happening, that most activities were very well received in each area, and that good relations were created and maintained. The communities were satisfied with the activities, especially the rebuilding of classes. Indeed, many communities were enthusiastic and participated (as they had traditionally done in the past) by setting to work themselves to help. 6. Many facilitators note that the project was necessary and has had an important impact. For instance, in this academic year (2012/13), the number of female pupils registered in the various schools has greatly increased. In addition, they are enthusiastic 43 These EPAs are found in Adamaoua, the East, the North, and the Far North. 57 about going to school. The rehabilitated classrooms and new benches have had a great effect in this. 7. A few minor complaints were voiced: Delays occurred because rain made roads or river crossings impassable and so the community would have preferred building to have been done with this seasonal issue in mind. In a similar vein, another concern voiced by some communities was that they could not attend the meetings because they were busy with the imperatives of the manually-intensive agricultural cycle (planting or harvesting). One facilitator mentioned the poor effect on the community of the abrupt end at the project. 8. Fuller, more complete information offered to the beneficiaries regarding the project as a whole (start and end dates and so on) would have ensured a more comprehensive response from them. Review of Facilitators Reports 9. The reports, submitted monthly to the regional level throughout the project life cycle by all twelve facilitators (from approximately January until September 2012), included an account of activities undertaken in each of the four sub-components, as follows. 10. Supervision of rehabilitation. Each monthly report details the progress of construction and rehabilitation, etc., and points outs any current issues to be addressed. A common theme seen in the reports is that a respect for community authorities helps facilitate work on the ground. Always informing them, and the community, before any decision concerning them is taken is critical. 11. Awareness campaign and social mobilization. The approach Plan Cameroon uses is known as Child-Centered Community Development (CCCD). CCCD is Plan’s right- based approach, in which children, their families and the communities are active and are leading participants in their own development. That is, they are involved in the identification, planning, implementation and evaluation of programs and projects. In this sub component, progress reports outline how the objectives of local workshop were attained, whether participation was good or not. In general, communities have drawn up school management plans for the improvement of their respective schools. A lesson repeated in many reports is that, in order to obtain desired goals, awareness campaigns touching on all issues (of the four sub-components) are essential. In addition, sensitization should not concern a select few, but should try to reach as many stakeholders as possible. Secondly, helping the community to draw up a calendar to help them coordinate school development is another useful recommendation. 12. Capacity-strengthening. Meetings were organized to sensitize communities to the importance of educating girls, protecting school infrastructure, and improving the school social and environmental setting. In general, communities understood the importance of these issues: parents promised to enroll their daughters in school, pledged to work in school 58 community organizations (PTAs) to improve their respective schools, and understood the importance of paying PTA fees. One important lesson drawn from the reports is that these meetings should respect community time tables. 13. Social and Environmental. To improve the school setting, trees and flowers would be planted. Most schools have carried this out, although one or two reports mention that the teak trees chosen were not always best suited to some school climates. Nevertheless, the growing sentiment understood by all is that the protection of the environment is essential for good school management as it provides a healthy learning context and in turn enhances student well-being and ultimately performance in school. 59 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results 1. A Stakeholder Workshop was convened in Yaoundé, Cameroon (and linked to Washington by audio connection) on February 12, 2013 to review the draft Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) of the Education Development Capacity Building (EDCB) project which closed on September 1, 2012 with the goal of gathering information, discussing the experience, and deriving lessons learned. It was chaired by Simon Thacker, Education Specialist, MNSHD, who also presented the ICR, being its principal author. The workshop was attended by Mr. Apollonaire Tchameni, Director, and Mr. Anton Bieteke, FM coordinator of the Project Management Unit; Shobhana Sosale, TTL of the project, and Mr. Vincent Perrot, consultant, both of the World Bank Africa Region. Representatives from Government were unfortunately not available to participate in the workshop due to scheduling issues. The results of a