88971 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment of Winter Storm Alexa West Bank and Gaza December 2013 A Report by the Palestinian Authority February 2014 With support from the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment With financial support from: © 2014. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202 473 1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved Disclaimer: The boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps in this report do not imply, on the part of the World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement of acceptance of such boundaries. All Photographs: Courtesy of the Palestinian Authority. Cover photograph: Gaza City. Design/Layout: Alejandra Linares-Rivas. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 2 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 3 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment From December 11 to December 14, 2013, Gaza and parts of the West Bank experienced heavy winter storms, including snowfall and rain. The resulting flooding caused significant damage throughout Gaza and in parts of the West Bank. Electricity blackouts lasted up to 21 hours a day in Gaza and from hours up to several days in some areas in West Bank. The total rainfall over the 4 days of the storm equaled 75 percent of average annual precipitation. Heavy snow rendered dozens of communities across the West Bank inaccessible, and thousands of homes were left without electricity. Many farms were destroyed; livestock were injured or killed; and crops were damaged. These agricultural losses resulted in supply shortfalls in the West Bank and Gaza markets, which translated into prices up to 50 percent higher. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 4 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Contents FOREWORD 7 TEAM COMPOSITION 8 ABBREVIATIONS 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11 1. Introduction 15 1.1 Overview of Disaster Facts 15 1.2 West Bank and Gaza Disaster Risk Profile 16 1.3 Summary of Responses to Date 18 1.4 Assessment Methodology (DaLA) and Process 20 2. Economic and Social Impacts 23 3. Damages and Losses and Impact on Human Development 25 3.1 Infrastructure 25 3.1.1 Water and Sanitation 25 3.1.2 Energy 27 3.1.3 Transport 29 3.2 Social 31 3.2.1 Housing 31 3.3 Productive 35 3.3.1 Agriculture and Rural Development (Crops, Livestock, Fisheries, Land) 35 4. Recovery and Needs 37 4.1 Guiding Principles for Implementation 37 4.2 Institutional Arrangements, Monitoring, and Oversight 38 4.3 Sectoral Recovery and Reconstruction Needs 38 4.3.1 Water and Sanitation 38 4.3.2 Energy 41 4.3.3 Transport 42 4.3.4 Housing 42 4.3.5 Agriculture and Rural Development (Crops, Livestock, Fisheries, Land) 43 4.4 DRM Needs and Recommendations 44 4.5 Transitional Recovery and Reconstruction Framework 47 APPENDIXES 50 1. Participants in the Rapid Assessment 50 2. Existing DRM Initiatives in West Bank and Gaza 52 REFERENCES 54 BOX Box 3.1 Displaced by Alexa: Palestinian Vulnerability to Weather Conditions 34 FIGURES Figure 1. Distribution of Damages and Losses 12 Figure 2. Map of West Bank and Gaza 14 Figure 3. Winter Storm Alexa Seen by the Spacecraft MODIS 17 West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 5 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Figure 4. Typical Sea-Level, Atmospheric Pressure Distribution Derived by Integration of Torrential Rainfall/Flash Flood – Cases Conditioned by the “Cyprus Low” 17 Figure 5. Reduced Peak Discharge (m3/s per km2) of 30 Largest Flash Floods, 1951–2010 17 Figure 6. Response to Alexa storm and population evacuations 20 Figure 7. Flooded Streets in Gaza Resulting from Winter Storm Alexa in 2013 24 Figure 8. Newly Built Access Road to NGEST Plant, Gaza 30 Figure 9. Surroundings of Al Sheikh Radwan Pond, the Most Flooded Area in Gaza City 32 Figure 10. Emergency Crew during the Initial Response Phase in Gaza 42 Figure 11. Neighbors in Gaza Row through the Streets to Help Evacuate Citizens 47 TABLES Table 1: Total Damages and Losses by Sector 12 Table 2: Civil Defense Operations Carried out in the West Bank in Response to Alexa 18 Table 3.1: Damages to the Water and Sanitation Sector in Gaza by Governorate 27 Table 3.2: Damages to the Energy Sector 28 Table 3.3: Damages to the Transport Sector 31 Table 3.4: Damages to the West Bank Housing Sector 33 Table 3.5: Damages and Losses to Agriculture and Livestock 36 Table 4.1: Immediate Reconstruction Needs for Water and Sanitation in Gaza 38 Table 4.2: Medium-Term DRM Needs Identified by CMWU 40 Table 4.3: Longer-Term DRM Needs Identified by CMWU 41 Table 4.4: Investments and Intervention Priorities for the Overall Energy Sector 41 Table 4.5: Recovery and Reconstruction Needs for Agriculture and Livestock in West Bank 43 Table 4.6: Aggregated Recovery Needs 48 West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 6 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Foreword In December 2013, West Bank and Gaza witnessed the worst snow storm in the last 140 years. The severe winter storm Alexa brought very high-speed winds, heavy rainfall, and high accumulation of snow, which caused extensive damages in many areas, particularly in the agriculture and energy sectors. The Palestinian Authority is grateful that the casualties were minimal. Special appreciation goes to all employees of Civil Defense teams, of the civil society, and of the United Nations (UN) organizations for their work during those critical days; and for helping provide assistance to the most vulnerable households. This report, "Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment of Winter Storm Alexa,” lays the groundwork for implementing a longer-term disaster risk management (DRM) framework within West Bank and Gaza, and for international partners’ assistance in doing so. The Palestinian Authority recognizes the need to set up a national DRM unit that would help build a more resilient future for its citizens. We are thankful to the World Bank, the UN Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the European Union (EU) for coordinating the rapid assessment in the aftermath of the storm. The rapid Damage Loss and Needs Assessment team is grateful for the technical and financial support from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). We need to strengthen our capacity to respond to future disasters in order to mitigate losses and prevent damages. This report estimates the physical damages and economic losses in the water and sanitation, transport, energy, housing, and agriculture sectors because they endured most of the storm’s impacts. Furthermore, the report explores ways to strengthen emergency management capacity, improve coordination between central and local governments, and establish a decentralized decision- support system. The Palestinian Authority is committed to ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens and to rebuild better to ensure a resilient infrastructure. Mohammed Abu Ramadan Minister of State for Planning Affairs Palestinian Authority. West Bank and Gaza West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 7 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Team Composition The Palestinian Authority’s team was led by Dana Erekat, Head of Aid Management, and Alaa Nofal, Division Director of Aid Management in the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, who coordinated the preparation and completion of the Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment. From the international community, the Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment was led by Andrea Zanon (World Bank), with support from Rima Abumiddain (United Nations); and in coordination with Paolo Curradi (European Union). The rapid assessment sectoral team focal points included Sajid Anwar, Marie Buellingen, Fabrizio Ferrucci, Zeyad Abu-Hassanein, Nur Jalal Nasser Eddin, Alejandra Linares- Rivas, Bjorn Phillipp, and Iyad Rammal. The broader team also included Almutaz Abadi, Salam Abuhantash, Ibrahim Adwan, Islam Ahmad, Diana Anani, Najeh Ayyash, Ashraf Barakat, Fayeq Deek, Walid Elastal, Mahmoud Fatafta, James Galloway, Subha Ghannam, Hasan Hamarsha, Alicia Hetzner, David Hutton, Meerna Jasser, Shifa Jayouse, Zubair Murshed, Nibal Najjar, Abdel Mughni Nofal, Khalida Qutob, Azmi Abdel Rahman, Elana Ramahi, Afif Said, Moayed Salman, Nizar Samhan, Bassam Shalan, Basema Shukair, Luna Abu-Swaireh, Anita Thamm, Husam Tubail, Antoine Waldburger, Rashad Yousef, and Izzat Zedan. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 8 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Abbreviations BoP balance of payments DaLA damage and loss assessment DRM disaster risk management CMWU Coastal Municipalities Water Utility CSO community service organization ERF Emergency Response Fund EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FSS Food Security Sector GDP gross domestic product GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery GIS geographic information system GPP Gaza Power Plant HFA Hyogo Framework for Action IEC Israeli Electricity Corporation IRP International Recovery Platform l/c/d liter per capital per day MDLF Municipal Development and Lending Fund MOA Ministry of Agriculture M&O maintenance and operation MOPAD Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development MOPWH Ministry of Public Works and Housing MOT Ministry of Transport NDC NGO Development Center NGEST North Gaza Wastewater Treatment Plant PA Palestinian Authority PAPP Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People PARC Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee PCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PEDC Palestinian Electricity Transmission Co. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 9 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment PETL Palestinian Electricity Transmission Ltd. PEA Palestinian Energy Authority PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PWA Palestinian Water Authority SME small and medium enterprise UN United Nations UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNISDR UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNDP UN Development Programme UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNOPS UN Office for Project Services UNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNSCO UN Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene cluster WB West Bank WBWD West Bank Water Department WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 10 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Executive Summary From December 11 to 14, 2013, West Bank and Gaza was hit by one of the strongest storms in the past five decades. Winter storm Alexa brought low temperatures, strong winds, heavy snowfall, and rains, which resulted in severe but localized floods. Agriculture and livestock were the most affected sectors and bore over 65 percent of the total damages and losses. The humanitarian situation deteriorated further in the Gaza Strip and in herding communities in Area C1 of the West Bank. Almost 10,000 people were displaced into temporary shelters. Although limited data are available, an estimated 21,280 households were affected. Coordination during the emergency response showed some institutional and technical gaps. Neither the West Bank nor Gaza has a disaster risk management (DRM) framework nor policies in place and individual areas and cities experienced varying ad-hoc interventions. In the West Bank, a high-level oversight committee was established under the leadership of the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD), with operational support from the Office of Civil Defense. In Gaza, all emergency response and recovery operations were carried out by the municipalities under the leadership of the mayors and with an undefined command-and-control structure. Alexa caused damage and losses estimated at over US$150 million. This amount can be broken down into US$73.7 million in damages to assets, and US$78.9 million in economic losses (See Table 1). Nevertheless, given that the data available was limited and the focus of the assessment was localized (sectors like Education or Health have not been assessed), the total economic impact is estimated to be much higher. For instance, the interruption of business, especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the agriculture sector, significantly disrupted the economic activity. Agriculture and livestock was the most affected sector. It suffered almost US$100 million (65 percent) of the total damages and losses, which is approximately 0.5 percent of national gross domestic product (GDP), largely due to production shortfalls. The electricity sector saw nearly US$30 million of the total damages and losses (approximately 20 percent of total), due mainly to damaged distribution lines and other network components. The transport sector experienced an estimated US$20 million in damages to the road structure in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to the fishing port in Gaza (13 percent of total damages and losses). 1 The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), divided the West Bank into 3 categories: Area A, comprising approximately 18 percent of the land in the West Bank, includes all the cities and most of the Palestinian population of the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is endowed with most governmental powers this area. Area B, comprises approximately 22 percent of the West Bank and encompasses large rural areas. Israel retained security control of the area and transferred control of civil matters to the PA. Area C covers 60 percent of the West Bank (approximately 330,000 hectares); Israel has retained almost complete control of this area, including security matters and all land-related civil matters, including land allocation, planning and construction, and infrastructure. The PA is responsible for providing education and medical services to the Palestinian population in Area C. However, construction and maintenance of the infrastructure necessary for these services remains in Israel’s hands. Civil matters remain under Israeli control in Area C and are the responsibility of the civil administration. