100507 AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPMENT UPDATE October 2015 Disclaimer: This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries Copyright Statement: The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. 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A focus topic, with a more in-depth analysis, is included in each publication. While lack of high-frequency data in the country make detailed analysis somewhat difficult, efforts are made to use reliable sources of data as comprehensively as possible. The Afghanistan Development Update is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, the donor community, the private sector, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Afghanistan’s economy. This report was prepared by Omar Joya, Claudia Nassif, Aman Farahi (all GMFDR) and Silvia Redaelli (Senior Economist, GPVDR). Useful inputs were received from Deepak K. Mishra and the wider country team. This report was prepared under the overall guidance of Shubham Chaudhuri (Practice Manager, GMFDR) and Robert Saum (Country Director). The authors also gratefully acknowledge the cooperation and suggestions received from the Afghan authorities and the International Monetary Fund staff. Table of contents PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ I A. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................... 1 1. Background ................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Real Sector Activity ....................................................................................................................... 1 3. Fiscal developments ...................................................................................................................... 5 4. External sector .............................................................................................................................. 7 5. Monetary and financial sector developments ............................................................................... 9 B. OUTLOOK AND MEDIUM-TERM PROSPECTS ......................................................... 11 C. FOCUS SECTION: POVERTY ......................................................................................... 16 Lessons learned................................................................................................................................18 APPENDIX: WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN .......................... 20 LIST OF BOXES Box 1: The National Unity Government has launched a number of ambitious reforms .....................................14 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Growing insecurity poses risks to growth and investment .............................................................................................. 1 Figure 2: GDP growth slowed in 2014, with lower growth across all sectors .............................................................................. 2 Figure 3: Cereals production has been at record levels over the past three years ........................................................................ 2 Figure 4: Use of Internet services has increased, while service prices have dropped .................................................................. 3 Figure 5: Investor confidence remains subdued as proxied by the number of new firm registrations .................................... 3 Figure 6: Opium production and the area under poppy cultivation declined in 2015 ................................................................. 4 Figure 7: Poverty has remained persistent, while inequality increased between 2007/08 and 2011/12 .................................. 4 Figure 8: Consumer prices are declining, but less steeply than global commodity prices ........................................................... 5 Figure 9: Revenues in the first eight months of 2015 were higher than in the same period last year, but were lower than the initial targets........................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 Figure 10: Expenditures and financing in first half of 2015 ............................................................................................................. 7 Figure 11: While exports increased in the recent past, they declined in the first half of 2015 ................................................... 7 Figure 12: Official imports increased in first half of 2015, likely due to improved recording ................................................... 8 Figure 13: The large projected trade deficit for 2015 is offset by foreign aid ............................................................................... 8 Figure 14: The Afghani depreciated in the first eight months of 2015, with no further accumulation in foreign exchange reserves ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Figure 15: Bank lending to the private sector is declining, and slowing economic activity has weakened money demand 10 Figure 16: The fiscal deficit is projected to increase in the medium term ................................................................................... 12 Figure 17: Poverty headcount and mean per capita expenditure and poverty headcount by region ...................................... 16 Figure 18: Trends in selected human development outcomes ....................................................................................................... 18 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Medium-term macroeconomic framework, 2015–18 .............................................................................. 11 Appendix Table 1: Selected economic indicators ............................................................................................... 22 Appendix Table 2: Selected fiscal indicators ...................................................................................................... 23 Appendix Table 3: Selected fiscal indicators ...................................................................................................... 24 Afghanistan Development Update Executive summary More frequent incidences of violence in Afghanistan, as well as delays in the elections process and cabinet formation, continued to fuel uncertainty and affected investor confidence in 2014 and the first half of 2015. Economic growth slowed to 1.3 percent in 2014, down from 3.7 percent a year earlier. Unlike in previous years, agriculture did not contribute much to growth in 2014. Production levels were high for a third year in a row but did not supersede the strong output in 2013. Growth was mainly driven by services and a slight expansion of industries where an increase in construction activities outweighed lower production in manufacturing. Private investment activities showed strong signs of slowdown in 2014, evidenced by a drop of nearly 50 percent in new firm registrations since 2012. Growth, projected at 1.9 percent in 2015, will likely remain sluggish in light of a further deterioration in security over the first three quarters in 2015. The number of new firm registrations in the first six months of the year, which is a proxy for investor confidence, remained at the same level as in the first half of 2014. Fiscal developments in Afghanistan point to some headway on revenue mobilization in 2015. Domestic revenue increased over the first 8 months of 2015 as a result of improvements in the customs and tax administration. New revenue measures, implemented in September 2015, will likely lead to an acceleration of revenue collection in the remainder of the year. The most recent projections indicate that domestic revenues will reach Af 114.2 billion (equivalent to 9.8 percent of GDP) by end 2015, falling much behind the initial target of Af 120 billion. However, recurrent expenditures are also projected to increase in 2015, due to growing security costs. Substantial, additional discretionary donor grants this year— agreed under the New Development Partnership Agreement with the United States and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Incentive Program—will likely help to balance the budget this year. Nevertheless, the budget may run a deficit if the Government fails to meet the agreed commitments that trigger fund disbursements under these programs. Moreover, the weak cash reserve position at the beginning of the year exposes the budget to larger fiscal risks. With declining global food and fuel prices and weakening domestic demand, inflation is projected at −1.7 percent (period average) for 2015. The depreciation of the Afghani—around 8 percent vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar in the first eight months of the year—has partially offset deflationary pressures stemming from the decline in food and nonfood prices. Imports amount to around 40 percent of GDP and tend to have a large impact on domestic prices through imported inflation. The medium-term outlook points to slow post-transition recovery. Real GDP growth is projected to increase to 3.1 and 3.9 percent in 2016 and 2017 respectively, conditioned on improvements in the security environment and strong reform momentum, which could help restore confidence in the economy. Nevertheless, much higher growth rates are required to counter population growth at 2.5 