beneficiary survey carried out just prior to this workshop were also mentioned, thus allowing other opinions – in government and in communities -- to be presented nevertheless. Presentation 2. Mr. Simon Thacker gave a general overview of ICRs, explaining how the project would be evaluated in terms of (a) the extent to which it had achieved its development objectives and produced the results specified in the program documentation; (b) other significant outcomes and impacts; (c) the prospects for its long-term sustainability; and (d) the performance of the Bank and the borrower, including compliance with applicable Bank policies. He also stressed how the ratings would be generated, following ICR guidelines, from the indicators established for the initial and restructured phases of the project and, to some extent, actual project disbursement levels. 3. Mr. Thacker first presented a graph of the level of disbursement over the life of the project, explaining how there had been 36% disbursement in the initial 5 year phase of the project followed by 16% disbursement in the restructured two year phase and 35% disbursement in the run up to project close and during the four month grace period. He then presented tables of Project Development Outcome indicators comparing baselines, goals, and actual achievements in the initial and restructured phases of the project, noting whether the targets had or had not been met and, where possible, why or why not. Finally, he summarized his main findings by presenting the strong and weak points of the Project and the roles of the World Bank, the Project Coordination Unit, and the Government. He explained how these informed his evaluation of the project in the ICR. Main Observations of the Workshop 4. The rating scale. Participants asked for explanations about the ICR rating scale. Mr. Thacker explained the scales out of 4 and out of 6 for, respectively, project relevance and efficiency, and for PDO achievement and Overall Project evaluation. He also explained how restructured projects, such as this, were weighted according to ICR guidelines. 60 5. Updating data. Mr. Bieteke commented that more up to date data were now available for certain indicators, thanks in large part to the recently available Country Status Report. So, for example, repetition rates in primary school, which were targeted to fall to 15% in the initial project, had only reached 20% in March 2009. Two points were made: (i) reform may take some time to take effect and so (ii) rates should also be given for the end of project in September 2012 at which time the rate stood at 12%, demonstrating that the initiative was in fact bearing fruit. In addition, two comments were made about the second and fourth indicators in the restructured project: that these could also be nuanced now with updated information. In response, the ICR author thanked the participant for these observations and explained that he would indeed update the data, where possible, to reflect these changes. 6. Strong and Weak Points. A table, compiled by Mr.Thacker, proposing the strengths and weaknesses of the project and/or the roles of the actors involved (the World Bank, the PCU, and Government) was presented to the workshop for comments. These are listed in the table directly below. Project World Bank PCU Government Strengths √ambitious √ provided a unified √ competent personnel √ found ways to √successful on the level of approach to the sector √ after a slow and difficult eventually advance communities, and in √ working with beginning and despite the project investment in government, the inadequate human resources at √ competent and infrastructure WB made a times, the PCU found ways to industrious personnel success of this make this project a success. project Weaknesses The project gave the X the WB proposed a X lack of transparency within the X lack of an adequate perception that it: design that was too unit institutional X was too complex complex X environment to work X included too many X too many TTLs with a complex components X appeared inflexible project X and so was a at times X poor leadership Christmas tree X weak capacity in project management, coordination, and the execution of the project There was general agreement with the table from most participants, though the following points were made during the ensuing discussion. 7. Strong points. The project was credited with bringing all actors in the sector together; it was an occasion that helped coordinate their efforts. Those working in government were not used to working in a sectorial manner, something that was exacerbated after the division of the Ministry of Education into three new Ministries as the project opened, but the project helped to formalize the new relationship that needed to exist between them. 61 8. Weak points. The mobility of personnel in government, the project coordination unit and the Bank was mentioned as a weak point. Legitimate or not, transfers of personnel away from the project caused delays in project execution. Turnover in government, in TTLs, in FM specialists assigned to the project was lamented. It is not clear how this can be resolved easily. 