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 11 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Table 1. Total Damages and Losses by Sector TOTAL EFFECT Sector Damages Losses Total % of Total Damages and Losses Infrastructure Sector Water & Sanitation $ 1,603,000 - $ 1,603,000 1.0% Electricity $ 29,300,000 - $ 29,300,000 19.2% Transport $ 19,400,000 - $ 19,400,000 12.7% Social Sector Housing $ 2,497,210 - $ 2,497,210 1.6% Productive Sector Agriculture & Livestock $ 20,910,300 $ 78,968,960 $ 99,879,260 65.4% TOTAL $ 73,710,510 $ 78,968,960 $ 152,679,470 The two main objectives of this rapid assessment are (1) to provide the Palestinian Authority (PA) with guidance and training on prioritizing financial and technical support for recovery and reconstruction, and (2) to inform the development of a long-term DRM framework.2 Through this assessment, Figure 1. Distribution of Damages and Losses the PA, with support from its international partners, Distribution of Damages and Losses by 1.0% has started identifying the Sector medium-to-long-term DRM 19.2% Water & Sanitation priority needs. The rapid 12.7% Electricity assessment recommends prioritizing disaster recovery 65.4% Transport interventions that jump-start Housing economic activity. Because 1.6% Agriculture & Livestock West Bank and Gaza’s economy is very reliant on its products for both consumption and economic growth (Table 4.5), priority interventions must include investments in the agriculture and livestock sector. The total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$96 million. However, given the limited data3 on which this assessment is based, the financial support required to recover to pre- storm conditions could be considerably higher. Beyond rebuilding destroyed infrastructure and assets 2 This report collects the results obtained from a rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment, which uses the Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) methodology. The methodology aims to capture the physical damages, economic losses and the impact of a disaster on human recovery and access to basic services. However, at the PA’s request, the current assessment focuses only on physical damages and economic losses on the water and sanitation, transport, energy, housing, and agriculture sectors. The majority of the data used for this report was provided by the PA and the UN partners. 3 Most of the data used for this assessment was provided by the PA and by the UN system West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 12 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment such as roads and housing, reconstruction efforts should incorporate a “build back better” approach to ensure that the infrastructure is resilient to future disasters. The majority of identified reconstruction and recovery needs are in the water and sanitation sector, followed by the energy sector (See table 4.6 for Aggregated Recovery and Reconstruction Needs). Given the increased frequency of extreme weather events, and the increased economy shocks that follows, this assessment strongly recommends developing and adopting a DRM policy. This policy would comprise both a legal framework and risk reduction activities across sectors including:  Develop a sustainable recovery framework to allow West Bank and Gaza to better manage future shocks deriving from natural hazards  Establish a network of hydro-meteorological sensors and early warning systems  Prepare and train most vulnerable cities and communities to better manage emergencies  Strengthen emergency management and preparedness capacity across sectors  Improve coordination and data sharing between central and local governments  Establish a long-term DRM framework, starting with hazard risk and vulnerability assessments West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 13 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Figure 2. Map of West Bank and Gaza West WestBank Bankand andGaza Gaza Source: UNOCHA 2011. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 14 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 1. Introduction The capacity of the West Bank and Gaza authorities to respond to extreme weather events must be assessed within the historical and political context of this region. Over the past 50 years, political developments in West Bank and Gaza have had a significant impact on the social and economic wellbeing of its population. Since the turn of the millennium, conflicts with Israel led to a severe recession between 2000 and 2002 in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and again in Gaza in 2006. Additionally, a combination of domestic, Israeli, and international policies has affected the Palestinian economy throughout this period, making growth volatile and difficult to predict. Large inflows of donor aid increased the disposable income of the Palestinian people but not the economic activity per se, making growth primarily consumption-driven. The wholesale and retail, as well as the construction and public, sectors have grown significantly over the past decade. In contrast, the share of the tradable sector has declined, due primarily to restrictions on movement, trade, and access to Area C, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. These restrictions have caused extreme fluctuations in growth and employment, as well as an increasing divergence between the economies of the West Bank and Gaza. Since its establishment in 1993, the PA has improved its institutional capacity and strengthened its fiscal management capabilities. These improvements, led to considerable economic growth, particularly after 2007-increased internal political stability. However, since 2012, the economy in West Bank and Gaza has contracted due to a significant decline in donor aid and prevailing Israeli restrictions on economic activity. The overall economic growth rate declined from an average of 11 percent in 2010 and 2011 to 6 percent in 2012. In the first half of 2013, the Gaza economy grew by 12.2 percent, whereas the West Bank’s economy contracted by 0.6 percent for the first time since 2002. During this time the combined inflation in the West Bank and Gaza was 2.5 percent. Despite the increase in donor support in the first half of 2013, a financing gap for 2013 of approximately US$320 million remained. The West Bank and Gaza have a combined population of 4.3 million.4 With a demographic growth rate of 3 percent per year, it is one of the fastest growing populations in the world. According to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), nearly 44 percent of the population is refugee.5 The unemployment rate continues to be persistently high due to low private sector activity. In the first half of 2013, the combined average unemployment rate reached 22 percent. In the West Bank, unemployment increased to 19 percent, and Gaza’s unemployment rate continued to be among the highest in the world at 29.5 percent. 1.1 Overview of Disaster Facts Winter storm Alexa affected West Bank and Gaza between December 11 and 14, 2013. The total rainfall during this period equaled approximately 75 percent of the average annual precipitation . The 4 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the total population of West Bank and Gaza in 2012 comprised 4,293,313 inhabitants. 5 UNRWA defines Palestinian refugees as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict” (http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees). West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 15 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment storm was also characterized by strong winds, low temperatures, and (in some areas) heavy snowfall. The snow accumulation reached 60–100 centimeters in most of the West Bank governorates (Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Salfeet, and Nablus). The rains strongly hit all of the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank governorates (Jinen, Tulkarem, and Qalqilia). Electricity blackouts reached 12 hours a day in Gaza. The heavy snow left thousands of homes without electricity and rendered inaccessible dozens of communities across the West Bank. The storm exacerbated the already poor humanitarian conditions of large segments of the Palestinian population, particularly by limiting their access to services, infrastructure, roads, and electricity. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ’ (UNOCHA) December 2013 “Humanitarian Bulletin,” the heavy flooding in the Gaza Strip displaced almost 10,000 people to temporary shelters in schools and mosques for the duration of the storm. One week after the storm ended, several hundred people remained in shelters. Although the housing data is limited, according to the PA, approximately 21,000 households had been impacted. The floods that resulted from the heavy rains severely affected plant production in greenhouses and open fields in Gaza. In Area C of the West Bank, the storm damaged the already precarious shelters of herding communities and caused extensive losses of livestock. Even though Alexa was among the strongest storms recorded in recent decades, another storm had hit West Bank and Gaza about a year earlier, in January 2013. That storm affected over 12,000 people in 190 communities, killing 5 people and displacing 650. Over 1,500 houses were damaged; agricultural land was ruined; and the livelihoods of many were severely affected. These recent extreme weather events demonstrate the high hazard-vulnerability of West Bank and Gaza and highlight the key needs in DRM (outlined at the end of this brief report). 1.2 West Bank and Gaza Disaster Risk Profile West Bank and Gaza is exposed to a number of natural hazards, including storms, flash floods, landslides, and seismic activity. Storms The cold wave, or winter storm Alexa, was the effect of a deep atmospheric low pressure, which channeled cold air from northeastern Europe and northwestern Asia to southern Europe and the Mediterranean (Figure 3). Between December 10 and 14, 2013, the storm brought winds of up to 25 m/s and temperatures as low as -1°C to the Mediterranean Middle East. Exposure to winter storms in the West Bank and Gaza is not uncommon. The cold wave and winter storm of January 2013 (Thorvaldsdóttir 2013) preceded winter storm Alexa, and in autumn and winter (October to February), the “Cyprus low,” also known as the “Syrian cold cyclone”, usually brings heavy rainfall, eventually leading to flash floods (Figure 4). West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 16 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Figure 3. Winter Storm Alexa Seen by Spacecraft MODIS, December 10–14, 2013 Source: Spacecraft MODIS. Note: Left: Cold air intrusion from eastern-northeastern Europe on December 10, 2013 with the low pressure over Cyprus- Syria. Right: Snow covers the highest areas from Jerusalem to Syria on December 15, 2013. Flash Floods Figure 5 shows largest peak discharge values of the 30 largest flash floods from 1951–2010 in the areas affected by winter storm Alexa. Total rainfall in all analyzed cases was always less than 60mm. In stark contrast, Alexa brought cumulated precipitation of up to 270 mm in the West Bank (Food and Agriculture Organization –FAO- 2014). For instance, Hebron received half of its total annual average precipitation over the four days of winter storm Alexa. Gaza received up to 256 mm of precipitation, equal to approximately 60 percent of its yearly total. It snows frequently in the highlands of the Galilee-Dead Sea area. However, winter storm Alexa was characterized as exceptional because it brought snow to the plains as well. In addition to the West Bank, Alexa also brought snow to Cairo, Egypt––for the first time since 1953. Figure 4. Typical Sea-Level, Atmospheric Pressure Distribution Derived by Integration of Torrential Rainfall/Flash Flood Cases Conditioned by the “Cyprus Figure 5. Reduced Peak Discharge (m3/s per km2) of Low” (marked with “L”) 30 Largest Flash Floods, 1951–2010 Source: Dayan and Morin 2006. Source: Tarolli and others 2012. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 17 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Earthquakes The Galilee-Dead Sea area is also vulnerable to earthquakes. According to historical data, important earthquakes occurred in 749 B.C. and 1033 B.C. Furthermore, the Dead Sea earthquake of 1759, magnitude 6.5, caused major damage to the area and was followed (25 days later) by a magnitude 7.4 earthquake in the Bekaa Valley. Other significantly damaging earthquakes were the 1837 quake in Galilee (magnitude 7.0), with approximately 6,000 casualties; and the Jericho earthquake in 1927 (magnitude 6.5), with approximately 500 fatalities. According to such seismic record, earthquakes are the most damaging natural hazards in the area, and a large-magnitude earthquake is likely to occur in the foreseeable future. Weather- and climate- related events are the second most concerning natural hazards (by strength and affected population), but they are more frequent than earthquakes, as proven by the recent events of January and December 2013. Global Warming Finally, global warming is affecting the frequency of extreme low pressures and the intensity of the associated hydrometeors. Hence, global warming may lead to two apparently contradictory risks (UNDP 2010): increased water shortages from lower rainfall and higher evaporation; and/or increased flooding or flash-flooding by storm waters, due to greater rainfall variability. 