Global Stock-Take of Social Accountability Initiatives for Budget Transparency and Monitoring

Key Challenges and Lessons Learned
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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT&amp;M</td>
<td>budget transparency and monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPL</td>
<td>Development Policy Lending</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>East Asia and Pacific Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Europe and Central Asia Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Financial Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>South Asia Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDV</td>
<td>Social Development Department (World Bank)</td>
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This stock-taking report is a product of the Social Development Department (SDV) at the World Bank. The study was led by Sanjay Agarwal under the guidance of Helene Grandvoinnet (SDV). The report was written by Harika Masud (lead author), Sanjay Agarwal, Martin Luis Alton, Shruti Majumdar and Darshana Patel. The core team benefited from valuable inputs, comments and guidance from a group of experts including Albert Van Zyl from the International Budget Partnership and David Nummy, Nicola Smithers, and Carolina Vaira from the World Bank.

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The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.
Budgets are key documents that lay out a government’s economic priorities in terms of policies and programs. Budget transparency refers to the extent and ease with which citizens can access information about and provide feedback on government revenues, allocations, and expenditures. Budget monitoring entails using such information to analyze, critique, and track government finances in order to provide this feedback.

Budget transparency is a prerequisite for public participation and accountability, which are instrumental for a democratic and legitimate budget process. Both budget transparency and monitoring efforts also help remove institutional bottlenecks that result in delayed budget allocations, thereby jeopardizing the delivery of vital services to people. Even though they have a far-reaching impact on the lives of people, opening up budgets beyond the exclusive domain of policy makers and administrators is a relatively recent phenomenon that has gained momentum in the last two decades. As evidence demonstrates, governments that are transparent about their budgets reap several benefits, including the ability to attract cheaper international credit (box 1).

**BOX 1. WHY IS BUDGET TRANSPARENCY AND MONITORING IMPORTANT?**

Budget transparency can provide numerous benefits. Budget transparency and oversight about how resources are allocated and spent are powerful disincentives for officials to misuse or misappropriate funds because their actions are more likely to be scrutinized; this leads to a decrease in corruption. When budgets are open to the public and effective legislative scrutiny, there is less room for deviation from policy decisions and reversal of budget allocations. There is a decreased likelihood that the ruling elite will manipulate budgets. Additionally, transparency and monitoring of budgets provides citizens with entry points to provide feedback on the quality and adequacy of services and infrastructure. This feedback, combined with reduced corruption, often results in a more efficient use of resources. In many cases, the perception of high levels of corruption, poor services, inadequate infrastructure, and opaqueness of operations lie at the heart of citizen distrust of government. The opening up of government books-of-account therefore usually increases trust in government. Budget transparency is also instrumental in generating higher revenues for governments because citizens are more likely to pay taxes and contribute donations to local schools and health centers when there is confidence that funds will be well spent.

Based on aggregate World Bank data for 169 countries, Islam (2003) finds a strong correlation between transparency (i.e., the existence of freedom-of-information laws and the regular publication of government economic data) and the quality of governance. Further, Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) suggest, based on the results of their study from 20 countries, that transparency is associated with lower levels of corruption, better socioeconomic and human development indicators, and greater economic competitiveness.

Furthermore, countries with high levels of budget transparency tend to achieve positive development outcomes and more fully realize the economic and social rights of their citizens; they also tend to be more democratic (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2011). Even when regional and per capita income differences are held constant, a significant statistical association between budget transparency and infant and child survival, the percentage of the population using improved drinking water, and public health expenditure levels still remains. Budget transparency also helps to attract cheaper international credit. Research shows that countries with higher levels of fiscal transparency have higher credit ratings and lower spreads between borrowing and lending rates (Hameed 2011). Glennerster and Shin (2008) find that sovereign spreads decline after the adoption of transparency-related reforms, such as the publication of International Monetary Fund country surveillance reports and the release of various reports about compliance with standards.
GLOBAL TRENDS IN BUDGET TRANSPARENCY

The trend of greater budget transparency and monitoring (BT&M) is part of a broader momentum toward “demand-side” transparency and accountability initiatives that are led by citizens seeking to hold the accountable by increasing transparency and access to information (McGee and Gaventa 2011). In addition to the “New Public Management” approach of the 1990s which emphasized downward accountability that gave individual consumers more information about choices of public service providers, the democracy and good governance agenda provided an impetus to demand-side accountability efforts by advocating for the direct participation of citizens in governance and by adopting a rights-based approach for access to public services (Joshi 2012). Political momentum around participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre during the mid-1980s, the “neoliberal” shift in economic policy in the 1990s, and the proliferation of a substantial number of independent budget groups in developing and transitional countries over the past two decades also helped to galvanize the trend toward more open budget processes (Robinson 2006).

On the supply side, mounting concerns over the ineffectiveness of government spending in addition to stringent aid budgets and public spending cuts in the wake of the global financial crisis continue to foster the international community’s interest in improving the accountability of budget processes and spending. Because of these developments, the budget transparency and accountability landscape has changed significantly. In addition to assuming more responsibility for providing complete, timely, and quality aid information flows to governments, development partners are increasingly using country systems to manage aid flows in the most transparent manner possible (CABRI 2011). The World Bank’s position of lending to finance budgets only in countries that publish their budgets represents an important milestone in this regard. In fact, in over 50 Development Policy Lending operations, the World Bank has introduced budget transparency as a necessary prior action or a set of actions prior to loan approval. Meanwhile, the capacity of civil society to analyze and influence public budgeting has expanded dramatically over the past 15 years. Today, civil society is actively engaged in public budget processes in over 100 developing and transitional countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America (IBP 2008), and more recently, in the Middle East and North Africa.1

Nevertheless, progress has been gradual for improving budget transparency and, to the extent that it is measurable, even slower for using budget reforms to improve development outcomes. The Open Budget Index score increased from 47 to 57 percent between 2006 and 2012—only a 10 percent gain—in the 40 countries where comparable data was available for this period. Public institutional reform, including improving budget transparency, is a complex and difficult task, both technically and politically. Even when there is support from the highest levels of government to institute such reforms, a considerable amount of time and technical support are required to foster their ownership within public institutions (World Bank 2000).

Documented examples of BT&M work confirm that while the efforts of development partners and civil society groups have led to increased budget allocations for specific sectors, they have yet to meet their promise of achieving resounding impact on governance and development outcomes. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) have questioned whether access to information can by itself address endemic issues of limited citizen capacity and inadequate incentives to process and utilize the information. In a similar vein, Joshi (2012) and McGee (2011) highlight the paucity of evidence attesting to the impact of transparency and accountability initiatives. Among other factors, this is traced to a lack of consistent and comparable focus on impact and cohesive theories of change.

In order to continue to build on the potential and the momentum of country-based budget transparency and accountability initiatives, a number of nascent global multi-stakeholder initiatives have emerged to promote open and accountable governance. For instance, more than 60

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1. Despite the wide expanse of BT&M activities, it is difficult to determine the costs involved through a desk research study because this information is not readily available and because it varies depending on scope, context, and duration. The authors had information about costs associated with the World Bank Budget Transparency Initiative in Nepal (annex 1.80) that was US$95,000 and Cameroon (annex 1.1) that was US$220,000, excluding staff and travel costs.

2. Produced by the International Budget Partnership, the Open Budget Index score for each country reflects the public availability, timeliness, and comprehensiveness of the eight key budget documents produced by governments, including the Executive’s Budget Proposal, Citizens Budget, Enacted Budget, In-Year Reports, Mid-Year Review, Year-End Report and Audit Report.
governments have formalized over 300 specific “open government” commitments and have agreed to be independently assessed on the implementation of these commitments through the Open Government Partnership. While the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency is focusing on advancing and institutionalizing global norms and standards for transparency, participation, and accountability in public finance, the Global Movement for Budget Transparency, Accountability and Participation is working to move budget transparency a step closer toward better governance and development outcomes by strengthening the link between budget accountability and human rights.

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

Even though there is a sizeable amount of literature regarding budget transparency, no systematic attempt has been undertaken to analyze information on budget transparency and monitoring initiatives. Therefore, the Social Accountability and Demand for Good Governance Cluster in the Social Development Department (SDV) of the World Bank sought to fill this gap by taking stock of budget transparency and monitoring initiatives that have adopted social accountability approaches and that have been implemented in World Bank and non-Bank projects. However, it was apparent from the onset that this exercise would draw heavily on the much broader and deeper range of civil society experiences in this area of engagement. The objectives of this stock-taking exercise are to:

- Compile a menu of budget transparency activities that illustrate different social accountability approaches adopted by civil society, governments, and World Bank task teams to improve budget transparency and monitoring and to facilitate North–South and South–South knowledge exchange on this subject;
- Identify drivers, key activities, and strategies used by BT&M initiatives; and
- Provide options to World Bank task teams and development practitioners of various budget transparency and monitoring activities that could potentially be integrated into projects.

AUDIENCE

Audiences for this report include World Bank task teams interested in learning about the options and strategies available for mainstreaming budget transparency activities into Bank operations; policy makers; Public Financial Management (PFM) professionals; fiscal transparency advocates; and civil society networks and organizations interested in improving transparency, civic engagement and accountability in budgetary processes.

SCOPE

This stock-taking exercise includes 174 budget transparency initiatives. Of these, 95 initiatives from 53 countries have been documented as short case studies that cover context, actions, results, and implications (annex 1). The remaining 79 are comprised of 33 initiatives currently under implementation (annex 2) and 46 World Bank-supported Development Policy Lending operations that contain BT&M elements (annex 3). 63 of the 95 initiatives were led by civil society groups, and for the most part, funded by development partners; the remaining 32 were mainly government initiated, with 26 initiatives supported by the World Bank and one by the Asian Development Bank (annex 1.39).

3. Launched in September 2011, the Open Government Partnership is a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance. To become a member of the Open Government Partnership, participating countries must embrace a high-level open government declaration, deliver a country action plan developed with public consultation, and commit to independent reporting on their progress going forward.

4. The Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency is a multistakeholder action network working to advance and institutionalize global norms and significant, continuous improvements on fiscal transparency, participation, and accountability in countries around the world.

5. The Global Movement for Budget Transparency, Accountability and Participation is an effort by a broad range of activists and organizations from around the world working to advance issues of public finance and budget accountability in order to achieve human rights.

6. Social accountability refers to the broad range of actions and mechanisms beyond voting that citizens can use to hold the state to account, as well as actions on the part of government, civil society, media, and other societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts. (World Bank Social Accountability Sourcebook).

7. Hopefully, because the experiences of several developing countries have been documented in this stock-take, this illustrative menu of BT&M options can help to promote South–South knowledge exchanges in the area of BT&M.
In terms of geographic breakdown, the greatest number of initiatives (36 percent) are from the Africa Region; the lowest number (2 percent) are from the Middle East and North Africa Region (figure 1). The “Others” category documents BT&M initiatives in developed countries such as Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, South Korea, and the United States. Four initiatives have been assigned to the “Multicountry” category, including three global initiatives and one regional initiative from the Middle East and North Africa Region.

The stock-taking exercise is illustrative—not comprehensive; it is an attempt to document a wide range of activities across the various stages of the budget cycle (figure 2). In every fiscal year, the budget cycle begins at the formulation

**FIGURE 1.**
**DISTRIBUTION OF 95 BT&M INITIATIVES ACROSS REGIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Initiatives</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Country</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2.**
**BUDGET CYCLE**

1. **Budget Formulation:**
   - The executive formulates the draft budget.
   - **Key Budget Documents:** Executive’s budget proposal; Supporting budget reports

2. **Budget Approval:**
   - The legislature reviews and amends the budget—and then enacts it into law.
   - **Key Budget Documents:** Budget law; Reports of legislative budget committees

3. **Budget Execution:**
   - The executive collects revenue and spends money as per the allocations made in the budget law.
   - **Key Budget Documents:** In-year reports; Mid-year report; Year-end reports; Supplementary budgets

4. **Budget Oversight:**
   - The budget accounts are audited and audit findings are reviewed by the legislature, which requires action to be taken by the executive to correct audit findings.
   - **Key Budget Documents:** Audit reports; Legislative Audit Committee reports

stage, when the executive normally drafts the budget and then sends it to the legislature for discussion, debate, and approval. The budget is enacted into law during the approval phase, which is followed by the execution phase when the government implements it. Finally, during the oversight phase, the legislature and supreme audit institution scrutinize budget expenditures undertaken during the fiscal year.

The Budget Transparency Feedback Loop (figure 3) charts out assumptions underlying the means by which governments can engage citizens in the budget process to promote social accountability and the entry points through which citizens can participate in the budget cycle. This feedback loop is based on the presumption that when supply-side actors (governments) in the budget process simplify and disseminate budget information to demand-side actors (citizens), citizens will use this information to provide solicited and unsolicited feedback on the budget. Ultimately, the government will respond to and/or incorporate citizen feedback in upcoming budget cycles, ensuring that the feedback loop is sustained over time.

Even though procurement is not the focus of this report, we have included it in this stock-take because it is an integral part of the budget implementation process, involves significant public resources, and has captured the interest of several demand-side initiatives involved in monitoring fiscal transparency.
Methodology

This stock-taking exercise was based primarily on desk reviews and involved sampling, documentation, and analysis.

**SAMPLING**

The team identified and screened close to 250 BT&M cases based on a literature review, extensive Internet searches, and input from 12 civil society organizations (CSOs) or networks and around 60 World Bank staff members. Purposive sampling was used to select 174 initiatives, of which 95 short case studies were documented, to provide a broad illustration of the range of BT&M activities across regions, sectors, and levels of government that met the predefined criteria of quality of information and robustness of results (annex 1). The remaining 79 are comprised of 33 initiatives currently under implementation (annex 2) and 46 World Bank-supported Development Policy Lending operations that contain BT&M elements (annex 3).

**DOCUMENTATION**

A standard template was created to compile and document 95 selected cases. Data on these cases was triangulated to the extent possible, given time and staff constraints, through Internet research and the input of concerned project/CSO teams.

**DATA ANALYSIS**

Selected cases were recorded into a database that captured the region, country, level of government, sectors and subsectors, duration, and type of engagement of the 174 initiatives (see http://dfggdb for the entire database). Data was analyzed to identify broad trends across the selected sample. The synthesis of the main findings was based on a combination of quantitative analysis of the data points for regions, sectors, and the types of activities, as well as a qualitative review of the factors that enhance or limit budget transparency and monitoring practices and the types of outcomes achieved.

**ASSESSING RESULTS**

Because of limited available evidence linking increased budget transparency to development results, only BT&M initiatives highlighting explicit results within a social accountability framework were documented. This social accountability framework categorizes results in terms of behavioral and institutional changes. Behavioral changes consist of (1) information-seeking behavior—nonstate actors asking for information about public resources and service delivery when they would not normally do so; (2) accountability-seeking behavior—individuals with a growing sense of entitlement beginning to question and challenge information, service providers, and governments; and (3) development outcomes-seeking behavior—citizens individually and collectively seeking to fulfill specific development outcomes through access to public services and entitlements. As these localized behavior changes are iterated over time they upwardly inform the practices of government; gradually they become internalized as norms and eventually established as institutional changes. Institutional changes include process changes (e.g. shifts in the functioning of management systems, including how data are received and how decision making occurs) and policy changes (e.g. changes to legislation).

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8. The universe of BT&M activities is fairly complex, lending itself to a wide array of tools, stakeholders, sectors, and levels of implementation; it is difficult to disentangle key trends from data currently available.
The case studies examined in this report vary considerably across a range of factors, including scope, scale, and actors, but they have at least one aspect in common: they all deploy strategies along the budget transparency feedback loop and engage citizens.

**WHO IS INVOLVED?**

This section maps out the state and nonstate actors involved in the BT&M area. State actors include the executive, oversight institutions (legislatures and supreme audit institutions), and the judiciary. Nonstate actors include citizens, CSOs, media, development partners, and the private sector.

While the executive continues to be at the foundation of budget transparency and monitoring work, this study shows that as this area continues to evolve, nonstate actors have also become increasingly engaged (figure 4).

### State Actors

**Executive.** The budget system functions with a series of horizontal and vertical accountability relationships: spending agencies and the central budget authority, public officials and political officeholders, the cabinet and the executive head-of-state, junior and senior officials, and regions and the capital. The diversified nature of the executive makes it possible for external actors to work with champions within government to push for increased transparency. One example of this is the state executive’s engagement with the Lagos State Civil Society Partnership in Nigeria (annex 1.19). The partnership was provided with the opportunity to contribute to the development of the education sector’s Medium Term Sector Strategy 2013–15, and its recommendations were eventually adopted by the Ministry of Education.

**Oversight institutions.** There are a growing number of cases in which the legislative branch and supreme audit institutions are making efforts to strengthen their budget oversight roles by engaging with citizens in a more proactive and effective manner. For example, Honduras’s Supreme Tribunal of Accounts (annex 1.67) has set up a process for citizens to participate in government audits by allowing them to provide input on the selection of audits, participate in public hearings, and work on action plans for institutional improvement arising out of selected audits. Similarly, Canada’s House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance (annex 1.83) not only arranges in-person prebudget consultations with citizen groups, but also invites online prebudget submissions that are posted on its website. Committee members then use this feedback to submit recommendations.

**Judiciary.** Given the increasing shift toward a human rights-based approach to budget work, in some countries, the judiciary has emerged as a player in PFM. For example, to overcome the government’s reluctance to increase budget allocations for HIV/AIDS programs, the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa filed and won a case in the high court against the government, enjoining it to introduce the full-scale Prevention of Mother-to Child Transmission Program (annex 1.26).

### Nonstate Actors

**Citizens and civil society organizations.** Civil society groups engaging in BT&M activities range from government-supported consultative groups to academic institutions and think tanks to networks of citizen coalitions.
BT&M activities in developed economies are generally more likely to be undertaken by think tanks or research institutes that tend to focus on upstream budget work, but there are exceptions to this. For example, Poland’s Gdansk Institute conducts detailed economic policy analysis and provides policy recommendations to the executive and legislative branches (annex 1.53). There is a more balanced mix of budget groups in middle income or transition countries. While think tanks such as Kenya’s Institute for Economic Affairs (annex 1.11) are instrumental in BT&M initiatives, organizations that work with peasants and workers like India’s Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (annex 1.78) have also proved to be successful.

There are also cases in which citizen-led movements have evolved into strong coalitions with formal organizational structures. For example, founded in 1989 by 500 concerned citizens, the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice in the Republic of Korea has grown to 35,000 members and 35 local branches. It has been able to use South Korea’s public audit system to improve government accountability for the use of public resources, particularly with respect to procurement (annex 1.90).

**Media.** The media, if it has the capacity and political freedom to perform its watchdog role, serves as a critical partner in promoting citizen participation and social accountability. Budget transparency campaigns, particularly ones led by CSOs, struggle to succeed without the media’s involvement. Media reports on corruption and the misuse of public funds can serve as a rallying point for CSOs and citizen groups to undertake BT&M activities. Conversely, civil society budget groups can work with the media to publicize instances of corruption or other weaknesses in budget processes. This was the case for Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR) in 2003, which, after uncovering that government funds for HIV/AIDS treatment had been misused, released its findings to a leading newspaper, a popular radio news program, and a television news program. This release was followed up with a press conference to discuss the case and to distribute related materials to additional journalists (annex 1.69).

**Private sector.** While the private sector’s involvement in BT&M activities has been limited, it has maintained an interest in the open contracting aspect of PFM. For instance, in 2004, the Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld GmbH, a limited private sector company in Germany, and Transparency International Germany joined together to introduce a no-bribes integrity pact to prevent corruption and illegal transactions during the procurement process of a major expansion of the Berlin Brandenburg International Airport (annex 1.85).

**Development partners.** Development partners provide funding and technical assistance for CSO-led BT&M activities and help to build the capacity and commitment of governments in aid-recipient countries. In 2010, development partners for Afghanistan committed to channel up to 50 percent of their funds through the budget on the condition that the government make its budget more transparent and increase its spending capacity. In turn, the government made a commitment to draw up a credible development plan that would increase its budget capacity and improve transparency (annex 1.74). The World Bank has undertaken a host of BT&M activities itself in the form of CSO capacity building. The World Bank Institute’s work through the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability—South Asia (ANSA-SAR) brokers relationships between CSOs and their government counterparts. Along these lines for example, the World Bank Institute’s Parliamentary Strengthening Program brings together like-minded members of parliament and parliamentary committees at the regional and global levels by using parliamentary networks, assisting ministries of finance to publish their budgets and opening up discussions to the public (e.g., Indonesia’s project on Improving Ministries and Agencies Websites, annex 1.37), and supporting analytical work (e.g., the Budget Transparency Initiative’s work in Cameroon, annex 1.1). These activities have been conducted through trust funds or by mainstreaming in the World Bank’s operations, such as through Development Policy Lending operations (box 2).

**WHY ARE BT&M INITIATIVES TAKING PLACE?**

BT&M activities are undertaken at both the domestic and international levels in response to a combination of socio-economic and political factors, ranging from increased crime to fiscal deficits.

**Domestic Factors**

Civil society groups have engaged in BT&M work in response to a host of factors, the majority of them domestic. In some cases, it is easier to isolate the factors involved. For
Main Findings

Box 2. Budget Transparency and Monitoring in World Bank-Supported Development Policy Lending Operations

Many World Bank-supported Development Policy Lending (DPL) operations incorporate BT&M-related “prior actions” and/or “benchmarks.” Prior actions are a set of policy and institutional actions deemed critical to achieving the objectives of a World Bank-supported program that are mutually agreed upon by the World Bank and the client and that a country agrees to take before the Board approves a loan. In short, they are legal conditions for disbursement. A review of the database of DPL operations indicates that a total of 51 projects in the past decade have included budget transparency related prior actions (annex 3).

A review of these DPL operations displays a wide range of prior actions related to BT&M. The most common action was consultation with civil society before the adoption of a budget law or charting of a new accounting system. For instance, in Peru, the 2007 Budget Law was to be passed only after consultation with civil society, resulting in the inclusion of 11 priority areas of social sector expenditures (annex 3.38). Some DPL operations go beyond consultation and envision a participatory role for civil society. For instance, as a prior action, the Government of the Central African Republic was required to adopt a new chart of public accounts but only after extensive consultations and workshops in which civil society and other stakeholders, such as development partners and government officials, are brought together to participate (annex 3.04). In Azerbaijan, representatives from civil society were invited to participate with members of parliament on an Oil Fund Supervisory Board in order to review expenditures (annex 3.20). In addition to consultation and participation, prior actions can require setting up mechanisms for the monitoring of government resources by civil society in specific sectors e.g., in the electricity sector in Haiti (annex 3.34) or through school management committees in Pakistan (annex 3.46).

There are prior actions that involve actively publishing and disseminating budgets in the form of paper publications e.g., the 2002 oil fund budget in Azerbaijan (annex 3.19) or the 2003 budget law in Chad (annex 3.05) and on existing or newly-created government websites e.g., in the Central African Republic, where the ministry in charge of mines published how mining revenues are used (annex 3.03), in the Democratic Republic of Congo where information on the management of oil resources was published (annex 3.06), and in Ecuador where disaggregated monthly central government expenditures and subnational accounts were posted (annex 3.26). The use of websites is encouraged at both the national and local levels. For instance, in the DPL operation in Orissa, India, updated month-end accounts of rural local bodies had to be posted on the government’s website.

A few prior actions have also taken transparency a step further by not only encouraging the regular publishing of budgets, but also actively disseminating information on budgetary allocations. For instance, in the capital city of Conakry and the administrative region of Kindia in Guinea (annex 3.09), a public information campaign to disseminate data on budgetary allocations for schools and primary health care centers in its FY 2001 Budget Law constituted a prior action. Additionally a few countries were advised to prepare citizens guides to budgets as a benchmark (e.g., Yugoslavia, annex 3.24) and even enact acceptable government budgeting and accountability laws as a prior action (e.g., Sierra Leone, annex 3.14).

Some benchmarks, or implementation progress markers that help monitor the progress of DPL operations, have also involved nonstate actors. These are few in number and squarely focused on actions like the participatory monitoring of budgets—such as expenditure tracking surveys or citizen report cards (e.g., Philippines, annex 3.17 and Senegal, annex 3.13).

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a. DPL operations provide rapidly disbursing financing to help borrowers address actual or anticipated development financing requirements of domestic or external origin. A DPL, which can be extended as loans, credits, or grants, aims to help the borrower achieve sustainable poverty reduction through a program of policy and institutional actions, such as strengthening PFM, improving the investment climate, addressing bottlenecks to improve service delivery, and diversifying the economy. They support such reforms through nonearmarked general budget financing that is subject to the borrower’s own implementation processes and systems.
b. Of the 51 projects, 5 DPLs (DRC, Kyrgyz, Peru, Morocco, and Sierra Leone) are discussed in annex 1. BT&M-related elements from the remaining 46 are summarized in annex 3.
instance, of the 95 documented cases, four BT&M initiatives were undertaken in response to the actualization of “special funds” that were provided to specific constituencies to address development needs, five in response to the availability of royalties or funds from investments in mining, one in the aftermath of a natural disaster, and two as a reaction to discrete events. In other examples, it is harder to distinguish the triggers from the symptoms because subpar service delivery and instances of corruption tend to go hand-in-hand. Examples of these factors are provided below.

**Changes in laws.** In 2003, when Kazakhstan passed a law that recognized the rights of disabled persons and established programs to provide rehabilitative services, Namys, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that advocates for the rights of disabled persons, proceeded to work with a coalition toward the ratification of the Integrated Disability Rehabilitation Policy at the local and national levels of government to ensure adequate funding for this policy (annex 1.50).

**Specific policy commitments.** The Mexican government made an international commitment to reduce maternal mortality, declaring it as one of its main health objectives for 2000–06. But by 2003, as the maternal mortality rate remained stubbornly high, FUNDAR—an independent center for analysis and research working on budget issues in Mexico—decided to evaluate the extent to which public resources were being allocated toward achieving this stated goal (annex 1.70).

**Access to windfall funds.** After the Asutifi district in Ghana started receiving gold mining revenues from the Newmont Mining Corporation in 2006, the Integrated Social Development Centre and the Institute of Local Government Studies created the Asutifi Subnational Project to address weaknesses in governance mechanisms to improve revenue management in the district (annex 1.6).

**Access to “special” funds.** In 2005, the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) in the Philippines launched Pork Barrel Watch to encourage more transparent use of funds for the benefit of the public (annex 1.44). This was in response to concerns that 20–50 percent of discretionary funds for special projects (“pork barrel” funds) assigned to congresspersons and senators had been squandered.

**Widespread corruption and scandal.** The Japan Citizen Ombudsman Association grew out of several citizen initiatives in various parts of the country during the 1980s and 1990s in response to numerous cases of bribery and malfeasance by public officials (annex 1.88).

**Poor service delivery.** There are also instances of governments choosing to engage in budget transparency work to address service-delivery gaps in collaboration with civil society stakeholders. In addition to providing valuable feedback, civil society partners can be useful allies in monitoring the effective implementation of state policies. An example of this is Gambia’s Pro-Poor Advocacy Group that brings the government, CSOs, and development partners to work together to ensure that the national budget is responsive to the priorities and needs of the poor (annex 1.5). In response to the consistently poor quality of education and the misuse of public funds intended for school construction, Malawi’s Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education used public expenditure tracking surveys to monitor the use of such funds (annex 1.14).

**Natural disasters.** In 2007, in response to the slow pace of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the affected communities in Northwest Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake, a large coalition of CSOs and citizens embarked on a campaign to realign rehabilitation assistance with the people’s priorities and to ensure that it was equitably distributed (annex 1.81).

**Discrete events.** As part of the Teenagers Rights Movement launched by the Institute for Socio Economic Studies in Brazil, teenagers are working with the People’s Cup Committee to monitor Brazil’s spending on the upcoming 2014 World Cup and to engage in related issues, including the potential for forced evictions because of the government’s building of infrastructure for World Cup events (annex 1.58).

**Improvement of Public Financial Management capacity.** In 2003, after a 2002 Public Expenditure Review revealed multiple weaknesses in Morocco’s budget and human resources management systems, the government decided to prepare a long-term public administration reform program with technical and financial assistance from the World Bank and European Union (annex 1.72). Rebuilding institutional capacity in postconflict environments is also a key motivation to engage in budget transparency and monitoring projects, as evidenced by World Bank projects in Liberia (annex 1.13) and in Sierra Leone (annex 1.22).
**Emphasis on decentralization.** After Indonesia’s “Big Bang” decentralization reforms in 2000, many district budgets were opaque, with little transparency or public consultation during the development phase or when expenditures in approved budgets were disbursed. It was in this context that the Indonesian government worked with the World Bank to prepare and implement the Initiatives for Local Governance Reform Project (annex 1.38).

**International Factors**

Global movements and coalitions that have mobilized civil society budget groups such as Global Movement for Budget Transparency, Accountability and Participation have helped to create a more receptive enabling environment for promoting networking and knowledge exchange on budget transparency work and encouraging CSOs to use their budget analysis and advocacy skills to tackle human rights issues (e.g., maternal mortality and education). Governments have also used budget transparency to respond to specific stimuli, including acknowledging international norms and trends, maintaining fiscal sustainability, and addressing breakdowns or gaps in service delivery. The majority of examples in this sample involve improving public financial capacity, particularly when development partners are involved. A few illustrative examples are provided below.

**Efforts to elicit and respond to donor interest.** Struggling to secure a steady flow of foreign assistance, reduce the fiscal deficit, and tackle development problems after the political crisis and suspension of foreign aid in 2009, the Honduran government decided to respond to the increasing attention of development partners to governance and accountability reforms by undertaking a number of measures to improve its financial management practices, including making the budget more transparent (annex 1.66).

**International attention.** In 2011, part of the commitment by the Philippines to the Open Government Partnership, a new initiative called the “Open Budget Partnership” aims to make the national budget more accessible and understandable among citizens, while a full-disclosure policy was included in the 2011 General Appropriations Act, compelling all government agencies and offices to disclose budgetary and financial documents, including legislators who have been assigned Priority Development Assistance Funds (annex 1.44).

**WHERE ARE BT&M TOOLS BEING USED?**

This section provides insights regarding the various levels of government as well as the main sectors and areas of engagement where BT&M activities are taking place.

**Levels of Government**

Despite efforts to select examples across all three main levels of government—national, provincial, and local—the number of documented BT&M examples at the national government level (67 percent) far exceed the number of cases at subnational levels (18 percent for the provincial level and 39 percent for the local level). This trend is persistent even after accounting for BT&M initiatives that are being undertaken across multiple levels of government, possibly because most of the documented research on budget transparency focuses on the national level. The fact that there are not as many documented examples at subnational levels does not necessarily mean that BT&M activities have not been undertaken at these levels.

With regard to the subnational BT&M examples included in the sample, there appears to be no bias toward working at these levels in some regions as compared to others. In fact, the distribution was more or less even across regions. Even in the case of the Middle East and North Africa Region, where BT&M work is relatively new, participatory budgeting has been piloted at the district level (annex 1.92). However, the same does not hold true for cross-country comparisons. In each region, there are countries where subnational budget work has taken root earlier or faster because there is a federal system requiring it in larger territories (e.g., Indonesia, annex 1.36); earlier campaigns have established precedents (e.g., India, annex 1.78); or service-delivery issues have become particularly dire at the local level (e.g., Tanzania, annex 1.29).

**Sectors and Areas of Engagement**

Not surprisingly, the majority of documented cases (83 percent) focus on improving budget transparency as part of their overall PFM practices. Others, while still incorporating PFM aspects, are more specific in terms of the sectors that they influence. BT&M initiatives were found in the health, education, water, and sanitation sectors. To a lesser degree,
they were also found in the agriculture, fishing, and forestry; mining; and environment sectors (see figure 5).9

Mapping the cases to the key sectors does not do justice to the wide range of BT&M work that is being carried out. To address this, some key areas of engagement, such as vulnerable groups (box 3), procurement, constituency development funds, budget analysis, monitoring, and capacity building, have also been identified (see table 1 for more illustrative activities).

BT&M activities not only span several levels of government and sectors, but also several types of countries with varying levels of state and CSO capacity. The stock-take reveals that, not only is a fair amount of BT&M work being done in stable countries where capacity issues are not very constraining, but that it is also being conducted in postconflict and fragile settings (box 4).

**HOW ARE BT&M INITIATIVES BEING IMPLEMENTED?**

This stock-take provides examples of BT&M initiatives that are being implemented at each stage of the budget cycle, from budget formulation through budget oversight. This section captures the range and number of mechanisms that

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9. The mapping by sector is based on the World Bank’s classification of sectors. It must be acknowledged that most BT&M initiatives attempt to influence budget allocation decisions with the intention of improving service delivery. Transparency and participation are mostly a means to that end.

**BOX 3. ALTERNATE BUDGETING FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS**

Understanding budget information from the perspective of the marginalized is essential in making a case for allocating more financial resources for the poor, underdeveloped, and marginalized sections of society. Toward this end, alternate budgets are generally developed by CSOs with high levels of technical skills to highlight the underlying priorities and biases of proposed fiscal policies by governments and their impact on specific groups or issues of public concern. Preparing an alternate budget involves analyzing a government’s proposed budget and based on a costing exercise, influencing budget allocations by producing viable alternatives or by monitoring budget execution, particularly as it affects disadvantaged or vulnerable groups.

**Children’s budgets.** For almost a decade in South Africa, a civil society coalition strove to increase the amount, age cohort, and coverage of the child support grant to disadvantaged communities and to improve its administration (annex 1.25). Since 2002, Zimbabwe’s Child-Friendly National Budget Initiative has also worked to hold the government accountable for resource allocation and use of funds for the benefit of children (annex 1.34).

**Gender budgets.** Since 1997, the Tanzania Gender Networking Program has promoted the examination of policy making and resource allocation with a gender perspective as well as the adoption of tools to mainstream gender considerations in government budgets (annex 1.30). In addition to other budget issues, SEKNAS FITRA (Indonesia Transparency Budget Forum), an Indonesian CSO, also works to make budget processing and implementation more gender-responsive at the provincial level through its Gender Budget Program (annex 1.35).

**Budgets for the disabled.** The Lebanese Physically Handicapped Union has produced alternative budgets that underline serious deficiencies in Lebanon’s social services and incorporate the needs and perspectives of all Lebanese social groups, including the disabled (annex 2.25). In Kazakhstan, the CSO Namys has collaborated with the government to ratify the state’s policy on disability rehabilitation and to improve allocations for its rehabilitation program (annex 1.50).

**Budgets for disadvantaged groups.** In India, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights led the campaign against the diversion of the Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan funds, a pro rata proportion of which is to be used specifically for Dalits, a segment of the population that has traditionally been outcast and has contended with deep-rooted educational, social, and economic discrimination (annex 1.75). In Pakistan, three years after the devastating earthquake, the Omar Asghar Khan Foundation led a campaign to realign rehabilitation assistance with people’s priorities and ensure that resources were being equitably distributed in Hazara (annex 1.81).
Main Findings

are being used for BT&M across the 95 documented cases (figure 6).

During the budget formulation stage, the majority of cases either attempt to solicit public input for the national or district budgets (e.g., prebudget consultations in Canada or participatory planning in the West Bank and Gaza, annexes 1.83 and 1.73, respectively) or produce alternate budgets for the benefit of certain issues or population groups (e.g., the cost-benefit analyses and action plans that South Africa’s Treatment Action campaign produced to make the case for increasing the health budget’s provision for HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, annex 1.26).

The budget approval phase involves a broader range of activities, including detailed budget analysis (e.g., Namibia’s Institute for Public Policy Research, annex 1.16); simplification and dissemination of the budget (Luta Hamutuk’s work in Timor Leste, annex 1.46 and the World Bank’s work in Cameroon, annex 1.1); and advocacy that spans many forms, such as engaging with government officials (Integrity Watch Afghanistan, annex 1.74) or legislators (Israel’s Adva Center, FIgure 5.

Note: The percentage of key sectors exceeds 100 percent because several initiatives involve more than one key sector.

BOX 4. BT&M IN FRAGILE AND POSTCONFLICT SITUATIONS

The process of recovery and transition from violent conflict and fragile situations is complex, and standard solutions are usually ineffective. Poverty levels are typically high and welfare outcomes low. The stability and social cohesion necessary for development is often lacking. When it comes to budget transparency, the influence of fragility and weak institutions manifests itself in a variety of ways, including a lack of access to budget data, low technical capacity of CSOs and the state, and inaccurate information.

In these contexts, therefore, building the capacity of the supply side is usually a priority. A classic approach is to focus on Public Financial Management reforms, and Sierra Leone is a case in point where the World Bank’s Integrated PFM Reform Project is working to strengthen civil service, fight corruption, and strengthen PFM. However, it is equally important to link these supply-side efforts with demand-side social accountability mechanisms in order to build legitimacy, trust, and the often-broken social contract between citizens and the state. For instance, the Bank project in Sierra Leone has interrelated components (annex 1.21). One component supports capacity development of nonstate actors (NGOs and civil society) for the monitoring and oversight of PFM functions and for exercising scrutiny over the use of public resources, while other components focus on strengthening macro fiscal coordination and central finance functions, and reinforcing the control system for improved service delivery. In other words, a major factor in the consolidation of a peace process with progress already made is the improved management of public resources combined with the empowerment of local communities to monitor funds. This is especially true in postconflict settings.

Another World Bank-supported project with the same approach is the Municipal Development Project in West Bank and Gaza, where improving financial management was as crucial as improving planning capacities and encouraging community participation (annex 1.73). The project helped over 50 municipal governments to collaborate with communities to develop simple Strategic Development and Investment Plans which have facilitated greater disclosure of information regarding financial data and municipal budgets and projects and achievements.
The budget execution stage generally entails budget tracking for a project or sector or the monitoring of discretionary funds. For example, the Uganda Debt Network has worked with citizen monitors to track funds expended on schools in the Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido, and Kumi districts of Teso region (annex 1.32). In Paraguay, Federación de Entidades Vecinalistas del Paraguay has worked with neighborhood associations to monitor the Special Projects Fund that supports the building of community infrastructure and generates employment (annex 2.19).

The budget oversight stage has involved both bottom-up and top-down approaches. An example of the former is efforts by the Kenyan group Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) to organize community-level social audits. These were followed by public hearings in which both community members and public officials participated (annex 1.10). In terms of the latter, the Supreme Tribunal of Accounts in Honduras has worked with CSOs to engage in eight government audits in the areas of education, health, infrastructure, the environment, and municipalities (annex 1.67).

The following section provides a more detailed breakdown of BT&M activities in support of citizen and CSO understanding of budget issues, developing expertise to analyze and compare budgets, and collaborating across boundaries. A summary of these activities is presented in table 1.

Supporting Nonstate and State Actors to Understand Budgets and Budget Issues

Providing training, technical assistance, and budget-literacy education. Budget training and sensitization has traditionally focused on citizens and civil society groups, but it is increasingly being used to educate legislatures, members of the civil service, journalists, and, to a limited degree, the private sector. For example, SEKNAS FITRA, the Indonesia Transparency Budget Forum CSO, maintains Indonesian language budget resource centers that are accessible to the public. The World Bank Institute has launched programs that provide tools and training to CSOs and their government counterparts as well as journalists and media owners to enhance citizen participation throughout the budget process (annexes 2.32 and 2.33).

Producers City Budgets. Citizens Budgets have emerged as an increasingly popular tool to mobilize citizens and promote budget awareness. They are produced both by NGOs (e.g., Namibia’s Institute for Public Policy Research) and

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**FIGURE 6. TYPES OF MECHANISMS USED BY BT&M INITIATIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticorruption</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litigation</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory Budgeting</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplification</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentage of activities exceeds 100 percent because several initiatives involve more than one activity.
TABLE 1. ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET TRANSPARENCY AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Engagement</th>
<th>Activities Related to Budget Transparency and Monitoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Disclosure**    | • Engaging with government officials to gain access to budget records (e.g., Kenya, A1.10).  
                 | • Using freedom-of-information laws to request access to budget information (Argentina, A1.57).  
                 | • Producing budget-tracking tools that provide constituency-level information on a project, including timeline, description, status, and multiyear disbursement schedule. (e.g., Kenya, A1.12).  
                 | • Designing and launching online portals to track procurement (e.g., Nigeria, A1.17) as well as budget execution and overseas development assistance (Timor Leste, A1.47). |
| **Simplification**| • Producing simplified budget guides (e.g., Ethiopia, A1.4).  
                  | • Producing Citizens Budgets (e.g., Namibia, A1.16).  
                  | • Producing simplified templates that consolidate and integrate information about service providers with information acquired from social audits (e.g., Nepal, A1.80). |
| **Dissemination** | • Organizing budget forums to disseminate information on current budget proposals (e.g., Zambia, A1.33).  
                  | • Organizing one-day interactive dialogues on budget transparency for local authorities and community leaders (e.g., Sri Lanka, A1.82).  
                  | • Organizing online participatory forums where local communities affected by projects can post comments, videos, links, and relevant documents (e.g., Brazil, A1.59).  
                  | • Setting up budget information boards in public places or local offices in order to present key budget information and event announcements (e.g., Azerbaijan, A1.48).  
                  | • Publishing databases or interactive maps of funded projects, including project descriptions and locations as well as information about beneficiaries (e.g., Mexico, A1.68).  
                  | • Sharing alternate budgets or public finance bulletins with the media and public officials (e.g., Poland, A1.53). |
| **Participatory Planning/ Budgeting** | • Sending geotargeted SMS messages to citizens inviting them to budget assemblies and allowing them to vote and provide feedback on preferred investment priorities (e.g., DRC, A1.3).  
                  | • Providing support to district municipalities in preparing a participatory district development plan (e.g., Peru, A.71).  
                  | • Preparing a Citizens Charter of Demands to consolidate and present priorities of citizens (e.g., India, A1.79) |
| **Analysis**      | • Developing a framework to analyze budget expenditures and allocations (e.g., Tanzania, A1.28).  
                  | • Conducting in-depth review of government budget documents for specific sectors (e.g., South Africa, A1.25).  
                  | • Examining annual growth of certain budget items and identifying trends (e.g., Nigeria, A1.19).  
                  | • Reviewing budget documents to assess trends in over- or underspending (e.g., Argentina, A1.57). |
| **Monitoring**    | • Developing internal performance indicators to assess progress of legislatures or local, provincial, and national governments (e.g., Ghana, A1.7).  
                  | • Collecting primary and secondary data on allocation and disbursements at the regional and district levels (e.g., Ghana, A1.9).  
                  | • Developing tools to measure corruption and inefficiency in public procurement (e.g., Philippines, A1.45).  
                  | • Establishing and training community budget oversight committees (e.g., Sierra Leone, A1.22).  
                  | • Organizing regular project site visits to follow up on project implementation (e.g., South Africa, A1.23).  
                  | • Mobilizing civil society as observers during bidding and procurement processes carried out by governments (e.g., Philippines, A1.42). |
| **Audit**         | • Organizing social audit hearings (e.g., Kenya, A1.10).  
                  | • Collaborating with the supreme audit institution to report budget waste (e.g., South Korea, A1.89) or conduct audits (e.g., Honduras, A1.67).  
                  | • Monitoring execution of investment works through citizen audit monitors (e.g., Colombia, A1.61). |

(continued)
The World Bank’s Financial Transparency and Accountability Initiative provided support to Ethiopia’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development to produce a simplified budget guide and budget templates as well as budget training modules (annex 1.4).

**Raising awareness and mobilizing communities and citizens.** A wide variety of tools have been developed to disseminate budget information and to get buy-in from citizens regarding fiscal transparency issues. For instance, the World Bank’s Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) in Nepal developed “frequently asked questions” (FAQ) flyers to inform stakeholders of the principles of good governance and social audits for schools (annex 1.80).

CSOs often work with the media to draw attention to advocacy campaigns, such as the “Bounced Check” rally organized by the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (annex 1.75) or the “sit-in” in front of the parliament building led by the Omar Asghar Khan Foundation in Pakistan (annex 1.81). CSOs have also organized civil disobedience marches, distributed petitions, engaged in door-to-door advocacy (South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign, annex 1.26), involved nontraditional groups—including young people—in budget discussions and monitoring (Brazil’s Teenagers’ Rights movement, annex 1.58), and facilitated interactive dialogues on budget transparency between government officials and communities (Sri Lanka’s Centre for Policy Alternatives, annex 1.82).

Governments have organized consultative groups to engage with CSOs and other stakeholders (Dominican Republic, annex 1.64) and have worked with development partners to train and institutionalize citizen monitors and watchdog groups (Colombia, annex 1.61). Both CSOs and governments have also organized pre- and postbudget hearings (Kenya’s Institute for Economic Affairs, annex 1.11; Canada’s Ministry of Finance, annex 1.83).
Developing and Using Specific Expertise to Analyze and Compare Budget Data

Using technical analysis to address budget issues. Both CSOs and governments use technical analyses to broaden and stimulate budget debates and to promote ex ante and ex post accountability for the use of public finances. Some CSOs scrutinize the government’s overall fiscal framework (e.g., Poland’s Gdansk Institute, annex 1.53), while others have assumed an approach oriented toward a particular sector (Luta Hamutuk’s work on the extractives sector in Timor Leste, annex 1.46) or a beneficiary group (NANGO’s work on Children’s Budgets in Zimbabwe, annex 1.34). Governments (e.g., Kenya and Moldova) have used tools such as BOOST to compile detailed data on public expenditures from national treasury systems to assess how to reduce budget deficits and restore medium-term structural balance (annex 1.95).

Producing tools and templates. Civil society and development partners can be instrumental in producing tools that can help to improve budget transparency and monitoring. In addition to the simplified “My School At-a-Glance” template outlining details on school-level demographics and resources, the World Bank’s Budget Transparency Initiative in Nepal produced the “School Governance Assessment Tool” that combines information on the social audit process, management of school finances, and the conduct of the School Management Committee (annex 1.80). Procurement Watch in the Philippines developed the “Differential Expenditure Efficiency Measurement Tool” to measure corruption and inefficiency in public procurement; it has been tested in collaboration with the government’s internal audit agency (annex 1.45).

Producing rankings and assessments. Government bodies and civil society groups have used assessment mechanisms to track commitments or produce rankings that compare progress and deficiencies in fiscal transparency. The Dominican Republic’s Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative uses a traffic light scorecard system to measure government agency compliance with an agreed roadmap to improve governance and to remind the agencies about milestones. Green indicates that the initiative’s recommendations have been completely adopted; yellow indicates that progress has been achieved but that some actions have yet to be implemented; and red indicates that implementation has been delayed (annex 1.64). The Institute for Public Finance, a Croatian CSO, produced the Croatian Open Local Budget Index that measured the quantity and quality of publicly available local budget information and the extent to which local budget processes are open to the public in 33 cities (annex 2.12).

Collaborating Across Boundaries

Forming coalitions. Civil society has made efforts to establish and foster coalitions for undertaking BT&M work. In addition to strengthening negotiating power in terms of numbers, coalitions have enabled CSOs to draw on various sources of expertise and, particularly in contexts where such activities are decentralized, expand monitoring networks (see box 5). For example, the three civil society groups involved in Mexico’s 2007 Subsidios al Campo campaign brought together different and necessary competencies to redress the unequal distribution of farm subsidies: FUNDAR, an urban-based CSO with budget skills; Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo (ANEC), a grassroots organization of small agricultural producers; and the Environmental Working Group, an organization with experience in building an open-access dataset on farm subsidies in the United States and raising awareness about the concentration of benefits among wealthier recipients (annex 1.68). In order to curb the misuse of the School Facilities Grant at the community level in Uganda’s Teso region, the Uganda Debt Network helped to establish the Teso Anti-Corruption Coalition that brought together representatives of communities from multiple districts to identify instances of corruption (annex 1.32).

Cooperating with government. Civil society groups and public officials have collaborated to curb corruption and improve the utilization of public funds. For instance, the Colombian Anticorruption Presidential Commission, with World Bank support, launched Citizens’ Visible Audits to promote transparency and citizen participation, specifically in the management of royalties for contracts overseen by state agencies. Between 2008 and 2010, 20 projects in the education sector were audited through this effort, representing investments of US$36,000 (annex 1.61).