percent and an estimated 400,000 entrants into the labor force each year. Good performance of the agriculture sector and declining food prices could mitigate the upward pressure October 2015 THE WORLD BANK I Afghanistan Development Update on poverty stemming from negative growth in per capita GDP in 2014 and 2015. However, poverty is expected to remain consistently higher than its pre-transition level due to the contraction in off-farm labor demand and security-related constraints in service delivery. The National Unity Government has embarked on an ambitious reform agenda to revitalize the economy, tackle corruption, and improve investment climate. However, it will take time for these reforms to have an impact, and it is yet unclear how much they will mitigate the high risks stemming from the fragile security environment. Growing trends in security and pension and wage spending over the medium term require immediate attention. Afghanistan faces significant financing shortages for both civilian and security spending. Therefore, securing continued high levels of donor financing over the coming years is of critical importance for fiscal stability in the country. The fragile security environment and financing constraints, compounded by weak governance capacity, pose serious challenges to service delivery in Afghanistan. Any setback in reform implementation would further slow down the pace of human capital accumulation in Afghanistan and reduce future prospects of growth and poverty reduction. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK II Afghanistan Development Update A. Recent Economic Development 1. Background Afghanistan’s Afghanistan emerged successfully from a security transition that was marked by the economic and social withdrawal of most of international military forces under the NATO-led International development is Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Responsibilities for security operations overshadowed by were fully shifted to the Afghanistan National Security Forces. Presidential elections tumultuous events at were held in 2014—for the first time without an incumbent candidate since emerging the political and out of conflict. However, disputes over the election outcomes and the formation of security front. National Unity Government (NUG) prolonged the political transition. Since in office, the NUG has embarked on a new, ambitious reform program centered heavily around initiatives to fight pervasive corruption. The NUG has also taken a number of bold steps to reshape internal and external political organization and restore peace. These steps were impeded by a change in the leadership of the Taliban and reports of the emergence of militant activities by the ISIS. Security continues to be a critical threat to personal safety, public service delivery, and private investments. Incidences of conflict and violence increased, resulting in nearly 3,700 civilian deaths in 2014, higher than any level in recent years. Between January and June 2015 the number of civilian deaths was slightly lower than over the same period last year, but the surge of large-scale insurgent attacks over the summer combat period has led to an extraordinarily large number of additional victims. Figure 1: Growing insecurity poses risks to growth and investment (number of death, year) a. Number of civilian deaths, conflict related b. Number of civilian deaths, conflict related Civilian deaths Poly. (Civilian deaths) biannual comparison 4,000 Jan - June July - Dec 2,000 3,000 1,500 2,000 1,000 1,000 500 0 - 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 2015 Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 2. Real Sector Activity Recovery from the Real GDP growth slowed to 1.3 percent in 2014, down from 3.7 percent a year earlier. impact of transition More frequent incidences of violence and growing uncertainty in the after-math of is slower than the transition process continued to affect business and consumer confidence. Unlike anticipated in previous years, agriculture did not contribute much to growth in 2014. Production levels were high for a third year in a row but did not supersede the strong output level October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 1 Afghanistan Development Update in 2013. Growth was mainly driven by two factors. First, there was slight growth in industries (2.4 percent), where an increase in construction activities (7 percent) outweighed lower production in manufacturing (−2.5 percent). Second, services grew by 2.2 percent in 2014, mainly on account of government and telecommunication services. Figure 2: GDP growth slowed in 2014, with lower growth across all sectors (percent) a. Growth of real GDP and output sectors b. Sector contribution to growth Real GDP growth Agriculture growth Agriculture Industries Services Services growth Industries growth 25 45 20 35 15 25 14.4 10 15 3.7 5 5 1.3 1.9 0 -5 -5 -15 -10 Sources: Central Statistics Organization (CSO) and Bank staff projections Agriculture output Agriculture production in Figure 3: Cereals production has been at record remained high 2014 continued to be strong, levels over the past three years but was only marginally up (thousand metric tons) from the bumper harvest in 7,000 Wheat Other crops 2013. Cereals output, including wheat, rice, maize, 6,000 and barley, reached a record level of 6.7 million metric tons in 2014, only 3.7 percent 5,000 higher than 2013 levels. Fruits production, on the other hand, 4,000 increased strongly by 18.5 percent. However, production 3,000 of other agriculture commodities declined, leading to a total decline in agriculture 2,000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 output by −0.1 percent. Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock Expansion of Industries grew overall by 2.4 percent in 2014. However, manufacturing and mining construction contracted by −2.5 percent and −2.2 percent respectively. This was offset by strong activities offset an growth of 7 percent in construction. These trends are likely to be a result of lower overall decline in domestic demand due to weaker consumer and business confidence. Manufacturing industry growth was particularly hard hit. Except for carpets, which are to a large extent exported, all manufacturing products are marketed domestically. On the other hand, construction activities are less prone to transitory shocks, because construction projects typically span several years and demand for construction stems largely from the public sector. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 2 Afghanistan Development Update Services growth Growth in services, which Figure 4: Use of Internet services has increased, while slowed considerably averaged 12 percent in the service prices have dropped past decade, was recorded (cost of 1 MB/month in US$ (LHS); traffic in GBbps (RHS)) at only 2.2 percent in 2014. Internet traffic (Gbps) Price of 1MB/month Nonetheless, due to its large share in GDP, $1,500 services remained the most $1,500 15 dominant driver of growth. Wholesale/retail trade and $1,000 $900 10 transportation services, which together comprise around a quarter of GDP, $500 $300 5 contracted by −2.9 percent $97 and −1.7 percent, $35 respectively. However, $0 0 strong growth in 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 government services (8 Source: Ministry of Communications and Information Tech percent) and telecommunications (7.8 percent) offset the decline in other services. Telecommunication has been the fastest-growing sector over the past decade, growing on average by more than 50 percent annually between 2003 and 2013. The number of Internet users increased from 1 million in 2011 to around 3 million users in 2014. This is largely due to the award of 3G licenses to all GSM operators in the country, the expansion of the fiber-optic network to additional provinces, and growing number of Internet service providers in the market. Over the same period, the wholesale price of 1 megabit (MB) of Internet bandwidth dropped from US$900 per month to only US$35 per month. Private investment There is little data on investment activity in Afghanistan. But proxy indicators, such activities remain as the number of new firm registrations, show that deterioration in the security subdued environment and political uncertainty have taken a toll on business confidence. The number of new firm registrations in the first half of 2015 remains stubbornly at the same level than 2014, and has dropped by almost half since 2012. Figure 5: Investor confidence remains subdued as proxied by the number of new firm registrations (total number of registration) a. Total number of new firm registrations per b. Total number of new firm registrations per month year 700 6,000 Manufacturing Construction 5,000 Services Agriculture 500 4,000 3,000 300 2,000 1,000 100 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 May-11 May-12 May-13 May-14 May-15 - 2012 2013 2014 Source: Afghanistan Investment Support Agency October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 3 Afghanistan Development Update Opium production Preliminary results of a most recent survey by the United Nations Office on Drugs and decreased in 2015 Crime (UNODC), which used a new sampling methodology based on satellite imagery, put opium