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Delivering Assistance to Conflict-Affected Communities

The BRA-KDP Program in Aceh

Adrian Morel | Makiko Watanabe | Robert Wrobel

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The full range of publications associated with the broader study of local conflict in Indonesia (of which this report is a product) is available online at www.conflictanddevelopment.org.

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Preface

The end of the conflict in Aceh led to the arrival of a range of different programs aimed at 'reintegrating' former combatants and providing assistance to conflict-affected groups. The BRA-KDP program was an innovative attempt by local and national governments to employ lessons learned from successful community-development programs to post-conflict Aceh. The program, designed and implemented with support from the World Bank, delivered around US$ 21.7 million to over 1,700 conflict-affected villages, aiming to support the welfare of conflict victims while building social cohesion and trust in the state.

Did BRA-KDP work? What did the program achieve? What challenges were faced and were they addressed successfully? What lessons can be learnt from the BRA-KDP experience that might be useful to similar programs in the future? This paper addresses these questions by presenting an assessment of program achievements drawing from data and evidence from the project's Monitoring Information Supervision (MIS) system, supervision missions and qualitative fieldwork. It should be read in conjunction with a complementary impact evaluation, *Community-Based Reintegration in Aceh: Assessing the Impacts of BRA-KDP* (Indonesian Social Development Paper number 12), which identifies project impacts on welfare, social cohesion, and trust in government.

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Executive Summary

The Community-based Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims (or BRA-KDP) channeled over US$ 20 million to 1,724 conflict-affected villages across 67 sub-districts in 17 districts from August 2006 to August 2007. The program was designed and implemented after earlier attempts by the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency (BRA) to apply an individual proposal-based system to identify and assist conflict victims proved unsuccessful, and an alternative mechanism was needed. BRA, with technical assistance from the World Bank, adapted the community-based block grant mechanism utilized by the Government of Indonesia's Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) to empower communities to decide who is a victim and what kind of assistance victims would receive. All villages within the targeted sub-districts received block grants ranging from Rp. 60 million (US$ 6,000) to Rp. 170 million (US$ 17,000) depending on the intensity of past conflict in the sub-district and the village population size. The primary objective of BRA-KDP was to improve the living conditions of conflict-affected communities and conflict victims by delivering development assistance tailored to local needs.

Main findings

The program aimed to identify and deliver assistance to conflict-affected villagers. The responsibility for identifying who was eligible to benefit, by how much, and in what ways was devolved to communities who made these decisions through a series of village meetings. Overall, this process went well. While funds were spread to a large proportion of households in target areas, communities differentiated categories of beneficiaries based on levels of conflict-affectedness. The 'most-affected' conflict victims were prioritized and received larger amounts of assistance.

Community participation in program meetings, even amongst vulnerable groups such as conflict victims and women, was strong: 40 to 56 percent of households were represented at key meetings of the program cycle. Conflict victims showed satisfactory levels of participation and awareness of program objectives and processes. A large proportion of women attended meetings, although the quality of their involvement in decision-making processes often proved poor. Ex-combatants interacted with and influenced BRA-KDP in positive and negative ways. The nature of the relationship with former combatants varied across areas and was influenced by the local conflict history, relations between ex-combatants and villagers and the level of influence former combatants retained over communities after the peace agreement and, above all, the ways in which program facilitators engaged with former combatants. Despite the fact that program procedures prevented ex-combatants from benefiting directly from the program, they were broadly supportive and sometimes played a very constructive role in socializing and implementing the program. A number of attempts by former combatants at capturing funds through extortion or by exerting pressures on villagers were resolved peacefully after mediation by program stakeholders.

BRA-KDP had positive welfare impacts in target areas. The program applied an open menu, which made both public and private goods eligible for funding. Communities overwhelmingly

preferred economic activities over public goods. Eighty-nine percent of funds were spent on livelihoods projects. Communities associated BRA-KDP with compensation for the conflict and opted for projects that would provide direct individual benefits. The large majority of beneficiaries invested funds in productive activities, such as the purchase of livestock and agriculture inputs. Technical assistance for small-scale livelihoods projects provided through the program was inadequate and efforts to link beneficiaries with outside sources of know-how and capital fell short.

Levels of satisfaction were high and communities felt that BRA-KDP was successful in providing a well-needed injection of capital as well as fulfilling the needs of conflict victims for compensation and recognition. The program instituted a complaints handling system that tracked complaints over time and provided information and clarification of program procedures. Complaints over BRA's shift from a proposal-based to a community-based system for assisting conflict victims, the amounts of sub-district and village block grant allocations, and implementation delays decreased over time as a result of intensive socialization activities and as funds hit the ground.

Implications and Recommendations

BRA-KDP could have been more effective had several modifications been made. These include the articulation of a clear policy stance by government linking BRA-KDP assistance to the obligations defined in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, upgrading the skills of program facilitators to assist communities in the process of identifying conflict victims, and linking small-scale livelihoods sub-projects to outside sources of technical assistance and capital.

Policy makers in Aceh should continue to leverage KDP, now called the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM Mandiri), to channel assistance to conflict-affected villages throughout the province. In 2009, the new Financial Assistance for Village Prosperity program (BKPG) will channel around US$ 100 million in provincial and district government funds through PNPM to all villages in Aceh. The government should explore possibilities of using BRA-KDP's targeting mechanism within BKPG to deliver private goods to vulnerable groups. Future development programs in Aceh should avoid targeting mechanisms linked to conflict-era identities. Instead, programs should apply targeting mechanisms based on indicators of welfare, such as unemployment, education, and asset levels.

Experience from BRA-KDP is relevant to DDR and community-driven development practitioners in conflict-affected countries and regions, as well as for policy makers in other parts of Indonesia. BRA-KDP's positive welfare impacts suggest that funds intended as compensation can have developmental impacts provided that the proper delivery mechanisms are in place. This questions the widely held assumption that DDR programs must follow a sequence in which compensation is delivered prior to implementing programs with a developmental focus. In terms of targeting, the program proved more successful when beneficiaries were identified strictly based on criteria related to conflict loss and victimhood. This suggests that

community-based DDR programs should allow all groups, including former combatants for which other targeted programs may exist, access to program benefits provided that targeting criteria are based on welfare indicators rather than identity.

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Glossary

Acronyms

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
CDD	Community-Driven Development
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
Forbes	Joint Forum to Support Peace in Aceh (*Forum Bersama Perdamaian Aceh)*
GAM	Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*); organization formerly seeking Acehnese independence
GoI	Government of Indonesia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
Kodam	Provincial Command of the Indonesian armed forces
KPA	Aceh Transition Committee (*Komite Peralihan Aceh*); name for demobilized GAM
LoGA	Law on the Governing of Aceh
MIS	Management Information System
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding (the peace agreement signed between GAM and GoI in Helsinki on August 15, 2005)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PETA	Defenders of the Homeland (*Pembela Tanah Air*): anti-separatist front
RRI	Indonesian State Radio (*Radio Republik Indonesia*)
Tapol/ Napol	Amnestied political prisoners (*Tahanan Politik/ Narapidana Politik*)
TNI	Indonesian armed forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*)
UNDDR	United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center
WB	World Bank

Indonesian Jurisdictional Levels

Kotamadya	Urban Districts (five in Aceh)
Kabupaten	Rural District (18 in Aceh)
Kecamatan	Sub-district (276 in Aceh)

Desa	Village (6,411 in Aceh)
Dusun	Sub-village/hamlet

Government Ministries

Bappenas	National Development Planning Agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional*)
Dinsos	Department of Social Affairs, provincial level (*Dinas Sosial*)
KPPN	Office of State Treasury (*Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara*)
PMD	Community Development division of the Ministry of Home Affairs, provincial level

Government Positions

Bupati	Rural District Head
Camat	Sub-District Head
Geuchik	Village Head (Acehnese)
Kepala Desa	Village Head
Walikota	Mayor of Urban District

BRA-KDP Terms

ARLS	Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys
Bapel	Agency responsible for implementing BRA programs (*Badan Pelaksana*)
BKPG	Financial Assistance for Village Development program (*Bantuan Keuangan Pemakmur Gampong*)
BRA	Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency (*Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh*)
BRA-KDP	Community-Based Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims program
DOK	Operational funds (*Dana Operasional Kegiatan*)
FD	Village Facilitator (*Fasilitator Desa*)
FK	Sub-District Facilitator (*Fasilitator Kecamatan*)
KDP	Kecamatan Development Program
KM	District Management Consultant (*Konsultan Managemen Kabupaten*)
MAD	Kecamatan Development Forum (*Musyawarah Antar Desa*)
MD	Village Meeting (*Musyawarah Desa*)

MD I	First Village Meeting (*Musyawarah Desa I*)
MD II	Second Village Meeting (*Musyawarah Desa II*)
MD III	Third Village Meeting (*Musyawarah Desa III*)
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PjOK	Sub-district level Development Coordinator
PL	Field Assistant (*Pendamping Lokal*)
PNPM	National Community Development Program (*Program Nasional Pengembangan Masyarakat*)
PTO	Operational Guidelines
RMU	Regional Management Unit
TK-PPK	KDP Coordination Team (*Tim Koordinasi PPK*)
TPK	Project Implementation Team at the village level (*Tim Pelaksanaan Kegiatan*)
UPK	Implementation Management Unit at the sub-district level (*Unit Pengelolaan Kegiatan*)

Other Terms

Bagi rata	Equal division of block grants across all individuals or households in a given village
Diyat	Form of compensation
Meunasah	Village community hall, also typically used for religious teaching and prayers
Musyawarah	Meeting where decisions are made based on deliberation and consensus
Mukim	Traditional figure
Panglima	Commander
Panglima wilayah	Commander at *wilayah* level
Pilkada	Local executive elections
Wilayah	Region, roughly equivalent to district

BRA-KDP Target Sites



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Peace Process in Aceh

On 15 August 2005, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) putting an end to a separatist conflict that lasted nearly thirty years and resulted in almost 30,000 deaths. Almost four years on, much progress has been made towards consolidating peace in Aceh. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) successfully oversaw the destruction of 840 GAM weapons and the withdrawal of 31,681 police and military by the end of December 2005. On 11 July 2006, the Indonesian national parliament passed the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), as required under the MoU. In 2006, during Aceh's first direct local executive elections, GAM-affiliated independent candidates Irwandi-Nazar won a landslide victory in the gubernatorial race, and GAM-affiliated candidates won half the regency contests. Despite sporadic violence, the 2009 legislative elections took place without major incident. Partai Aceh, the local political party formed by GAM, fell just short of obtaining an absolute majority in the provincial parliament and secured over half the seats in seven district legislatures, a further step in the transformation of the former separatist movement into a democratic political organization.

Despite these early successes, the transition from conflict to sustainable peace will take many years. Experience from other post-conflict contexts demonstrates that a serious risk of renewed conflict exists for a number of years after any peace agreement (Collier et. al. 2003). The Aceh conflict had significant impacts, which continue to shape social and state-society relations. Thousands of lives were lost, thousands more were traumatized, the economy was severely stunted, civil society was weakened, and government capacity reduced (MSR 2009). While the initial return of combatants and former political prisoners occurred without serious problem, addressing their needs as well as those of the wider community is crucial to healing the fractures in society and ensuring sustainable peace.

The MoU mandated the establishment of a Reintegration Fund, financed out of the national budget and managed by provincial government, to address many of these challenges and to facilitate the reintegration of former conflict actors into social and economic life.[1] The *Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh* (Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency or BRA) was established in February 2006 to oversee the reintegration process, and developed a series of programs targeting key population groups. To carry out these programs, the Indonesian government budgeted Rp. 1.5 trillion (approximately US$ 150 million)[2] for the Reintegration Fund for 2005-2007.[3] The

[1] "GoI and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil society. These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. A Reintegration Fund under the administration of the authorities of Aceh will be established" (Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, Clause 3.2.3).

[2] The exchange rate used throughout this report is of US$ 1 = Rp. 10,000.

[3] The central government allocated BRA a budget of Rp. 200 billion (US$ 20 million) in 2005, Rp. 600 billion (US$ 60 million) in 2006 and Rp. 700 billion (US$ 70 million) in 2007, by which time it was anticipated that BRA

Reintegration Fund provided social and economic assistance (see Table 1.1). The former included compensation for the relatives of those dead or missing due to the conflict, housing assistance, assistance for physically disabled people, and medical assistance. The latter provided a set amount of compensation to different target groups such as former combatants, political prisoners and conflict victims.

Table 1.1 BRA Reintegration Programs 2005-2007

Category	Planned no. of beneficiaries	Form of assistance	Amount (US$)
GAM combatants	3,000	Cash	2,500 / person
GAM "non-combatants"	6,200	Cash	1,000 / person
Political prisoners	2,035	Cash	1,000 / person
Pro-Indonesia militia groups	5,000	Cash	1,000 / person
GAM who surrendered before the MoU (and who usually joined the militia groups)	3,204	Cash	500 / person
Medical assistance	3 packets	In-kind assistance	500,000 / year
Village-based assistance (2006 to mid-2007)	1,724 villages	Village grants	6,000 – 17,000 / village
Individual conflict victim assistance (mid-to late 2007)	1,059 persons	Cash	1,000 / person
Compensation for loss of family member (*diyat*)	33,424 persons	Cash	300 / person per year
Housing assistance	31,187 units	Cash allocation	3,500 / house
Assistance for the physically disabled	14,932 persons	Cash	1,000 / person

Source: Forbes (2007a; 2007v); BRA (2008); communication with BRA members

1.2 Community-Based Assistance for the Reintegration of Conflict Victims

The Reintegration Fund included support for conflict victims. In April 2006, BRA invited all individuals who suffered conflict-related losses to send proposals directly to BRA. This process proved untenable as over 48,500 requests for funds were submitted, and BRA had no means to research and verify these proposals (Sharpe and Sim 2009). At the request of BRA, the World Bank supported the design of an alternative delivery system that utilized the existing Government of Indonesia's Kecamatan Development Program (Box 1.1).

would have completed its mandate and its functions would be mainstreamed into existing government structures. The combined contribution of central and provincial governments to the reintegration effort amounts to Rp 1.7 billion or US$ 170 million and represents just under half of the total amount of post-conflict assistance committed to Aceh (Rp 3.7 trillion or US$ 370 million). The other half has come from donors, the private sector and NGOs. (MSR 2009).

Box 1.1 The Kecamatan Development Program and PNPM in Indonesia and Aceh

KDP was a joint World Bank–Government community development program that was first launched in 1998 at the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Over three phases delivered from 1998 to 2007, the program channeled US$ 1.4 billion of World Bank loans and grants and national government funds to 33,500 of the poorest villages, almost half of Indonesia's communities.

KDP consisted of a straight-forward system of decision-making and administration. Block grants of between US$ 60,000-170,000 for each sub-district (*kecamatan*) were provided directly to collective accounts at that level. These grants were used for almost anything villagers identified as a development priority for their village.

In 2008, the Government of Indonesia decided to scale-up KDP to achieve national coverage, under the umbrella of the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM). In 2009-2010, PNPM-KDP will channel grants of up to US$ 300,000 to every sub-district nationwide, covering each of the archipelago's 70,000 communities. The central government will scale-up its financial contribution to the program to full financing by 2011, and plans to extend program implementation until at least 2015.

In Aceh, KDP operated throughout the conflict years and was used as a platform through which to respond to the tsunami. After that disaster, KDP was scaled-up to cover every rural village in the province. It was the first large international post-tsunami project to start and finish. Over a two-year period, the project covered every sub-district in Aceh and Nias, reaching almost 6,000 villages. Given coverage and past successes, KDP provided a mechanism for channeling reintegration funds to conflict-affected areas.

Recently, the provincial government of Aceh elected to use PNPM as a key instrument in its development strategy. Launched in 2009, the Financial Assistance for Village Development (BKPG) program will provide grants of Rp. 150 million (approximately US$ 15,000) to every village in Aceh through the PNPM mechanism. BKPG is financed jointly by provincial government (Rp. 100 million per village) and district governments (Rp. 50 million per village) and is the largest sub-national poverty program in Indonesia.