9. Comments on behalf of other parties. The question of the role of procurement in this project was raised on behalf of the Government. The project was overly dependent on procurement and indeed too much time and effort was spent on the procurement process, most notably in securing non-objections from the World Bank. The ICR author mentioned that this fact was commented on more than once in the ICR and that one lesson learned would be to try to limit reliance on this method of procurement in future development projects in Cameroon. 10. Evaluation of the project in terms of ICR ratings. Following the M.Thacker explained how he had attributed the rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory, in accordance with ICR guidelines, to the Bank and the Borrower and how the Overall Rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory had been calculated. 11. Conclusion. In concluding remarks, M.Tchameni expressed his hopes that after what he and others had added during the Stakeholders Workshop that the project might be rated ‘Moderately Satisfactory’ because, from where the project stood to where it stands today, this rating would reinforce the idea of the growing coordination between the WB, the PCU, and within Government, a point that needs to be encouraged in the new strategy. 12. Next Steps. M.Thacker explained that the next steps entailed an External Review of the ICR to be held on Feb 21, 2103, which would include the CMU, the Development Effectiveness Unit of AFTOS, and the Sector Leader. From there, the necessary revisions would be made before the document would be submitted. 62 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR 1. The 15 page Government report on the project is divided into the following main parts: (1) Implementation issues; (2) Risks and mitigating measures; (3) Lessons learned and recommendations; and (4) The performance of stakeholders in Government and at the World Bank. Implementation Issues 2. The implementation of the initial phase of this project encountered major difficulties due to the absence of a logical framework for preparation. 3. At the institutional level, the initial project was to be run by two departments: the Ministry of National Education (MINEDUC) and the Ministry of Higher Education (MINESUP). In December 2004, following a government reorganization, MINEDUC was divided into three new Ministries. It was suddenly imperative that the World Bank develop a sectorial education approach. In addition to this major change, before the preparation phase had finished, the project began to be implemented, which resulted in inconsistencies. 4. As the risks inherent in the implementation of complex projects had not been thoroughly anticipate, mitigation strategies were not always found in time. In general, the implementation of the project was hindered by: - Difficulties in mobilizing funds from the government during the preparation phase and start-up activities; - The absence of a local shelter for the Program Coordination Unit (PCU) resulting in a late start of activities. After implementation took place in 2005, the first activities were actually only started in 2006; - Instability of the officials in charge of coordinating the program: three Coordinators General, three Technical Coordinators, four Procurement Specialists, three Administrative and Financial Managers, four Accountants succeeded one another in the past seven years of the program while five World Bank Task Team Leaders all of whom resided in Washington, DC changed as well; - Mobility of officials in charge of implementing the project in the ministries, who were regularly transferred. This resulted in problems of ownership and in the understanding of the logic behind implementation of the program; - Implementation of the activities of certain components and sub-components, which began to be delayed or lagged due to the absence of regulatory measures or the inappropriateness of planned activities, resulting in their removal with the consequent depletion of certain expenditure categories and the need for the reallocation of these funds by categories. 5. More specifically, problems of implementation were seen in three major areas of the project, namely: in (i) capacity building activities, (ii) the operationalization of the Continuing Education and Distance, (iii) micro-projects in Contract Management Agencies. 63 Risks and mitigating measures 6. Risks in the implementation of activities can be assessed through their impact on the achievement of objectives, the technical quality and operational results as well as the duration and cost of operations, and finally by measures used to mitigate their effects, as demonstrated in the following summary: Event / Critical risk Impact Assessment Response Unavailability of TTL Delay in granting non objections TTL appoint a resident in Yaounde Implementation of cross-cutting Extension of time for processing Increase awareness, mobilization activities cases and exchange between Operational and Monitoring units, the project Coordination Unit and the World Bank. Provide workshops to create shared ownership Mobility of stakeholders Weak ownership of the project Improve the ability to communicate and work together to promote a better flow of information Instability of key personnel No deadlines set out in the Seek to retain staff with attractive approved PPM salaries and better working conditions