production in Figure 6: Opium production and the area under poppy 2015 at 3,300 tons and area cultivation declined in 2015 under poppy cultivation at (metric tons (LHS); thousand hectares (RHS)) 183,000 hectares. While results of the 2015 opium Opium production Cultivated land survey are not directly 300 comparable with the 2014 8,000 estimates due to the change in survey methodology and 6,000 200 the magnitude of decline cannot be computed, 4,000 additional tests confirm the 100 direction of change for both 2,000 indicators. Both area under poppy cultivation and - - opium production declined 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 in 2015, most likely due to improved eradication efforts. Source: UNODC Poverty is high and Poverty incidence Figure 7: Poverty has remained persistent, while persistent in nationwide was 35.8 percent inequality increased between 2007/08 and 2011/12 Afghanistan in 2011/12, compared to (in percent of population) 36.3 percent in 2007/08, 2007/08 2011/12 with no statistically significant change in spite of 36.3 35.8 rapid growth and improved 31.6 29.7 social outcomes and service delivery. A number of factors appear to be responsible for this pattern. First, poverty incidence in the Northeast 7.9 8.4 Region increased sharply during this period: without the Northeast, poverty declined from 36.3 percent in Poverty rate (%) Poverty gap (%) Gini index (%) 2007/08 to 33.4 percent in Source: National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2011/12. Second, climactic (CSO). shocks impacted the country, Poverty rate is the percentage of population living below the national poverty line. with two consecutive years Poverty gap indicates how far below the poor are, on average, from of negative agricultural the poverty line. Gini index is a measure of income inequality; which varies between growth prior to the 2011/12 0 meaning no inequality and 100 indicating maximum inequality. survey (and the climactic shocks appear to have been more prevalent in the Northeast). Third, inequality nationwide increased during this period, with per capita consumption growth of the top quintile significantly greater than that of bottom quintile, with the latter actually negative. Finally, Afghanistan faces a daunting demographic challenge, with around 400,000 new entrants into the labor force each year and underemployment being pervasive. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 4 Afghanistan Development Update Inflation slipped into Declining prices for global commodities, as well as weakening domestic demand, have negative territory lowered the prices and exerted deflationary pressures. Consumer price inflation dropped to −4.8 percent in July 2015, down from 1.4 percent in December 2014. This is much more moderate than the decline in global price trends in commodities. World prices of grains and energy, for instance, plunged by −40 percent and −21 percent respectively (on a 12-month comparison basis in April 2015). The impact of declining global prices has been countered to some extent by the depreciation of the exchange rate for the Afghani. Imports amount to around 40 percent of GDP and tend to have a large impact on domestic prices through imported inflation. Deflationary Food and nonfood consumer prices fell by −5.9 percent and −3.5 percent in July pressures are driven 2015 respectively. Specifically, prices of cereals and bread—which comprise nearly 18 by both food and percent of the consumer basket—declined by −6.6 percent (year-on-year basis). nonfood prices Prices for vegetables, which are the second largest food item, fell by −21 percent. Among nonfood items, prices for housing, transportation, and communication services—which together comprise more than a fourth of the consumer basket— have also been falling. Property prices have plummeted over the past two years as a result of a lower propensity to invest under the prevailing uncertainty. Figure 8: Consumer prices are declining, but less steeply than global commodity prices (12-month percentage change) a. Domestic CPI inflation b. World commodity prices 12 40 10 Non-Food 20 8 6 Energy Food 0 4 Headline 2 -20 0 -2 -40 Grains -4 -6 -60 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Source: Central Statistics Organization, and World Bank Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Deflation could The current deflationary trend is expected to be transitory. Prices are projected to benefit the poor rebound next year because exchange rate depreciation will start to exert upward pressure on domestic prices. Deflation, as long as it does not persist for long periods of time, benefits the poor through the impact of lower food and nonfood prices in the household consumption basket. However, deflation that persists for extended period of time could become a drag on growth. This is because households delay consumption with the expectation that prices will further decline in the future. Period-average inflation is projected at −1.7 percent for 2015. 3. Fiscal developments Revenues have After a decade of strong revenue performance, revenue collection started to decline improved over the from a peak of 11.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to 8.7 percent in 2014. Domestic last year, but remain revenues rebounded in 2015 and reached Af 70.7 billion by the end of August below targets (compared to Af 62 billion in August 2014), but were 11 percent short of the initial October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 5 Afghanistan Development Update revenue target for that month. Nonetheless, all categories of revenue, including tax, customs, and nontax revenues, increased over the 2014 level. Income tax and sales tax, which comprise the largest sources of tax revenue, increased by 7 percent and 13 percent respectively in the first eight months of 2014 compared to the same period last year. Fixed tax revenues, on the other hand, declined by nearly 7 percent. Customs duties also increased by 23 percent over the same period. Revenue collection Revenues in the first half of 2015 amounted to Af 52.4 billion. Current trends project has been supported revenue growth to accelerate in the second half of 2015 and reach Af 114.2 billion by by a series of tax end-2015 as a result of additional tax measures, which were implemented in the measures second and third quarters of 2015. These measures include an increase in the business receipts tax rate from 2 percent to 4 percent, introduction of a 10-percent telecommunications tax on mobile phone top-ups, increase of fuel fee from Af 1 per liter to Af 2 per liter, and an increase in the overflight fees for Afghanistan’s airspace. Figure 9: Revenues in the first eight months of 2015 were higher than in the same period last year, but were lower than the initial targets (billion AFS) a. Monthly revenue collection, 2015 initial b. Revenues in first eight months of 2014 and target versus 2014 and 2015 actuals 2015 Tax revenue 80 Actual 2014 80.0 Customs Duty and Fees Target 2015 Non-tax revenue 70 70.0 Actual 2015 60 60.0 16.4 13.6 50 50.0 19.7 40 40.0 16.0 30 30.0 20 20.0 32.8 34.7 10 10.0 - - M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 2014-M8 2015-M8 Source: Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan Financial Management Information System [AFMIS], data extracted Sep 16, 2015) Note: The monthly targets for 2015 are based on the initial annual target of Af 120 billion. Expenditures are Expenditures in Table 1: Expenditures in the first six months of 2014 and 2015 close to 2014 levels the first half of (Af million) 2015 were close to Expenditures 2014-H1 2015-H1 the spending Total recurrent 96,251 94,537 levels of the same Security 56,038 54,339 period last year. Civilian 40,213 40,198 Total expenditures Wages & salaries 23,647 24,055 were recorded at Operations & maintenance 6,060 7,204 Af 128 billion Capital expenditures 1,287 678 (roughly US$2.2 Social transfers 8,942 7,658 billion) in the first Interest payments 278 602 six months of the Discretionary development 6,586 8,324 year, as compared Recurrent + Discretionary development 102,837 102,861 Nondiscretionary development 28,366 25,419 to Af 131 billion in Total core expenditures 131,203 128,280 the same period in 2014. Recurrent Source: Ministry of Finance (AFMIS) expenditures amounted to Af 94.5 billion (US$1.6 billion), of which Af 54 billion (US$930 million) were security spending. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 6 Afghanistan Development Update The tight fiscal The 2015 budget plans Figure 10: Expenditures and financing in first half of policy stance runs civilian expenditures at 2015 the risk of somewhat lower levels (Af billion) procyclicality than 2014 and cuts Non-discretionary grants Civilian discretionary grants discretionary development Domestic revenues Security Grants spending by almost half. Non-discretionary dev. Discretionary development This tight fiscal stance was Civilian recurrent Security recurrent reasonable in light of the sharp fall in revenue 120.0 25.4 collection, accumulation of 22.3 arrears, and the drawdown 8.3 7.7 of cash reserves in 2014. 