KDP was identified as an appropriate platform through which to deliver assistance to conflict victims and conflict-affected communities. The program had demonstrated its ability to operate in sensitive conflict and post-conflict areas. It was able to sustain its Aceh activities since 1998, despite the continuing conflict, in large part because of its popularity with the community and its perceived political neutrality. KDP has also successfully operated in other conflict areas in Indonesia, including Poso, Ambon, and Central and West Kalimantan.

A number of KDP's design elements made it a suitable mechanism for distributing reintegration assistance. First, the program design emphasizes equity, transparency and accountability. These principles are important in all development projects, but are even more vital in post-conflict contexts. Second, the program devolves decision-making to the local level. All decisions on fund allocation in KDP are made at the village and sub-district levels, ensuring that local knowledge is utilized. Given the scarcity of resources, and difficulties in ensuring accurate targeting, involving communities in decision-making can make resource allocations more acceptable. Allowing communities to decide who should benefit and what the money should be spent on increases their ownership. This in turn can curb elite capture and makes communities more receptive to the outcomes of the program.

BRA-KDP delivered around Rp. 204 billion (US$ 20.4 million) in block-grants[4] to 1,724 villages in 67 sub-districts across 17 districts. It was initially planned that BRA-KDP would be implemented over two years, with around Rp. 564 billion (approximately US$ 56 million) of central government funding channeled to every rural village in Aceh in two successive rounds. However, as the first round was nearing completion in mid-2007, BRA decided to revert to its initial scheme of individually-targeted assistance and BRA-KDP's second round was never implemented.

BRA-KDP allowed communities to propose almost any kind of project; beneficiaries could be the entire community, a group of villagers or individuals, depending on the community's decision. Villagers affected by conflict were the principle target group and had to benefit from the program.

1.3 Structure, Aims & Methods

This paper presents an overview of BRA-KDP's achievements, an analysis of issues faced, and provides recommendations for community-driven development (CDD) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) practitioners designing or overseeing programs that use community-based mechanisms to deliver reintegration assistance. It should be read in conjunction with an accompanying impact evaluation (Barron et. Al. 2009). This paper draws on four primary sources: (i) a survey of KDP district facilitators; (ii) joint supervision missions; (iii) KDP's Management Information System (MIS) database; and (iv) findings from the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys.

KDP District Facilitator Survey. A telephone survey of all KDP district facilitators was conducted in November 2006. The aim was to get a snap-shot of progress before funds reached the ground and to identify key technical and socio-political issues that could affect program implementation. This also allowed for the identification of districts that needed special attention. A total of 25 responses (24 male and one female) from 15 out of 17 districts (responses from Aceh Jaya and Nagan Raya were missing) were collected. A focus group discussion with representatives from six diverse districts was conducted for more in-depth discussion.

Supervision Missions. In order to capture a more detailed picture of progress and implementation dynamics, the World Bank, together with BRA and KDP's Regional Management Unit (RMU), conducted three major supervision missions. These missions covered a combined two-thirds of project locations (44 out of 67 sub-districts) – see Annex B. The first mission was conducted in November 2006 before funds were disbursed to target villages. A more comprehensive supervision mission was conducted in March 2007 when implementation was well underway. Five teams surveyed 20 sub-districts across eleven districts, almost

[4] The total budget of the program was of Rp. 217.7 billion (US$ 21.7 million), of which 94 percent were disbursed to beneficiary communities as block grants, while the remaining six percent were used to cover program operational expenses at sub-district (three percent) and village (three percent) levels.

one-third of target sub-districts. A third supervision mission was held in July and late September 2007 to make an initial assessment of program outcomes. In all three missions, selection of target areas took into account geographic diversity, representation of diverse levels of conflict-affectedness, population size, and the size of block grants. Interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted with a wide range of informants including BRA district-level officials, KDP facilitators, ex-GAM combatants, Homeland Defenders Front (PETA) members, local government, community leaders, conflict victims, and women heads of household.

MIS Database. Project data was used to obtain information on program progress, participation rates at inter-village and village meetings, samples of proposals prioritized by villagers, and conflict victim maps.

Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS). A large survey was carried out one year after completion of the program, from July to September 2008 to evaluate program impacts in three distinct areas: welfare of the conflict victims and conflict-affected communities; reintegration and social cohesion; and trust in local government and state-society relations. 2,150 randomly selected households, as well as all village heads, were interviewed in 215 villages spread across each of the 67 rural sub-districts that received BRA-KDP, and 215 matched control villages that did not benefit from the program but were otherwise similar. These surveys included detailed measures of household welfare, social cohesion and attitudes towards government, to assess how villages treated in BRA-KDP differed post-program from those that were not treated. The present paper uses preliminary findings from the ARLS, but a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of the survey's results is presented in the separate impact evaluation paper (Barron et. al. 2009).

The paper is divided into seven sections plus annexes:

- Section II gives a brief description of the program and the program cycle;
- Section III discusses how communities handled the challenging tasks of identifying conflict victims and directing assistance to the most-affected;
- Section IV looks at participation and inclusion issues, including ways that ex-combatants interacted with the program;
- Section V discusses beneficiary communities' usage of funds and program welfare impacts;
- Section VI assesses the level of satisfaction of communities with program outcomes and provides an analysis of main complaints and concerns;
- Section VII provides a summary of findings and recommendations.

2. THE BRA-KDP PROGRAM

The design of the BRA-KDP program differed in a number of ways from regular KDP. This section describes the BRA-KDP program: its objectives, target areas, institutional arrangements, and the basic program cycle. It also outlines arrangements made to assure quality and promote institutional learning.

2.1 Objectives of BRA-KDP

BRA-KDP aimed to deliver quick assistance to conflict-affected villagers to improve their material wellbeing in the short-term. In addition, it sought to promote social cohesion, to strengthen village-level decision-making institutions, and to cultivate greater faith in governmental institutions in the aftermath of the conflict (Box 2.1). A previous World Bank study on the efficacy of KDP suggested that by applying the principles of participation, transparency, local choice and accountability, community-driven development programs help improve inter-group and state-society relations, which in turn builds immunity to violent conflicts (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 2006). BRA-KDP applied the community-driven development approach to reintegration with the hope that it would improve relations between various conflict-affected groups, including ex-combatants, IDPs, conflict victims, and the state.

Box 2.1 Objectives of BRA-KDP

- Deliver quick assistance to conflict-affected villagers in a transparent and accepted manner to help stabilize the security situation and to ensure reintegration funds do not lead to new conflict
- Enhance productive economic activities or activities that enhance conflict-affected individuals' and communities' living conditions through economic or community infrastructure projects
- Enhance community participation and involvement in deciding priority activities that help address peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction
- Promote cohesion and a culture of peace in villages and develop and strengthen the development of institutions in villages for this purposes

2.2 Target Areas and Allocations

BRA-KDP targeted 1,724 villages across 67 sub-districts in 17 districts, or around one-third of villages in Aceh. Urban areas did not receive the program. Target sub-districts were selected based on conflict intensity[5] and past performance in regular KDP. All villages within the selected sub-districts received block grants varying from Rp. 60 million (approximately US$ 6,000) and Rp. 170 million (approximately US$ 17,000), with the amount dependent on the intensity of past conflict in the sub-district and the population of the village (Table 2.1). Villages

[5] Conflict intensity was calculated at the sub-district level based on the following nine indicators: conflict victims (2002 Dinsos); conflict victims (2003 Dinsos); conflict victims (2004 Dinsos); military intensity (Kodam); GAM returnee estimates (AMM/WB); political prisoners (IOM), GAM-GoI incidents (2005 Aceh Kita & Serambi); perceptions of safety pre-MoU (WB); and perceptions of conflict pre-MoU (WB). Insufficient information existed to target by conflict intensity at the village level.

were divided into three bands based on population—large (over 700 persons), medium (300 – 699 persons), and small (below 299 persons). The following table shows the different sizes of the block grants for each village. A list of targeted sub-districts and block grants is provided in Annex A.

Table 2.1 Size of Village Block Grants (Rp.)

		Population		
		Large	**Medium**	**Small**
Conflict Intensity	**High**	170,000,000	150,000,000	120,000,000
	Medium	120,000,000	100,000,000	80,000,000
	Low	80,000,000	70,000,000	60,000,000

Where there were discrepancies in the number of villages or village population size, village allocations could be readjusted through discussions at the inter-village meeting, which took place at the sub-district level. The allocation for each sub-district could not be augmented, but the amount could be redistributed between villages.

2.3 How was the Program Implemented?

BRA-KDP was managed jointly by BRA and KDP with technical assistance and support from the World Bank. The provincial-level Department of Social Affairs (Dinsos) had fiduciary responsibility for the program. BRA at the provincial level was responsible for overall policy and implementation. Dinsos and BRA coordinated closely with the Ministry of Home Affairs, which executes KDP, as well as the Governor's Office, the National Planning Agency (Bappenas), the KDP Regional Management Unit (RMU), and the World Bank on any major issues related to the program. BRA's Project Implementation Unit (PIU) along with the KDP Regional Management Unit was in charge of day-to-day implementation and monitoring of the program.

The program used the same open menu as regular KDP—meaning that communities could propose almost any kind of project. Villagers affected by conflict were the principle target group.[6] Former combatants were not intended to benefit from BRA-KDP assistance as the Reintegration Fund included other programs that specifically targeted them. During public village meetings community members decided who would receive assistance and how much would be provided to each person or proposal group. To better target assistance, the program included a conflict victims mapping process, which assisted communities in identifying the most vulnerable victims to help ensure that they would benefit. Individuals and groups who had submitted proposals to BRA under the previous system could present their proposals at the

[6] Funds were disbursed based on proposals and could not simply be equally divided among individuals or households.

village-level meeting for consideration by the community at large. However, existing proposals received no special consideration and were not necessarily prioritized over other proposals. The project followed ten main steps as shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 BRA-KDP Program Cycle



Step 1 – Socialization at the sub-district level: the inter-village meeting (MAD). Here, district facilitators explained the BRA-KDP program and its procedures to a broad audience. The target groups for this meeting included the sub-district heads (*Camat*), religious and traditional figures (*Mukim)*, sub-district level government development coordinators (PjOK), BRA, ex-combatants, community representatives, police, the Indonesian military, village heads, community leaders, and KDP facilitators at the district, sub-district and village levels. A plan on how to spend the sub-district operational fee (three percent of the sub-district's block grant) was discussed, and the schedule for village meetings was determined.

Step 2 – Socialization at village level: the first village meeting (MD I). The program and its procedures were socialized and discussed at the village level by local KDP facilitators and field assistants (PL). Discussion covered the background to the program, explanation of procedures, fund allocation and release procedures, reporting requirements, and scheduling of the second village meeting (MD II). A plan for how to spend the village operational budget (three percent of the village's block grant) was also discussed. The operational budget covered village meeting expenses and expenses of the village implementation teams.

Step 3 – Development of project ideas and mapping conflict victims. To make sure vulnerable groups were not excluded, BRA-KDP instituted two measures: the conflict victims mapping and small group meetings, including a women's meeting. Village facilitators (FD) and PLs organized the mapping and small group meetings. The village facilitators helped identify the most affected conflict victims, which in turn enabled the facilitators to work with them to help ensure their effective participation. The small group meetings provided avenues for marginalized groups such as women and the poor whose voices were otherwise likely to be dismissed at larger community-wide meetings. KDP facilitators sat with the smaller groups and helped them define their priorities and choose projects that corresponded to their needs.[7]

Step 4 – Community prioritization and decision-making: second village meeting (MD II). Ideas for sub-projects were prioritized during the MD II, and conflict victims maps were reviewed. Prioritization followed the same process as KDP—open discussion followed by voting. The number of proposals and the amount allocated for each proposal selected depended on the availability of funds and the community's decision.

Step 5 – Sub-district verification and proposal writing. After priorities were determined, prioritized groups prepared their proposals. These were then submitted to a verification team who provided technical inputs and advice on how to improve them. The verification team had to verify proposals within five days of receipt.

Step 6 – Third village meeting (MD III). This meeting was held to confirm fund allocation for the prioritized proposals and to schedule the date for the release of funds.

[7] See the subsequent sections for more details on conflict victims mapping and the women's group meeting.

Step 7 – Sub-district Head's sign-off. When each village was ready, proposals were submitted to the *Camat* for sign-off. The *Camat* could issue an endorsement letter as proposals were submitted without waiting for other villages to submit their proposals. Information on the issuance of the endorsement letter had to be posted on project information boards.

Step 8 – Fund disbursement. Upon receipt of the *Camat*'s sign-off, the KDP financial unit released funds to project teams. Villagers witnessed this fund distribution.

Step 9 – Implementation. Villagers implemented sub-projects under the supervision of the village implementing team and the KDP facilitators.

Step 10 – Accountability meetings. The village implementation team was obliged to update the community on the progress of the sub-projects and provide financial reports twice during implementation through accountability meetings. The first meeting took place before the implementation team requested the third tranche of funding. Communities' approval, and the KDP facilitator and local government's endorsement at the accountability meeting, triggered payment of the third tranche. Once the project was completed, a second accountability meeting was held.[8] Table 2.2 shows the progress of program implementation, step by step.

Table 2.2 BRA-KDP Implementation Time Line

	2006				2007											
	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Receipt of 6% DOK																
Receipt of 94% BLM																
Inter-Village Meeting (MAD)																
1st Village Meeting (MD I)																
Conflicts Victims Mapping																
Sub-village meetings																
2nd Village Meeting (MD II)																
3rd Village Meeting (MD III)																
Disbursements to communities																
Implementation of Activities																
Accountability Meeting																

[8] Eventually, the decision was made to allow disbursement of block grants in two tranches only: six percent and 94 percent. The main reason for this decision was the prevalence of livelihoods projects among activities selected by beneficiary communities. While successive tranches of disbursements allow better monitoring and control over the implementation of infrastructure projects, one-off disbursement is more fitted to the purchase of livestock or agricultural inputs. Therefore, only one accountability meeting was eventually held in most villages, after the completion of activities.

3. IDENTIFYING CONFLICT VICTIMS

The program aimed to deliver assistance to conflict-affected villagers. Failing to ensure a transparent, fair and widely accepted targeting process risked increasing tensions and social jealousies. BRA-KDP devolved decision-making over who qualified as a conflict victim to communities. This approach presented several significant challenges. First, the outcome of the targeting process very much relied on the beneficiary communities' subjective perceptions of victimhood. As it turned out, the dominant perception in many target locations was that most villagers were victims to some extent. Indeed, given the intensity of the conflict in program areas, many individuals could legitimately claim some form of conflict-related loss. To address as many of these claims as possible, communities often decided to spread funds thinly across a large proportion of households or individuals, including to those who had been only lightly, if at all, affected by the conflict. While this prevented tensions from emerging between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, it meant that less support was available for the most affected villagers. Second, community-based mechanisms are susceptible to influence by elites or powerful groups, such as ex-combatants, who sometimes tried to capture the decision-making process to secure a share of the assistance.

This section analyzes the ways in which communities identified conflict victims. It begins by discussing the definition of conflict victim used by the program. It then provides a description of identification procedures and mechanisms. This is followed by an analysis of how communities actually identified and prioritized victims.

Key Findings:

- The targeting process went well overall. The most heavily-affected victims were prioritized, and the amount of assistance they received was typically higher than that of non-victims by almost 20 percent.
- Funds were spread broadly across households. A total of 233,282 individuals (22 percent of the overall population of target sub-districts) benefited directly from the assistance. Thirty-nine percent of beneficiaries were women.
- Communities differentiated categories of beneficiaries according to levels of conflict-affectedness and scaled assistance accordingly.
- The identification process proved to be sensitive. This resulted in demands, widespread during early stages of the program cycle, for funds to be divided equally across all households or individuals in a given village. A range of factors affected the ability of program facilitators to overcome these demands.

3.1 Who is a Conflict Victim? Perceptions of Victimhood and Identification Criteria

The Helsinki MoU does not include a definition of who is and is not a victim and hence who is entitled to assistance. Meetings between BRA and GAM produced an agreed list of criteria to be used for determining victim status. Most of Aceh's population fell under this broad definition, given the decision to include the negative impact of conflict on livelihoods (see Box 3.1).