1.3 Summary of Responses to Date Table 2 summarizes the emergency operations carried out by the PA Office of Civil Defense between the beginning of the crisis on December 10, and the end of the emergency, on December 19, 2013. Table 2. Civil Defense Operations Carried Out in West Bank in Response to Alexa TUNNELS WATER DRAINAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS ROADS WATER DRAINAGE OPEN CLOSED ROADS RESCUE OF INJURED ELECTRICITY POLES REMOVING TREES ROAD ACCIDENTS TRAPPED PEOPLE STUCK VEHICLES GAS LEAKAGE CASUALTIES EXPLOSIVES DISTRICT PLACARDS FIRES Ramallah 21 20 54 30 68 99 139 104 181 662 1145 - - - 2523 Hebron 12 7 21 16 17 43 33 79 160 311 288 1 - - 988 Jerusalem 2 16 13 21 17 31 87 93 35 379 217 - - - 911 Salfeet 8 8 16 84 8 84 57 146 91 61 140 - - - 703 Bethlehem 15 4 9 10 5 24 39 10 41 163 320 - - - 640 Nablus 3 2 2 12 7 24 18 62 63 242 117 - 1 - 553 Jenin 8 15 8 7 43 45 40 10 74 62 67 - - - 379 West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 18 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Tulkarem 2 20 16 13 20 21 16 18 56 14 15 - - - 211 Jericho 60 6 2 3 2 10 3 9 11 10 3 - - 1 120 Tubas 2 1 3 5 7 4 25 4 6 - - - 57 Qalqilia 1 2 2 1 3 2 3 2 21 3 3 - - - 43 Total 134 101 143 200 195 390 439 533 758 1911 2321 1 1 1 7128 Source: Statistics from the report “Analysis and Assessment on the 10–19/12/2013 Low,” PA Office of Civil Defense. Note: The only casualty was associated to a fatal fall from a roof, partly unrelated to the emergency. From Table 2 it appears that (i) almost two-thirds of rescue operations were conducted in Ramallah, Hebron, and Jerusalem; (ii) approximately 70 percent of the operations were related to road servicing and vehicle rescuing; and (iii) no casualty or major injuries were related to the rainfall and snowfall itself. This third statement indicates that the dimension and impact of this winter storm were moderate. Agriculture Sector Interventions Between December 11 and 15, 2013, the World Food Program (WFP) provided emergency food assistance to 181 families (a total of 1,000 people) consisting of wheat flour, pulses, sugar, vegetable oil, and salt. Additionally, between December 11 and 15, WFP also provided vouchers with a value of US$17 per family per week to a total of 40 families (approximately 255 people). Beneficiaries could redeem the voucher for 15 different types of food products from local shops. Regular general food distribution in the West Bank was disrupted from December 12 to 15 due to the storm. On December 16, regular general food distribution resumed in the governorates of Tulkarm, Tubas, Jenin, and Nablus. Poor road conditions delayed an additional week WFP’s planned distribution cycle to Bedouins and herders in Area C, until December 22. UNRWA continues to monitor and respond to needs arising in all 19 refugee camps, many of which remain without adequate power. The Ministry of Agriculture is still working to obtain potential funding to compensate farmers and herders. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 19 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Figure 6. Response to Alexa Storm and Population Evacuations 1.4 Assessment Methodology (DaLA) and Process The Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment of winter storm Alexa utilized the DaLA methodology, developed in the 1970s by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC), and further updated by the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). This methodology utilizes a number of sector-specific assessment methodologies and combines them to provide an overall picture of disaster effects and impacts to physical assets and the economy. Under the DaLA methodology, three disaster effects and impacts are measured:  Damages: The value of physical, durable assets that may be destroyed due to the action of the natural hazard that caused the disaster, expressed in terms of the replacement value of the assets and assuming the same characteristics that they had prior to the disaster.  Losses: Changes in the normal flows of the economy that may arise in all sectors of economic and social activity due to the external shocks brought about by the disaster, until full economic recovery and reconstruction has been achieved. Losses are expressed in current values.  Macroeconomic impacts: The possible macroeconomic impacts due to losses caused by the disaster also are measured as a part of the assessment. These include possible slowdown of GDP, deterioration of the balance of payments (BoP) and of fiscal sector position, and increase in inflation. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 20 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Based on these findings, sectoral teams then are able to determine the needs for recovery and reconstruction, as well as for integrating disaster risk reduction measures to ensure that recovery interventions reduce the vulnerability to hazards and do not place affected populations at increased risk.  Recovery needs are estimated on the basis of the financial resources required for immediate reactivation of personal or household income, rehabilitation of basic services, and reactivation of productive activities.  Reconstruction needs are estimated as the financial requirements to repair, reconstruct, or replace the physical assets that were destroyed or damaged by the disaster. These figures include a build back better factor to consider quality improvements.  Disaster risk reduction needs are additional needs identified above and beyond the ones in recovery and reconstruction. Inclusion of these disaster risk reduction needs is aimed at building longer term resilience through systematic efforts to “anal yze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.”6 This assessment utilized existing data and sectoral assessments already conducted by the PA, FAO, and UNOCHA. The key objective of utilizing the DaLA methodology is to compile all existing assessments into one internationally accepted standard for determining damages and losses. This standard then can be used to target PA and donor investments for recovery and reconstruction. As a result, no new primary quantitative data was collected for this assessment. Assessment Process On December 24, 2013, the World Bank received an official request from the PA for assistance in conducting a rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment. In response to the request, and based on the 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning, the EU, the UN, and the World Bank agreed to coordinate post-disaster rapid assessment efforts under the leadership of the PA. As a first step, on December 26, the World Bank circulated templates for the collection of relevant baseline data as well as damage and loss data resulting from the storm to the PA technical experts to begin data collection. On January 14, a 1-day training on the DaLA methodology was provided to approximately 20 PA technical experts in West Bank and Gaza. These experts represented the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MOPWH), the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Palestinian Water Authority, the Energy and Natural Resources Authority, the Ministry of National Economy, the Office of Civil Defense, the Municipal Development and Lending Fund, the NGO Development Center, the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee, and the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD). The training focused on how to estimate damages and losses caused by the winter storm; and, based on these findings, how to determine the needs for recovery and reconstruction. The DaLA methodology training enabled the PA to take the lead in loss and damage assessment with technical and financial support from its development partners. The training was also a key aspect in 6 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) definition, http//www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology#letter-d. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 21 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment developing the capacity of the PA to independently conduct future post-disaster assessments under an internationally accepted methodology. The training. Following the training, two World Bank teams, in Gaza and the West Bank, conducted field visits to validate the quantitative data previously collected by the PA and UN agencies, and to gather additional qualitative data through interviews with local PA officials and affected communities. Subsequently, World Bank sector teams analyzed the data to determine both accurate figures for damages and losses and medium- to long-term recommendations for recovery and risk reduction. The assessment focused on five key sectors: Water and Sanitation, Transport, Energy, Housing, and Agriculture. The assessment faced some limitations. These included the inability to access national accounts and appropriate baseline data for all sectors, as well as the lack of distinguishing between disaster effects and impacts based on geographic location. Despite these limitations, the findings of the assessment remain relevant as they identified: (i) targeted and transparent recovery interventions and (ii) longer term risk reduction measures to reduce vulnerability to hazards. The preliminary findings were presented by the World Bank team on January 16, 2014 at MOPAD. These findings first outlined the approximate total value of damages and losses. They also identified sectoral priorities for recovery and reconstruction in the short, medium, and long terms. The consolidated findings and this final report formulate a transitional recovery framework. These findings will enable the PA and its development partners to define sectoral and geographic priorities for a more efficient recovery and reconstruction that contributes to disaster risk reduction. This recovery framework also provides broad guidelines to be adhered to during the recovery process. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 22 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 2. Economic and Social Impacts A comprehensive assessment of the macroeconomic impacts of the December 2013 winter storm Alexa cannot be made due to the lack of data. However based on the existing data, we it can be determined that impacts of the storm are significant. The storm has affected the Palestinian economy in the following ways. First, severe weather caused closures and disruption of business activity across almost all sectors for roughly one week. While some businesses will be able to make up for lost days and the associated business losses, other businesses will not. These losses should be reflected in the aggregate demand data for the fourth quarter of 2013. However, this data, compiled by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) was not available at the time of the completion of the rapid assessment.7 Second, both businesses and households have suffered damages that caused an immediate reduction in output as well as reduced production capacity . Preliminary assessments reveal that damages are heavily concentrated in the agriculture and transportation sectors, estimated at US$21 million and US$19.4 million, respectively. The output lost as a result of this damage in the transportation sector is thought to be relatively small (and, given data scarcity, difficult to estimate). However, the output loss in the agriculture sector is substantial. The loss is estimated at US$79 million, which is equivalent to approximately 0.5 percent of the estimated Palestinian GDP in 2013. 8 Furthermore, some damage assessments have been carried out in the electricity and water and sanitation sectors, but in each case the lost output has been assessed as relatively small with negligible effects on GDP. Third, the investments to offset the damage caused as these households and businesses may have a positive effect on GDP growth in 2014 and beyond. The damage estimates for the agriculture, transport, electricity, and water and sanitation sectors add up to approximately US$42 million. Nevertheless, such investments to offset this damage will have a negative impact on the Palestinian BoP (due to a significant import component of investments). The PA reports that the 2014 budget allocates approximately US$12 million in investments to offset some of the damages caused by winter storm Alexa. This amount is limited and will not be sufficient to cover all the required investment. Nevertheless, given its fiscal stress, the PA will not be able to allocate additional financing for this cause in 2014. Therefore, the PA is attempting to secure pledges from international donors to invest to offset the damages. However, neither the scale nor the timeframe in which these investments will be made can be estimated now with any reasonable degree of confidence. On the other hand, unless measures are taken to restore confidence, particularly among farmers, concerning how the effects of any future storm can be mitigated, investors’ confidence in the sector could be negatively affected. Decreased confidence could result in even lower investments in a sector whose low levels of investment have severely eroded its productivity from 1994 to now. Finally, Alexa has led to some transitory effects on consumer prices, particularly those of locally produced agricultural yields. Because the economy in West Bank and Gaza is open and imports most of 7 Once the national accounts data for Q4 2013 becomes available, it will be possible to revisit the estimates provided herein to carry out a more systematic assessment of the macroeconomic impacts of the storm. 