Late coding procedures Procedures manual developed under the third PIA director who ran the project Absence of a resident education Delay in certain decisions Appoint a World Bank specialist "Education" counterpart in the WB resident mission in Yaoundé Fiduciary risks in the Because of these risks, several The production of a manual of implementation of capacity essential seminars were either procedures adapted to the building seminars misunderstood or simply deleted management of training seminars for large groups; A manual was tried with success for the training of more than 13,000 primary school teachers Weakness of the filing and This caused personal mobility on Make available computerized archiving of procurement records the one hand -- trained staff left software archiving the project -- but also cramped offices and the lack of supplies for archiving Delay in granting non objections Compliance with procurement Envisage the capacity building of Quality of the procurement procedures could be measured by stakeholders process the number of rejections of Implementation of a quality Poor quality of ToRs submissions at screening or the control record to be transmitted to number of comments made by the the Bank for comments. 64 Bank: No submission could Institution of a weekly meeting receive a non-objection without between the cell and the comments either about the content coordination of procurement to or the procedure involved. ensure better follow-up. Poor mastery of World Bank Mobilize technical staff of Plan Insufficient capacity of the CMAs procurement procedures Cameroon and members of its Weak planning / programming of Board of Administration in order activities to give special support to this A mismatch between the planned project. project work schedule with the school calendar and the seasons. Resizing work with the addition of Procrastination of World Bank Associate local authorities in the desks, latrines and boreholes at the project teams in monitoring drafting of a simplified procedure instigation of newly recruited TTL additional work both in terms of for facilitating supervision and under the project without undue their scope, approach to monitoring plan risk analysis prior timetable for implementation and the granting Mobilization of beneficiary implementation, procurement , of non-objections required to communities weather advance the timing of activities following preset schedules Too many tangentially unimportant (intangible) activities (seminars, study tours, training ...) Predominance of foreign MINEPAT combines industry consultants experts and concerned officials of the Agency for Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) when negotiating contracts Lessons learned and recommendations  The project created a sector-wide approach and provided a framework for the meeting of all Education Ministers. It also supported the at-the-time new education sector strategy through specific activities in each of the various components. It also helped to create a culture of internal evaluation of the education system through audit training.  Many procedures have been codified. This is thanks to the workshops and seminars that produced a more effective management of funds, specific procedures for the management of micro-projects and CMAs, and in the production of various media (instruments and evaluation guides, manuals procedures for managing audits, training materials on a variety of topics ...).  Minimizing the risk of establishment of DCC equipment through AACED for the establishment of the first Centre for Continuing Education Distance Learning in Central Africa, which highlights the benefits of South-South cooperation in the design and monitoring, and the technical implementation of this technical solution. 65  The formation of a national team for elementary and secondary school competence- based curriculums. This training has enabled the development of South-South cooperation.  Specifically, the lessons learned during the implementation of CMAs micro- projects can be summarized as follows: o The constitution of the project team should focus on skills related to the construction of infrastructure and not on skills education; o The recommendation of the World Bank in collaboration with civil society organizations is essential for training procedures; o Resizing projects and reducing implementation time should be avoided; o Interference of any kind and influence peddling in the production of various reports are sources of errors and frustrations; o The flow of information is essential. Clear communication plans should be developed to ensure that all stakeholders are informed of the progress of the project, something which ensures transparency and avoids frustrations o The organization of a clarification meeting (at the start of technical work / activities) starting with the Enterprise and supervision consultants and communities, helps aligns all stakeholder views. o Effective communication between all stakeholders is also very important for tracking and project success o The involvement of local authorities in the beginning of the project is very important for the success and management of potential conflicts with the beneficiaries. o The requirement of guarantees from corporations can reduce the high number of companies submitting unreliable offers for projects. o In terms of the rehabilitation of classrooms: a. technical evaluations of the work is crucial to the success of rehabilitation and should be closely monitored; b. Despite assessments done before work begins, some problems appear only when the rehabilitation work has started. This can cause additional work which must be covered to be fair to businesses. 