Box 3.1 BRA Criteria for Conflict Victims

In February 2006, representatives of BRA, former combatant groups and civil society agreed in a joint meeting on the following criteria to define conflict victims and determine eligibility to compensation:

- Widows/widowers and children of individuals deceased because of the conflict;
- Relatives of individuals who disappeared as a result of the conflict;
- Individuals whose house was damaged, destroyed or burned because of the conflict;
- Individuals whose properties were damaged, destroyed or disappeared as a result of the conflict;
- Individuals who were displaced as a result of the conflict;
- Individuals who were physically disabled or mutilated as a result of the conflict;
- Individuals who suffered psychological trauma because of the conflict;
- Individuals who were physically injured;
- Individuals who lost their source of income because of the conflict.

Specific BRA programs targeted some of the most-affected and most objectively identifiable categories of conflict victims, such as those who lost a family member as a result of conflict violence (through the *Diyat* program), individuals whose house had been damaged or destroyed (through the BRA housing program), and those who suffered physical or mental injuries. However, these programs did not benefit the wider share of the Acehnese population that had also suffered from the conflict but to a lesser degree. This emerged as a significant source of tension within communities as villagers who had not received assistance resented those who had. BRA-KDP aimed to defuse these tensions by complementing highly targeted programs for the most-affected by providing some level of compensation to the wider population that was less affected.

BRA-KDP Conflict Victim Identification Mechanisms

After the MD I, hamlet meetings were held where villagers made a list of conflict victims. The program allowed communities to apply its own definition for victimhood. The BRA criteria were used as a starting point for discussions but villagers could decide to expand or amend the criteria to adapt targeting to local dynamics and needs. These lists were brought to the second village meeting (MD II) where the whole community reviewed the list. Community members drew up a map of conflict-affected persons to assist in proposal selection (see Figure 3.1 for an example). During the MD II, the maps were reviewed and communities agreed on a final list of beneficiaries. Where KDP facilitators felt the process had not been inclusive, or that victims had not benefited, they often called more village meetings.

Figure 3.1 Sample of Conflict Victims Map



Note: highly affected victims' houses are colored in black

3.2 How Communities Identified Conflict Victims

Villagers perceived a large proportion of the population to be victims. Communities differentiated types of victims based on the level of affectedness, usually using three categories: highly affected, medium affected, and slightly affected. These categories were often used to prioritize proposals and scale the size of benefits. Those most affected received more than those who were less affected.

"Everybody is a conflict victim"

According to MIS data, 233,282 individuals, or 22 percent of the overall population of target locations, benefited directly from BRA-KDP assistance through the provision of cash or in-kind assistance for economic activities. Most were identified by communities as conflict victims, although a share of the assistance was often directed towards 'non-victims' in order to maintain cohesion or in an attempt to address the needs of other vulnerable groups, such as the poor.[9] Figure 3.2 below shows that there was important geographic variation across

[9] According to ARLS projections, an estimated 530,000 individuals live in households that benefited from BRA-KDP. Of these, over half (287,000) are conflict victims. Note that these figures reflect the number of persons living in

districts, with the percentage of direct beneficiaries ranging from seven to 58 percent of the total population of target locations.

Figure 3.2 Direct Beneficiaries as a Percentage of the Total Population



Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

In some sub-districts, the proportion of direct beneficiaries reached over two-thirds of the population: 66 percent in Beutong, Nagan Raya; 71 percent in Samalanga, Bireuen; and even the entire population of Peusangan Siblah Krueng, Bireuen. However, Table 3.1 below shows that in 85 percent of BRA-KDP target sub-districts the proportion varied more moderately from less than ten to 30 percent of the population.

Table 3.1 Variation in the Proportion of BRA-KDP Direct Beneficiaries in Sub-district Population

Proportion of the population who benefited directly from BRA-KDP	Number of sub-districts	% sub-districts
> 50%	5	7.5
30% - 50%	5	7.5
20% - 30%	20	30
10% – 20%	24	36
< 10%	13	19
Total	**67**	**100**

Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

An estimated 209,026 people benefited indirectly from infrastructure and other projects that benefited the community as a whole**.** This group overlaps with that of direct beneficiaries, as many individuals benefited both directly from livelihoods support and indirectly from infrastructure and communal projects.

beneficiary households, not the number of direct beneficiaries (Barron et. al. 2009).

Representation of women among beneficiaries

Among direct beneficiaries, 90,166 (39 percent) were women. The proportion varied from 18 to 51 percent across districts (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 Proportion of Women Among Beneficiaries by District



Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

At the sub-district level, both the highest and lowest ratios of women were recorded in Aceh Timur, with 58 percent of women benefiting in Peureulak sub-district and eleven percent in Madat sub-district. However, in most locations, the percentage of women varied between 30 and 50 percent of beneficiaries (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Variation in the Proportion of Women Among BRA-KDP Beneficiaries Across Sub-Districts

Proportion of women among BRA-KDP direct beneficiaries	Number of sub-districts	% total sub-districts
> 50%	7	10%
30% - 50%	40	60%
< 30%	20	30%
Total	**67**	**100%**

Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

Not all conflict victims are the same

> "Everyone in the village is a conflict victim and will benefit from BRA-KDP, but these twenty households needed more than the rest."
>
> *Village Head, Batee Damai, Makmur sub-district, Bireuen*

Communities often understood the need to differentiate victims according to degree of affectedness and to scale benefits such that those that were seriously affected received more than others. Strategies for creating categories and ranking beneficiaries typically originated

from the KDP facilitators and were socialized through village-level facilitation and implementation teams. Communities generally used BRA's set of criteria as a starting point but also occasionally applied other criteria. The most common combination used to identify and classify conflict victims was the degree of conflict-affectedness and the level of economic vulnerability. In some cases, prior receipt of outside forms of assistance was used as an additional criterion. For example, in Singah Mulo village, Bener Meriah, several conflict victim widows were excluded as BRA-KDP beneficiaries because they had received assistance from government programs in 2005. Box 3.2 gives a number of examples of how communities used and combined different types of criteria to rank conflict victims and scale assistance accordingly.

Box 3.2 Criteria Used to Rank Conflict Victims and Scale Assistance

A. Degree of conflict-affectedness

Asong Tongpeuding, Titeu Keumala sub-district, Pidie. Four categories of conflict victims were decided upon, with each category receiving a different amount of assistance. These are: High - people whose house was burned received approximately Rp. 3.5 million per household; Medium - people who had a death in the family received approximately Rp. 2 million per household; Low - people who were tortured received approximately Rp. 1 million per household; and common community members who received approximately Rp. 500,000 per household.

Blang Pantei, Paya Bakong sub-district, Aceh Utara. All households in the community were divided into four proposal groups. The first group, consisting of five households, each of which suffered a death in the family, received 30 percent of the total block grant allocation. The second group, consisting of seven households whose house were burnt, received 25 percent. The third group, consisting of five households whose members suffered heavy beatings, received 25 percent. The fourth group, consisting of the rest of the community, shared the remaining 30 percent. Those in the fourth group were considered as having suffered from minor beatings and loss of livelihoods.

B. Degree of conflict-affectedness and economic need

Meriah Jaya, Timang Gajah sub-district, Bener Meriah. Of 322 households, 167 were selected as beneficiaries. Beneficiaries were divided into three groups: (i) households who suffered a death in the family, or had houses and fields destroyed; (ii) households who suffered trauma or who were unable to tend fields; and (iii) poor households that did not possess land or did not have money to purchase food. Assistance was scaled with the first group receiving the largest amount of support.

Jaba, Peudada sub-district, Bireuen. Seventy-two of 102 households were identified as conflict victims. Given that the conflict was very intense in this village, these households were identified because they were relatively poorer than the other 30 households. Beneficiaries were divided into two proposal groups, livestock and farming. The amount of assistance was scaled within the proposal groups according to levels of conflict-affectedness. In the livestock group, twelve households who suffered a death in the family, an assault that resulted in a family member being disabled, or who had plantations burnt, received six goats each. Eight households whose members suffered beatings or psychological trauma received three goats each. Seven households who suffered a loss of livelihood received two goats each. Forty-five households that were not affected by the conflict received inputs for rice farming due to their economic situation.

C. Degree of conflict-affectedness and prior receipt of economic assistance

Timanang Gading, Kabayakan sub-district, Aceh Tengah. Twelve out of a total population of 49 IDPs were prioritized as BRA-KDP beneficiaries because they were severely affected by the conflict and had not received any prior forms of assistance. Each beneficiary received Rp. 2.5 million. The remaining block grant funds were used for community projects.

The examples in Box 3.2 illustrate how communities took advantage of the flexibility of the BRA-KDP identification mechanism by forming categories of beneficiaries based on a combination of criteria, some conflict-related and others not, that best fitted local realities, dynamics and needs. They also reflect the prevailing pattern of communities applying a very broad definition of conflict victims while at the same time extending benefits to non-victims. In all the examples cited above, a minority share of the benefits was allocated to "the rest of the community", either in the form of direct individual assistance to villagers that were not identified as conflict victims but who needed economic support, or indirectly through infrastructure or communal projects that benefited the whole village. Such decisions were typically aimed at avoiding social envy and tensions that might result from excluding part of the community from the assistance. Similar concerns about maintaining social cohesion and avoiding inequities affected the balance between livelihood and infrastructure proposals in terms of activities selected by communities. In many villages, while the bulk of the funds were allocated to economic activities, some money was invested in the rehabilitation or reconstruction of communal infrastructure as a way to ensure that the whole community would benefit in some way (see Section 5).

Findings from the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS) confirm some of the observations from supervision missions. The surveys found that assistance was indeed broadly distributed. Large numbers of direct beneficiaries were reached and included conflict victims as well as the wider population. The ARLS data justifies some reservations with regards to the efficacy of village-level targeting, as it shows that conflict victims were not significantly more likely to benefit from the assistance than other villagers. On average, 44 percent of victims and 41 percent of the most-affected in target areas received support, while 40 percent of non-victims also benefited. However, the survey does show that the average amount of assistance received by victims was higher than that received by non-victims, and that the most-affected received the greatest amount. Figure 3.4 shows that victims received approximately thirteen percent more than non-victims, and the most-affected nearly 20 percent more (Barron et. al. 2009).

Figure 3.4 Average Amounts of Assistance Received by Victimhood Category



Source: Barron, Humphreys, Paler and Weinstein (2009)

Identifying victims: a controversial process

Evidence from the impact evaluation suggests that communities were satisfied with the outcome of the targeting process.[10] However, designating victims and scaling assistance often proved controversial and sensitive. An unwillingness to label individuals or subsets of households as conflict victims or non-victims led in many cases to community requests that funds be dispersed equally across all individuals or households. Villagers claimed that they would rather get no assistance if they could not divide up the funds equally. Such demands for 'equal division' (*bagi rata*) were widespread during the early stages of the program.[11] In various locations both the MAD and MD I meetings failed and had to be repeated, as facilitators did not consider *bagi rata* to be an acceptable outcome. The March 2007 supervision mission found that in some locations reaching consensus required up to five successive village meetings.

Demands for equal division of funds across households or individuals

Bagi rata demands were typically regarded by KDP facilitators as contrary to program procedures, and therefore strongly discouraged. Communities often presented legitimate reasons in favor of equal division of the assistance. Some communities argued that in their village everyone had suffered more or less in the same way from the conflict and that trying to

[10] Only ten percent of respondents thought that not enough people had benefited, and twelve percent that conflict victims had not been sufficiently prioritized (Barron et. al. 2009).

[11] A phone survey of facilitators in 67 sub-districts in the initial stages of implementation found that there had been demands for equal distribution of money in 158 villages, or approximately nine percent of all target villages. The exact proportion of villages that eventually divided the assistance equally is hard to assess, as villagers tended to hide it from facilitators and many cases remained unreported. However, supervision missions found that this trend was particularly strong in Aceh Timur, in some west coast districts such as Nagan Raya, and in Gayo Lues and parts of Aceh Tengah. In March 2007, every village in each of the four Aceh Timur sub-districts that were surveyed had performed *bagi rata.* By *bagi rata,* we refer to the distribution of equal shares of funds or in-kind assistance to all individuals or households in the village, without exception or any level of differentiation.

distinguish further between categories of victims was an unnecessarily painful process that would threaten social cohesion and result in inequities. Concerns over the fairness and inclusiveness of communal decisions were also raised. Community-driven approaches carry an inherent risk of excluding the marginalized.[12] Marginalized groups may not be invited or fail to attend decision-making or may lack the voice to lobby in favor of their inclusion in the program. In villages surveyed in November 2007 in Aceh Selatan, two communities insisted on equal disbursement of funds because conflict victims feared missing out on program benefits.

> "Conflict victims have less education and are a minority in this village. We don't have leverage in the community. If we rely on the community to determine who qualifies for assistance, we won't get the benefits that we deserve. "
>
> *Conflict victim, Kluet Selatan sub-district, Aceh Selatan*

> "One man burned the MD I attendance sheet when he was told that the money couldn't be divided up equally. He was very upset because his son died during the conflict, but he still hasn't received any assistance or compensation."
>
> *Villager, Kluet Selatan sub-district, Aceh Selatan*

Demands for dividing funds equally could therefore originate from concerns over inclusiveness, equity and justice. In other cases, demands for equal division did not emanate from the community as a whole, but rather from pressures exerted by specific groups. Supervision missions found that many demands for *bagi rata* were the result of interventions from ex-combatants within the community. As ex-combatants received support from other assistance schemes specifically targeted at them, they were not intended to benefit directly from BRA-KDP. However, they sometimes tried to circumvent program restrictions by pushing for equal division of the assistance, which would allow them to secure a share of the funds. In Nagan Raya, all four villages surveyed in September 2007 did not rank conflict victims and opted for *bagi rata.* Although the rationale offered by villagers was the need to avoid generating tensions over the distribution of assistance, evidence suggested that ex-combatants had strongly advocated, if not imposed, this option as a way to ensure they too would benefit from the program. Such cases typically generated bitterness and disappointment among civilian victims who had suffered severely during the conflict.

Box 3.3 below contrasts how demands for equal division and targeting issues were handled in Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur. Although these two neighboring districts shared a number of important similarities, targeting was done very differently. Comparing them helps to isolate factors that explain why some communities identified subsets of conflict victims and scaled assistance while others failed to do so.

[12] Although the risk of exclusion of marginalized groups is just as great in projects that use more top-down approaches, where, for example, government officials or other key informants identify beneficiaries.

Box 3.3 Ranking Conflict Victims in Aceh Timur and Aceh Utara

Aceh Timur and Aceh Utara are neighboring districts that share several important characteristics. Both were the seat of some of the most intense conflict violence and have large numbers of ex-combatants. These districts benefited from the largest share of BRA-KDP allocations, with Aceh Utara receiving approximately US$ 5.5 million or 27 percent of BRA-KDP block grant allocation and Aceh Timur receiving around US$ 5 million or 24 percent of block grant allocation. The size of the target population in both districts is also similar. Despite these similarities, targeting outcomes were strikingly different. Most villages in Aceh Timur distributed equal allocations to all households whereas relatively few did so in Aceh Utara. There are several factors that explain why communities in Aceh Utara tended to carry out a detailed process of identifying and ranking conflict victims:

Facilitation skills of KDP facilitators: The Aceh Utara district-level KDP manager (KM) held a special session for all FKs during which they were instructed not to allow equal distribution of assistance across all households. The KM insisted that FKs facilitate a ranking process.

The influence of ex-combatants: KDP facilitators in Aceh Utara engaged ex-combatants constructively in the program, thus turning them into allies and not spoilers. In Blang Pantei, Aceh Utara, a member of the Village Implementation Unit (TPK) that was also an ex-combatant advocated using BRA-KDP funds for sustainable livelihoods activities rather than for one-off consumption. By contrast, in Aceh Timur, ex-GAM combatants strongly advocated in favour of *bagi rata* so that they would receive a share of the assistance. Village authorities and non-elites tended not to intervene in the face of such overt manipulation by ex-GAM.

Levels of elite capture: In villages such as Seneubok Bayu, Aceh Timur, non-elites indicated that they did not trust village authorities and therefore wanted nothing more than their individual cut of the BRA-KDP assistance.