80.0 40.2 Moving forward, however, 52.4 further expenditure cuts 40.0 could weaken domestic 54.3 demand and negatively 38.7 affect growth and service - delivery, which in turn Expenditures Financing could perpetuate fragility Source: Ministry of Finance (AFMIS) risks. A higher revenue collection effort and additional grant financing could avoid procyclicality in upcoming years. 4. External sector Official exports have Official exports in the first half of 2015 were 15 percent lower than exports over the dropped same period in 2014 in spite of a weaker exchange rate and strong agriculture output. In fact, as exports in Afghanistan are agriculture-related products and commodities, years with strong agriculture production normally see increases in exports. Dried fruits, medicinal plants, and carpets represent the three major export items for Afghanistan. The limited effect of the exchange rate depreciation on exports implies large competitiveness challenges in production and supply chains in export sectors. Figure 11: While exports increased in the recent past, they declined in the first half of 2015 (US$ million) a. Official quarterly exports b. Official exports by product groups Others 2013 2014 2015 197.71 230.0 700.0 Carpets 200.0 600.0 Dry fruits 153.19 154.0 167 500.0 Fresh fruits 170.0 125.3 119.5 115.51 114.46 400.0 Medicinal plants 113.2 101.56 140.0 300.0 Oil seeds 110.0 Karakul skins 200.0 80.0 100.0 Animal by-products (excl. Karakul) 50.0 - Cotton Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2012 2013 2014 Source: CSO October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 7 Afghanistan Development Update Figure 12: Official imports increased in first half of 2015, likely due to improved recording (US$ million) a. Imports in the first two quarters of 2014 and b. Imports share by product group, first half of 2015 2015 4,000 Vehicles, machinery Q1 Q2 and equipment 3,500 212 Fuel and oil 3,000 Metal products 1,916 2,500 1,877 696 Chemical products 2,000 1,849 Cement 244 1,500 Wheat and wheat 48 flour 1,000 1,828 Veg. Oil 1,579 92 500 240 Textile and clothing 199 - 178 Other 2014 2015 Source: CSO Official imports Official imports in the first Figure 13: The large projected trade deficit for 2015 is increased in the first six months of 2015 were 8 offset by foreign aid half of 2015, likely percent higher in value than (percent of GDP) due to improved in the same period last year. recording The increase in official Exports 4.3 imports could likely be the -46.2 result of improved Imports recording at customs. -42.0 However, estimates indicate Trade balance that 15–20 percent of all trade in Afghanistan is Net income 0.7 unrecorded and smuggled. Current transfers, net As such, official statistics 45.7 fall short of capturing all trade flows. The strong Current Account balance 4.4 asymmetry of import and -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 export flows results in an Sources: IMF and Bank staff estimates annual trade deficit estimated at around 40 percent of GDP. This deficit is projected to increase to 42 percent (US$7.9 billion) in 2015. As in previous years, the trade deficit is almost entirely financed by foreign aid, which puts the current account at a small surplus (projected at 4.4 percent of GDP in 2015). Exchange rate The exchange rate of Afghani against the U.S. dollar depreciated by nearly 8 percent depreciated by nearly between December 2014 and August 2015. Though the Afghani was stable in the 8 percent in the first first quarter of the year, it plummeted against the U.S. dollar in the second and third eight months of the quarters of 2015. While the exchange rate was expected to depreciate during and after year the transition due to declining foreign aid inflows, the abrupt depreciation of the Afghani this year could also be attributed to larger capital outflows. News reports point toward increasing capital flight in the recent past, possibly triggered by larger out-migration. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 8 Afghanistan Development Update Risks to balance of The current trend of currency depreciation is not expected to cause external payments in the imbalances in the immediate future. At the moment, the high level of imports are immediate future are predominantly financed by the large foreign aid inflows. The flexible exchange rate low regime further safeguards the stability of the external accounts because it allows the pass-through of changes in international prices on domestic prices without affecting the level of foreign exchange reserves. The same mechanism, however, could potentially lead to inflationary pressures on domestic prices which over the past months have been offset by the declining prices for global commodities. On the other hand, Afghanistan’s low domestic production capabilities and narrow export base limit the positive impact of the depreciation on competitiveness and export growth one would typically expect. This has important implications for macroeconomic stability: balance of payment risks could increase if foreign aid declines unless alternative sources of foreign exchange earnings are secured, for example, through export revenues or incoming foreign direct investments. Development of investment opportunities and exports, for instance in extractives sector, will therefore remain a critical priority in the years to come. Figure 14: The Afghani depreciated in the first eight months of 2015, with no further accumulation in foreign exchange reserves a. Afghani exchange rate against the U.S. b. Foreign exchange reserves dollar and euro 65 7,600 80 63 7,400 Exchange rate (US$) Exchange rate (euro) Reserves (US$ million) 60 75 7,200 Euro (RHS) 58 7,000 70 6,800 55 65 6,600 53 USD (LHS) 60 6,400 50 6,200 48 55 6,000 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Source: Da Afghanistan Bank Foreign exchange Gross international reserves were US$7.3 billion as of July 2015. While foreign reserves remain at exchange reserves grew strongly up until early 2013, they have since remained US$7.3 billion, stagnant at around US$7 billion. The withdrawal of international military troops, equivalent to around which reduced both military and civilian aid (for instance, Provincial Reconstruction eight months of Teams’ assistance), slowed foreign exchange accumulation. Gross reserves are imports currently at a comfortable level at an equivalent of eight months of imports. But such a level is needed to adequately manage the downside risks to Afghanistan’s balance of payments (including fluctuations in foreign aid inflows). 5. Monetary and financial sector developments Money demand has Broad money (M2), which includes currency-in-circulation and deposits in weakened in the first commercial banks, grew by 4.7 percent in July 2015 (year-on-year), as compared to half of 2015 8.3 percent in December 2014. Growth of currency-in-circulation (year-on-year) declined to 4.4 percent in July 2015, down from 16.7 percent in December 2014, indicating weakening money demand and slowing economic activity. Deposits in commercial banks—which were declining throughout most of last year—grew October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 9 Afghanistan Development Update positively at a 6.1 percent annualized rate in July 2015, but they are still growing at a much lower rate than in previous years. Banking lending Commercial banks’ lending to the private sector continued to decline over the first continues to decline half of the year. Credit to private sector has been declining since the second half of last year and dropped, as of July 2015, by −3.3 percent (year-on-year). Total banking sector loans stood at US$740 million in July 2015, as compared to US$818 million twelve months earlier. The drop in banks’ lending can be attributed to economic slowdown, banks’ limited appetite for lending, and stricter regulations imposed on FX-denominated loans. With increased uncertainty in the economy, proxy data indicates that private investment has stalled and thus borrowing from the banking sector has dropped. Further, the banking sector appears to have become more risk averse since the Kabul Bank crisis in 2011. The decline in bank lending portrays weak financial intermediation, which remains a key challenge to the system’s efficiency and development. In addition, the quality of assets has deteriorated. The ratio of nonperforming loans increased from 6.3 percent in June 2014 to 13.8 percent in June 2015, leading to a total loss of US$14 million in the first seven months of 2015. Figure 15: Bank lending to the private sector is declining, and slowing economic activity has weakened money demand (percent change) a. Growth in monetary aggregates, b. Growth in banks' deposits and loans to year-on-year change private sector Currency in circulation 20 25 Broad money (M2) 15 10 Deposit 5 0 -5 Reserve money Loan -10 -15 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Source: Da Afghanistan Bank Apr-15 The Central Bank The overnight deposits facility, which was suspended by the Central Bank in mid- restored the 2014 with the objective of encouraging bank lending, was restored on May 30, 2015. overnight deposits The overnight rate is set at 1 percent below the 28-day capital notes cut-off rate. As facility of September 1, 2015, the 28-day capital notes cut-off rate was 3.55 percent. Capital notes are short-term securities issued by the Central Bank to commercial banks and certified money dealers with different maturities (7 days, 28 days, 182 days, and 364 days) and are used as a monetary policy instrument. The total outstanding amount in capital notes stood at Af 39 billion (equivalent to around US$650 million) as of September 1, 2015. Further, the Central Bank continues to exercise its weekly foreign exchange auction as another instrument of managing liquidity in the market. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 10 Afghanistan Development Update B. Outlook and Medium-Term Prospects The growth outlook Growth, projected at 1.9 percent, will likely remain sluggish in light of the for 2015 remains deterioration in security over the first three quarters of 2015. Investor and consumer sluggish confidence in the nonagricultural sectors show no signs of picking up over 2015. With declining global food and fuel prices and weakening domestic demand, inflation is projected at −1.7 percent (period average) for 2015. While currency depreciation will offset to some degree the effects of declining global commodity prices, weakened domestic demand will continue to exert deflationary pressure through prices of nontraded, nonfood items. Fiscal vulnerabilities will continue to be high. Revenues recovered somewhat in the first half of the year, but they may remain below the initial target of Af 120 billion. In light of the current revenue performance, the revenue target for 2015 is revised to Af 114.2 billion (equivalent to 9.8 percent of GDP). Recurrent expenditures are projected to increase in 2015, due to growing security costs. The budget could potentially run a deficit of US$100–US$150 million this year. However, if substantial, additional discretionary donor grants materialize under the New Development Partnership Agreement with the United States and under the ARTF Incentive Program, the government should be able to balance the budget and build up depleted cash reserves. Post-transition Real GDP growth is projected to increase to 3.1 and 3.9 percent in 2016 and 2017 recovery is expected respectively, conditioned on improvements in the security environment and strong to be slow reform momentum, which could help restore confidence in the economy. Nevertheless, much higher growth rates are required to counter population growth at 2.5 percent and estimated 400,000 entrants into the labor force each year. Good performance of the agriculture sector and declining food prices could mitigate the upward pressure on poverty stemming from negative growth in per capita GDP in 2014 and 2015. However, poverty is expected to remain consistently higher than its pre-transition level due to the contraction in off-farm labor demand and security- related constraints in service delivery. Table 1: Medium-term macroeconomic framework, 2015–18 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Actual/estimates ---------- Tentative staff projections ------- Real GDP growth (%) 14.4 3.7 1.3 1.9 3.1 3.9 5.0 Nominal GDP (US$ billion) 20.5 20.5 20.0 19.0 20.1 21.5 23.8 CPI inflation (period average, in %) 6.4 7.4 4.6 −1.7 3.0 3.5 5.0 Fiscal Percent of GDP Revenues and grants 23.2 24.1 24.4 29.2 29.3 30.9 32.6 Domestic revenues 10.3 9.7 8.7 9.8 10.1 10.5 11.6 Foreign grants 13.0 14.4 15.7 19.4 19.2 20.4 21.0 Total core expenditures 23.8 24.6 26.2 29.9 30.1 31.9 33.8 Recurrent expenditures 17.1 17.5 19.8 22.3 21.9 23.4 25.0 Development expenditures 6.7 7.1 6.4 7.7 8.2 8.5 8.8 Overall balance (incl. grants) −0.5 −0.5 −1.8 −0.8 −0.8 −1.0 −1.2 Overall balance (excl. grants) −13.5 −14.9 −17.5 −20.2 −20.0 −21.4 −22.2 External Trade balance −45.8 −41.6 −40.6 −42.0 −41.7 −43.5 −38.7 Current account balance (incl. grants) 6.2 7.4 6.2 4.4 1.3 −2.4 −3.7 Source: World Bank staff estimates, tentative and subject to revision October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 11 Afghanistan Development Update The growth outlook Agriculture and services will likely be among the key drivers of economic growth. is contingent upon a Agriculture accounts for about a quarter of GDP and is also linked closely to other relatively stable parts of the economy, such as food and beverages (which account for almost all of political and security manufacturing), and parts of transport and retail. Afghanistan has the potential to environment build on this foundation by reviving its historical position as an important exporter of fruits, nuts, vegetables, and other higher value-added products. This will require investments in irrigation and extension services to improve capacity, as well as efforts to build and improve downstream agro-processing activities. On the other hand, the government also has the option to tap into large potential for developing extractive industries, which currently account for a very small share of GDP. Unlocking this potential will require progress on the legislative framework as well as securing financing for the necessary infrastructure. The medium-term The fragile political and security environment has been a considerable constraint to growth outlook is private investment and growth. Continued violence, economic crime, and systemic subject to serious corruption also have often undermined progress in Afghanistan’s governance and risks, which will state-building agenda. Much will depend, therefore, on Afghanistan’s success in need to be carefully achieving peace, stability, and reconciliation. A number of factors are exposing poor managed and vulnerable households to more risks. First, the sharp slowdown in growth during 2013–15 puts pressure on underemployment and thus consumption across the board. Second, although agriculture experienced a bumper year in 2012 (growing by 18.2 percent, likely postdating the 2011–12 household survey), subsequent growth in the sector during 2013–14 remained relatively flat, and unfavorable weather conditions point toward a contraction in 2015. Poverty incidence in 2015 is thus projected at 39 percent. In the medium term, Afghanistan faces headwinds from declining aid and a demographic youth bulge. In this context, making progress on poverty reduction will require a combination of factors, including a pickup in overall growth, achieving steady growth in the agriculture sector, reducing underemployment, mitigating climactic shocks, and addressing regional disparities. Figure 16: The fiscal deficit is projected to increase in the medium term (percent of GDP) Recurrent Discretionary development Non-discretionary development Domestic revenues Fiscal deficit excluding grants 35 25 15 10.3 10.5 11.6 9.7 8.7 9.9 10.1 5 -5 -13.5 -14.9 -15 -17.5 -20.0 -20.0 -21.4 -22.2 -25 2012/13 2013 2014 2015p 2016p 2017p 2018p Source: Bank staff tentative projections October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 12 Afghanistan Development Update Restoring fiscal Revenue reforms have picked up momentum in the second half of 2015, with the stability will require implementation of new tax measures and commitments to important institutional accelerating revenue- reforms in the customs and revenue administration. Nevertheless, the fiscal crisis in enhancing reforms, 2014 exposed the Government to larger fiscal risks in the medium term. The weaker additional cash position and larger stock of arrears at the beginning of 2015 mean that there will discretionary be more need for adjustment moving forward. In the medium term, contingent on assistance, and the successful implementation of revenue-enhancing reforms, revenues are projected prioritizing to improve from 8.7 percent of GDP in 2014 to 11.6 percent by 2018—which is expenditures about the level of revenue in 2012. While the projected increase in revenues is ambitious, it will still leave Afghanistan with a currently unfinanced fiscal deficit of 1–2 percent of GDP during 2015–18. The fiscal deficit (excluding donor grants) is forecast to reach 22.2 percent of GDP by 2018. If additional resources are not forthcoming to cover this gap, more aggressive expenditure consolidation efforts would be needed, which would compromise development prospects and social outcomes. Raising fiscal Recent analysis shows that with considerably greater effort to reduce leakages and revenue will require improve administration of the tax regime, revenues could be raised up to 16 percent larger reform efforts of GDP. This is grossly inadequate to finance Afghanistan’s current level of spending, and promoting new which is at 30 percent of GDP and does not yet fully account for liabilities that are sources of economic currently financed off-budget, especially in the security sector. But raising revenue growth above its current potential would require tapping into new sources for economic growth. The natural resources sector would be a good contender, with its large potential to contribute to revenues in the medium and long term. However, the timeline for new developments in extractive industries has become more uncertain in light of strategic reorientation in policy decisions and slow progress in reforms over the past year. Budget expenditures Total budget expenditures are projected to rise from 26 percent of GDP in 2014 to are projected to rise, 30 percent in 2016. This increase is largely a result of more security spending moving with higher security on budget, while it was previously undertaken directly by international partners. and social benefit