Collaborating with development partners. While the majority of CSO-led BT&M initiatives in this stock-take are donor-funded exercises, growing international interest in improving governance outcomes has led to more
cooperating with the private sector. Even though the primary focus of BT&M work is public sector accountability, it also involves interactions with the private sector, particularly in the context of procurement. One government-led example is that of the efforts of Liberia’s Public Procurement and Concessions Commission to advance procurement reform by organizing regular trainings for local suppliers of goods and services about how to submit strong competitive bids (annex 1.13).

Supporting oversight institutions. In addition to working with legislatures to improve their budget literacy and internal administrative and financial management (e.g., the Canadian Parliamentary Center), CSOs like Israel’s Adva Center and Kenya’s Social Development Network engage intensively with members of parliament during the budget debate process by providing briefings and sharing alternative approaches to the budget. There is also an increasing uptake of collaboration between civil society and supreme audit institutions, such as opportunities proffered to citizens by the Supreme Tribunal of Accounts of Honduras to participate in government audits (annex 1.67).
Litigating to advance public interests. Civil society groups have generally resorted to using public interest litigation when other means of engaging with the government to address budget issues have been unsuccessful. In 2001, South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign won a case that it filed against the government in the high court to enjoin the introduction of a full-scale Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission program for HIV/AIDS. The court ordered the government to draw up an implementation plan for this program within three months and ultimately, by 2010, the initiative covered over 80 percent of all expectant mothers in the country (annex 1.26).

How long does it take for BT&M initiatives to produce results?

For ease of analysis, the timeframe for the 95 documented initiatives has been divided into four categories: (1) less than one year; (2) 1–5 years; (3) 5–10 years and; (4) 10+ years.

As depicted in figure 7, the majority of BT&M initiatives documented as case studies lasted 1–5 years. Most of these initiatives succeeded in bringing about behavioral and process or policy changes. However, these changes have not always been institutionalized or replicated. While the majority of the examples consist of campaigns to increase budget allocations for specific sectors or disadvantaged groups (e.g., Tanzania Gender Networking Program, annex 1.30), there are instances of CSO-led activities at the budget execution stage that have succeeded in having short-term influences (e.g., the tracking of constituency development funds by MUHURI in Kenya, annex 1.10) or medium-term influences (e.g., the tracking of constituency development funds by Pork Barrel Watch in the Philippines, annex 1.44). Initiatives led by governments and development partners tend to require less time to meet their objectives.

Initiatives that have continued for longer than a decade include economic analyses conducted by think tanks and academic institutions and budget tracking and monitoring initiatives undertaken by organizations with robust and expansive grassroots support. Established in 2001, Namibia’s Institute for Fiscal Policy Research continues to conduct budget analyses and provide policy recommendations (annex 1.16). Similarly, India’s Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan has been led by grassroots support from peasants and workers since its formation in 1990 (annex 1.78).

Depending on the political context and demands involved, other civil society BT&M campaigns have taken longer than five years to achieve desired outcomes that brought about institutional changes. A case in point is the decade that passed before a civil society coalition could convince the South African government to increase the amount and age cohort of the child support grant in the context of a macroeconomic policy that prioritized reducing budget deficits and other measures of fiscal discipline (annex 1.25).

19 BT&M initiatives became functional during the past 5-10 years and continue to be engaged in ongoing activities. For instance, the Gambia’s Pro-Poor Advocacy Group was launched in 2003 to promote dialogue among stakeholders with the goal of opening up the budget process to citizen participation and continues to work towards this objective (annex 1.5).

Results of this stock-take are mixed for BT&M work conducted for less than one budget cycle. In the case of the Marshall Islands (annex 1.39), for example, an attempt to institutionalize gender budgeting over the course of 18 months failed. But activities such as producing budget transparency assessments (annex 2.12) and organizing a right-to-budget information campaign (annex 1.93) to disseminate knowledge about the state of budget transparency have been moderately successful.

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10. Impacts can be uneven and often depend on numerous factors, such as positive or negative shifts in the political economy. In some cases, impacts can be rolled back. Because the stock-take was based on a desk review of cases that invariably did not refer to the rolling back of impacts, this has not been explicitly discussed.
WHAT RESULTS HAVE BT&M INITIATIVES ACHIEVED?

This section analyzes the results of BT&M initiatives within a social accountability framework of behavioral changes, including information-seeking, accountability-seeking, and development outcome-seeking behavior as well as institutional changes comprised of process and policy changes.

This stock-take confirms the findings from existing literature that BT&M initiatives are generally successful in meeting their stated goals (McGee and Gaventa 2011) and that while there is no tangible evidence that the initiatives lead to better development outcomes, they have met more intermediate goals like exposing corruption. Results have been highlighted in table 2 by categorizing the outcomes in terms of behavioral, process, and policy changes. It is assumed that, over time, a combination of increased information and accountability will lead to institutional changes that might accelerate the achievement of concrete development outcomes.

While the framework used to capture outcomes based on behavior and process changes is useful, it is often difficult to maintain a strict dichotomy between them for two reasons:

Table 2. Mapping BT&M outcomes across the budget cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Budget Cycle</th>
<th>Behavioral Changes</th>
<th>Process Changes</th>
<th>Policy Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td>• The executive invites CSOs to contribute to documents outlining medium-term government priorities (Nigeria, annex 1.19). • Development partners agree to channel more aid to budget initiatives (Afghanistan, annex 1.74).</td>
<td>• Provincial governments start opening up the budget formulation process (India, annex 1.79). • The government makes public the budget summary, a Citizens Budget, the enacted budget, and in-year reports (Democratic Republic of Congo, annex 1.2).</td>
<td>• The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance conducts prebudget hearings in accordance with a standing order of Parliament (Canada, annex 1.83).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>• CSOs use awareness-raising tactics (e.g., Ask Your Government Campaign radio diaries (annex 1.93) and Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan’s street theater (annex 1.78).</td>
<td>• There are increased allocations for social development for three consecutive fiscal years in response to the evidence provided by alternate budgets (e.g., the Social Watch Philippines’ Alternate Budget Campaign, annex 1.43).</td>
<td>• Legislatures draft or amend legislation (Indonesia, annex 1.35).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Citizens begin providing input and feedback on the budget process and report budget waste (South Korea, annex 1.89). • Citizens participate in social audits (Kenya, annex 1.10).</td>
<td>• Governments and the private sector generate savings through better procurement practices (Philippines, annex 1.45).</td>
<td>• The government begins using public expenditure tracking surveys to track execution of funds (Malawi, annex 1.14). • The government enacts a new law to promote budget transparency in procurement contracting (Law No. 10/010 of April 27, 2010, Democratic Republic of Congo, annex 1.2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight</td>
<td>• The supreme audit institution invites the public to engage in state audits (South Korea, annex 1.89).</td>
<td>• Supreme audit institutions improve oversight by getting budget waste reports (South Korea, annex 1.89) or by working with citizen monitors (Honduras, annex 1.67).</td>
<td>• The government introduces external audit systems to local governments (Japan, annex 1.88).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main Findings

Because most BT&M initiatives are not based on theories of change that are well mapped out, it can be difficult to distinguish between milestones of changing behaviors and processes. For example, the goal of the Ask Your Government campaign (annex 1.93) was to illustrate the real-life experiences of citizens going through the process of requesting budget information from their governments and to offer concrete evidence on the problems civil society faces in accessing public budget information in a wide range of countries. This can easily be characterized as information-seeking behavior. However, in instances such as Brazil’s Teenager’s Rights Movement (annex 1.58), it is harder to differentiate whether the activities of the youth involved can be characterized as accountability-seeking behavior, development outcome-seeking behavior, or both.

There are overlapping areas between the behavioral changes of nonstate actors and institutional changes by state actors as well as changes in perceptions and understanding of both state and nonstate actors and the development of understanding (or lack thereof) between these two sets of stakeholders. For instance, the opportunity to provide input into the budget has encouraged an increasing number of Canadians to engage in the budget formulation process, and this high level of participation has in turn motivated the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance to take ownership of public consultations (annex 1.83).

With regard to both institutionalized outcomes and replication of CSO-led BT&M practices by governments and other CSOs, the results of this stock-take are encouraging. For example, a World Bank-led Citizen Visible Audit project in Colombia (annex 1.61) expanded to 158 audits in 29 communities in 2008–09, covering public works funded by US$348 million from royalty funds. In response to irregularities uncovered by the Japan Citizens’ Ombudsman Association, the government amended the law to add an external audit system for local governments that now includes a lawyer, an accountant, and a tax accountant who are required to draft audit reports (annex 1.88).

While some of the outcomes listed can be characterized as one-time benefits, even when BT&M initiatives do not lead to institutionalized outcomes in the short- or medium-term, over time and over several iterations, several have influenced more successful campaigns. In South Africa, Equal Education—a community- and membership-based NGO—built on the Amasango and Seven Schools public interest litigation cases (annex 1.24) by making a deliberate effort to challenge the systemic issues plaguing the education system. As a result, the court directed the government to set minimum norms and standards for school infrastructure.

WHAT ARE THE COMMON CHALLENGES?

This section outlines some difficulties that emerged across the multiple BT&M initiatives included in this stock-take, including limited capacity, legal frameworks, limited time horizons, lack of institutionalization, and unwilling stakeholders.

Limited Capacity

Even though the expansion of BT&M initiatives is a proxy attestation of improved demand-side capacity for engaging in this type of work, gaps in budget literacy, limited technical skills and staffing, and financing constraints remain challenges by reducing incentives either to initiate budget work or continue it over the medium and long term.

While litigation and other budget transparency mechanisms can successfully expand the responsibilities and/or priorities of the state, it is often the case that there is no corresponding expansion in the state’s ability to administratively or financially deliver on them. It took the Treatment Action Campaign a decade to convince the government to increase the grant amount and coverage for the child support grant. The relatively slow pace of these reforms had much to do with the South African government’s unwillingness to acknowledge the seriousness of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, but budget constraints constituted another key issue. Corresponding staff and time constraints such as those encountered in implementing Colombia’s integrity pacts (annex 1.62) make it more difficult to engage with citizens on budgets even if there is support from higher levels of government.

Restricted Access to Budget Information

Even though public access to budget information has improved (the average Open Budget Index score for 40 comparable countries increased from 47 to 57 percent between 2006 and 2012), citizens still have difficulty acquiring needed budget information, well illustrated by the Ask...
Your Government Campaign, during which only 1 out of 80 countries (New Zealand) provided substantive answers to all six budget information requests (annex 1.93).

However, relevant mechanisms and staff capacity for compiling, directing, and responding to budget information requests may not be available. Generally, there is not a single integrated unit in the Ministry of Finance—or any other ministry—that responds to demands for this information. Even in a case like South Korea’s Budget Waste Hotline that provides a mechanism to solicit public feedback, the government, as it contended with budget cuts, phased out the public relations campaign encouraging citizens to report waste (annex 1.89).

Furthermore, it is important to note that while governments may make budget information available through a Ministry of Finance website, this may not be particularly beneficial if literacy rates are low or if a limited percentage of the population has access to the Internet. In Honduras, only 11.8 percent of the population has Internet access, of which only 44 percent have the ability to access the information from home (annex 1.66).

**Lack of Enabling Legal Frameworks**

While the absence of right-to-information legislation (e.g., MUHURI’s struggle to gain access to constituency development fund records) is a difficult issue to contend with, another hindrance is the use of legal loopholes to escape the consequences of corruption. This is manifested by a case in Mexico where Provida, a nongovernmental organization, failed to pay a penalty imposed by the internal controller for the misuse of funds designated for HIV/AIDS treatment. Similarly, inadequacies in Mexico’s judicial process have allowed the president of the budget committee who was instrumental in Provida acquiring the government grant to escape indictment (annex 1.69).

**Lack of Institutionalization**

Even though most CSO-led BT&M campaigns included in this stock-take have managed to meet their immediate objectives, often no institutionalized systems and practices are put in place for effective governance and public accountability. An illustration of this is FUNDAR’s campaign to convince the Mexican government to increase budget allocations for the Arranque Parejo en la Vida program that sought to reduce maternal and child mortality. FUNDAR and its partners were able to successfully lobby the federal government for a tenfold increase in the budgetary allocation for the program in the 2003 budget. However, by 2004, the government had included these funds in a highly aggregated budget for a blanket health protection scheme, making it impossible to determine whether or not the resources for the program’s implementation had been impacted by that year’s budget cuts (annex 1.70).

**Short Timelines and Limited Funding**

It is difficult to achieve structural changes in governance arrangements and build capacity in government institutions and CSOs within a one-year timeframe. In addition to the breakdown of funding, this was a key drawback of the gender budget project that the Asian Development Bank and the University of South Australia piloted in the Marshall Islands (annex 1.39). Additionally, some of the examples in this stock-take attest that, short of institutionalization, replication and scaling-up of BT&M involves medium- to long-term processes. An example of this is the Parliamentary Centre’s work with the Russian legislature, which started in 1994 with parliamentary development and staff training for the two chambers of the Russian federal assembly and the regional legislatures; by 2004, it had evolved into the Accountability Strengthening Program, launched to realize the gains that had been made by strengthening the linkages between the Russian supreme audit institution and the Russian federal assembly (annex 1.54).

**Reluctant and/or Disinterested Stakeholders**

There are examples of executive branches being unwilling to engage in efforts to change the status quo because it is usually their activities being scrutinized by CSO-led BT&M initiatives. In extreme cases, this includes banning CSO activities, as was the case in 2005 when the Tanzanian government imposed a ban on HakiElimu for “misinforming the public about the state of education in the country” (annex 1.29). Similarly, efforts to improve budget transparency have been perceived as opposition tactics to discredit the current government or as lip service for short-term political gains. Moreover, weak demand for transparency, particularly at the local level, does not bode well for improving governance.
It is also possible that there are genuine time constraints that make it more difficult to meet demands for transparency. During the implementation of integrity pacts in Colombia, the public administration was torn between the legitimate goal of attaining results in the short term and the need to devote sufficient time to design and structure good projects as well as to the monitoring of these projects by third parties. Another challenge was to get the civil servants to devote sufficient time to listen to firms, civil society, and citizens in general, and to provide well-substantiated responses to their questions.

Contention among key actors on how to change the status quo, particularly during short-term projects, can pose difficulties. The Asutifi subnational project in Ghana faced challenges resolving differences about whether it should focus on helping the district forecast and manage volatile revenues or on encouraging participatory budget planning. This division deterred the success of the project because several initiatives were started but were not carried through to fruition (annex 1.6).

Even though the media has been an instrumental source of support for BT&M campaigns, its focus of interest cannot be taken for granted. For example, while coalition members leading the Subsidios al Campo campaign wanted to emphasize issues of inequality in the rural sector such as agricultural subsidy distribution, journalists were more interested in ferreting out any scandalous findings.

Some multi-stakeholder groups, such as the Gambia’s Pro Poor Advocacy group, have successfully involved multiple stakeholders to engage in a continued dialogue and to open up budget processes. Others have not been particularly useful, either because of a heavy bias in their composition in favor of the government that would put them in a stronger position to stamp out dissent, or as was the case for the Stakeholder Working Group for the Bayelsa Expenditure and Income Transparency Initiative in Nigeria, because policy and budget decisions were made without taking into account input from CSO representatives (annex 1.18).

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11. BT&M interventions often include activities relating to motivating and training journalists.
The fact that almost all of the initiatives documented in this stock-taking exercise achieved their objectives demonstrates the great potential of BT&M activities to unearth problems and increase accountability. To make lasting change, the process must be institutionalized. Several lessons can be extracted from this exercise that may be relevant for project teams and practitioners as they promote open and accountable budget systems and practices.

**Plan for Long-Term Engagement**

Engagement over a number of budget cycles is often necessary for institutionalization or replication. Even though government-led attempts to improve fiscal accountability are easier to institutionalize than CSO led efforts, they often take several years to become established and demonstrate results. A short timeframe is valuable for raising awareness and increasing understanding of nuanced budget issues, but it usually takes several budget cycles for budget reforms to take root. It is also useful to have a profound understanding of the budgetary decision-making process and its politics, especially because of the wider governance implications that they often have. This was evident in the attempts of the Asian Development Bank and University of South Australia to pilot gender budgeting in the Marshall Islands (annex 1.39).

Quick fixes are not always possible or effective. Medium- to long-term CSO campaigns have greater impact because sustainable service delivery and policy reforms often require comprehensive, sequential changes. For example, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights in India first used a right-to-information request to obtain data on funds earmarked for poor and vulnerable scheduled castes. Next, they successfully campaigned to have “code 789” established, which enabled civil society to track funds earmarked for Dalits (annex 1.75). By using this code, they were able to identify funds diverted to the Commonwealth Games and, ultimately, pressured the government into returning the funds to special caste programs.

**Adjust to Context**

**BT&M opportunities that emerge during transitions should be seized.** Political transitions, including upcoming or ongoing elections, measures to curtail fiscal crises, new legislation, policy commitments at the international and domestic levels, and high-profile corruption scandals can provide windows of opportunity to advance BT&M. The prospect of upcoming elections for example, enabled MUHURI in Kenya to obtain previously unavailable constituency development fund records from one parliamentarian who had a political incentive to be transparent (annex 1.10).

Fragile and postconflict situations call for an incremental approach. In fragile and low-capacity contexts, an incremental approach that starts with the basics (e.g., capacity building, simplifying, disclosing, and disseminating local-level budgets) is more likely to succeed. In Liberia, capacity building was accompanied by improved incentive schemes, and intensive in-service training (annex 1.13). This focus on the career development of the training participants ensured their commitment to the cause.

**BT&M initiatives are more likely to be successful when embedded in large programs or projects.** In the case of Ethiopia’s Protection of Basic Services project, fiscal transparency received traction because it was integral to the project. It helped to scale up the project and secure required attention from its development partners and government ministries and garner political support. Further, new methodologies and tools, such as those associated with the protection of basic services, often require a long incubation and learning phase that can be accommodated in large projects such as this one (annex 1.4). Similarly, the World Bank-supported Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative in the...
Dominican Republic confirmed that successful implementation requires the continued commitment and engagement of national and local political leadership and international development agencies as well as constant pressure from a dense network of coalitions (annex 1.64).

Use a Range of Analytical Tools and Mobilization Approaches

A wide range of tools can be used to promote budget transparency. Tools include Citizens Budgets and simplified budget guides, such as those produced by Ethiopia’s Financial Transparency and Accountability Initiative (annex 1.4); information dissemination platforms, such as those used by the BNDES Platform in Brazil (annex 1.59); radio diaries, such as those used by local CSOs in Malawi and Uganda during the Ask Your Government campaign (annex 1.93); web consultations and face-to-face roundtables by Canada’s House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance and the Department of Finance (annex 1.83); web portals that provide information on budgets, procurement aid, and project results, such as those set up by the government of Timor Leste (annex 1.47); simplified budget templates, such as those used by the World Bank’s Budget Transparency Initiative projects in Cameroon and Nepal (annexes 1.1 and 1.80); and South Korea’s budget waste hotline (annex 1.89). However, the use and effectiveness of such tools, particularly information and communication technology tools, is wholly dependent on context. For example, lessons learned from Nigeria’s procurement portal observatory demonstrate that citizens may not automatically use available technology in the absence of incentives (and the means) to do so. Information might need to be translated into local languages and presented in an organized fashion by sectors or localities so that citizens can monitor areas of particular interest to them (annex 1.17).

Mass mobilization around budget issues is possible—and has happened before. A major challenge for BT&M initiatives that are focused on citizen and civil society action is reaching a critical mass of pressure on officials to heed demands that have been raised. It may be crucial for great numbers of people to rally around specific BT&M-related demands to gain political traction, especially in democracies, because elected leaders have to be responsive to popular pressure in order to be reelected. This stock-take has documented that large numbers of people can be motivated to engage on budget issues if the media is used strategically, if CSOs coalesce around a single cause, and if issues are taken up that have a very concrete impact on many people’s lives, despite the dry nature of all things budget-related.

Technical budget analysis that is aligned with government priorities is more useful and convincing. Examples of this type of successful alignment can be found in the Treatment Action Campaign’s cost-benefit analyses and well-researched action plans in South Africa (annex 1.26); they were helpful in attempts to increase allocations and expenditures on HIV/AIDS because the government was already contending with efficiency and implementation issues in this sector.

Collaboration between CSOs and government entities yields the best results. As with Pakistan’s Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation following the 2005 earthquake, World Bank projects can include reputable advocacy organizations as executing agencies to help increase the effectiveness of their monitoring efforts and use of resources. World Bank teams, through their convening power, can catalyze partnerships between CSOs and government ministries for BT&M.

Strengthen Legislation

Laws matter. They can provide teeth to citizen demands for particular services; patchy legal frameworks allow officials committing fraud to escape sanctions. This stock-take features several cases in which a minimum level of service provision to citizens was enshrined in law, allowing civil society to sue the government for failing to meet its obligations. This type of public interest litigation has proven successful in several cases, providing powerful legal trappings to demands for good governance. On the other hand, this stock-take also includes cases in which officials convicted of fraud never served their sentences because of loopholes in legal frameworks. Therefore, in environments with independent judiciaries willing to rule against the government, advocating for the adoption of particular laws can provide excellent openings for advocacy campaigns and offers disincentives toward corrupt behavior.
Support State Institutions

Ministries often need support in responding to budget transparency demands. Today, in over 100 developing and transitional countries, civil society is actively engaged in the public budget process. And although there is a fair amount of demand for budget transparency, there is not yet a concomitant expansion of state capacity to respond to it—financially or administratively. Ministries often need support to respond to these demands, which could be provided in the form of a dedicated unit or even autonomous entities such as parliamentary budget offices that are solely responsible for responding to BT&M demands. BT&M work in Afghanistan revealed that it was difficult to access budget information because there is no integrated unit in the Ministry of Finance—or in any ministry for that matter—that was responsible for providing such information upon request (annex 1.74). These supply-side constraints act as deterrents to BT&M efforts.

**BT&M activities must be extended to subnational governments.** Provincial and local-level governments are at the frontlines of service delivery. They suffer from issues such as lower capacity and weak budget execution. To achieve better development outcomes, more systematic consideration must be given to BT&M at subnational levels, especially the local level, through technical assistance and capacity-building activities that focus on local-level officials as well as CSOs.

A nonpartisan approach to working with legislatures may be effective. High-level technical analysis combined with training for parliamentarians is useful to build their capacity to engage more effectively in the budget process (e.g., World Bank Institute’s work on creating autonomous parliamentary budget offices to support parliamentarians in their BT&M work, annex 1.94). This also makes it easier to work at the regional and local levels by mitigating the suspicion surrounding budget work. Adopting a nonpartisan approach, such as that of Israel’s Adva Center (annex 1.86) and serving all legislators regardless of party affiliation helps to expand the budget debate and establish the legitimacy of the concerned entity with government officials and the public.

Supreme audit institutions can be engaged as willing partners in BT&M. Increasingly featured in both government and CSO-led efforts to promote budget transparency, national supreme audit institutions can be useful allies, both in terms of conducting timely and comprehensive audits of projects and collaborating with citizens to monitor satisfactory implementation of ongoing projects. Relevant improvements in the quality of government audits are possible within a short time period if audit institutions, audited entities, and civil society collaborate.

Support Civil Society Organizations and Other Nonstate Actors

Civil society and citizen networks offer advantages of scale and rationale. A credible national network of citizen groups that advocate for evidence-based change (United States’ State Fiscal Policy Initiative, annex 1.91) can influence policies and allocations. Networks that actively monitor the external auditing process (e.g., Japan’s Citizen Ombudsman, annex 1.88 and South Korea’s Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice, annex 1.90) are strong deterrents for misusing public resources. Such networks also encourage mentorship of new groups and cross-pollination of ideas and strategies on different fiscal issues. In addition to high quality technical analysis and coalition building, garnering grassroots support to push for reforms in budget processes and policies is often helpful. SAPDA’s strategy in Indonesia to convene and train stakeholders helped secure the financing of health security for the disabled. Projects supporting such networks of budget organizations should be considered (annex 1.36).

Complementing advocacy skills of CSOs with technical analytical capacity on BT&M helps build a constructive dialogue. In contexts with a vibrant civil society but relatively inexperienced CSOs, interventions to improve advocacy skills that are complemented by initiatives to strengthen technical capacity can help create a constructive dialogue with government. South–South learning on public procurement and monitoring among CSOs is worthy of integration in projects as well.

The media is often crucial for successful BT&M activities. A common theme in the stock-take is that the media can make or break BT&M efforts. The media is a powerful amplifier of messages, and if it reports on BT&M activities, they will gain more traction immediately. Three things are necessary for this to happen: a political environment that allows the press to freely report on BT&M issues, including corruption; a sufficient capacity of journalists to investigate and analyze budget issues; and media interest in reporting
about such issues. Development partners can significantly contribute to each of these.

**The private sector can play a much larger role in BT&M.** Examples of private sector engagement around BT&M are scarce in this stock-take, but it is evident that there is much potential for it to play a larger role. One major area of engagement is procurement. Many companies have an interest in transparent and fair contract awards but face collective action problems that are difficult to overcome. Donors can use their convening power to help solve such coordination failures. Further, natural resource extraction companies can use their influence to set up mechanisms to ensure that mining royalties going directly to local communities are spent transparently—instead of being pocketed by elites.
Conclusion

The stock taking exercise illustrates the range of mechanisms involved in BT&M in different contexts and demonstrates significant promise of influencing governance processes and outcomes. The vast array of techniques, tools, and strategies for advocacy, analysis, dissemination, and mobilization of different types of actors in producing medium-term results is truly remarkable. The stock-take also reveals gaps that need to be addressed in order to realize long-lasting benefits of BT&M and confirms that theories of change and expected outcomes of BT&M initiatives are not always clear, making it difficult to track and attribute results regardless of timeframes. Finally, there is a dearth of literature on initiatives that have not achieved their goals, which would allow lessons to be drawn from these failures. There are incentives to document successes rather than failures, but there is value in documenting failures because this allows for a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities that may be useful to consider when designing future BT&M interventions.


## Annexes

### Sectors

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<th>Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry</th>
<th>Mining</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law, and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Flood Protection</td>
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</table>
### Annex 1. Summary of Budget Transparency and Monitoring Case Studies

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<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Implementing Organization/Implementing Agency/Name of Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>A1.1. Simplifying and Disseminating Budget Information to Increase Citizen Feedback and Reduce Waste and Corruption</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>National, Provincial, and Local</td>
<td>Education; Health; Public Administration, Law, and Justice (Decentralization, Public Finance)</td>
<td>Budget Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1.2. Using the Open Budget Index to Promote Budget Transparency</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ICT4Gov for Participatory Budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1.4. Simplifying and Disseminating Budgets to Expand Budget Literacy</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1.5. Championing Pro-Poor Budget Policies through Budget Analysis and Training</td>
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<td>Pro-Poor Advocacy Group</td>
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<td>A1.6. Unsustained Budget Monitoring Fails to Improve Weaknesses in Governance Mechanisms</td>
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<td>Local</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Revenue Watch Institute, Integrated Social Development Centre, and Institute of Local Government Studies</td>
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<td>A1.7. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes to Promote Better Budget Oversight</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>National</td>
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<td>A1.8. Analyzing and Publicizing the Budget to Promote Pro-Poor Fiscal Policy</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>A1.9. Tracking District Budget Allocations and Disbursements to Promote the More Efficient Use of Public Resources</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>A1.11. Facilitating the Review of Public Policy and Public Affairs to Inform Budget Decision-making</td>
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A1.1. Simplifying and Disseminating Budget Information to Increase Citizen Feedback and Reduce Waste and Corruption

**CONTEXT**

Despite relatively strong economic growth in recent years, service delivery continues to be poor in Cameroon. When compared to other countries in the region, Cameroon lags behind on many human development indicators and is unlikely to meet any of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. An important reason for this is Cameroon’s weak governance, as evidenced by its consistently low score on the Mo-Ibrahim governance index (45 out of 100 in 2012) and a low ranking on the 2012 Corruption Perception Index (144). As for budget transparency, Cameroon scored only 10 out of 100 on the Open Budget Index in 2012. This reflects the fact that while budgets are public documents accessible to all citizens in principle, in practice, budget information is difficult to come by because of political, administrative, capacity, and logistical constraints as well as cost barriers at all tiers of government, including national, regional, and municipal levels, and at service-delivery points like schools and health centers. To address this problem, a Governance Partnership Facility (GPF)-financed initiative has piloted a citizen-centered approach for disseminating simplified budget information for 151 schools, 58 health centers, 28 municipalities, regional administrations from 2 of Cameroon’s 10 regions, and the national public investment budget.

**ACTIONS (2011–13)**

- The Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) piloted a new approach to simplify, analyze, and disclose budgets at multiple levels (i.e., national, district, health center, and school) and to build the awareness and capacity of government officials at various levels as well as citizens to promote a public dialogue about public expenditures, thereby increasing social accountability.
- BTI introduced transparency into budget processes to reduce waste and corruption and to foster the demand for disclosure of financial information. This was accomplished in two pilot regions of Cameroon by actively engaging citizens and soliciting their feedback.
- Activities primarily targeted health clinic users and staff, parents, teachers, students, local communities, mayors, local civil society organizations (CSOs), and the media in over 230 institutions (151 schools, 58 health centers, and 28 municipalities). They created awareness and engaged citizens through radio programs, theater and art competitions, and newly-established student budget clubs.
- BTI organized and facilitated over 200 public meetings in local communities during which budgets were read out and citizen feedback gathered.
- BTI developed and implemented a local budget transparency index and a website, the “Cameroon Budget Inquirer,” which presents the national public investment budget using appealing graphics. A Facebook page created under the initiative with 2,138 “friends” from the Northwest Region allows interested citizens to exchange views on budget transparency and allowed the World Bank team to remotely supervise activities under the pilot.
- In order to build capacity, over 30 workshops were organized to train heads of schools and health centers on how to fill out simplified budget templates and to explain the roles of different stakeholders, including principals, health center managers, local officials and mayors, during budget dissemination meetings. A workshop to train journalists on how to investigate and report on budget-related issues was also conducted.

**RESULTS**

Anecdotal evidence shows that activities under the BTI were successful in:

- **Increasing tax revenues.** In at least one local council (Ngaoundere III), tax revenues increased after a budget dissemination session because the council managed to raise XAF 763,400 (US$1,527) in cattle taxes for the first time. The mayor attributes the change to activities under the BTI.
- **Empowering parent-teacher associations (PTAs).** Parents reduced their PTA contributions by 50 percent (from US$4 to US$2) at one school after its budget was disclosed because they felt that the school’s official funds were sufficient for most of its needs.
- **Increasing trust between citizens and officials.** Disclosing budget information and directly engaging citizens increased their trust in officials, improving relationships between them. For instance, during a BTI radio program, the mayor of the council of Ngaoundere I could clarify a caller’s question about a bridge he had promised to build.
- **Influencing priorities.** Secondary-school students used dissemination meetings to express their priorities and concerns; in some cases, they were able to influence school priorities and decisions on resource allocation.

(continued)
Reducing corruption. A school principal was forced to return misappropriated funds (XAF 10 million, approximately US$20,000) after students and parents revealed that he had raised fees for items already covered by the lump sum registration fees. In another case, a CSO galvanized by BTI exposed a corrupt health official.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
• For budgets to result in feedback from citizens, better policies, and more efficient resource allocations, budgets not only need to be made public but also simplified and proactively disseminated.
• An index to benchmark local government budget transparency can spur greater transparency and improved performance if implemented repeatedly.

REFERENCES
Cameroon Budget Inquirer:
http://cameroon.openspending.org/en/
Facebook page:
https://www.facebook.com/budgettransparencyinitiative.cameroon?fref=ts
A1.2. Using the Open Budget Index to Promote Budget Transparency

CONTEXT

The 2008 Open Budget Survey (OBS) revealed that of eight key budget documents, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo only provided information on one, the enacted budget, and it only provided that after the budget had already been passed, denying citizens the opportunity to provide input on the budget formulation or execution process. As a result, the overall Open Budget Index (OBI) score was 0 out of 100. Réseau Gouvernance Economique et Démocratie (REGED), a civil society network originally launched to support the postconflict transition process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was well aware of the reasons for this low score. Government employees, for example, are generally subject to administrative secrecy and disclose information only after receiving authorization from senior officials. A high level of administrative secrecy has been observed, particularly as it relates to demands for financial information. Furthermore, the government struggles with data management and reliability. The data exists but its collation is complicated and requires improved capacity. A single directorate is responsible for many tasks, including data collection, budget preparation, and monitoring.

ACTIONS (2008–11)

- After the release of the 2008 OBI in February 2009, REGED directly engaged with the ministry of budget and discussed essential documents that should be published by the government to improve budget transparency. After these sessions, the government began publishing more budget reports in detail, starting with quarterly reports dating back to January 2009.
- REGED organized a workshop for civil society to introduce the Citizens Budget and held a workshop for journalists on the eight key budget documents of the OBS. It also trained media on how to follow the parliamentary debate on the budget law and how to discuss taxation and budget information on television.
- REGED prepared a memorandum for the minister of budget. The memorandum called for the release of documents, the development and publication of a Citizens Budget, and the need to work with officials for joint ownership of budget transparency requirements. Concurrently, it trained provincial assemblies on budget transparency in 7 of the 11 provinces, held formal and informal meetings with parliamentarians and advisers, and submitted formal proposals and briefing notes to government officials to explain and garner support for the memorandum.
- Once the memorandum was signed by the minister, REGED engaged in working sessions with the budget minister’s office to discuss the issues highlighted in the memorandum and helped the ministry develop a Citizens Budget.
- As a civil society representative in the Economic Governance Thematic Group, REGED participated in the committees that produced the March 2010 Strategic Plan for Public Finance Reform and played a key role in introducing the concept of “citizen oversight” in the strategic plan.

RESULTS

- Release of hitherto unpublished budget documents. By the end of September 2010, the government had made the budget summary, a Citizens Budget, the enacted budget, and in-year reports public. As a result, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s overall score rose to 6 in the 2010 OBI. The government also published the executive’s budget proposal for 2010, but did so after the cut-off date used by the OBS to assess the public availability of documents. If this document had been published in a timely manner, the OBS score would have been much higher.
- Enactment of laws promoting budget transparency. Soon after the release of the strategic plan for public finance reform, new laws were enacted that further entrenched budget transparency. Law No. 10/010 of April 27, 2010, which relates to procurement contracts, has several provisions to promote fiscal transparency, including Article 6 that establishes prerequisites for public procurement, the integration of needs assessments within budget planning, and compliance with disclosure requirements and transparency. The provisions of Article 17, which enshrine the principle of bidding for public procurement, constitute important elements of disclosure because the law mandates all offers be published in the press for several weeks.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

Leveraging the World Bank’s convening power to bring together civil society organizations that are willing to engage in evidence-based advocacy with relevant government stakeholders has the potential to result in significant improvements in budget transparency.

REFERENCES

International Budget Partnership Website: www.internationalbudget.org.
A1.3. Using Information and Communication Technology-Mediated Participatory Budgeting to Mobilize Resources for the Poor

CONTEXT
The Democratic Republic of Congo has long suffered from conditions that have prevented the full development of its citizens and communities. Citizens have suffered the effects of conflict and in many provinces are unable to access the most basic of public services. South Kivu is a context where lack of trust between citizens and the government has become a major barrier for better public service delivery. In fact, a core reform area now is decentralization because the transfer of funds from provincial to local governments is not currently mandated by law, nor is participation or feedback from citizens. While many citizens in the province do not have access to water or electricity in their homes, most have mobile phones. Mobile phones are performing a key role in enhancing transparency and accountability. Mobile penetration in the Democratic Republic of Congo is increasing rapidly, from 16 percent to an estimated 47 percent in 2013. In addition, 55 percent of the country’s population resides in areas currently covered by mobile networks, including most rural areas from the eastern province of South Kivu. The World Bank Institute’s ICT4Gov program is leveraging and improving upon this technology to enhance participatory budgeting processes.

RESULTS
- Large volume of SMSs received. Over 250,000 SMSs have gone out, of which 100,000 are received messages from the population. Evidence suggests that even farmers from far flung villages (who cannot travel to meetings) have successfully sent in votes articulating their priorities.
- Better allocation of resources. As senior officials point out, this has substantially improved their understanding of what citizens want and has allowed them to readjust budgets accordingly. They had assumed that health and education were priorities, but they found out that what was in fact more important was infrastructure (e.g., building bridges between schools and farming areas).
- Increase in transfer of funds from provincial to local level. As the provincial government sees an increasing capacity of the local government to better allocate resources, communities involved have already seen an increase in transfer (and regularity) of funds from the provincial to the local level.
- Reduction in tax evasion. The preliminary results of an external evaluation suggest a reduction of tax evasion at the local level, with citizens more willing to pay taxes as they link government spending to an improvement in the delivery of services.
- Greater trust and enthusiasm among citizens. In a survey conducted in 2012, 70 percent indicated that trust between citizens and the leaders of the local governments has been strengthened throughout the process and 92 percent of citizens said they would enthusiastically participate in the new cycle of participatory budgeting in 2012–13.
- Replication of the model in other countries. The mobile usage experiences in South Kivu have been replicated in the Dominican Republic, Cameroon, and Brazil.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In fragile contexts, where levels of trust are low and citizens hard to reach—both because of a lack of trust and because of the limited reach of the state—information and communication technology tools can prove to be powerful for enhancing citizen participation in budgets from a distance. As highlighted above, a large number of citizens were able to make their investment priorities heard, even though they were not at the assembly meetings where investment decisions were made.

REFERENCES
Powerpoint created by project team: http://prezi.com/s0rtts3nlpqz/ict-mediated-participatory-budgeting-in-south-kivu-drc/.
### RESULTS

- **High rate of budget disclosure.** Over the last two years, public budget and service-delivery information has been disclosed at public venues in over 95 percent of districts using FTA tools.

- **Higher number of budget-literate citizens.** Nearly 200,000 citizens drawn from different sections of society had received basic budget literacy training as of March 2013.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

Financial transparency initiatives are likely to be more successful when they are an integral part of large projects like PBS that can help with scaling up and securing the necessary attention from all partners. Furthermore, if such initiatives complement existing government policies, they are more likely to garner the political support necessary to succeed. However, adapting tools to local contexts presents several design challenges and can cause implementation delays. Further, new methodologies and tools such as those associated with the FTA require long incubations/learning phases.

### REFERENCE

Ethiopia—Ethiopia Promoting Basic Services Program Phase III Project: P12889—Implementation Status Report: Sequence 01 (English), World Bank, Washington DC.
A1.5. Championing Pro-Poor Budget Policies through Budget Analysis and Training

CONTEXT
The Pro-Poor Advocacy Group (Pro-PAG) was set up in 2003 by civil society organizations, donor agencies, and government partners. ProPAG emerged at a time when the Gambia was graduating from poverty by raising awareness of community-based poverty issues. The strategies for poverty alleviation implemented since 1994 to the government of the Gambia identified Pro-PAG as “a forum for ongoing dialogue between stakeholders with a view to opening up the budget process to citizen participation.” Its vision is to ensure that the national budget is responsive to the priorities and needs of the poor by raising awareness of community-based poverty issues.

ACTIONS (2004-PRESENT)
• During the annual budget consultations, Pro-PAG conducted a series of capacity-building and sensitization workshops for civil society members and parliamentarians on basic budget literacy and analysis. Upon receipt of the cabinet’s budget estimates, Pro-PAG carried out a preliminary analysis and released a “budget brief,” a copy of which was officially shared with the Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs (DOSFEA). Once the budget was submitted to the national assembly, and before it was debated, Pro-PAG convened a budget sensitization session for parliamentarians to share key observations on the draft estimates.
• Pro-PAG builds the capacity of the national assembly to understand the education budget and analyze allocations to education. Members of the national assembly were taken to local schools to see for themselves that, although a large proportion of national resources have been committed to education, this did not automatically translate into gains in the international education goals committed to by the government. As each national assembly committee’s term ends and a new body of members is elected, these trainings are repeated. Pro-PAG expanded these capacity-building initiatives to include other groups, including the Gambian teachers’ union and the Child Protection Alliance.
• Pro-PAG produced a database on educational expenditures by level and type that allowed for a review of budget estimates and actual expenditures from 2000 to 2004. A period when declarations were made in “Education for All,” the government’s national action plan for education from 2004–15. The results were published in a synopsis of government spending on education and were used to advocate for greater budget allocations to the education sector. In a bid to take budget tracking down to subdistrict-level communities, Pro-PAG presented the data in an understandable format and materials were disseminated that were used for sensitizing communities on the importance, nature, and magnitude of resources made available by central government to the education sector. Materials were used to train regional budget groups of teachers, parent–teacher associations, and representatives of the Tanji Bird Reserve Site Management Committee.
• The 2000–04 budget expenditure publication was later updated for the period 2001–05 and shared with the national assembly, sparking action on the parliamentarians’ part to request advance copies of the 2006 budget from DOSFEA. The national assembly aired their concerns via the media and in discussions with the ministry of finance.

RESULTS
• Increased budget allocations for education. Increased allocation of 1.5m GMD (US$45,696) to the 2004–05 education budget benefited voluntary school staff, such as untrained teachers and school caretakers.
• Improved awareness of parliament. Members of the National Assembly Select Committee have become more aware of the importance of their role in legislative oversight and have gained a better understanding of issues related to the education budget.
• Increased support from donors. Budget work with committee members attracted the support of other organizations, such as the UNDP, the African Development Bank, and DFID. Due to the success of the initial training program, it became possible to expand the capacity-building initiatives to include other groups such as the Gambian teachers’ union and local municipalities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
• In some contexts, working from the national level down to the community level with national government support might be more effective than starting with local budget work.
• Working closely with members of parliament to build their capacity to engage more effectively in the budget process helps mitigate the suspicion surrounding budget work, making it easier to work at regional and local levels.

REFERENCES
Pro-Poor Advocacy Group Website: http://www.pro-pag.org/.
A1.6. Unsustained Budget Monitoring Fails to Improve Weaknesses in Governance Mechanisms

CONTEXT
In 2006, Asutifi, a tiny district in central Ghana with a relatively unknown farming community, caught the attention of one of the world’s largest gold producers, Newmont Mining Corporation (NMC). While the revenue Asutifi was to receive from Newmont was small compared to other districts, it made up a significant percentage of Asutifi’s income. Income from gold, however, is volatile and requires financial forecasting, realistic budgeting, and participatory management, all of which were major challenges for Asutifi. Three years later, Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) partnered with two Ghanaian organizations—the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) and the Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS)—to create the Asutifi subnational project and produce a baseline study. The study found weaknesses in the governance mechanisms for revenue management in the district: mining revenue was being spent arbitrarily and there were no internal fiscal rules for spending it. In 2008, Newmont Gold Ghana Ltd (NGGL) established Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation (NADeF), a corporate social responsibility initiative, in an attempt to spur development in 10 communities within the company’s operating area; it agreed to contribute US$1 for every ounce of gold sold. They raised US$7 million, but soon, tensions arose between NGGL and the local authorities with the latter accusing the company of disregarding locally-determined development priorities. Therefore, RWI’s aim was to improve the overall governance of mining revenues. The project lasted for two years, 2009–11.

ACTIONS (2009–11)
- To ensure that the community’s needs were reflected in Asutifi’s 2010–13 Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP), ISODEC and ILGS led a workshop that targeted 15 district officials, who in turn trained 80 people drawn from area councils, unit committees, and other community leaders. This workshop focused on helping participants identify and prioritize their needs so they could offer input to the local government’s development plan.
- ISODEC coordinated the formation of a quarterly consultative forum, comprised of traditional chiefs, district assembly members, NMC, and local civil society organizations (CSOs). In the forum, these stakeholders shared expectations and discussed mining-related issues, including environmental damage, transparency in the use of royalties, and participation in the district planning process.
- To address the problem of NADeF and the assembly’s development plans not being aligned and that the former was disregarding locally-determined development priorities, ISODEC prepared a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that required Newmont to consult the MTDP when selecting projects to support. Even though Newmont refused to sign the MOU, at the very least, the MOU proposal catalyzed a more collaborative approach among Newmont, the district assembly, and the district office.

RESULTS
- After conducting a detailed survey of the capacities, attitudes, and practices of local stakeholders, ILGS drafted modules to provide training for the district assembly and others in the transparent, accountable management of mining resources.
- Disrupted fund flows. Because of a lack of additional resources and expertise, ILGS was unable to finalize the modules.
- Pushback from hierarchical authorities. ISODEC designed templates for the traditional chiefs to report the use of mining royalties, but they went unused because of the chiefs’ refusal to be more accountable to their communities.
- Limited uptake of findings in the district plans. Even though participatory processes led to prioritizing and incorporating community needs into Asutifi’s MTDP for 2010–13, it is unclear if those needs were adequately incorporated. In short, even though the project set out to improve the transparency of the spending and management of mining royalties, the Asutifi government has not shown much progress.
- Inability to support the creation of functional and multistakeholder consultative platforms. Overall, the project required dialogue and the entering into coalition with Asutifi’s elected assembly and administration, NGGL and NADeF, traditional chiefs in the district, local businesses, and civil society, the absence of which eventually led to the project’s derailment.
- Small wins of more awareness and trust. Despite its failure in achieving its objectives, the project did build awareness of the need for transparency in the mining sector among both assembly and community members. Moreover, the level of trust and collaboration in the district improved with the formation of the consultative forum. For instance, as a result of advocacy by CSOs, through the Ahafo Extractive Engagement Group, in 2010, Newmont agreed to pay a fine of 7 million Ghanaian cedis (approximately US$3.7 million) for cyanide spillage in the previous year.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Building alliances for monitoring and working through civil society partners that have gravitas in a given context is key to the success of Budget Transparency & Monitoring initiatives. Moreover, it is necessary to align interests and voices within civil society—in this case, among the district assembly officers, the traditional chiefs, and community members—in order to bring about constructive change.

REFERENCES
Website of Revenue Watch: www.revenuewatch.org.
A1.7. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes to Promote Better Budget Oversight

CONTEXT
For most of the tumultuous political period since Ghana became independent, parliament’s proscribed role in matters of governance has been partly responsible for its limited capacity and weak oversight. When Ghana turned to a multiparty electoral democracy in the early-to-mid-1990s, a number of bilateral and multilateral donors identified the opportunity to provide support to Ghana’s parliament so that it can play a stronger role in the country’s governance. One of them is the Parliamentary Centre, a Canadian nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that supports parliaments around the globe, including Ghana’s, by providing training and technical assistance to build capacity.

ACTIONS
Fundled by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and UK Aid, the Parliamentary Centre assisted Ghana’s parliament with the Ghana Parliamentary Budget and Finance Unit project as well as the Financial Scrutiny project.

October 2006–December 2008. For the Ghana Parliamentary Budget and Finance Unit project, the Parliamentary Centre:

- Established a budget and finance unit equipped with the necessary expertise, including economic modeling and forecasting knowledge.
- Developed consultative mechanisms such as roundtables between key parliamentary committees, budget policy think tanks, and the Ministry of Finance to increase parliament’s capacity to engage effectively in Public Financial Management and budget processes.
- Developed internal performance indicators to enable Parliament assess its own progress with respect to its role in the budget process.

May 2007–November 2009. For the Financial Scrutiny Project, the Parliamentary Centre:

- Provided training to the members of the public accounts committee (PAC) to improve their knowledge of Public Financial Management and to scrutinize the evidence produced by the auditor general.
- Organized a public meeting of the PAC, October 16–29, 2007, to deliberate on the auditor general’s report on the ministries, departments, and agencies for 2004 and 2005 to promote public support for the work of the committee and parliament.

RESULTS
For the Ghana Parliamentary Budget and Finance Unit project, the Parliamentary Centre:

- Contributed directly to the drafting of a budget bill by introducing a bipartisan draft version that included a provision for a parliamentary budget office.