Levels of trust in the village: Villagers interviewed during supervision mission FGDs in Aceh Timur were often reluctant to pursue projects that required collective arrangements for implementation, maintenance or profit sharing. The conflict negatively impacted on social relations within and across villages. One result was a lack of trust and uncertainty, which meant that many favored immediate over long-term benefits. The same pattern was clear in other areas, as illustrated by the quote from an Aceh Barat Daya villager below:

> "Everyone asked for equal disbursement because group activity is difficult. If a group planted rice and rats ate it, they'll blame each other. If a group bought a tractor to share, it is difficult to decide who's in charge of fixing if it broke. It's easier for everyone to get small amounts of cash individually."
>
> *Female villager, Babahrot sub-district, Aceh Barat Daya*

Information flows: In Aceh Timur, communities received instructions from BRA allowing them to distribute assistance equally across all households and heard rumors that neighboring villages had already done so.

4. INCLUSION: INVOLVING DISADVANTAGED GROUPS IN DECISION-MAKING

In a program that aimed to provide assistance to conflict victims, and particularly the most vulnerable among them, the inclusiveness of the decision-making process was key to success. Community-based mechanisms present an inherent risk that the voice of the minority and the most disadvantaged social groups will be ignored by the majority. Guaranteeing wide participation and representation of all in collective discussions, and preventing specific groups from exerting undue influence over these discussions, were therefore critical.

This section analyzes community participation in BRA-KDP program meetings and processes, with a focus on the involvement of two groups that are typically vulnerable to exclusion, namely women and the most affected conflict victims. It begins with a breakdown of attendance levels at meetings, and a comparison with attendance at regular KDP meetings. Analysis then turns to the degree to which various groups were able to influence the BRA-KDP decision-making processes and the challenges that different groups faced in trying to do so. The section concludes with a discussion of how ex-combatants interacted with the program. Former combatants were formally excluded as program beneficiaries, yet often exerted a strong influence over communities and decision-making processes. Depending on how they were engaged by program stakeholders, former combatants could be spoilers or supporters in socialization efforts and in defusing tensions.

Key Findings:

- Levels of participation were high, varying from 40 to 56 percent of households attending key meetings. Attendance at BRA-KDP village meetings compared favorably to that of regular KDP.
- Women's participation was high with women making up 38 percent of meeting attendees. Relatively high attendance levels of women did not result in influence over decision-making.
- Conflict victims showed similar levels of attendance, awareness, and efficacy as other villagers.
- Engaging ex-combatants and KPA[13] in positive ways led to better outcomes.

4.1 Levels of Participation

This section breaks down levels of attendance at the most important meetings. Attendance levels at similar meetings in regular KDP offer a useful means of comparison as KDP follows the same program cycle and has been received positively by communities in Aceh.[14] Figure 4.1 compares levels of attendance in BRA-KDP and regular KDP.

[13] The Aceh Transition Committee (KPA) is the civilian organization formed after the peace agreement to represent former combatants from GAM's military wing.

[14] Several rounds of KDP have been implemented in Aceh since 1998. The program is well known of villagers. Data used here for comparison was taken from the 2007-2008 round of KDP, known as PNPM-KDP.

Figure 4.1 Comparison of Attendance Rate Between BRA-KDP and KDP, as a Proportion of All Households[15]



Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

Attendance at the MAD

The MAD is a forum to socialize the program to a wide audience at the sub-district level. Each sub-district enjoyed high participation with an average of 120 people attending the MAD per sub-district. On average, 142 people attend the MAD for regular KDP. However, in regular KDP, the MAD is a particularly important forum where villages compete for block grants and hence participation is high. In BRA-KDP, the MAD simply provided information on block grant sizes and operational procedures; it was important in terms of socializing the program to communities, but no key decisions were to be taken during this meeting. That participation levels for the BRA-KDP MAD were so high demonstrates the strong interest of community representatives in the program.

Attendance at MD1

MD I is the village-level socialization meeting where information on the program is provided to the community at large. Most of the MD I enjoyed high levels of attendance. In some villages, more than 300 people attended with the average attendance 57 people per village. Across program areas, forty-two percent of households were represented at MD I. Participation compares favorably to regular KDP village meetings, whose average number of participants is 49 per village, or 38 percent of households.

Attendance – dusun meetings

Between MD I and MD II, sub-village meetings were held in each hamlet (*dusun*). At these meetings villagers drafted lists and maps of conflict victims and discussed activities to be funded through BRA-KDP. The highest levels of attendance were reached during these meetings.

[15] Attendance to MAD, discussed in the text, is not shown in this figure, because it is a meeting at sub-district level where the attendance of all villagers is neither required nor expected. Each village will typically send a delegation composed of a limited number of people. Therefore, the proportion of households attending is not an appropriate indicator of success.

An average of 76 people attended in each village, representing 56 percent of households. This is significantly higher than for regular KDP, where the average is of 60 people per village, or 46 percent of households.

A number of factors explain why a higher proportion of villagers attended *dusun* meetings than village-level meetings. For one, they were smaller-scale and more flexible gatherings that could be organized in a way that better accommodated the respective schedules of participants. Second, they were meetings that gathered people who were immediate neighbors, possibly making discussions and decision-making smoother. Finally, sub-village meetings were meant to prepare identification of beneficiaries by listing and mapping conflict victims in each *dusun*, and discuss activities that would best address their needs. Provided they were happy with the outcome of these meetings, many villagers considered that their active participation was no longer necessary. They entrusted a number of delegates to convey the sub-village listings and proposals during the MD II. At the end of the decision-making process, this resulted quite often in the organization of prioritized proposal groups along *dusun* lines, with the conflict victims of each sub-village assembled in the same group.

Attendance at the MD II

In the MD II, the listing and mapping of conflict victims was reviewed by communities and villagers selected proposals for funding after open discussion. The MD II was thus a key meeting where decisions were made about who should get assistance and how the funds would be used. An average of 55 people participated in each MD II representing 40 percent of households. This again compares favorably to KDP, whose average number of participants in MD II was 41 per village, or 32 percent of households.

Why were attendance levels higher for BRA-KDP?

At the village and sub-village level, significantly higher levels of attendance were recorded for BRA-KDP. A reason for this difference may be the types of activities financed by BRA-KDP. In contrast with KDP, where infrastructure projects are dominant, BRA-KDP communities gave preference to livelihoods proposals that would provide benefits to individuals or individual households. The prospect of receiving direct benefits provided villagers and victims alike with a strong incentive to attend meetings.

4.2 Participation of Disadvantaged Groups: Women and Conflict Victims

The participation of women and conflict victims in the program was high. However, women often played a passive role in the decision-making process.

Participation and inclusion of women

The participation of women in BRA-KDP meetings was relatively high with women representing 38 percent of the audience of meetings on average. This percentage varied little from one meeting to another (Table 4.1). There was also very little geographic variation across districts, with the proportion of women among the audience of MAD, MD I, *dusun*-level meetings and

MD II between 36 and 39 percent in all areas.

Table 4.1 Levels of Attendance of Female Villagers in BRA-KDP and Regular KDP

	BRA-KDP		Regular KDP	
Meeting	**% of meeting attendees who are women**	**Average number of women attending**	**% of meeting attendees who are women**	**Average number of women attending**
MAD	37	44	40	57
MD I	38	22	44	22
Dusun	39	30*	43	26
MD II	38	21	43	18

* This is the average total number of women who, in each village, attended one or the other of the sub-village meetings, not the average number of women who attended each of these meetings.

Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

Women were also well represented among beneficiaries (39 percent). However, FGDs during the supervisions missions showed that women's understanding and influence over the decision-making process was on the whole very weak.[16] Most women had little knowledge of the program beyond the amount of block grant allocations.

There are a number of reasons for low levels of understanding and involvement from women. Programs that encourage women's participation are challenging in Aceh as such efforts often collide with local traditions and perceptions. Husbands and sons tend to represent the household in public discussions and make decisions. Meetings were often held at night or early in the morning, at a time that was convenient for men but not for women, who attend to household matters at these times. Married women would typically only attend when their husbands had other obligations. When they did accompany their husbands to meetings, women would generally let the husband represent the household and did not take part in the talks. During FGDs, many women admitted being uncomfortable when offered to play a more assertive and influential role in program discussions. Lower levels of education and literacy among women also hindered their capacity to understand program procedures and participate more actively.

Incentives were not sufficient to strengthen women participation. BRA-KDP procedures emphasized flexibility as a way of allowing communities to design solutions best fitted to the needs of local conflict victims, regardless of gender. The program cycle included women's group meetings, to be held between MD I and MD II. These meetings were aimed at encouraging women conflict victims to develop and submit proposals. However, evidence from supervision missions shows that women's group meetings were often not held, or were poorly organized and facilitated. These meetings generally did not result in the submission of women's-oriented proposals, let alone selection by communities. There were, however, notable exceptions.

As is common in CDD programs, the extent and quality of women's participation hinged on the

[16] The March 2007 supervision mission ranked women's awareness as satisfactory in only three of the twenty sub-districts surveyed.

quality of facilitation. In each village, the community elected two Village Facilitators (FD), one man and one woman. Supervision teams evaluated the performance of FDs as generally very poor. A majority of FDs appeared insufficiently trained and under-utilized by sub-district level facilitators. This impacted on women's participation, as female FDs were expected to play a key role in mobilizing women, organizing meetings, providing them with further information on program objectives and procedures, and encouraging them to form proposal groups. In some areas, however, good quality of facilitation at the sub-district level managed to overcome these challenges. Some KDP facilitators interrupted meetings when they felt too few women were present and conditioned the continuation of the program on higher levels of women's participation. Women's proposal groups were formed in 31 villages of Titeu Keumala sub-district, Pidie, and each submitted a proposal for a revolving fund.

> "There was very high participation in the program here. People were really interested in the program. In one village, the PLs [field assistants] stopped the meeting because not enough women came. They talked with the local leaders about this. Then later, the program was able to start again with very high female participation."
>
> *KDP sub-district facilitator, Seunuddon sub-district, Aceh Utara*

Finally, findings from FGDs suggest that women who were heads of households, often conflict widows, tended to be more actively engaged than other women. As they could not be represented by men, they were more likely to attend meetings and participate actively. In FGDs, most showed a better understanding of program procedures, although they often complained that their claims were insufficiently taken into consideration.

Findings of the ARLS survey (see Figure 4.2), by and large confirm program MIS data on women's participation. Female respondents were less likely than men to have heard about BRA-KDP (men: 62%; women: 52%), heard about meetings (men: 40%; women: 34%) or attended meetings (men: 27%; women: 12%). However, female heads of households were more involved than other women and their levels of awareness and attendance at meetings nearly matched that of men (17 percent attended meetings compared to 20 percent of male-headed households) (Barron et. al. 2009).

Figure 4.2 Participation and Awareness by Gender



Source: Barron, Humphreys, Paler and Weinstein (2009)

Participation and inclusion of conflict victims

On the whole, the level of participation of conflict victims was satisfactory and victims were as aware and involved in BRA-KDP as the rest of the community. Figure 4.3 shows only slight differences across groups.

Figure 4.3 Participation and Awareness by Victimhood Category



Source: Barron, Humphreys, Paler and Weinstein (2009)

Mixed outcomes across regions

Findings from the September 2007 supervision mission showed evidence of significant variation in participation and inclusiveness across regions. In Aceh Timur, the central highlands and the west coast of Aceh, non-elites and disadvantaged groups, including conflict victims, often did not attend MDs because they were not invited to the meetings. In the same areas, findings also suggested that village elites, and in some cases ex-combatants, monopolized key

decision-making processes.

> "Meetings are normally attended only by village authorities. Hamlet Heads, religious figures, community leaders and village government officials attend."
>
> *Female villager, Lut Tawar sub-district, Aceh Tengah*

> "It is always a group of people who are close to the village authorities that monopolize the benefits."
>
> *Villager, Indra Makmu sub-district, Aceh Timur*

On the other hand, some areas enjoyed high degrees of inclusiveness. In Bireuen, key informants from disadvantaged groups, including conflict victim widows, IDPs and youth, indicated that they frequently participated in MDs. They were able to describe the venue, the agenda and the approximate number of attendees. Satisfaction with BRA-KDP decision-making processes was high. The key factor explaining higher levels of non-elite participation in Bireuen is the way in which ex-combatants were formally engaged in the program as PLs or TPK members. Given the high population of ex-combatants in the district, their buy-in was essential for successful program implementation.

4.3 Engaging Ex-Combatants

Former combatants interacted with and influenced BRA-KDP both positively and negatively. In some places there were tensions, as former combatants were excluded as direct beneficiaries. In other areas, former combatants played a supportive role. The nature of the relationship between BRA-KDP and ex-combatants depended on factors such as the local conflict history, power relations with communities and, above all, the extent to which facilitators managed to engage them in socialization efforts and other program processes.

Ex-combatants' relationships with communities

There were very few serious problems related to the return of GAM combatants and former political prisoners to Acehnese villages.[17] However, supervision missions observed wide variation in the relationships between GAM and other villagers across regions. Three types of relationship were identified, and each helped shape the nature of the participation of ex-combatants in the program. In areas where GAM enjoyed strong support during the conflict, such as the east coast of Aceh, ex-combatants continued to play a strong role in village life. This, however, sometimes led to attempts at extortion or fund diversion, impacting on program performance.

> "The peace process is not realized 100 percent but only 80 percent. The shadow of GAM's power still prevails. There is still high influence of GAM in every aspect of life."
>
> *Villager, Seunuddon sub-district, Aceh Utara*

[17] The GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment found that 89 percent of former GAM combatants had not encountered any problems returning to their villages, primarily because they returned to places of origin (World Bank 2006).

In other villages, ex-GAM enjoyed strong support but did not have exclusive dominance in decision-making. All the villages the supervision team visited in Aceh Barat Daya, for example, were pro-GAM. Families in these villages had ties to former combatants, either as relatives or through friendships, and many had assisted GAM in the past. However, the power of GAM was never such that other forms of authority were marginalized. In these villages, the relationship between ex-combatants and communities (and their leaders) was not a problem and GAM returnees reintegrated smoothly into their communities. Excluding them from the program did not become a major issue perhaps because they still had support from their families and their families were most likely getting assistance from BRA-KDP.

Third, in villages where communities suffered aggression from both the military and GAM, such as in the central highlands and Aceh Selatan, the relationship between ordinary villagers and former combatants remained tense. Although few acts of vengeance have taken place, some villagers, especially victims, said that they tried to stay away from GAM returnees.

> "To be honest, we're really hurt by what GAM did to us. We would like to take revenge if possible. So we don't interact with them at all."
>
> *Villager, Samadua sub-district, Aceh Selatan*

In such villages, GAM returnees' participation in community meetings or collective activities was lower. Because they did not participate, their understanding of the program was minimal. Knowing they were not included in the target beneficiaries, some actively tried to steer some community members to demand equal disbursement with the hope to get a portion of the assistance.

Ex-combatants' sense of entitlement to assistance

Many ex-combatants felt that their sacrifice during the conflict meant that they should control local leadership positions. Some also felt that they fought for independence "on behalf of the community" and hence should be prioritized in receiving assistance. Such views possibly justified demands in some areas for a share of the funds, and in some occurrences, extortion attempts when these demands were not met.

> "Everyone should understand that returning GAM are heroes. We should receive money. There are 1,000 combatants here [in Nisam] and there's potential for them to conduct criminal acts if BRA-KDP doesn't target them. GAM are conflict-affected people as well and therefore we should also get money. We have priority over others in the community. People should respect us and our values. Don't give us small money as we will lose dignity."
>
> *Ex-GAM commander, Nisam sub-district, Aceh Utara*

This mentality was exacerbated by the lack of transparent, equitable and consistent distribution of other forms of reintegration assistance to GAM. To provide economic support to former GAM combatants, BRA initially developed a program targeting 3,000 combatants with individual payments worth Rp. 25 million. Funds were channeled through KPA. *Wilayah*

(roughly equivalent to a district)-level KPA leaders were responsible for determining the names of the former combatants eligible for assistance. The money was then to be divided among other ex-combatants and GAM-affiliated people who were not included in the list. Eventually, the assistance, planned for 3,000 individuals, ended up being divided across a much larger number of beneficiaries (Barron and Burke 2008). Moreover, KPA's management of funds lacked transparency and was not consistent across regions. This resulted in numerous former combatants receiving much smaller sums than they expected, or not receiving anything at all (MSR 2009).