Moreover, Afghanistan has considerable public expenditure needs in the areas of spending service delivery, building essential infrastructure, and operations and maintenance. For example, delivering on goals to improve education outcomes will require hiring increasing numbers of teachers. Developing new sources of growth will require much better infrastructure. Prioritizing these expenditure needs within the Government’s limited resource envelope will be critical to maintaining a pro-development stance. With social benefits for martyrs and disabled increasing significantly in 2014, the Government will need to consider reforms in the pension and social benefit scheme going forward. Although more detailed analysis of public expenditures in needed, there appears to be limited space to adjust expenditures. Donors have At the December 2014 London Conference on Afghanistan, the international committed to community reaffirmed its Tokyo commitment of providing US$16 billion in considerable development assistance for Afghanistan over 2012–15, sustaining support through assistance for 2017 at or near the levels of the past decade, and providing continuing but declining Afghanistan support through the transformation decade. These funds, contingent on satisfactory contingent on reform progress under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), would satisfactory reform allow Afghanistan to progress toward sustainability and meet its development and progress infrastructure targets. Together with earlier pledges on the security side, this means annual aid of about US$8 billion—roughly equally divided between civil and security October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 13 Afghanistan Development Update aid. In light of the recent fiscal crisis, returning to a path of sustainability in Afghanistan will require acceleration of reforms as well as additional on-budget assistance. Box 1: The National Unity Government has launched a number of ambitious reforms The National Unity Government has started implementing a number of reforms that are anchored in commitments with international partners. Successful and timely implementation of reforms will move Afghanistan toward greater self-sufficiency and improved governance. The table below highlights selected reform programs that aim to strengthen the macro-fiscal environment in the country.  Human resource management, enforcement, and business process in tax and customs The ARTF administration Incentive  Tax policy coordination and tax code Program 2015–17  Design and delivery system of pensions and social benefits  Land management and administration  Business licensing and registration  Fiscal deconcentrating and provincial budgeting  Performance audits, civil society accountability instruments, audit follow-up mechanisms  New tax policy measures for 2015 IMF Staff  Banking supervision and regulation Monitored Program 2015  New Banking Law  Strengthening of AML/CFT legal framework  Financial market development: Sukuk Law and secondary trading of existing instruments  Privatization of New Kabul Bank  Tax administration  Fiscal regime for natural resources  Public financial management (PFM) reforms  Anti-corruption efforts  Civilian systems of procurement, and financial transparency and accountability in security SMAF 2015 ministries (Self-Reliance  Electoral reforms through Mutual  Anti-corruption measures and civil service reforms Accountabilit  Provincial budgeting policy y Framework)  Tax administration  E-payments in Customs  PFM Roadmap II  Multi-year budget framework  Investment climate reforms and public-private partnership regulatory framework  Raising revenue and stabilizing banking sector New  Improving business environment Development Partnership  Procurement reforms Framework  Civil service reforms  Implementation of citizen charter  Provincial budgeting  Land tenure security  Women’s empowerment An ambitious reform The National Unity Government has initiated a number of bold measures since it agenda is already in took office. Consistent with its strategy for greater self-reliance presented at the 2014 hand London Conference, the Government put forward an ambitious reform plan at the Senior Officials Meeting in September 2015. The plan is anchored in programs such as the ARTF Incentive Program, the IMF-supported Staff Monitored Program, and the Mutual Accountability Framework (see Box 1). October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 14 Afghanistan Development Update Three measures The new reforms will take time to have an impact—as will the current efforts to complement the achieve peace and stability. Meanwhile, given the current economic outlook, poverty, Government reform unemployment, and fragility will continue to increase. Three measures could help to program for the strengthen the impact of the Government’s reforms: short- and medium  Restore private sector confidence to stimulate investment. In the short term term necessary reforms—such as the recent ones in procurement and tax policy— can be viewed as increasing uncertainty. To mitigate this perception, closer dialogue with the private sector would be key for building support for reform. Providing greater clarity on the Government’s economic policy stance could further enhance investment predictability.  Enhance the poverty impact of public expenditure. The fiscal space is very narrow and without additional financing, the only way to mitigate poverty in the short term is to reprogram the existing portfolio of development interventions. In this context, opportunities for expanding direct household transfers, insurance schemes, and adult literacy programs could be explored to complement existing service delivery efforts. Our experiences show that such measures could improve mobility and productivity, and enhance participation of the poor in the growth process.  Rearticulate the needs for security and development assistance. Afghanistan’s security strategy and commitments need to be revisited in light of the changes in the security situation. Achieving greater self-reliance will critically depend on how realistic and affordable the country’s security will be in the long term. Commitments for development financing will likely need to remain at least at current levels in order to meet Afghanistan’s extraordinary development needs. A new National Development Strategy could provide a clearer sense of direction and vision for donor financing. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 15 Afghanistan Development Update C. Focus Section: Poverty Growth without Strong economic growth in Afghanistan during the pre-transition period has not poverty reduction reduced poverty. Afghanistan’s per capita GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.9 percent between 2007–08 and 2011–12. In 2007–08, 36 percent of Afghans were poor—that is, more than one in every three Afghans did not have the buying power to satisfy basic food and nonfood needs. Four years later, in 2011–12, 36 percent of Afghans were still poor. Economic growth, while necessary, is not in and of itself enough to reduce poverty. The problem is in the distribution of the gains. Patterns of growth contributed to widening inequality. Average per capita consumption grew at an annual rate of 1.2 percent between 2007–08 and 2011–12, but growth in consumption was not uniform, thus increasing inequality. While the poorest 20 percent of the population saw a 2 percent decline in real per capita expenditure, the richest 20 percent experienced a 9 percent increase. Widening inequalities are reflected in an increase of the Gini index, which moved from 29.7 in 2007–08 to 31.6 percent in 2011–12. Characteristics of Afghanistan’s poor: Data shows that the characteristics of the poor did not change (Figure 17). Poverty rural, agricultural, in Afghanistan strongly correlates to geography—that is, to where people live. Four underemployed, and out of every five poor people live in rural areas. The mountainous East, Northeast, heavily vulnerable and West-Central regions—where almost half of inhabitants are poor—have the lowest per capita consumption and highest likelihood of poverty. Figure 17: Poverty headcount and mean per capita expenditure by region a. Poverty headcount and mean per capita expenditure b. Poverty headcount by region 60 LAGGING REGIONS 55 WestCentral Northeast 50 Poverty rate (%) 45 40 East South 35 Rural North 30 West 25 Central Southwest Urban 20 15 1200 2200 3200 4200 Per capita consumption (average) Note: Area of symbol proportional to size of poor population Source: World Bank Staff calculations using NRVA 2011–12 Education, type of job, and access to basic services clearly contribute to Afghan poverty. Poor people tend to be illiterate (75.6 percent), and often lack opportunities to educate their children. Poor people face higher unemployment1 (8 percent) or are 1 In Afghanistan, as in most developing countries, labor is the most critical asset for poor households. For individual living in poorer households, being engaged in some sort of income-generating activity is a necessity to make ends meet. Poverty, together with the widespread availability of poor-quality jobs in the informal sector, make open October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 16 Afghanistan Development