For the Financial Scrutiny Project, the Parliamentary Centre:

- Increased the openness of PAC proceedings by opening them to the public, a change that has now been institutionalized. This has boosted parliament’s efforts to increase accountability and transparency, combat corruption, and improve budget oversight and resource allocation. This, in turn, has renewed public confidence in the ability of parliament to oversee the executive; it has also increased the transparency and accountability of Public Financial Management procedures and officials.
- Increased interest to establish audit report implementation committees. By November 2007, as result of the PAC’s probing questions, the Daily Graphic reported that 10 ministries, departments, and agencies approached the Internal Audit Agency to help them establish audit report implementation committees to strengthen Public Financial Management.
- Prosecuted malfeasance. The attorney general set up a special unit to prosecute cases recommended for prosecution prior to the establishment of the Financial Administration Tribunal (court). The project also saw the attorney general resume the prosecution of dormant cases about the loss of public resources.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In addition to providing training and technical assistance to legislatures, it is critical to develop internal performance indicators to allow parliament to assess its own progress with respect to its engagement in the budget process. These indicators could prove to be a valuable tool if they are institutionalized and used to hold successive parliaments to account for their level of engagement in the budget process.

REFERENCES
Parliamentary Centre Website: http://www.parlcent.org/en/.
A1.8. Analyzing and Publicizing the Budget to Promote Pro-Poor Fiscal Policy

CONTEXT
In 2000, the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC), a civil society organization (CSO), created the Centre for Budget Advocacy (CBA) with the mandate to specialize in social budgeting activities. Now relaunched as the Institute for Fiscal Policy (IFP), the CBA helps ISODEC and other advocacy groups underpin their policy arguments with informed budget analyses. Furthermore, it uses budget information to engage with policy makers for more pro-poor tax rules and spending, particularly with regard to education.

ACTIONS (2000–PRESENT)
• The IFP analyzes annual pre-budget and post-budget statements and comments on government budget policy. It also partners with other groups to produce themed budget analyses. For instance, in 2009, it produced a study with UNICEF that showed that, despite overall expenditure exceeding the budget in 2008, spending for sectors critical to children and women was below budgeted amounts.
• Once the national budget is passed, the IFP analyzes district-level budgets to determine the share of the budget going to social sectors. It has also worked with the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC), a network of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working on education issues to track district-level education budgets. The IFP developed surveys for GNECC to interview students, teachers, and others to monitor how capitation grants1 are used and helped the coalition analyze the gathered data. The coalition used the resulting reports to engage the Ministry of Education and school-level officials.
• The IFP disseminates the findings of its pre- and postbudget analysis through ISODEC’s bulletin “Public Agenda” as well as through radio and television. It organizes local, national, and international workshops as well as press conferences, and also publishes articles in newspapers. It sponsors annual forums across the 10 regions to collect public opinions on the annual budget and then includes them in its “Open Letters” to the President.
• The IFP also provides training to local government staff, legislators, and civil society groups on pro-poor planning and budgeting, enabling it to engage directly with key decision makers.

RESULTS
• Adoption of IFP’s fiscal policy suggestions. Some recommendations included in the Open Letters to the President and in the IFP budget statements have been adopted by the government, including revenue and expenditure measures advocated for by the IFP, although other factors could have contributed to this, too.
• Dissemination of budget and regular reports on education expenditures. The IFP has been successful in producing and widely disseminating regular reports on the budget. It also successfully facilitated the formation of the GNECC, and through the coalition, the production of regular reports on expenditures at the school level. In addition, it collaborates with the coalition to influence educational policies and allocations, resulting in increased investment in the education sector through the government’s capitation grant.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
• Supporting organizations such as the IFP can lead to more budget transparency and, eventually, to increased expenditure on social development.
• For results to materialize in budget processes or policies, technical or financial support to CSOs may need to be provided over several years.

REFERENCES
ISODEC Website: http://www.isodec.org/gh/aboutus.php.

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1. Capitation grants are school operating grants. Under the policy, the central government makes cash transfers to all public schools based on the number of students enrolled. In other words, it allocates funds to schools on a per capita basis to support efforts at improving school performance.
A1.9. Tracking District Budget Allocations and Disbursements to Promote the More Efficient Use of Public Resources

CONTEXT
Decentralization can lead to severe imbalances in the regional distribution of wealth and development, as the resources of local authorities are often unequal. This was the case in Ghana, in the 1990s, when district assemblies were facing problems in generating their own revenues to meet their financial commitments. The District Assemblies’ Common Fund (DACF) was set up as a pool of resources created under section 252 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana. It is a minimum of 5 percent of the national revenue that is set aside for sharing with all district assemblies in Ghana by a parliament-approved formula, enabling the use of the nation’s wealth for the benefit of all citizens. Since the turn of the century, however, payments into the DACF have been delayed for more than a year, resulting in a failure to disburse to the metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs). Moreover, there have been complaints from citizens and reports of misapplication and financial malpractices in connection with the disbursements to and use of proceeds by the MMDAs. Therefore, to monitor the DACF, to find out if the guidelines of the DACF are transparent and well followed, if resources allocated indeed get to the MMDAs, and if the funds received by MMDAs are used for assigned purposes, the African Development Program, in collaboration with other nongovernmental organizations, has engaged in intense budget analysis and tracking with the explicit aim of bringing about more transparency and more efficient use of public resources at the district level.

ACTIONS (APRIL–JULY 2003)
• Primary and secondary data was collected on allocation and disbursements of the DACF at the regional and district level. A comprehensive body of information on budget allocations was compiled on four district assemblies—from the West, East, North, and the Ashanti region by means of key informant interviews carried out to gather primary information and to verify information provided by various agencies and documents, through observations of physical evidence, and through focus-group discussions at the community level.
• The data was then analyzed in terms of the timeliness of allocations, disbursements, receipts of the funds, and the consistency of the amounts allocated by each agency with the amount actually received by the four district assemblies.

RESULTS
• Evidence of a serious lack of accountability and transparency in district budget allocations and disbursements. Some of the major findings were that (1) for the past four-year period, the ministry of finance had never released the full allocation to the administrator of the DACF; (2) there were several delays throughout the disbursement process, including the submission of the proposed formula to parliament, the acquisition of approval, the allocating of funds, and finally, the disbursement of funds to the various MMDAs and even the receipt of the money by the assemblies; and (3) barring one district, the amounts received by the district assemblies were lower than what was allocated and what was to be disbursed to them.
• Improved sensitization and awareness. Through the process of participating in this research, monitoring, and evaluation of the DACF, and through focus group discussions with community members, both were sensitized to the DACF. Moreover, this was the first time that links were established between the government, development partners, and the team undertaking the study.
• Limited follow-up by district officials. Documentation on the DACF and the undertaken projects is either not available or not easily accessible. At the roundtable discussions in one of the districts, the representatives of the assemblies promised to send more detailed information, but none of the four districts actually did so.
• Lack of sustained funding. One problem is the lack of funding support to mobilize and train communities as a follow-up activity and for the institutionalization of involving civil society organizations in the tracking of DACF and other public funds to become part of the decentralization process.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Involving the government and communities in the research and monitoring and evaluation process from the very beginning is key to ensuring that their perspectives are taken into account, which also facilitates data collection for budget tracking and analysis. Additionally, technical and financial support for such initiatives needs to be sustained over lengthy periods of time if they are to be effective.

REFERENCES
A1.10. Using Social Audits to Monitor Constituency Development Funds

CONTEXT
Established in 2003, Kenya’s Constituency Development Fund (CDF) entitles each Member of Parliament (MP) in Kenya to allocate approximately 83,839,922 Kenyan shillings (approximately US$987,420) per year to support development projects in their district. While some reports praise the projects funded by the CDF and its potential to improve community infrastructure, others complain about corruption and a lack of public accountability in the management of CDF funds. Since 2005, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), a nongovernmental organization based in Mombassa, Kenya, has been monitoring expenditures made under the CDF.

ACTIONS (2005-PRESENT)
MUHURI conducted two social audits—one in August 2007 in Changamwe and the other in July 2008 in Bahari.

- Because there is no access-to-information law in Kenya, MUHURI struggled unsuccessfully against resistant officials for two years to gain access to CDF documents. However, by describing the audit as a “training” event instead of a public discussion, MUHURI eventually convinced the MP of Changamwe that the social audit would be a groundbreaking event because he would be the first MP to ever open his accounts to civil society. In addition, they convinced the MP that the audit would help boost his public image—a particularly persuasive argument during an election year. MUHURI obtained a partial set of CDF records for 14 projects as part of the social audit—projects the Changamwe CDF Committee (CDC) considered the best. These included bills of quantities, minutes of CDC meetings; and completion certificates.
- Using these acquired documents, MUHURI and the social audit team conducted site visits to all 14 projects, which included interviews with local residents. They discovered a number of problems in the implementation of the projects that would have been impossible to identify without detailed project records. A day-long public hearing was then held to announce the findings, with an attendance of approximately 1,500, including residents, local CDF officials, and the media.

RESULTS
- Signing of petition for greater transparency. Toward the end of the hearing, the Changamwe MP signed a petition that demanded greater accountability and transparency measures be incorporated into the CDF Act and called for a comprehensive freedom-of-information law, which he had previously opposed.
- Reelection of the Changamwe MP. At the end of 2007, the MP was reelected, even while the majority of sitting MPs lost their seats. CDC officials and the MP himself acknowledged to MUHURI staff members that “at least 40 percent” of the votes the MP received were due to the social audit.
- Social audit precedent for the Bahari constituency. Given the precedent set in Changamwe, the Bahari MP agreed to give MUHURI access to Bahari’s CDF records. According to government audit reports, Bahari had the “best-managed” CDF in the country, but the social audit revealed several irregularities. A public hearing with over 1,000 attendees was held, but the proceedings were delayed and CDC members did not attend.
- Unsuccessful attempts to gain access to CDF funds in other constituencies. After these two social audits, attempts by MUHURI to acquire CDF documents from the Kisauni and Likoni constituencies were unsuccessful. Even though both constituencies had new MPs who would not be implicated in any mismanagement of the CDFs that the social audits might uncover, both refused to provide the CDF records to MUHURI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
CDF legislation should have disclosure provisions, and right-to-information legislation greatly facilitates the implementation of budget transparency interventions. Furthermore, reelection plans can be leveraged to gain support for budget transparency activities.

REFERENCES
MUHURI Website: http://www.muhuri.org
Every year, BIP hosts pre-budget hearings that provide an opportunity for the corporate sector, the social sector, and other interested groups to make budget proposals for possible consideration by the treasury. Submissions are synthesized by the IEA in the form of a Citizen Alternative Budget and presented to the treasury for consideration.

After the presentation of the budget but before the parliamentary debate on the budget, BIP summarizes key points from the budget documents and presents the information to members of parliament in a timely manner that is easy to comprehend. It also provides key budget information to the media in order to stimulate public interest.

BIP conducts additional in-depth research and analyses on public policy and budgets, disseminating it in the form of bulletins and research papers to the media, civil society, parliament, and ministries. Its manuals on budget literacy include the “MP’s Guide to the Budget” and “Training for Trainers.”

BIP organizes post-budget workshops. During the post-budget workshop for the Members of Parliament in September 2011, BIP presented a written memorandum to the commission entitled “Implementation of the Constitution and the Ministry of Local Government.” It laid out BIP’s concerns about the need for space for public participation and its support for stronger transparency in the budget process.

BIP represents civil society in the task force established by the permanent secretary in the ministry of finance to develop the second five-year Public Financial Management (PFM) reform strategy (2013–18).

Positive influence over legislation. In March 2003, parliament passed a motion allowing a bill to be brought before the House that would establish a parliamentary budget office. The IEA, working with several reform-minded legislators, was centrally involved in the drafting of this bill and the subsequent revision to the parliamentary standing orders that enhanced the role and effectiveness of parliament in the monitoring of public finances. More recently, BIP made a number of proposals for Kenya’s PFM Bill 2011, one of which reiterated the need for clear disclosures on all financial reports and was incorporated in the published draft of the amended Public Financial Management bill.

Improved communication of the concerns of multiple sectors. BIP’s activities have given voice to sectors that are not normally consulted by government. Rather than considering only the main productive sectors like agriculture and manufacturing, the government is now exposed to the concerns of, for example, the service sector, the capital markets, the Bankers Institute, and the social sectors.

Utilization of BIP Training. Some organizations have used the skills and knowledge from BIP’s trainings to undertake budget monitoring and analysis from a gender perspective; organizations such as ABANTU, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and the Health Rights Advocacy Forum (HERAF), among others, have used various tools, including community scorecards.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Building expertise to influence the budget process and gain legitimacy as a stakeholder takes a number of years as well as strategies such as capacity building and information dissemination.

REFERENCES
Institute of Economic Affairs Website: http://www.ieakenya.or.ke.
A1.12. Mobilizing Citizens to Influence Development Planning and Resource Allocation

CONTEXT
The Social Development Network (SODNET) is a voluntary forum founded in April 1994 to promote effective strategic alliances among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) interested in social development. One of SODNET’s programs is designed to facilitate public participation in the budget process. This was in response to the fact that most citizens in Nairobi are unaware of the link between the national budget and grassroots-level spending given that the budget is a technocratic project involving little effort to engage the public by the government. SODNET provides opportunities for local communities to monitor the management of public resources across the country through its social watch chapters. This is achieved by processing public demands for probity, transparency, and accountability among public servants.

ACTIONS (1996–PRESENT)
- SODNET has facilitated the establishment of committed grassroots groups in the districts to monitor public expenditures and demand participation in the governance processes. SODNET also supports this cadre by holding workshops and training events, presenting group concerns to national ministries, encouraging cooperation with government officials at the district level, and holding regional and national meetings.
- SODNET has set up what is now called the “Infonet programme,” which aims to weave technology, open data, and citizen empowerment into a potent product for social change. SODNET’s Infonet program supports four different projects. One of them, named Ugatuzi, is a budget-tracking tool designed to enable citizen engagement in Public Financial Management. It provides constituency-level information on projects funded by devolved funds: project timelines, description, project status, and multiyear disbursement schedules. It allows organized groups in communities to input comments and identify incidences of corruption and malpractice.
- SODNET works closely with multiple stakeholders on budget issues, including government officials, parliamentarians, other nongovernmental organizations, and the media. It also establishes liaisons with NGOs working on similar issues.

RESULTS
- Creation of self-sufficient budget groups. The grassroots groups created by SODNET have become effective at transmitting popular social demands from below and mobilizing popular participation in policy making. They elect their own representatives and form committees for this work. The committees also submit quarterly reports to SODNET and monitor resource allocation and use. Overall, SODNET’s activities have provided a way for citizens to effectively engage with other actors, allowing citizens to shape social policy processes that influence development planning, resource allocation, and use and to monitor public resource management in a way that facilitates government fulfillment of the needs of people, especially those living in poverty.
- Improved understanding of budget processes. The initiatives first began in 1996 in only three districts, but today SODNET has chapters in sixteen Kenyan districts. There has been an ever-increasing demand from SODNET’s grassroots constituencies for more intensified popularization of the budget process and for meeting ordinary Kenyans’ need to gain a deeper and more functional understanding of the intricate—and sometimes deceptive—linkages between macroeconomic framework conditions and the budgetary dispensations that accompany the annual parliamentary business.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
An effective way to enhance citizen awareness and collect citizen feedback on the budget is by creating and nurturing grassroots organizations that work on budgetary issues. However, it is important to go beyond merely building strategic alliances on the demand side—SODNET’s primary focus—because it is only when the demand side strategically links up with the supply side, and relevant entry points of the supply side are identified, that the budget transparency loop can be expected to be closed. The ability of a civil society organization to advance its goals can be greatly enhanced if it develops the capacity to engage as partners in the local and national economic governance processes.

REFERENCE
A1.13. Holistic Procurement Reform toward Reconstruction of Post-War Liberia

CONTEXT

Fourteen years of civil war (1989–2003) destroyed Liberia’s professional workforce, infrastructure, and institutional capacity. The public procurement system disappeared and the country was left without skilled practitioners. Civil servants, without the necessary training and experience, carried out procurement. This held back Liberia’s recovery—in large part due to procurement delays, only 46 percent of the capital budget was spent in the fiscal year 2009–10. Faced with an overwhelming lack of capacity, the Liberian government realized it needed to go beyond traditional procurement reform, which tends to emphasize the creation of a strong regulatory system. Instead, first and foremost, it aimed to ensure that all stakeholders—from monitors to suppliers—had the right knowledge and systems to fully play their roles.

ACTIONS (2011–13)

To drive the massive reconstruction effort, a three-pronged approach to procurement reform assisted by the World Bank supported Reengagement and Reform Support Program (RRSP4) was taken:

- Liberia’s existing oversight body, the public procurement and concessions commission (PPCC), urgently needed strengthening so it could adequately perform its regulatory function. With World Bank support, a consultant conducted an assessment of its human resource requirements and identified a severe shortage. As a result, the government employed 12 additional procurement monitors, increasing the total number of staff to 40. The consultant developed a roadmap to further strengthen the commission’s institutional capacity and funding was secured to implement these recommendations.

- To upgrade the skills of existing procurement employees and to train newly-recruited personnel, the government began a short-term in-service training program through the Liberia Institute for Public Administration. A World Bank procurement specialist facilitated monthly procurement clinics at the ministry of public works to impart practical skills for carrying out procurement processes to staff. The government also established a Procurement Training School to deliver an intensive one-year procurement training course to 25 students per year to provide procurement specialists for deployment in the public sector.

- To help local suppliers of goods and services participate effectively in the tender process, the PPPC began regular sessions to train private sector staff on how to submit competitive bids.

RESULTS

By addressing capacity issues for the regulatory body, public sector personnel, and private service providers, the approach is already transforming Liberia’s procurement process.

- Enhanced procurement oversight. The reforms have strengthened the public procurement and concessions commission, enabling it to recruit and train new monitors so it can begin procurement monitoring expected of a regulatory body. Government institutions must have approval from the commission for their procurement plans before they can access their allocations from the national budget. The commission now has a public website where it publishes information, including procurement plans and opportunities. It has also started reviewing procurement documents from government institutions, in compliance with the law.

- Strengthened capacity for cadre of professionals. The short-term in-service training and monthly procurement clinics have strengthened staff capacity, resulting in better quality documents and reduced lead times for the procurement processes.

- Increased budget utilization. The percentage of the budget spent rose nine points—to 58 percent—for the year 2010–11, benefitting all sectors, from agriculture and infrastructure to health and education. Instead of obtaining quotations only from known suppliers or awarding contracts directly to a specific company, procurement staff now places notices of public procurement opportunities in the newspapers. Tighter procurement practices have helped Liberia improve its score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index since 2010, from a ranking of 87 out of 178 countries in 2010 to 75 out of 176 in 2012.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

While capacity building is routine in projects of this nature, ensuring that it is holistic takes more effort. In a fragile state with a dearth of critical skills, capacity building can be accompanied by improved incentive schemes and intensive in-service training. Enriching the career development of participants ensures their commitment to the course.

REFERENCE


CONTEXT
From 1994 to 2001, increased funding for education in Malawi has not translated into increased quality of education. The Malawi government’s funds for education are given to the National Local Government Finance Committee, which allocates funds directly to districts using parliament-approved formulas. District assemblies then distribute funds to the schools as they see fit. In 1999, for example, the Ministry of Education was conned out of MK 187 million (US$453,585) slated for school construction. To fight such abuse, since 2002, the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CSCQBE) in Malawi has performed annual budget monitoring surveys of education expenditures. Using the Education for All (EFA) assessment and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as guidelines, the coalition has conducted surveys to ensure that the government has allocated sufficient resources to basic education that are in line with the EFA and MDG goals and that these resources are spent according to the government’s policy and budget.

ACTIONS (2002–PRESENT)
- For its surveys, the CSCQBE samples roughly 10 percent of all schools in Malawi. The schools are divided into geographical regions and then subdivided into rural and urban schools from which a certain number are randomly chosen. Member organizations of the CSCQBE administer the surveys to sampled schools.
- When in 2003 it was discovered that a number of teachers either received their salaries late or did not receive them at all, CSCQBE lobbied a parliamentary committee on education to investigate the issue. The committee returned a report to the national assembly.
- A draft report of the results of each year’s survey is circulated among CSCQBE organizations and discussed at a special budget monitoring meeting. In order to coincide with the budget deliberation in Parliament, the report is released in June at a public meeting with ministry officials, parliamentarians, development partners, and the media. The CSCQBE sends out press releases and holds district meetings where district assembly officials, district education officials, civil society organizations, and school officials can discuss the results and, if necessary, formulate action plans to address any salient issues.
- CSCQBE has set up 13 district networks to decentralize monitoring of the education budget in order to give citizens more control of the budget monitoring process. These networks support school-based budget monitoring by school or community-based groups like school boards or parent–teacher associations.

RESULTS
- Increased allocations. Based on the evidence provided by CSCQBE, the Malawi government has been addressing the disparities between rural and urban areas and plans to introduce incentives for rural teachers, including providing hardship allowances and paying for the construction of housing for rural teachers. Similarly, government budget statements reflected that funds to purchase teaching and learning materials and to train teachers who specialize in teaching children with special needs increased from MK 20 million (US$51,638.480) in 2002–03 to MK 34 million (approximately US$87,777) in 2004–05.
- Institutionalization of budget work. Complementing CSCQBE’s survey efforts, in 2004, the Malawi government conducted the first public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) for the education sector, and civil society counterparts were included in the Survey Management Team.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
PETs can be successfully conducted, even in low-capacity environments, if challenges such as inadequate budget data produced by the government and limited time and technical capacity of civil society to analyze data and produce quality reports are overcome.

REFERENCES
CSCQBE Website: http://www.cscqbe.org.
A1.15. Monitoring Budgets to Improve Service Delivery After Decentralization

CONTEXT
When it was enshrined in the 1992 constitution, decentralization—a central element of the modernization agenda in Mali—was expected to improve allocation efficiency in the face of different local preferences for public goods. In the past two decades, Mali has made significant progress in the postdecentralization era, especially with respect to budget credibility, comprehensiveness, transparency, policy-based budgeting, and predictability in budget execution at the central level.

Moreover, several competencies have been successfully transferred to the municipalities (Collectivités Territoriales or CT). However, the transfer of resources needed for their effective implementation has lagged behind. Also, several challenges remain to improve the public administration, law, and justice system, especially with regard to accounting and financial reporting, internal and external audit and oversight, and enhancing capacities at the decentralized level. At the request of the government of Mali, the World Bank’s Governance and Budget Decentralization Technical Assistance was financed to strengthen capacity for Public Financial Management at the CT level for improved budgetary decision-making and enhanced transparency and oversight. One of the three components of the technical assistance (TA)—External Oversight and Community Participation with a budget of US$1.7 million—is supporting capacity building for fiduciary oversight and participation by communities.

ACTIONS (2011–14)

- The specific subcomponent related to budget transparency and monitoring provides support to establish a framework for effective participation of key stakeholders, including women and youth, in the monitoring and evaluation of the allocation and use of public resources.
- Guidelines for citizen budgets are being prepared and civil servants, elected officials, and civil society members are being trained to prepare citizens budgets as well.
- Consultants are preparing studies and providing input for the drafting of procedure manuals on the collection and treatment of financial data to inform community surveillance committees, they will also provide training on the use of such manuals.
- Study visits are being organized so that officials and community members across CTs in the country and in the West African Economic and Monetary Union countries can learn from each other about budget monitoring.

RESULTS

- Preparation and dissemination of studies and templates for training and capacity building of CTs and communities. First and foremost, studies have been prepared to identify resources to be transferred to CT and guidelines and templates on the participatory monitoring and evaluation systems in education are now available and have been disseminated. Moreover, training material on citizen budgets to train community members have also been cleared. And finally, templates for the treatment of financial data for citizen surveillance committees are now available.
- Training of CTs and piloting of citizens budget. Several training sessions have already been organized on budget preparation and execution as well as on procurement procedures at the CT level. Moreover, in certain CTs, citizens budgets are now being piloted as well.
- Delay of progress due to country context. To date, there have been a number of barriers to project implementation; given the weak capacity of implementers, some aspects related to the implementation mechanism, specifically combining national and World Bank procedures, have proven to be quite complex. Following a supervision mission in March 2013, a number of measures were adopted to simplify procurement plans with a more fluid validation mechanism; significant progress regarding implementation is expected by the end of 2013.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

Once citizen budgets are prepared and disseminated, it is important to take the next logical step to close the budget transparency loop by ensuring its active utilization by all stakeholders and ownership by both the CTs and the committees of these budgets. Moreover, since the purpose of the citizens budget is to enable people to participate in discussions around the budget, it should be made available and produced as soon as the budget is approved.

REFERENCES

A1.16. Making National Budgets Accessible to Citizens through Budget Analysis

CONTEXT
The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to enhancing budget transparency at the national level in Namibia. It was founded in 2001 in a context of limited budget analysis within and outside the government as well as limited civil society participation in national budget formulation. The problem was not one of limited information. As IPPR notes, there were a plethora of budget documents that could be readily downloaded from their website. Instead, the problem was that the quality of the documents did not keep up with the quantity. There were plenty of discrepancies in estimates, each document was more than 800 pages long and difficult for the casual reader to navigate, let alone understand the finer details. Therefore, IPPR aimed to make the national budget accessible to the general public, to provide accessible information and analysis to policy makers, and to assess whether the budget met stated policy objectives.

ACTIONS (2009–PRESENT)
• IPPR conducts the Open Budget Survey for Namibia, and helps produce general budget commentary by applying general economic principles to assess the extent to which the budget is being used to meet national development objectives.
• Because the existing Namibian budget documents are difficult to navigate and often use somewhat technical language, the need for a Citizens Budget was expressed; this would allow not only a larger share of Namibians to understand the budget and make their voices heard, but would also address key questions, such as the government’s overall strategy with the budget, how the budget can help during the economic crisis, and what it is being spent on.
• IPPR also appealed to the ministry of finance to involve ordinary citizens in the budget formulation process.

RESULTS
• Introduction of a Citizens Budget. The ministry of finance has embarked on producing a leaflet entitled “A Citizen’s Guide to the National Budget” containing annual public spending and revenue in a nutshell and actively distributing it as a supplement to newspapers and via the Internet.
• Improved Open Budget Index (OBI) ranking. Namibia’s rank in the 2012 Open Budget Survey went from 53 to 55 and is now ranked second in Africa, suggesting that more user-friendly budget information is now available to the general public.
• Uptake of IPPR’s suggestions by the government. The ministry of finance has taken up many of the recommendations contained in the budget analysis, including a three-year rolling budget, fiscal targets, disclosure of contingent liabilities, future projections, and improvement of budget documents and data.
• Suggestions for improved budget transparency and citizen engagement. IPPR research is read and used by the government but is not institutionalized in any sense. Moreover, IPPR research suggests that, in order for Namibia to get a score between 61 and 80 on the OBI (wherein citizens get a “substantial peek” into state coffers), more must be done by the government (for example, holding a pre-budget briefing before it is tabled in parliament, a mid-term budget review in order to assess the execution of programs and projects halfway through the financial year and inform citizens about the progress made.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In countries with low state capacity for quick uptake, high-quality budget analysis needs to be backed by capacity-building efforts.

REFERENCES
IPPR Website: http://www.ippr.org.na/?q=news.

CONTEXT
After years of scandal, Nigeria has struggled to restore public trust in the government and rid the public sector of persistent corruption. This is most apparent in the government procurement process, where approximately 70 percent of government activity seems to take place behind closed doors. Complicating matters, public-service contracting is often highly technical, making it arcane and difficult for the average citizen to take advantage of recent laws allowing civil society to observe all stages of the procurement process. As a result, citizens are often unable to monitor and provide feedback to the government about this process. In order to strengthen the feedback loop in energy sector investments, the World Bank is working with the government of Nigeria as well as local CSOs to train citizen monitors that can ensure accountability and effectiveness of expenditures.

Under the Nigeria Procurement Monitoring Project, the World Bank provided technical assistance on contract monitoring by drawing on lessons learned from procurement systems around the world. Within the government, the project has worked primarily with the bureau of public procurement, the regulatory agency for government procurement. The project has also established a voluntary coalition of Nigerian civil society organization (CSOs), led by the Nigerian Public and Private Development Center. Other members of the coalition include representatives from the extractive industries and the media.

ACTIONS (2009–PRESENT)
• The design of the procurement portal observatory is innovative; careful thought and consideration was put into the needs of the various stakeholders in the procurement process including investigative journalists; CSOs; professional bodies (procurement observers); the bureau of public procurement (regulators); federal ministries, departments, and agencies (procuring entities); contractors, suppliers, and bidders; development communities, and Nigerian citizens.
• During the development phase of the procurement portal observatory, advocacy toward and capacity-building activities for various stakeholders—CSOs, professionals, regulators, public procurement officers, and legislators—were undertaken to ensure that the system and design framework could meet the information needs of various stakeholders and that it could be scaled up.
• The portal is broadly categorized into descriptive pages (open) and participatory, analytical, and technical pages (restricted). The descriptive pages are mainly for receiving and sharing information.

Access is open to the general public and includes standard website tab displays and an open source library. The participatory, analytical, and technical pages on the portal are focused on generating procurement reports, offering online procurement training, and providing procurement-related legal advice; access is restricted to verified procurement monitors.
• To ensure that procurement information can be reported with uniformity, a standard checklist was developed based on the benchmarks in the Public Procurement Act and in consultation with representatives from the various identified stakeholders.

RESULTS
• Better dissemination and scrutiny of public works. Over 120 citizen monitors trained as part of the project are now actively tracking public works across the country. The website has gone live and is fully functioning, and it serves as an important educational tool for citizens interested in accessing reports and guidelines.
• Created an active online portal. Citizen monitors have generated and submitted 135 reports through the online portal.
• Greater state-society coordination on issues of corruption. The project has successfully fostered a strong working relationship between CSOs and government enforcement agencies aimed at eliminating corruption. Citizen monitors file reports while the bureau of public procurement ensures that appropriate follow-up action is taken.

IMPLICATION FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Lessons learned from the Nigerian experience to date indicate that the use of information and communication technology by citizens—such as the website—has much room for improvement. It cannot be assumed that citizens will automatically use available technology; incentives should be offered to encourage people to fully participate in monitoring projects that use technology. Moreover, there is a growing understanding that information might need to be presented organized by sectors so that citizens can monitor areas of particular interest to them; people tend to find it easier to monitor procurement in subject matters that they are already interested in.

REFERENCE

Country: Nigeria
Sectors: Mining; Public Administration, Law, and Justice
Level: Provincial
Name of Project: Nigeria Procurement Monitoring Project
Areas of Engagement: Anticorruption; Budget Disclosure; Capacity Building; ICT; Monitoring; Procurement
## A1.18. Attempting to Work with Multistakeholder Groups to Institutionalize Budget Transparency

### CONTEXT

Like many resource-rich countries, Nigeria passes a great portion of its oil wealth directly to oil-producing regions such as Bayelsa State—an underdeveloped region that was the site of Nigeria’s first oil discovery in 1956. But without careful management and oversight, such increased revenues can undermine local economic stability, reduce accountability, and increase conflict. In fact, the state government is frequently accused of financial recklessness and mindless extravagance. Paradoxically, Bayelsa State is the only state in Nigeria that is implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative at the state level. The Bayelsa Expenditure and Income Transparency Initiative (BEITI), is a multistakeholder initiative inaugurated by the government and supported by the United States-based Revenue Watch Institute (RWI). Launched in 2008, BEITI’s main aim is to institutionalize transparency and accountability and enhance citizen participation in the budget process. It was initiated by executive governor of Bayelsa to demonstrate his commitment to running an accountable government that seeks sustainable development for its citizens beyond oil, and that seeks to decrease vulnerability to conflict and social violence. However, despite being the first state in the Niger Delta to publish its budget and revenue allocation, what began with a “big bang,” has cooled down over time.

### ACTIONS (2008–11)

- Soon after BEITI was established, the governor brought together a multistakeholder working group comprised of top government officials, including commissioners, directors, the director of due process and e-governance, oil company representatives, the private sector, and civil society organizations (CSOs) who worked collectively to open up the books of the state to the highest level of scrutiny in an attempt to position Bayelsa as Nigeria’s most transparent state government.
- RWI provided technical assistance to the ministry of justice to help draft the BEITI bill (intended to improve regional transparency and citizen participation in the budget process, and BANGOF has helped gather local groups to issue joint calls for quicker action (for example, to expedite the passage of the bill into law).
- RWI has also funded and provided training to several CSO platforms—such as the Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform on budget and project monitoring at the community level; it also funded and provided reports of its findings and its efforts to increase accountability mechanisms.

### RESULTS

- **Limited impact on increasing transparency.** While civil society’s understanding of Public Financial Management systems and its ability to analyze and critique government planning and budgeting processes has increased, this awareness has not yet translated into improved transparency and accountability of resource revenues or increased government capacity and performance. A website—http://bayelsa.gov.ng/beiti—has been created but is rarely updated.
- **Failure to pass BEITI bill.** Because BEITI was housed in the bureau of due process and e-government that lacks its own legal framework and only recently became a full-fledged agency of the government, passage of the bill was delayed. This delay evoked CSO advocacy and lobbying led by BANGOF, but despite best efforts, the bill was not passed.
- **Limited gains on challenging top-down structures.** Despite the bold step of including civil society in the multistakeholder working group, colonial legacies of top-down governance proved hard to challenge in the short run.
- **Small wins.** Nevertheless, there is evidence that the attempt to develop and institutionalize the initiative has produced lessons critical to replication efforts elsewhere in the country.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

Ideally, a subnational project should be embedded within the state government’s development strategy and viewed as a key aspect of Public Financial Management reform. In terms of institutional location, subnational initiatives are better placed within one of the core finance agencies, ministries or departments before they try to acquire their own legal framework and measures of independence from the government. Only then can a more transparent and accountable approach to governance work its way through the government via an effective communications strategy.

### REFERENCES

Revenue Watch Website: http://www.revenuewatch.org

A1.19. Collaborating with the Provincial Government to Promote the Transparent Utilization of the Budget

**CONTEXT**

During 2012, in their latest drive to promote citizen engagement and accountability in the budget process, the Lagos state house of assembly and the executive branch have encouraged partnerships with civil society. Established in 2007, the Lagos State Civil Society Partnership (LACSOP) is a coalition of 47 major civil society organizations that has been working to institutionalize participatory governance and sustainable pro-poor service delivery in Lagos state through collaborative interventions with the executive, legislature, and media and by conducting independent assessments of government performance.

**ACTIONS (2007–PRESENT)**

- LACSOP's research on the government's budget priorities in the education sector has focused on teacher quality, the construction and rehabilitation of school facilities, and the provision of tuition-free education at all levels. In their budget analyses, LACSOP considered economic indicators, including nominal growth rates and the percentage of total expenditures that are budgeted for education compared to current policy commitments.
- In one example, LACSOP investigated the quality of school instructional materials like textbooks, which are crucial both to building teacher capacity and supporting student learning. Analysis revealed that expenditures for examinations were over 50 times greater than the funds allocated to books under the curriculum services department. While examinations are important for measuring student learning, LACSOP argued that books should be prioritized over exams—without adequate budget support for books, the quality of education and government efforts to meet education commitments risked being compromised.
- In other instances, LACSOP examined the annual growth of certain budget items and identified a troubling trend: from 2009 to 2010, the share of total education funding budgeted for “special duties” more than doubled, from 4 to 8.6 percent. However, the meaning of “special duties” was not clearly defined, allowing for the inefficient and potentially corrupt use of education resources. LACSOP’s budget report stated that unless special duties can be shown to play a major role in fulfilling policy commitments and improving education, such a considerable increase in allocation could be better used for items that have the potential to impact change and promote sustainable results.

- LACSOP’s analyses of the education budget helped launch their budget series, which includes analyses of the health, infrastructure, and poverty-alleviation sectors. In turn, this research has deepened their engagements with the executive and legislative branches of government.

**RESULTS**

- Input for the education sector strategy. The executive asked LACSOP to contribute to the development of the Education Sector Medium Term Sector Strategy 2013–15. The strategy process had not been previously been open to public participation, but the recommendations of LACSOP were eventually adopted by the ministry. LACSOP expects to see these changes reflected in the 2013 budget.
- Input for 2013 budget proposal. Following engagements with the legislature, LACSOP's research on education budgets prompted promising reactions from the executive and legislative branches of the Lagos state government, including an invitation by the state legislature to provide technical support for reviewing the executive governor’s budget proposal prior to the passage of the 2013 appropriation law. This request was considered a significant breakthrough given the one-party nature of the state’s political terrain and the legislature’s reputation for not wanting to “rock the boat.”

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**

In addition to the executive branch and the national legislature, engagement with provincial legislatures and executives can provide critical entry points for engaging CSOs in the promotion of budget transparency. They should be considered key stakeholders in BT&M activities.

**REFERENCES**

LACSOP Website: http://www.lacsop.org.
A1.20. Engaging Civil Society Partners to Ensure a Transparent Procurement Procedure

CONTEXT
The Nigerian Procurement Monitoring Portal is an example of how civil society organization (CSO) monitoring coupled with a robust web-based mechanism can be effective at encouraging, promoting, and supporting citizen participation in the public procurement process. Its objective is to promote transparent, accountable, and efficient public procurement that delivers value for money and increases the quality of services delivered. The portal is operated by the Public and Private Development Centre (PPDC), a CSO that brings together the interests of both citizens and the private sector to improve procurement in Nigeria. The following are the key features of the portal:

1. To support citizen monitoring of the Nigerian federal procurement process to hold it accountable to statutory objectives of transparency and accountability; to provide citizens, media, regulatory, and oversight stakeholders with evidence-based reports that, when monitored, can provide early warning signals of procurement that is likely to fail; and to support compliance by government entities through public disclosure and access to information.

2. The observatory also provides daily legal advice for investigative journalists, and other interested observers through blogs.

3. CSOs use submitted reports to carry out evidence-based advocacy to federal ministries on the challenge of accessing procurement information, which has led to the creation of guidelines for accessing procurement information that, for the first time, outlines how CSOs, professional bodies, and other interested members of the public can play more effective roles in the public procurement process. This is now on the portal along with other procurement-related resources for various stakeholders, including procurement training tools and manuals.

4. Reports from the portal placed on the listserv, guide regulators to areas of concern and support their ability to prevent, detect, and investigate wrongdoing.

RESULTS

- Mobilization of CSOs. CSOs now mobilize and coordinate their engagement with the public sector on accountability and transparency using the free and open software made available by PPDC.

- Detection of misuse of funds. Reports from the portal placed on the listserv, guide regulators to areas of concern and support their ability to prevent, detect, and investigate wrongdoing.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

Lessons learned to date from the Nigerian experience indicate that citizen use of information and communication technology, such as the website, leaves much room for improvement. It cannot be assumed that citizens will automatically use technology. There should be incentives to encourage people to fully participate in monitoring projects that use technology. Moreover, there is a growing understanding that the information presented may need to be organized by sector so that citizens can monitor areas where they have a particular interest; it was noted that people find it easier to monitor procurement in subject matters that already interest them.

REFERENCE

A.21. Enhancing Service Delivery by Including Nonstate Actor Oversight in Public Financial Management Reform

CONTEXT
Since the end of the civil war in 2002, Sierra Leone has made significant progress in building peace, achieving macroeconomic stability, reestablishing democratic institutions, strengthening core systems, and bringing decisions and resources closer to citizens through a major decentralization initiative. The government’s new poverty reduction strategy paper sets the direction and development priorities for the new administration based on a foundation of good governance that includes strengthening the civil service, fighting corruption, and strengthening Public Financial Management (PFM). The Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project supports the government’s integrated PFM program with interrelated components including one that supports capacity development, monitoring, and oversight of PFM by nonstate actors (nongovernmental organizations and civil society). The various technical activities being undertaken contribute to three “platforms”—credible and transparent budgets; improved allocation of all available resources; and greater efficiency and probity in resource use that leads to improved service delivery.

ACTIONS (2009–13)
Activities can be divided into four relevant components that relate to improved budget management and service delivery:

- **Strengthening macrofiscal coordination** and budget management by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). This includes improving budget credibility associated with a more developed and appropriately-managed aggregate fiscal position by establishing a macrofiscal division in MoFED; implementing the International Monetary Fund-styled financial programming and policies model system (SLIMM); developing a medium-term expenditure framework; and strengthening budget process in ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs).

- **Reinforcing the control system for improved service delivery.** This involves 19 local councils and working toward a robust public procurement cadre, norms and practices, tightened payroll and compensation controls, improved accounting reporting and procedures, and further publication of the public expenditures tracking survey;

- **Strengthening central finance functions**, which primarily includes the rollout of the Freebalance system, a new government resource planning technology, in 12 MDAs and all aspects of training and human resource capacity development required to support the main PFM functions; and

- **Nonstate actor oversight**, such as assisting the development of analytic and dissemination capacity of nonstate actors to scrutinize the use of public resources.

RESULTS (PRELIMINARY)

- **Online budget dissemination.** The 2012 national budget has been published on the MoFED website. A Citizens Budget was prepared and disseminated in 2012 and 2013.

- **Dissemination of income and expenditure data.** The accountant general’s department publishes income and expenditures on a quarterly basis through the national gazette and on the MoFED website. The national public procurement authority also publishes contracts issued on their website.

- **Dissemination of data on central allocations for education.** Local councils display funds from central government quarterly allocations that are included in the national annual budget and available for primary health care and schools.

- **Improved oversight by non-state actors.** Fifteen nonstate actor organizations from the four regions of the country have been awarded grants to the tune of US$472,919 for projects that promote ongoing Public Financial Management reform efforts.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

In low-capacity contexts like Sierra Leone, an incremental approach that begins with the basics, i.e. strengthening the credibility of the budget and financial accountability, is more likely to be successful in the end. Sustainable public sector reforms also require strong government ownership as well as financial commitments from and day-to-day involvement in the work by development partners. Finally, a multidonor approach is preferable in these low-capacity contexts. In the particular context of Sierra Leone, the idea of support being provided through separate bilateral agreements was considered but dropped. Low-capacity governments require additional external support at the local level to facilitate regular sets of disbursement, financial management, procurement, and reporting requirements to avoid prolonging the modernization process and to ensure transparency.

REFERENCES
A1.22. Enhancing Participation in the Monitoring and Execution of the Budget in a Post-Conflict Situation

CONTEXT
A couple of years after emerging from the end of a brutal civil war that lasted more than ten years, Sierra Leone made gradual but significant progress in reestablishing peace and security and promoting social and economic security for its people. In particular, the government has made significant progress in strengthening public expenditure management under reforms aimed at strengthening budget implementation, monitoring, and expenditure control. These reforms have been supported by the World Bank through ERRC I and II, an important component of which was the involvement of local communities in the budget process. In fact, fiscal 2002 witnessed a substantive increase in participation by civil society in budget formulation, with consultative workshops and sector discussions helping identify expenditure priorities and allocation of resources. The Republic of Sierra Leone expressed its intent to maintain this participative process; one of the main aims of the ERRC III was to assist the government with this process.

ACTIVITIES (2004–05)
To ensure the transparent and accountable management of public expenditures, the following actions were taken:

- **Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)** were used to examine the flow of funds from the center to frontline delivery units in order to explore and understand the lack of correspondence between increased allocation of government resources and improvements in the social sectors. In its second phase, PETS provided quantitative evidence of budget execution; leakages in nonsalary recurrent expenditures at the central ministry, district, and facility level; and diagnostic information on critical poverty sectors.

- **Community and civil society participation in budget preparation and execution** was encouraged to enhance the participatory nature of the budget process. The government established budget committees to review and endorse all of the objectives and policies stated in strategic plans and to participate in the execution of the budgets of the ministries, departments, and agencies. **Community budget oversight committees have been established in all regions.** They participate in annual budget discussions when the ministries and departments defend their policies and budget proposals and discuss activities carried out in the previous year. The budget discussions are also attended by representatives of local and international nongovernmental organizations as well as representatives of their development partners in the country to inform them of the government’s development activities so as to avoid overlapping or duplicating development efforts. Another task of the community budget oversight committees is to monitor budget implementation in their respective regions or districts, complementing the PETS task team.

RESULTS

- **Reduction in leakages of school budget allocations as a result of PETS.** New PETS reports on education and essential drugs were completed. The former led to reduced leakages in resources transferred to the primary school system. Overall, PETS has strengthened the accountability framework for the government—the president’s national policy advisory committee, auditor general, and anticorruption commission agreed that the PETS report was an important source of information for their work. Apart from highlighting the leakages, it has also pinpointed the importance of strong planning norms for budgeting.

- **Increased awareness of financial management problems and documentation of their sources.** PETS reports are discussed in the cabinet and are valued by the president’s national policy advisory committee, the auditor general, and the anticorruption commission. Senior public servants now have increased awareness of the high degree of noncompliance with budget execution guidelines and of the low levels of capacity, especially in bookkeeping skills, in cost centers at all levels.

- **Active participation of civil society organizations.** Civil society organization representatives actively participate in the annual policy hearings and budget discussions when line ministries and departments defend their budget policies, proposals, and activities.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In Sierra Leone, the aftermath of the civil war weakened traditional accountability mechanisms, as is the case in any postconflict and fragile situation. The auditor general’s office, the internal audit, and parliament had been significantly weakened, but PETS were able to fill this accountability vacuum, even though this created a significant amount of pressure on and expectations from PETS that had to be managed by the team.

REFERENCES
Sierra Leone—Third Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit Project—English. Implementation Completion and Results Report, World Bank, Washington, DC.
A1.23. Advocating to Increase Access to Sanitation in Informal Settlements

CONTEXT
The Social Justice Coalition (SJC) is a coalition of civil society organizations in the informal settlement of Khayelitsha in Cape Town. Soon after it was formed in 2008, SJC received reports from many residents that the lack of adequate toilet facilities resulted in people being assaulted, raped, and murdered when relieving themselves. SJC estimated that at least 500,000 residents of informal settlements in Cape Town did not have access to adequate sanitation. Therefore, in 2010, SJC launched the Clean and Safe Sanitation Campaign, which aims to ensure that the City Council properly maintains existing toilets and provides additional clean and safe sanitation facilities in informal settlements.

ACTIONS (2008–PRESENT)
SJC used various strategies to launch and implement the Clean and Safe Sanitation Campaign.

- SJC did some budget work, but it was not able to find reliable information on how much the city spends on Khayelitsha or on informal settlements in general. It therefore started mobilizing public support for its goals by raising awareness. For instance, SJC lined up at public toilets in places frequented by the middle class to represent the many South Africans still waiting for access to clean and safe sanitation facilities.

- SJC also endeavored to create a better relationship with the city. The city listens to SJC because of its large community-based membership and its partnerships with other sections of civil society. SJC’s partners range from religious leaders to professionals and organizations that often have skills to help SJC put forward its arguments and demands. SJC has encouraged the city to make incremental changes to improve sanitation in Cape Town’s informal settlements.

- Since the mayor of Cape Town conceded to SJC’s demands and committed to the provision of improved sanitation services by June 30, 2012, SJC has monitored these commitments. For instance, SJC visited ten sites over three months and found many problems.

RESULTS
- Provision of funds for janitorial services. The City of Cape Town introduced a janitorial service for regular maintenance of flush toilets and standpipes. This service also provided jobs for 500 unemployed people. The city promised to fund this service every year.

- Improved maintenance of sanitation facilities. The city now takes its maintenance responsibilities more seriously. For example, in November 2011, it repaired 256 toilets in Khayelitsha.

- Successful access to janitorial service contracts. SJC found that the city spent 11 percent of its operational budget to contract private companies to perform functions like servicing chemical toilets, but the companies did not clean the toilets as often as agreed, and the city did not monitor them properly. After repeated requests, SJC was given copies of the agreements with the private service providers. According to the law, these agreements should be on municipal websites, but SJC only received them after there was media advocacy and a threat of legal action. SJC used the agreements to show that the providers were not complying with all requirements.

- Tagging of GPS coordinates for public toilets. The SJC convinced the city to tag each toilet with its GPS coordinates to enable repair teams to find them easily when problems are reported. Tagging is necessary because many streets in Khayelitsha do not have formal names and numbers.

- Establishment of complaint hotlines. The City of Cape Town agreed to install free phones, which residents can use to report problems directly to the water and sanitation technical operations center.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Integrating high-quality technical analysis with targeted advocacy of key decision makers, public mobilization, and the use of the media can result in pro-poor changes in budget allocations as well as more transparency regarding how these funds are spent.