Some ex-combatants also felt they should play a formal role in the program because they thought they knew better than others who the 'real conflict victims' were. Some GAM interviewed during the second supervision mission felt the program was less than effective because it provided assistance to 'victims' who did not actively support GAM during the conflict. In the words of one local commander, "communities may have one definition of conflict, but we know who the real victims are. It is those who sacrificed for Aceh by actively becoming involved in the struggle."

Impact of Socialization

Lack of socialization of the program to ex-combatants led to inappropriate interventions from some of them later during implementation. Insufficient information about BRA-KDP and, in cases, misinformation spread by word of mouth resulted in attempts to capture assistance through illegitimate means. Some ex-combatants felt neglected and this in turn deepened their frustration towards BRA and jealousy for the program beneficiaries. Where ex-GAM did attend socialization meetings they usually played a constructive role.

Ex-combatants as partners in program implementation

Findings from supervision missions indicated that a vast majority of ex-combatants were supportive of the program. In eleven out of the 15 sub-districts surveyed in March 2007, KPA and ex-combatants gave positive opinions of BRA-KDP. They often played a constructive role in the program, acting as intermediaries between the communities and facilitators, providing further socialization to villagers, and helping defuse tensions. In areas with a high population of GAM returnees, they often held positions as Field Assistants (PLs), Heads of Village Implementation Teams (TPK) or Village Facilitators (FD). In Bireuen and Aceh Utara in particular, the role of GAM-affiliated program staff was key in overcoming tensions and problems that arose during the early stages of program implementation, such as demands by other ex-combatants to benefit from BRA-KDP, pressures to divide funds equally and extortion attempts. Box 4.1 provides examples.

Box 4.1 Defusing Tensions in Bireuen

During early socialization of BRA-KDP in Cot Katepang village, Jeumpa sub-district, over 40 ex-combatants in the village mistakenly thought that BRA-KDP assistance was to be directed specifically to them. Attempts by KDP staff to clarify this misunderstanding led to a violent backlash, and a sub-district official was physically assaulted. However, thanks to the efforts of Baharuddin, an ex-combatant employed as a KDP field assistant (PL) in Jeumpa, resistance to BRA-KDP among ex-combatants was overcome over time. Baharuddin carried out repeated, face-to-face socialization efforts with ex-combatants in local coffee shops. By approaching ex-combatants in an informal manner, Baharuddin was successful in clarifying BRA-KDP objectives and methodologies. As a result, ex-combatants remained engaged in the program, and subsequent MDs took place without further incident.

KDP staff in Gandapura sub-district faced similar challenges with ex-combatants. In one incident, ex-combatants stopped an FK while she was driving to a village and demanded BRA-KDP funds from her. Munzir, an ex-combatant employed as PL, intervened on the FK's behalf to defuse tensions with the ex-combatants.

> "I explained to my friends that BRA-KDP assistance is for conflict victims, not for those that make the conflict."
>
> *Munzir, PL, Gandapura sub-district, Bireuen*

On the whole, BRA-KDP facilitators interviewed during supervision missions underlined the importance of securing the buy-in of ex-combatants to ensure satisfactory program outcomes. Facilitators suggested additional socialization efforts specifically directed at former combatants, and often advocated the formalization of their involvement in the program through the recruitment of a specific number of ex-combatants as facilitators and program staff in each sub-district.

Ex-combatant's demands for assistance and extortion attempts

Most ex-combatants understood the rationale for not allowing them to benefit from the assistance. However, in a few cases former combatants did not accept it and interfered negatively with the program. In two villages in Aceh Selatan visited in November 2006, ex-GAM insisted that the village block grant be equally disbursed so that they could receive a share of the funds. Similar cases were observed in Nagan Raya and in Aceh Timur.

> "There is a rumor here that GAM have requested 20 percent of the [BRA-KDP] project funds. I think the money should go to them first, not the community. Because once they have received something the process will go more smoothly."
>
> *Villager, Seunuddon sub-district, Aceh Utara*

In Seunuddon and Nisam sub-districts in Aceh Utara, ex-combatants strongly demanded that they receive a portion of the block grants, leading KDP facilitators and communities to fear that the program would not go on unless some money was paid to them. Such attempts at extortion were recorded in eight of the 67 target sub-districts (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Reported Case of Extortion by Ex-Combatants

Location (sub-district, district)	Nature of the incident	Steps taken and outcome
Seunuddon, Aceh Utara	Demands by KPA for a 20 percent cut of village block grants.	Demands dropped after further socialization.
Terangon, Gayo Lues	Demands by KPA for a 15 percent cut from village block grants.	Demands withdrawn after protests from communities.
Kabayakan, Aceh Tengah	KPA issued a letter to the *Camat*, demanding a Rp. 3 million (US$ 300) cut per village.	After mediation from the BRA district office, demands were withdrawn.
Kluet Timur and Samadua, Aceh Selatan	Reported attempts by KPA to obtain a 21 percent cut of block grants in both sub-districts.	Intimidation and threats stopped after further socialization.
Nisam, Aceh Utara	Demands of a Rp. 13 million (US$ 1,300) cut per village.	Demands dropped after special follow-up meetings.
Geulumpang Baroe, Pidie	As block grants were disbursed to Blang Baroe village, Rp. 58 million (US$ 5,800) was handed over to a KPA member.	The money was later retrieved by local police.
Gandapura, Bireuen	Reports of demands by KPA for a Rp. 2.5 million (US$ 250) cut from village block grants.	Local KDP facilitators later denied that any attempt was successful.

Source: MIS Complaints-Handling Data and supervision missions

Most cases were sorted out after socialization and mediation, sometimes with the help of BRA district offices. On the whole, KPA showed good will and withdrew demands without much resistance. Only in Nisam sub-district in Aceh Utara were there significant implementation delays that necessitated the intervention of provincial BRA and KDP management (see Box 4.2). These experiences illustrate how inadequacies in BRA's reintegration assistance to GAM ex-combatants sometimes negatively impacted on BRA-KDP.

Box 4.2 Ex-combatants Demand a Piece of the Pie—the Case of Nisam, Aceh Utara

Nisam sub-district was one of the most severely affected areas during the conflict. Large numbers of people were killed, numerous houses damaged and livelihoods were destroyed. Both the cause and effect of this was the high concentration of ex-combatants in the sub-district. According to some GAM sources, there are 1,000 ex-GAM members in Nisam of whom at least a half are former combatants. Many did not receive any BRA assistance as the agreement between GAM and the central government covered only 3,000 combatants whose names were submitted to BRA. Those who missed out felt they were entitled to reintegration benefits from elsewhere. This resulted in persistent demands from local KPA for a piece of BRA-KDP.

In late 2006, two KPA commanders from Wilayah Pasee (Yusop HS and Jafar Daud), issued a letter instructing that every village allocate funds to benefit the following groups: at least five former combatants; at least ten GAM civilians; 15 GAM supporters; and four regular community members. In addition, they made a number of conditions such as "if female combatants had their houses burnt down, they should receive a special allocation", "villages that were less conflict-affected should give 50 percent of their funds to other villages that suffered from higher conflict impact". Such instructions were clearly against the principles of BRA-KDP, which state that fund use should be determined democratically by community members.

These initial claims were abandoned following negotiations involving the provincial management of BRA, KDP and the World Bank. However, in March 2007, facilitators reported that KPA was making new demands directly to communities, whereby each village should save a Rp. 13 million (US$ 1,300) share, allegedly to build a cemetery and memorial for ex-combatants. It appeared that some communities actually supported the initiative. The issue was further complicated when local police informed that KDP facilitators could be prosecuted for "complicity of public funds embezzlement" if they allowed villagers to accommodate KPA demands. KDP staff consequently decided to freeze funds disbursements until the issue was sorted out. Eventually, after a new round of negotiations led by a joint BRA, KDP and World Bank delegation, KPA agreed to withdraw any demands can cause no further difficulties. Relations between KPA and KDP field staff remained cordial after this.

Such problems were not specific to BRA-KDP alone. The two supervision missions found attempts by ex-combatants to appropriate funds from a range of development programs. In fact, attempts by former combatants to obtain a "tax" of ten percent from development projects have become common practice in Aceh (Aspinall 2009). Another case in Sawang sub-district, Aceh Utara, deserves mention. Although not directly related to extortion, it illustrates how the intervention of ex-combatants could worsen existing tensions between communities and KDP facilitators, playing a leading role in escalating protests and frustrations to physical intimidation (see Box 4.3).

Box 4.3 Ex-Combatants as Spoilers—the Case of Sawang, Aceh Utara

Sawang is a neighboring sub-district of Nisam that shares a number of similar characteristics, including a high level of conflict intensity and a large number of former combatants. In Sawang, inequities in the distribution of reintegration assistance to ex-combatants led to a feud between rival groups which resulted in serious violence, including kidnappings and assassinations. Sawang also has a history of widespread extortion and intimidation by KPA on public projects and development programs.

On 7 February 2007, a mob led by four KPA members raided the local KDP Implementation Management Unit office. Office equipment, documents and archives were destroyed. Computers were damaged or stolen. Troubles seemed to originate from misinformation disseminated by a member of the BRA district office, which created the perception that facilitators were responsible for delays in implementation. The perpetrators allegedly acted "on behalf" of frustrated local communities. The incident resulted in a two-month halt in program implementation. It was eventually sorted out through a special MAD with the participation of BRA, KDP and World Bank provincial staff.

It is unclear whether extortion was also a triggering factor in the incident. However, what is interesting in this case is how KPA's intervention allowed for existing but manageable tensions to escalate and led the program to a temporary halt.

Impacts of BRA-KDP on the relationship between ex-combatants and other villagers

The ARLS surveys provide some evidence that the program impacted negatively on communities', and particularly conflict victims', levels of acceptance of returning former combatants (Barron et. al. 2009). This is possibly due to attempts by ex-combatants to claim a share of the assistance, as illustrated in the examples above. The surveys show that the most frequent complaint of beneficiaries regarding BRA-KDP outcomes was that ex-combatants benefited too much. On the other hand, levels of acceptance are higher in locations where communities decided to exert some flexibility and allow ex-combatants to benefit. There might be two reasons for these seemingly contradictory findings. First, villagers were more likely to accommodate the claims of ex-combatants in communities where former combatants were better integrated from the start. Second, allowing former combatants to benefit was probably a good way to prevent them from making troubles. Conversely, enforcing program procedures too rigidly by excluding ex-combatants might have led to tensions, thus affecting negatively the relationship between ex-GAM and other villagers.

These findings point to the exclusion of ex-combatants from the assistance as a possible flaw of the program that undermined the program's objective of strengthening social cohesion. This suggests that specific groups should not be excluded from programs delivering reintegration assistance through community-based mechanisms, and that more emphasis should be placed on engaging ex-combatants positively in program processes.

5. HOW FUNDS WERE USED: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM

BRA-KDP encouraged beneficiaries to invest funds in productive activities that would result in sustainable improvements in economic welfare. The program offered a truly open menu that allowed communities to choose to spend money on infrastructure as well as on private goods. Delivery of funds was conditional on the submission of sound project proposals and program facilitators provided technical assistance to beneficiaries to develop and carry out productive economic activities. Both measures helped safeguard against assistance being wasted in one-off consumption. Communities largely gave preference to livelihoods projects, and two-thirds of beneficiaries invested project funds in productive activities (Barron et al 2009). Although relatively modest amounts of assistance were provided to individuals and households, there is evidence that this injection of capital had significant impacts on the welfare of beneficiary communities.

This section begins with a breakdown of the types of sub-projects selected by communities. It is followed by a discussion of the reasons for the prevalence of private over public goods, and concludes with an assessment of the program's economic impacts.

Key Findings:

- Most beneficiary communities preferred to use program assistance for economic activities rather than common goods and infrastructure. Eighty-nine percent of block grants were spent on livelihood projects with cattle-breeding and agriculture inputs the dominant activities. Ten percent of funds were invested in infrastructure.
- The most important reason for the prevalence of livelihoods projects over common goods is that communities associated BRA-KDP with compensation for the conflict. They consequently opted for projects that would translate into direct individual benefits.
- Higher levels of satisfaction were found in communities where a minority share of assistance was used for common goods and infrastructure, as a strategy to ensure that the whole community would benefit.
- BRA-KDP was successful in providing beneficiary communities with a much-needed injection of capital. Two-thirds of beneficiaries invested funds in productive activities.
- The program was associated with significant impacts on the welfare of target communities, including a reduction in the number of households reported as poor, gains in household asset holdings and an increase in land use.

5.1 What did Beneficiaries Use Funds For?

The program procedures allowed for great flexibility in terms of the activities eligible for funding (see Box 5.1). Communities could propose almost any kind of project.

Box 5.1 The Open Menu

The program used the same open menu as regular KDP. Funds could be spent on economic activities, infrastructure, health and education-related activities or anything the community proposed except the following: development/rehabilitation of office buildings; financing of civil servants' salaries; purchase of chainsaws, weapons, explosives, asbestos, and other materials damaging to the environment; financing of activities related to the employment of under-working age children; financing of activities related to politics/political parties; and financing of anything related to the military or armed forces. Unlike regular KDP, building or rehabilitation of mosques and purchase of fertilizers was allowed.

In contrast to regular KDP, where communities typically use 80 to 90 percent of the funds for infrastructure projects such as access roads and irrigation canals, BRA-KDP beneficiaries overwhelmingly preferred economic activities. Eighty-nine percent of BRA-KDP funds were spent on economic activities (Rp. 181.8 billion, or approximately US$ 18 million); ten percent were invested in infrastructure (Rp. 21.4 billion, or US$ 2 million); less than one percent were used for other kinds of activities (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Funds Spent by Type of Activity



Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

Trends in project selection varied by region (Figure 5.2). In Aceh Tamiang and Simeulue, the assistance was exclusively spent on economic activities. Similarly, in Pidie, Bireuen, Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur, the four districts which benefited from over 80 percent of all BRA-KDP funds due to high levels of conflict-affectedness and large populations, at least 90 percent of the money was used for economic activities. By contrast, Aceh Tengah and Aceh Barat gave priority to infrastructure over economic sub-projects, allocating 60 percent and over 80 percent of funds respectively for these activities.

Figure 5.2 Economic Sub-projects vs. other Activities, Per District, as a Proportion of Funds Allocated



Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

Among the economic activities, animal husbandry and agricultural activities were the most preferred (Figure 5.3). Around Rp. 138 billion (approximately US$ 14 million) or 67 percent of all BRA-KDP block grants were allocated for these two activities. The domination of livestock and agriculture projects reflects the social composition of the target population of the program, but also reflects the preference given to activities that would address pressing economic needs.

Figure 5.3 Breakdown of Sub-projects by Type (% of Funds Allocated to Economic Activities)



Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

Where communities selected infrastructure, they largely favored social and religious facilities

such as community halls (*meunasah*) and mosques over roads, irrigation and other public goods (see Figure 5.4). There are a number of reasons for this. First, the amount of BRA-KDP allocations would generally be insufficient to allow for heavy infrastructure work. In contrast, facilities such as *meunasah*, mosque and prayer rooms were less costly. Second, as discussed in greater detail below, communities often used infrastructure projects to address perceived inequities resulting from projects that provided funds to sets of individuals or households. In this scenario, the majority of funds financed livelihoods projects, while the remainder was invested in public goods from which all benefited. This strategy mitigated jealousies and helped maintain social cohesion. With these objectives in mind, the choice of social and religious facilities was therefore a sensible one.

Figure 5.4 Breakdown of Sub-project by Type (%of Funds Allocated to Infrastructure)



Source: MIS data, KDP Regional Management Unit

5.2 Reasons for the Choices made by Communities

Why were most funds used for economic activities?

There are a number of reasons why livelihoods activities were generally preferred. Villagers expected compensation for the hardships suffered during the conflict. Individual economic benefits provided beneficiaries with a better sense of recognition than infrastructure projects.