Update underemployed (41 percent). When employed, poor people are more likely to have a vulnerable and informal job (84.3 percent), most likely in agriculture (43.6 percent). Poor people are much less likely to have access to basic services such as electricity (63.8 percent), safe drinking water (40.3 percent), and sanitation (2.8 percent). Poverty in Afghanistan closely intertwines with natural and manmade risks. Approximately 84 percent of Afghan households experienced at least one economic shock in 2011–12, and 53 percent suffered from three or more. Due to mountainous terrain, poor connectivity, and greater reliance on subsistence and rain-fed agriculture, the poorest regions in the East, Northeast, and West-Central are particularly exposed and vulnerable to shocks, especially natural hazards. Poor people are among the most vulnerable, because they are exposed the most to a wide array of risks, and because they lack means to cope with hazards. Poor households are more likely to use harmful risk coping mechanisms that may protect them in the short term, but at greater long- term cost, reducing the likelihood of escaping from poverty in the future.2 International International spending did not benefit Afghanistan’s employment sectors, regions, spending is an and people equally. International spending on military and civilian assistance drove effective driver of economic growth in Afghanistan, but growth did not reach the poor. International growth, but gains spending contributed to growth and job creation in the service sector. However, while not distributed the service sector growth created good-quality jobs, especially in the public and in equally health and education-related services, 80 percent of new jobs were in informal day labor arrangements. Lacking education, the poor could not compete for these jobs, and moved from vulnerable employment in agriculture to vulnerable employment in the service sector. On the other hand, aid did not contribute to raising productivity of the agriculture sector, where most of the poor find employment. While losing its GDP primacy, the continued importance of agriculture in the Afghan economy contributed to economic growth volatility due to the sector’s high reliance on rain- fed production and vulnerability to weather-related shocks. Tilted towards military operations, international spending benefited high-conflict areas most, leaving behind the poorest West-Central, Northeast, and East regions.3 Moreover, while in the rest of the country a thriving service sector created new and less vulnerable jobs, “lagging” regions remained reliant on vulnerable employment in agriculture. Greater incidence of and greater vulnerability to natural hazards contributed to widening inequality between the poorest regions and the rest of the country. Despite significant While consumption-based poverty in Afghanistan stagnated, overall country human progress, gap in development outcomes improved. Enabled by international aid–supported public education and basic investment, from 2007–08 to 2011–12, literacy rates for the population aged 15 and services widened above grew by 5 percent, youth literacy by 8 percent, and primary school enrollment unemployment a rare phenomenon. The relatively low level of open unemployment is counterbalanced by the severity of underemployment. 2 Lacking proper means to cope with risk, poor households face extremely unfavorable trade- offs when hit by a shock and may resort to “harmful” coping mechanisms. These include things like selling livestock or assets that may affect future productivity and livelihood; increasing the use of child labor, which leads to intergenerational poverty; or reducing consumption and going hungry, which affects health, human capital accumulation, and future labor productivity. 3 Aid increased in nonlagging regions by 79 percent over the period compared to only 31 percent in lagging regions. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 17 Afghanistan Development Update by 6 percent annually. Access to electricity, access to safe drinking water, and access to improved sanitation all improved, growing annually by approximately 14 percent each. While these achievements have been significant, it is important to note that— at its pre-transition pace of progress—it will take the country from 20 to 25 years to achieve the same level of adult literacy of other low-income or conflict-affected countries. Further, it would take Afghanistan from 11 to 15 years to achieve the same level of youth literacy, and from 12 to 23 years to achieve the same level of primary- school enrollment. Afghanistan is still a long way from closing the widening gap between poor and better- off Afghans. Between 2007–08 and 2011–12, the gap in education between poor and nonpoor Afghans widened. Children in poor households have significantly lower school enrollment rates than their counterparts in nonpoor households. While urban areas and nonlagging regions saw significant improvement in school enrollment, education outcomes stagnated in rural areas and in lagging regions, mostly due to negative impact of shocks and conflict on girls’ enrollment. The gap in access to Figure 18: Trends in selected human development basic services between outcomes the poor and nonpoor (percent(LHS); annual growth rate (RHS)) also widened, except in 80 2007-08 16 the case of access to 70 2011-12 14 electricity, mostly Annual growth rate thanks to expansion in 60 12 the use of solar and 50 10 battery sources. 40 8 Expanded service delivery to rural areas 30 6 reduced the urban-rural 20 4 services access gap, but 10 2 differences between the poorest East, 0 0 Adult Youth Net Electricity Improved Safe Northeast, and West- Literacy Literacy Enrollment Sanitation drinking Central regions and the Rate, age Rate, age Primary water 15+ 15-24 rest of the country Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NRVA 2007–08 and widened, possibly 2011–12. reflecting differences in international aid allocation. Lessons learned While economic growth is necessary to reduce poverty, the poor must receive benefits from the growth. For any given rate of growth, the extent of poverty reduction depends on the ability to distribute income, assets, and access to opportunities to the poor. For Afghanistan, the implications of our analysis are as follows:  Strengthening agriculture remains a top priority in Afghanistan to sustain growth as aid dwindles, and for accelerating poverty reduction. As 75.6 percent of poor aged 15 and above are illiterate, they cannot take advantage of better employment opportunities requiring high skills. Thus poverty reduction should October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 18 Afghanistan Development Update benefit the most from growth in sectors like agriculture, where the poor concentrate.  Afghanistan needs sustained investment in human development to support economic growth, reduce poverty, and bridge gaps in these areas between Afghanistan and other countries in the region. While continuing to expand the supply of education, health, and basic services, the country should devote greater attention to improving access in underserved areas and among traditionally underserved groups such as girls and the poor.  Afghanistan’s poor households need help to manage risk. Geography (which can increase exposure to natural hazards), economic structure, and high incidence of poverty (which limits households’ ability to cope with shocks) require coordinated assistance to prevent and mitigate risks, and to help people coping with the impact of shocks. In particular, greater attention should be devoted to the development of an efficient system of safety nets to promote poverty reduction, and to complement and improve the effectiveness of investments in human development and agriculture. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 19 APPENDIX: WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN 1. The World Bank Group’s program in Afghanistan is governed by the joint Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for FY 2012–FY 2014, which focuses on three themes: (i) building the legitimacy and capacity of institutions; (ii) equitable service delivery; and (iii) inclusive growth and jobs. The process for preparing the next country strategy—the Country Partnership Framework for Afghanistan—has been launched, and work on the Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCD) is in progress. 2. Since 2002, the International Development Association (IDA) has committed a total of US$3.12 billion in grants (86 percent) and credits (14 percent) in Afghanistan. Thirty seven development and emergency- reconstruction projects and four budget-support operations have been committed as of end-August 2015. In addition, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) has generated US$7.99 billion from 33 donors, and committed US$3.61 billion for the government’s recurrent costs and US$3.79 billion for government investment programs. At end of August 2015, the active IDA portfolio was worth US$725.98 million and the active ARTF investment portfolio was worth US$2.5 billion. 