REFERENCES
Website: http://www.sjc.org.za.
A1.24. Using Budget Analysis and Litigation to Eradicate Mud Schools

CONTEXT
One of South Africa’s poorer provinces, the Eastern Cape, spends 45 percent of its total provincial budget on education. Of the education department’s total budget of R26.2 billion (approximately US$2.6 billion) for 2012–13, 81 percent was allocated for personnel, leaving few resources for desperately-needed investments such as safe school structures. Despite promises by politicians to ensure safe school structures in the province, the Eastern Cape still had 572 mud schools in 2004–05. In 2009, the education department stated that R23 billion would be required to eradicate all unsafe structures, including mud structures, but the total education infrastructure budget for that year was only R981 million.

ACTIONS

The Amasango Case (2008–11)
• Desperate for a new building for Amasango School, the school’s governing body (SGB) lobbied the education department for years in repeated meetings, letters, and phone calls, but with no results. Therefore, the SGB set up a task team to address the issue, including police, labor union representatives, municipal officials and politicians, members of the school management team, and parents. On the recommendation of this task team, in 2008, SBG, in collaboration with the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) and the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM), pursued legal action against the education department. The SBG based its case on the argument that the failure to provide adequate facilities for Amasango was a violation of the constitutional requirement for the government to provide appropriate and adequate education for all children.
• The education department backtracked on its initial offer for a settlement, arguing that Amasango was already on the list of priority schools and that resources were insufficient to address all needs simultaneously. PSAM’s budget analysis helped to reject the education department’s argument by demonstrating that the education department had been under-spending its infrastructure budget and that as part of the provincial budget process, under-spent budget lines are routinely adjusted downward. If sufficient funds were unavailable, this was partly the result of the department’s failure to spend its resources.
• The complaint filed against the Eastern Cape province and the national government made three points. First, it cited the constitutional right to education and numerous government policies and legislation at the national and provincial level that aimed to eradicate mud schools. Second, the complaint detailed the efforts made by each of the schools to communicate their needs, including petitions and correspondence. Finally, it stressed the lack of transparency by the Eastern Cape education department in designing its plans for improving educational infrastructure.

RESULTS

The Amasango Case
• Lack of compliance with court ruling. The court ruled that the Eastern Cape education department’s failure to provide appropriate and adequate school facilities at Amasango was “unconstitutional, unlawful, and invalid.” It ordered the department to develop and implement a plan for improving the school’s facilities and to report back to the court every three months on its progress. Unfortunately, the court has been unable to ensure compliance. To date, and in contravention of the court ruling, only temporary structures for the Amasango school have been put in place, and a new school has not been built.

The Seven Schools Case
• Legal commitment to replace inadequate school structures. The government of South Africa committed R8.2 billion (US$1 billion) to replace inadequate educational structures nationally over the following three years. Allocations for each of the seven schools were included in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the national government and other parties involved in the case. Additionally, the provincial education department was instructed to put in place temporary measures for the seven schools within two months. Temporary structures were in fact constructed, and some of the seven schools have since been rebuilt, although the construction of some has been delayed because of difficulties with tenders and contractors.

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• Establishment of the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative (ASIDI) by the national department of education in 2011. ASIDI was funded by two conditional grants from the national department of basic education, which provided two major dedicated funding streams for the eradication of mud schools: the Education Infrastructure Grant and the School Infrastructure Backlogs Grant. Both were introduced in the 2011–12 budget, which was tabled by the national minister in the same month that the MOA on the seven schools was signed.

• Establishment of Precedent. More recently, Equal Education, a community and membership-based education nongovernmental organization, made a deliberate effort to challenge the systemic issues plaguing the education system by asking the court to require the minister to set minimum norms and standards for school infrastructure that would apply countrywide. Shortly before March 2013, the minister conceded to this demand.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
• In addition to strategic public interest litigation, a comprehensive campaign that includes grassroots mobilization and community ownership, a plan for obtaining high-level political support, and a deliberate strategy to harness the media are often necessary to convert court victories into meaningful policy changes.
• It is the work in these other areas that often prepares civil society organizations (CSOs) for successful litigation. The Amasango and seven-school cases developed as a result of committed CSOs being prepared to respond to legal opportunities when they arose, and that poise and preparation was a consequence of their previous efforts in the field of educational justice—efforts that for PSAM had included budget monitoring and evaluation.

REFERENCES
International Budget Partnership Website: www.internationalbudget.org.
A1.25. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Improve Child Support Grant Budget Allocations

CONTEXT
In 1996, as part of the South African government’s commitment to realize the right of the poor to social security, the Lund Committee was tasked with assessing the existing system of support for children and families known as the State Maintenance Grant (SMG), and with developing approaches to target children more equitably but within the SMG budget. The SMG did not reach the poorest women and children—approximately 45 per 1,000 Indian and “colored” children received the grant, while only 2 per 1,000 African children received the grant, despite the fact that there is more extensive poverty in black communities. As per the recommendations of the Lund Committee, the South African cabinet agreed to phase out the SMG in favor of a new Child Support Grant (CSG) that would cover more children at a lower monthly grant payment of R75 (approximate US$8) per eligible child up to the age of seven. Civil society was largely excluded from the deliberations and recommendations of the Lund Committee. However, once this information became public, national civil society called on the government to increase the amount and the age cap of the grant and to improve its administration.

ACTIONS (2001–09)
• A key aspect of the efforts of civil society organizations (CSOs) was to undertake extensive evidence-based research. In 2000, for example, research conducted by the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) and the Children’s Institute demonstrated how the value of the grant had fallen in real terms since its introduction in 1998. This evidence was used in a number of submissions to relevant government departments and legislative committees in 2000 and 2001. Such research was also used to demonstrate that there were sufficient public resources to finance an extension of the CSG to children and youth up to 18 years of age, and to assess and monitor service-delivery problems as well as the value of the CSG as an effective tool to address poverty.
• Since the early days of the CSG, CSOs have organized marches and filed petitions aimed at the Department of Social Development (DSD), parliament and specific members of the government, and participated in policy processes. For instance, when the government published draft regulations for a proposed extension of the CSG for children and youth up to the age of 18 years, civil society made a joint submission to the DSD to address key concerns with the regulations. One issue was the “start-stop” problem—i.e., children qualified for the grant at the start of each phase-in year of the grant but then “fell off” the system when they were a year older. The CSO coalition recommended that any child born after April 1994 be eligible for a grant during each of the phased extensions, regardless of their age and the current stage of the grant rollout process.
• More recently, an increasingly discomfited civil society has resorted to instigating litigation supported by evidence-based research.

RESULTS
• Increase in the grant amount. The CSG was introduced in 1998 at R100 per month, increased again to R110 in July 2001, and was then increased every year at a rate equal to or slightly higher than inflation. Because of these increases, budget allocation toward CSGs have gone from R2.4 billion (approximately US$315 million) to R14.4 billion (approximately US$1.89 billion) between 2001 and 2008.
• Increase in coverage. Changes in the age cohort have also taken place since 1998, increasing gradually from children under 7 years old to a phased-in extension to children and youths up to 18 that began on January 2010. This extension was set to benefit a further two million children at an estimated additional cost of R7.4 billion (US$970 million) over the three years of phased extension.
• Resolution of “start-stop” issue. In response to the CSO submission to the DSD, an eligibility date was chosen that will prevent children from “falling off” the CSG system.
• Changes to means test to qualify for grant. CSG litigation has resulted in changes to the means test that has led to increased grant applications and the implementation of regulations reducing the document burden on applicants.
• Acknowledgment of CSO research support. Government officials have recognized the value of CSO research that provides evidence of the poverty-fighting value of the CSG. It has been acknowledged that this evidence-based research was regularly used by the DSD and that it has led to “general support” within the treasury for the CSG to be expanded as far as possible given the government finances.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

- In addition to strong research-based evidence, high-quality CSO engagement sustained for many years (in this case for more than a decade) can result in desired fiscal policy changes.

- At the same time, while litigation can achieve desired outcomes, ramping up incidences of litigation by civil society could encourage the government to become more conservative in its policy making, and while litigation may successfully expand the responsibilities of the state, there is often no corresponding expansion in the state’s ability to deliver in terms of administration and finances.

REFERENCE


CONTEXT
In South Africa at the turn of the millennium, even though the HIV/AIDS epidemic had reached epic proportions, the South African government allocated a mere R214 million (approximately US$28.5 million) to implement HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment regimes. The government’s reluctance to increase budget allocations for HIV/AIDS programs stemmed from its skepticism regarding the link between HIV and AIDS and, to a larger extent, the high cost of procuring drugs and rolling out treatment plans, particularly in the context of the limited national health budget. Launched in 1998 to campaign for equitable access to healthcare, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and its partner organizations used a number of tactics to address the lack of government action to deal with this health epidemic.

ACTIONS (1998–07)
In the early 2000s, TAC launched the Prevention of Mother-to Child Transmission (PMTCT) Campaign and the Antiretroviral Medicine Campaign (ARV) to convince the government to expand both programs. Both campaigns involved four key strategies:

- To counter the government’s argument that implementing HIV/AIDS programs was unaffordable, TAC conducted an in-depth review of the government’s budget documents and drew attention to the 2001 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, which reported that provincial departments of health had actually under-spent their budgets by R473 million (US$63.1 million).
- TAC utilized the expertise of health economists and medical professionals to produce a draft National Treatment Plan (NTP) based on the analyses of necessary delivery systems and medicines and their associated costs. This NTP was used to engage with government representatives as well as labor and business leaders at the National Economic, Development and Labor Council because the minister of health was unwilling to engage with TAC. For both campaigns, TAC commissioned research that proved that public funds expended on these programs would actually lead to measurable cost savings within five years.
- The results of TAC’s budget analysis were used during the proceedings of the case that it filed—and won—in the high court against the government, enjoining it to introduce a full-scale PMTCT program.
- To promote its civil disobedience campaign while contending with government delays in implementing the agreed upon NTP, TAC influenced the media and public opinion by leaking a copy of the report from the Joint Treasury and Health Task Team. This report demonstrated that, contrary to the governments’ claims, an ARV treatment plan was affordable and that it would save thousands of lives.

RESULTS
- Increase of budgetary allocations for HIV/AIDS programs. In 2007, the South African cabinet endorsed the HIV & AIDS and STI (sexually transmitted infections) Strategic Plan for South Africa (2007–11), which committed the government to spending R45 billion (US$6 billion) on HIV and AIDS prevention and treatment over a five-year period.
- Expansion of HIV/AIDS programs. By 2010, the PMTCT initiative covered over 80 percent of all pregnant women and the ARV program allowed 12 million South Africans to receive antiretroviral treatment through the public health sector.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
- High-quality technical analysis is invaluable to effect changes in budgetary allocations and key to credibly engaging with government representatives, influencing public opinion, or taking legal actions.
- Demands for revised budget allocations based on a cost-benefit analysis and accompanied with a well-researched action plan are more likely to have a favorable impact because governments are already coping with issues of allocative efficiency.

REFERENCES
A1.27. Using Budgets to Facilitate Social Monitoring

CONTEXT
In July 2008, Policy Forum entered into an agreement with the Mwanza Policy Initiative (MPI), a civil society network operating in Tanzania’s Mwanza Region, to jointly develop a social monitoring program. A monitoring team was formed in Mwanza city comprised of staff members and volunteers from local civil society and community-based organizations that were members of MPI. The Mwaloni Fish Market Association, a member of MPI whose members are fishermen and fish sellers, identified the first issue for monitoring. In September 2008, the Mwanza City Council announced that it planned to increase its levy on the Mwaloni Fish Market Association by 100 percent, effective that month. The association felt that this was unfair because they were already heavily taxed, while the plumbing in the fish market had been broken for several years. The local government had yet to fix the plumbing despite the fact that poor sanitation at the fish market contributed to the cholera and typhoid outbreaks that were a regular occurrence in the city.

ACTIONS (2008–10)
- The monitoring team started by collecting the city council’s budget and planning documents, a challenging task because the information was either not produced or not accessible to civil society. However, after three months, the team was able to obtain the strategic plan, medium-term expenditure framework, annual plan and budgets for two years, and the annual auditor’s report.
- Policy Forum assisted MPI’s monitoring team to analyze the budget documents, which produced three key findings that helped them address the tax hike. First, they discovered that, despite the fish market contributing three percent of total revenue to the city’s budget, they were excluded from the city council’s participatory planning and budgeting process, which was accessible to civic actors by invitation only. Second, in contrast to the 25 percent allocated to the renovation of the council treasurer’s office, there was no allocation in the 2007–08 capital budget to rehabilitate the fish market’s water and sanitation infrastructure. Lastly, there was a discrepancy of approximately 10 million Tanzanian shillings (US$8,000) between the amount they recorded as having paid the tax collector and the amount the council reported it had received. These conclusions were shared with relevant government officials and local councilors at a public hearing as well as with the wider MPI network.
- When the city council refused to negotiate and engage in spite of these findings, the association resorted to civil disobedience, refusing to pay any tax until the council agreed to meet with them. Finally, in December 2008, the council agreed to meet with the association.

RESULTS
- **No increase in fish market levy.** The fish market levy was not increased, and the association was invited to participate in the planning and budget process by the Mwanza City Council.
- **Budget allocation for fish market infrastructure.** An allocation was included in the 2009–10 city budget to rehabilitate the infrastructure at the fish market as per instructions from the national ministry of livestock development and fisheries.
- **Issuance of government directive on unspent funds.** Policy Forum has used the evidence from these local monitoring initiatives to inform its national-level advocacy. For example, it noted that in all districts where social monitoring was conducted, there were unspent funds that were neither reallocated nor returned to the ministry of finance. Based on evidence that it prepared, in September 2009, the ministry of finance issued new council financial instructions to all district councils, which emphasized that they must either reallocate or return to the Treasury all unspent funds at the end of the year, and that disciplinary action would be taken if this was not done.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
It is useful while undertaking BT&M projects to take into account that when community members are involved in generating information that solves some of their concrete problems, they have a greater incentive to make the necessary effort to access such information and to learn how to rigorously analyze it. Even then, however, change is often gradual and it takes time for results of social accountability exercises to materialize.

REFERENCES
International Budget Partnership Website: www.internationalbudget.org.
**CONTEXT**

While civil servants have relatively low salaries in Tanzania, some benefit from various additional allowances when they attend trainings or study tours and are therefore keen to receive this additional income. Since 2006, Sikika has been analyzing the government’s health budget in collaboration with like-minded civil society partners, and presented the findings of this analysis to the annual health sector review attended by government, donors, and civil society organizations. Based on its analysis of the health sector in the 2008/2009 budget proposal, Sikika found that health sector allocations for unnecessary expenditures such as allowances, workshops and training, overseas and local travel, and vehicles added up to Tshs 34.2 billion (approximately US$21,034,367). Sikika argued that this money should be more efficiently allocated to other items that would improve health care. The issue captured the attention of the prime minister, who announced that future government expenditures on workshops and seminars had to be approved by his office and that expenditures on new vehicles would be restricted. The prime minister’s directives led to revised budget guidelines in 2009, but these guidelines did not include specific targets for reducing unnecessary expenditures.

**ACTIONS (2007–10)**

Sikika monitored adherence to the prime minister’s commitment by launching a national “unnecessary expenditures” campaign between 2009 and 2011. This campaign involved three key steps:

- **Sikika developed a framework to analyze “unnecessary expenditures” across all government operations.** This included expenditure categories allowing for an appropriate level of analysis that would be easily understood and that would be comparable over time. Because actual expenditure data was unavailable, Sikika analyzed budget allocations rather than actual expenditure amounts.

- **It used its analysis of the national budgets for 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 to identify unnecessary allocations for new vehicles, seminars, and conferences and to lobby key stakeholders to garner their support for reducing these expenses.** This analysis provided a valuable means of engaging with members of parliament (MPs) and members of the Social Services Committee in the context of oversight and budget planning.

- **Sikika made a conscious effort to first identify and engage with potential agents of change, including the administration, political circles, the donor community, and trade unions.** From April 2010 onward, it disseminated its findings through the media. With headlines like “Government uses TzS 176 mil for allowances” and “Government shooting itself in the foot on allowances,” Sikika clearly hit a nerve with its focus on wasteful expenditures.

**RESULTS**

- **Decline of budgetary allocations for unnecessary expenditures.** Between 2009 and 2011, the prime minister’s directive was taken seriously with regard to training and ignored for vehicle purchases, hospitality, travel, and the like. In 2009/2010, overall “unnecessary expenditure” category allocations decreased by 22 percent through cuts in trainings and workshops. In 2010/2011, there was a nominal increase in total unnecessary expenditures. During both fiscal years, spending on training and workshops declined, while expenditures in other categories, such as allowances, increased.

- **Increased awareness of budgetary issues and processes.** Trade unions used Sikika’s analysis to argue for wage increases by cutting excessive allowances. Other civil society organizations (CSOs), including Twaweza and Policy Forum, published an analysis of public sector allowances in September 2009. Donors became more conscious of the use of aid disbursements, which resulted in them taking a tougher stand to remove hidden wage costs. Through the Social Services Parliamentary Committee and other select MPs, Sikika effectively assisted MPs in analyzing budgets and proposing revisions to the ministry of health and social welfare.

- **Establishment of presidential commission on public service salary enhancement.** The growing public debate on allowances and public service pay issues led to the establishment of a presidential commission on public service salary enhancement in 2006. This commission reportedly recommended significant reductions in expenditures on allowances and seminars and workshops as well as the taxing of allowances. However, the commission’s report, though submitted to the President in January 2007, has yet to be released.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**

High-quality technical analysis is necessary but not sufficient to effect changes in budgetary allocations. An approach that integrates analysis with targeted advocacy of key decision makers, public mobilization, and use of the media is more effective.

**REFERENCES**

Sikika Website: http://www.sikika.or.tz/en.
Even though the government initially reacted strongly against HakiElimu’s campaign by issuing an interdict against it in September 2005, HakiElimu continued to engage with different parts of the government, either face-to-face or in stakeholder consultative meetings with the prime minister, the Ministry of Education, and the ministry of finance, among others, to obtain their input on how to end the delays of getting teachers their salaries and how to improve their welfare.

RESULTS

- Increase in the minimum wage. In January 2007, the government increased the minimum wage for teachers from 80,000 Tanzanian shillings (US$60) to 100,000 Tanzanian shillings (US$75) per month.
- More timely distribution of wages. Since 2007, teachers have received their salaries before the end of month and with fewer hassles.
- Improvement in teacher–pupil ratio. The number of teachers employed in primary schools increased from 135,013 in 2005 to 154,895 in 2008, while the number of government primary schools increased from 14,257 to 15,673, and secondary schools from 1,202 to 3,039. The teacher–pupil ratio in primary schools improved from 1:56 in 2005 to 1:52 in 2006.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

- It is useful to build grass roots awareness and support for better utilization of public resources while advocating for policy reforms.
- It is also helpful to take timing and political priorities into account. In this case, when the Mkapa government banned HakiElimu activities in 2005, the country was approaching general elections and the ruling party was planning to use enrollment gains as a campaign issue.

REFERENCES

HakiElimu Website: www.hakielimu.org.

**CONTEXT**
Initiated by the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), the Gender Budget Initiative (GBI) has its roots in the lack of informed participation and feedback of citizen groups for the poverty reduction strategies and structural adjustment programs of the 1980s that left women and children on the margins of economic development. Inspired by both the South African and Australian gender initiatives and using funding provided by Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, TGNP pioneered the GBI in 1997 along with 20 other like-minded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) united under the Feminism Activism Coalition. Its key objectives included promoting the examination of policy, decision-making processes, and resource allocation and utilization with a gender perspective as well as the design and adoption of tools for gender mainstreaming of budget policies and budgets.

**ACTIONS (1997–01)**
- TGNP collected and analyzed budget data with a gender lens in selected ministries, including education, health, agriculture, and industries and commerce. TGNP teamed up government officials from most sectors with nongovernmental researchers and commissioned a gender-activist university professor to supervise the research. This approach was part of their strategy of reaching key actors, creating openings, and building alliances.
- TGNP’s analysis concentrated on the main direction of policy development, planning, and budgeting, the decision-making processes, sources of income, and the actual allocation of resources both to sectors and specific programs. TGNP published the results of this research in a booklet that was also translated into Kiswahili. The findings of this exercise were shared in public forums with a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society, government, donors, and members of parliament.
- Dissemination activities were complemented by efforts to build the capacity of coalition members, other NGOs, Community Based Organizations, and key government actors. These included: alternative gendered budget guidelines; checklists for the ministry of finance to facilitate gender mainstreaming in budget processes; and guidelines for the routine collection of gender-disaggregated data for budgeting purposes.

**RESULTS**
- Direction provided for the preparation of budget guidelines with a gender focus. The government recognized the importance of gender budgeting and included gender in the budget guidelines. In 2001, budget guidelines further mandated that all ministry, department, and agency budget submissions had to be prepared with a gender focus.
- Institutionalization of gender mainstreaming in selected sectors.
  - The ministry of water and irrigation has a policy that directs the establishment of water committees made up of 50 percent women at all administrative levels.
  - The government training of budget officers for the new requirements of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework also included gender issues. Training on gender budgeting is now required, and the TGNP coalition is the main provider of it.
  - The government and donors invited TGNP and its partners to participate in a public expenditure review and in the Tanzania Country Assistance Strategy processes. As a result, TGNP could provide input during the consultations and advocate for transparency and accountability of government actors and the inclusion of a variety of gender perspectives in government decision making.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
Efforts to assist with mainstreaming gender budgets in the Public Financial Management cycle should begin with a mapping of gender-related budgets and pilot experiences with selected ministries, sectors, or projects.

**REFERENCES**
TGNP Website: www.tngp.org.
“GBI: The Case of Tanzania.” Case Study prepared for Course on Introduction to Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Analysis, Module II, World Bank, Washington, DC.
A1.31. Building the Capacity of Community Procurement Committees in Fragile Areas to Enhance Transparency in Community Subproject Investments

CONTEXT
Northern Uganda’s economic stagnation arose out of more than two decades of brutal conflict. The insurgency in the region took a toll on both the population and the economy such that, by the end of 2005, an estimated 1.6 million people had been forced to leave their homes in Northern and Eastern Uganda out of fear of being attacked or abducted by rebels to live in camps for internally displaced persons. The community safety-net systems and the traditional social and economic fabric of the people of Northern Uganda had been greatly disrupted and weakened by the armed conflict. In response to these factors, the government of Uganda, under the coordination of the prime minister’s office, initiated the implementation of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) project, with the aim of empowering communities in 18 districts of Northern Uganda by enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and plan for their needs through subprojects; implementing sustainable development initiatives to improve socioeconomic services and opportunities; and by placing money in the hands of communities, contributing to improved livelihoods. NUSAF 2 further strengthened bottom-up accountability with a support program provided as part of a Transparency, Accountability, and Anti-Corruption Program.

RESULTS
- **Improved utilization of community funds.** The direct involvement of communities in monitoring enhanced subproject completion rates and promoted the utilization and sustainability of the investments.
- **Reduced leakage in funds.** The strengthened capacity of communities to perform oversight functions helped to minimize some forms of malpractice at the community level, such as corruption, elite capture, and waste of community resources.
- **Increased responsiveness of local governments.** Despite variations in capacities across and within districts, local governments at the district and subcounty level have been responsive about appraising subprojects, providing technical support during implementation, and supporting the certification and commissioning of funded community investments.
- **Enhanced capacity for grievance redress.** A total of 3,695 social accountability committees have already been instituted and trained in subproject implementation and grievance-handling; 31 percent of the committee members were women. The SMS Corruption Reporting System (Report2IG), which will enable citizens to send SMS text messages to report cases of corruption, has been developed and tested.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
When placing money in the hands of communities, transparency and accountability in handling of subprojects and investments can be a challenge, especially in hard-to-reach areas. However, combining efforts at increasing the participatory involvement of communities in subproject management, public sharing of expenditures at the local level, and follow-up on the misuse of funds appears to have successfully enhanced levels of transparency.

REFERENCES
RESULTS
UDN’s actions prompted the prime minister’s office to conduct an investigation that confirmed UDN’s findings, identified serious flaws in the tendering process, and subsequently led to the introduction of measures within SFG to prevent the abuse of funds, including:

- **Appointment of a new engineer.** The district tender board was dismissed and a new district engineer was appointed to oversee the SFG projects in the district.
- **Rebuilding of classrooms.** The contractors responsible for the poor construction of school buildings were ordered to rebuild the classrooms.
- **Revisiting quality assurance procedures.** The government of Uganda also revised the SFG guidelines and introduced provisions to ensure that construction of school buildings, classrooms, and toilets maintained high quality standards. For instance, contractors are now required to submit performance guarantees that they will do quality work and ensure timely delivery. Further, banks are required to provide guarantees on any advances that are released to the contractors who need to demonstrate some prequalification before they are allowed to bid for local government contracts.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Strategic linkages with senior government officials, parliamentarians, and the media are essential to build anti-corruption coalitions. In this case much of UDN’s success was determined by its capacity to identify key allies in different sections of society and cultivate these relationships by demonstrating how its goals were also in their interest.

REFERENCE
Caritas Zambia (Caritas) is a faith-based civil society organization based in Lusaka, which was founded in 2001. It works to improve the lives of all Zambians through its four key programs: the Institutional Development Programme, the Sustainable Livelihoods Programme, the Economic and Environmental Justice Programme (EEJP), and the Governance and Human Rights Programme. Under the EEJP, Caritas has been a strong voice on budget-related issues for many years and is widely recognized as one of the leading organizations conducting budget analysis and advocacy in Zambia. In fact, the EEJP predates the forming of Caritas and has been doing budget work for more than 15 years.

RESULTS

• **Worked toward a progressive tax system.** In response to pressure toward a more progressive tax system, the government raised the minimum tax threshold (the income level at which people must begin to pay taxes) in 2001 and introduced a more equitable tax code in 2004.

• **Pushed for legislative change in extractive industries.** In 2008, in response to the Caritas campaign for a windfall profits surtax on Zambian extractive industries, the government finally started to apply the country’s progressive tax regime to the extractives sector and passed the Mines and Minerals Development Act, which increased the mineral royalty rate to 3 percent and allowed the ministry of mines and minerals development to enforce a “use it or lose it” principle with regard to exploration licenses. The government also set up a revenue resource account—a special fund to be used for new social programs—especially in the education sector.

• **Government incorporated Caritas’ suggestions in the budget.** When Caritas demanded that the government implement certain components of its “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” the government responded by adopting some of the suggested strategies in Zambia’s 2002 budget.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

Outreach to the community, in conjunction with a comprehensive public communication campaign and media strategy, has raised awareness of the importance of using gains from natural resources for social development.

REFERENCES

A1.34. Using Budget Analysis to Improve Gender-Sensitive and Child-Friendly Budgeting

CONTEXT
Between 1999 and 2007, Zimbabwe’s political and economic challenges imposed significant financial pressure on households and on the nation as a whole, making budgeting difficult. In addition, background research conducted separately by the Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN) and the National Association of Non Governmental Organizations (NANGO), revealed that the needs and input of women and children were not represented when the national budget was formulated.

ACTIONS (2002–07)
Since 2002, the Child-Friendly National Budget Initiative (CFNBI) launched by NANGO and the Gender Responsive Budgeting Project (GRBP) headed by ZWRCN have adopted the following strategies to hold the government accountable for resource allocation and use for the benefit of women and children.

- Desk research as well as multistakeholder consultative workshops and focus group discussions with women and children, which bring together beneficiaries and policy makers to share views and expectations regarding gender-sensitive and child-friendly budgeting and to inform the policies and budgets of key government ministries.

- To influence fund allocations, independent budget analysis is conducted before the national budget is crafted and after presentation of the budget statements. Post-budget analysis workshops help to identify, plan, and implement additional action-oriented research and advocacy activities. Parliamentarians, policy makers, and budget makers are invited to participate so that they can hear the undiluted views of women and children.

- Capacity-development programs have been launched, which include budget literacy and analysis training workshops that use a “trainer of trainers” approach; they also use “nontraining” capacity-building methodologies, including training manuals, information and educational materials that government officials, civil society, and other development actors can use independently. Workshops are conducted for the public and for members of parliament, the women’s parliamentary caucus, and government policy makers.

- Both NANGO and ZWRCN make oral and written submissions and hold meetings with government officials and policy makers to share specific recommendations on issues that will make the national budget more responsive to the challenges facing women and children. They have mobilized various stakeholders to form strong coalitions for child-responsive and gender-sensitive budgeting.

RESULTS

- Increases in budgetary allocations. In addition to the introduction of new budget line items, such as the “Children in Difficult Circumstances” line item under the “Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare,” by 2007 there was a nearly 50 percent increase in budget line items such as the Basic Education Assistance Model, Children in Difficult Circumstances, public assistance, and other social protection programs as a percentage of the total national budget.

- Increased transparency and accountability. In response to a strong campaign by NANGO and ZWRCN for increased transparency in the distribution and use of resources set aside for HIV and AIDS, for instance, it is now common for a newspaper to run a full-page list of quarterly beneficiaries of these funds.

- Democratization of budget debates. Parliamentary portfolio committees, including the budget committee that reviews submissions of line ministries and stakeholders on policy issues and allocations, have been established.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BANK OPERATIONS
Using targeted and informed advocacy to increase budget allocations for vulnerable and/or marginalized groups is helpful in leading to positive outcomes.

REFERENCES
**CONTEXT**
Stories of corruption and graft from some of Indonesia’s remote provinces are common. Civil society organizations and the media have always been skeptical of the ability of local governments to responsibly manage their finances, and for the past decade, they have been putting pressure on members of the local legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) to submit their budgets and expenses for audit. The Sekretariat Nasional Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi Untuk Anggaran (Indonesia Transparency Budget Forum, or FITRA) emerged in September 1999 as an autonomous nonprofit organization to promote good governance and to support the right of the public to be involved in budget processes—from budget arrangement to its evaluation. It seeks to become the foundation for discourse and activities on budget transparency in Indonesia by conducting research and analysis and by orchestrating public policy advocacy campaigns via the media, publications, and public education programs. Since 2000, FITRA has performed activities that concern state budget analysis and citizen participation in Jakarta as well as Banten, Depok, Solo, Maluku, Papua, Kupang, and other regions in Indonesia.

**ACTIONS (2005–PRESENT)**
• In 2006, when the government passed Regulation Number 37, which provided retroactive income and funding for all DPRD members, the controversy over budget outlays peaked in Indonesia. The regulation included a salary increase for legislators and a communications and operational support allowance; FITRA quickly pointed out that poorer provinces could not afford this. It would mean that money would be funneled away from already-deprived sectors. It galvanized 45 nongovernmental organizations to form a coalition, devised a media strategy to extend its reach, and published widely. The movement culminated in large public demonstrations outside the state palace and the supreme court.
• FITRA’s other projects include the nationwide development program on budget transparency, the Gender Budget Program, which aimed to make budget processing and implementation more gender-responsive in the areas of Polmas Sulawesi Barat regent, Palu and Timur Tengah Selatan, and the Pro Poor Budgeting in NTB, an advocacy campaign aimed at eradicating poverty.

• FITRA publishes regular analyses of budget issues, press releases, and more lengthy budget-related studies that are meant to strengthen social monitoring of the national budget through greater social consciousness and awareness-raising.
• As part of its public education program, FITRA maintains a separate Bahasa Indonesian only website containing up-to-date budget information and documentation. It also maintains Indonesian-language budget resource centers that are available to the public.

**RESULTS**
• Government Regulation 37 annulled. Under pressure from the coalition against Government Regulation 37, the president of Indonesia assembled a panel and decided to annul the operational provisions of the law; DPRD members were required to return funds already disbursed (US$155.4 million). DPRD budgets now reflect regional fiscal capacity.
• Increased allocations to health and education. Supported by the Partnership for Governance Reform, a multistakeholder organization working with government agencies and civil society organizations to advance reforms, they successfully called for greater budget allocations to health and education, while USAID supports their transparent and accountable budget programs and advocacy efforts.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
A nongovernmental organization’s horizontal linkages (i.e., coalition-building capacities) and vertical linkages (i.e., capacity to move the state or legislatures), combined with technical competency, are essential for influencing legislative and executive changes.

**REFERENCES**
SEKNAS-FITRA Website: http://seknasfitra.org
A1.36. Using Budgets to Advocate for Expanding Health Security for the Disabled

CONTEXT
According to data issued by the ministry of social affairs in 2008, there are at least 40,290 people with disabilities in the Yogyakarta Special Administrative Region (DIY). The data do not include all people with disabilities, particularly those living in remote areas who are often concealed by their own families, preventing them from being properly recorded. They also do not belong to an organization that specifically works to address the interests of people with disabilities. Their exclusion from the statistics and the government database often causes a problem in access to basic services such as health security for citizens. And despite evidence of insufficient medical services for people with disabilities, the government does not as yet have a regulation that provides a legal basis for the healthy security provision for them. The health financing schemes of the national and local governments still exclude them. The Advocacy Center for Women, People with Disabilities, and Children (SAPDA) has been addressing this gap, and, among other things, has been keenly focused on budget advocacy for the disabled since 2005 through social mobilization and capacity-building efforts; it eventually succeeded in encouraging people with disabilities to establish their own organization and helped them gain access to regional public funds.

ACTIONS (2005–11)
• SAPDA began with what they called an “issue mapping” of persons with disabilities. Given that the limited efforts of people with disabilities to improve their access to health services were among others associated with their lack of understanding of their key issues, they began by facilitating a process of problem analysis and identification of their key issues. This mapping revealed that the government at both national and local level had not prioritized services targeting the disabled in their budgets.
• They also organized budget training for disabled communities in Klaten, Sleman, and Yogyakarta city in 2005. The training and capacity building focused on developing skills in public policy advocacy as well as technical skills for negotiating with the government in advocating for the fulfillment of the basic rights of the disabled community.
• Upon completion of the training, SAPDA and the communities and organizations of people with disabilities at the city level moved forward to advocate for the fulfillment of rights in the form of health security and budget allocations for people with disabilities in the annual city budgets of the and the province of DIY. It started with a meeting in Central Java in 2008 between disabled stakeholders from six areas and provincial- and city-level government agencies, facilitated by the regional government secretariat; the meeting also benefitted from the informal support of the vice governor of Java. After this meeting, a strategic network of stakeholders was developed to approach the government on a continuous basis, especially the regional council and the agencies responsible for health security in order to increase their understanding of the needs of the disabled.

RESULTS
• Increased health security for the disabled and spillover effects. As of December 2010, SAPDA has succeeded in getting health security financed for more than 1,573 disabled people through an allocation from the provincial government of DIY. This strengthened the bargaining position of people with disabilities who previously had never received sufficient health security. And now that health security has increased, this should create the basis for people with disabilities to receive—or at least demand—other services as well.
• Increased budgetary allocation for empowerment of disabled. In Sleman municipality, the budget allocation for empowerment of people with disabilities rose from IDR 25 million (approximately US$ 2,500) in 2006 to IDR 500 million (approximately US$ 50,000) in 2009. This money can be used to finance health, education, economic, and other special needs of people with disabilities, such as mobility devices and hearing aids.
• Authorized SAPDA to facilitate access to healthcare for disabled. SAPDA persuaded the health social security financing division of the health department of the Province of Yogyakarta Special Territory to give it the authority to assist people with disabilities access healthcare in that province. SAPDA volunteers now provide assistance to over 1,500 disabled members and their families to access health security and sustain the initial efforts of SAPDA.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Budget advocacy efforts for the marginalized or disabled must begin with those affected first: building a basis for self-reliance and capacity to feel equal with fellow citizens is crucial and becomes the foundation for involving them in advocacy efforts.

REFERENCE
A1.37. Improving Websites of Targeted Ministries to Increase Public Knowledge of Government Spending

CONTEXT
Indonesia has made great strides in strengthening governance since political reforms were initiated in 1998. However, critics have lamented the slowing pace of reforms. It is thought that increased public knowledge of government spending is able to boost demand for more accountability and to increase deterrence against irregularities. An Institutional Development Fund grant—Improving Ministries and Agencies’ Websites for Budget Transparency—seeks to boost the public knowledge by assessing the websites of government agencies and evaluating their indicators of accountability. Improving the public perception of the integrity of the agencies is another very important goal. No public documentation of the government agencies’ efforts toward greater accountability and transparency had previously existed. The websites had offered very limited public information. The project’s objective, since its launch in October 2012, has been to assess the effectiveness of 47 government ministry and agency websites as well as their performance as it relates to budget transparency. Paramadina University, which is implementing the project in collaboration with the primary government counterpart of the central information commission, provides counterpart funding for office facilities, staff time, and administrative support as mentioned during the project preparation.

ACTIVITIES (2012–PRESENT)
- Paramadina University, in collaboration with central information commission is providing assessment benchmarks. Five ministries, including the Ministry of Education and the ministry of religious affairs, are receiving particular focus because of their size.
- The website assessments, which began in December 2012, are carried out by a team of 18 website reviewers and a steering committee that evaluates the team’s work. The steering committee is comprised of members of prominent antigraft civil society organizations and the media—such as Masyarakat Anti-Korupsi (Anti-Corruption Community), Viva News, and FITRA (Coalition for Budget Transparency) as well as representatives from the central information commission and academia. The evaluation of the websites considers the following: financial, procurement, and performance (planning and activities) information; design and architecture; and content management.
- After evaluating the websites, the team is then expected to develop modules for website design and management. Practical training and on-site assistance will also be provided to the website officers of the targeted ministries.

RESULTS (ANTICIPATED)
- Demonstration of increased knowledge of budget transparency by staff. It is hoped that by the end of 2014—the project’s anticipated completion date—at least 75 percent of the technical staff of the five targeted ministries will at least be able to demonstrate knowledge of improving public accessibility to information, and also possibly expand accessibility.
- Increase in the number of budget inquiries. Correspondingly, when the project closes, it is expected that there will be at least a 50 percent increase in the number of inquires about budget information and reports.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Combining assistance in creating websites for agencies geared toward budget transparency and complementing online dissemination with an oversight committee comprised of stakeholders from antigraft civil society organizations and the media—is an interesting two-pronged approach that is likely to strengthen the transparency process.

REFERENCE
Please contact Dini Sari Djalal at ddjalal@worldbank.org for more information.
One of ILGRP’s three main components, Local Governance Reform, is budget-transparency related and supports the following activities—reforming the district planning and budgeting process with a focus on the enhancement of participation and strengthening links with local pro-poor priorities; reforming district budget implementation as well as financial management and reporting, with a focus on improving local procurement and financial management practices; and strengthening accountability mechanisms, such as increasing information disclosure and cross-district networking.

**RESULTS**
- **Disseminated budgets in 14 districts.** Prior to ILGRP, there was little or no active information dissemination. As a result of the project, summaries of district budgets, accountability reports, and district procurement plans with estimated contract amounts were made public.
- **Strengthened financial management practices.** At the outset, all districts had relatively weak financial management arrangements, but after receiving the qualified audits, 14 district governments now have sound financial management practices.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
Successful district-level governance reforms require strong district leadership, the presence of change agents within the district-level bureaucracy or cadre of civil servants, and dynamic and engaged civil society.

**REFERENCES**
In order to push the pilot project’s focus from analysis and awareness-raising to developing a program focusing on one gender issue—teenage pregnancy. This would serve as a focal point for budget analysis and revision. Toward this end, a second workshop was organized for government officials to understand that their ministry budgets had significant direct and indirect impacts in the area of gender. After the workshop, two meetings were held between the ministries of health and education and the chief secretary’s office. During these meetings, each ministry had the opportunity to map out their funding allocations for programs and outputs having a direct or indirect impact on teenage pregnancy. The process of sharing information about the programs being conducted enabled the ministries to identify some duplications and gaps in programs on teenage pregnancy.

RESULTS

- **Breakdown of budgetary process.** Overall progress in changing and reallocating the budget was completely hindered by a breakdown in the budgetary process that year, resulting from a renegotiation of the compact grant funds with the United States.
- **One-off efforts to incorporate gender considerations in the budget.**
  - The ministry of internal affairs achieved a reallocation of funds, which it planned to spend on a teenage pregnancy program. Unfortunately, this program did not succeed because of staff changes in the project’s steering committee and a failure to spend the funds on time, thereby losing the opportunity to direct this reallocation of money toward a program on teen pregnancy.
  - The Ministry of Education decided to spend a United States federal grant received for health education among adolescents on the issue of teenage pregnancy, an example of changing budget allocations by redirecting resources to alter the type and quality of goods and services delivered by government.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

- Even though a one-year timeframe is valuable for raising awareness and creating an understanding of gender issues in policies, in order for gender budgets to fulfill their potential, they need to be developed over several budget cycles.
- Even though gender-sensitive budget analysis is essential to achieving a gender-sensitive budget, changing budget allocations requires a deep understanding of the budgetary decision-making process and its politics.

REFERENCE

A1.40. Institutionalizing Civil Society Engagement to Make the Procurement Process Transparent

CONTEXT
Mongolia’s legal architecture for procurement has been undergoing considerable changes over the past few years. Major revisions of the public procurement law in June 2011 included the creation of a central procurement agency responsible for all major procurements from the national budget, a greater role for local governments in procurements funded from local budgets, enhanced internal controls, a new provision for framework agreements, and a new formal role for civil society organizations (CSOs) in bid evaluation and ex post contract monitoring. A Governance Partnership Facility grant that aims to improve transparency and the value-for-money of Mongolia’s public procurement system focuses on the last provision, about the new role of CSOs in public procurement. The amended procurement law opened the door to the formation of the Public Procurement Partnership (PPP), a procurement-monitoring network of CSOs. Established in 2012, this network of about 60 CSOs is working to build awareness, participation, and accountability around public procurement—a joint effort that has magnified their strength to engage with government agencies through increased coordination of advocacy efforts.

ACTIONS (2013–PRESENT)
- The grant will finance several nonlending technical assistance activities, including supporting the Procurement Policy Department of the Ministry of Finance to develop implementing rules and guidelines to govern the participation of CSOs in various stages of the procurement process—from bid evaluation to monitoring of contract implementation—at both central and local government levels. It seeks to ensure that CSO monitoring is well coordinated with other state oversight bodies, including the national audit office and the anticorruption agency.
- Furthermore, the grant will facilitate the PPP in developing internal self-governance regulations for its members that will set the rules for participation within the network and ensure that CSOs are accountable and free of any conflicts of interest. It will also help the PPP to develop internal monitoring tools.
- The grant will develop the capacity of the PPP through training, peer-to-peer learning, and networking with other organizations within and outside the East Asia region, including partnerships with the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability; knowledge exchange visits to countries that have been innovating in this area, such as the Philippines; and partnerships with CSOs active in the field of procurement including Procurement Watch and Roads Watch, among others.

RESULTS
Over the last year, PPP transitioned from developing basic structures, processes, and norms to “enhancing” its network, that is, fine tuning strategies, solidifying memberships, and engaging in network activities such as joint advocacy and procurement monitoring. Some key achievements to date include:

- **Increased membership and member engagement.** PPP has been successful in increasing its membership from approximately 30 to 60 CSOs. Engagement of its members through contributions of staff time and in-kind resources has also increased, indicating greater connectivity among and enthusiasm of its members.
- **Development of a five-year strategic plan.** A strategic plan has been developed and publicly declared clear goals and agreed-upon strategies aimed at improving effectiveness of the partnership.
- **Coordination of policy dialogue and constructive engagement with the Ministry of Finance.** As a result of the dialogue, in Fall 2012, the Ministry of Finance changed the implementing rules and regulations to include several of PPP’s requests, including allowances for monitors and the use of specific reporting templates for members of the CSO bid evaluation committee.
- **Cooperation agreements with subnational governments.** The PPP and its subnetworks have signed or are in the process of signing cooperation agreements on procurement monitoring with several aimags (provinces) (e.g., Khuvsgul, Uvorkhangai, and Omnogovi Aimags). In partnership with these government agencies, members of the PPP will monitor the implementation of contracts, especially in the road and construction sectors.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
When working in a context such as Mongolia, with a vibrant civil society and a growing—but still limited—number of CSOs with specialized skills in procurement, interventions to improve advocacy skills should be complemented by initiatives that strengthen the technical capacity of CSOs. South–South learning about public procurement and monitoring among CSOs is also worthy of integration in projects.

REFERENCE
In order to improve the anticorruption framework in Mongolia, a main activity involved adopting an effective conflict-of-interest framework for reducing corruption and increasing integrity in the Mongolian public administration that complies with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. This was realized by producing outputs that included a functional system of income- and asset declaration and disclosure and a code of conduct framework for conflict-of-interest prevention and resolution.

Finally, in order to develop a robust framework for monitoring corruption, the project assisted the anticorruption agency in developing the Mongolia Corruption Index, a perception survey-based index of corruption. It was launched in 2009 and is updated every two years.

RESULTS

- Improved public accountability and monitoring. Before the start of the project, very little procurement data was public. Now, through the ministry of finance’s website, citizens can access information on key parts of the procurement cycle, such as tender announcements, bidders, and awarded contracts.
- Lowered perceptions of corruption. The perception of corruption has decreased as measured by the Mongolia Corruption Index.
- Improved Open Budget Index ranking. A reduced perception of corruption within the country led to Mongolia’s Open Budget Index ranking improving from 18 in 2006 to 60 in 2010, before declining to 51 in 2012.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

A combination of technical assistance and capacity building yields the most effective results in budget transparency interventions.

REFERENCES

A1.42. Engaging Civil Society Partners in Monitoring the Procurement Process

CONTEXT

Studies have shown that 30 percent of the Philippine government’s procurement budget, which constitutes about 15 percent of the total annual budget, is lost due to corruption and other forms of misusing public funds. Sources include audit reports, testimonies from witnesses such as government employees involved in procurement, and entities who have been parties to procurement by government. Several of these corrupt practices have also been exposed in the mass media. To stop this type of corruption, the Davao Procurement Transparency Group (DPTCG), a coalition of 26 member organizations involved with programs on good governance and anticorruption, has been operating in the Mindanao region of the Philippines since 2009.

ACTIONS (2009–10)

• DPTCG seeks to organize and enhance the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) by mobilizing them as observers during the bidding and procurement processes carried out by the government. The participation of CSOs as observers of all phases of the bidding and procurement process as well as in contract monitoring is allowed by the Philippines Government Procurement Reform Act, but it is not required.

• Since DPTCG operates with CSOs involved with voluntary monitoring as observers of the procurement process, it first must build trust with government entities in order to have access to bidding procedures and documents. Therefore, DPTCG also seeks liaisons with and outreach toward government agencies to help bridge resistance and create partnerships for fighting corruption. Several meetings, forums, and other interface activities with server heads and key personnel of different government agencies were initiated by DPTCG.

• Some of the additional functions performed by DPTCG include capacity building, third-party monitoring, community mobilization, coalition building, and structured consultations.

RESULTS

• Decreased irregularities in procurement. More monitoring has resulted in better procurement with fewer irregularities noted by observers and a resulting drop in corruption associated with procurement. Several CSOs also reported that, as a result of their vigilance in the monitoring of the construction of a government building, the budget had been utilized as laid out in the original project plan, resulting in better quality of construction and, in some instances, better services for the population.

• Increased acceptance of CSOs as a legitimate oversight mechanism. Another observed impact has been the growing number of government procuring agencies that are open to the presence and participation of CSOs as observers of the bids and awards committees (BAC). In the initial phase of the project, only seven government agencies were receptive, most of them from Davao city. Currently, some 18 government agencies are inviting DPTCG to send BAC observers to monitor all phases of the bidding process, and several invitations have been received from provinces around the Davao region as well.

• Enhanced legitimacy of DPTCG as a government partner in procurement. DPTCG is now a key partner in helping the government prioritize and select what procurement procedures will be the focus of coalition oversight.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

One of the factors identified by DCPTG as critical to success is the participation of academia and the private sector in the early stages; this proved to be an effective strategy for facilitating dynamic and progressive thinking and the development of action steps to combat corruption in the procurement system.

REFERENCE

DPCTG Website: http://ptfund.org.
A1.43. Improving Budget Accountability and Allocations for Social Development

CONTEXT
Founded in 1997, Social Watch Philippines (SWP), a part of the International Social Watch Network, is a network of civil society organizations and individuals with the broad goal of monitoring and advocating for progress of the government commitments to the social development goals defined in the 1995 Copenhagen Summit and the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). SWP’s primary activity is the Alternative Budget Initiative (ABI) in which civil society organizations engage in the national budget process during the budget preparation, legislation, implementation, and accountability stages. The group analyzes the budget’s impact on education, health, the environment, food and agriculture, and the overall economy. ABI members, together with their partner legislators, formulate an alternative budget proposal that, in their view, would lead to better progress toward the MDGs.