> "This assistance is for conflict victims. If the funds should be used for community goods, then people should use another source of money."
>
> *Villager, Kluet Selatan sub-district, Aceh Selatan*

A lack of capital was and remains a major impediment to economic recovery and growth in rural Aceh (World Bank 2005). Many villagers noted that provision of capital, compared to other forms of livelihoods support, would best enable them to rebuild and recover from the losses they had suffered. This is common in post-conflict settings where severely

conflict-affected communities often have a need for immediate livelihoods support such as capital, inputs for fishing and farming, and income-generating activities. Programs such as regular KDP were in place to provide infrastructure whereas in most villages programs providing capital were scarce. BRA-KDP, through its open menu which allowed for economic activities, served as a badly needed source of capital. Villagers in Aceh Barat Daya, for example, clearly noted that if they needed rural infrastructure, they would use other sources of assistance.

Mixed messages and miscommunication from different program stakeholders played a role in influencing communities' project preferences. BRA viewed the need to fulfill compensation claims of the most-affected conflict victims as an important part of its mandate, and encouraged the use of BRA-KDP funds for economic activities over infrastructure. BRA's preference for livelihoods activities ran against program rules that allowed for public goods to be funded. On more than one occasion, this tension was exacerbated by insufficient coordination between BRA provincial leadership and district branches, which resulted in contradictory messages being circulated to KDP facilitators and communities. During the early stages of the program cycle, BRA district offices in Aceh Timur and Aceh Selatan issued official instructions to KDP facilitators that infrastructure sub-projects were not allowed in BRA-KDP. These instructions were quickly revoked by the BRA provincial level management and clarification letters were circulated to KDP field offices. The circulation of inconsistent messages led to considerable confusion as communities were forced to unnecessarily withdraw and/or revise proposals. In Aceh Tengah, villages such as Kelupak Mata abandoned community hall construction projects after the intervention of BRA district personnel.

The role of infrastructure in maintaining social cohesion

Although on the whole infrastructure projects were rarely selected for funding, records of village meetings show that communities often indicated a strong need for drinking water, irrigation systems and roads. Project proposals for such activities frequently figured among those initially submitted for selection. However, in locations where the majority of funds were used for infrastructure sub-projects (up to 100 percent of funds in some villages), decisions were usually based on the desire to avoid conflicts and tensions generated by the process of identifying conflict victims. Singling out the most-affected, differentiating categories according to levels of suffering, and prioritizing some to the detriment of others was often a very sensitive process (see earlier chapter). In villages where all had suffered more or less the same level of impact from the conflict, categorization and prioritization was even more challenging. In communities where some had objectively suffered more, their claims could still conflict with the need of the wider community for some measure of compensation and recognition of their own suffering. Infrastructure sub-projects served as a mechanism through which communities could avoid tensions related to identifying victims by providing public goods for the whole village.

Complementary aspects of livelihoods and infrastructure sub-projects

Higher levels of satisfaction were observed in communities that made the most of BRA-KDP's

flexible procedures and open menu by selecting both economic and infrastructure projects. Infrastructure projects were sometimes funded through a combination of BRA-KDP and funds from other programs or private contributions (see Box 5.2). Infrastructure projects helped maintain social cohesion by offsetting jealousies that stemmed from the prioritization and delivery of assistance to the most-affected by providing public goods benefiting the entire community.

Box 5.2 The Balance between Livelihoods and Infrastructure in Batee Dabai, Makmur, Bireuen

From a block grant allocation of Rp. 150 million (approximately US$ 15,000), Batee Dabai used Rp. 109 million to purchase livestock for the benefit of twenty highly-affected households, including eight widow-headed families. The remaining 41 million was used to build a *meunasah* (community hall). Although the Rp. 41 million was not sufficient to complete the construction of the *meunasah*, village authorities raised an additional Rp. 30 million in voluntary contributions.

5.3 Technical Quality of Projects

> "BRA-KDP gave us a kick-start this year. It reduced our loan burden and allowed us to plant more."
>
> *Villager, Peudada sub-district, Bireuen*

The ARLS data shows evidence of significant program impacts on the welfare of target communities. BRA-KDP was associated with an eleven percent drop in levels of poverty as reported by village heads. The program also resulted in gains in household asset holdings, such as stoves and motorcycles, especially amongst conflict victims. Most strikingly, the survey shows strong evidence associating BRA-KDP with a large increase in the amount of land being farmed (Barron et. Al. 2009).

Durable improvements were presumably more likely in locations where strong prioritization of the most-affected allowed them to benefit from higher amounts of capital. One would therefore expect marginal impacts where benefits were spread thinly across a large number of individuals or households, as occurred where *bagi rata* took place. While sufficient data is not available to test these hypotheses, supervision missions found examples of *bagi rata* that led to meaningful welfare impacts and others that failed to do so (see Box 5.3).

Box 5.3 Bagi Rata–Cases of Successful and Unsuccessful Sub-project Selection and Implementation

Successful case: Kandeh Village, Seunagan sub-district, Nagan Raya

Kandeh village was almost totally deserted during the last six years of the conflict. After the MoU, nearly all households returned. Many were former GAM combatants. The community decided to use the totality of BRA-KDP funds to start a rubber plantation, with each household receiving half a hectare. Five conflict widows conveyed their frustration with project selection. They felt they should have been prioritized over other villagers. They also complained that ex-combatants manipulated the decision-making process to their advantage, as they benefited from plantation lots on top of the Rp. 25 million they had already received from BRA. Nonetheless, villagers on the whole, including the widows, acknowledged that the rubber plantation was a sound project that should, over time, have a significant impact on the community's welfare. The villagers knew they would not collect any direct benefit from the plantation before five years. However, in this community where rubber is the traditional trade, most considered the project "as an investment for their children and grandchildren".

Unsuccessful case: Blang Beurandeh village, Beutong sub-district, Nagan Raya

Similar factors influencing sub-project selection led to a total failure in Blang Beurandeh. In 1999, this village was the theater of one of the most infamous incidents of the conflict years: the massacre by the Indonesian military of Teungku Bantaqiah, a controversial Islamic scholar accused of supporting the rebellion, and about sixty students from his Islamic boarding school. As in Kandeh, the BRA-KDP decision-making process was heavily influenced by ex-combatants who pushed for *bagi rata* in order to get a share of the benefits. However, instead of investing assistance funds in a sound and sustainable economic project, cash was handed out, with every individual in the village receiving Rp. 160.000 (US$ 16). With funds spread so thinly, money was quickly spent on consumer goods. The widows of the sixty victims of the 1999 massacre strongly deplored this outcome. Ironically, even ex-combatants complained the funds were insufficient.

Strong facilitation during project design, and prior experience and technical knowledge of the activity amongst beneficiaries, also contributed greatly to the success of projects. Box 5.4 shows an example of a livelihood project that resulted in sustainable economic gains as it was tailored to the professional skills and experience of the proposal group.

Box 5.4 Poultry Farm in Timanang Gading

Twelve conflict victims in Timanang Gading village, Kebayakan sub-district, Aceh Tengah, each received Rp. 2.5 million (US$ 250) in assistance from BRA-KDP to pursue economic activities. A poultry farm had an immediate positive impact on the livelihood of one of the beneficiaries. Prior to receiving BRA-KDP assistance, a conflict victim owned close to a hundred chickens. However, he did not have a proper place to house the poultry, nor did he have the capital to fatten, breed and market them. Upon receipt of the assistance, the beneficiary invested a portion of the amount to construct a large coop to house the chickens. He purchased an additional 100 chickens at a total cost of Rp. 260,000 (US$ 26) and invested the remaining amount in feed. At the time of the September 2007 supervision mission, the conflict victim was selling chickens to food vendors and restaurants at a profit of Rp. 4000–5000 per chicken. He was using the profits to construct another coop and purchase more poultry.

6. VIEWS OF COMMUNITIES: LEVELS OF SATISFACTION & COMPLAINTS

This section draws from supervision mission findings and the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS) to assess overall levels of satisfaction in beneficiary communities. It also presents the prevalent types of complaints conveyed by beneficiaries and the ways in which these were addressed by the program.

Main Findings:

- Levels of satisfaction were high and communities felt that BRA-KDP was successful in fulfilling the needs of conflict victims for compensation and recognition.
- Complaints, widespread in the early stages of the program cycle, were focused on the following issues: change in the delivery mechanism from earlier BRA proposal-based system to BRA-KDP's community-based system; sub-district and village block grant allocations; and delays in implementation.
- Project-related complaints decreased over time as a result of effective socialization by KDP facilitators and as funds hit the ground. There were very few cases where complaints or protests led to intimidation or resulted in significant delays or disruptions in program implementation.
- The program undertook an extensive socialization campaign that utilized multiple types of media. Face-to-face socialization activities were most effective, while radio had the least impact.

6.1 Levels of Satisfaction

Ninety-four percent of all respondents from target locations, and 97 percent of the most-affected conflict victims, deemed the program "typically helpful" to them and the community.[18] Overall levels of satisfaction observed during supervision missions were also high. In March 2007, thirteen of fifteen surveyed sub-districts showed strong support for the program. Dissatisfaction or hostile reactions were recorded in two sub-districts of Aceh Timur. These were driven by the frustration of local ex-combatants at not being formally allowed to benefit or stemmed from implementation issues, such as delays or protests over the amount of allocations, that were later addressed.

Regarding satisfaction with program decision-making processes, findings of the September 2007 supervision were more nuanced with substantial variation across regions. In Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, the central highlands and the west coast, some felt that decisions were unduly influenced by elites. In these areas, women tended to be less satisfied with the program than men. In contrast, both the March and September 2007 supervisions recorded the highest levels of support and satisfaction in Bireuen and Pidie. In these two districts, the decision-making process was widely regarded as fair, despite initial resistance from ex-combatants. High satisfaction levels across groups including women, most-affected conflict victims and other

[18] Barron et. al. (2009). Respondents could choose between three options: typically helpful; neither helpful nor harmful; rather harmful.

disadvantaged groups was in large part attributable to higher levels of participation from non-elites and the program's constructive engagement of ex-combatants.

While most people were satisfied with overall outcomes and agreed that BRA-KDP was successful in providing a needed and immediate injection of capital to conflict-affected communities, respondents interviewed during supervision missions conveyed doubts that BRA-KDP assistance would result in sustainable impacts. The amount of BRA-KDP funds was deemed insufficient in the absence of linkages to and follow-up from programs that improve infrastructure and provide access to capital, skills training, and marketing support.

> "The community is happy enough to get assistance, even if amounts were not sufficient. The money at least gives us hope and renewed spirit to undertake new activities"
>
> *Head of TPK, Timang Gajah sub-district, Bener Meriah*

Of particular importance with regards to BRA-KDP's main objective, most communities acknowledged that BRA-KDP successfully fulfilled the needs of conflict victims for compensation and recognition of enduring past hardships. Even in locations where assistance funds were spread thinly, many beneficiaries interviewed during supervision missions felt satisfied with having received compensation and were ready to focus more on longer-term development.

> "It was important for us to receive compensation. Now that we have received it, we no longer need further compensation. We will choose economic development in the future"
>
> *Village Head of a community who opted for equal division of funds across all households, Syamtalira Bayu sub-district, Aceh Utara*

6.2 Complaints Handling Mechanisms

Communities had high expectations for the reintegration benefits provided by local government and, for many of them, a history of disappointment in local government service delivery. It was therefore vital to create a mechanism through which communities could submit inquiries and complaints and provide evidence to communities that complaints and questions was being heard and acted upon. In BRA-KDP, inquiries and complaints were submitted through a variety of channels, including text messages to a publicized phone number, walk-ins to KDP or BRA offices, a designated post office box, KDP facilitators, other stakeholders, and the media. A Complaints Handling Specialist was hired at the KDP Regional Management Unit (RMU) to compile and categorize all incoming complaints. Once categorized, all complaints were registered in the BRA-KDP database before being relayed, when deemed relevant, to the appropriate KDP or BRA staff for follow-up. Complaints submitted directly to KDP and BRA personnel, newspapers and text messages were the channels utilized most frequently, with text messaging the most popular amongst community members.[19]

Given the political sensitivity of the program, there were complaints of a nature that KDP staff

[19] The flow chart of BRA-KDP's Complaints Handling mechanism is shown in Annex C.

alone could not address. These were forwarded to the BRA Project Implementation Unit (PIU) (Table 6.1). Together with BRA PIU, the Complaints Handling Specialist determined the best way to address the issues and was in charge of providing responses to the complaints. Verification and problem solving were followed-up by the Complaints Handling Specialist together with KDP facilitators.

Table 6.1 Categories of Issues

Issues to be handled by KDP	
1	Problems related to program process/procedures • Problems regarding size of block grants • Problems regarding categories of conflict victims • Problems regarding target site selection
2	Misallocation of program funds
3	Inappropriate intervention from government officials or KDP consultants
4	Unforeseeable events such as natural disasters (force majeure)
Issues to be handled by BRA	
5	• Problems related to the concept of program (e.g. shift to community-based mechanism) • Problems regarding already submitted proposals • Inappropriate intervention from ex-combatants/KPA, PETA, political prisoners, security forces etc. • Complaints regarding reintegration program in general

6.3 Complaints

The number of complaints was relatively low. Widespread during early stages, the frequency of inquiries by communities progressively decreased as implementation progressed and further socialization was carried out, providing communities with a better understanding of program mechanisms.

Complaints and concerns most commonly reported were related to the following issues:

(i) Questions over the fate of previously submitted proposals;
(ii) Conflict intensity categorization and village block grant allocations;
(iii) Delays in implementation;
(iv) Demands for funds to be distributed equally;
(v) Ex-combatants/KPA requesting a part of the assistance.

Issues (iv) and (v) were discussed at lengths in previous sections. The others are discussed below.

Questions regarding previously submitted proposals

Over 48,500 proposals from conflict victims were submitted to BRA in April 2006. On supervision missions, it was not uncommon to find villages in which over a hundred people had sent proposals to BRA. People had high expectations and a genuine need for BRA assistance. Most had invested significant amounts of time and money in preparing the proposals and had no information that the proposal-based system had been abandoned until this was discussed in

BRA-KDP's first village meeting. Individuals were understandably upset at this change in policy, disappointed that their proposals would not be acted upon, and dismayed at the prospect of having to expend additional time and effort in participating in BRA-KDP. BRA's change in policy was a major source of complaints early on in the BRA-KDP cycle. As funds reached communities in early 2007, tensions over past proposals largely disappeared and community satisfaction grew. The March 2007 supervision mission found no serious cases of complaints about the shift to BRA-KDP's community based system.

> "A lot of community members sent proposals to BRA so people initially thought that the [BRA-KDP] money was for the proposals. There was no explanation about the shift in system, and many are still waiting for them to be funded. In fact, only a week ago, there was a flyer from the BRA district office encouraging people to send more proposals for BRA-KDP."
>
> *Village Head, Kluet Selatan sub-district, Aceh Selatan*

Conflict intensity and village block grant allocation

Some communities noted that conflict intensity varied significantly within sub-districts and hence village allocations should be scaled according to both population size and *village-level* rather than *sub-district level* conflict intensity. Finding consensus on this contentious issue often required more than one village meeting; some communities held a series of KDP-facilitated meetings to reach consensus. An extreme case was that of Kecamatan Manyak Payed in Aceh Tamiang, where a second MAD was held to reallocate village block grants according to village-level conflict intensity (Box 6.1).

Box 6.1 Reallocation of Village Grants--the Case of Manyak Payed, Aceh Tamiang

The MAD in Manyak Payed sub-district conducted on November 2006 was attended by many community representatives, village heads, KDP facilitators, ex-combatants, BRA and other prominent figures. It ended in dispute because community representatives disagreed with the village allocations. Villagers thought allocating village block grants based on sub-district-level conflict intensity and village population size was unjust. Failing to consider village-level variation in conflict intensity meant that villages with high conflict intensity but small populations got lower allocations than villages with lower conflict intensity but larger populations. Ex-combatants and villagers argued that some villages experienced difficult situations during the conflict and therefore deserved more assistance. They thus demanded that village allocations be revised by conducting another special MAD.