8 This estimate is based on the 2012 ratio of output to GDP in Palestinian accounts of 78 percent and a preliminary GDP estimate of USS11.28 billion in 2013. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 23 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment its food, this impact was short lived. For instance, FAO assessed that, immediately after the storm, poultry prices increased by 21 percent in West Bank and Gaza; and egg prices increased by 13 percent and 44 percent in the West Bank and in Gaza, respectively. However, other reports suggest that the prices of lamb and beef dropped because injured animals had to be slaughtered. Thus, the net effect on food prices in the immediate aftermath of the storm still is not clear.9 In any case, the storm is not expected to have a significant lasting effect on inflation or price levels even in specific sectors of West Bank and Gaza’s economy. Figure 7. Flooded Streets in Gaza Resulting from Winter Storm Alexa in 2013 9 CPI data for December 2013 is not available yet to confirm any of these findings on monthly prices. However, price changes may be missed by that data depending on when in the month measurements were taken. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 24 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 3. Damages and Losses and Impact on Human Development 3.1 Infrastructure 3.1.1 Water and Sanitation A. Pre-disaster Status Groundwater is the main resource available to meet water demand in West Bank and Gaza .10 The coastal aquifer in Gaza is overdrawn by approximately 100 million cubic meters (m3) annually, causing a rapid decline of the groundwater reserves, seawater intrusion, and deterioration of the aquifer water quality. The Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) reported that 95 percent of the water wells in Gaza contain high chloride and nitrates concentrations – –in some places much higher than World Health Organization (WHO) standards. Nevertheless, per capita withdrawal levels are among the lowest in the Middle East and North Africa Region–– approximately 100 liters per capita per day. Although nearly 90 percent of the population has access to water networks, service discontinuity results in low consumption rates and significant economic impacts. While there are a number of existing or under-construction wastewater treatment facilities, the existing ones are overloaded, under-maintained, or dysfunctional due to shortages of fuel and electricity. With poorly managed wastewater facilities and inadequate collection and treatment infrastructure, much raw or partially treated sewage is discarded into open pools or wadis, or directly into the sea. This sewage harms the water resources, the environment, and the health and well-being of the communities, especially in Gaza. Over the past decade, the CMWU has made continuous efforts to consolidate the service provision of water and sanitation in Gaza under its umbrella. Nevertheless, only 15 municipalities of the 25 municipalities in the Gaza Strip are managed (either fully or partially) by the CMWU. In fact, the largest municipality in Gaza (Gaza City, which comprises approximately one-third of the population) remains outside the reach of the utility. The fragmentation of the sector’s governance, the lack of a regulatory role of PWA in Gaza, and the inability to consolidate all municipalities’ service provision under a unified structure (the CMWU) are among the factors affecting the economics, management, coordination, and efficiency of the sector, particularly under the effects of a natural hazard. B. Storm Impacts on the Water and Sanitation Sector Direct damages and losses in the water supply and sanitation sector as a result of the flood are relatively small, considering its pre-disaster poorly developed and highly vulnerable infrastructure. 10 On December 24, 2013, the Palestinian Authority officially requested the World Bank’s a ssistance to assess the damages and losses produced by the Alexa storm in Gaza. However, during the Bank team’s first meeting with the PA, the authority asked to analyze the storm’s effects also in the West Bank. Nevertheless, given the higher level of damages and losses in the Gaza Strip, the rapid DaLA has strongly emphasized Gaza, for which there is more information available in most sectors. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 25 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Before the storm, due to the lack of electricity and fuel, storm water collection ponds and channels had been used for sewage release to mitigate sewage flooding. The indirect damages caused as a result of the poorly maintained water and sanitation system, particularly to the housing and business sectors, are substantial. The vast majority of the damages and losses caused by the storm were concentrated in 14 “hot spots” in Gaza Strip and Gaza City, clustered around critical points of the sanitation sector, such as storm water collection ponds and pumping stations. Sewage pumping stations were unable to pump to their respective treatment plants and were forced to divert a total amount of 12,000 m3 of sewage to open channels or adjacent areas, to the sea, or to storm water lagoons. Some damages were incurred in the North Gaza Wastewater Treatment Plant (NGEST), currently under construction, as a result of the storm water eroding the access roads to the facility and damaging the electromechanical equipment of the plant. These damages have been estimated at US$300,000. This damage will be an added cost to the project development. Pumping stations, water wells, and parts of the networks also were damaged by the floods. The CMWU, Gaza Municipality, and other municipalities suffered damages and losses due to the cost of rehabilitation and maintenance and the operation (M&O) of stand-by equipment, repair costs, and spare parts to cope with the event during the floods. The CMWU alone reported damages and losses of approximately US$1.6 million. Although this figure is relatively small, those damages are significant losses to the water utility (CMWU) and other municipalities, which have been under severe financial stress for several years. The water utility and other service providers have been suffering a low rate of service cost recovery and a declining fee collection rate as a result of Gaza’s widespread poverty and unemployment. Furthermore, in the last few years, collection rates for water and sanitation services have been in the low range of 25 percent-50 percent. In the West Bank, the governorates most affected by the snow were Nablus, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron. Other areas in the northern West Bank (Salfeet in particular) were hit by heavy rainfall, which caused flooding and damage to homes. The most affected areas were mainly marginalized communities in Areas C and B. The Old City of Hebron was flooded, damaging hundreds of shops. Flooding of residential areas was widespread due to the limited capacity of drainage systems. However, the citizens did not have to be evacuated. C. Damages The damages to water infrastructure in the West Bank (wells and conveyance lines) were not significant. The disruptions of some water services were due to power outages. Once electricity was restored, water supply services resumed normal function in most areas. There were minor impacts in the Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU) conveyance and storage system due to US$650,000 worth of damages to 2 generators and to water meters. Because these damages were reported after the conclusion of the rapid assessment, they were not able to be validated by sectoral teams so they will not be included in the overall findings. However, they should be considered when planning and budgeting the reconstruction. The damages for the water and sanitation sector during the storm in the 5 governorates of the Gaza Strip are listed in Table 3.1. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 26 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Table 3.1 Damages to the Water and Sanitation Sector in Gaza by Governorate Governorate Damages (US$) North 281,000 Gaza 610,000 Middle 224,000 Khanyounis 163,000 Rafah 335,000 Total 1,603,000 3.1.2 Energy A. Pre-disaster Status The energy market in West Bank and Gaza is small and almost entirely dependent on imported energy supplies including electricity and oil products (85 percent from Israel). Because of political and logistical factors, at present, nearly all of these supplies come from Israel. Israel discontinued supply of additional energy to Gaza in 2004, following Israel’s blockade and unilateral disengagement from Gaza policy. Electricity transmission to West Bank and Gaza is handled through the Israeli Electricity Corporation’s (IEC) medium voltage lines (22kV and 33kV). In contrast, distribution networks are rather fragmented and are handled by a combination of distribution utilities and municipalities. Energy demand in West Bank and Gaza has grown rapidly since the Second Intifada, in late 2000. The energy access rate in the West Bank is 99 percent and in Gaza approximately 97 percent. However, in recent years, electricity demand and growth in Gaza have been limited by the shortage of supply, damage to electricity networks, and the blockade. The peak demand in the West Bank was reported in 2008 at 550 MW by the Palestinian Energy Authority (PEA). PEA is highly dependent on electricity supply from the IEC, which provides approximately 98 percent of the total electricity to the West Bank. The remaining marginal supply of 2 percent comes from cross-border connections with Jordan. The Gaza Strip is suffering from a severe shortage of electricity and fuel. Currently, Gaza residents receive only 6 hours of electricity a day due to the limitation of electricity import from Israel and the shortage of fuel supplies needed for the Gaza Power Plant (GPP) to operate. On November 1, 2013, the GPP was shut down several times for extended periods due to a lack of the fuel and natural gas needed to operate the substation. GPP’s total generation capacity is 140 MW, but the plant is operating at around 50 percent (80 MW) of its capacity. This electricity crisis not only has affected the already fragile economy and challenging daily lives of Gazans but also has hindered the operation of water supply and sewage treatment facilities and caused a humanitarian and environmental disaster. For the past few years, electricity has been a scarce resource in Gaza, and the situation continues to deteriorate. Gaza relies primarily on imported electricity from Israel (62 percent) and from Egypt through a 220 KV double circuit line (7 percent), while the remaining electricity (31 percent) is generated West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 27 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment by the GPP.11 Electricity supply from Israel to Gaza reached 22,370 GWh in September 2013, a 45 percent decrease from the previous year.12 B. Storm Impact on the Energy Sector During winter storm Alexa, power outages in many areas of the West Bank and Gaza lasted several hours to several days. The intensive rains and accumulation of snow on the medium- and low- pressure lines collapsed some networks and damaged some transformers. Consumers’ reliance on the electrical power for heating increased the electrical load, which resulted in approximately 30 percent of the damages. Additionally, the high pressure and distribution lines owned by the IEC, which supplies the Palestinian communities, also were damaged. Despite the efforts of the municipalities and the employees of the West Bank and Gaza electricity companies to restore power, the absence of recovery plans, operational manuals, and administrative procedures in these companies; and the lack of emergency squads and adequate equipment led to longer power outages in some places. In Gaza, blackouts reached 21 hours. Hebron and Nablus, the two biggest municipalities in the West Bank, experienced the largest damages but repaired the affected networks in a short time. C. Damages The damages caused to the energy sector by Alexa in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip total US$29.3 million (Table 3.2). Table 3.2 Damages to the Energy Sector Area Damages (US$) Communities not under distribution 7,000,000 companies’ jurisdiction Jerusalem District Electricity Co. 6,000,000 (JDECO) Northern Electric Distribution Co. 4,000,000 (NEDCO) Southern Electric Power Co. 2,000,000 (SELCO) Hebron Electric Power Co. (HEPCO) 3,200,000 Gaza Electricity Distribution Co. 7,100,000 (GEDCO) Total 29,300,000 11 PCBS 2011 data (http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Enr_2011_E_tab5.htm). 12 IEC data, September 2013. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 28 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 3.1.3 Transport A. Pre-disaster Status Road transport is the most important means of travel in West Bank and Gaza. The overall network is well developed relative to Regional standards. The Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) estimates that almost 50 percent of the road network under the PA’s control is in very poor condition and, hence, beyond economic repair. This almost total disrepair has been caused mainly by the lack of funding allocated to regular maintenance over many years. The PA has limited access to, and control over, most of the road network in the West Bank. More specifically, the PA controls only the roads in Areas A and B. The rest of the network remains under Israeli jurisdiction or control, limiting the PA’s ability to implement its transportation plans or maintenance. In addition to the underfunding, the restrictions imposed on travel among the three security sectors (A, B, and C) creates traffic bottlenecks accelerating the deterioration of road pavements. Israel’s internal and external closure regime together with the Separation Barrier13 hinders the economic and social development in the West Bank and in Gaza. The policy of closure, which broadly consists of comprehensive restrictions on the movement of people and goods within the two Palestinian territories, has resulted in highly fragmented economic activity in West Bank and Gaza. The MOPWH, the Ministry of Transportation, and the municipalities share responsibility for sector development but lack adequate road network planning, management, and maintenance capacity. These limitations have been highlighted by inter-Palestinian differences that have resulted in a split within the ministries between the West Bank and Gaza, with all the legal, institutional, operational, and developmental complications that this implies. Approximately 60 percent of the roads in Gaza (approximately 925 km) are reported to be in bad condition (World Bank 2012). The total length of the Gaza road network is estimated at 1,530 km. Of these roads, approximately 83 percent are local roads; 11 percent are urban collectors; and 6 percent are interurban or regional roads. B. Storm Impact on the Transport Sector Winter storm Alexa considerably damaged vehicles, equipment, and some parts of the transportation infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza's transport system. Such damages further complicated access to most basic services including schooling, health, and commerce, worsening the daily lives of the population. Given the limited sectoral data available, it is difficult to accurately assess how much road damage was caused by the recent weather conditions. What is clear, however, is the significant increase in potholes and cracking throughout the road network of the affected areas. These damages were for the most part caused by the freezing weather and snow accumulation, which infiltrated the already deteriorating road infrastructure. 13 The Separation Barrier is constructed by the Government of Israel. The route of this barrier significantly departs from the 1967 Armistice Line and cuts into the territory of the West Bank. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 29 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment The fishing port in Gaza was shut down for 4 days because the storm caused considerable damage to some parts of the breakwater, further increasing the vulnerability of the seaport infrastructure and fishing boats. The storm decreased the deep water inside the bay (which was already deteriorated from the original 10 meters) to the current 4 meters, further affecting the already fragile livelihood of the fishers. More specifically, this new environmental configuration is resulting in additional cost to the fishers to bring their boats to deep water fishing areas. Approximately 3,700 professional fishers work along the 40km coastline of the Gaza Strip. The fishery sector economically supports almost 40,000 people, including mechanics, fishmongers, fishers, and their families. Of a total fleet of 700 fishing boats, Alexa put nearly 100 fishing boats out of business, and 200 fishers have seen their activity affected. Figure 8. Newly Built Access Road to NGEST Plant, Gaza C. Damages Damages to the transport sector in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are listed in Table 3.3. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 30 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Table 3.3 Damages to the Transport Sector Subsector Damages (US$) Vehicles and equipment 500,000 Roads (West Bank) 16,300,000 Roads (Gaza) 2,000,000 Ports 600,000 Total 19,400,000 3.2 Social 3.2.1 Housing A. Pre-disaster Status According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the total number of households in West Bank and Gaza in 2012 was estimated at 736,000, of which 482,000 resided in the West Bank and 254,000 in the Gaza Strip.14 The population density of the West Bank was 468 persons per square kilometer (sq km). The corresponding figure for the Gaza Strip was 4,505 persons per sq km––making the Gaza Strip the fifth most densely populated area in the world .15 The housing sector employs 11 percent to 14 percent of the national workforce, making housing the largest economic sector.16 This sector also is the focus for the development of new financial instruments and products and a potential catalyst for the local development of industries and new technologies related to construction and energy efficiency. B. Storm Impact on the Housing Sector Hebron and Nablus are the two biggest municipalities in the West Bank and experienced the greatest damages and losses during the Alexa storm. As reported by these two cities mayors, due to lack of municipal funds, the damaged houses were left to the private owners to repair. During the storm, the affected inhabitants evacuated their homes and moved in with their neighbors or relatives, or were housed temporarily in public shelters. The lack of personnel, preparedness plans, and equipment hindered the central and local level authorities’ ability to open roads and reach the most affected areas, especially those in Area C and near the Israeli settlements. According to the PA and the mayors of Hebron and Nablus, the volunteers, particularly the youth movements (which in the case of Nablus were well organized), contributed to the response efforts reducing considerable damage and losses . The volunteers ensured the effective evacuation of affected people, temporary shelter, and the reconstruction of houses. Despite insufficient data for Gaza’s housing sector, the United Nations (UN) estimated that approximately 10,000 people were temporarily displaced from their homes during the storm and 14 Palestinian Housing Sector Profile, revised final version, November 2013. 15 PCBS, Press Release on the Eve of International Population Day, July 11, 2012. 16 MOPWH, Housing Sector Strategic Plan Summary, 2010, 2. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 31 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment were housed in shelters or with relatives for the duration of the storm. Dozens of other families living in two-story buildings did not leave their homes but moved to their second floors until the water receded. The CMWU indicated that flooding incidents occurred in at least 25 locations in all 5 Gaza governorates. The worst hit was the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City (Figure 9), in which most water pumping facilities and storm water lagoons were flooded and out of order. At the peak of the storm on December 13, flood water levels in the area reached 6.5 meters. Figure 9. Surroundings of Al Sheikh Radwan Pond, the Most Flooded Area in Gaza City C. Damages Based on the limited data available, approximately 280 houses in the West Bank experienced total or partial damage during Alexa, resulting in cost of roughly US$2.5 million. The Nablus governorate experienced the highest number of damaged houses (95) valued at US$0.5 million, followed by the Salfeet governorate with 93 damaged houses and total destruction of retaining walls for approximately 70 houses, resulting in approximately US$0.98 million of damages. Table 3.4 shows the damages in all governorates of the West Bank. In Gaza, according to the UN and based on interviews conducted by the rapid assessment sector team during the field visit to Gaza, up to 21,000 households and 400 buildings may have been damaged by the floods. Due to the very limited data and imprecise calculations, the damage estimate for the housing sector does not include figures for Gaza. Table 3.4 shows the scale of the impacts on the population. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 32 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Table 3.4 Damages to the West Bank Housing Sector Governorate No. of Damages (US$) damaged houses Hebron 42 581,560 Bethlehem 26 140,000 Ramallah 4 38,790 Jericho 12 50,500 Nablus 95 521,922 Qalqilia 8 144,057 Jenin 2 40,866 Salfeet 93 979,515 Total 282 2,497,210 West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 33 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Box 3.1 Displaced by Alexa: Palestinian Vulnerability to Weather Conditions UNRWA provides support to almost 2 million refugees: 1.1 million in Gaza and 771,000 in the West Bank. These refugees, many of whom continue to live in the 8 refugee camps in Gaza and the 19 camps in the West Bank, are among the poorest and most vulnerable of the Palestinian population. During winter storm Alexa in December 2103, 10,000 Gazans were temporarily evacuated from their flooded homes. They sheltered with relatives or in community centers and schools, including one UNRWA school in Jabalia that hosted 600 people. Approximately 20,000 families requested nonfood-item support from UNRWA, at an estimated cost of US$1.7 million. Some 1,100 refugee shelters also were damaged. In the West Bank, UNRWA provided relief items primarily in its 19 refugee camps. Over 600 individuals were provided with emergency items including blankets, kitchen kits, and food parcels. Refugees in both Gaza and the West Bank remain at risk of natural hazards. The camps in both areas are characterized by inadequate infrastructure, overcrowding, and poor living conditions. In the West Bank, Shu’fat camp highlights the risks of an increasing camp population, unauthorized construction, and inadequate infrastructure. As an example, the original housing units in Shu’fat camp, built by UNRWA in 1965, were designed to hold 1 floor but today commonly reach 3–6 floors to accommodate the growing population. Overcrowding and dangerous construction expose the population to a variety of hazards, both human-made and natural. Seismic activity in the region has the potential to result in a disproportionately high number of deaths and injuries. Palestinian refugees’ vulnerability is further heightened by their economic marginalization and impoverishment. The ongoing Israeli blockade of Gaza has had a devastating impact on refugees. Restrictions on imports and exports combined with the recent closure of the majority of tunnels, an important life line to Gaza’s economy, have influenced the unprecedented levels of unemployment (37 percent) and a dramatic increase in food insecurity (57 percent). The West Bank also has witnessed rises in unemployment and food insecurity, reaching 20.9 percent and 19 percent, respectively, in 2012. Of the refugees living in camps, 34 percent are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity. Bedouin and herding communities in the West Bank also are highly vulnerable to natural disasters. Communities in Area C often face restrictive policies and practices that have progressively limited their freedom of movement and a loss of livelihoods and assets. Many families live in basic residential structures that are inadequate to cope with extreme weather conditions. The impoverishment of refugees limits their capacity to cope with day-to-day shocks such as family illnesses and other household emergencies. Even more so, their impoverishment prevents households from preparing for and responding to the impacts of severe weather events and other hazards. Nevertheless, there are viable opportunities to strengthen the refugees’ preparedness for disasters: the existence of strong community networks ensures a mechanism of mutual support and assistance, especially for the most vulnerable families. These networks not only enhance the capacity of refugees to cope with losses and shocks of all types but also can serve as an organizational basis to develop and implement community-based emergency preparedness activities. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 34 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 3.3 Productive 3.3.1 Agriculture and Rural Development (Crops, Livestock, Fisheries, and Land) A. Pre-disaster Status Agriculture is an essential component of the Palestinian national, cultural, economic, and social fabric. Agriculture also provides a buffer because it is a source of income and food supplies in times of crises. The cultivated area is estimated at 1.854 million dunums,17 or 31 percent of the total area of West Bank and Gaza. Of the cultivated area, 91 percent is in the West Bank and 9 percent in the Gaza Strip. The rain-fed area constitutes 86 percent of the total cultivated land, whereas the irrigated area constitutes 14 percent. The rangeland amounts to 2.02 million dunums. However, the area in which Palestinians are allowed to graze is only 621 thousand dunums. In addition, forests cover 94 thousand dunums. The West Bank and Gaza house a total of 48 natural reserves. Of these, only 17 were transferred to the PA. These 17 are concentrated in the Eastern Slopes and the Jordan Valley area. Approximately 62.9 percent of the arable land is located in Area C, 18.8 percent in Area B, and 18.3 percent in Area A. Water available for agriculture amounts to 150 million cubic meters (mcm) per year, and constitutes 45 percent of the total water distributed to the West Bank (70 mcm) and the Gaza Strip (80 mcm). Agricultural production, both crop and livestock, contributes directly to achieving food security, reducing poverty, and thus raising living standards by providing food, income, and work for farmers and other stakeholders. Local agricultural production enables self-sufficiency for the majority of vegetables, olives, olive oil, poultry and eggs, and honey. However, most production inputs and supplies are imported. Multiple institutions are involved in the agricultural activities: 1. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and PA 2. Ministry of Agriculture 3. Other ministries and public bodies 4. Semi-official bodies (Palestinian Olive Oil and Olive Council, Milk Council, and Grapes Council). 5. NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) (Approximately 35 NGOs and CSOs are involved in agriculture) 6. Private sector 7. Donors and international organizations. In the Palestinian context, agriculture is not merely an economic or income-generating activity. It also is considered a safeguard against confiscation and settlements development. Agriculture provides food security and job opportunities for 13.4 percent of the total labor force. It contributes 8.1 percent of GDP and 15.2 percent of total exports. 17 A dunam (dönüm, dunum) is a unit of land enclosing 1000 square meters. Land area in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip has been measured in dunams since the era of the British Mandate of Palestine. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 35 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment B. Alexa’s Impact on Agriculture and Rural Sector The agricultural sector in West Bank and Gaza suffered devastating losses during the four days of severe weather conditions brought by Alexa in the highlands in the southern West Bank. According to the Department of Agriculture, the losses in the livestock sector were estimated at more than US$29.7million. Also as a result of the storm, 15 percent of lactating ewes and cows suffered from diseases, which affected milk production for 25 days and decreased layer egg production by 20 percent for approximately 1 month. According to the FAO winter storm report,18 173,000 square meters of livestock shelters were destroyed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip combined, and approximately 789,000 animals were killed. Market deficiencies and the increase of the input rate led to a significant increase in the prices of poultry meat and eggs. Due to the limited resources, the MOA will be able to compensate farmers only partially to enable them to continue rearing animals. The priority compensations will be for livestock shelters and greenhouse plastic sheets. The storm impacts on plant production carried through until January 2014, significantly affecting the economies and society in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. An estimated 6,823 farmers were affected. Agriculture’s contribution to GDP will be diminished in the next 2 years due to market price changes of agriculture and livestock products and consumers’ decreased purchasing power. A decreased purchasing power will have longer term effects on poverty and food security. C. Damages and Losses The aggregated damages and losses for the agriculture and livestock sector are an estimated US$100 million (Table 3.5). The majority of this is due to production losses for crops and livestock, which totaled to nearly US$80 million. Table 3.5 Damages and Losses to Agriculture and Livestock Sector Damages Losses Total (US$) Agriculture 10,771,277 49,237,570 60,008,847 Livestock 10,139,023 29,731,390 39,870,413 Total 20,910,300 78,968,960 99,879,260 18 FAO, “Winter Storm Alexa Damage Assessment and Response: West Bank and Gaza Strip,” 2013, Jerusalem. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 36 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 4. Recovery and Needs 4.1 Guiding Principles for Implementation To determine needs for recovery and implement programs and projects, broad guiding principles should be used. Such guidelines help ensure that the recovery and reconstruction process contributes to West Bank and Gaza’s longer term risk reduction. Furthermore the guidelines simultaneously help develop the capacity of the PA and its communities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from future disasters and shocks. Four guidelines follow. 1. Establish clear institutional arrangements for planning and overseeing the recovery process . Ensure that this responsibility for disaster recovery is backed by a strong legal mandate that clarifies reporting structures and ensures transparent processes. The existing high-level oversight committee under the lead of MOPAD can serve as a starting point for formalizing the institutional arrangements, which will be in place throughout the long-term recovery process and can be utilized in future recovery programs. 2. Ensure coordination between central and local governments for recovery planning and implementation. Coordination on recovery should be the basis for strengthening long-term coordination on risk management, contingency planning, and emergency preparedness. Because local governments are the first responders to disasters and have the primary responsibility to residents for recovery and reconstruction, decentralizing decision-making to the extent possible is advised. In the event of a natural hazard, decentralization can empower local governments to handle most of the emergency response with adequate technical and financial support from the central PA. 3. The build back better approach should be a central principle in any recovery or reconstruction project. This principle ensures that risk reduction aspects are integrated in recovery investments so that the economy can absorb future shocks and recover more quickly, making West Bank and Gaza more resilient to future disasters and more economically competitive. During this phase, it is essential to differentiate between normal development and disaster recovery. Whereas the authorities will focus on securing development gains for the affected communities, doing so should not come at the expense of communities not affected by the disaster. Therefore, while every opportunity should be taken to increase the resilience of the affected communities during the recovery phase, these investments should not overlap to include improvements that fall under normal development. 4. The recovery actions should be aligned with existing guidance and national policies on disaster risk management and climate change adaptation . For instance, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority (2010) identifies the development of DRM capacity within the PA as critical for effective climate change adaptation in West Bank and Gaza. Actions undertaken during recovery and beyond should contribute to the capacity development of the PA for longer term DRM. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 37 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 4.2 Institutional Arrangements, Monitoring, and Oversight Currently, no official structure exists to develop, oversee, and implement a longer term DRM framework in West Bank and Gaza. However, this structure can be built on the ad hoc response mechanisms developed for winter storm Alexa. During the immediate response to the storm, a high- level oversight committee was established under the lead of MOPAD, under the overall responsibility of the Office of Civil Defense. Guidance and lessons learned from the development and coordination of this oversight committee can be used to develop an institutional and monitoring framework for long-term DRM activities. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of programs specific to Alexa recovery should build on the mechanisms put in place for this oversight committee as well as on the existing mechanisms within the PA to monitor normal development projects. At the outset of the recovery and reconstruction program, the existing oversight committee should define a results framework that clearly outlines the expected outcomes and the timeframe for their completion. 4.3 Sectoral Recovery and Reconstruction Needs 4.3.1. Water and Sanitation While Alexa’s damages to the water and sanitation sector were relatively modest compared to damages to the other sectors, important lessons have emerged for the water utilities and municipal departments.19 The damages for the sector in Gaza are US$1.6 million, or 1.2 percent of total damages. In Gaza, the CMWU, in partnership with the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster, identified the need to develop a coordinating body that would involve all concerned parties (water utility, electrical utility, civil defense, and municipalities). This body would be in charge of responding to current and future emergencies. CMWU also identified the immediate needs for reconstruction to restore service provision to the pre-disaster conditions and to identify gaps in the utility infrastructure to handle flood emergencies on the medium and longer terms. Table 4.1 shows the immediate needs for recovery. Table 4.1 Immediate Reconstruction Needs for Water and Sanitation in Gaza Description of Needs Cost Estimates Governorate (US$000) 211 North Repair vehicles and equipment; overhaul mobile pumps; supply submersible pump to Beit Hanoun; supply materials; cement; and spare parts; supply 500 KVA generator to Abo- Rashed PS West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 38 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 500 Gaza City Repair Al-Samer PS No. 6A; supply mobile pumps; overhaul flooded pump stations; supply materials; cement; and spare parts to rehabilitate networks 164 Middle Repair Moghraqa PS; supply materials and spare parts to maintain networks; repair Khaled water well in Zawaida; repair electrical panels at Bureij PS 63 Khanyounis Repair vehicles and equipment; repair Araysheya PS; maintain Khozaa PS; supply materials and spare parts to maintain networks 305 Rafah Repairs to Jemezet Assabeel PS; repair water well 148; repair Tal Asultan PS; supply generator to Jemezet Assabeel PS; repair vehicles and equipment 1,243 Total Medium- to Long-Term DRM Needs In the West Bank, the PWA identified six main needs for preparedness and risk reduction in the medium and long term to help mitigate the impacts of future flooding. To improve water and sanitation services to the population, it will be necessary to: 1. Obtain additional fuel support to operate standby generators. 2. Facilitate the access of additional mobile pumps to the most affected areas in times of emergency. 3. Improve well facilities by securing (a) additional mobile electricity generators to ensure continuity of operation of well pumps; and (b) additional stations for West Bank Water Department (WBWD) and small standby generators for water providers such as municipalities, Joint Service Councils, and Village Service Councils. 4. Define a system that maintains a minimum availability of clean water supply of 20 liters per capita per day (l/c/d) to domestic consumers. When the bulk of the water supply system for specific areas fails, or networks are shut down, customers will be supplied by tankers or stand pipes. The new system should ensure that available tanker supplies are distributed in a fair manner at a fair cost. This system would supply a maximum of 30,000 homes with 180 liters per day, equivalent to approximately 20 l/c/d, or a total of 5,400 m3. The PWA/WBWD has a similar strategy for towns that are not supplied through the network but do not have the capacity to cope with large-scale emergencies. 5. Train teams to operate within a formal organizational structure to ensure the successful delivery of large-scale domestic supplies by water tanker. 6. Have financial liquidity so that funds can quickly be made available for an emergency. In Gaza, the CMWU has identified the procurements necessary to strengthen its medium-term preparedness plans. These procurements include mobile pumps, hoses, electricity generators, suction trucks, evacuation boats, spare parts, and reserve fuel. Furthermore, the hiring of service contracts will be required to maintain and monitor the pumping stations and the collection ponds. Table 4.2 details the necessary items and their cost estimates. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 39 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Table 4.2 Medium-Term DRM Needs Identified by CMWU Item Description Cost Estimate Number (US$000) Needed 1 Reserve fuel, liters 250 250,000 2 Service contracts for maintenance of lagoons 250 and pumps 3 Mobile fuel tank, 500 liters capacity 90 2 4 Mobile pumps, capacity 500 cubic meters/h 300 6 5 Mobile pumps, capacity 250 cubic meters/h 240 6 6 Mobile pump, capacity 100 cubic meters/h 180 6 7 Mobile submersible pumps, capacity 20 cubic 100 20 meters/h 8 Hoses for pumps, different diameters (4, 6, 8 120 inches), 1000 m length each 9 Generators 450 • 88KVA 5 • 100KVA 5 • 250KVA 2 • 500KVA 2 10 Safety tools and equipment 100 11 Suction trucks 300 2 12 Backhoe loader 1000 5 13 Emergency rubber boats (5X2 meter) 10 5 14 Spare parts and equipment 1000 Total 4,390 After analyzing the root causes that caused the floods in the 14 hot spots in Gaza City and other governorates, the CMWU was able to determine that priority investments should be designed to increase the absorptive capacity of storm water collection ponds. These interventions will focus on improving the infiltration capacity of the terrain and the capacity of the pumping stations and the pressure lines, which connect the ponds with the sea outfalls and/or the infiltration basins. These activities also aim to separate the wastewater from the storm water networks in the most vulnerable spots until a master plan for the management of storm water in the Gaza Strip is established and implemented. Table 4.3 details these investments and their cost estimates. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 40 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Table 4.3 Longer-Term DRM Needs Identified by CMWU Item Description Location - Cost Estimate Governorate (US$000) 1 Separate network and pumping stations between Al- Rafah 2,400 Jneineh and Jimezet Assabeel 2 Construct new pumping Station in Western Rafah (Tal Rafah 1,500 Asultan) 3 Construct pumping station and pressure line from Khanyonis 1,500 Khanyounis City to infiltration basin 4 Upgrade Sheikh Radwan Pond, Pump Station No. 4, and Gaza 2,500 pressure line to sea 5 Upgrade pumping stations in Mahader, Aslan, and Al- North 2,000 Karama, which serve North Gaza Governorate 6 Construct box culvert at Wadi Assalqa Middle 500 Total 10,400 Note: According to UNDP, the tendering for this upgrade is in process, but PWA strongly objects to the project and has requested to freeze it. 4.3.2. Energy In the aftermath of the storm, the Palestinian Electricity Transmission company (PETL) assessed the underlying causes of the energy outage in West Bank and Gaza and identified priority projects to be implemented within the next 12–24 months. These investments will restore the affected transmission lines, build new lines and substations, and configure the load to decrease the losses and power cuts during future storms. Table 4.4 details these investments and their cost estimates. Table 4.4 Investments and Intervention Priorities for the Energy Sector (Million US Dollars - MUS$) Outcome: Subsector recovers to pre-flood level Priority Activities Baseline Public/ Short-Term Medium-Term Long-Term Private Needs (MUS$) Needs (MUS$) Needs (MUS$) [6 months] [12-18 months] [18+ months] Restore lines affected Electricity Public 10.0 during storm (6 disruptions in months) some communities Construct new lines (1 Electricity Public 15.0 year) disruptions in some communities Construct new Electricity Public 25.0 substations and disruptions in reconfigure load to some decrease losses and communities power cuts during such storms (2 years) Total US$50.0 West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 41 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 4.3.3. Transport The estimated cost to repair the damages to the transportation sector is US$19.4 million. These damages are related to vehicles, roads, and the fishery port in Gaza. In addition to retrofitting the most critical roads in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for Gaza’s economic activity to get back to normal, it is necessary to rebuild its fishery port. The following repairs will need to be done urgently: a. Provide emergency support to repair the damaged parts of the fishers’ ports, thus enabling fishing business to return to normal b. Provide immediate support to fishers, safeguarding them from losing their livelihoods, and to stop the deterioration of the fishing port infrastructure c. Reduce financial encumbrances on vulnerable fishers by reinstating the bay area to serve its function as proper parking space for boats d. Dredge the seaport basin to its designed depth (10 meters), after conducting an environmental study on the potential negative impact of such work. Figure 10. Emergency Crew during the Initial Response Phase in Gaza 4.3.4 Housing There is no reliable data for the damages in the housing sector in the Gaza Strip. However, an average US$2,000 per household would be needed to repair the damages to the houses. Among the approximately 21,000 households affected, the level of damages varies significantly––from partially damaged to completely destroyed houses. Conservative calculations show that approximately US$42 million will be necessary for housing reconstruction. In the West Bank, approximately US$2.5 million will be required to repair damaged and destroyed homes and related structures, such as retaining walls. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 42 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment 4.3.5 Agriculture and Rural Development (Crops, Livestock, Fisheries, and Land) The details for prioritized interventions to approach the agriculture and livestock sector’s recovery to pre-storm levels are provided in table 4.5. Table 4.5 Recovery and Reconstruction Needs for Agriculture and Livestock in West Bank Outcome: Agriculture subsector recovers to pre-storm level Priority Activities Storm Disruptions Public/ Short-Term Medium-Term Long-Term Private Needs (US$) Needs (US$) Needs (US$) [6 months] [12-18 months] [18+months] Rehabilitate damaged Agriculture production Public 3,000,000 3,000,000 7,000,000 greenhouses to and working enable farmers’ opportunities lost in the return to production southern parts of the West Bank (Hebron, Dora, Yata, and Bethlehem) Establish grapes Grape production and Public 500,000 1,000,000 12,000,000 support units working opportunities lost for 2 years in the southern parts of the West Bank (Hebron, Dora, Yata and Bethlehem) Rehabilitate Transportation Public 576,000 agricultural roads between agricultural land and disrupted communities National risk National risk reduction Public 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 reduction strategy strategy had not been and institutional formulated; low capacity building capacity of MoA to deal with natural disasters Subtotal 4,500,00 5,576,000 20,000,000 Outcome: Livestock subsector recovers to pre-storm level Priority Activities Storm Disruptions Public/ Short-Term Medium-Term Long-Term Private Needs Needs Needs Shelter rehabilitation Repair damaged 5,974,224 shelters and provide temporary shelters for livestock and fodder Veterinary assistance 1,562,000 West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 43 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Fodder compensation Compensation to most 1,095,452 vulnerable farmers for livestock fodder losses Animal death Compensation to most 5,721,430 compensation vulnerable farmers for livestock death Subtotal 7,536,224 1,095,452 5,721,430 Sector total 12,036,224 6,671,452 25,721,430 Source: West Bank Ministry of Agriculture. 4.4 DRM Needs and Recommendations While this rapid assessment focuses on quantifying the impacts of the winter storms in selected sectors, it also provides an insight into the institutional and technical issues that must be addressed to shift from a culture of disaster response to one of disaster prevention and preparedness. The impacts and effects of winter storm Alexa highlighted many of the challenges that authorities and communities in West Bank and Gaza face in preparing for, mitigating, and responding to disasters. The guidance that this assessment provides for a resilient recovery also should catalyze the development of a long-term Disaster Risk Management Strategy and Framework and the identification of the critical infrastructure that requires retrofitting. DRM activities should be considered separately for the West Bank and for Gaza. Even though the Office of Civil Defense in the West Bank acts as the central body for response activities in the entire West Bank and Gaza, response efforts in the Gaza Strip were carried out primarily at the municipality level under the lead of the mayor and with an unspecified command-and-control structure. This section highlights key issues that can be addressed in the short, medium, and long terms. Many of the following recommendations can be considered “low regret” options, both financially and technically, that can be planned and implemented quickly. 1. Develop a sustainable recovery framework to allow West Bank and Gaza to better manage future shocks deriving from natural hazards It is necessary for West Bank and Gaza to shift from response-based ad hoc solutions to proactive prevention. A “Recovery Plan” would facilitate a more effective and efficient recovery process in the event of a disaster. The differentiated response to winter storm Alexa in the West Bank and in Gaza highlighted a gap, although informal, in the national system drawn up by National Law N.3/1998 for the Civil Defense. It is essential that any agency or department mandated to coordinate risk reduction and disaster response activities have significant, recognized legal authority to do so. This Recovery Plan should include measures to:  Strengthen forecasting and monitoring –This would improve the response to fast-impacting natural hazards such as storms. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 44 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment  Develop emergency preparedness, identify response and evacuation routes, retrofit critical infrastructure, empower the agency mandated to coordinate disaster risk management efforts – These activities would improve seismic preparedness, which is the most critical.  Guidance for the Recovery Plan could be provided by the International Recovery Platform, which is developing a standard international approach.20 2. Build a network of hydro-meteorological sensors Although the winter storm was announced in a timely manner and followed by all major meteorological services, nowcasts21 and local forecasts were not available or were inaccurate. Efficient short-term forecasts depend on (i) the type and extent of the storm at synoptic scale,22 (ii) the real-time availability of elevation-pressure-temperature-hygrometry data, and (iii) the capacity to convert them in real time into circulation models. The priorities should be:  Develop an adequate network of sensors (short-term)  Formally and effectively integrate y West Bank and Gaza’s meteorological services with those of neighboring countries, given the trans-boundary nature of the meteorological risks (long-term)  Expand preparedness, prevention, and response to any type of emergency, by improving the capacity to monitor the territory (long-term) Modelling and forecasting natural disasters is also the main pathway to manage the effects of climate change in West Bank and Gaza. 3. Prepare the communities for emergencies Communities at risk should be able to independently carry out self-protection and impact mitigation actions. Priority actions to improve preparedness should be:  Community trainings and simulations at the local and national level: These should be based on lessons learned from other countries with similar risk profiles (exceptional rainfalls and floods); and on hypothetical scenarios for natural hazards with low recurrence rates (such as earthquakes, storm surges, tsunamis). Community preparedness and simulations should also be included in the national Development Plan. 20 The key role of the International Recovery Platform (IRP) is to identify gaps and constraints experienced in post- disaster recovery and to catalyze the development of tools, resources, and capacity for resilient recovery. IRP aims to be an international source of knowledge on good recovery practice (http://www.recoveryplatform.org/). 21 According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), nowcasting comprises the detailed description of the current weather along with forecasts obtained by extrapolation for 0 hours to 6 hours ahead. In this time range, it is possible to forecast small features such as individual storms with reasonable accuracy (https://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/amp/pwsp/Nowcasting.htm). 22 “…”synoptic” means "view together" or "view at a common point" (https://www.google.com/#q=noaa+synoptic+weather+maps). According to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’s Weather Service, “synoptic” is “ The spatial scale of the migratory high and low pressure systems of the lower troposphere, with wavelengths of 1000 km to 2500 km.” West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 45 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment  Creation of formal volunteer networks through legislation. These policies also would provide for appropriate training and for the command, control, and communication structure necessary to coordinate volunteer efforts.  Develop, validate, and test disaster risk management and emergency response plans at both the national and the governorate levels 4. Develop a long-term DRM framework Based on analyses of the storm in January 2013 and in December 2013, disaster and risk reduction policy making should become a national priority in the Palestinian development plan. Additional key elements for the development of a long-term DRM framework follow.  Conduct a comprehensive multi-hazard risk assessment. A risk assessment is the first step to understand key vulnerabilities and risks faced in West Bank and Gaza, and it is essential to plan for long-term risk reduction. A multihazard risk assessment and a climate risk assessment should be conducted at the earliest opportunity. These risk assessments will help all stakeholders understand the primary natural hazards faced in West Bank and Gaza, how these hazards may vary by the projected impacts of climate change, the critical infrastructure at risk, and which communities face higher risks from natural hazards.  Strengthen emergency management capacity. The main tools are: - The development of communications systems, geographic information systems (GIS), and monitoring and early warning. - The improvement of institutional coordination, including activation of the Higher Council for Emergency Response, foreseen by Law #03/1998 under the Civil Defense, which is led by the Deputy Minister of Interior. An advanced operation center should also be established to coordinate all functions across agencies and departments. - The clarification of roles and responsibilities. There is no clear codification of structure, criteria, priorities, and command chain at the municipality level, thus raising substantial questions about risk management capacity and disaster response.  Ensure appropriate maintenance of alleys and gullies. Gaza Municipality mobilized emergency teams to clean gullies (wadis) 24 hours after the flooding occurred. In a change of mindset, servicing and keeping gullies clean should be considered as a necessary risk prevention measure, rather than the response to an ongoing hydraulic emergency.  