ACTIONS (2007–PRESENT)
• To complete this initiative within the time allotted for budget hearings, members of the ABI consortium split into clusters on health, education, agriculture, the environment, and macroeconomics. Each cluster then forms a technical working group to identify priority issues and formulate alternative budget proposals for each area. After the group’s consultations are completed, each cluster meets with legislators to discuss and finalize the budget proposals.
• SWP also conducts various workshops to involve more citizens in the budget process. For example, in 2007, SWP taught other civil society actors how to formulate their own alternative budgets. A year later, the group conducted a workshop that produced a detailed plan for the 2009 budget engagement for each cluster, with agreements on key priority issues, a work plan, strategies of engagement with the executive and the legislative, and a media strategy. SWP also organizes training seminars to help members of the media better understand the issues behind the national budget process so that they can then more effectively present the issues to the masses and to build partnerships with reporters covering the national budget and civil society interventions.
• For the ABI to influence actual budget allocations, SWP and its partners brief legislators in the Philippines House of Representatives and Senate on the alternative budget proposals, gather their suggestions and input, and try to gain support for the proposals. ABI responds to questions and concerns from legislators and provides additional information supporting the alternative budgets. ABI clusters vigilantly monitor budget deliberations and readily provide legislators data for their media releases, speeches, and responses to issues. During budget deliberations, ABI provides technical notes to support legislators in their interactions with government agencies. After both chambers pass the budget, ABI defends its gains against the veto power of the president and calls for immediate approval and implementation of the budget jointly approved by the House and Senate. The ABI clusters also conduct budget tracking on the budget for agriculture, the environment, health, education, and conditional cash transfers. They monitor the implementation of the budget items that were included in the General Appropriations Act because of ABI’s budget advocacy.

RESULTS
• Increased allocations for social development. Because of the Alternative Budget Initiative campaign, there was an increase of P5.2 billion (approximately US$127,232,923) in allocations for social development in the 2007 national budget, P6.3 billion (US$154,147,580) in the 2008 budget, and an increase of P7.7 billion (US$188,402,598) in the 2009 budget for health, agriculture, the environment, and education. Ahead of the 2009 budget, the entire minority group of the Senate and House of Representatives, as well as majority group members of both chambers, adopted all alternative budget proposals.
• Increased accountability. Moreover, ABI’s rigorous campaign for transparency and accountability, focusing on the release of impounded funds, led to a special provision against impoundment. Additionally, the Bicameral Conference Committee made a resolution to let the public attend and learn the results of bicameral meetings on the budget. The Senate and House of Representatives also agreed to form a joint legislative oversight committee on the budget to conduct monthly hearings on budget implementation.
• Participation of nongovernmental organizations in the budget process. Because of the ABI, the Congress Committee on Appropriations invited nongovernmental and people’s organizations to participate in budget deliberations in congress and to present their alternative budget proposals. The House Committee on People’s Participation is now working on a bill to institutionalize people’s participation in the national and local budget processes—a result of ABI advocacy for a participatory budget process.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
High-quality technical analysis is necessary but not sufficient to effect changes in budget allocations. An approach that integrates analysis with targeted advocacy of key decision makers, public mobilization, and use of the media is more effective.

REFERENCE
Website: http://www.socialwatchphilippines.org.
A1.44. Using Citizen Monitors to Track Pork Barrel Funds

CONTEXT
More commonly known as “pork barrel funds,” the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Congressional Allocations (CA) in the budget of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) are discretionary funds allocated to each congressperson and senator to finance projects they identify. Because 20–50 percent of earlier discretionary funds were squandered, the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) launched the Pork Barrel Watch (PDAF Watch) in late 2005. Capitalizing on its capacity as the largest network NGO aimed to influence relevant national policies and the practices of legislators in order to achieve a more responsible and transparent use of discretionary funds.

ACTIONS (2005–10)
CODE-NGO has undertaken PDAF Watch in the years 2005–06 (Phase I), 2007 (Phase 2), and 2009–10 (Phase 3).

- Every phase of PDAF Watch begins with the recruitment of volunteer monitors across different regions of the country. These volunteers are trained on how to gather information, interview key informants, and conduct field monitoring of PDAF projects. Simultaneously, information on the utilization of PDAF is requested from DPWH, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and all congresspersons and senators.
- Based on the list of PDAF/CA-funded projects, volunteer monitors randomly select three projects in their assigned district. Once the projects are identified, volunteer monitors gather pertinent documents regarding these projects from the office of the legislator, the district engineer’s office, and/or the local government unit; undertake field monitoring visits to validate the status of the project as reported; and inspect whether project specifications were met.
- Key informant interviews among officials of the implementing agencies and members of the community are also undertaken to further explore any concerns raised during the field monitoring.
- Volunteer monitors then prepare a report and submit it to CODE-NGO, which then analyzes all the data and prepares and disseminates a consolidated report.

RESULTS
- Launch of a transparency and accountability initiative for lump sum funds. In 2011, after the new administration took office, the DBM took a major step in making the information on PDAF publicly available through the electronic “Transparency and Accountability Initiative for Lump Sum Funds” (e-TAILS) section on its website. The DBM also adopted measures to promote the proper and efficient use of the PDAF. These include requiring that legislators specify the scope of work and type of equipment needed, the number of units to be built for housing projects, the type of vehicle and the number of units to be purchased, the number of scholars and health beneficiaries, and, for education and health projects, the names of schools and hospitals.
- Issuance of full disclosure policy. In 2010, the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued a full disclosure policy that requires local government units to make publicly available through their website or bulletin boards various budget, financial, and other documents, including the PDAF projects that went to the local government units.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
A new administration geared toward addressing corruption and poverty and that is willing to take measures to promote budget transparency could be the linchpin for making the budget more transparent, participatory, and accountable.

REFERENCE
A1.45. Monitoring Public Procurement to Reduce Inefficiencies and Corruption

CONTEXT
Before Procurement Watch Inc. (PWI) was established in 2001 to combat corruption in public procurement, there were no laws governing the procurement of office goods and supplies. The government could change procurement practices at will. When the government set up a task force to examine procurement reforms and draft a new law on procurement, members of PWI’s governing board were included. Thus, PWI became intimately involved with the task force activities and established itself as a nongovernmental procurement expert. Over the next two years, PWI led a civil society campaign to support passage by the national legislature of the Government Procurement Reform Bill (GPRB), a new procurement law, and after the law’s passage it devised means for its implementation.

ACTIONS (2001–PRESENT)
To have full access to government information, PWI adopted a non-adversarial stance and presented itself as a partner to the government offering its services. It undertook the following actions:

- To promote passage of the procurement law, PWI provided technical assistance and advocacy support.
- To increase the chances of getting sufficient votes for the passage of the procurement law, PWI provided free technical assistance to both the administration and opposition leaders. PWI was a vital part of the Technical Working Group (TWG), tackling the procurement bill in both houses of congress; it was also designated as a member of the Secretariat of the TWG of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws.
- As a part of its advocacy support, PWI organized information campaigns for both private and public sectors on the GPRB, stressing that the bill was an anticorruption measure. PWI staff met with professional government associations, business groups, civil society organizations (CSOs), and student organizations to present the bill’s salient points, impart updates, and garner support. It also granted TV, radio, and broadcast interviews and distributed posters, streamers, and primers on the GPRB.

To promote the implementation of the law, PWI has:

- Assisted in crafting the law’s implementing rules and regulations.
- Provided training to track procurement for different groups, including the ombudsman, government agencies involved in large procurements, CSOs, and private citizens.

- Set up a web-based reporting and feedback mechanism to aid in the drive for greater transparency and sharing of reports by trained CSO affiliates. The reports submitted by the affiliated CSOs have not yet been posted on PWI’s website for wider readership but shall be made accessible to the public.
- Developed the differential expenditure efficiency measurement (DEEM), a tool to measure corruption and inefficiency in public procurement. It has tested DEEM by collaborating with the government’s internal audit agency, which agreed to provide PWI with access to procurement documents maintained by the agencies it audits.

RESULTS
- Savings achieved due to better procurement practices. In the first semester after the passage of the GPRB, savings materialized from the posting of advertisements on the Philippines Electronic Government Procurement System for projects up for bid due to an increase in information dissemination and a subsequent increase in competition. For instance, the bureau of corrections recorded savings of 58 percent on subsistence of prisoners, ammunitions, and office equipment. The housing and land-use regulatory board saved 38 percent on information technology parts and accessories.
- Training of 800 citizen monitors. PWI’s efforts have resulted in the training of 800 citizen monitors to ensure that contractors comply with contracts.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
- Creating or supporting entities that can provide quality technical assistance as partners to members of the legislature is an effective strategy to further the public good.
- Helping civil society get a seat at the government’s table can lead to effective collaboration in implementing better Public Financial Management practices.

REFERENCE
A1.46. Using Community Monitoring to Address Mismanagement of Post-War Reconstruction Funds

CONTEXT

After a long history of violent conflict, the reconstruction of Timor-Leste’s physical and social infrastructure is a priority. However, reconstruction projects are prone to corruption and misappropriation of resources whether they are managed by government agencies or private contractors. It is therefore critical to increase transparency. In this vein, Luta Hamutuk was established in 2005 by a number of activists to ensure a participatory and accountable development process. As of 2011, Luta Hamutuk was working with the government and community monitors to ensure the effective oversight of 15 reconstruction programs and projects worth US$1.3 billion across various districts.

ACTIONS (2005-PRESENT)

Luta Hamutuk works in the following areas:

- It reaches out to as many communities in Timor-Leste as possible to facilitate discussions on the state budget, the petroleum fund, and the development plan. Led by Luta Hamutuk staff, such community briefings provide basic information on the source of the state’s revenues (oil and gas). They explain the mechanisms by which these revenues enter the state budget, what the state budget is, how allocations are made, and what the present development plans are. These briefings encourage community feedback to foster informed citizen action in order to improve the reconstruction process. Community briefings also serve as a recruiting ground for volunteer “focal points” who become the link between the local leaders and the community and between the community and the Dili-based policy community.

- Luta Hamutuk supports the focal points and their communities as they monitor projects in eight districts. The total value of development projects monitored by Luta Hamutuk was US$7,404,672.83, as of November 2010. The monitoring exercise serves to verify whether promised projects are in fact implemented and whether the quality is appropriate. The projects monitored are mostly clinics and school buildings as well as electricity, irrigation, canalization, water and sanitation, and road projects.

- Luta Hamutuk facilitates the creation of monitoring committees that include local government authorities and community members and which monitor and report on several reconstruction projects. The focal points regularly update the committee members on the status of the projects that they monitor. Results of the committee meetings are used for advocacy with the government and companies working on infrastructure projects.

- It also encourages focal points and their communities to identify development projects that would respond to their needs and to advocate for them to the government.

RESULTS

- Delivery of infrastructure. The community monitoring has contributed to greater community engagement and the delivery of critical infrastructure to more than 101,660 Timorese people. In Bazartete, for example, a municipality of 63,329 people, monitoring committees discovered that schools lacked desks, chairs, and blackboards. They shared these findings with the Ministry of Education, resulting in the delivery of the necessary school furniture and in rehabilitation of schools. Community monitors also mobilized to ensure that low-quality pipes were substituted with better ones, as a result of which villagers now have access to clean water.

- Pro-poor budget allocations. In addition to increasing efficiency savings due to whistle-blowing on project delays and lack of maintenance, Luta Hamutuk’s work has led to pro-poor budget allocations, ensuring national funds reach communities across the country. For instance, Luta Hamutuk monitored the building of housing for war veterans in the Dili, Viqueque, Manatuto, and Liquisa districts. They found that the houses were often too small and/or insufficient for the number of veterans. Luta Hamutuk offered recommendations to address these problems to the office of the prime minister, parliament, SEAVAC, the ministry of infrastructure, and the high court; these recommendations were also shared with the media. As a result of their monitoring and advocacy, Luta Hamutuk was able to increase veteran housing budget allocations.

- Replication in post-conflict contexts. Learning from the successful experience in Timor Leste, similar citizen/state committees have been replicated in Afghanistan to enhance community-driven accountability there. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, Luta Hamutuk’s partner in the Network for Integrity in Reconstruction, visited Luta Hamutuk to learn about their approach to community engagement and monitoring and are now supporting similar monitoring boards at the provincial level in Afghanistan.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BANK OPERATIONS

- Undertaking budget transparency and monitoring can be instrumental in postconflict countries where gaining legitimacy and showing results are often pressing concerns, even more so than in other developing countries.

- Replicating successful budget transparency and monitoring models from other post-conflict countries could be supported in World Bank projects.

REFERENCES

Luta Hamutuk Website: http://www.lutahamutuk.org.
A1.47. Pursuing Transparency in Budgets, Aid, and Procurement via Online Portals

CONTEXT
Throughout 2011 and into 2012, the government of Timor-Leste made several significant advances in the pursuit of its transparency and good governance agenda by launching a series of online portals dedicated to improving public sector transparency. These online portals were part of a broader initiative, referred to as the Timor-Leste Transparency Model (TLTM), which, according to the government, provided a system of “360 degree fiscal accountability chain from the point of resource extraction to the time of investment through reliable, public and shared systems and information.” On its website, the government of Timor-Leste declared the goal of the project as follows:

“The Transparency Website will allow people to participate, in real time and interactively, in the process of the Timor-Leste national budget and to contribute to National Development. Citizens can investigate projects further to view budget transactions to ensure the budget is being spent as intended. This ensures honesty and transparency to improve citizen and investor confidence. The Timor-Leste Transparency Portal provides 10 years of budget information: the budget that was approved and the actual budget spent. Reports and filtered results can be exported in PDF, Word, Excel, XML and HTML formats.”

APPLICATIONS (APRIL 2012–PRESENT)

• Households within the ministry of finance, the portals can be accessed online—www.transparency.gov.tl. Their launch is considered an important achievement for Timor-Leste as they provide a set of user-friendly and generally-accessible tools for use by government, civil society, the private sector, and citizens to engage and hold each other to account for the use of public resources.

• The portals are currently split across four fields: budget execution, overseas development assistance, government procurement, and project results. Data on revenues, allocated budgets, and budget execution across ministries are updated every 24 hours, whereas data on aid disbursements from development partners are collected on a quarterly basis—in Portuguese, Tetum, and English. The next step for the portals is to post photos of public works projects to provide the public with an even better understanding of public decisions in real time.

• Besides the portal, the government has also undertaken a range of other transparency initiatives under the TLTM. Timor-Leste is now part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a program that calls for transparency for countries with energy wealth. Through the EITI process, companies publish what they pay and governments disclose what they receive; this information is verified and publicly disclosed.

RESULTS
Luta Hamutuk, a civil society organization dedicated to budget transparency, evaluated the effectiveness of the Portals of Transparency and the EITI process across several districts of Timor-Leste. Interviews were conducted with the district administrator, the subdistrict administrator, students, village chiefs, youth representatives, companies, political parties, local nongovernmental organizations, teachers, lecturers, and communities. Results suggest:

• Limited guidance on utilization of the portal. As many as 95 percent of the respondents questioned the use of the website because they were unable to understand how to use it. In addition, many of them experienced difficulties in understanding terms and acronyms used on the portal.

• Lack of clarity on the future of these portals. Challenges remain regarding the expansion of these portals to line ministries and the widening of their usage as core tools.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

The provision of a web-based tool to increase transparency can complement sound economic policy, encourage public oversight, and build confidence within the private sector, attracting investors by dispelling inaccurate information through reporting in an open and timely manner on government processes, particularly those related to public finance management and procurement. In postconflict and fragile states like Timor-Leste, the reputational benefits that such portals can offer should not be ignored—that is, regardless of its effectiveness, by signaling to the population its intention to “open up its books,” the initiative can have a trust-building effect that is key in such contexts.

REFERENCES
A1.48. Promoting Public Participation in Municipal Budgets to Increase Transparency

**CONTEXT**
Since the inception of the local self-government system in Azerbaijan in 1999, the establishment of a well-functioning governance system at the local level has been a priority. Even so, as of October 2006, municipalities struggled because of a lack of budgeting skills and lack of experience with civic engagement in budget drafting and budget documentation procedures. In order to encourage public participation in municipal budgets and policy making and to improve the transparency of the local budget process, the Economic Research Centre, an independent nonprofit research institution based in Baku, with support from Counterpart International, initiated a project called Enhancing Transparency Initiatives and Ensuring Public Participation in Municipal Budgets.

**ACTIONS (OCTOBER 2006-MARCH 2007)**
- Based on their assessment of the budget management systems of the six selected municipalities, project experts provided technical assistance to design economic and functional classifications of expenditures in order to bring the budget projections for the next fiscal year in line with legislative requirements. They also provided assistance with software-based registration of local tax and duty payers and developed model regulations for the local budget process.
- Budget information boards were set up in various public places, such as in front of school buildings or municipal offices, to present key budget information or event announcements in an attempt to garner broader public attention. Decisions at different stages of the budget process were also shared on these boards and thus disseminated to members of the local community.
- Each of the six municipalities hosted public hearings in early and mid-December 2006 to encourage public participation in the debate on the draft 2007 budgets for municipalities. Before the hearings, chief municipality officers and persons responsible for financial matters were provided with necessary guidelines on the forms and contents of the reports to be developed. Public advertisements detailing the place and date of the hearings were posted throughout the municipalities before the event. The municipal budgets were published in newspapers with explanatory comments and disseminated to the local population before the hearings to enable them to raise relevant questions during the hearings.

**RESULTS**
- Improvement in tax collection. The public involvement in the decision-making process increased citizens’ sense of ownership and increased trust between them and the municipal management body. This was reflected in the changes in postproject tax collection. For instance, Piral municipality had an increase of up to 95 percent in tax collections and Hasangala municipality stated that the debts outstanding since 2000 have been repaid, in part due to increased tax revenues since the public hearings.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
Supporting small pilot projects can lead to meaningful results and serve as valuable learning experiences, thus incubating larger efforts at promoting participation in and transparency of budget processes.

**REFERENCE**
A1.49. Publishing Citizens Budgets and Influencing Budget Transparency Legislation

CONTEXT
The Center for Legal and Economic Reforms Assistance (CLERA) is an Almaty-based civil society organization (CSO) that has been working on budget transparency—particularly publishing Citizens Budgets—in Kazakhstan since 2010. Funded by the Soros Foundation—Kazakhstan’s Public Finance Transparency Program and the Local Government Initiative, CLERA has been working to improve the provision of information to the public by the Kazakh government, which scored only 38 points out of 100 on the 2010 Open Budget Index.

ACTIONS (2010–PRESENT)
- Soon after its formation, CLERA pioneered a model for a Citizens Budget in Kazakhstan and the Central Asia region more broadly.
- In November 2010, they developed three different types of Citizens Budgets that could be used at the national, regional, and local level. These models were widely disseminated at several regional conferences, including one about the 2010 Open Budget Survey in Astana, Kazakhstan where key stakeholders such as the finance minister and members of supreme audit institutions participated and noted that the Kazakh government could use the CLERA Citizens Budget model to draft its own version for all levels of the budget system.

RESULTS
- Integration of CLERA’s Citizens Budget methodology in finance ministry’s work. In May 2011, the ministry of finance formally established a working group to develop procedures and a methodology for the production and publication of the Citizens Budget. The working group included CSO representatives and members of National Budget Network of Kazakhstan (NBSK).
- Legislative changes. The draft legislation, called the “Methodology of Development and Dissemination of the Citizens Budget,” was prepared after two months of actively-engaged cooperation between CSOs, the ministry of finance, and the Soros Foundation. The finance minister’s bill was signed into law in June 2011 and covers issues related to the development of Citizens Budgets at both the central and local level. What is unique about the bill is that Citizens Budgets will not only be published when the government publishes the executive’s budget proposal but also after the formulation, approval, implementation, and evaluation stages of the budget process.
- Wide dissemination of budget and information on the bill. As of October 2011, the finance minister’s bill is currently being implemented, and relevant chapters are available on official websites of state agencies, including that of the ministry of finance and local governments. Individual line ministries and state agencies have made vast strides by publishing their own Citizens Budgets, which they strive to make more user-friendly.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Working closely with a champion (in this case the finance minister) is key to making the shift from advocacy and research toward making an impact on legislation and policy.

REFERENCES
A1.50. Analyzing the National Budget to Strengthen the Rights of the Disabled

**CONTEXT**
Established in 2002, Namys (“Conscience”) advocates for the rights of disabled persons. Initially, Namys focused its attention on advocating for a law that recognized the rights of disabled persons and established programs to provide rehabilitative services. In 2003, Namys launched a campaign to overturn a regressive law proposed by the government that would have represented a return to the old Soviet policy that essentially left the disabled to their own devices. These efforts paid off when the government accepted some of Namys’s main provisions, including clearly placing the responsibility to protect the rights of disabled persons on public agencies.

**ACTIONS (2001–08)**
Having achieved the passage of the law protecting the rights of the disabled, Namys began focusing on the budgetary issues:

- Namys monitored allocations to public agencies meant to help disabled persons in order to ensure that they were being properly utilized. During the course of its monitoring activities, it found that Almaty city’s program to provide new wheelchairs to 250 disabled persons every year was procuring wheelchairs of a poor quality.
- In 2004, Namys organized a coalition of partners to advocate for the ratification of the Integrated Disability Rehabilitation Policy at the local and national government levels and to ensure adequate funding for the policy.
- The coalition conducted policy-based research on the Governmental Program on Disability Rehabilitation from 2001–05, which found that the previous government program only met 40 percent of its target indicators for this program. The coalition also determined that the program was underfunded and that it did not account for issues other than health rehabilitation that would improve equal access for the disabled. The coalition used this research to formulate a new rehabilitation policy.
- Namys lobbied for policy ratification at both the local and national levels. At the national level, the coalition established strong contacts with heads of ministries, parliament members, and representatives of the presidential administration, working directly with seven separate ministries, including the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Ministry of Economy and Budgeting, Ministry of Culture Information and Sports, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of Public Health, and Ministry of Industry and Trade. It conducted a number of high-level discussions with members of parliament on the promotion of the policy within the government.

**RESULTS**
- Ratification of government program on disability rehabilitation. In late 2005, the Almaty city administration ratified the integrated rehabilitation policy designed by the advocacy coalition led by Namys. This advocacy campaign was an unqualified success resulting from sound policy research and constructive engagement by nongovernmental organizations with government officials. Ultimately, Kazakhstan signed the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol in 2008. In addition, a national law, “On Social Protection of Invalids in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” was passed along with the Complex Program on Rehabilitation of Invalids for 2006–08.
- Increase in budget allocations for a rehabilitation program. The Almaty city government disability rehabilitation program for 2002–05 had a budget of approximately US$2 million. As a result of the advocacy campaign, the newly-approved budget for the Integrated Disability Rehabilitation Policy for 2006–08 in Almaty was US$27 million—a 13-fold increase.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
- Viable propositions made by civil society can be initially adopted at the local level and then only later at the national level.
- In addition to civil society engagement, the government’s intent to become a signatory to an international convention can provide an incentive to change laws and policies.

**REFERENCES**
A1.51. Strengthening Reforms to Make Budget Execution Transparent

CONTEXT
A small, landlocked country with a population of 4.9 million, the Kyrgyz Republic began its transition to a market economy in 1990 with relatively good social indicators. However, since independence, income levels have declined by approximately 60 percent, and in 2001, poverty levels were high, with income per capita at only US$300, the second lowest in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Improving governance was seen as critical if these challenges were to be successfully overcome. In this context, the Governance Structural Adjustment Credit (GSAC) program sought to improve public sector transparency and responsiveness; to develop the ability of external stakeholders to hold the government accountable; and to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the public sector. In turn, the Governance Technical Assistance Credit Project supported the GSAC reforms, particularly with regard to the second objective. The objectives of the credit project were to strengthen public expenditure management by establishing a more strategic and transparent budget formulation process and strengthening accountability and transparency in budget execution; to improve the internal control environment; and to improve transparency, value for money, and accountability in public procurement.

ACTIONS (2003–12)
- A plan was developed to restructure and strengthen the state commission on public procurement and material reserves, and the procurement function of ministries and agencies was clearly delineated.
- Revised procurement rules and processes were implemented to increase transparency and impartiality and support to publish the procurement bulletin was provided.
- Procurement audits of selected items that affect service quality in the health and education sectors (e.g., pharmaceuticals and textbooks) were carried out to verify compliance with procurement rules and regulations, to assess value-for-money in reference to national and international market prices, and to take consequential remedial actions.

RESULTS
• Budget preparation through due process. Before the implementation of the Governance Technical Assistance Credit Project, the budget was poorly presented and allocations were managed on a monthly basis according to cash availability. Since the implementation of the credit project, a transparent budget is being prepared with the ultimate goal of integrating it into a medium-term framework.
• Published budgets on the treasury website. In a context where budget reports were fragmented and not made widely available, the budget execution reports (monthly, quarterly, and annual) are now being published on the website of the central treasury. Summary budget reports are also made publicly available within six months of budget execution.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Enhancing the effectiveness of public procurement by regularly publishing information is an integral part of the process of making budget implementation transparent.

REFERENCES
CONTENTS

A1.52. Strengthening Budget Literacy among the Media and Citizens to Enhance Transparency

CONTEXT

With a Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) grant of US$793,000, the Information Matters: Transparency and Accountability in the Kyrgyz Republic (IMTAK) program provided training to the executive and elected branches of local self-governments (LSGs) and representatives of civil society on budget transparency and budget literacy. The project builds on an overall government commitment to enhance transparency with a focus on budget processes at the village level of government (Ayl Okmotu) where citizens can feel the most impact. IMTAK supports the larger Public Financial Management program through the development of constructive demand for transparent budget process at the village level of self-government.

RESULTS

• Better informed media coverage of budget transparency issues. Using newly-acquired analytical skills, journalists have started writing well-informed articles on complex budget related issues. They understand that any budget—whether it is one of a particular state or of a family—depends on the contribution of every able-bodied member creating material or cultural value for the benefit of the community. The articles published have covered a wide range of topics, including the role of foreign borrowing, the management of municipal assets, the reduction of fiscal deficits, and the correlation between taxation and the business climate.

• Enhanced literacy among all stakeholders with regard to budget matters. The project has raised the awareness of citizens and the mass media about the right to information—particularly budget information—and has enhanced the level of literacy about budget matters. These efforts have helped improve the responsiveness of public officials to requests from citizens for budget-related information.

• Promotion of constructive dialogue. By bringing together multiple stakeholders with differing points of view, the project has facilitated a constructive dialogue about the budget between communities and local governments and has increased the involvement of civil society representatives at all stages of the budget process.

• Scaling up of IMTAK’s activities and efforts. The impact of IMTAK was scaled up by follow-up and spin-off activities funded by the World Bank and other donors.

(continued)
Additional funding for extension of reforms.
- Based on the early successes of IMTAK, one local partner has leveraged significant additional funding from the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives to extend the program with facilitation of open budget hearings and other supporting activities. The funding enabled an increase in training coverage; introduced a wider set of activities; and organized budget hearings in 185 villages and four cities and towns of the Naryn, Talas, and Osh oblasts—over 7,000 citizens participated in these hearings. Using materials developed at the first stage of IMTAK, the USAID-funded project developed methodical manuals for LSG staff and easy-to-read “how-to” guides for citizens about participation in local budgeting. Several state bodies and nongovernmental organizations requested copies of the manual for distribution and use by their staffs.

- In August 2012, a project funded by the World Bank-managed Europe and Central Asia Region Public Financial Management trust fund began with the aim of establishing a platform for the exchange of experience and ideas among LSG staff. Under this grant, a system for mutual peer-to-peer training to discuss issues of local budgets and to share experiences and proven solutions is being set up. The trust fund steering committee is considering allocating more funds for scaling up this program as a recipient-executed activity.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
- Media can be both a powerful agent and a platform for the budget transparency agenda of any country. It is therefore critical to ensure that the media is well-informed and capable of reporting on complex budget transparency issues.
- The effectiveness of budget transparency and literacy capacity-building and training exercises can be significantly increased by using more hands-on exercises and practical examples that participants can use in their daily work.

REFERENCE
A1.53. Influencing National Budgets to Push Legislative Changes

CONTEXT
Ever since Poland shifted gears toward a free market economy in 1989, the country has witnessed unprecedented growth rates. However, the difficult process of modernizing the Polish economy occurred with a backdrop of a major shortcoming in the Polish legal system: a lack of precisely-defined rules and regulations specifying how the council of ministers prepares and publishes documents containing comments on the state budget and fiscal policy. These factors led to an internal demand for transparency and a better understanding of the national budget as well as a demand for civil society participation in the public debate over the challenges of fiscal policy in Poland. To fill this gap, the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (GIME) was established in 1989 as a nongovernmental independent scientific research institution (ISRI) that conducts research, provides independent assessments of the economy for the business sector and the public at large, and formulates useful recommendations for government policy.

ACTIONS (1989–PRESENT)
- GIME is reputed for strong fiscal transparency-related research and in 2001, it conducted a standalone study that compared Poland’s performance to the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Transparency Code, revealing that the state of openness and transparency of public finance in Poland was slightly worse than found in the IMF’s own assessment. They not only pointed out the drawbacks and deficiencies of the system that was responsible for this, but also formulated practical recommendations for legislative changes, which gained traction.
- Since 2002, GIME has been publishing the “Public Finance Bulletin” every quarter. It contains current data on the state of public finances in Poland: state budget execution, public debt, local self-government finance, appropriated funds, descriptions of new legislation concerning public finance, and other articles. It also includes forecasts of public revenues and expenditures and describes the relationship between fiscal policy and macroeconomic performance of the economy.
- GIME also organizes annual specialist conferences—sector-specific seminars presenting its quarterly research findings; these are well attended by key stakeholders from the government, the private sector, and the media as well as civil society.
- GIME was also concerned that the systems that fund Polish health care and education are inefficient, and with investigation and research, it found that education funding is allocated inflexibly and unfairly by a system that does not clearly delineate local and national funding responsibilities. With regard to health care, it found a hospital system groaning under the weight of unsustainable debt.

RESULTS
- Considered legitimate government partners. In 2009, the Ministry of science and higher education commissioned a project in partnership with Ernst and Young, inviting GIME to prepare a strategy for the ministry.
- Pushed legislative changes. The strategy prepared by GIME for the ministry of higher education is now the basis for a slew of legislative changes for the period 2011–15—changes that address the financing and management of institutions of higher education.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Wherever possible, projects should engage credible independent scientific and research institutions for quality budget analysis.

REFERENCE
A1.54. Strengthening Parliamentary Processes to Promote Better Oversight of the Budget Process

**CONTEXT**
In response to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Russia’s adoption of its 1993 constitution that established the framework for freely-elected multiparty legislatures, the Parliamentary Centre, a Canadian nonprofit organization, has worked since 1994 to enhance the capacity of the Russian legislature. After the Canada-Russia Parliamentary Program ended in 2004, the Accountability Strengthening Program (ASP) was launched to realize the gains that had been made to improve parliamentary oversight by strengthening the linkages between the Russian supreme audit institution (the accounting chamber of the Russian federation) and the Russian federal assembly. It aimed to increase transparency and accountability in the use of government funds by strengthening parliamentary oversight at the federal and regional level; strengthening budgetary accountability in the Russian federation through the development of a system of state financial control; and reforming the internal administrative and financial management of the Russian federal assembly (the duma and the federation council).

**ACTIONS (2004–08)**
- The ASP provided assistance to develop the relevant methodology and conduct six pilot performance audits of government programs with significant social impact in four regions, such as support to the disabled, healthcare, children in northern areas, and road construction. The results of these performance audits were reviewed by the relevant legislative assemblies and were appealing to parliamentarians because they focused on the economic and efficient management of public funds and the effectiveness of government programs.
- ASP assisted in the improvement of internal management practices in the federal assembly by introducing a system of member office budgets that allows for the spending of funds available for the work of parliamentarians in their constituencies and in their Moscow offices in a more flexible, efficient, and accountable manner.
- ASP assisted in the development of draft legislation on state financial control, proposing a clear delineation between the external and internal audit of public expenditures.

**RESULTS**
- **Introduction of performance monitoring.** The project helped to introduce performance auditing in four Russian regions.
- **Measures to improve independence of the legislative branch from the executive branch.** Russian partners became strongly interested in approaches used in Canada to guarantee the independence of parliament from the executive branch. Inspired by the Canadian model, the Federation Council Commission on Internal Economy submitted a series of proposals for legislative amendments aimed at reducing the dependence of the federal assembly on the government. These were the first formal steps taken aimed at strengthening parliament’s independence in Russia.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
While technical support is useful, it is important to keep in mind while designing projects that it takes several years to achieve changes such as strengthened legislatures and more open political spaces for legislatures to perform oversight functions.

**REFERENCES**
Parliamentary Centre Website: www.parlcent.org
A1.55. Using Budget Analysis and Training to Promote Amendments to the Budget Law

CONTEXT
The St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies (CHPS) is a civil society organization established in 1993 by a group of deputies of the city council, activists of democratic parties, journalists, and businessmen, with the purpose of fostering the development of civil society in St. Petersburg and other regions of Russia. The main activities of the center focus on Human Rights and Development of the Regional Ombudsmen program, the Civil Society Against Corruption Initiative, the Transparent Budget Program, the development of public policy centers, and setting up the Expert Council on Civil Education and Human Rights in the State Duma. In particular, the Transparent Budget Program aims to promote participation of independent nonstate specialists in the budget process, assuming that it increases the efficiency of the budgeting process and helps achieve improved social impacts.

ACTIONS (1998–PRESENT)
- CHPS began their preparatory efforts in 1998 when they focused squarely on assessing the situation, gaining information, implementation of the IMF Code on Budget Transparency, and learning from the experience of the United States, Brazil, Croatia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, and South Africa.
- By the early 2000s, the CHPS began involving local government officials, training nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in budget transparency through master classes and seminars, and began demystifying the contents of the budget into a format easily understood by the public. They handed out informational brochures in the regions of Novossibirsk, Samara, St. Petersburg, Pskov Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, and Petrozavodsk city.
- In 2001–02, the CHPS began to disseminate the budget through public hearings focused mostly on the budget draft and on budget execution information. It also brought together independent experts from NGOs to work together in consultative groups at the budget draft preparation stage; the NGOs provided valuable feedback and made recommendations to modify the legislation to make public participation sustainable.

RESULTS
- Uptake of suggested amendments to the budget. During the drafting of St. Petersburg’s 1999 budget, NGO activists and budget experts set up working groups to identify key budget priorities, analyze the implications of choosing various alternatives, and draft comments and addenda to the proposed budget that were later made available to government officials. Amendments to the budget regarding the education and care for the disabled were, in fact, ultimately accepted.
- Recognition as a legitimate partner in budget transparency. The Russian department of finance asked the CHPS to prepare a draft law on budget transparency for the subsequent budget.
- Resistance from media and lower-level government officials. Two aspects were common hindrances in the work of the CHPS: the media’s unwillingness to publish information about the budget for fear that the public might start delving too deeply into it and provoke difficult debates, and a lack of willingness at the lower echelons of the government to open their budgets, much less to provide resources to make the process participatory.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In an environment where the media is resistant to cooperate with budget transparency initiatives, carrying out a systematic public relations campaign, introducing new ideas to the general public, and shaping the informational space need to feature particularly prominently.

REFERENCE
St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies Website: http://strategy-spb.ru (in Russian).
A1.56. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight and Building Coalitions to Enhance Budget Transparency

CONTEXT
Tajikistan is the poorest country in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Region. It also has the most remittance-dependent economy in the world. Still recovering from a civil war that ended in 1997, Tajikistan faces a number of development challenges, including energy security and high rates of poverty—54 percent in 2007. It ranks below average in the ECA Region in terms of governance and continues to struggle with corruption and a lack of transparency and accountability in the budget process. Accountability in the budget process is hindered by opaque policy processes and decision making and by technical limitations. The objective of the project is to help ease the governance constraint on development in Tajikistan by mainstreaming governance interventions on the country, sector, and project level. It seeks to support greater citizen engagement in the budget process through improved capacity of parliament, improved media and citizen access to analyze budget information, increased government financial accountability to parliament and the electorate, and increased public service-provider responsiveness to citizens. Two budget-related activities include the introduction of budget-related transparency and accountability measures and the strengthening of the parliament’s capacity in approving budgets and reviewing expenditures.

ACTIONS (2010–13)
In order to increase transparency and accountability several measures are being carried out:

- Networks and alliances among stakeholders around budget transparency have been facilitated by organizing regular workshops on budget issues for civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in the budget issues, parliamentarians, national and local government officials, members of mahalla (neighborhood) committees, and journalists. These events serve as a forum for information exchange, knowledge-sharing and networking, and provide the opportunity for CSOs to define how best to participate at the national level.

- Information is used for a dialogue with authorities of different levels. Proactive information-sharing has been facilitated between the parliament and CSOs working on public-finance issues.

Activities to strengthen Parliament have been conducted:

- A budget committee secretariat with permanent research staff for whom training and support is provided has been established.
- Mobilization of independent research to advise parliament on budget reform issues.
- Support has been provided to the parliamentary communications office, including training and resources for media events and publications to improve parliament’s external communications on budget issues.

RESULTS (ANTICIPATED)
- Heightened awareness by and participation of Tajikistan citizens. The project anticipates a 10 percent improvement in levels of participation and budget information demand and in their awareness of their right to budget information.
- A more accountable state due to the exposure of graft. The project expects a 10 percent improvement in business confidence as demonstrated in the final annual survey.
- Increase in the amount of budget information in the public domain. An increase of 10 percent is expected by the end of the life of the grant.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
The capacity of CSO networks and relevant parliamentary committees to engage on budget issues and impact budget processes can be significantly strengthened when linked, allowing each to leverage the other’s expertise and influence in order to improve budget processes and make them more transparent.

REFERENCES
A1.57. Using Budget Analysis to Promote Access to Education

**CONTEXT**
In Argentina, the constitution of the city of Buenos Aires solidifies the right to education by establishing that the government must guarantee and finance a public, secular, and free education system that respects the principle of equal opportunity. Moreover, while the national government has a duty to provide access to education to every child over five years old, the city’s duty applies to every child over 45 days old. Furthermore, the city’s constitution dictates that budget items assigned to education cannot be reallocated. For many years, there was a dearth in the number of early education facilities and kindergartens in Buenos Aires. Between 2002 and 2006, the number of children excluded from early education increased by 37 percent; the number has continued to increase ever since. As a part of its education equality program, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ), a Buenos Aires-based civil society organization, decided to work on this issue.

**ACTIONS (2006–11)**
- To highlight the discrepancy between the amounts allocated for early education and actual spending, ACIJ used the Buenos Aires Freedom of Information Act to request information about the total number of existing schools offering early education, a detailed and disaggregated account of the number of students who had applied for early schooling between 2001 and 2006, and the number of children placed on waiting lists in each school in those years. It also requested information about all the resources allocated to school infrastructure between 2001 and 2005 as well as complete and detailed spending data on construction, maintenance, and school provisions for the same years.
- When the government did not give ACIJ the requested information, the organization litigated on the grounds that the Freedom of Information Act compelled the government to provide the information.
- After collecting all the necessary information, ACIJ used a budget analysis to produce evidence that, for five years, the city government had under-spent a significant portion of resources allocated to early education facilities. Based on this evidence, it filed a class action case arguing that the city of Buenos Aires had not complied with its constitutional obligation to guarantee and finance universal access to initial-level education.
- Both before and after the lawsuit, ACIJ carried out a public campaign, disseminating information about the education crisis and encouraging members of the public to write letters of complaint to public officials.

**RESULTS**
- A court ruling in ACIJ’s favor. The court ruled that the government should guarantee and finance universal access to initial-level education for children between the ages of 45 days and five years and that it must submit detailed information about all ongoing and planned projects directed at satisfying the existing demand for space. Moreover, the court demanded that the government produce specific plans aimed at guaranteeing access to initial-level education for each qualifying child from 2008, taking into account the children excluded in 2007.
- An out-of-court agreement to take action to meet space needs at existing initial-level educational facilities. After the government of Buenos Aires appealed the court’s ruling, the high court promoted an out-of-court agreement that included commitments from the government to take action to meet all space needs at existing initial-level educational facilities, to create new spaces by agreed deadlines, to guarantee that the budget resources required to meet these commitments be available, and to include specific budget items earmarked for fulfilling new needs in every budget henceforth. The high court retained jurisdiction in order to intervene at a future date in case there is a lack of compliance with the agreement.
- Organization of a public hearing by the high court to discuss the agreement. In an unprecedented move, the high court set up a public hearing that included all relevant actors in the education community to engage them in a fruitful and enriching public debate. Support for the draft agreement at the hearing was almost unanimous.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
The establishment of informal or, as in this case, formal monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance with agreed reforms might be considered.

**REFERENCE**
ACIJ Website: http://acij.org.ar.
A1.58. Working with Public Schools to Promote Human Rights and Improve Budget Transparency

CONTEXT
Many of Brasilia’s public schools are plagued by violence and drugs, contributing to weak academic performances, continued poverty, and social exclusion of many students. In 2007, the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies (INESC) launched the Teenagers’ Rights Movement—ONDA (Onda: Adolescentes em Movimento Pelos Direitos) to teach youth how to participate in discussions about their rights and citizenship, and how they are affected by public budgets. INESC selected schools from differing communities on the outskirts of Brasilia—including some rural areas—based on their levels of social exclusion, teenage violence, drug abuse and drug dealing, and lack of academic performance.

ACTIONS (2008–PRESENT)
• To date, INESC has organized workshops for 500 young people from 10 public schools that focus on human rights; democratic participation and state obligations; the public budget; and communication and advocacy strategies.
• During the workshops, students were trained to become writers, photographers, and illustrators for the magazine Descolad@s, which aims to broaden the budget debate, delve deeper into discussions generated at ONDA workshops, and, in its “Eye on the Budget” section, highlight the budget execution of programs aimed at children and teenagers. It also seeks to provide a forum for reaching consensus on an agenda for influencing public policies and budgets geared toward education and the youth in Brasilia. Other workshops have been focused on budget issues in specific localities, such as child labor in Cidade Estrutural, the environment in the Rio São Bartolomeu basin community, and citizen rights in the Mesquita Quilombo community.
• In addition to the school programs, INESC encouraged the students to attend other events where public budgets were debated, such as city council meetings and the federal legislature. It also urged them to join advocacy networks for children and young people, where the knowledge gained through the project could be used.

RESULTS
• Amended 2009 budget for schools. A key success occurred in 2009, when the students participating in the project met with lawmakers and public managers about the federal district education budget. After monitoring their school budgets and analyzing budgets, the students proposed a budget amendment of approximately US$1 million to the local parliament. The amendment was passed and funds were allocated to build sports facilities and renovate schools.
• Greater oversight of 2014 World Cup spending. In 2012, 200 teenagers from the poor region of Cidade Estrutural participated in a forum with the People’s Cup Committee, an entity established to monitor Brazil’s spending on the World Cup. Comparing the World Cup budget to the federal district government’s spending on the promotion of the rights of children and teenagers, students learned about the importance of monitoring government budgets for equity and fairness. They also discussed the government’s shortcomings in addressing several risks around the megaevent, such as the sexual exploitation of children and teenagers, child labor, and the potential for forced evictions as the government builds World Cup infrastructure. The teenagers will continue to engage with these issues as the date of the World Cup approaches.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Capacity building targeted at youth is necessary to expand traditional citizen engagement in budget transparency projects.

REFERENCES
INESC Website: http://www.inesc.org.br.
A1.59. Civil Society Platform Works Together to Encourage Brazil’s Development Bank to Disclose Spending

CONTEXT
The powerful Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), one of the world’s largest development banks, has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of transparency. Criticisms of BNDES have focused on its unhampered growth, its unclear criteria for subsidizing loans, and its murky accounts, as well as on the fact that four-fifths of its lending goes to large and powerful companies.

ACTIONS (2005–PRESENT)
Between 2005 and 2011, the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE) used the following strategies to monitor BNDES’s spending:

• In 2007, IBASE helped create the BNDES Platform, a coalition of 35 civil society organizations to monitor the activities of BNDES. The platform leads a campaign to create popular pressure on BNDES to change its policies and practices and to strengthen the role of civil society in monitoring its budget and decision-making processes. In April 2010, in order to highlight the relationship between corporations and equity participation by the bank, the BNDES Platform published an interactive map of BNDES-funded projects that includes project descriptions and locations and information on beneficiary corporations as well as the share structure for each project. The map also features an important participatory forum, where local communities affected by projects can post comments, videos, links, and relevant documents.

• IBASE acts as a reference organization within the platform, producing and disseminating information on the activities and impact of BNDES and acting as the coalition’s convener. IBASE conducts studies on BNDES operations, using the bank’s own information in addition to analyses and data from other research institutions.

• IBASE publishes a newsletter with information on the platform’s monitoring activities of BNDES and conducts awareness-raising campaigns about the role BNDES plays in development and the related budgetary implications this has. For instance, in November 2009, the BNDES Platform held the first of a series of projects called the “South American Meeting of Populations Affected by BNDES.” It attracted participants from 50 organizations and social movements from Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and a number of other countries where BNDES operates. At the end of the meeting, a delegation met with the president of BNDES, demanding greater transparency and decision-making reform at the bank.

RESULTS
• Increased availability of information about BNDES projects. For the first time in the history of the bank, some information about the projects that it funds has been made public. In February 2009, BNDES published a list of the projects that had begun within the previous 12 months; it was updated quarterly. After additional lobbying by IBASE, the bank began providing information on all of the projects it has funded since 2008.

• More informed media reporting about BNDES. The BNDES Platform’s advocacy work has changed the content and frequency of media stories about BNDES. At the start of the Platform’s campaign, the media only echoed information submitted by the bank itself publicizing the bank’s activities, but now there is more critical scrutiny of BNDES by important opinion leaders in the media.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
• Supporting information dissemination platforms coordinated by credible organizations can yield substantial results in terms of increased transparency and accountability.

• Complementing support to such platforms by helping targeted public institutions publish the requested information is likely to significantly increase the impact of civil society efforts.

REFERENCES
IBASE Website: http://www.ibase.br/en.
“Brazil’s Development Bank: Nest Egg or Serpents Nest?” The Economist, Rio de Janeiro (August 5).
A1.60. Using Budget Analysis to Construct a Right-to-Food Budget

CONTEXT
Brazil is the world's fourth-largest food exporter with a productive capacity sufficient to meet internal demand and still be a major food exporter. Nevertheless, in 2009, 30 percent of Brazilian households—some 66 million people—faced some degree of daily food insecurity. Of these, more than 12 million people experienced severe food insecurity or hunger. Access to food, not production, is the primary problem because millions of people simply have too little income to buy enough food. In 2003, the National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSEA) in Brazil was established to advise the president on food security and right-to-food issues; it submits recommendations for action directly to the cabinet. It is comprised of 40 representatives from civil society, 17 from government, and 16 nonvoting observers. In 2005, CONSEA made plans to compile a right-to-food budget to be in a better position to assess whether or not the Brazilian government's budget allocations to food and nutrition were adequate. The right-to-food budget was envisioned as a basis from which CONSEA could get involved in the budget planning process and make concrete suggestions for increases and decreases in specific budget lines.

ACTIONS (2005–07)
• After exploring whether an institutional or programmatic approach would be more useful for monitoring the government's budget allocations to food and nutrition, CONSEA chose the latter. The institutional approach sums up the budgets of all government institutions that have responsibilities for achieving food security goals, while the programmatic approach sums up the budgets of all programs that have specific food-security objectives, irrespective of the institutions responsible for them.
• CONSEA then listed all government food security programs in Brazil. In addition to the 31 programs included in the Fome Zero Strategy (a government initiative to eradicate hunger), many other government activities had to be considered. To minimize the complexity of the process, CONSEA decided to only include activities carried out and financed by the federal government. It identified 18 policy priority areas related to food and nutrition security, which together make up the food and nutrition security budget of around R$27.2 billion (US$16.3 billion).
• CONSEA has been monitoring the allocations and expenditures of a smaller number of priority programs since 2006. This work has enabled it to make concrete proposals to the federal government related to the budget for food and nutrition security and to examine the food and nutrition security proposals within the annual budget bill.