KPA Aceh Tamiang took the initiative to organize a special MAD. With 300 participants, including community representatives from 36 villages, the *Camat,* military, district police, KPA*,* and KDP facilitators, the meeting's attendance was well above the provincial average. At the meeting, it was decided that village allocations should be revised based on village-level conflict intensity. Allocations were then determined and agreed by all participants. The table below shows the agreed reallocation:

		Population		
		Large	Medium	Small
Conflict Intensity (village)	High	Rp. 150,000,000 (6 villages)	Rp. 130,000,000 (10 villages)	-
	Medium	Rp. 110,000,000 (4 villages)	Rp. 95,000,000 (5 villages)	-
	Low	Rp. 75,000,000 (5 villages)	Rp. 65,000,000 (6 villages)	-

This reallocation did not entail changes to the previously determined sub-district allocation of Rp. 3,880,000,000. All the villages felt they had a say in determining the block grant and the meeting adjourned with everyone feeling satisfied.

Other communities pointed out that the population of certain villages was larger than that identified by BRA-KDP and that allocations should be revisited accordingly. An extreme case was Gampong Mesjid village, Nurussalam sub-district, Aceh Timur, which had 1,818 inhabitants and suffered from high levels of conflict intensity. The village benefited from the highest possible block grant allocation (Rp. 170 million, US$ 17,000), but it was still regarded by the community as insufficient to cover local needs. It was also considered unfair in comparison to villages that received the same amount but had been less affected and had fewer inhabitants. This caused trouble, leading villagers to refuse to go through with the program. In November 2006, a delegation of villagers came to Banda Aceh to convey their complaints to BRA's provincial management. Although BRA was sympathetic to the communities' claims, no agreement was reached: budget limitations meant that it was not possible to add to Gampong Mesjid's block grant without reducing the allocations of other villages in the same sub-district. Program implementation was still frozen when the March 2007 supervision mission surveyed the village. Eventually, BRA found a budgetary solution that allowed Gampong Mesjid to benefit from a Rp. 50 million (US$ 5,000) block grant complement and program implementation was resumed. This was the only case where disagreements over allocation amounts led to protracted protests and a total halt to program activities.

Issues (i) and (ii) mostly appeared during early stages, between MD I and MD II. They lost importance as further socialization was carried out and implementation progressed. After the MD II, they were replaced by protests over the pace of implementation.

Delays in disbursements

The program was socialized in August 2006 but due to administrative delays program funds were delivered to sub-district Financial Management Units only in December of the same year (Box 6.2).

Box 6.2 Constraints and Issues with Initial Disbursement to Sub-districts

Operational funds and block grants were first transferred to collective accounts created by KDP's Financial Management Units (UPK) in each of the 67 participating sub-districts in December 2006. The primary reasons for slow initial disbursement to the sub-district accounts were BRA's and the Department of Social Affairs' (Dinsos) lack of familiarity with the community-driven approach and a lack of capacity to manage the necessary paperwork. The situation improved after BRA established a Project Implementation Unit in October 2006. Nonetheless, to prevent the 2006 budget from being taken away by the Ministry of Finance after December 2006, the end of the Indonesian government's fiscal year, the World Bank had to mobilize financial experts from the KDP team who worked full-time with BRA, Dinsos, and the Treasury (KPPN) to ensure the disbursement happened in time.

In the end, operational costs (six percent of the total allocation) were disbursed on 1 December and the remaining 94 percent for 65 out of 67 sub-districts was disbursed between 18-20 December. Two sub-districts (Simpang Kramat and Kuta Makmur, both in Aceh Utara) were late in submitting the request for disbursement and hence were paid out of the unspent portion of BRA's 2005 budget in late April 2007.

The delay in the disbursement of the operational budget led to complaints. In some areas, the delay raised community suspicions that either BRA or KDP facilitators were stealing the money, or that no assistance was going to come through after all. This negatively impacted upon the credibility of BRA and KDP personnel. Negative perceptions persisted until funds were transferred from collective accounts at the sub-district level to the village level. This step took an additional several months as villagers had to submit sound proposals before funds could be released. Hence, there were widespread suspicions by communities in some areas that KDP facilitators were deliberately slowing down the implementation process in order to collect interest on program funds deposited in bank accounts.

> "There's distrust of people here towards KDP facilitators. This is because there was false news in the newspaper. The paper said that the funds had already been disbursed to the Financial Management Unit, but that the disbursement to the villages was delayed because the UPK was trying to earn interest off the funds."
>
> *KDP Facilitator, Manyak Payed sub-district, Aceh Tamiang*

> "The delay in disbursement is the biggest problem. The community's trust towards the KDP facilitators is decreasing because the disbursement is slow."
>
> *KDP Facilitator, Samadua sub-district, Aceh Selatan*

Concerns over disbursement delays had largely dissipated by the time of the March 2007 supervision mission, in part due to effective further socialization and facilitation by KDP staff, in part because funds had started to reach villages and beneficiaries.

The evolution of issues over time: Inquiries and complaints received via text messages

As one of the channels most often used by communities to address information and complaints, text messaging provides a useful instrument to identify issues and analyze their evolution over time. Text messages were classified into one of five sub-categories: (i) clarification of previously submitted proposals; (ii) questions concerning the process and mechanisms of BRA-KDP (beneficiaries, mechanisms, timing of disbursement, etc.); (iii) questions concerning other BRA reintegration programs; (iv) complaints and requests related to BRA-KDP, such as GAM extortion attempts, demands for direct cash transfers, complaints regarding KDP facilitators and corruption allegations; and (v) others, usually inquiries that were not directly relevant to the program. Between 23 August 2006, and the end of April 2007, a total of 493 messages were received. As Figure 6.1 shows, 41 percent of all messages received sought information on eligible beneficiaries, disbursement schedules or the program implementation process. Another 22 percent were questions regarding BRA's other reintegration assistance. Fifteen percent were complaints about BRA-KDP, including demands to equally divide the funds, corruption allegations, and GAM extortion attempts. A further six percent sought clarification on the status of previously submitted proposals.

Figure 6.1 Breakdown of Information Requests and Complaints Received Via Text Message



Source: MIS Complaints Handling System

The number of complaints and information requests evolved over time (Figure 6.2). There was a steady increase in the number of monthly incoming messages until the end of December, except for a temporary drop in November. The number of inquiries, however, dropped significantly starting in February. No messages were recorded after April and the Complaints Handling Specialist handling the line was demobilized in June. The significant decline in the number of inquiries appears to relate to three factors: first, as meetings progressed community

understanding of the program increased; second, articles on BRA-KDP appeared more frequently in the local press (throughout February, for example, newspapers featured stories about the program almost every day); third, complaints and concerns declined as funds disbursements started in February.

Figure 6.2 Evolution of Information Requests Over Time



Source: MIS Complaints Handling System

Figure 6.2 also shows that the type of information requested changed as the program progressed. In August, most sought clarification on the status of previously submitted proposals and eligibility criteria. Inquiries about proposals rapidly decreased, however, demonstrating increasing acceptance of the shift of mechanism. The number of text messages on eligibility also decreased over time while the disbursement schedule became the communities' foremost concern.[20] Statements such as "We need it [the funds] urgently" or "Is it [BRA-KDP] just a lie?" expressed a sense of impatience among communities. This type of inquiry progressively disappeared as disbursements started in February.

A positive trend was the general demand for program oversight. In August and September people sought information about the program and fund allocation in order to preempt any misconduct. From September onwards, messages reporting (alleged) corruption or elite capture started. A case was reported from Manyak Payed in Aceh Tamiang that a Village Head had prioritized his family in the allocation of funds. In one sub-district in Aceh Selatan, the sub-district facilitator allegedly decided on who would receive funds. In Lawe Alas, Aceh Tenggara, the KDP Financial Management Unit (UPK) and communities received pressure from the *Camat's* office to save funds from the grants allocated to the sub-district to finance the

[20] Both inquiries about eligibility and disbursement schedule fall under the same category – Questions about BRA-KDP process and mechanism – in Figure 6.2.

rehabilitation of a road. In Manyak Payed, Aceh Tamiang, reports were received of attempts by the *Camat* to take a cut from the operational funds allocated to the sub-district financial units (UPK). March saw a significant increase in complaints related to implementation issues as disbursement to villages was in full swing. The main types of complaints were: (i) those over the way assistance was distributed, including by heavily affected conflict victims who felt they should have been prioritized more; (ii) corruption allegations; and (iii) reports of extortion attempts by KPA. In all cases, there was follow-up by program staff and most cases were solved.

Messages about other BRA reintegration assistance were also frequently sent throughout the nine months, and notably accounted for the majority of messages in December. These included questions from ex-GAM combatants, amnestied political prisoners, members of former anti-separatist militia, IDPs and ordinary villagers asking about reintegration assistance in general, and, specifically, about housing assistance and *Diyat*. The number of messages on each issue fluctuated over time but queries over housing assistance were the most frequent.

6.4 Socialization

The discussion of the nature and evolution of complaints above underlines the importance of socialization. Many concerns and issues stemmed from insufficient understanding by communities of program mechanisms, and they were eventually sorted out by simply carrying out further socialization activities. Socialization was also critical in defusing claims from former combatants to a share of the assistance.

BRA- KDP's socialization strategy

BRA-KDP was socialized through three primary forms of media: print media, radio and meetings between program facilitators and beneficiary communities (see Box 6.3). Initial information dissemination targeted the public at large through newspapers, community radio, posters, and brochures. Q&A advertorials were published in three different newspapers. Five editions of *Ceureumen*, a bi-weekly tabloid delivered with the Banda Aceh-based daily *Serambi Indonesia*, provided a full-page report on the progress of BRA-KDP and provided answers to complaints sent by text message. Four episodes of radio drama produced by a local NGO were broadcast throughout the province to provide details of the program in a humorous manner using easily understandable language.

More targeted socialization activities came in the form of workshops held at the district and sub-district levels by BRA, KDP provincial and district staff and the World Bank. District-level workshops were held between September and October 2006 in ten locations clustering all 17 target districts. Inter-village meetings were held in all 67 sub-districts. These gatherings aimed at socializing the program to sub-district heads (*Camat*), government coordination bodies, BRA district offices, KPA, religious figures, community leaders, village heads, military, and police.

Box 6.3 Summary of Socialization Activities

1. Printed Materials
   - 5,000 posters on program introduction
   - 5,000 posters on the program cycle
   - 100,000 Q&A leaflets
   - 2,000 flipcharts for village-level socialization
   - 3,800 copies of operational guidelines

2. Q&A Newspaper Ads
   - *Serambi* Indonesia (August 18 and October 18)
   - *Waspada* (August 18 and October 18)
   - *Ceureumen* (mid-August)

3. Radio Drama
   - Four episodes broadcast on RRI from October 16 to November 20, three times a week for one episode

4. Bi-weekly Program Update in Ceureumen

5. Updated Q&A
   - Second set of Q&A was produced immediately to answer major questions and to clarify confusing information. Copies were sent to all BRA district offices and KDP facilitators.

6. Workshops & Socialization Meetings
   - District-level workshops held between late September and early October in ten locations (representatives from all 17 districts attended)
   - Sub-district level socialization meetings (MADs) were held between October and November in all 67 sub-districts
   - Every village held the first village meeting between October and November to socialize the program to community members

A follow-up socialization campaign was prepared that included additional training to BRA and KDP facilitators, distribution of a monthly program newsletter, additional Q&A documents, and the development of a text messaging system for rapid dissemination of information. BRA-KDP joint monthly coordination meetings started in March 2007 to improve information sharing and coordination between BRA and KDP facilitators. These additional socialization efforts helped reduce the amount of inaccurate information disseminated by BRA district offices. In intractable situations where the two parties could not agree on an issue in the field, representatives of BRA, RMU and the World Bank conducted follow-up missions to help to clarify issues.

Village meetings appear to be the most effective means of socialization at the community-level (Sharpe and Sim 2009). KDP facilitators noted that communities' low education levels and lack of awareness sometimes limited the impact of print media; personal contact was a more effective approach because the community could have questions answered immediately. Field missions also found that communities regarded KDP facilitators as the best source of information. However, depending on verbal socialization alone posed risks. Both quality and

quantity of information diminishes as it cascades down the KDP facilitator chain. Furthermore, vulnerable and often marginalized groups, including women, were less likely to attend village meetings. As such, special socialization efforts were required to seek out and engage these groups.

Print media was effective at the district and sub-district level, but had a more limited impact at the community level. There are several reasons for this. First, particularly in rural areas, villages showed a reluctance to read print materials, such as the Q&A advertisements published in newspapers. Acquiring the newspapers required time and money and some community members had difficulties understanding the technical language presented exclusively in Indonesian. Visual aids, such as flip charts and posters, were more effective at the community level.

Radio was the least effective medium. The primary reason for this is that the radio drama episodes were broadcast exclusively by the local station of Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI). Although RRI has a broad coverage area, a multitude of local radio stations reach roughly the same number of communities throughout Aceh. Research shows that communities exhibit a strong preference for local radio stations rather than public radio (Sharpe and Wall 2007). Airing the radio drama on local as well as public radio stations would most likely have had a greater impact.

Mobile phones are one communication medium increasingly used by NGOs and the private sector in Indonesia. Regional mobile phone use is exploding and phone ownership in rural Aceh is significant. While no concrete data on phone ownership is available, anecdotal evidence suggests that vulnerable groups, including youth and former GAM combatants, frequently own mobile phones. Mobile phones can be used as a two-way communications tool that disseminates information and allows the users of such information to provide feedback. BRA-KDP's complaints-handling system allowed communities to channel complaints via text messages with great success. This suggests that mobile communications could be used as an effective socialization media.

Challenges to socializing the program

Engaging vulnerable groups such as women and the most-affected conflict victims required extraordinary efforts from program facilitators. Marginalized groups were less likely than others to attend project socialization meetings. Public spaces such as coffee shops are exclusively male environments in Aceh and therefore women are effectively excluded from this information source (Sharpe and Wall 2007). Further, women in rural villages have few opportunities to access television and print media. To compensate for this lack of access to information, program facilitators experimented with organizing informal meetings or women's groups as means through which to more effectively reach out to women.

Logistical obstacles in rural areas severely hampered efforts to socialize BRA-KDP. Village facilitators working in remote areas tended to have a relatively weak understanding of program

processes because they often did not attend training sessions held at the sub-district level because of high transportation costs. This lack of information in turn limited the information that could be passed on to communities. Similarly, villagers living in remote areas had limited access to print media and other sources of information on the program. Because of high transportation costs, villagers in remote areas would rarely travel to sub-district centers where they could access newspaper or visit the KDP sub-district or sub-district administrator's office to request information. In addition, it took longer for print materials, such as posters and flip charts, to reach remote areas. In some cases these were only made available after key meetings took place.

Delivery of print materials was delayed and therefore did not reach sub-district and community levels prior to MAD and MD I. As such, sub-district and village facilitators were unable to use valuable visual aids during this crucial stage of the socialization process.

Lack of coordination between BRA and KDP personnel at the district level had negative consequences for the socialization effort. In several cases, information provided by BRA staff at both the provincial and district levels caused confusion among communities. For example in Aceh Selatan, the BRA district office distributed flyers requesting that communities continue to send individual proposals for conflict victims assistance to the office. The BRA district office also told communities that the funds could be disbursed equally to individuals without a need for proposals. This led a few villages to reject KDP facilitators' explanation that the funds could not be disbursed equally, bringing the project process to a standstill.

> "We went to the BRA district office and heard about the program. BRA told me that the [BRA-KDP] funds were for previously submitted proposals."
>
> *Ex- GAM combatant, Samadua sub-district, Aceh Selatan*

Finally, facilitators had a limited time span in which to socialize the program. They were under pressure to complete program socialization, conflict victim mapping, and proposal identification activities so that all disbursements could be made to UPKs by December 2006. As a result, facilitators had to rush socialization activities and could not wait for print materials to arrive. Socialization to all stakeholders requires a significant amount of time and resources but can lead to benefits in terms of greater ease of program implementation and decreased local tensions. Key messages must be reinforced on numerous occasions and through various means in order to have an impact.

6.5 One Year after Completion: What Issues are Identified by Beneficiaries?

The ARLS, implemented in mid-2008, provides a useful indication of what beneficiary communities think about the program a year after its completion. A striking 94 percent of villagers and 97 percent of the most-affected victims thought the program was generally or very helpful (Barron et. al. 2009). The survey also shows that the level of complaints was very low (Figure 6.3). The greatest complaints, made by twelve percent of respondents, were related to perceptions of diversions of money and project selection. Among the most affected conflict

victims, the main complaint was that the program benefited other groups, such as ex-combatants, too much. Only twelve percent of conflict victims felt that they did not benefit enough from the program. This figures drops to ten percent among the most-affected.