7. The performance of stakeholders. After a discussion of the roles of each unit, a brief appreciation of each is given. 8. The Steering Committee was chaired by the MINEDUB, MINESEC and MINESUP vice-presidents and included among its members, representatives of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, and the Secretaries General and Focal Points in each Ministry of Education. The General Coordinator of PASE is the Rapporteur. The Steering Committee met six times in accordance with the timetable and three times in special sessions to consider specific issues. It fulfilled its mandate satisfactorily, using a given framework for addressing issues relating to the operation of the overall education sector. 66 9. The Sub-Committee Technical Coordination and Monitoring was restricted to the Project’s Coordinator General and three Project Focal Points within ministerial departments. This unit suffered from the unavailability and lack of capacity of some of its members who were often conspicuous by their absence. 10. Operational Monitoring Cells (COS) were chaired by the Secretaries General of Ministries together the Heads of components and sub-components involved in the implementation of the project. COS experienced delays in implementation. In some departments, funds were budgeted annually for the operation. 11. The Project Coordination Unit, under the authority of a General Coordinator and comprising experts in project management, procurement and financial management, was responsible for fiduciary aspects and tasks of daily management of the project. It saw high turnover in key personnel, including the recruitment of some to other World Bank projects while their contract within the Project was still running, which broke the continuity of service and had a negative impact on the implementation of the project. The PCU accompanied the implementation of the project with happiness. In general, instances of supervision, coordination and implementation of the project had to be relegated behind the overwhelming imperatives of procurement and financial management. This was one of the weaknesses of the PCU management. Performance of the World Bank 12. The Bank team included five Task Team Leaders. The first TTL had the foresight to bring all those responsible for the education sector to work together to develop a program. He helped the Government develop a vision for education in Cameroon. He was very active and did not hesitate to meet with the various Ministers to advance project implementation. Because of his determination to start the program even in the absence of a sectoral strategy, his only oversight was not developing a logical framework for the project. The second TTL started operations. However his unavailability to respond quickly to requests for non- objection was a hindrance to the progress of completion. The third TTL had the merit to have done an in-depth analysis of the problems in the project. In restructuring the project, he added a logical framework and removed activities that had no longer any link with the objectives assigned to the project. However, his availability created delays in the project (delays in non-objections). The strength of the fourth TTL was that she helped to monitor the project before taking office as TTL. Unfortunately, her leadership was of short duration. The fifth TTL monitoring activities were undermined by some hesitation in making decisions. However, it was during her tenure that the largest disbursements were made: those to do with the CMA and the equipment for the Distance Learning Center. However, it should also be noted that delays in the granting of non-objections did not favor the execution of a number of planned activities which had to eventually be removed. 67 Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A 68 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents World Bank and the Government of Cameroon. February 15, 2012. Education sector Country Status Report for Cameroon. Washington, D.C., USA and Yaoundé, Cameroon. __________. 2011. Implementation Completion and Results report. No.00002369 for the “Cameroon Education for All-Fast Track Initiative support to the Education Sector� project. Washington, D.C., USA. __________. Various ISRs and Aide-Memoires of the Education Development Capacity Building Project (P075964). Washington D.C., USA. __________. May 2, 2005. Project Appraisal Document of Education Development Capacity Building Project (P075964). Washington. D.C., USA. __________. April 6, 2010. Proposed Project Restructuring of the Education Development Capacity Building Project Credit (P075964). Washington, D.C., USA. 69 Annex 10. Analysis of Project Procurement Activities Impact on project implementation Procurement (building capacity to undertake better education development) ICR Primary Impact on project Aspect Author’s