RESULTS
• Support for food security laws at the state level. In 2007, CONSEA successfully influenced the national budget when it proposed strengthening the national food and nutritional security system, and approximately R$2.7 billion (US$1.6 billion) were distributed among the 27 Brazilian states to support the drafting of food security laws at the state level.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BANK OPERATIONS
An assessment made from a food perspective that identifies the underlying causes of hunger in the country may point to the most relevant government actions that should be undertaken and monitored.

REFERENCES
CONSEA Website: www.gender-budgets.org
A1.61. Promoting Transparency around Royalty Funds to Enhance Social Control over Public Investments

CONTEXT

Colombia’s legal framework sets a foundation for the participation of civil society. The constitution protects the right of citizen participation and Law 80 of 1993 establishes that all contracts entered into by state agencies are subject to surveillance and social control, and that the national government and local authorities must establish mechanisms to ensure that these contracts are controlled and supervised by the community. In line with this, the Colombian Anticorruption Presidential Commission launched Citizen’s Visible Audits (CVAs) to promote transparency and citizen participation, specifically in the management of royalties. Further, the 2007 National Development Plan (Law 1151) assigned the responsibility of implementing CVAs to the national department of planning. In order to support it in the design, implementation, and institutionalization of CVAs, a US$700,000 Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) grant was commissioned in 2008 with three explicit goals: to raise awareness among citizens regarding royalty sources, to increase confidence in community monitoring as a tool to hold governments accountable, and to improve collaboration between communities and local authorities on transparency and accountability issues.

ACTIONS (2008–PRESENT)

- The community adopted a methodology for monitoring the execution of investment works.
- Consultations with citizen groups as well as hands-on training were conducted to generate confidence to engage and know how about how to implement the CVA process and to increase the citizen groups’ ability to judge the quality of the execution of work;
- Lessons learned were promoted and disseminated among citizens;
- Presentations and discussions were carried out during public hearings, which were carried out before the launch of a project, midway through its implementation, and after its completion to evaluate final results.

RESULTS

- Expansion of the CVA program. From its beginning, the program expanded from 1 to 158 CVAs in 29 communities; by 2009, it covered public works funded by mining royalties to the tune of US$348 million. Between 2008 and 2010, 20 projects in the education sector were audited through CVAs, representing investments of US$36,000. In total, the project supported the organization of 72 community hearings at the start of the public work projects, during their execution, and at their completion; 4,000 people representing more than 680,000 beneficiaries participated.
- Raised awareness. Because of the detailed explanations provided in workshops at the beginning of CVAs, now citizens better understand how royalty resources are managed.
- Greater demand for accountability. As a result of the initiative, and shown by an impact evaluation, communities have started asking for greater public accountability by showing their concern about the allocation of royalty resources and insisting that these funds be invested in priority areas that communities can identify for themselves.
- Better coordination and greater consensus. As a result of the CVAs, there is better coordination between communities and local authorities around the prioritization of public projects.
- Necessity of expanding citizen participation throughout the whole public investment cycle. The impact evaluation demonstrated that CVAs would maximize their impact if applied at the different stages of the public investment cycle. It was also suggested that the use of information and communication technology would decrease the cost of CVAs and increase participation. As a result, the World Bank presented a follow-up program aimed at expanding CVAs throughout the Public Financial Management cycle and inserting the use of information and communication technology tools in the process. This follow-up program is financed through another GPF grant and will be implemented throughout fiscal 2013–15.

(continued)
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Legislation creating spaces for citizen participation is the bedrock for promoting social control over public investments. Furthermore, it became clear during this project that participation, if it is to be meaningful and scalable, must be inclusive and cost effective.

FLOWCHART OF CVA METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

Constraints
Irregular use of funds and even corruption practices in public works financed with royalties

CD Activities
Public hearings at launch, implementation, and completion of public projects

Agents of Change
Local councils
Beneficiaries committees
Communities

ICOs and Change Process
Raised awareness regarding use of royalty funds and community’s role; increased know-how in monitoring public projects; improved collaboration between communities and local authorities

Change in disposition and ability to interact with citizens and be more responsive
Change in the ability to monitor investments works
Change in motivation and ability to control the use of royalties

Strengthened Inclusive Ownership
• Increased transparency of information on public projects
• Greater commitment to transparency, collaboration, and accountability in use of public funds
• Participation in public hearings increased
• Community’s demand for accountability on the use of royalties and the quality of public expenditure is increased

Source: diVinadio and others (2012).

REFERENCES
A1.62. Using Integrity Pacts to Generate Savings and Address Corruption in Contracting

CONTEXT
Given the political turbulence and allegations of corruption linked with the previous administration, Colombian president Andrés Pastrana, after winning the 1998 elections, made the fight against corruption a key component of his political agenda, and he made the vice president directly responsible for it. In this context, Transparencia por Colombia (TPC), was invited by the vice president to participate in the debate about the proposals and main lines of action of the Presidential Program to Fight Corruption. The Integrity Pact (IP) emerged as one of TPC’s key recommendations. A tool for preventing corruption in public contracting, an IP is an agreement between a government agency offering a contract and the companies bidding for it that obliges that latter to abstain from bribery, collusion, and other corrupt practices for the duration of the contract.

RESULTS
• Adoption of IPs by multiple corporations. Sixty-two IPs were implemented for contracting in sectors including communications, public works, transportation, informatics, and finance and energy as well as in areas related to goods and services, food, beverages, and supervision of major contracts. These pacts were agreed and subscribed to by 301 national and 52 international corporations.
• Savings due to less corrupt procurement processes. On average, the pacts generated a savings of 18 percent of the budget for the corresponding contracts.
• Use of IPs by the Bogota Ombudsman’s office. The IP tool was transferred to the Veeduría Distrital de Bogota (Bogota Ombudsman’s office), which adapted it to its needs and used it in 49 of the main contracting processes in 16 city entities during the administration of Mayor Mockus, involving a total of US$1,560 million.

IMPlications FOR PROJECT TEAMS
IPs are beneficial to curb corruption in procurement, but the time investment required by third parties to monitor these projects and by public officials to respond to contract-related queries and to ensure transparency of the procurement process are also considerations.

REFERENCES
Transparency International Colombia Website: www.integrity.transparency.bg.
A1.63. Combining Supply-Side Reforms and Demand-Side Capacity Building to Increase Budget Transparency and Monitoring

**CONTEXT**
The Dominican Republic has long-standing governance problems and numerous surveys confirm that corruption is perceived as a major problem by a majority of the population and that institutional trust is low. In 2012, in its Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International gave the Dominican Republic a score of 2.2 out of 10 (1 representing the greatest perception of corruption). Service provision is often clientelistic, captured for private gain, and governed by discretionary and opaque processes. The population generally lacks accountability mechanisms to change the situation in its favor. To address these problems, the World Bank, in its 2010–13 Country Partnership Strategy, embarked on an ambitious program to improve governance, including measures to increase budget transparency and monitoring by civil society organizations (CSOs).

**ACTIONS (2010–12)**
- To foster budget transparency at the national level, the World Bank included as a trigger for the Performance and Accountability in the Social Sectors Development Policy—the creation of a citizen-friendly online budget portal. Feeding directly from the Dominican Republic’s financial management information system, the Portal del Ciudadano Dominicano was launched in 2011, establishing citizen access to national budgetary information through a user-friendly online portal.
- In addition, citizens can access a Citizens Budget (Presupuesto Ciudadano), in which the government’s intended activities and associated expenditures are laid out along with the sources of revenues to finance them. The Presupuesto Ciudadano also provides information on key milestones in the budget process.
- Complementing this reform with demand-side measures, the Public Budget Monitoring Project provided capacity support to the public budget observatory—a body comprised of several CSOs with the support of the Centro Juan Montalvo—to promote advocacy and analysis on national budget issues and to translate it into accessible formats at the community level.
- The observatory has published periodic analyses of the budget to show whether allocations match government commitments and has informed various other civil society efforts, including the movement that demands that 4 percent of GDP be allocated to education. Using comic strips, it demystifies the budget, raises awareness, and generally increases budget literacy. This has included analyses of specific sectoral budgets, including one on education resources and performance that helped in the movement to increase the percentage of gross national product (GDP) allocated to education to 4 percent in accordance with the law and another one on specific municipal budgets, comparing actual practices to norms.
- In addition, the observatory has engaged in policy debates on the budget by providing alternative budget proposals. However, this policy-level engagement is still relatively new and requires continued capacity support.

**RESULTS**
- Improved access to reliable budget data. Through the portal, citizens can now obtain reliable and timely data about where, when, and what the government spends money on as well as about types of spending, funding sources, and budget execution rates. Data can be downloaded in Excel, PowerPoint, and PDF formats.
- Improved Open Budget Index score. During the most recent International Budget Partnership assessment, the Dominican Republic score went from 14 out of 100 in 2010 to 29 in 2012, the second highest increase in the region after Honduras.
- Enhanced political engagement and dialogue. The level of political engagement in protests also increased from 5 to 8 percent in 2012, probably due to the engagement of the coalition in support of spending 4 percent of GDP on education. For the first time, the government is making good on its 4 percent spending commitment and the dialogue has shifted toward how to ensure quality of education, through both supply-side measures to monitor performance at the school level and through greater engagement of citizens.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
Efforts to increase budget transparency and to make governments more accountable for its spending will likely best succeed if the governments’ financial information is made accessible to citizens in user-friendly formats and if the technical capacity of CSOs to analyze this information is simultaneously built.

**REFERENCE**
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A1.64. A Multistakeholder Participatory Initiative to Curb Corruption

CONTEXT

Even though the Dominican Republic has undertaken initiatives against corruption in the last decade, the results have not been enough to increase people’s confidence in public institutions. Instead, corruption has led to poor quality in public services, which in turn reduces the public’s confidence in the administration, generating tax evasion and eroding social support for political reforms. Concerned by the citizens’ loss of confidence in the government, the president appealed to international development agencies for support in preparing a plan to fight corruption. The World Bank and 12 other institutions helped set up the multistakeholder Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative (IPAC)—a broad participatory mechanism under which representatives from the government, Dominican civil society, and the private sector sat at the same table to coordinate efforts to fight corruption in the country.

ACTIONS (2010–12)

• The IPAC was launched at a workshop with the participation of 260 people from different sectors of Dominican society, including the media, which gave it broad coverage. At the workshop, 10 multistakeholder working groups were established: procurement and acquisition, civil service, planning and financial management, access to information, infrastructure, public health, education, energy, water, and fiscal supervisory agencies.

• A public road map was then developed in six weeks, with priorities, implementation arrangements, donor responsibilities and financial support, responsible government officials, a calendar, and concrete milestones. The road map was published on the initiative’s webpage without prior government consent and opened for a one-month public online consultation.

• The 30 recommendations and 99 actions to achieve them were officially presented to the president in a second workshop, which also had very high attendance and extensive media coverage.

• To measure government agency compliance with the agreed-on measures, the workshops introduced a traffic light scorecard system, with green indicating recommendations that had been adopted completely, yellow indicating that some advances had been made but that action had yet to be finalized, and red indicating that the recommendation was delayed. The instrument not only measured implementation status but also served to remind different government departments about the need to meet a specific deadline. Four accountability workshops were held every three months, with an average attendance of 250 people.

• An independent civil society observatory made up of a coalition of 14 civil society organizations, oversaw implementation and presented their results during the accountability workshops.

RESULTS

IPAC as a new country approach to tackling corruption has led to tangible improvements in the quality of public expenditures by making budget execution more transparent and accessible, the procurement process more integrated with the financial management system and by contributing to significant progress in the creation of a single treasury account.

• Greater online budget dissemination. The publication of a web-based user-friendly tool that provides the public access to budget information from the financial management information system.

• Creation of a new performance-assessment framework. To move toward greater professionalization of the public administration, a new and innovative performance assessment framework was created for civil servants.

• Greater transparency in budget management. Significant progress was made in the establishment of the single treasury account to centralize all public resources and ensure greater transparency in the management of public funds.

• Increase of civil society capacity to analyze and monitor state budgets. Civil society organizations published a regular budget-monitoring bulletin, used them for advocacy campaigns (such as the 4 percent of GDP for education), and introduced budget literacy programs for grassroots organizations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

To make irreversible advances against corruption as in the Dominican Republic, early actions must be strongly institutionalized in the public administration to gain more legitimacy with political stakeholders. Continued engagement of international development agencies is important, as is the commitment of the national and local political leadership. Battling corruption requires constant pressure from a dense network of coalitions.

REFERENCE

A1.65. Using a Human Rights Approach to Promote Social Spending

CONTEXT
The International Center for Human Rights Research (CIIDH) in Guatemala was formed in 1993 to support and seek justice for victims of the Guatemalan civil war. CIIDH focused on investigating past human rights abuses and winning reparations for victims as well as protecting political rights in the postwar era. This Guatemala City-based organization began budget work and policy advocacy in 1997 following the negotiation of the Peace Accords. In addition to promoting political reconciliation under the accords, CIIDH monitored military spending in Guatemala and has since expanded the scope of its work to include research and advocacy on fiscal policy, analysis of social spending, and promotion of budget transparency and accountability all over Guatemala.

ACTIONS (1997–PRESENT)
- To make the more vulnerable sectors of the population a collective priority, CIIDH has campaigned to increase budget allocations for health, education, and rural development.
- CIIDH uses the integrated accounting system of the Guatemalan government to monitor information on the execution of the federal budget; it complements this information with in-depth interviews of public officials working in different areas of government. It releases a quarterly report entitled “Social Spending Watchdog” (Observatorio del Gasto Social) with information on the quality, quantity, and transparency of the federal budget concentrating on fiscal revenues and social spending with a particular focus on the ministries of education, public health, and social assistance. Every quarter, within eight days of its finalization, the report is presented to the public at a press conference. It is then distributed to public officials, members of congress, civil society organizations, the private sector, and international institutions.
- CIIDH is active in providing input to strengthen a 2006 anti-tax evasion law. In its original form, the bill was drafted by business interests and had no provisions to enforce tax compliance.
- Its Monitoring the Right to Food and Nutrition Security project ensures that all Guatemalans have access to safe and affordable food by monitoring the implementation of the National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security.

• In 2012, CIIDH presented a “Diagnosis with Human Rights Approach” report for the Mi Familia Progrresa (My Family Makes Progress, or MIFAPRO) conditional cash transfer program; the report lessons learned from other conditional cash programs in Latin America as well as suggestions for policy directions for MIFAPRO to take. CIIDH used this diagnosis to provide input for a bill regarding conditional cash transfer programs with a human rights approach, and presented and discussed this with various civil society organizations, congressional committees, and the ministry of social development, which is in charge of running the program.

RESULTS
- Prevention of tax evasion. In 2006, CIIDH’s suggested amendments led to the creation of an interagency commission to prevent tax evasion. By establishing a framework to crack down on lenient regulations, CIIDH’s social expenditure observatory helped the government uphold the rule of law and increase revenue for spending in the social sector.
- Implementation of school feeding program. During the 2007 budget negotiations, CIIDH successfully pressured the finance and currency committee, as well as the minister of education, to implement a school feeding program, which resulted in 1,500 schools receiving rations of milk powder and additional discretionary funding to support a supplemental nutrition program for poor children.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Drawing on the human rights background of civil society organizations combined with detailed budget analysis and effective monitoring skills can help influence increases in budget allocations.

REFERENCE
A1.66. Using the Open Budget Index to Encourage Progress on Budget Transparency

CONTEXT
Despite the enactment of the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law and the establishment of the Institute for Access to Public Information in 2009, Honduras’s score on the International Budget Partnership’s (IBP’s) Open Budget Index (OBI) declined dramatically from 38 points out of a 100 in 2006 to 11 points in 2008 and 2010. While the decline in these scores can be attributed the political crisis in 2009–10, it also reflects the inconsistent attitude and approach of the different governments in Honduras toward budget transparency. IBP and its local partner, Fundación Democracia sin Fronteras (FDsF), used the results of the OBI to encourage the government to meet domestic and international demands for fiscal transparency and citizen participation.

ACTIONS (JANUARY 2011–DECEMBER 2011)
- The results and recommendations for Honduras in the 2010 Open Budget Survey—a product of the collaboration between the IBP and its civil society partner in Honduras—were disseminated through press conferences, television presentations, and events with government and civil society representatives. IBP and one of its Honduran partners, El Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH), also organized subsequent meetings with government officials from the ministry of finance. Other national and regional authorities in addition to international agencies also took note of the results, including the National Anticorruption Council of Honduras, which integrated the OBI into its training program as an indicator of governance.
- In 2011, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Honduran government agreed on a new policy improvement plan to improve the country’s governance and fiscal transparency. Because the MCC had to measure how well this plan was implemented in order to determine further funding, it requested that IBP and FDsF independently assess the budgetary developments made in 2010 and 2011. In addition to the off-cycle OBI assessment, the MCC facilitated the “Public Finance Management Performance Report,” produced by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, to monitor the implementation of transparency and financial management reforms in Honduras.

RESULTS
- Establishment of measures to improve fiscal transparency and management. The Honduran government drew on the findings of the “Public Finance Management Performance Report” and OBI reports to formulate the 2012 plan to improve fiscal transparency and management. Coordinated by the minister of the presidency, the plan was developed by an interagency commission comprised of the minister of finance, the revenue service, the minister of planning, the public accounting authority, and the Institute for Access to Public Information.
- Drafting of anticorruption plan based on fiscal transparency measures. To further its commitment to better governance and fiscal transparency, the Honduran government joined the Open Government Partnership. To qualify, the government drafted an anticorruption plan that included elements from the plan to improve fiscal transparency and management.
- Rejection of the second compact for Honduras. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, the MCC rejected the second compact for Honduras in December 2011. The decision was based on a number of considerations, including the availability of funds, the first compact’s implementation record, the opportunities to generate growth and reduce poverty, and Honduras’ poor scores on a series of governance indicators.

IMPlications FOR PROJECT TEAMs
For World Bank operations, it is useful for task team leaders to keep in mind that pressure to steady the flow of foreign aid can encourage governments to make fiscal transparency reforms a priority. Basing the push for such reforms on independent and legitimate assessments can also increase their likelihood of being adopted by the government.

REFERENCE
A1.67. Audit Institutions and Civil Society Join Efforts to Improve Public Audits

CONTEXT
Despite significant efforts to encourage civil participation in the social auditing processes in Honduras, the results have been mixed because of a lack of coordination and communication between the civil society organizations (CSOs) who would provide the social oversight and the supreme audit institutions that exercise institutional control. From September 2007 to March 2008, Honduras’s supreme tribunal of accounts (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas or TSC), with assistance from the World Bank, developed a methodology that allowed citizens and CSOs to participate in the TSC’s government audits. The methodology was designed to democratize and increase the transparency of government audits and is the result of an important planning process that included developing the conceptual design and technical structure of the auditing process; implementing eight government audits with citizen participation in the areas of education, health, infrastructure, the environment, and municipalities; and training auditors and public employees of audited entities as well as citizens from 87 CSOs across the country.

ACTIONS (SEPTEMBER 2007–MARCH 2008)
The process for citizen participation in eight government audits consisted of five stages:

• Stage one involved integrating information generated by citizens and the media into the general plan of audits as a decisive element for choosing which institutions to audit.
• At stage two, the roles and activities of the TSC as well as those of civil society and audited institutions, were discussed and agreed upon. This phase was important because it established the institutional and social alliances needed to improve the management of the audited entities and public service provisions. These alliances helped strengthen communication channels and encourage citizens to voice opinions on the quality of services.
• At stage three, the TSC organized public hearings to explain to citizens how their input would be integrated into the auditing process, the aspects and areas in which their contributions would not be included, and the reasons why some suggestions would not be included.
• At stage four, the TSC presented its findings and recommendations for improving the audited entity’s management at public hearings, including the roles and responsibilities of both government and civil society. Attended by 1,200 individuals, these hearings also provided an opportunity for the representatives of eight of the audited entities to sign public commitments to make improvements based on the audit.
• Stage five involved citizen tracking of improvement recommendations. This promoted citizen participation and control over the action plans for institutional improvement that arise from audits.

RESULTS
• Improved TSC credibility. The credibility of the TSC’s performance has increased as has trust in both the auditing institution and the audited entities. This strengthens the auditor’s ability to perform its oversight duties by enhancing its capacity to address social and community concerns.
• Improved citizen input in government audits. The audit control process changed due to this mechanism to incorporate the perspectives of citizens on the quality of services provided by public agencies. Following these public hearings, 123 of 187 internal control deficiencies were detected because of information provided by the public. Based on input from the public, 12 of 23 cases related to noncompliance with existing laws were detected; and 26 of 40 audit findings were determined by the public. In fact, 92.8 percent of the total financial amount of civil liabilities was detected through information provided by the public.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
• Relevant improvements in the quality of government audits are possible within a short time period if audit institutions, audited entities, and civil society join efforts.
• Social control, exercised through social auditing, does not replace institutional control but can complement and strengthen it and can help improve the audit institution’s performance.

REFERENCE
A1.68. Using the Freedom-of-Information Law to Expose Unjust Farm Subsidies

CONTEXT

Since the 1990s, the Mexican government’s Procampo program subsidizes large and small farmers to shield them, and poor farmers in particular, from the effects of trade liberalization. Despite government expenditures on these programs amounting to 176 billion pesos (approximately US$14.3 billion), by 2007, it was clear that rural poverty had continued to rise. Because Mexico City-based media was not interested in the technical details of agricultural policy, the public debate focused on the total budget allocated to the rural sector rather than on the distribution of the resources within it. In 2007, Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR) and the Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo (ANEAC) launched the Subsidios al Campo campaign to inform public debate on the issue.

ACTIONS (2007–09)

- The coalition used Mexico’s freedom of information law to obtain lists of agricultural subsidy recipients. Obtaining correct information in the necessary format required 30 requests, 16 appeals, and one year of patient work to clean the datasets and convert them into user-friendly formats on the web. The website shows that the distribution of subsidies is not only skewed toward wealthy farmers, but also toward wealthier states.
- Since journalists tended to focus more on scandalous findings than on subsidy distribution, the coalition promoted a deeper analysis of the Procampo program and a more nuanced agenda in the press. With support from the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, a group of academics and policy experts were invited to conduct research on topics related to the campaign using data from the Subsidios al Campo website.
- These studies captured the attention of policy makers and experts in the field and also led to increased newspaper coverage as more irregularities in the program were exposed.

RESULTS

- Revision of subsidy recipient list and rules of the program. In response to the coverage and debate generated by the project, the ministry of agriculture announced that it would revise the recipient list, removing individuals who received illegal benefits. In response, peasant groups insisted that the updated list also include small producers who should not have been excluded in the first place. In April 2009, the ministry announced new operating rules for Procampo, which included a minimum subsidy of 1,300 pesos (US$99) for small producers—those with less than five hectares—and a ceiling of 100,000 pesos (US$7,630) for large producers. The new rules also called for a single registry system to enhance transparency and accountability. In 2009, amidst continued controversy over the program, the campaign claimed its first political casualty: the minister of agriculture resigned and returned to the senate.
- Lack of compliance to changes in the program. Several institutional failures prevented the campaign from more profoundly influencing the distribution of farm subsidies. While the Ministry of Agriculture mandated important changes to the operation of the farm subsidies program, the government agency responsible for implementing the program has not complied; moreover, the ministry has no mechanism for ensuring compliance. As a result, as late as 2011, the mandated floor and ceiling for agricultural subsidies were not in place, and the new unified registry had not been established.
- Auditor general’s review of the program. A review of the program by the auditor general (AG) found 557 officials from the ministry of public administration on the recipient list; they were asked to return over five million pesos (approximately US$380,000) that they had received in 2009. The AG also found 18,023 producers with more than one identification number and 323,026 beneficiaries older than 75 years of age—a dubious figure for that age bracket.
- Greater transparency of the program. One minor legal outcome was an order in the 2011 budget for greater transparency in the agricultural subsidies program. This outcome led the ministry of agriculture to routinely publish figures on farm subsidies, although the government does not divulge the names of individual recipients as the Subsidios al Campo website does, citing privacy concerns.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

Diversity of coalition partners to bring about changes in fiscal policy can be an asset. In this case, the combined efforts of activists, a peasant farmer organization, information and communication experts, and academics proved to be essential to inform public debate on the Procampo program.

REFERENCES

A1.69. Tracking Misuse of HIV/AIDS Funds to Reverse Wrongful Allocations

**CONTEXT**

In 2002, Mexico’s chamber of deputies (the lower house of congress) approved an increase of 600 million pesos (approximately US$48,985,046) for national HIV treatment and prevention. Subsequently, however, the president of the chamber’s budget committee arbitrarily shifted 30 million pesos (approximately US$2,449,224) allocated for the purchase of antiretroviral drugs for an HIV/AIDS program to ten “Centers to Assist Women.” This was unlawful since nongovernmental organizations may not receive more than 250,000 (US$20,410) pesos from the ministry of health per year and are required to submit proposals in an open process in order to be eligible to receive any funding at all. Funds cannot be allocated at the discretion of government officials.

Angry legislators, involved in the initial approval of the 600 million pesos for HIV treatment and prevention, called civil society organizations (CSOs) to denounce the allocation to these centers. Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR), along with groups focusing on reproductive rights, women’s health, gender budgeting, and HIV/AIDS advocacy, formed a coalition to investigate this reallocation of funds.

**ACTIONS (2003–05)**

In order to reverse the wrongful allocation of funds and to address legal loopholes, the FUNDAR coalition adopted a four-pronged strategy:

- **It used Mexico’s freedom-of-information law to obtain information** from the ministry of health that confirmed the illegal disbursement of funds to the Centers to Assist Women. In this way, the coalition was also able to reveal that the Centers to Assist Women were a front for Provida, a pro-life organization that campaigned against the government’s HIV/AIDS policies. Based on the financial records that Provida had submitted to the Ministry of Health, FUNDAR and its partners were also able to audit Provida’s expenditures and determine that 90 percent of the funds allocated to Provida had been blatantly misused.

- **FUNDAR shared the results of the audit with other CSOs and requested their support to demand greater transparency and accountability** in this case. Consequently, more than 2,000 CSOs supported the coalition.

- **In order to reach public opinion and to make the case inescapable for the government, the coalition decided to target the story to a leading newspaper, a leading radio news program, and a leading TV news program.** Proof of misuse of funds was shared with the media in advance of the story’s release to enable them to conduct additional research and to prepare the story. The release was followed by a **press conference to discuss the case and distribute the evidence** to additional reporters.

- After the media’s coverage of the case, FUNDAR and its partners were invited to meet with the ministry of health, members of the legislature, the internal controller, and Mexico’s supreme audit institution (SAI) to discuss the follow up to the case.

**RESULTS**

- **Audit of Provida funds.** The internal controller’s investigation corroborated the coalition’s findings and identified other administrative irregularities. In its report, the controller recommended that Provida be fined 13 million pesos and be required to return the funds provided to it. The SAI also conducted an audit of the Provida case and reconﬁrmed the controller’s ﬁndings. The SAI demanded that Provida return the funds, pay the imposed penalty, and be barred from receiving public funds for 15 years. In addition, the Ministry of Health cancelled all further disbursements to Provida that had been planned for subsequent years.

- **Lack of follow-up to audit findings.** Unfortunately, legal loopholes have helped Provida avoid paying its penalty, and the case was still being adjudicated in court as of February 2008. Furthermore, inadequacies in Mexico’s judicial process have allowed the president of the budget committee, who was instrumental in getting Provida the government grant, to escape indictment.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**

Providing support to CSOs to conduct quality budget analysis, to make effective use of Freedom-of-information laws, and publicizing the misuse of funds via the media can result in the unearthing of corruption and the return of misallocated or misappropriated funds. Legislators might also look to CSOs with such expertise and form coalitions to fight corrupt practices. Therefore, in some contexts, coalition-building between legislators and CSOs can strengthen the demand for good governance.

**REFERENCES**

FUNDAR Website: [www.fundar.org.mx](http://www.fundar.org.mx).

A1.70. Using Budget Analysis and Advocacy to Increase Budget Allocations for the Reduction of Maternal Mortality

CONTEXT
During 2002, Centro de Análisis e Investigación (FUNDAR), a center for analysis and research that works on budget issues in Mexico, engaged in a project evaluating the extent of public resource allocations for the reduction of maternal mortality. The Mexican government had made an international commitment to reduce maternal mortality, and this was also one of the government’s main health objectives for 2000–06. Despite of the 2001 launch of the Arranque Parejo en la Vida (APV) program, which sought to reduce maternal and child mortality, the maternal mortality rate remained stubbornly high in 2003 at 6.2 deaths per 10,000 births.

ACTIONS (2002–03)
- Since FUNDAR did not have the specialized knowledge to address maternal mortality issues, it partnered with civil society organizations, networks, and longstanding experts with substantial experience working on reproductive health issues. FUNDAR and its partners organized a working meeting to produce a research plan that specified the type of information that would be useful to investigate for the production of politically relevant information.
- Before the 2003 national budget was tabled, FUNDAR and its partners built momentum for a broader discussion about strengthening the APV program. They broadcast radio interviews and published several articles in national newspapers, and they organized a series of meetings with both chambers of congress. One of these meetings was a public forum exclusively dedicated to the issue of maternal mortality; it was broadcast on the “congress channel” and included the officials responsible for the topic. Once the budget proposal was tabled, further meetings were organized in order to inform government decisions and encourage it to increase the budget allocation to and scope of the APV program.
- During 2003, FUNDAR continued to monitor the APV program at federal and state levels and demonstrated important impediments to progress in reducing maternal mortality, including deficiencies in program design, delays in the execution of funds, and budget allocation criteria that reinforced prevailing inequalities among the different states.

RESULTS
- Increased budget allocation. FUNDAR and its partners successfully lobbied the federal government for an increase in the budget allocation for APV, arguing that previous funding levels were inadequate to reduce maternal mortality to levels promised. This resulted in a tenfold increase from 62 to 602 million pesos in the 2003 budget.
- Raised awareness of maternal mortality issues. Health officials started to show interest in the project, examine its findings, and ask for advice about defending their budget and making a case for why it should be a priority in the budget. Furthermore, the arguments of the members of congress working on issue related to gender, equity, and health were bolstered; and the agenda of longstanding committed groups was reinforced with new information and articulated in terms that the government could not deny.
- Setbacks in 2004. Between 2003 and 2004, the budget for the APV program was integrated into that of a blanket health protection scheme that covered all diseases and illnesses and did not meet the criteria of a maternal mortality program. Since the budget for this blanket scheme was highly aggregated, there was no way to identify whether the cuts in the 2004 budget affected the resources for the implementation of APV. The fact that the program did not release implementation progress reports makes ascertaining the amount of resources it had at its disposal even more difficult.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
If the government has made policy commitments at international and domestic levels, budget analysis can be directly juxtaposed to the government’s own promises.

REFERENCES
Website for FUNDAR: www.fundar.org.mx.
A1.71. Strengthening Community Participation to Make Road Construction and Maintenance Transparent

**CONTEXT**
Since 1995, the Peruvian government has engaged in a large-scale decentralization process to improve both the coverage of rural infrastructure and the quality of public expenditures. Decentralization has been most successful in the rural road sectors under the Peru Rural Roads Program (known by the acronym PCR), which was initiated under a central agency within the ministry of transport and communications (Provias Descentralizado), to support the decentralization of rural road management to local governments. But despite the progress achieved by PCR, a number of barriers remain; a particular challenge is the improvement of the quality of public expenditures for subnational governments, especially ones receiving significant transfers. Moreover, the rigidities of subnational governments in the use of their budget resources have to date been a binding constraint to the full realization of decentralization. The project therefore sought to improve the quality of decentralized public expenditures.

**ACTIONS (2001–06)**
- Unlike centrally-delivered road programs, PCR gives communities a key role at two important stages: the identification and prioritization of the roads to be rehabilitated and maintained. PCR partnered with a Peruvian nongovernmental organization (Caritas Peru) to provide training in project management, work with local communities to develop proposals, organize participatory planning sessions, and provide technical assistance during implementation.
- To foster integrated development planning and strengthen the management and planning capacity of local authorities, the Local Development Window (Ventana de Desarrollo Local or VDL) helped district municipalities prepare a participatory district development plan (81 district plans were elaborated under the second phase of the program). The preparation of participatory plans to identify key rural roads will ensure that the needs of local stakeholders are fully reflected in the prioritization of investment alternatives.

**RESULTS**
- **Implementation and approval of participatory provincial road plans.** There have been 150 road plans that reflect the community’s investment priorities that have been approved, and in 15 provinces, rural infrastructure investments prioritized by the plans have been implemented.
- **Development of better participatory budgeting skills.** Technical skills in participatory budgeting have increased under the program as province-level staff assists local officials to develop projects and technical proposals.
- **Greater disclosure of flow of funds.** As a result of the project, local authorities are providing more information to citizens about account status and resource use. Some municipalities have invited microenterprises comprising community members (microempresas de mantenimiento vial rutinario or MEMV) to be part of participatory budget sessions.
- **Strong behavioral changes toward making budgets transparent.** In one of the districts, the mayor, in an attempt to make the budgeting process more accountable, plans to hold several meetings for residents to learn about the management of the municipality’s resources. In a number of other districts, mayors have organized sessions in Quechua and Spanish to inform the citizens of the program and discuss wider local development issues.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
Participatory provincial budgets and road plans within the scope of this project are treated as living instruments that should be continuously updated to make certain that they remain powerful planning tools. This approach ensures the sustainability of the project and is essential for the full realization of decentralization.

**REFERENCE**
**A1.72. Enhancing Budget Transparency to Make Public Spending More Efficient**

**CONTEXT**
In 2002, the Moroccan government, in cooperation with the World Bank, conducted a participatory public expenditure review that showed multiple weaknesses in its budget and human resources management systems. The findings of the review prompted the government to prepare a long-term public administration reform program in 2003 with technical and financial assistance from the World Bank and the European Union. Both institutions helped the government design the reform program, which led to the signing of the Public Administration Reform Loan (PARL) and to a structural adjustment grant from the European Union. Following up on PARL I and II, PARL III and IV were designed to continue the support to the public administration reform program agenda. The objectives of PARL IV are to improve government efficiency in the management of budget resources by promoting greater transparency and accountability and by introducing performance measurements; to improve government efficiency in the management of human resources by preparing a new management system for staffing and remuneration that includes performance measurements and by streamlining current human resources management; to consolidate and control public payrolls; and to improve public services and simplify procedures through e-government.

**RESULTS**
Public bids go online. Existing tools as regard public bids online have been extended to some public entities as well as some local administration (download offers, terms of reference, results and the submission of offers online). Over a third of the government-controlled public institutions and all local governments can access tender documents, terms of reference and outcomes online using the common online procurement portal, www.marchespublics.ma. Extending the e-procurement portal (where 80 percent of bidding documents are published) to all ministerial departments has further reinforced transparency in the management of public finances.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
E-government not only increases transparency, but it can also greatly enhance the efficiency of government procedures and processes—such as procurement.

**REFERENCE**
Morocco—Public Administration Reform Loan IV, Governance Assistance Project, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Report No. ICR00001932, June 30, 2011.

**ACTIONS (2009–10)**
- To increase the efficiency of budget management, public investment execution rates were increased, performance audit capacity was built, and accounting information was made more reliable and transparent.
- Institutional governance was strengthened by improving e-government productivity as measured by the number of public online banking transactions and by making public procurement procedures more transparent with online applications and by simplifying procedures.
A1.73. Enhancing Financial Management and Planning Capacities of Municipalities to Deliver Better Services

CONTEXT
The key issue facing Palestinian local governments is ensuring the adequate provision of municipal services to citizens in the face of an eroding revenue base and a crippling financial and economic crisis. Since 2000, municipal revenues have steadily declined and a large part of the existing municipal budgets are spent on operating costs with limited resources for development investments. Nearly 90 percent of their own municipal budgetary resources are allocated to the operating budget, which makes budgetary allocations for municipal development, such as economic and social infrastructure, fairly limited (11.63 percent). By international standards, this constitutes an insufficient allocation for local public services. In the Palestinian context, this gap is bridged by the donor community. Improved municipal service provision and the sustainability of these services are dependent on sound municipal finance that includes principles of planning, budgeting, and transparency.

ACTIONS (2009–PRESENT)
Under one of four main windows that deal with capacity building for municipalities, the Municipal Development Project (MDP) has provided and continues to provide technical assistance to municipalities to:

• Improve their financial management, including a roll out of the municipal budgeting procedures developed under the previous project—the Local Government Capacity Building Project—to all municipalities. In addition, fixed assets registration guidelines have been issued and implemented in at least 32 municipalities, a financial policies and procedures manual has been developed and is being used in at least 96 municipalities, and promotion of municipal external audits is ongoing;

• Improve planning capacities with a specific focus on community participation. In an effort to prioritize investments over the medium term, MDP has supported 84 municipalities in preparing Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIPs). These have occurred with the participation of communities and relevant stakeholders;

• Improve overall management, especially for operations and maintenance plans.

RESULTS (IN PROGRESS)
• Municipalities disclose budget information. Since the project began, 68 percent of municipalities disclosed information in at least two of three areas: financial data and municipal budgets, municipal ranking, and projects and achievements. This was achieved through publicly available SDIPs, annual external audits, project related data, municipal budgets, and performance rankings;

• Investments identified in municipal SDIPs. 100 percent of investments financed were identified in the municipal SDIPs for those municipalities that have a SDIP.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In fragile environments where state institutions are weak and technical capacity is low, it is important to think carefully about the demand side of transparency and how best to integrate it with the supply side. In short, a multipronged approach that strengthens both is more critical in such contexts.

REFERENCES
A1.74. Using the Open Budget Index to Make Progress on Budget Transparency

CONTEXT
Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, suffers from widespread corruption, including the embezzlement of public resources. Prior to 2008, efforts to reform the budget system in Afghanistan largely focused on internal documentation, improving fiduciary controls, and making data available to donors and the country’s decision makers. Little attention was devoted to whether budget documents were accessible to the public. The International Budget Partnership (IBP), an international nongovernmental organization, published a 2008 budget transparency evaluation for Afghanistan, which found that the government provided the public with “scant” information on its budget documents during the year. This situation, along with most aid being off-budget, made it difficult for Afghans to hold the government accountable for its management of public funds.

ACTIONS (2008–11)
• In its 2008 Open Budget Survey for Afghanistan, the IBP established a framework for a pragmatic analysis of the impact of budget transparency measures in Afghanistan as well as a baseline that made it possible to monitor progress. After the release of the 2008 survey, the IBP and its local partner Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) held follow-up meetings with senior representatives and fiscal policy unit staff from the ministry of finance. These meetings revolved around discussions on budget transparency, particularly as it relates to the Open Budget Index (OBI). IWA established a relationship with the ministry of finance that allowed them to engage in ongoing discussions about budget transparency and public engagement.
• Because the survey provided a simple and easy strategy for improving budget transparency in addition to a means to assess progress, the government took note of the OBI and put measures in place to improve its ranking. These measures included identifying the budget documents it should be publishing and the key deadlines for making them public, improving the content of these documents, establishing an internal monitoring process, assigning a liaison officer to communicate with the Open Budget Initiative, and regularly reporting to the committee of ministers, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board—a high-level board that includes donors, and the government through the National Priority Program’s quarterly updates.
• The ministry also began the process of raising awareness about the budget among civil society organizations (CSOs) by holding workshops and by including these organizations in budget preparations. At the request of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the ministry of finance, two CSO representatives began attending the government policy and budget meetings. In the meantime, a limited number of CSOs and Open Budget Initiative researchers engaged with the Ministry of Finance on budget-related issues published their analyses of the budget and organized public awareness campaigns. For instance, IWA organized workshops in Herat for 80 local monitors who were tracking the budget at the grassroots level and also trained between 30 and 40 local public officials.

RESULTS
• Budget information made publicly available. Following the publication of the 2008 survey, the government of Afghanistan took measures to increase budget transparency that helped lift its OBI score from 8 in 2008 to 21 in 2010. This improvement stems largely from the fact that the government started publishing more comprehensive in-year reports and a mid-year review and made the audit report publicly available. Most of the documents that had previously been published only in English plus one national language are now published in English and both national languages (Dari and Pashtu).
• Donor commitment to disburse aid on budget. Based on the Open Budget Index recommendations, in 2010, donors made a commitment to channeling up to 50 percent of their funds through the budget on the condition that the government make its budget more transparent, as measured by the OBI, and that it increase its spending capacity.
• Shift in government policy. The consensus about the importance of the OBI ranking measure resulted in a shift in government budget policy in 2010. At the Kabul International Conference in June 2010, the government drew up the Public Financial Management Roadmap, which focused on “strengthening the budget in driving effective delivery of key priority outcomes; improving budget execution; and increasing accountability and transparency.” It also made an action plan to improve its OBI score to 30 by June 2011. In 2011 the government published a Citizens Budget and in the 2012 Open Budget Survey Afghanistan scored 59.

(continued)
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

- Measures to improve budget transparency have not yet been applied to “off-budget” allocations. A recent IWA report suggests that donors share less than 35 percent of the information on their activities within Afghanistan with the Afghan people. The World Bank could influence other donors to adhere to principles of budget transparency when disbursing international aid funds too.

- Budget information is difficult to access, partly because there is no integrated unit in the ministry of finance—or in any other ministry—that is responsible for providing it on request. The World Bank could support the creation of such units in client countries.

REFERENCES

IWAWEB Website: http://www.iwaweb.org.
A1.75. Tracking Misuse of Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan Funds to Improve Budget Implementation

CONTEXT
The Government of India’s Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan (SCSP) requires the government to ensure that a pro rata proportion of overall plan funds is specifically used for Dalits, one of the scheduled castes that has traditionally been outcast and has contended with deep-rooted educational, social, and economic discrimination for centuries. Unfortunately, the implementation of the SCSP has been beset by several challenges. Expenditures were neither binding nor clearly earmarked, and most importantly, they could not be tracked because their allotted budget code (Code 789) was not operational. In 2008, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), a secular platform advocating for Dalit rights, launched the Dalit Ardhik Andolan (campaign for economic rights, or DAAA). DAAA led the campaign against the diversion of SCSP funds and tracked Code 789 in collaboration with the Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) as well as other networks in Delhi.

ACTIONS (2007–10)
This campaign influenced government and associated decision makers in a number of ways:

• In 2007, the NCDHR filed public interest litigation (PIL) on the grounds that the government of the state of Delhi had not allocated the funds stipulated for scheduled castes, which contravenes the guidelines issued by the government of India (GOI). The GOI, the Delhi state government, and the planning commission were named as respondents in the litigation. When the Delhi state government responded with notional (and not actual) allocations that were in excess of the stipulated percentage of the scheduled caste population in Delhi, NCDHR realized that Code 789 was not operational and filed a right-to-information application with the Delhi government to uncover the reasons for this. When it did not get a satisfactory response, the NCDHR filed an appeal.

• After determining that INR 7.44 billion (approximately US$137,243,023) of SCSP allocations had been diverted to fund the 2010 Commonwealth Games, DAAA launched a media campaign that included press releases, press conferences, and the education of individual journalists on the issue. Subsequent media reports made the public and journalists aware of the matter, which created pressure from the electorate and an opening for opposition parties to raise the issue in parliament.

• The NCDHR assisted parliamentarians through background research and documentation so that they could raise targeted questions in Parliament, and reached out to the Planning Commission of India, the Finance Ministry in Delhi, and the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India to activate Code 789.

• The campaign mobilized citizens to organize the “Check Bounced Rally” in May 2008, which increased public awareness about the SCSP issue and highlighted how the Dalits were being “cheated” of resources that were rightfully theirs.

RESULTS


• Public admission of misuse of funds. The Home Minister admitted to parliament that SCSP funds were diverted and made a commitment to return the funds.

• Revision of planning commission guidelines. The campaign also triggered a serious discussion on how to ensure more effective implementation of the SCSP. For example, in June 2010, the planning commission set up a taskforce to reexamine and revise the extant guidelines issued by the planning commission for the implementation of SCSP. The revised guidelines included provisions that only 25 ministries or departments would be responsible for implementing SCSP and that unutilized funds could be transferred to the Nonlapsable Central Pool of SCSP Funds (NLCPSF), which could in turn be allocated to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to implement schemes for the scheduled castes.

• Lack of implementation of planning commission guidelines. The 2012 Union Budget reflected that the planning commission’s revised guidelines were not being implemented and that Dalits were being deprived of about Rs 26,233 crore (approximately US$4,860 million) worth of development funds in fiscal 2012–13.

(continued)
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS

- Small, incremental institutional measures like the operationalization of a code to track budgeted funds can serve as stepping stones toward bringing about more transformational changes to increase the transparency of budget implementation.
- Judicial intervention, when made possible by right-to-information legislation, can help acquire information regarding budget allocations and expenses when it is not readily available from the executive branch.

REFERENCES

NCDHR Website: http://ncdhr.org.in/daaa-1/daaa.
A1.76. Civil Society Monitoring of Drug Procurement and Disbursement to Address Inefficiencies

CONTEXT
The lack of essential medicines in public health facilities in Maharashtra is a serious problem and a major reason for the low utilization of the public health system. Despite evidence about this, there is limited knowledge of the drug procurement system, supply chain, and budget allocations. In response to this gap, the Support for Advocacy and Training to Health Initiative (SATHI), an organization that was established in 1998, initiated a project that looked into medicine procurement, the distribution process, and the budgetary allocations for and the overall availability of essential medicines in primary health centers (PHCs) from the Pune district of Maharashtra.

ACTIONS (2007–PRESENT)
• SATHI worked to build coalitions at both the local and national level to advocate for universal access to appropriate health services.
• To assess the availability of essential medicine, 64 select medicines at two select PHCs from Pune district of Maharashtra were monitored, selected from the list of around 112 essential medicines for PHC prepared by the directorate of health services. Data were collected during six rounds of monitoring at both the PHCs from April 2010 to September 2010. It was discovered that there was no stock of several essential medicines.
• In addition to the monitoring of medicine stock, a case paper audit and exit interviews were conducted. Data regarding medicines prescribed for 122 patients at both the PHCs were noted. Approximately 48 exit interviews were conducted using a short interview schedule in both districts.
• Information regarding procurement, the distribution system, and budgetary allocations was gathered through a review of existing literature and discussions with health officials from the state and district level. The study revealed a number of gaps.
• As part of its Maharashtra Health Equity and Rights Watch Project, SATHI also conducted a household survey in 10 districts in the state. In this survey, information on illnesses treated on both an inpatient and outpatient basis were gathered from 1,659 households (8,373 persons).

RESULTS
• Deficiencies in the existing procurement and distribution system revealed. The details of medicines purchased, rate of purchase, selected manufacturer, and the like were not publicly displayed. Moreover, the procurement and distribution system’s external monitoring mechanisms were lacking at all levels. Finally, because of the absence of a procurement manual, there is lack of clarity among staff about terms and conditions related to the procurement process, leading to a dilution of standard procedures.
• Major difference between budgetary allocations for medicines in Maharashtra versus other states demonstrated. In 2010–11, 18.7 percent of total health expenditures in Maharashtra was for medicines; in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, it was 65 percent and 73.2 percent, respectively.
• Additional resources pooled in by government. Based on these findings, the government is planning to establish two warehouses at the state level, eight at the regional level, and 33 at the district level, all of which will have computerized systems and will manage their budget data online; they will also follow a daily stock reporting system.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Since data collection is often a problem, and officials involved in irregular practices can create obstacles at every stage of the data-gathering process, it is important to work through an organization with gravitas and influence, especially in a sector with very little transparency. In this particular case, SATHI is the lead organization in the state under the National Rural Health Mission, and this unique position allows the organization to solicit data related to the procurement of medicines.