3. The Bank also administers the ARTF—the World Bank Group’s largest single-country multi-donor trust fund. The ARTF provides grant support to Afghanistan based on a three-year rolling financing strategy. Together, the IDA and the ARTF provide close to US$1 billion per year in grant resources (about US$150 million from IDA and about US$800–US$900 million from the ARTF). The ARTF is a key vehicle for providing the Government with predictable and transparent on-budget financing and provides a platform for policy dialogue between Government and donors. 4. In FY 2015, the World Bank Board approved additional financing for an existing project—the Second Customs Reform and Trade Facilitation Project—in the amount of US$21.5 million. No new projects were approved under the ARTF during the political transition period. Funds were, however, allocated to ongoing projects for a total of US$450 million, which includes US$50 million for the National Horticulture and Livestock Project, US$100 million for the National Solidarity Program III, US$100 million for the Rural Access Program, and US$200 million for the System Enhancement for Health in Transition Project. In FY 2015, US$419.56 million was disbursed under the Recurrent Cost Window, including the baseline financing (US$125 million), Incentive Program (US$132.5 million, of which US$65 million was through the O&M Facility), and additional donor grants of US$146.9 million through ad hoc mechanisms. 5. The World Bank continues to engage in rigorous analytical work and places large emphasis on policy dialogue. These nonlending activities have been supportive of the Bank’s lending program and have played a crucial role in informing government of its strategic choices and advancing dialogue between the Government of Afghanistan and its international development partners. In recent years, four pieces of analytical work stand out: Transition Economics, Resources Corridors, Poverty Analysis, and the Agriculture Sector Review. The Bank also prepared Policy Notes on key sectors of the economy to help guide its policy dialogue with the new administration and launched the preparation of a comprehensive revenue analysis. 6. The portfolio of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in Afghanistan has more than doubled since FY 2008—from around US$8 million to about US$135 million to date. IFC is following an integrated advisory and investment strategy. It is focused on improving the investment climate, building capacity, and supporting selective investments in sectors with high development impact and job creation. Currently, IFC’s portfolio includes two investments in the telecommunications sector and two operations in the financial markets. Going forward, IFC is looking to expand its investment program in Afghanistan, in the areas of infrastructure, finance, manufacturing, agribusiness, and services. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 20 7. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has US$154 million of gross exposure in Afghanistan, supporting telecoms and agri-business projects. In 2013 MIGA launched its Conflict Affected and Fragile Economies Facility, which is supporting the agency’s exposure in Afghanistan. MIGA is currently supporting three projects in Afghanistan, of which one is a joint effort with IFC in the telecoms sector (supporting telecom operator MTN). The other two operations are MIGA-only dairy and cashmere production projects. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 21 Appendix Table 1: Selected economic indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Income Levels Nominal GDP (billion Afs) /1 1,061 1,133 1,151 1,171 1,269 1,408 1,532 Nominal GDP (billion US$) /1 20.5 20.5 20.0 19.0 20.1 21.5 23.8 GDP per capita (US$) 689 670 640 593 613 641 693 Population (million) 29.8 30.6 31.3 32.0 32.8 33.6 34.3 Real Income and Prices (% growth) Real GDP growth /1 14.4 3.7 1.3 1.9 3.1 3.9 5.0 Agriculture 18.2 0.0 −0.1 0.2 0.5 −0.5 0.8 Industry 7.8 3.1 2.4 1.4 3.1 3.9 7.8 Services 10.3 5.3 2.2 2.8 4.8 5.6 9.6 CPI inflation (period average) 6.4 7.4 4.6 −1.7 3.0 3.5 5.0 Core inflation (excl. fuel & cereals; p.a.) 6.6 7.0 2.4 −0.8 .. .. .. CPI inflation (end period) 5.8 7.3 1.4 0.5 .. .. .. GDP Composition (% of GDP) Agriculture 24.6 24.1 23.5 23.1 22.4 21.5 20.3 Industry 21.8 21.2 22.3 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.3 Services 53.5 54.7 54.2 54.7 55.4 56.3 57.4 External Sector (% of GDP, unless otherwise indicated Exports of goods (million US$) /2 640 729 775 810 937 1,131 2,001 Imports of goods (million US$) /3 10,054 9,244 8,917 8,790 9,328 10,492 11,196 Trade balance −45.8 −41.6 −40.6 −42.0 −41.7 −43.5 −38.7 Net current transfers 47.0 41.7 43.5 45.7 42.6 42.1 37.6 Current account balance 6.2 7.4 6.2 4.4 1.3 −2.4 −3.7 Gross foreign exchange reserves (million. US$) 6,771 7,447 7,360 7,410 7,500 7,650 7,700 Gross foreign exch. res. (months of imports) 7.2 7.6 8.2 7.8 7.2 7.0 6.7 External debt /4 6.7 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.8 6.6 7.8 Exchange rate (AFN/USD, period average) 51.7 55.4 57.4 60.9 .. .. .. Exchange rate (AFN/USD, end period) 52.1 56.6 58.1 63.9 .. .. .. Real effective exchange rate 127.0 125.5 121.1 116.2 116.5 115.3 114.0 (decrease=depreciation) Monetary and Financial Statistics (% of GDP) Broad money (M2) 32.0 33.0 34.9 35.8 36.7 37.6 38.5 Total deposits 17.6 17.6 17.7 18.1 18.9 19.5 20.1 Share of dollar deposits (%) 70.2 68.0 66.0 65.4 .. .. .. Credit to private sector, commercial banks 4.1 4.2 3.8 3.5 4.1 5.3 7.6 Loan-to-deposit ratio (%) 23.0 23.7 21.6 19.3 21.7 27.2 37.8 Note: 1/ National Accounts data exclude opium value added. 2/ Exclude sales of goods to nonresidents in the country. 3/ Include estimated unofficial trade or smuggling. 4/ Incorporates committed but not yet delivered debt relief; excludes Russian Federation’s loan. Sources: Central Statistics Organization, Central Bank, World Development Indicators, IMF staff estimates, and Bank staff projections. October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 22 Appendix Table 2: Selected fiscal indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 In Billion Afghanis, unless otherwise Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. indicated Domestic revenues 108.9 109.4 100.1 114.2 128.2 147.9 177.8 Tax revenue 51.7 52.4 51.8 57.0 60.9 71.8 84.3 Customs duty and fees 28.5 28.3 26.0 31.2 33.0 39.4 47.5 Nontax revenues 28.7 28.7 22.3 26.0 34.3 36.6 46.0 Donor grants 137.8 163.0 180.7 227.3 243.7 287.3 321.3 Discretionary grants 85.9 105.2 119.1 159.0 163.7 188.7 219.1 Non-discretionary grants 51.9 57.8 61.6 68.3 79.6 91.1 102.1 Total expenditures 252.5 278.3 301.0 350.5 382.1 449.3 518.0 Recurrent expenditures 181.1 198.0 228.3 260.8 278.0 329.6 383.1 Security 106.6 119.8 137.4 170.1 180.2 222.5 252.8 Civilian 74.5 78.3 91.0 90.7 97.7 107.0 130.3 Wages and salaries 43.5 47.9 52.7 53.1 57.1 61.4 73.7 Operations and maintenance 20.1 18.0 16.3 16.1 17.3 19.9 26.8 Capital expenditures 1.2 1.7 1.9 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.2 Social transfers 9.8 10.5 19.2 20.3 22.0 24.2 28.0 Interest payment 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Discretionary development 20.1 19.0 9.9 21.4 22.8 26.8 30.6 Non-discretionary development 51.4 61.3 62.8 68.3 81.2 93.0 104.2 Discretionary balance (Recurrent + Disc dev.) −6.3 −2.4 −19.1 −8.9 −8.9 −19.7 −16.9 Overall balance −5.8 −6.0 −20.2 −8.9 −10.5 −21.6 −18.9 Overall balance excluding grants −143.6 −169.0 −200.9 −236.3 −253.9 −301.4 −340.2 Revenues to recurrent spending ratio (%) 60.2 55.2 43.8 43.8 46.1 44.9 46.4 Sources: Ministry of Finance (AFMIS), and Bank staff projections October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 23 Appendix Table 3: Selected fiscal indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. In Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated Domestic revenues 10.3 9.7 8.7 9.8 10.1 10.5 11.6 Tax revenue 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.5 Customs duty and fees 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.1 Nontax revenues 2.7 2.5 1.9 2.2 2.7 2.6 3.0 Donor grants 13.0 14.4 15.7 19.4 19.2 19.9 21.0 Discretionary grants 8.1 9.3 10.3 13.6 12.9 13.4 14.3 Nondiscretionary grants 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.3 6.5 6.7 Total expenditures 23.8 24.6 26.2 29.9 30.1 31.9 33.8 Recurrent expenditures 17.1 17.5 19.8 22.3 21.9 23.4 25.0 Security 10.0 10.6 11.9 14.5 14.2 15.8 16.5 Civilian 7.0 6.9 7.9 7.7 8.3 9.1 11.1 Wages and salaries 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.5 4.9 5.2 6.3 Operations and maintenance 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.3 Capital expenditures 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 Social transfers 0.9 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4 Interest payment 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Discretionary development 1.9 1.7 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 Nondiscretionary development 4.8 5.4 5.5 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.8 Discretionary balance (Recurrent + Disc dev.) −0.6 −0.2 −1.7 −0.8 −0.7 −1.4 −1.1 Overall balance −0.5 −0.5 −1.8 −0.8 −0.8 −1.5 −1.2 Overall balance excluding grants −13.5 −14.9 −17.5 −20.2 −20.0 −21.4 −22.2 Revenues to recurrent spending ratio (%) 60.2 55.2 43.8 43.8 46.1 44.9 46.4 Sources: Ministry of Finance (AFMIS), and Bank staff projections October 2015 THE WORLD BANK 24 26