Increase community involvement through public awareness campaigns and introduce DRM in the educational curricula. Issues of DRM and preparedness should be communicated through public awareness campaigns and integrated in national school curricula, starting with primary school. Integration of these topics in other countries’ educational systems has proven an effective tool to strengthen a culture of prevention. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 46 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Figure 11. Neighbors in Gaza Row through the Streets to Help Evacuate Citizens 4.5 Transitional Recovery and Reconstruction Framework To utilize the recovery and reconstruction process to also contribute to long-term risk reduction, the priorities of the recovery process should be sequenced to make the recovery efficient but still flexible. The development of a transitional recovery framework will help guide the development of an overall recovery plan that takes into account the priorities and the available financing. Section 4.5 broadly prioritizes each of the sectoral needs and provides an indicative timeframe. A recovery plan should remain flexible to respond to the needs of the affected communities. The needs here listed are not exhaustive, and this section does not provide guidelines on financing recovery or on the institutional capacity of various actors to implement the recovery. These issues must be addressed later in the recovery process during the development of the overall recovery plan. Prioritization of recovery activities was done in each sector prior to the compilation of this transitional recovery framework. This basic framework is separated according to short (S: 6 months), medium (M: 12-18 months), and long-term priorities (L: beyond 18 months). West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 47 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Table 4.6 Aggregated Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Recovery Needs Sector Activity Estimated Cost Timeframe Details (US$) (Short, Medium-, Long-Term) Agriculture Rehabilitate damaged greenhouses to enable 13,000,000 S farmers to return to production Agriculture Establish grapes support units 13,500,000 S Agriculture Rehabilitate agricultural roads 576,000 S Agriculture Write national risk reduction strategy and 3,000,000 L institutional capacity building Agriculture Repair damaged shelters and provide 7,223,604 S temporary shelters for livestock and fodder Agriculture Provide veterinary assistance 1,562,500 S Agriculture Compensate livestock fodder losses 1,095,452 M Agriculture Compensate most vulnerable farmers for 4,474,587 L livestock death Energy Restore lines affected during the storm 10,000,000 S Energy Construct new transmission lines 15,000,000 M Energy Construct new substations and reconfigure 25,000,000 L load to decrease losses and power cuts during such storms Water and Repair vehicles and equipment; repair 1,243,000 S For North Sanitation pumping stations and water wells; repair Gaza, Gaza electric panels and generators; replenish City, Middle, spare parts Kahnyounis, and Rafah Governorates Water and Repair and replace mobile pumps 940,000 M Sanitation Water and Repair and replace generators 450,000 M Sanitation Water and Repair mobile fuel tank and replenish reserve 340,000 M Sanitation fuel Water and Repair and replace tools and equipment, 2,410,000 M Sanitation vehicles (suction trucks and backhoe loaders), and emergency boats Water and Separate network and pumping stations 2,400,000 L Long-term Sanitation between Al-Jneineh and Jimezet Assabeel DRM need West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 48 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Water and Construct new pumping station in Western 1,500,000 L Long-term Sanitation Rafah (Tal Asultan) DRM need Water and Construct pumping station and pressure line 1,500,000 L Long-term Sanitation from Khanyounis City to infiltration basin DRM need Water and Upgrade Sheikh Radwan Pond, Pump Station 2,500,000 L Long-term Sanitation No. 4, and pressure line to the sea DRM need Water and Upgrade pumping stations in Mahader, Aslan, 2,000,000 L Long-term Sanitation and Al-Karama, serving North Gaza DRM need Governorate Water and Construction of box culvert at Wadi Assalqa 500,000 L Long-term Sanitation DRM need Transport Fill potholes and rehabilitate surface 10,000,000 M Total needs for recovery and reconstruction $120,215,143 West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 49 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Appendixes Appendix 1. Participants in the Rapid Assessment Name* Title Organization Email Najeh Ayyash Director of Planning Civil Defense najehayyash@yahoo.com Paolo Curradi EU Representative EU paolo.curradi@eeas.europa.eu Nibal Najjar Head of Planning and Jerusalem Water nibal-jaffa@yahoo.com Projects Management Undertaking Abdel Mughni Nofal Director General MDLF abednofal@mdlf.org.ps Nizar Samhan Strategic Planning MDLF nsamhan@mdlf.org.ps Manager Azmi Abdel Rahman Director MET azmia@met.gov.ps Meerna Jasser Head Ministry of mirnaj@met.gov.ps National Economy Rashad Yousef Statistics Dep. MNA rashady@met.gov.ps Ashraf Barakat Director MOA ash_bar@hotmail.com Moayed Salman Head of Ruminant MOA moayednas@yahoo.com Division Alaa Nofal Division Director of MOPAD anofal@mop.gov.ps Aid Management Dana Erekat Head of Aid MOPAD derekat@mop.gov.ps Management Afif Said D.A MOPWH afifalisaid@yahoo.com Bassam Shalan G.D. MOPWH bmshalan@yahoo.com Fayeq Deek Deputy Minister MOPWH Islam Ahmad G.D. MOPWH islamjaber@yahoo.com Walid Elastal Director MOT welastal@yahoo.co.uk Hasan Hamarsha Coordination NDC hasan@ndc.ps Antoine Waldburger Humanitarian Affairs UNOCHA waldburger@un.org Officer Diana Anani Humanitarian Affairs UNOCHA ananid@un.org Officer Elana Ramahi Coordination UNOCHA ramahi@un.org Basema Shukair Project Manager PARC basema@pal-arc.org Izzat Zedan Program Manager PARC izzat@pal-arc.org Ibrahim Adwan IT Manager PETL ibrahim.adwan@petl.ps Almutaz Abadi Adviser of Head of Aid PWA mutaz.abadi@gmail.com Management Salam Abuhantash PWA salamahah@gmail.com West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 50 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Husam Tubail UNDP husam.tubail@undp.org Rima Abumiddain Team Leader UNDP rima.abumiddain@undp.org Subha Ghannam WASH Cluster UNICEF sghannam@unicef.org James Galloway Program Manager UNOPS jamesg@unops.org Shifa Jayouse Prog. Coord. Officer UNSCO jayousi@un.org Alejandra Linares-Rivas DRM Analyst World Bank alinaresrivas@worldbank.org Andrea Zanon Senior DRM Specialist World Bank azanon@worldbank.org Bjorn Philipp Senior Urban Specialist World Bank bphilipp@worldbank.org Fabrizio Ferucci Senior DRM Specialist World Bank fabrizio.ferrucci@open.ac.uk Iyad Rammal Senior Infrastructure World Bank irammal@worldbank.org Specialist Khalida Qutob Program Assistant World Bank kalqutob@worldbank.org Sajid Anwar DRM Specialist World Bank sanwar@worldbank.org Zeyad Abu Hassanein Senior Water and World Bank zabuhassanein@worldbank.org Sanitation Specialist *Note: This list compiles some the names of the people who participated in the assessment, even though some of them were not involved in all of the activities. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 51 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Appendix 2. Existing DRM Initiatives in West Bank and Gaza Implementing Activity Agency Palestinian Red Activities and services of the Disaster Management program include (i) capacity Crescent Society building and training exercises to increase staff’s preparedness , (ii) risk reduction efforts to enhance local communities’ disaster response capacities , (iii) school- based risk reduction to develop students’ and teachers’ capacities, (iv) risk and vulnerability awareness campaigns, and (v) an emergency response program for emergencies caused by natural hazards or conflict. UNDP/PAPP “National Strategy and Action Plan for Combating Desertification”: Project aims to (Programme of assist the PA develop a strategy to combat desertification in arid, semi-arid, and dry Assistance to the subhumid regions. Project also will help implement the United Nations Convention Palestinian People) to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). UNDP/PAPP “Rapid Support to Livelihoods and Social Services in Gaza and Advanced Planning for Early Recovery”: This project aims to prevent a total collapse of essential service delivery, while planning for multistakeholder early recovery. It will enhance resilience of the Gaza Strip residents through (i) the provision of quick impact livelihood support and (ii) the restoration and maintenance of emergency and essential services delivery capacities through civil society organizations (CSOs). UNDP/PAPP “Development and Rehabilitation of Water and Electricity Networks in Nablus City”: The project objective is to develop and rehabilitate the existing networks to enable the municipality to better manage their water and electricity services and to provide more reliable services and reduce intermittent water supply and intermittent power supply. UNISDR (UN Office Strengthening national capacity in the monitoring and reporting on implementation for Disaster Risk progress of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). This activity has enabledWest Reduction) Bank and Gaza to report twice through the Global HFA Monitor Tool (in 2011 and 2013). UNISDR Strengthening knowledge and awareness of Palestinian DRM stakeholders by engaging them in regional and global DRM activities and forums. UNISDR Supporting the establishment of a national disaster loss database to take account of all historical disaster losses for the past 3 decades using international standards and methodology. This database has been coordinated and funded through UNISDR since July 2013 and was completed by in March 2014. The disaster loss database will enable the development of a national risk profile and will be a cornerstone in any risk assessment process and DRM investment policy. This database also is contributing to a regional initiative on climate change vulnerability assessment for the water sector, led by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. West Bank and Gaza | Winter Storm Alexa, December 2013 52 Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment Engaging 8 municipalities/local authorities in the Making Cities Resilient Campaign, UNISDR working toward enhanced capacity of local actors to reduce and manage disaster risk. Six of them are in the West Bank and 2 in Gaza. These 8 municipalities have formally joined the Global Campaign, and have participated in exchange fora with other municipalities worldwide to share knowledge on DRM. The municipalities will be guided to implement a local government self-assessment on DRM. One of them, Ramallah, recently won the Rockefeller Resilience Award for its efforts. UNISDR Several advocacy activities have been done with Al Najah University and its disaster risk reduction center targeting urban planners, local governments, and policymakers. UNOCHA The “2014 Strategic Response Plan” aims to enhance the protection of populations in Gaza, Area C, the Seam Zone, and East Jerusalem by improving equitable access to essential services, among other means. It also aims to improve the food security and livelihoods of vulnerable communities by improving economic access to food. UNOCHA The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) in West Bank and Gaza was established in August 2007 to provide rapid allocation and disbursement of funds to NGOs and UN agencies to support humanitarian activities at the sudden onset of emergencies. ERF funding has two priorities. The first is to provide an immediate response to unforeseen emergencies through life-saving interventions and/or preventing the further erosion of livelihood assets and coping mechanisms of the affected communities. The second priority is to strategically fill gaps in funding within a humanitarian response plan until mainstream humanitarian funding is available. UNRWA The UN agency has several programs geared toward emergency response services for Palestinian refugees, with interventions in food aid, the water and sanitation sector, temporary shelters, emergency cash assistance, cash for work programs, emergency education, emergency health services, and reconstruction. WFP “Strengthening the Food Security Coordination Platform in the State of Palestine”: The Food Security Sector (FSS) in West Bank and Gaza was created in December 2012 to establish a food coordination mechanism. It covers the food security continuum from humanitarian to development and includes stakeholders from 3 former sectors which have been combined into 1: food assistance, agriculture, and cash for work. FSS is now the primary source of information and analysis on the food security situation in West Bank and Gaza. It coordinates humanitarian/development food security strategy and operations. WFP The “Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations” aim to meet immediate food needs, enhance food consumption, and improve dietary diversity. The operations will promote long-term resilience and support the national social safety net by developing capacity for monitoring food security and increasing the PA’s capacity to manage food and voucher programs. WFP “Emergency Food Assistance to the Nonrefugee Population in Gaza Strip”: To offset the ongoing ban on exports and some imports in Gaza. 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