REFERENCES
SATHI Website: www.sathicehat.org.
Marathe, Shweta, Deepali Yakkundi, and Nilingi Sardeshpande. “Study of Procurement and Distribution System of Medicines and Availability of and Budgetary Provisions for Medicines in Maharashtra.” SATHI supported by International Budget Partnership, Washington, DC.
A1.77. Advocating for Changes in Government Budget Priorities in Favor of Disadvantaged Groups

CONTEXT
The western state of Gujarat, India, has seen several major catastrophes in the past decade—from a devastating earthquake to periodic droughts and cyclones to sectarian riots—all of which have had a significant impact on state finances. Amid this storm, the priorities of marginalized groups, particularly the tribals, have received declining attention from the state. Developing Initiatives for Human and Social Interaction (DISHA) is a leading nongovernmental organization (NGO) engaged in budget analysis and advocacy work in Gujarat dedicated to the political and economic empowerment of the poorest citizens, predominantly in the eastern tribal belt. Complementing its efforts to mobilize tribals and dalits to demand their rights, the organization uses budget analysis to ensure that successive state governments adhere to their constitutional mandate of providing resources and services to the most marginalized communities.

ACTIONS (1995–PRESENT)
• DISHA advocates for changes in government budget priorities in favor of disadvantaged groups, with a particular focus on tribals and agricultural labor.
• DISHA analyze government spending commitments and expenditure outcomes in areas that are of greatest concern to the poor.
• Since 1995, DISHA has conducted more than 40 training events in budget work and conducted workshops for NGOs and elected representatives in local panchayats (local village-level decision-making bodies)
• Provides information and budget analysis data to members of legislative assemblies (MLAs), the media, and NGOs on the state government’s budget priorities and the implementation of expenditure commitments with a view to improving the transparency of the budget process.

RESULTS
• **Sole legitimate source of detailed publicly-available budget information.** Because the Gujarat government only presents a summary of the budget on its website, DISHA is the sole source of publicly-available budget information. The media and legislators also rely on DISHA’s analysis for reporting purposes.
• **Regular use of data by MLAs.** MLAs are highly satisfied with the information provided by DISHA in terms of its timeliness, accuracy, and relevance; MLAs use their analyses in budget debates.
• **Identification and dissemination of news on corruption.** When tracking expenditures, DISHA has identified examples of misused public funds or delayed implementation. These analyses are actively used by newspapers in Gujarat—both by the vernacular Gujarati press as well as the English language daily papers.
• **Rise in pro-poor budgetary allocation.** When DISHA began its work, funds allocated to the tribal subplan were significantly underspent. However, the level of execution of funds consistently increased since 1993, with an average overspend of 15 percent above initial estimates, an improvement directly linked to DISHA’s work.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Independent budget work can gain legitimacy when linked to social movements for the rights of the poor, and it can be an effective tool in the arsenal of advocacy and campaign approaches deployed by such movements. Furthermore, in contexts where the government is nonresponsive to transparency measures, engaging and providing budget information to nonstate actors is crucial. On the other hand, simultaneously engaging the government bureaucracy is also necessary to ensure that recommendations from the outside lead to improvements in public expenditure management.

REFERENCE
A1.78. Pioneering a Participatory Approach to Public Expenditure Management

CONTEXT
The work of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), a community-based organization in Rajasthan—one of the most economically and socially backward states in western India—demonstrates how a grassroots movement in which the community demands to know the details of public expenditures can eventually lead to the enactment of legislation guaranteeing the right to information (RTI). The MKSS, whose members are mostly from lower socioeconomic classes, including marginal farmers and landless laborers, was founded in 1990 with the stated objective of using constructive action to change the lives of the rural poor so that they could live with dignity and justice. Since land and minimum wages have always been the two major issues affecting the rural landless poor, the MKSS initiated struggles on issues of land redistribution and minimum wages.

ACTIONS (1995–06)
1. Villagers, under the aegis of MKSS, used traditional forms of protest such as hunger strikes and sit-ins to demand payment of the legal minimum wage. They sought access to official expenditure documents that could be verified and investigated. They demanded copies of official records of expenditures incurred in the name of panchayats—the village-level local self-government institutions in India.
2. The secured documents were scrutinized and subject to collective verification in Jan Sunvais (literally “people’s hearing”), a process of participatory social auditing, that was held in the concerned panchayats. This was one of the most important innovations introduced by the MKSS in which a public hearing is organized independently in a public place, not through the official village assembly; official data on amounts sanctioned and spent on local development projects is analyzed and information on suspected corruption in these projects generated by volunteers is made public; and villagers, particularly laborers, speak out and verify if they received the money owed to them or whether or not construction took place as claimed; officials are encouraged to provide clarifications or to defend themselves.
3. Encouraged by the results of the Jan Sunvais (outlined below), in 1996, the MKSS launched a dharna (literally “sitting”), putting forward an immediate demand for an amendment to the Panchayati Raj (local self-governance) law that would allow citizens to obtain certified photocopies of any document in local government offices, especially records on expenditures like bills, vouchers, and muster rolls. At the same time, demands were made to pass a comprehensive RTI law for all spheres of governance.
4. They also launched a series of rallies to compel the state to make its development-fund records public, culminating in a 53-day protest in Jaipur; the movement soon took on India-wide dimensions.

RESULTS
1. Social audits pioneered. MKSS was one of the first organizations to pioneer social audits as an accountability method in the 1990s. Despite fierce resistance by local officials that included threats, assaults, and appeals, and despite a refusal to comply and submit themselves to an audit by nonofficials, the public hearings continued, and soon the campaign of hearings became a broader campaign for transparency in government.
2. Corruption revealed. The Jan Sunvais helped identify different types of corruption in rural development practices in all sectors: purchase overbilling, sale overbilling, fake muster rolls, underpayment of wages, ghost works and workers, and so on. Many villagers also discovered that they had been listed as beneficiaries of anti-poverty schemes but had never received any benefits.
3. Public hearings by state government institutionalized. The government of Rajasthan has institutionalized social audits for all development works. The state government has started organizing Jan Sunvais in villages, sometimes under the supervision of MKSS, especially where large amounts of money have been spent.
4. Legal changes at local level scaled up. MKSS succeeded in getting the state government to change the local government act to include local residents directly in auditing official development schemes. Moreover, the movement soon took on India-wide dimensions as intellectuals, politicians, and the media joined, eventually giving rise to the National Campaign for the People’s Right to Information.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
The work of MKSS on social audits in India was more successful when it decided to campaign for the RTI legislation as well as amendments to the state’s local government law (the Panchayati Raj Act) to create mandatory legal procedures for the investigation of corruption and to officially institutionalize the public hearing audit method at the village assembly level. An integrated approach to promoting social accountability can be particularly powerful when it involves both demand- and supply-led factors and moves from being introduced as part of a stand-alone intervention to one that is institutionalized.

REFERENCES
MKSS Website: www.mkssindia.org.
A1.79. Using a People’s Charter of Demands to Highlight Budget Priorities

**CONTEXT**
In response to the fact that the budget-making process in India has been closed and opaque, a number of civil society organizations formed the People’s Budget Initiative (PBI) in 2006. This coalition has facilitated the involvement of civil society in the budget process of the Union government every year by creating a platform where civil society activists articulate key demands and expectations from the forthcoming Union budget. The coalition is comprised of people’s movements, grassroots organizations, national and international development organizations, academics, and the media. The Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA) serves as the Secretariat of PBI.

**ACTIONS (2006–PRESENT)**
- The PBI organizes a national convention on the Union budget every year to build a common understanding among different stakeholders on critical gaps in the provision of important public goods and for arriving at a common set of prioritized policy and budgetary demands for different sectors. In addition to academics and policy analysts working on various sectors, this convention includes a significant number of participants with grassroots-level experience.
- During this national convention, these stakeholders prepare a charter of demands that forms the basis of their advocacy with the policymakers and members of the legislature in the ensuing months.
- The PBI monitored the government’s commitment in the 11th Five Year Plan (2007–12) to establish one model school in every block throughout the country and an additional model school in every block over the next five years. In 2009, CBGA calculated that the total cost of this commitment was about US$8.6 billion, far above the US$2.7 billion allocated in the plan. But CBGA’s research also showed that the cost of setting up the 6,000 model schools required to achieve the government’s goal could be met by reducing the revenue lost from tax exemptions in one year by only 10 percent (approximately US$8.9 billion for 2008–09). To bolster the impact of its research findings, in 2009–10, the CBGA experimented with “door-to-door” advocacy, discussing different budget and public policy issues with more than 100 members of parliament.
- PBI also monitored the government’s commitment to make the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) proposal available to all. This scheme sought to ensure nutritional security through Anganwadi centers (government-sponsored centers for the care of mothers and children) by 2012, by providing food and preschool education to all children under six years old. Its analysis concluded that making the ICDS universally available would require an investment of approximately US$9.2 billion to US$16 billion—significantly higher than the actual 2010–11 budget allocation of approximately US$1.8 billion.

**RESULTS**
- Decentralization of budget advocacy process. The process of civil society participation in the formulation of the Union budget has been decentralized and carried out using a bottom-up approach; it has also opened up to include various new stakeholders.
- Parliamentary endorsement of inclusion of civil society input in the Union budget. In response to CBGA’s door-to-door advocacy in 2009–10, members of parliament endorsed the PBI’s appeal to the Union finance minister to hold civil society consultations before the Union budget is tabled.
- Replication at provincial level. The efforts to open up the Union budget’s formulation have been replicated at the state level by the members of the PBI.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD BANK-SPONSORED OPERATIONS**
Working with a wide network of institutions that focus on budget policy can be useful because:
- Key representatives of the network can engage with governments and succeed in influencing budget policy at both the national and subnational level.
- These types of networks also encourage mentorship of new groups and cross-pollination of ideas and strategies on a variety of fiscal issues.

**REFERENCE**
A1.80. Improving Budget Literacy to Empower Citizens

CONTEXT
Nepal embarked on a process of decentralization, first through the 1999 Local Self Governance Act, which introduced major policy reforms to devolve decision-making power to local bodies, and later through its 2007 interim constitution, which abolished a feudal state structure and established a federal system of governance that made local government its priority. These reforms presented an important opportunity, not only to improve efficiency, but to engage citizens at the subnational level. However, the reforms have not yet translated into a more efficient use of budget resources at the subnational level or an enhancement of understanding by citizens of budget processes. In this context, the Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) piloted an innovative approach in 2011 in three pilot districts—Kaski, Dolakha, and Nawalparasi—to simplify, analyze, and disclose budgets at the subnational level and to build the awareness and capacity of government officials and citizens that, hopefully, would promote a public dialogue around public expenditures. The BTI also promoted budget transparency and better governance in schools. Some of the approaches piloted under this initiative are expected to be replicated and scaled-up by a recently-created Public Financial Management multidonor trust fund.

ACTIONS (2010–12)
- At the national level, a “Budget Literacy Handbook” was developed to enhance budget awareness and literacy, and workshops were conducted for constituent assembly members. At the subnational level, budgetary allocations were disclosed, simplified, and disseminated to key stakeholders (e.g., village development councils, district development councils, and civil society organizations).
- A study analyzed how and when funds are released for education programs and how these allocations can be better aligned with district priorities. Analysis revealed several gaps between policy and practice in subnational budget formulation and execution processes, such as the predominance of a top-down process, lack of cost-benefit analyses in budget allocation decisions, delays in communication of budget ceilings and release of allocations, and capture of user committees.
- A series of capacity-building interventions for constituent assembly members and district-level officials around budget processes were undertaken to address the demand for training in this area.
- At the community-school level, a Social Audit Gap Analysis was conducted in 60 schools to identify gaps between the guidelines of the mandated school social audits and their implementation. Gaps in implementation were mainly due to poor capacity and lack of information at the community level to enable full understanding of different stakeholders’ responsibilities.
- The BTI included a training program for master trainers and social audit facilitators. In turn, these facilitators strengthened the capacity of the social audit committees and collected data at the school level. A series of other tools and information materials were developed to support training efforts and the dissemination of information to school stakeholders, including “My School At-a-Glance,” a simplified template that outlines school-level demographics and resources; “School Governance Assessment Tool,” a template combining information on the social audit process with information on the management of school finances and the conduct of the school management committee; and two “Frequently Asked Questions” to inform school stakeholders about the principles of school good governance and social audits.

RESULTS
- Creation of a cadre of social audit facilitators. A three-day program for social audit facilitators trained 30 social audit facilitators, strengthening the capacity of social audit committees in 60 schools.
- Improvements in school social auditing practices. A postcapacity building assessment in 20 schools in one district found that one iteration of social audit trainings mentioned above significantly improved community-level capacity to monitor and improve over 50 percent (22 of 39) of the indicators in the social audit guidelines.
- Increase in demand for budget transparency. Discussions with stakeholders at all levels have revealed a high demand for budget simplification and disclosure, and they agreed that these activities will help prevent misuse of funds, enhance transparency, and increase community participation. The latest discussions with partner nongovernmental organizations and government officials confirm ongoing enthusiasm for the initiative and positive feedback from local communities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Comprehensive training and capacity-building efforts at all levels (from policy makers down to the community level) have strengthened the relationship between the demand and supply sides of budget transparency and, consequently, the feedback loop between the two.

REFERENCE
A1.81. Tracking Earthquake Reconstruction Funds to Ensure they Reach Intended Beneficiaries

CONTEXT
In October 2005, a devastating earthquake shook the Hazara region and the Azad Kashmir province in Northwest Pakistan, destroying shelters, livelihoods, and lives in an already-marginalized region of the country. The magnitude of the destruction led to a flood of donor money for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the affected areas. But three years later, owing to the slow pace of reconstruction and contrary to the claims of the government’s earthquake reconstruction and rehabilitation authority (ERRA), many people were still without adequate housing or critical public infrastructure. It was in this context that a large coalition of civil society organizations and citizens embarked on a campaign in 2007 to realign rehabilitation assistance with the people’s priorities and ensure that resources were equitably distributed. The campaign was led by the Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation (OAKDF), which engages people in the Northwest region in efforts to secure their human and livelihood rights.

ACTIONS (2007–09)
The OAKDF coalition adopted the following campaign tactics to meet its goals:

- It enlisted technical experts to analyze and identify inconsistencies in ERA's earthquake reconstruction data. It also engaged 150 activists from the quake-affected communities to help people in the 57 villages of the Hazara region identify their needs, to check the truth of ERA’s claims on the ground, and to determine whether or not the agency’s priorities matched those of the villagers. These efforts demonstrated that, even after accounting for opportunity costs and inflation, there was a significant shortfall in effective reconstruction and housing subsidies that earthquake victims received.
- It formed the People’s Coalition of Hazara, which is comprised of 300 people’s organizations from the quake-impacted area, the lawyer’s campaign, journalists, and other citizen groups. In October 2008, it also organized a sit-in in Islamabad in front of parliament and the president’s office to draw attention to the problems with the reconstruction efforts and effectively utilized electronic media to highlight them.
- The OAKDF made a strategic decision to become an executing agency for the ERA in one union council. This provided useful insights into the implementation policies of the ERA, greatly benefitting campaigns strategies and tactics.

RESULTS
- Improved reconstruction and provision of prioritized services. After the sit-in in front of parliament and the president’s office, the reconstruction data showed a rapid increase in activity for housing compensation, health, water supply, and sanitation—all of the sectors included in the coalition’s demands to the ERA.
- Increase in the completion rate of projects from 9 to 29 percent in 14 months. Prior to June 2008, 9 percent of all projects were completed, 12 percent were under construction, and 52 percent were in the tender or planning stages; by August 2009, 28.5 percent were completed, 31.6 were under construction, and 39.9 were at the tender or planning stages.
- Increase in the percentage of affected citizens receiving subsidies. Among earthquake-affected people eligible for the fourth tranche of Rs. 50,000, by June 2008, only 39.1 percent had received subsidies; this figure rose to 81.2 percent by August 2009.
- Increase in the rate of completion of health projects from less than 1 to 59 percent.
- Increase in the rate of completion of water and sanitation projects from 23 to 59 percent in 14 months.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Including advocacy organizations as executing agencies for various projects can help them increase the effectiveness of their monitoring efforts and thus serve as a catalyst for the better use of funds more generally.

REFERENCES
OAKDF Website: http://www.oakdf.org.pk.
A1.82. Introducing Participatory Budgeting to Enhance Accountability of Pradeshiya Sabhas

CONTEXT
In the local government sector of Sri Lanka, local authorities are divided into three different groups: municipal, urban, and regional councils (pradeshiya sabha or PS). All of the PSs are income-generating units that have the power to spend public money on the provision of services and local infrastructure through an annual budget approved by its members. It is therefore important that the citizens have a say in the budget process and can ensure that the income generated from them is spent in a rational and responsible manner. The Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) set up its Governance and Anti-Corruption Program with the explicit aim of increasing citizen awareness of the budget process, encouraging participation and contributing to the development programs of the PSs. Supported by the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability, an initiative of the World Bank Institute to globally promote, strengthen, and sustain the concepts and practices of social accountability, the project studies PS budget processes and awareness and supports newly-elected members and officials of the PSs as well as community members in understanding and participating in the budget process.

RESULTS
- Citizen participation in the budget formulation stage. Through the workshops funded by ANSA-SAR, CPA was able to get citizen committees involved in the formulation, approval, and execution of the PS budget. During a formulation phase, each elected member conducts group discussions with village groups to identify issues and projects in their localities that must be financed out of the PS budget. Following the village-level discussions, concerned citizens, eminent personalities, and CSO and CBO representatives put together a wish list, which is then narrowed down to a priority list. A budget proposal is formulated for each prioritized activity and discussed at the Sabha level. Activities selected are included in the main budget.
- Bridging of the language gap in budgets. Prior to the intervention, it was found that copies of even the Pradeshiya Sabha Act were not available from the government. Through active dissemination of trilingual, user-friendly publications on relevant subject areas and analytical studies, the program was able to bridge the gap of budget information in local languages.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Initiatives that go beyond a simple participatory exercise of giving voice to citizens in the budget process, and move towards integrating their voice in the actual formulation, approval and execution of the budget can have a transformative impact that goes beyond the distribution of specific goods. These forums can become (as in this case) schools of active citizenship, where communities come together for the first time, are informed of their rights and responsibilities, and learn how to act on it.

REFERENCE
A1.83. Consulting with the Public to Develop Budget Policies and Priorities

CONTEXT
Although not legally prescribed, the communications policy of the government of Canada states that the government should consult the public and listen to and take account of people’s interests and concerns when establishing priorities, developing policies, and planning programs and services. In this spirit, in April 2006, Canada’s federal government urged Canadians to provide their views to the government online during the pre-budget consultation period. Key questions posed by the government included: what would the public like to see in the 2006 and future budgets; in which areas should the government cut expenditures if tax cuts or spending increases are proposed; and what suggestions can they propose for how the government could deliver programs more efficiently and effectively?

ACTIONS (2006–PRESENT)
The government’s pre-budget consultation process includes three elements:

- The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, which is required by standing order of parliament to conduct pre-budget hearings in both Ottawa and across the country and then report back to parliament on what it has heard.
- The minister of finance conducts his own pre-budget consultation sessions with key stakeholders. These consist of face-to-face roundtables in Ottawa and, schedules permitting, similar sessions in communities across the country.
- The department of finance stages its own pre-budget consultations where individual branches meet with key stakeholders. At the same time, the department conducts public opinion research and focus groups as part of the budget preparation process. The submissions are analyzed, sorted into categories, and forwarded to relevant departments.
- More recently, both the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance and the Department of Finance launched pre-budget consultations on their websites. The web-consultation page provides information about how to make submissions by email, by fax or snail mail.

RESULTS
- **Citizen engagement with the department of finance.** In 2006, an estimated 7,000 Canadians responded to the department of finance’s invitation to submit advice, ideas, and insights for the 2007 budget.
- **Citizen engagement with the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance.** Since the launch of the pre-budget consultations, each year, more than 500 organizations have submitted their suggestions on what the budget should include, and the submissions are available on the committee’s website. Since 2007, these submissions are translated and shared with members of parliament on the committee, who then call on certain groups to make presentations in Ottawa.
- **Public reporting on citizen feedback on the budget.** More recently, in December 2012, the committee reported publicly on its own public consultations held across the country. For the 2013 budget, committee members submitted 60 recommendations based on the feedback they heard from well over 600 individuals, businesses, and organizations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Providing support to Ministries of Finance and the Committees on Finance to better engage with citizens ahead of the formulation of the budget and at the time of debating the draft budget can be an effective way to help open the budget process to citizen input and oversight. Online consultations are another powerful way to engage large swathes of the population, especially in countries with a high rate of Internet coverage.

REFERENCES
A1.84. Proposing Alternative Federal Budgets to Demystify Budget Formulation

CONTEXT
Founded in 1980, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) is an independent, nonpartisan research institute concerned with issues of social, economic, and environmental justice. Among other activities, CCPA, with the participation and support of researchers, activists, and leadership from a broad spectrum of civil society organizations (CSOs), has been publishing the annual alternative federal budget (AFB) since 1994. The AFB program emerged as a response to the neoliberal vision of Canada’s federal government. The primary focus of the program is economic literacy: to demythologize budget-making and hence public accountability. The AFB has now been produced for several provinces, including British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia.

ACTIONS (1994–PRESENT)
- AFB is a valuable vehicle for coalition building. It brings together progressive CSOs and other stakeholders to collectively develop tax and spending measures, and create a sophisticated and workable alternative budgetary framework within which the measures can be met. This framework acknowledges political and economic realities but still produces a dramatically different result than the federal government’s budget.
- CCPA released the 2013 AFB in March in response to the government signaling that the tabled budget would be short on details about spending cuts. The AFB called on the government to deliver a transparent budget that protects the services relied on by Canadians; eliminates costly programs such as new prisons and fighter jets; and shows how the government can increase investments in job creation, public programs, and infrastructure, and still balance its budget. The AFB is released at a national press conference 2–3 weeks before the Finance Minister’s budget is held in April, and a host of meetings, workshops, conferences, and roundtables are organized by CCPA during this period.
- AFB strongly believes that the federal government could do a much better job involving Canadians in the budget process and thus more accurately reflect their priorities. Currently, the only channels for citizen feedback on the budget are the pre-budget consultations; the suggestions derived from these rarely make it to the actual federal budget. Because of this, AFB created a health care innovation fund worth US$2 billion over two years with a goal to allow communities to decide how money is spent on the priorities that matter to them. As part of the process, the

AFB developed an online tool that allowed Canadians to convey how they would like to see the money spent on the various program choices.

RESULTS
- Increased federal spending toward social investment. AFB has come to be regarded as representing one side of the national debate on broad budgetary priorities. Since the year 2000, it had a significant impact on the slow shift back toward social investments in federal program spending.
- Established as a credible voice in public debates. CCPA has succeeded in establishing itself as an important public voice about government finances; it has helped shape the public debate over the budget for the past two decades.
- Promoted unity of policy analysis. The idea of alternative budgeting has spread across almost half of Canada’s provinces. Effectively, AFB has promoted collaborative policy-related budget transparency work among labor researchers and fostered closer links with policy researchers from nonlabor organizations. Many nongovernmental organizations—from childcare and anti-poverty advocates to environmental groups—have helped shape AFB spending proposals and used them as an analytical framework from which to advance their own proposals.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In order to remain credible over a long period of time, it is important to take a multipronged approach to budget transparency—one that maintains a good balance between myth-busting through research, coalition-building through debate, and working on solutions through the government.

REFERENCES
CCPA Website: http://www.policyalternatives.ca.
A1.85. Using Integrity Pacts to Keep Corruption at Bay in Public Sector Contacting

**CONTEXT**
In 2001, the proposed building of a new international airport near Berlin was marred by corruption allegations, forcing several modifications of the project’s administrative and financial structures and finally a cancellation of all project agreements reached by that time. By 2004, the Federal Republic of Germany and the States of Berlin and Brandenburg had determined to go ahead with the project, albeit on a more modest scale than originally envisaged. For that purpose, they formed a private sector company, the Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld GmbH (FBS), a limited liability company owned by the three public authorities, with the Mayor of Berlin as Chairman of the Board of Supervisors. In view of the earlier corruption allegations and under instructions from the mayor of Berlin to various state authorities to seek new ways to avoid corruption risks in large investment projects, FBS and Transparency International Germany (TI-D) joined efforts to introduce a no-bribes Integrity Pact (IP) to prevent corruption and illegal transactions in the course of a major expansion that included turning FBS into the Berlin Brandenburg International Airport (BBI). At the time, this was the largest infrastructure project in eastern Germany, anticipating investments of ca. EUR 2 billion (US$2.6 billion) between 2005 and the planned opening of BBI airport in 2010.

**ACTIONS (2004–10)**
- TI-D and FBS managers and staff worked together to develop a model IP adapted to Germany's legal context. In light of TI-D’s suggestion that an independent external monitor should be appointed to effectively shield FBS management against potential efforts to undermine correct procedures, both parties selected an IP monitor.
- Sanctions for breaching the Schönefeld Airport IP were instituted. These included setting a liquidated damages clause at three percent of the contract value, up to an amount of D50,000. In addition, FBS was entitled to exclude the bidder from the bidding process and, in case of serious violations, from future bids as well. The amount was increased to the equivalent of five percent of the contract value in case of violation of the IP provisions after the contract was awarded. In this case, FBS reserved the right to cancel the contract and, again, in the case of a serious violation, to exclude the contractor from future bidding processes. Because special conflict resolution mechanisms already existed under German law that were applicable to the Schönefeld Airport Project and to FBS, they were not included in the IP.
- FBS invested a significant amount of time and effort to communicate about the Schönefeld Airport IP. It was included in regular presentations about the project to the local chamber of commerce and other industry associations.
- Because of the large volume of contracts and the ensuing difficulty of negotiating the IP content with all bidders, the Schönefeld Airport IP was used as a standard mandatory document. Since the terms of reference were clear in requiring the signature as a condition for participating in the procurement process, the few bidders who refused were not allowed to participate. After five years of implementation, there were no new cases of reluctance to sign the IP.
- FBS used the IP as a project implementation and communications tool. In FBS’s view, the IP complemented the partnership agreement that the contractors signed, where they agreed with FBS to general terms of behavior towards FBS and their own employees, some risk management measures, information sharing, and so on.

**RESULTS**
Successful IP implementation with zero corruption. By June 2009, the project had entailed 338 individual bidding processes and 900 signed contracts, including design, construction, and supplies, worth more than D1.5 billion (approximately US$1.9 billion). The monitor reviewed a good portion of these contracts and there were no reports of corruption.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
In addition to signaling that an extra effort was being made to curb corruption in the procurement process by instituting an IP, key features that make these pacts successful included getting the basics right—such as procurement procedures, law, the monitoring system, and communication about the IP—and involving the stakeholders.

**REFERENCES**
Transparency International Website: www.transparency.org.
A nonpartisan, action-oriented policy analysis center, Adva established the Budget Analysis Project in 1995, which is designed to promote a broader public debate on national priorities and a more equitable distribution of government resources. The project analyzes the social service allocations of the national budget of Israel via a series of reports entitled “Looking at the Budget.” The budget presented by Israel’s government in 1998 contained deep cuts in social spending, with the avowed hope of stimulating economic growth. The cuts included reducing child allowances and old-age pensions, abolishing the uniform health care package, and limiting eligibility for unemployment compensation. Adva took the position that the proposed cuts would result in serious harm to the welfare state and the people who depended on it.

**ACTIONS (1998–PRESENT)**

- Before the 1998 budget proposal was even finalized, the organization distributed two “Budget Bulletins” in response to the government’s proposed spending cuts to document the negative implications for the Israeli welfare state.
- Adva promptly brought into the debate a broad spectrum of organizations whose constituencies would be affected by the budget decisions. Through meetings and information sessions, Adva worked to increase awareness within the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, establish a common agenda, and present a united voice to the government. Adva provided information that was both timely and useful, and strategically disseminated it to select audiences. Longer, more in-depth reports and short, easily digestible issue briefs were sent to a broad spectrum of NGOs, legislators, health ministry officials, and other key players; the reports were also widely publicized in the media.
- When the 1998 budget was published, Adva released three specialized budget reports, one on the implications of the proposed budget for women, another for Arab citizens, and the third for residents of Jewish development towns. These reports were widely circulated within the government and among civil society to bring more attention to the issue and to raise the level of debate.
- Adva also focused its energy on lobbying within the Knesset. Staff distributed Adva’s full budget report as well as shorter budget bulletins, met with legislators, testified at various Knesset committee meetings, and held an “alternative budget” debate attended by members of the Knesset and representatives from dozens of NGOs. These venues provided Adva the opportunity to educate legislators on the impact of the proposed budget and bolster opposition to the proposed social spending cuts.
- More recently, the Adva Center has assumed leadership of the Women’s Budget Forum, a coalition of over 30 feminist and human rights organizations, which seeks to promote changes in government programs with new legislation and regulations that are more friendly toward women and minorities.

**RESULTS**

- **Restored social sector considerations in the 1998 budget.**
  Adva’s efforts were very effective at highlighting the social sector implications of the 1998 budget and helping to generate a well-informed debate on the issues. The budget was not approved by the standard December deadline, and the Foreign Minister David Levy resigned in opposition to the proposed cuts in social services. Eventually, even though the bill was ultimately passed, three important aspects of the social services budget were restored: the universal package of health services was preserved, cutbacks in teaching hours and government housing assistance program were reduced, and the deep cuts in child allowances and old-age pensions were nullified.
- **Reference to Adva’s reports.** Throughout the course of the Knesset debates in 1998 and since, Adva’s reports on the economy and the national budget were read regularly by executive and legislative officials and were utilized in Knesset committees and plenary debates. They were reported extensively by the mass media and utilized by social advocacy organizations. They provided the impetus for changes in legislation, regulations, and government planning.
Increased focus on gender budgeting. In November 2011, the Adva Center released a report entitled “Gender Mainstreaming Calls for Gender Breakdowns Case Study: The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor,” which positions the advocacy work of the Women’s Budget Forum. The report was presented to the Minister of Industry, Trade, and Labor as well as to department heads at a meeting held in March 2012. Following an Adva Center presentation, the minister instructed the director of his research department to submit a plan for collecting data by gender within two months for the purpose of promoting women’s employment.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
Bank TTLs can encourage civil society organizations that are providing training and technical assistance to legislatures in order to expand the parameters of the budget debate and establish legitimacy with government officials and the public by adopting a nonpartisan approach.

REFERENCES
Adva Website: http://www.adva.org.
A1.87. Using Budget Analysis to Propose Alternative Budget Approaches

CONTEXT
In Italy, the finance law vests the national government with the power to choose where to take public money from and how it should be spent in the following year. Unfortunately, too often the law is discussed, negotiated, and drawn according to special interests, and its implications are presented as inevitable. Furthermore, it is shrouded in figures and graphs that should represent the collective welfare but which seem of little importance to the uninitiated reader. Sbilanciamoci! is a campaign involving 51 associations, nongovernmental organizations, and networks that has proposed several alternatives to Italian budget policies, arguing and advocating for social and environmental priorities.

ACTIONS (SEPTEMBER 1999–PRESENT)
• One of the key initiatives of the campaign is the Other State Budget Project. One of the outputs of this project was “The Other Budget Report,” in which, after a thorough review of the budget law and the state budget, alternative proposals on how to use public expenditures for society, the environment, and peace are developed.
• Annual meetings (counter cernobbio) with mass media visibility were organized at which policy makers, government delegates, and civil society organization representatives are invited to discuss alternative economic policies and proposals published in “The Other Budget Report.” Some their suggestions included abolishing the tax reform module II, which took away resources from public policies in favor of welfare; increasing resources for the national fund for social policies through the introduction of a capitation rate; allocation of additional resources to the national health fund to be transferred to the regions to sport the dynamic growth of health expenditures; and the promotion of fair trade and social public procurement.
• Since 2002, Sbilanciamoci! has also been calculating a composite regional development quality indicator (Qualita Regionale dello Sviluppo, or QUARS), which was devised under a consultative and participatory process. This composite indicator is geared at identifying and linking up the components of development in the Italian regions on the basis of 41 indicators.

RESULTS
• **High volume of activity.** During ten years of activity, the campaign has elaborated research tools and advanced critical analysis, both of which are an essential part of its activity on disseminating information, exerting political pressure, and mobilizing multiple stakeholders. Sbilanciamoci! has published 20 reports: 10 on Italy’s State Budget; 8 on QUARS, the regional index on alternative quality-of-life indicators elaborated by Sbilanciamoci!; 1 on the war in Iraq; 4 on development cooperation; and 2 on military expenditures. It has also organized over 20 national conferences and conventions, promoted 256 local initiatives, such as seminars and debates, has collected more than 30,000 signatures in support of the state budget alternative proposals; and helped table 57 amendments to laws with the support of members of parliament supporting the campaign.
• **Uptake of several recommendations from the proposal in government programs.** Some proposals in “The Other Budget Report” have been directly incorporated into government programs—for example, the construction of 3,000 crèches and the implementation of green accountability in the political decision-making process;
• **Setting up of working groups.** A working group has been established by the ministry of the treasury that will systematically review and verify the uptake of alternate budget proposals by the government.
• **Uptake of the regional development indicator by politicians.** QUARS is now being used to make politicians aware of alternative indicators to the conventional economic ones and to establish and guide priorities, particularly with regard to the way budgets are allocated.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
In countries where civil society organizations have high capacity and technical expertise, it is effective to take a multipronged, radical, and holistic approach to budget analysis, advocacy, and reform analysis by encouraging relevant nongovernmental organizations to create coalitions that can collectively propose pragmatic alternatives to the existing budget while at the same time galvanize support from multiple stakeholders.

REFERENCE
Sbilanciamoci Website: www.sbilanciamoci.org.
A1.88. Citizen Activists Work Together to Monitor the External Auditing Process

CONTEXT
The Japan Citizen Ombudsman Association (JCOA) is a network whose members include a large number of lawyers and long-time activists who have organized and coordinated disclosure request campaigns about falsified business trips, entertainment expenses for bureaucrats, and unaccountable granting of subsidies to auxiliary organizations. It grew out of several citizen initiatives in various parts of the country during the 1980s and 1990s in response to numerous cases of bribery and malfeasance. Initially established in Osaka, Nagoya, and Sendai, citizen ombudsman groups continued to proliferate in other prefectures and big cities, including Tokyo. In 1994, these groups convened and formed the Japan Citizen Ombudsman Association (JCOA).

ACTIONS (2000–PRESENT)
Composed of 85 suborganizations and 6,000 members, JCOA has worked on disclosure request campaigns on entertainment expenses incurred by the bureaucracy, bid collusion practices, public works, “fake duty” trips, and bribery of the police. It has adopted the following techniques and approaches:

- Since 2000, JCOA has been monitoring the external auditing process by making audit reports prepared by external auditors available to the public and the news media in a “Report Card of External Audits.” In order to curtail repetition of delinquencies that characterized earlier local audit committees, JCOA keeps a close watch on external auditors. For example, when the external audit mechanism first began, one audit report consisted of only six pages, for which the external auditors received a payment of 11.55 million yen (USS120,000). JCOA protested and sued the external auditors to return the money.
- Since the 2001 legal amendment that requires ceiling prices of construction bids be disclosed, JCOA writes annual reports that rank local governments based on successful bid ratios for public construction projects. It also calculates the successful bid ratio for 47 prefectures, 17 large cities, and 33 medium-sized cities. It calculated that local governments may have overpaid up to 1.16 trillion yen (USS12 million) in public work budgets in fiscal 2005 alone because of big rigging.
- JCOA works to maintain its financial independence by not entering into financial relationships of any kind with local and central government agencies or with private companies. Every time JCOA wins a court case against a local government involving overcharging in government contracts, the settlement includes a provision that the local government must pay the JCOA attorney fees. JCOA’s lawyers also sometimes donate part of their fees to the association.

RESULTS
- Increased disclosure of information. Among the first gains of the association was to learn from each other’s experiences on how to investigate local governments, particularly with regard to demanding disclosure of information. This enabled association members to retrieve a lot of information that was not previously open to the public. In 1995, the association discovered numerous entertainment expenses and fake official travel by government officers paid for with taxpayer money. This prompted the association to demand the disclosure of information in each of Japan’s 47 prefectures.
- Addition of an external audit system. In 1996, the JCOA exposed inappropriate business trip expenses by the supervisory auditor. In response, the government amended the law in 1999 to add an external audit system for local governments that includes a lawyer, an accountant, and a tax accountant who are required to draft audit reports.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
- A countrywide network of citizen groups that advocate for viable change and to back up their efforts with evidence can have a resounding impact on policy. However, these networks take time to grow and expand, and quick wins in the beginning can help consolidate a network’s mission and hone its techniques.
- The active involvement of a national network to monitor the external auditing process can serve as a constant deterrent to the misuse of public resources.

REFERENCES
Japan Citizen Ombudsman Association Website: www.ansa-sar.org.
A1.89. Using Citizen Participation Mechanisms to Verify Fiscal Priorities

CONTEXT
The introduction of the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) by South Korea’s budget office allowed budget allocations to be based on multiyear expenditure ceilings, but concerns remained that without credible and legitimate mechanisms for setting the ceilings, the rationale for them could be undermined and enforcement by line ministries made difficult. To resolve this issue, budget authorities decided to establish mechanisms through which stakeholders could provide feedback at different stages of the budget cycle, enabling the government to assert that a realistic expenditure ceiling had been established and that attempts to renegotiate it would be ineffective.

ACTIONS (2002–PRESENT)
Korea’s public participation mechanisms are closely aligned with the formulation and execution cycle of the annual budget and the MTEF.

- During the process of setting budget ceilings, the budget office organizes open discussions for the public (ODP) about any potentially expensive project with a direct impact on the quality of life of citizens. At the ODP, each major sector, such as social welfare and health, infrastructure, and the environment, is allotted a 90-minute session for deliberation and discussion, which concludes with questions and comments from the floor. To ensure a balanced perspective, each sector convenes a panel consisting of Public Financial Management experts, high-level government officials from line ministries and the budget office, budget execution entities, and civil society organizations. The hearings are televised to ensure transparency.
- Since 2009, the budget office has arranged meetings with local governments in major provinces and cities to learn about their needs and to get updates on projects being implemented at the local level. In turn, local governments voice their opinions on projects, grants, and subsidy programs.
- Before finalizing and submitting the budget to the national assembly, the budget office consults with the fiscal policy advisory council comprised of line ministries, outside experts, and local governments regarding the budget and the adjusted MTEF. The inputs are then reported at the cabinet meeting before the submission of the budget to the national assembly.
- When the national assembly receives the draft budget from the government, a special committee on budget opens a public hearing of assembly experts. This hearing evaluates the overall economic and tax forecasts, fiscal stance, and the need to amend any expenditure programs. Should questions arise from the hearing, the special committee on budget requests a query session with the government and makes adjustments to the draft budget if it is necessary.
- Citizens can use the website of the ministry of strategy and finance budget waste report center or the budget waste hotline to report suspected cases of budget waste or suggest creative ways to save resources. Retired budget office officials with budgeting or budget implementation experience manage the hotline.
- The board of audit and inspection (BAI) posts the names of agencies to be audited along with the respective audit dates on its website and opens it for citizen feedback. Citizens are encouraged to suggest what public entity operations or expenditures should be audited. Additionally, citizens can request the BAI to examine any reports of impropriety or inspect certain budgets throughout the budget implementation phase.
- In July 2012, the budget office launched its first nationwide contest to gather creative ideas from the public on new fiscal projects. The objective of the contest was to encourage the public to provide input on what and how projects should be designed.

RESULTS
- Inclusion of ODP inputs in policy process. Based on ODP requests, the childcare budget has increased at an average annual rate of 27.2 percent from 2005 to 2013, surpassing the 8.5 percent annual growth rate of the social welfare sector as a whole.

(continued)

REPORTS RECEIVED FROM THE PUBLIC AND BAI’S ACCEPTANCE RATE

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<th>Year</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of reports</td>
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<td>142</td>
<td>163</td>
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<td>Acceptance rate (percent)</td>
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<td>61.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
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</table>

Source: Board of Audit and Inspection.
The target group expanded from low-income households to all households with children under age five. The government introduced a monthly childcare allowance in 2009.

- **Improved oversight of budget waste.** From 2006 onward, the number of reports received on budget waste has increased in direct proportion to the resources devoted to awareness campaigns by the ministry of strategy and finance. This system has been so effective that local governments adopted it as well.

- **Adoption of citizens’ suggestions for new fiscal projects.** Twelve of the 866 suggestions—both new project ideas and ideas that expanded on ongoing projects—were reflected in the budget. Some of the ideas highlighted as creative and reasonable include the establishment of a network for small- and medium-sized companies by function or by region for better coordination and information-sharing and to improve the companies’ bargaining power and reduce costs; and a mentoring program through which college students guide and teach children from low-income households.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**

In addition to using various mechanisms to solicit feedback on the budget during different phases of the budget cycle, project teams could also consider encouraging governments to “close” the feedback loop and to indicate which public suggestions and how many they have incorporated into their programs and processes.

**REFERENCE**


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**PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE BUDGET AND MTEF FORMULATION PROCESSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MTEF and annual budgeting cycle</th>
<th>Public participation mechanisms</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 MTEF preparation (LMs)</td>
<td>Open discussion for the public (public hearing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 MTEF Draft (BO)</td>
<td>Meeting with local governments and field trips</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 • Coordination (BO and LMs)</td>
<td>Fiscal policy advisory meeting with LMs, experts, and local governments</td>
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<td>4 • Cabinet meeting</td>
<td>Assembly experts hearing</td>
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<td>5 • Ceilings communicated to LMs</td>
<td>Budget waste report center</td>
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<td>6 Budget draft by LMs</td>
<td>Public participation on audit by BAI</td>
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<td>7 • Budget formulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 • Submit to the assembly</td>
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<td>9 Assembly review and finalization</td>
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A1.90. Encouraging Citizen Participation in Audits to Uncover Waste of Public Resources

**CONTEXT**

In South Korea, several schemes have been introduced by the national supreme audit institution—the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI)—to encourage citizen participation in audits. A citizens’ audit request system, introduced under the Anticorruption Act of 2001, allows citizens to request from the BAI special audits on public agencies suspected of corruption or legal transgressions. Applications are made under this scheme to a citizen audit request screening committee, comprised of citizens and audit officials and designed to screen requests to identify frivolous complaints and decide which merit a full audit. A Korean citizen movement called the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) established the Citizens Against Budget Waste (CABW) as one of its divisions. CABW identifies issues within the administrative affairs of government and requests the Korean BAI to audit agencies or programs of concern.

**ACTIONS (1999–2003)**

CCEJ requested the BAI to conduct audits in two cases.

- The first was that of ballooning construction costs and delays in building the National Cancer Center (NCC) that the government had begun in 1991. Rather than the originally estimated cost of 41.9 billion Korean Won (approximately US$58 million), by 1999 the construction budget for the NCC had increased to over 200 billion Won (approximately US$180 million), with completion more than three-and-a-half years behind schedule.

- Before requesting that the BAI conduct an audit of the NCC, CCEJ utilized its wide network of experts and volunteers to undertake research and compare the budgets of cancer wards at other university hospitals with the government’s budget plan for the NCC and found that the latter was excessive. CCEJ also consulted with professors and government officers who corroborated their suspicions and confirmed that a power struggle between two government ministries over control of the NCC had inflated the NCC’s budget even further.

The second case involved an audit official who informed CCEJ in 2003 that the National Tax Service (NTS) had provided three companies with unfair tax cuts totaling 6 billion Korean Won (approximately US$5,434,525), and that he had been demoted because of his opposition to those policies.

- In 2003, CCEJ began an investigation and issued an open inquiry against NTS, citing unfair audit practices, preferential taxation, omitted taxes amounting to 6 billion Korean Won (US$5,434,525), and retaliatory actions against whistleblowers. When, in response to CCEJ’s request, the BAI conducted an investigation of the tax collection practices of the NTS and found no fault with them, CCEJ opted for another system of government redress and took the case to the committee in charge of coordinating the Korean government’s anticorruption policies.

- CCEJ used the media strategically as a tool to highlight these cases and to motivate the government to address the concerns of citizens. It declared March 3 as “Taxpayers’ Day,” which was originally the day on which the National Tax Administration was established in 1966. It tried to show cases of budgetary waste (including the NCC case) and celebrate the excellent government officials who implemented efficient budgets; each year it announced the ten worst cases and gave taxpayers’ “friend” awards to efficient officials. When the worst cases were related to a specific ministry, the minister and high-level officials were embarrassed because the president criticized the ministry.

- It organized classes on the government budget for citizens to increase the average Korean citizen’s basic knowledge on fiscal matters.

- It developed close relationships with local organizations. Each of CCEJ’s 40 local chapters established a division for budget monitoring, which led to better collaboration with the CABW.

**RESULTS**

- Determination of budget waste. In the case of the NCC, the BAI determined that insufficient planning, unsystematic construction, and a lack of human resources had contributed to budget waste. It also found that overlapping and unclear investments between the NCC and a university hospital had caused inefficiency. The BAI informed the ministry of health and welfare that it should harmonize the functions of the two hospitals and provide a firm plan for acquiring the human and material resources necessary to get the NCC open as soon as possible. The NCC was operational by 2001.

(continued)
Prosecution of whistleblower’s demotion. In case of the NTS, the anticorruption committee accepted the arguments by the audit official and CCEJ, and transferred the case to a local prosecutor who in turn decided that the official’s demotion had been unfair and the tax exemption had been unlawful. The prosecutor ordered that the required tax payments of 6 billion Won (US$5,434,525) be collected.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
National Supreme Audit Institutions can be useful allies, both in terms of conducting timely and comprehensive audits of World Bank-supported projects as well as collaborating with the public to monitor satisfactory implementation of ongoing projects.

REFERENCES
CCEJ Korea Website: http://www.ccej.or.kr/English.
A1.91. Promoting Progressive Budget and Tax Policies to Advance Equity and Prosperity

CONTEXT
Created in 1993, the State Fiscal Analysis Initiative (SFAI) network is a unique national network of 42 diverse public policy organizations in 41 states and the District of Columbia. Coordinated by the Washington-based Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (the Center), the SFAI network promotes progressive budget and tax policies at the state level and seeks to shape tax, budget, and related debates to foster a more equitable and prosperous society. The SFAI’s work is particularly relevant in the face of the unprecedented challenges that states face today, including a devastating, recession-driven decline in revenue, severely weakened services for low-income and vulnerable families, regressive state tax systems, and insufficient transparency, accountability, and civic engagement.

ACTIONS (1993–PRESENT)
- SFAI’s work begins with credible, timely, and accessible research and analysis. This fact-based approach drives thoughtful and practical policy ideas that SFAI groups and their partners then promote in their states. SFAI groups strategically assess opportunities and threats when choosing which topics to address. Their work plans—often developed in coordination with allies that are prepared to organize around policy change—respond to fast-moving legislative developments.
- The Center and SFAI members focus on communicating effectively to a wide range of audiences. SFAI groups are major sources of information for journalists and opinion leaders, and they help to shape coverage of key budget and policy issues in their states. In some states, newspapers have reached out to SFAI groups to partner on interactive tools aimed at helping readers better understand state budgets and the tradeoffs involved in developing them.
- SFAI groups expand state budget and fiscal policy debates by helping and partnering with a diverse range of constituencies. They assist other nonprofits in raising awareness of specific issues, formulating policy solutions, developing effective messages, and refining legislative strategies. Often a group involved in a particular issue—for example, mental health or K–12 education—will have expertise in one part of the budget but will need the broader information an SFAI group can provide to consider the overall budget context.
- Though budgets and political dynamics in the states differ, the Center and SFAI members regularly share policy ideas, written reports, op-eds, messaging strategies, and tactical approaches. SFAI groups have developed a robust peer-to-peer network that provides a sounding board for fiscal policy and organizational questions, alerts members to field developments, and offers opportunities to share successful strategies. Groups also mentor new members to reduce the start-up time necessary to launch successful groups.