outcomes assessment Implementing Procurement Implementing Contractors agency analysis by agency the Bank response ORIGINAL PROJECT 1. Quality of All The Bank’s The The Numerous Although the impact supervision/ procurement role was to implementing contractors procurement on project outcomes is implementation activities were provide no agency then are at the end activities of very difficult to initiated by the objections to goes through of the varying values measure, the Borrower using the annual the various procurement ranging from ineffective the annual procurement procurement chain. They small to large procurement observed procurement plans. steps. sign the procurement during the original plan. contract after were all being project phase, since it How did the Bank’s no undertaken at caused many delays, How did the Bank team How did the objection. the same time, hindered project Borrower fare fare in this Borrower fare so each activity effectiveness as a in this regard? regard? in this regard? What was the at a different whole and so likely effect on procurement played a role in Poor timeliness Generally Timeliness of contractors? stage. weakening the in initiating speaking, working Eg. CMA achievement of project procurement Timeliness of through the (MOD) This was outcomes. activities. providing non various Executing challenging for objections procurement agency all parties to Tendency to (though there stages. promising follow-up put off were some more than consistently and procurement. complex Poor follow-on their capacity in a timely This resulted in issues to do response even to deliver. manner. very few with the after receiving Contract activities being procurement timely non- delivery dates The elapsed completed of consultants objections from not reviewed time for each between 2007 that did take the Bank in at signing procurement and 2010 when much more some cases. even though activity was the project was time). contract non- inordinately restructured. Not careful objection long. If there were about from the delays in reviewing Bank was The agreed providing non- contract dates. provided procurement objections, this Eg. See Mr. three months plan could have was because Zerbo’s ahead. Eg. been used as an there was a technical See Mr. effective tool to lack of evaluation Zerbo’s streamline dedicated report on technical implementation, project elapsed time evaluation but it was not. procurement for contractors report. specialist. to undertake Rather than Rather, there the Works being an was an over- component. education dependence on project, the centralized project became procurement a procurement- support with centered too few activity. See handling foot note 27 in procurement ICR document. for the country portfolio. 70 Impact on project implementation Procurement (building capacity to undertake better education development) ICR Primary Impact on project Aspect Author’s outcomes assessment Procurement Implementing Implementing analysis by agency Contractors agency the Bank response RESTRUCTURED PROJECT 1.Quality at It is the ICR Lost Entry (QAE) team’s belief opportunity to that the streamline onerous procurement. character of Numerous procurement procurement should have activities of been evaluated very small value as a greater ranging from risk than it $5,000 to was in the $50,000. revised Intended to project, and so bypass addressed procurement no more objections from aggressively. the Bank. 2. Quality of There were an The last two At restructuring, The If the Impact on project Supevision/ excessive TTLs, the PIU streamlining restructuring outcome is difficult to Implementation number of recognizing significantly of procedures, was ineffective assess, once again. small and only the strengthened its and the close at first (in terms tangentially detrimental implementation supervision of improving important effect that capacity by (i) by an in- disbursement), activities procurement streamlining country WB the approach of requiring procedures the of all the final two excessive were having coordination activities, project TTLs – numbers of on the project, structures to improved to lessen the non-objections adopted improve the contractors’ onerous submitted to the measures to coordination ability to character of Bank. streamline between carry out procurement several ministries and contracts. procedures and The PIA aspects of the PIU, (ii) Problems to refocus only seemed to be procurement hiring persisted, but on the essential lost in the in order to additional this approach in project details of these focus on only qualified proved activities – led myriad those matters personnel, in successful, as to a surge in procurement that were the areas of the significant disbursement in procedures. central to the financial rise in the run up to success of the management, disbursement project close. project. procurement, at the end of and monitoring the project and evaluation demonstrated. and putting in place better tracking systems for procurement and financial reporting; and (iii) adopting new procedures to simplify the implementation of training activities (which represent a 71 significant share of the project activities). However, despite these measures, disbursement remained extremely feeble. 