RESULTS
The SFAI network has significant impact on state policy. Some of SFAI’s key policy victories include:

- Established earned income tax credits in numerous states. The earned income tax credit (EITC) is the nation’s most effective policy tool for reducing child poverty. However, prior to SFAI’s involvement, few states had their own versions of this successful federal program. Today, 25 state-level EITCs provide US$2.4 billion per year to help more than 9 million working families make ends meet and to lift many of them above the poverty line.
- Defeated crippling limits on state revenues and services in over two dozen states. Strict, arbitrary spending or revenue limits can force damaging cutbacks to education, health care, and other vital services. When such measures are proposed in states, SFAI groups sound the alarm about the consequences that would result. For example, SFAI and Center researchers have documented the devastating effects that these proposals would have on education, health care, and human services; they disseminated those findings to journalists, policymakers, and community groups.
- Safeguarded services by building state revenue coalitions in 30 states. State cutbacks in services due to the 2007–09 recession would have been even deeper without the leadership of SFAI members, who have been instrumental in creating coalitions to rally support against cuts-only budget proposals that damage economic growth and hurt struggling families. Nearly all SFAI groups have either launched or strengthened broad-based revenue-enhancing coalitions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
It can be useful to work with a countrywide network of institutions that focuses on budget policy because:

- Key representatives of the network can engage with national and subnational-level governments and can succeed in impacting budget policy at the national and subnational levels
- Such networks also encourage mentorship of new groups and cross-pollination of ideas and strategies on different fiscal issues.

REFERENCE
State Fiscal Analysis Initiative Network Website: www.statefiscal.org.
A1.92. Building Participatory Budgeting Coalitions to Improve Municipal Budgets

**CONTEXT**
Traditionally, in Jordan, citizens are unaware of their right to give input on municipal budgets, and they have never been provided with opportunities to provide feedback on budget allocations about what they believe are key priorities for their municipalities. Because of this lack of knowledge and engagement, citizens tend to request services from municipalities that are either outside of their mandate or for which there is no budget. To encourage citizens to understand the financial capacities of their local government and participate in the budget process, Partners-Jordan, a nonprofit organization, launched the Arab Initiative for Equitable Budget project with a regional coalition comprised of the countries of Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon.

**ACTIONS (2008–10)**
- Each partner of the participatory budgeting coalition project from Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Yemen identified and selected core coalition team members for their respective country coalitions. Organized and implemented by Partners Jordan, the regional training program for coalition members worked with 15 participants from the core coalition team of each country on cooperative planning, advocacy skills, and best practices in drafting local government budgets.
- Coalition members organized focus groups in these countries with respective groups of local government officials, national-level government officials, and members of the economic and financial committees of parliaments involved in drafting the budget.
- In addition to developing training materials, Partners-Jordan organized “awareness workshops” that introduced the concept of participatory budgeting, how budgets are planned and allocations determined, and trained attendees on how to participate in drafting the government budget.
- Coalition members in Jordan, Yemen, and Lebanon conducted quantitative field research in selected municipalities to assess needs and rank community priorities. The results were published in consolidated reports that were distributed to local communities and discussed with the leadership of the municipalities.
- They also organized “learning conferences” to review the implementation of project activities in Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain, to compare successes and challenges, and to discuss possible next steps.

**RESULTS**
Incorporation of local priorities in municipal budgets. In Jordan and Yemen, the 2010 municipal budget was approved based on priorities identified by local citizens. For instance, residents of the two selected municipalities in Jordan had identified the construction and maintenance of roads, street cleaning, waste collection, and street lighting as pressing issues, and the 2010 budget for these municipalities reflected those priorities.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**
Supporting regional coalitions to promote budget transparency to initiate pilot projects may complement rather than adopt country- or sector-wide approaches in certain contexts.

**REFERENCE**
For more information please contact Noor Zada at Partners Jordan (mediation@partners-jordan.org).
A1.93. Engaging in a Cross-Country Exercise to Demand Budget Information

**CONTEXT**

The “Ask Your Government!” initiative began in January 2010, when 100 civil society organizations (CSOs) launched an ambitious effort to document public access to budget information in 80 countries. The goal of this campaign was to showcase the real-life experiences of citizens going through the process of requesting budget information from their governments and to offer concrete evidence on the problems they face in accessing it. The initiative was jointly coordinated by the International Budget Partnership (IBP), Access Info Europe (AIE), and the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD), and involved international and local CSOs in 80 countries.

**ACTIONS (JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2010)**

- The “Ask Your Government!” partners identified six specific pieces of budget information that relate to established international development commitments on maternal health, the environment, and foreign aid. In order to guide local partners through the process of formally submitting information requests for each question to the responsible government agencies, IBP, AIE, and CLD designed a protocol based on international best practices and established standards regarding the right to access public information. This protocol provided options for procedures in countries with and without access to information laws as well as guidelines for following up on each request and keeping detailed records of the process and experience for each participating organization.
- One local organization in each country assumed the responsibility for submitting and following up on the information requests with the respective government. Over a course of three-and-a-half months, governments were given as many as three opportunities to respond to the information requests from citizens, which were submitted through letters, phone calls, and visits to government offices.
- Once the results of a total of 1,061 requests for information were compiled, IBP, CLD, and AIE jointly produced a comparative analysis of the results of this exercise. IBP produced an “Ask Your Government!” radio series, which documented the experiences of local researchers as they repeatedly requested budget information from the government. Because the six questions also referred to issues linked with Millennium Development Goals (MDG) — on improving maternal health, 7 — on ensuring environmental sustainability, and 8 — on developing a global partnership for development, the coalition also created a petition to demand that governments that were going to attend the 2010 MDG summit adopt requirements for greater budget transparency.

**RESULTS**

- **Documentation of the availability of budget information on thematic issues gathered.** Responses to the questions posed by the campaign provided a wealth of information on maternal health, the environment, and foreign aid.
- **Documentation of processes for dealing with public information requests.** This includes the different kinds of responses to the requests, how long it took to respond, and which countries or groups of countries, performed better or worse in terms of openness.
  - Only one country—New Zealand—substantively answered all six requests by providing budget information that clearly answered the questions posed. Requests to the New Zealand government only had to be submitted once, and the responses were provided promptly and in a succinct and easy-to-understand format.
  - An additional 22 countries offered official answers to all six information requests but with varying degrees of comprehensiveness (e.g., India, South Africa, Germany, and Serbia).
  - In the majority of countries (46), government agencies answered some questions but failed to provide any answer to at least one of the questions posed.
  - In 11 countries, government agencies did not respond to any of the six information requests: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, East Timor, Iraq, Liberia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and Yemen. These included cases in which access to budget information was explicitly denied as well as requests that were simply ignored.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**

Developing functional protocols and procedures for countries to facilitate requests for budget information can increase access to budget information.

**REFERENCES**


Tools:
- Model Information Requests: http://www.access-info.org/documents/6QC/6QC_Sample_Requests.pdf
Parliaments are typically entrusted with ensuring that public funds are properly used and spent in the public interest, yet in many legislatures, budget research capacity is negligible or nonexistent. Oversight by parliaments and other accountability institutions can help guarantee that the decisions and actions of governments stay within the bounds of the law, thereby strengthening open and transparent democracies. A challenge to effective oversight is the lack of credible, timely, nonpartisan analysis that can be used by parliamentary committees to hold government officials accountable. A growing number of legislatures are exploring the idea of setting up independent nonpartisan parliamentary budget offices (PBO) to provide independent policy analysis on budget documents, fiscal policy, and financial implications of proposals in to assist parliaments in constructively engaging in the budget process. When made public, the nonpartisan analysis provided by PBOs can also benefit other demand-side actors, including civil society. In addition, the nonpartisan analysis has the potential to strengthen government reform proposals and the national budget by providing additional data points in the debate and verifying government assumptions made during policy formulation.

Collectively, PBOs and fiscal councils are considered independent fiscal institutions. PBOs are similar to fiscal councils in that they independently scrutinize fiscal policy but are distinct in that their principals are legislatures. The primary end user of their analyses are parliaments and civil society, and there is a greater emphasis on analyses relevant to parliamentary functions, such as contributing to the estimating process through economic and fiscal forecasting, budget analysis, and costing proposals and bills. The first such office was established in the State of California in 1941, three decades before the United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1974. While the CBO is the largest of its kind, such offices also exist in the Philippines, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Uganda, and South Korea. More recently Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, South Africa, Austria, Seychelles, and Australia have established PBOs and many other jurisdictions at the national and subnational level are considering doing the same. Fiscal councils exist in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, France, Sweden, and Finland.

The budget is a forecast of revenue and planned expenditures. A precondition to constructive participation by citizens and parliaments in the budget process is the availability of independent budgetary analysis of both budget estimates and appropriations. The World Bank Institute (WBI) enhances the capacity of PBOs globally as part of its broader open budgeting programming aimed at empowering parliaments to promote open budgeting processes through enhanced participation, transparency, and demand for accountability. PBO capacity is strengthened using a number of interrelated tools and strategies, including:

- The Global Network of Parliamentary Budget Offices (GN-PBO) is a global community of practice consisting of officers and staff of PBOs. It provides a platform for PBO practitioners to convene (virtually and face-to-face) to share experiences, identify best practices, and enhance technical capacities. The community members provide ongoing peer assistance on an ad hoc basis.
- Technical training opportunities are provided to PBO practitioners and parliamentary staff through face-to-face clinics training and online modules delivered through the e-Institute portal on a periodic basis.
- WBI collaborates closely with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and GN-PBO to design applied research processes aimed at capturing practice and experience. This informs good practice guidelines and pedagogic and training materials used for structured learning activities. In addition, WBI is collaborating with the Office of the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer in order to develop the content of the global e-PBO portal, an interactive virtual knowledge platform for parliamentary budget analysts.

RESULTS (ACHIEVED AND ANTICIPATED)

- Enhanced parliamentary capacity to engage in the budget process. By establishing and working with PBOs and parliamentary audit committees, WBI aims to enhance the capacity of parliaments to play constructive roles during the formulation of national budgets and to oversee the implementation of projects funded under national budgets.

(continued)
• **Strengthened ability of parliaments to use knowledge.** By delivering targeted training to members of parliaments and their staffs, including facilitating demand-driven action planning processes, WBI aims to strengthen their ability to use the data and technical knowledge that is at their disposal, and thereby bolster the effectiveness of specific oversight committees.

• **Preliminary evidence of uptake of PBOs in few countries.** There is a strong trend toward the establishment of PBOs in developing countries. The primary drivers for this institutional reform are parliaments seeking access to nonpartisan analysis to enhance their role as independent actors in national budget processes. Over 15 countries have implemented these reforms in the last 10 years. There is a growing trend for these institutions to be established in Africa and Asia, but parliaments in Latin America are also beginning to explore hybrid models.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS**

Although their experience is predominantly working with fiscal councils, the International Monetary Fund has been promoting the establishment of independent fiscal institutions, including PBOs, in client countries. The WBG has supported the establishment of these organizations as well. To best provide capacity support to emerging and nascent institutions, it is important for WBG operations to link local institutions with regional and international experience in order to overcome the inherent challenges of establishing a nonpartisan institution embedded in a political environment.

**REFERENCE**

A1.95. Giving a BOOST to Budget Analysis and Country Capacity for Budget Transparency

CONTEXT
Launched in 2010, the BOOST initiative is a World Bank-wide collaborative effort to facilitate access to budget data and to promote its effective use to improve decision-making processes, transparency, and accountability. Engagements with client on BOOST activities have been launched in approximately 40 countries. BOOST databases collect, compile, and present detailed information on public expenditures from national treasury systems in a simple, user-friendly format. BOOST is constructed to support budget analysis and decision making within the government, but it also has the potential to be a powerful tool for building open budgets by making budget data accessible to key users in a consistent and readily-understood framework. This provides a key asset for improving budget allocations toward priority areas and seeking efficiency savings in order to reduce budget deficits. BOOST also helps enhance accountability, regardless whether it is used by the executive in improving the quality and clarity of budget planning and preparation, by the legislature, or by civil society organizations more interested in holding the executive to account for budget performance and service delivery.

ACTIONS (2011–15)
- A typical database contains the approved and revised budgets as well as actual expenditure amounts broken down by government level (central or local); administrative unit (ministry, department, agency, university, hospital, or school); subnational spending unit (district, municipality, town, or village); economic classification (e.g., wages, goods and services, or capital expense); functional classification (sector and subsector); program classification (if program-based budgeting is being used); and financing source (e.g., budget revenue, aid, domestic, or foreign borrowing).
- Once constructed, BOOST provides a significant opportunity for government officials to have easier access to budget data and gives civil society the means to participate in monitoring public spending. To this end, web-based applications are developed, allowing citizens easy access to public data that supports advocacy efforts or participation in public budgeting.

RESULTS
- High-quality and disaggregated budget data made available to policymakers. BOOST provides policymakers with the information necessary to how well—or poorly—spending units and regions are performing with available resources. For example, BOOST was used to prompt debate on primary-education spending efficiency in Poland and Moldova with significant variations in outcome and spending patterns across municipalities. Results from BOOST served as the starting point for an analysis of the underlying causes of the outcomes.
- Support provided to annual budget cycle and public expenditure reviews. BOOST databases are being developed in countries where the client agrees to use the data actively to support the annual budget cycle, public expenditure analytics, or both. BOOST databases provide updated expenditure datasets that support a series of programmatic public expenditure reviews that are integrated into the short- and medium-term expenditure dialog.
- Expansion of BOOST program to all regions. By mid-2013, engagements with client countries had been launched in some 40 countries, with databases in about 20 countries delivered in support of Bank analytical work. The initial focus of the BOOST program has been on Europe and Central Asia as well as Latin America, while scale-up of BOOST activities in Africa and other regions are expected in the next couple of years. Once databases are delivered, if a government agrees, these may be posted on the government’s own public data portal, or on the Open Budget portal, which the Bank will be launching in October 2013. With a view to sustain BOOST databases, the World Bank intends to expand BOOST trainings to government officials and civil society, showcasing that superior policy advice can be generated when detailed data is placed in the hands of policy analysts.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT TEAMS
BOOST is an excellent tool to facilitate the provision of budget data in formats that can be used for analysis by a wide audience. It is a tool that both projects supporting Public Financial Management reform and projects that support civil society efforts to monitor expenditures should consider integrating to increase the transparency of budget data and help its dissemination.

REFERENCES
Country Examples and Websites:
World Bank’s BOOST Website:
ANNEX 2. ADDITIONAL BUDGET TRANSPARENCY AND MONITORING INITIATIVES UNDER IMPLEMENTATION UTILIZING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

In addition to projects currently under implementation, this list also includes projects that have ended but for which results were unclear because they were solely based on desk-based research. This type of project is denoted by an asterisk (*).

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<td>Kenya, National</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law and Justice</td>
<td>Budgeting for Land Reforms: Ensuring People's Participation</td>
<td>International Budget Partnership and Hakijamii</td>
<td>In June 2012, International Budget Partnership and Hakijamii produced a report on Kenya's land reform and budget allocations to provide information about civil society organizations (CSOs) working on land issues to relevant committees (department committee on lands and natural resources and the budget committee) in parliament during the fiscal 2012 budget process. This report contains analysis of the budget for fiscal 2012–13 and the medium-term expenditure framework to ascertain whether the government has set aside or is planning to set aside the requisite funds to implement land reforms as envisaged by the Kenyan constitution. They have also provided recommendations for parliament and the executive branch.</td>
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| 2       | Mali, Provincial    | Health | Monitoring the Allocation and Use of Debt Relief Funds for Health | Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement—Mali | As a continuation of its work on monitoring the allocation and use of debt relief funds for health, Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement—Mali is the process of:  
  • Undertaking an exhaustive study on the impact of the budget on the Koulikoro region's midwife workforce in order to understand the relationships between current budget allocations and the distribution of midwives, the condition of health infrastructure, and health personnel training. Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement—Mali will broadly disseminate the findings of the study among its partners, the government, donors, and members of parliament.  
  • Building the capacity of local monitoring committees to engage in budget analysis and advocacy through a series of workshops with the national and regional staff of Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement—Mali, the Independent Budget Partnership and its advocacy partners.  
  • Planning to lead a broad advocacy campaign to allocate greater resources to the Koulikoro region. |

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| 3       | Mozambique          | Local  | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Centro de Integridade Pública. The Center for Public Integrity | As a follow up to the results of its earlier efforts to implement a local government monitoring project in six districts and uncovering the disconnect between the stated goals of district development plans and the actual budget of local governments, the Center for Public Integrity is in the process of:  
• Renewing and expanding its local government monitoring program. It will work in 30 districts in 9 provinces across Mozambique, training citizens to conduct expenditure tracking at the community level. It will compile and analyze data collected by the community monitors, comparing it to national- and local-level development plans. This method of analysis seeks to create linkages between budget processes at the national, provincial, and district level by tracking the flow of resources at all levels of government and then auditing their execution. |
| 4       | Madagascar          | National, Provincial | Public Administration, Law and Justice | The World Bank and the Government of Madagascar | The objective of this Public Management Capacity Building Project was to support the Ministry of Finance and Budget and the Ministry of Economy and Planning, which were charged with budget preparation, implementation, and monitoring. To date this project has:  
• Helped implement budget reforms at the central and regional levels through the Ministry of Finance and Budget. These reforms provide an accurate picture of how resources were actually spent and included ways to achieve better budget formulation and improved expenditure controls.  
• Supported the efforts of the Ministry of Economy and Planning’s Directorate for Public Investment to improve sectoral policy design, expenditure management, and implementation of the public investment and public expenditure programs; the public expenditure programs were designed to ensure consistency between sector strategies and multiyear consolidated public expenditure programs. | (continued) |
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| Nigeria         | Provincial          | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Monitoring Public Expenditure and Dissemination of Fiscal Information to Strengthen Economic Governance | The World Bank and the Government of Nigeria | The Economic Management and Capacity Building (EMCAP) project includes the following activities:  
  - The project works to improve and monitor public expenditures by strengthening the prioritization, allocation, and monitoring of public expenditures. Technical assistance to the national planning commission and the budget office formed the basis for an annual public expenditure review exercise, which will be tied to the budget cycle within the context of a rolling three-year public investment program and a medium-term expenditure framework.  
  - The technical assistance supports oversight institutions to promote transparency and accountability in the public sector, including the dissemination of data on fiscal operations. It provided assistance in the areas of accounting, internal and external auditing, and budget monitoring activities of the national assembly.  
  - The technical assistance will review procurement practices at the federal and state level (including some government-sponsored enterprises) as well as financial accountability systems (i.e., the state of accounting and audit practices). |
| Uganda          | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Building the Demand Side of Budget Accountability by Mobilizing Citizens | Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment | Through its Citizens Budget Tracking and Information Centre, Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment is working to build the demand side of budget accountability so that citizens are mobilized around budget issues with access to appropriate information and analyses on government revenues and resource allocation and utilization. The principal activities of Citizens Budget Tracking and Information Centre include:  
  - Producing budget information and assisting other CSOs in conducting budget tracking and generating information about their communities and sectors.  
  - Conducting sectoral Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys and Quantitative Service Delivery Studies in health, education, the environment, roads, and agriculture.  
  - Working with mass membership organizations (e.g., businesses and farmers), other CSOs, the media, and information and communications technology professionals to increase awareness of budget information in Uganda. |
| Zimbabwe*       | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Institutional Strengthening of Parliament | Center for International Development; State University of New York | Implemented between 1999 and 2008, this project aimed to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Zimbabwean parliament. Its activities included:  
  - Provision of technical assistance in analyzing the budget to the various portfolio committees.  
  - Dissemination of budget information to members of parliament through workshops, special sessions in committees, and face-to-face sessions.  
  - Conduct research on the adequacy of the budget and provide recommendations to members of parliament about how to prioritize activities within ministries, given the limited resources available. |
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| 8 Cambodia | National | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Raising Awareness of Budget Issues | NGO Forum | The NGO Forum’s Development Issues Program launched the National Budget Project in late 2006. Its activities are comprised of the following:  
- It has established a website to gather, consolidate, and disseminate all publicly-available budget information that had been scattered across different libraries, ministries, and websites of government institutions involved in the budgeting process.  
- It is coordinating a media strategy to raise awareness about budgeting issues. For instance, it organized several radio talk shows in 2010 to discuss agricultural financing and services. |
| 9 Philippines | National | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Citizen Participatory Audit Project | Philippines Commission on Audit, Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific and the Australian Agency for International Development | The project aims to increase transparency, accountability, and citizen participation in the audit process by working with individual citizens, CSOs, the private sector, and the media to conduct value-for-money or performance audits of selected government programs. |
| 10 Philippines | International | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Collaborating with North/South Networks to Reform Aid Policies and Practices | The Reality of Aid | The Reality of Aid Network is the only major North-South international nongovernmental initiative focusing exclusively on analysis and lobbying for poverty eradication policies and practices in the international aid regime. Its activities are comprised of:  
- Publishing the biennial “Reality of Aid” thematic report, “Reality of Aid” regional reports, and the Reality Check newsletter.  
- Facilitating the country level implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action through CSO capacity building, multistakeholder dialogue, and promotion of good practices.  
- Commissioning case studies and research initiatives to document CSO involvement in aid policy reforms. |
| **EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA** | | | | | |
| 11 Azerbaijan | National | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Monitoring Public Finances | The National Budget Group’s Public Finance Monitoring Center | Established in 2003, the Public Finance Monitoring Center engages in the following activities:  
- Monitoring of oil revenues and financial activities of state-run enterprises.  
- Issuing quarterly information on the national budget.  
- Organizing policy roundtables and dialogues. |
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| Croatia*         | Local               | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Measuring Budget Transparency and Openness of Budget Processes at the Local Level | Institute of Public Finance                          | In 2010, in order to assess and measure different aspects of subnational budget transparency in Croatia, the Institute of Public Finance examined the budget processes and systems of the 33 largest cities in the country.  
  • It developed the Croatian Open Local Budget Index by adapting the Independent Budget Partnership Open Budget Index to the local context. This measured the quantity and quality of publicly-available local budget information and the extent to which local budget processes are open to the public.  
  • The project’s findings were released in June 2011 and an award was presented to the mayor of the city with the highest combined Croatian Open Local Budget Index score. The study also received widespread media coverage in local and national newspapers, on radio programs, and on online news sources. |
| Romania          | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Strengthening Public Financial Management To Strengthen Budgets in Post-Financial Crisis Phase | The World Bank and Government of Romania            | In addition to other sectors, the World Bank’s Romania Development Loan (DPL) aimed to support the government’s reforms in cross-sector Public Financial Management (PFM) and PFM in the health and education sectors.  
  • The DPL supported fiscal consolidation through better management of the budget, and its actions anchored the budget within the medium-term expenditure framework, set binding constraints on the composition of expenditures, limited deviations from the parliament-approved budget, and set in motion multiyear management of investments. It also enhanced skills and competencies in public administration through a more transparent and fair unitary pay system.  
  • The DPL supported PFM reform in the education sector. Through the DPL, the government introduced per-student financing, which will offer incentives to local governments managing pre-university education toward school and staff rationalization and consolidation, and it will allow a reallocation of resources to priority programs to enhance the quality of education. |

**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

| Dominican Republic* | National | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Working with the Ministry of Finance and Supreme Audit Institution to Improve Budget Transparency | Independent Budget Partnership | In 2011, Independent Budget Partnership’s Mentoring Government Program undertook the following activities:  
  • It mentored the Ministry of Finance in designing the Fiscal Transparency Portal and organizing a consultation process with potential users in order to improve its content, format, and accessibility.  
  • Produced and disseminated a draft of the citizen version of the 2010 audit report to public officials in collaboration with the Cámara de Cuentas.  
  • Organized a Social Audit workshop in collaboration with the Cámara de Cuentas to train public servants, members of CSOs, and members of the media on different issues regarding social audits.  
  • Shared a proposal with the government and CSO partners to conduct a social audit pilot in collaboration with CSOs and Cámara de Cuentas. |
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| Ecuador | National            | Health                          | Helping to Eliminate Health Service User-Fees in El Salvador | Fundación Maquilishuatl                    | • As a follow-up to its monitoring of El Salvador’s healthcare program, Fundación Maquilishuatl will continue to monitor the healthcare system through policy analysis and social audits to ensure that these reforms become a reality—not only on paper but also in practice.  
• Fundación Maquilishuatl is in the process of incorporating new budget analysis and expenditure-tracking techniques into their existing community-level health policy monitoring programs and will advocate for reforms that will regulate prescription drug prices in the public sector. Such reforms would help control high out-of-pocket healthcare expenses and would ensure that all Salvadorans have continued access to healthcare, regardless of income. |
| El Salvador | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Helping to Make El Salvador More Transparent | National Foundation for Development       | • The National Foundation for Development is currently working with the administrators of the FISDL (Social Investment Fund for Local Development) program to strengthen the capacity of local councils to monitor contracts, the execution of projects, and the disbursement of conditional cash transfers in their districts; it also facilitate the flow of information between the councils and policymakers at the national level.  
• The National Foundation for Development is piloting technical training and capacity-building exercises with councils in six highly marginalized municipalities. These activities will be scaled up to include additional districts, and the National Foundation for Development will implement its subnational plans in the context of a broader national-level strategy to promote citizen engagement with and oversight of government institutions. |
| Honduras* | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Working with Government and Civil Society to Produce Citizens Budgets | Independent Budget Partnership          | • In 2011, Independent Budget Partnership’s Mentoring Government Program prepared a first draft of the Citizens Budget that was shared with public officials of the ministries of the presidency and finance for comments. The Ministry of Finance used this draft to produce two versions of the Citizens Budget (a Word document and a PowerPoint presentation) that were published on its website.  
• The program organized a two-day consultation workshop to provide technical assistance to CSOs and the media on preparing the Citizens Budget for 2012.  
• The program organized a high level workshop on budget transparency to communicate the importance of budget transparency, access to information, and public participation from an international perspective; introduce the Open Budget Index methodology and review the results of Honduras’s 2010 Open Budget Index score; review the contents and main features of a Citizens Budget; and introduce the methodology of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment. |
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| Nicaragua* | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Nicaraguan Legislative Strengthening Project | Center for International Development, State University of New York                      | Between 1997 and 2000, the Center for International Development, State University of New York sought to enhance the capacity of the Nicaraguan National Assembly (NNA) to enact legislation, provide oversight of the national budget, and build mutually-accepted channels for citizen input into national legislation and debate. Program activities included the following:  
  • Technical assistance was provided to the budget analysis office and the local government affairs committee.  
  • The Center for International Development, State University of New York upgraded the infrastructure used by the NNA with the installation of new electrical and fiber-optic cabling for its computer system. Deputies and staff were trained in the use of computer applications and software. A new, state of the art computer network was provided for the NNA. Staff members were trained in the use of the new legislative information system.  
  • An upgraded website was developed that received 35,000 visitors in the first six months of its operation. |
| Paraguay   | Local               | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Working with Neighborhood Associations to Monitor “Special Project” Funds | Federación de Entidades Vecinalistas del Paraguay                                           | A national nongovernmental organization (NGO), one of Federación de Entidades Vecinalistas del Paraguay’s key activities is monitoring the Special Projects Fund that supports the building of community infrastructure and generates employment using the money that it receives from the real estate tax (currently about 10 percent). Its activities include:  
  • Training members from neighborhood associations on their legal rights under municipal law on the city’s special project fund and on topics such as information access, project development, accountability, transparency, and effective mechanisms that promote effective citizen oversight.  
  • Working with Radio Viva 90.1 FM to produce short radio spots in Spanish and Guarani that explain how the special project fund works.  
  • Establishing a special project fund information and complaint hotline for the public to get more information about the fund or to lodge complaints.  
  • Establishing a committee that included representatives from neighborhood associations, Asociación Trinidad, Federación de Entidades Vecinalistas del Paraguay and the Municipality of Asuncion to monitor the efficiency and transparency with which the fund is implemented by the municipality and the neighborhood commissions. |
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<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Implementing Organization</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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| Peru*       | Provincial          | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Measuring Subnational Budget Transparency, Participation, and Accountability | Grupo Presupuesta Ciudadana                      | Since 2003, Grupo Presupuesta Ciudadana has been engaged in monitoring the fiscal decentralization process. As part of this work, Grupo Presupuesta Ciudadana and some of its partner organizations undertook activities to monitor and evaluate regional budget transparency and accountability mechanisms. Their activities included:  
• Preparing a research study that involved an evaluation of regional transparency portals provided between 2007 and 2009 by all of Peru’s regional governments as well as a detailed assessment of the budget management practices and processes of three regional governments through case studies.  
• Organizing a number of public events to share the results of the study and disseminating the information through newspapers, radio programs, and online news sources at both the regional and national level. |
| Uruguay     | Local               | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Mobilizing Rural Community Members to Engage in the Participatory Budgeting Process | Agencia de Desarrollo Productivo Consejo Económico Social | This project aims to strengthen farmers’ participation through the development and strengthening of community councils “mesas zonales” to increase transparency and participation of rural community members in the participatory budgeting process. It is the process of implementing the following activities:  
• Providing training and technical assistance to mesa zonales to strengthen them and to help them understand their rights and solicit funds from the local government for projects prioritized and development by the community.  
• Mobilizing rural community members to meet, plan, and negotiate solutions to address community issues through the establishment of mesas zonales.  
• Assisting mesas zonales to manage subgrant funds to support activities that they have identified to address health, education, infrastructure maintenance, and other needs.  
• Facilitating the replication of this model to engage citizens at various stages of budget implementation in other parts of Uruguay. |
| Egypt       | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Budget Monitoring and Advocacy Initiative | The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights | Initiated in January 2013, the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights Budget Monitoring and Advocacy initiative seeks to advance public access of budget information in Egypt and call for an accountable and transparent budget system. It will be comprised of the following:  
• Publication of simplified handbooks focused on specific budget topics.  
• Publication of research papers on health budget allocations and other topics.  
• Organization of an “Egypt Group for Budget Monitoring.”  
• Organization of an “Arab Network Group for Budget Monitoring.” |
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Level of Government</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Implementing Organization</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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</table>
| Egypt and Tunisia | National           | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Working to create a national multistakeholder platform for access to information and budget transparency                                  | Independent Budget Partnership                      | The Independent Budget Partnership’s work in Egypt and Tunisia seeks to create a national multistakeholder platform for access to information and budget transparency. This network would potentially include high-level officials of the Ministry of Finance as well as CSOs.  
  • In 2011, Independent Budget Partnership, with the Ministry of Finance, organized a two-day workshop on budget transparency and the Open Budget Index methodology. |
| Jordan        | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Enhancing Opportunities for Public Participation in the Budget Process                                                                 | Partners Jordan                                     | Begun in November 2012, this project aims to enhance opportunities for public participation in the budgeting process and to improve public access to timely and accurate information in municipal budgets and expenditures in six municipalities. Its activities consist of:  
  • Organizing three awareness-raising trainings to introduce participatory approaches in preparing municipal budgets.  
  • Preparing needs assessments and priority rankings in conjunction with municipality members.  
  • Organizing consultation meetings with municipal officials to incorporate community priorities into the 2014 budget.  
  • Organizing a conference on lessons learned that involves all stakeholders engaged in the project. It will focus on evaluating the project, highlighting successes and best practices, and identifying difficulties and resolution strategies. |
| Lebanon       | National            | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Using Budgets to Promote the Interests of Minority Groups                                                                                   | Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union                 | Founded in 1981, the Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union designs its intervention with civil society participation and transparency in mind, aiming for budgets that are inclusive of the interests of minority groups in Lebanon. Its activities include:  
  • Empowering potential partners to become capable and knowledgeable of budget-related issues and processes in order to influence the budget process.  
  • Collaborating with stakeholders in the Ministry of Finance, local and international economic and financial experts, and development agencies and networking to learn from relevant best practices that have been undertaken in other countries.  
  • Collecting data about the budget process and exploring the relevant political economic circumstances surrounding this process.  
  • Exploring possible entry points for intervening in the process of each annual budget.  
  • Organizing national awareness campaigns to introduce the perspective of the project and to promote the concept of transparency, inclusion, and diversity at the budgetary level within the Lebanese society. (continued) |
## Annex 2. Additional Budget Transparency and Monitoring Initiatives under Implementation Utilizing Social Accountability Mechanisms

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OTHERS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>National, Local Public Administration, Law and Justice</td>
<td>Alternative Green Budgets</td>
<td>Green Budget Coalition</td>
<td>The Green Budget Coalition is comprised of 21 of Canada's leading environmental and conservation organizations and, since 1999, has made annual budget recommendations regarding ecological fiscal reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTH ASIA</strong></td>
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</table>
| 27       | Afghanistan         | Provincial Public Administration, Law and Justice | Integrity Watch Afghanistan Pilot Budget Tracking Program | Integrity Watch Afghanistan                      | Launched as a pilot in 2011, this program aims to train local monitors in basic budget literacy and then support them to track the implementation of the set budgets in the health and education sectors at the local level. Its ongoing activities include the following:  
  • Selecting districts and developing a budget literacy training material.  
  • Mobilizing communities and conducting budget literacy trainings.  
  • Facilitating community-based budget monitoring activities.  
  • Gathering feedback on this process through personal testimonies and learning workshops.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 28       | Afghanistan*        | National Public Administration, Law and Justice | Working with Parliaments to Improve Budget Oversight | Center for International Development. State University of New York | Beginning in 2010, the Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program project aimed to strengthen the budget oversight capacity of Afghanistan's legislature. Its activities included the following:  
  • Assisting all 29 legislative committees with law drafting, bill reviews, and the exercise of their oversight functions.  
  • Providing in-depth analysis of the executive budget and expenditures.  
  • Providing assistance to the Department of Information and Public Relations and developing outreach to citizens, CSOs, and the international community. This team also publishes the APAP Newsletter, a valuable English language resource.  
  • Assisting parliament in improving rules of procedure, staffing and human resource structures, and support services.  
  • Providing training to ministers of parliament and staff on the skills necessary for the efficient operation of all legislatures.                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 29       | India               | National, Local Public Administration, Law, and Justice; Education | PAISA: Planning, Allocations and Expenditures, Institutions: Studies in Accountability | Accountability Initiative                         | PAISA is Accountability Initiative's flagship project that works to develop innovative models to track social sector programs by developing practical, scalable, people-friendly tools and using them to collect data on fund flows, expenditures, and implementation processes. PAISA's key activities include:  
  • The production of annual district-level and national-level reports on fund flows and program implementation.  
  • The capacity-building program involved a year-long course offered to individuals selected from PAISA states to assist in the design and implementation of PAISA and PAISA-like efforts.  
  • PAISA aims to disseminate data collected in an easy-to-use, accessible format at the district, block, and village level.                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Level of Government</th>
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<th>Activities</th>
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</table>
| Nepal   | National, Provincial, Local | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Using Public Financial Management to Improve Social Accountability | The World Bank | The Program for Accountability in Nepal supports social accountability activities in three focal areas: (1) Public Financial Management; (2) municipal governance; and (3) public service delivery. Its activities include:  
   - **Public financial management**  
     - Conducting independent budget analysis (by CSOs, think tanks, research institutes, and the like)  
     - Demystifying and disseminating budget information and raising levels of public awareness and budget literacy.  
     - Facilitating participatory expenditure tracking.  
   - **Municipal governance**  
     - Forming civic unions to interface with municipal authorities and establishing social contracts between municipal authorities and citizens.  
     - Creating mechanisms for regular dialogue between citizens and municipal governments and for enhanced municipal transparency and downward accountability.  
     - Promoting participatory municipal planning and budgeting.  
   - **Public services**  
     - Promoting community management and the use of community scorecards as well as other participatory monitoring and evaluation methods to monitor services.  
     - Encouraging the public posting of entitlements and fees by service providers.  
     - Promoting the use of citizen charters and social audits.  
     - Introducing effective mechanisms for complaints. |
| Nepal   | Local               | Water and Sanitation             | Using Budget Tracking to Improve Governance in the Water and Sanitation Sectors | Federation of Drinking Water and Sanitation Users | Since April 2005, FEDWASUN coordinating with WaterAid Nepal has been implementing the Citizens’ Action Program in several districts to improve water and sanitation governance through citizen action and budget tracking. Its key activities include:  
   - Organizing status reviews of the water and sanitation situation through orientation trainings for district branch members on the legal aspects of water and sanitation governance.  
   - Conducting a budget analysis and monitoring of allocations for water and sanitation.  
   - Providing assistance to communities for participatory analysis and prioritization of governance issues on water and sanitation.  
   - Presenting user experiences to district-level service providers through interactive workshops.  
   - Preparing participatory action plans with representatives of water and sanitation user committees and service providers.  
   - Implementing and monitoring participatory action plans in close coordination with FEDWASUN district branches. |

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<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MULTI-COUNTRY</td>
<td>Global Multi-Country</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law and Justice</td>
<td>E-Learning Courses on Social Accountability Tools</td>
<td>World Bank Institute and Affiliated Network for Social Accountability, SAR and AFR</td>
<td>World Bank Institute's e-learning course on social accountability tools focuses on the “how-to” of social accountability by introducing to civil society practitioners some of the most commonly used tools. The course is organized into four modules that present the key concepts and provide opportunities to apply and discuss the social accountability tools, including Budget Work, Participatory Budgeting, Participatory Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, and Performance Monitoring.</td>
</tr>
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| 33 Global Multi-Country | Public Administration, Law and Justice | Media Program | World Bank Institute | World Bank Institute's media program is forging coalitions of media practitioners around priority areas identified by the journalists themselves, including Public Financial Management and procurement. It works with partners and media practitioners to:  
  • Facilitate both South-South and North-South knowledge exchanges by serving as a space for experts and practitioners to share investigative journalism practices and strategies.  
  • Connects media practitioners with expertise from local and global centers of excellence to work on challenges facing media sectors around Africa and the Middle East.  
  • Run “just in time” journalism training courses on PFM and economic journalism for a core group of North and South Sudanese journalists at the request of the World Bank’s Sudan office. |

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Prior Action/Benchmark</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Burundi</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Economic Reform Support Grant</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Adoption of an emergency action plan to improve competition and transparency in public procurement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Central African Republic</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>CF-Development Policy Operation DPO FY07</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Ministerial order by the minister in charge of mines compelling the publication on the government’s website of: (1) a summary of all mining agreements containing the key clauses (including financial and tax-related terms and conditions, duration, and amounts received as signature bonuses and equity shares); and (2) documents evidencing the transfer of the amounts received (as bonuses or equity shares) in the public accounts as well as an indication of how the funds were used. For agreements already signed, effective publication of this information is an integral part of the prior action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Central African Republic</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Economic Management and Governance Reform Grant</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>In order to strengthen its treasury operations, accounting, and reporting systems, the government has adopted, by decision (arrêté) no. 515/MFB/DIR-CAB/DGTCP.08 of April 2, 2008, a new chart of public accounts finalized after extensive consultations and workshops with stakeholders, including civil society, donors, and government officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Chad</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Institutional Reform Support Credit</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Completion and publication of an audit for the 2002 procurement contracts and system; continued publication of the quarterly procurement bulletin and monthly publication of the report on the execution of the budget distinguishing between commitment, order to pay, and payment by ministry. Publication and wide dissemination of the government’s 2003 Budget law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Congo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Credit</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Internet publication of information on management of oil resources, including the audit report on the SNPC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Ghana</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>GH-EGPRC (fast-track)</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Commencement of regular publication of comprehensive and detailed quarterly fiscal outturns with no more than one quarter lag in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 49 of the Letter of Development Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Ghana</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>PRSC III</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Improvement of monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E) capacity by increasing resources available for it and the implementation of participatory M&amp;E activities, such as expenditure tracking surveys and Citizen Report Cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Guinea</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>SAC IV</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Implementation of a public information campaign to disseminate data on budgetary allocations for schools and primary health care centers in its fiscal 2001 Budget Law, beginning with the publication of relevant data relating to the capital city of Conakry and the administrative region of Kindia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Kenya</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Economic &amp; Public Sector Reform</td>
<td>Prior Action for Future Tranche</td>
<td>Submission of a progress report on the implementation of the plan to enhance fiduciary transparency involving public resources and improve the quality and timeliness of audit reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Rwanda</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>PRSG VI</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Submission, to the ministry of finance and economic planning by at least 80 percent of the agencies involved in procurement, of a procurement plan consistent with their allocated budget, and publication by the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority of at least 60 percent of such plans on its website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Senegal</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>SN-DPO fast-track</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Publication on the website of the ministry of finance of monthly budget execution reports from SIGFIP, including the January, February, and March monthly reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Senegal</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>PRSC II</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Conducting participatory semiannual monitoring exercises of budget and performance at all levels of the health system and publishing their results.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>DPG-1</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Fortification of decentralized procurement by strengthening the 1995 procurement subdecree and the 1998 implementing regulations to promote economy, efficiency, and transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Governance Promotion Adjustment Loan</td>
<td>Prior Action for Future Tranche</td>
<td>Publication by DFT of budget reconciliations and projections according to a schedule agreed with the Bank, and the completion of additional measures to improve fiscal transparency and accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>PH-Development Policy Loan - DPL I</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Continuing implementation of procurement reforms including sustained joint inspection/monitoring with civil society of medicine and textbook procurement and school building construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>VIETNAM - POVERTY REDUC. SUPPORT CREDIT</td>
<td>Prior Action for Future Tranche</td>
<td>Improved transparency and reliability of national budgetary information by designating the borrower’s state treasury as the agency responsible for a comprehensive management information system for government expenditures and by publishing sectoral breakdowns of at least 75 percent of total government spending.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>SAC 2</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Adoption of a governance and management framework for the oil fund, that provides for professional fund management under appropriate oversight, includes prudential investment rules and guidelines for desired risk-return combinations, and requires publication of the audited annual accounts and the 2002 Oil Fund budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>SAC 2</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Appointment of oil fund supervisory board with appropriate representation of parliament nominated by parliament itself and of civil society. Proposed oil fund expenditures are subject to review and endorsement of the supervisory board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Economic Management SAC</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Preparation of a framework law on fiscal responsibilities by the state ministry of finance and treasury that defines fiscal management principles across levels of government in order to ensure fiduciary accountability and transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Implementation of a program under which the government: (1) issues a resolution to require the official publication of the quarterly financial accounts (balance sheet and profit-and-loss statements) of the ten public enterprises as well as three government agencies prepared according to International Accounting Standards; (2) officially publishes the accounts of these ten public enterprises as well as three government agencies of QI 2001, which are to be published before the end of Q2 2001; (3) ensures that all government purchases from these enterprises are paid for through cash mechanisms; and (4) officially publishes a quarterly report on its payables to and receivables from these ten enterprises (the first quarterly report to be published shall be for the payables and receivables for QI 2001, which is to be published before the end of Q2 2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>PRSC I</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Report on procurement procedures and performance published on website of State Procurement Agency (SPA), including indicators of procurement efficiency and transparency and modalities for monitoring progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia, Fed</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>SAC (MONTENEGRO)</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>The ministry of finance has prepared a “Citizen’s Guide to the Budget.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>EC Fiscal Consolidation and Equitable Growth</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>MEF has completed a transparency plan with three components: (1) a SIGEF-based system to produce monthly, timely, and reliable reports on executed expenditures beginning in mid-2003 and consolidated NFPS financial statements through the government’s website (portal) beginning in 2004; (2) an e-government system to develop public procurement; and (3) a public investment system that allows monitoring and evaluation of public investments.</td>
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<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Prior Action/Benchmark</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Second Fiscal Consolidation and Competitive Growth SAL</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>MEF has implemented the transparency plan satisfactorily. Outcomes include: (1) a MEF website; (2) posting of disaggregated monthly central government expenditures and subnational accounts; (3) posting of the external audits of 2002 fiscal accounts on the comptroller’s website; and (4) publication of tax and expenditure earmarks, oil subsidies, and off-budget activities in the 2005 budget law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>EC Fiscal Consolidation and Equitable Growth</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>MEF has started implementing the Fiscal Transparency, Stability, and Responsibility Law (FTSRL) with the issuance of the Reglamento (Executive Decree No. 121) containing the norms for the following key components of the law: (1) multiannual budgeting; (2) quantitative benchmarking of fiscal management; (3) public debt reduction plan; (4) investment by public enterprises; (5) management of the oil stabilization fund; and (5) fiscal transparency and citizen control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>SV Public Finance and Social Sector DPL</td>
<td>Prior Action for Future Tranche</td>
<td>The borrower has issued regulations to enable and promote public access to fiscal information redesigned and launched an effective fiscal transparency portal, including user-friendly applications to access information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>SV Public Finance and Social Sector DPL</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>The borrower has increased the transparency and efficiency of its public procurement system by implementing the public procurement dissemination module MODDIV of COMPRASAL in at least 172 governmental agencies and municipalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Broad Based Growth DPL</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Integrated financial management system (SIAF) operational in 43 central government entities, including congress, 20 decentralized agencies, and 46 municipalities; and fiscal transparency portal launched to enhance public access to budget data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>GT Fiscal and Institutional DPL I</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Under the borrower’s national transparency and anticorruption agenda, the following actions have been implemented: (1) creation of the Vice Ministry for Fiscal Transparency and Evaluation at the ministry of finance (with responsibility for improving public access to information, enhancing the regulatory framework for financial and fiscal transparency, and strengthening budgetary institutional capacity); and (b) incorporation of mechanisms to enhance the control and transparency of regular monthly financial reporting of public trust funds in the 2009 budget submitted to congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Public Management Operation</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Improvement in the monitoring and evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy activities as evidenced by the issuing of the first semiannual publication of executed current and capital public expenditures by sector and priority poverty-related programs; publication of a summary of the 2002 census; launching of household income and expenditure survey; and completion of the mapping of access to basic services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Economic Governance Reform Operation II</td>
<td>Prior Action for Future Tranche</td>
<td>Regular publishing of summaries of civil society organizations’ quarterly monitoring reports on the MEF website, through circulation to the media by transmitting to parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Economic Governance Reform Operation II</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Establishment of adequate mechanism for monthly monitoring of government resources allocated to the electricity sector as evidenced by the publication on the MEF website of reports presenting at least three months of data reflecting government spending on fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Nicaragua PRSC I</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Approval by presidency of regulations to the municipal law establishing a methodology for participatory municipal investment planning satisfactory to IDA and KfW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>NI PRSC II</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Presidency has approved regulations to the Municipal Law establishing a methodology for participatory municipal investment planning, satisfactory to IDA and KfW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>PE-Programmatic Social Reform Loan II</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Policy guide issued for the implementation of an electronic government procurement system to raise transparency and efficiency in public contracting (Supreme Decree No. 031-2002-PCM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>REACT DPL</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Following a consultation with civil society, the 2007 budget law has specified 11 priority areas for improving the quality of social sector expenditure through results-based management, and requires the establishment of physical goals for each of these priority areas at the national, regional, and local level. The 2007 budget law includes a pilot on participatory monitoring of expenditures of subnational governments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<td>MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Financial Sector DPL</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Agreement action plan for enhancing transparency and compliance with accepted standards for management of public funds including the budget process; control over revenues; consolidated government budget and accounts; cash management; and internal auditing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTH ASIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Afghanistan Strengthening Institutions DPG</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>The recipient has issued a presidential decree approving an amendment to the procurement law providing for, inter alia, the reinstatement of transparency in the procurement process with respect to low-value procurement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>DSC-IV</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Enhancement of effectiveness and transparency of public procurement by establishing a complaints mechanism for procurement, including independent review panels that meet standards stipulated in the procurement regulations; and publishing quarterly procurement management information systems results on CPTU's website on a pilot basis, with performance indicators for key implementing agencies in the infrastructure and power sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>KARN SAL I</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Karnataka has completed the first phase of its public financial accountability and management improvement program satisfactory to the association, consisting of the establishment of a controller's office and task force to lead the program, the posting of monthly financial accounts on the Internet, and commencement of treasury computerization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>KARN SAL I</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Karnataka has enacted the Karnataka Transparency in Procurement Act 1999, which requires all government departments to follow more transparent procurement practices and the Karnataka Right to Information Act 2000, aimed at making government documents more accessible to the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>AP SAL II</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Initiation with a firm timetable of the second (revised) procurement review and action plan. Initiation of recommended measures, including inter alia: strengthening of transparency in the bidding process, publishing of large tenders on the Internet, improving the system for handling complaints, and increasing government's value for money in state procurement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Orissa Socio-Economic DPL 2</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>Beginning of implementation of action plan to strengthen financial accountability, including enhanced level of disclosure of financial information in budget documents and updated month-end accounts of rural local bodies posted on the government's website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Sindh Structural Adjustment Credit</td>
<td>Prior Action</td>
<td>The Government of Sindh has increased accountability, access, and quality of education through the expansion of the role of the school management committees chaired by parents/citizens community board members to monitor teacher performance and school budget implementation; redeploying and recruiting teachers to make viable schools functional; and setting up the monitoring and evaluation cell of the Department of Education and initiated the monitoring of schools.</td>
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</tbody>
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