72 Annex 11. Beneficiary Assessment: Questionnaire Used for Survey 1. Did you attend a workshop in connection with the PASE project? a. Yes b. No c. Don’t know d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 2. What was your general impression of this workshop? a. Good b. Quite good c. No particular impression d. Bad e. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 3. Was the workshop well organized? a. Well organized b. Acceptably organized c. Badly organized d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 4. How many of the workshop objectives were met in your view? a. Many objectives b. Few objectives c. Not enough objectives d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 5. How was the information presented at the event organized? a. Well organized b. Acceptably organized c. Badly organized d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 6. Was the workshop presenter well prepared? a. Well prepared b. Quite well prepared c. Ill prepared d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 73 7. Was the presenter motivated? a. Yes b. No c. Not sufficiently d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 8. Did the presenter present the material too fast, too slowly or at the right speed? a. Too fast b. Neither too fast nor too slowly c. Too slowly d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 9. Did the presenter take too much time, too little time or the right amount of time for his explanations? a. Enough time b. Neither too much nor too little time c. Not enough time d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 10. Did the presenter take too much time, too little time or the right amount of time for the general discussion? a. Enough time b. Neither too much nor too little time c. Not enough time d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 11. Did you feel comfortable asking questions at the event? a. Comfortable b. Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable c. Uncomfortable d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 12. Was the presenter concerned about how you, as a student, were learning? a. Yes, very concerned b. Reasonably concerned c. Not sufficiently concerned d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 74 13. How useful was the training workshop professionally? a. Very useful b. Quite useful c. Of doubtful usefulness d. Not useful enough e. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 14. What did you retain from this workshop? a. A great deal b. A little c. Very little d. Not enough e. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 15. Did you improve your skills as a result of this training? a. Yes b. A little c. No d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 16. Since the workshop, to what extent have you used what you learned? a. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 17. What was the main interest of this workshop for you? a. Professional b. Personal c. Social d. Other e. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 18. Was the per diem received for attending this workshop sufficient, insufficient or about right? a. Sufficient b. About right c. Insufficient d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 75 19. Was the workshop better than you expected, worse than you expected or roughly what you expected? a. Better b. Roughly what I expected c. Worse d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 20. On the whole, are you satisfied with the event, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, or dissatisfied? a. Satisfied b. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied c. Dissatisfied d. Comments : ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 76 IBRD 33382 12º E 14º E 16º E Lake C A MER O O N This map was produced by 1963 Level the Map Design Unit of The Chad World Bank. The boundaries, 1973 Level colors, denominations and any other information shown SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS 2001 Level on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank To Group, any judgment on the PROVINCE CAPITALS Fotokol Massaguet legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or NATIONAL CAPITAL Maltam acceptance of such To boundaries. RIVERS Maiduguri 12º N To Mandélia MAIN ROADS 0 40 80 120 160 Kilometers To RAILROADS Maiduguri 0 40 80 120 Miles ts. PROVINCE BOUNDARIES INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES Mora M a r EXTREME da To Maroua an Guelengdeng NIGERIA M Yagoua NORD Kaélé 10º N 10º N To Figuil Kim To Pala To Leré CAMEROON Garoua Touroua Bé no ué CHA D NORD Fa ro 8º N 8º N bang. Mbé Mts M na Vi Ngai Ngaoundéré ts. M ADAMAOUA ua Banyo ao m m ére Dj Wum da Ngaoundal A Tibati To NORD- 6º N Ikom OUEST Kumbo To 6º N Bamenda Bankim Sangbé Bouar Mamfe Mb Garoua Boulai u Foumban Bafoussam Dschang OUEST Yoko Lo m CENT RA L A F R I CAN SUD- Bafang CENTRE REPUBLI C OUEST Nkongsamba Mb am Bélabo Kadei Kumba Bertoua Nanga ou Yabassi Yabassi Eboko Batouri W Mt. Cameroon (4,095 m) LITTORAL Buea Ntui Tiko 4º N Limbe Douala Akonolinga Abong Mbang Yola 4º N Edea YAOUNDÉ EQUATORIAL Eséka Nyong EST Bou GUINEA Mbalmayo mb a Echambot Kribi Ebolowa Sangmélima Lokomo SUD Ambam Dja Kom Mouloundou 2º N 2º N To Oyem G ul f o f EQUATORIAL GA BO N G ui n e a GUINEA CO NGO 10º E 12º E 14º E 16º E SEPTEMBER 2004