Figure 6.3 Perceptions of BRA-KDP



Source: Barron, Humphreys, Paler and Weinstein (2009)

7. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BRA-KDP complemented highly targeted reintegration programs designated for former combatants, political prisoners and other categories of conflict-affected groups. The program's community-driven process aimed to strengthen social cohesion while supporting the economic and social reintegration of civilian conflict victims. This paper shows that BRA-KDP was largely successful in delivering assistance to conflict victims in a swift, transparent and locally appropriate way, and led to welfare improvements in target areas. However, as discussed in detail in the accompanying BRA-KDP impact evaluation, the program was less successful in building social cohesion despite its attempt to engage former combatants and victims alike in decision-making processes related to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. This final section draws from the main findings of the paper to consider how BRA-KDP could have been more effective, provide recommendations for future post-conflict programs in Aceh, and assess the broader implications for DDR theory and practice.

7.1 How Could BRA-KDP have Contributed more Effectively to Reintegration in Aceh?

While BRA-KDP funds intended as compensation produced positive welfare impacts, the program fell short on several other counts, such as identifying conflict victims within villages. A lack of commitment from government to devolve decisions on compensation to communities, and inadequate training for project facilitators and technical assistance to beneficiaries are some of the obstacles that prevented the program from fully achieving its objectives. The recommendations below highlight ways in which obstacles could have been overcome and may therefore be relevant to CDD and DDR practitioners operating in other parts of Indonesia or in other conflict-affected countries and regions.

Recommendation 1: Encourage government stakeholders to define clear policies and programs for delivering compensation.

The Government of Aceh prioritized the quick delivery of compensation to former combatants and conflict victims in order to meet its commitments stipulated in the Helsinki MoU. At the same time, some of the government's international partners stressed the need to maximize the developmental impacts of the compensation and encouraged the use of mechanisms such as BRA-KDP to achieve both objectives. While the government used BRA-KDP to channel assistance to conflict victims, there was never a clear policy statement that assistance delivered through the program would fulfill the government's obligation to compensate conflict victims. The failure to clearly articulate the program's policy objective vis-à-vis the Helsinki MoU resulted in tensions and the dissemination of conflicting messages during project implementation. Conflict victims with high expectations of being compensated did not understand why they were required to submit a proposal in order to obtain assistance through BRA-KDP. Conflicting instructions were issued by KDP facilitators and BRA counterparts over how program funds could be used. The lack of a clear policy stance damaged the credibility of BRA and hindered the implementation of BRA-KDP.

Recommendation 2: Provide program facilitators with the skills and tools needed to facilitate a process of identifying conflict victims within villages.

BRA-KDP leveraged a network of experienced KDP district and sub-district facilitators who were embedded in communities and familiar with local conflict dynamics. KDP facilitators were highly adept at facilitating a process of managed competition through which KDP program funds are allocated across village-level infrastructure projects. These skills benefited BRA-KDP, as only a handful of program-related conflicts resulted in violence or the destruction of property. However, the KDP facilitators were ill equipped to guide communities through a process of identifying conflict victims. Facilitators had never undertaken such a process before, and were unfamiliar with concepts of victimhood, compensation, and reconciliation and how these could be applied within the context of KDP. The program used BRA's broad criteria to define conflict victims and claims for compensation were widespread. Further complicating matters, the subject of victimhood was a sensitive and painful one within communities, and conflict victims were reluctant to publicly identify themselves, or even to discuss the matter, without prompting.

Identifying conflict victims may have been more successful had it been linked with a broader process of community-level healing and reconciliation. A diverse range of peace-building skills, ranging from conflict resolution to social psychology, would be needed to facilitate such a process. While it is unrealistic to expect all or even a majority of facilitators within a program of the scale of BRA-KDP to possess such skills, at a minimum they should have a basic knowledge of conflict resolution techniques, including mediation and negotiation, and be provided with a clear set of criteria for identifying conflict victims.

Recommendation 3: Provide a mechanism and safeguards through which former combatants are able to benefit from BRA-KDP assistance.

Chapter 4 points out the importance of allowing all groups, including former combatants, to access the program regardless of other objectives. For BRA-KDP, defining a mechanism through which to provide benefits to former combatants was difficult given that former combatants were entitled to large amounts of support through separate targeted programs. Priority was rightly given to non-combatants who lacked other sources of assistance. However, given the poor delivery of government programs targeting former combatants, many of the rank-and-file received little to nothing, and therefore had legitimate claims for assistance at the time BRA-KDP was implemented.

One strategy to provide former combatants access to program benefits would be to define targeting criteria solely on victimhood rather than structure programming by other conflict-era identities. In such a scenario, former combatants would be eligible for assistance provided that they could demonstrate an extraordinary need that had not been met by other government reintegration programs. Safeguards to prevent program capture by former combatants might include reaching out to former combatant leadership to socialize the program's prioritization of non-combatants and cross checking BRA beneficiary lists to avoid overlap.

Recommendation 4: Provide high quality technical assistance to victims in support of the private goods delivered through BRA-KDP, including building linkages to training and sources of capital.

BRA-KDP led to clear welfare improvements in target sub-districts and villages. This finding is in some ways surprising given that the KDP program structure is better suited to support infrastructure sub-projects, while BRA-KDP funding was overwhelmingly used for small-scale livelihoods activities. As KDP facilitators did not have the experience or resources needed to provide training and follow-up support for these livelihoods activities, some stakeholders feared that BRA-KDP funding would be used only for short-term consumption. In reality, the largest proportion of BRA-KDP funding was used for productive investments in agriculture, livestock, and other small-scale economic activities. This suggests that BRA-KDP welfare impacts could have been even greater if the program had been able to link beneficiaries with access to training and other sources of capital.

7.2 What's Next for Community-Based Reintegration and Post-Conflict Recovery in Aceh?

A recent study of post-conflict recovery in Aceh shows that the needs of former combatants and conflict victims have evolved significantly since BRA-KDP was conceived and implemented in 2006 (MSR 2009). Aceh has benefited from solid levels of economic growth driven by tsunami reconstruction over the last four years. Former combatants have by and large reintegrated successfully into political and social life and most now benefit from full-time employment. However, certain groups, such as former combatants aged 36-45, women-headed households and displaced persons, have not benefited proportional to others and are vulnerable to economic shocks. Moving forward, inclusive economic growth rather than targeted reintegration programs is needed to generate sustainable livelihoods and sustain the social and economic improvements of the past four years (MSR 2009).

The Government of Aceh should use the substantial resources at its disposal to promote inclusive growth by providing public goods through investments in agriculture and rural infrastructure, encouraging regulatory and security environments that are favorable to private investment, and offering programs and services to vulnerable groups. The following recommendations outline ways in which programs like BRA-KDP can support inclusive growth.

Recommendation 5: The Government of Aceh should continue to leverage PNPM's community-driven mechanism to channel assistance to rural villages.

In 2009, the Government of Aceh will deliver the first round of the *Bantuan Keuangan Pemakmur Gampong* (Financial Assistance for Village Development —BKPG) program. This program, which is financed from provincial and district budgets, will deliver approximately US$ 15,000 to every village in Aceh each year for the next three years. BKPG offers an excellent opportunity for villages that might otherwise miss out on other sources of assistance, including regular PNPM, to meet pressing infrastructure needs. Similar to BRA-KDP, BKPG grants are delivered at the village level, thereby eliminating competition for funding across villages. The

community-driven approach that delivers public goods will ensure that benefits are spread widely rather than targeted to specific groups.

Recommendation 6: Explore opportunities to target and deliver private goods to vulnerable groups through BKPG.

In 2009, PNPM and BKPG will channel around US$ 130 million to villages in Aceh. Around US$ 100 million of this will be delivered at the village level through BKPG. While infrastructure needs are high in many parts of the province, particularly in rural areas, the concentration of large amounts of funding at the village level will encourage villages to prioritize needs that go beyond infrastructure and other public goods. Villages should be encouraged to prioritize the needs of vulnerable groups and deliver benefits in the form of private goods through BKPG. The Government of Aceh should consider piloting an approach similar to BRA-KDP that expands BKPG's project menu to include private goods for vulnerable groups. Key elements of this approach would include an open menu that includes private goods, criteria for identifying vulnerable groups, and specialized technical assistance to small-scale economic activities initiated by program beneficiaries. The government could channel additional funding to areas where it wishes to pilot such an approach, or simply use funds that have already been allocated for BKPG.

Recommendation 7: Policymakers should use welfare indicators rather than conflict-era identities to target future programs.

There have been literally hundreds of government and donor-supported post-conflict programs implemented in Aceh, many of which have targeted the needs of former combatants. While overall former combatants are reporting high levels of employment, there is little evidence to suggest that highly targeted programs have led to significant welfare improvements across all groups of former combatants (MSR 2009). Nearly four years on from the signature of the Helsinki MoU, programs that deliver assistance based on conflict-era identities will further harden these identities and ultimately undermine social cohesion. There is little if any justification to continue programs that target specific groups based on conflict-era identities.

This is not to suggest that some former combatants and conflict victims do not require further assistance. Lower levels of welfare tend to correlate with characteristics such as age, gender, unemployment, and asset levels (MSR 2009). Policymakers should therefore use such criteria to target programs in order to assist vulnerable people from a range of groups including former combatants, conflict victims, and displaced persons.

7.3 Implications for DDR Theory and Practice

BRA-KDP emerged from a growing consensus amongst DDR practitioners that the needs of victims must be addressed *in addition to* the needs of former combatants in order for communities to reconcile and heal. DDR programs that focus solely on providing cash and in-kind assistance as incentives for combatants to lay down their arms ignore the needs of

civilians who suffer greatly as a result of the conflict, and face major challenges in rebuilding their lives. This can create jealousies within the non-combatant population, damage social cohesion, and undermine the process of reintegrating former combatants. Given that targeted programs were provided to former combatants and other groups, BRA-KDP's policy was to assist civilian conflict victims only.

Recommendation 8: Community-based/driven reintegration programs that aim to strengthen social cohesion should avoid program rules that exclude specific groups, including former combatants, as program beneficiaries.

Findings from the accompanying impact evaluation show that BRA-KDP had marginal impacts on social cohesion (Barron et. al. 2009). Surprisingly, communities in program areas were less likely to accept former combatants than they would have been if they had not received the program. The findings presented in this paper show that this negative finding is very likely due to the decision to exclude former combatants as direct beneficiaries. Findings from the evaluation and the supervision missions showed that acceptance of former combatants was *higher* in communities in which former combatants actually benefited directly from BRA-KDP assistance. This suggests that relaxing program rules to allow former combatants to benefit directly from the program contributed positively to social cohesion.

DDR practitioners, particularly those that are designing or overseeing programs that apply community-based and community-driven mechanisms, should consider the potentially negative impacts on social cohesion when deciding whether or not to restrict access to benefits for groups such as former combatants.

Recommendation 9: Under the right conditions, community-based/driven reintegration programs can deliver 'emergency' compensation in ways that maximize developmental impacts.

DDR programs generally follow a sequence in which compensation/reparations are delivered to combatants and victims immediately following a peace agreement. This 'emergency' phase of DDR prioritizes the political importance of the delivery of these cash or in-kind payments over the impacts that these resources may have on the well-being of the individuals that receive them. Programs with broader development objectives, such as the reconstruction of infrastructure and provision of sustainable livelihoods, generally come after the 'emergency' phase is completed (UNDDR 2006).

DDR in Aceh followed a similar sequence (Barron 2009). The Helsinki MoU mandated the compensation of combatants and victims, after which broader 'economic empowerment' programs would be delivered. Compensation to former combatants was delivered through a top-down mechanism in which payments were made directly from the government to former combatants through the KPA. Minimal efforts were made by the government to track how much compensation was received and by whom, much less whether the funds were used for productive purposes (Zurstrassen 2006). BRA-KDP by contrast attempted to compensate

conflict victims in a way that aimed to maximize developmental impacts. The program did so by devolving decision-making authority over who is entitled to compensation to communities, linking the delivery of compensation to the submission of sub-project proposals, and providing TA to help communities use funds for viable small-scale economic activities. While, as discussed in Section 7.1, each of these mechanisms had its shortcomings, findings from the impact evaluation show that the program had positive impacts on welfare. The majority of project funds were used for productive purposes as opposed to one-off consumption. Ultimately, it was the community-driven mechanism for identifying victims that proved politically unacceptable to the BRA. BRA preferred a top-down approach in which compensation was transferred directly to victims that were identified by district-level verification teams.

BRA-KDP shows that it is not necessary in all cases to separate programs that deliver 'emergency' compensation from programs with broader development aims. Community-based and community-driven reintegration programs can deliver compensation in ways that have positive welfare impacts on those being compensated. The key to the success of this approach lies with the political will of national and local governments to allow communities to decide who deserves compensation and what form the compensation should take.

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ANNEX A: LIST OF 2006 TARGET SUB-DISTRICTS AND ALLOCATIONS

No.	Kabupaten	Sub-district	# Villages	Population	Intensity	Allocation
1	Aceh Barat	SAMATIGA	34	17,118	LOW	2,410,000,000
2	Aceh Barat Daya	BABAHROT	7	16,243	MEDIUM	840,000,000
3	Aceh Barat Daya	TANGAN TANGAN	21	17,272	LOW	1,580,000,000
4	Aceh Besar	MESJID RAYA	13	12,451	LOW	970,000,000
5	Aceh Besar	KRUENG BARONA JAYA	12	12,865	LOW	910,000,000
6	Aceh Besar	DARUSSALAM	29	19,508	LOW	2,020,000,000
7	Aceh Besar	SUKA MAKMUR	35	12,537	LOW	2,350,000,000
8	Aceh Jaya	KRUENG SABEE	17	15,477	MEDIUM	1,840,000,000
9	Aceh Selatan	KLUET TIMUR	7	8,925	MEDIUM	800,000,000
10	Aceh Selatan	TAPAKTUAN	15	19,308	MEDIUM	1,700,000,000
11	Aceh Selatan	SAMADUA	27	15,282	MEDIUM	2,800,000,000
12	Aceh Selatan	KLUET SELATAN	17	12,538	LOW	1,210,000,000
13	Aceh Singkil	LONGKIP	10	4,531	LOW	690,000,000
14	Aceh Singkil	SULTAN DAULAT	17	12,065	LOW	1,240,000,000
15	Aceh Tamiang	MANYAK PAYED	36	26,774	MEDIUM	3,880,000,000
16	Aceh Tengah	KEBAYAKAN	19	12,891	LOW	1,380,000,000
17	Aceh Tengah	LAUT TAWAR	15	17,605	LOW	1,130,000,000
18	Aceh Tenggara	LAWE ALAS	23	14,390	LOW	1,690,000,000
19	Aceh Timur	BANDA ALAM	16	8,521	HIGH	2,240,000,000
20	Aceh Timur	JULOK	35	21,559	HIGH	5,140,000,000
21	Aceh Timur	RANTAU SELAMAT	14	16,248	HIGH	2,280,000,000
22	Aceh Timur	PEUREULAK BARAT	11	9,672	HIGH	1,740,000,000
23	Aceh Timur	PEUREULAK	33	30,658	HIGH	5,200,000,000
24	Aceh Timur	PANTE BIDARI	23	21,403	HIGH	3,610,000,000
25	Aceh Timur	INDRA MAKMU	5	3,289	HIGH	760,000,000
26	Aceh Timur	SIMPANG ULIM	23	5,051	HIGH	2,890,000,000

27	Aceh Timur	PEUDAWA	17	9,836	HIGH	2,510,000,000
28	Aceh Timur	IDI TUNONG	25	8,651	HIGH	3,290,000,000
29	Aceh Timur	MADAT	26	22,265	HIGH	4,110,000,000
30	Aceh Timur	RANTAU PEUREULAK	22	29,887	HIGH	3,410,000,000
31	Aceh Timur	NURUSSALAM	42	17,352	HIGH	5,860,000,000
32	Aceh Timur	DARUL AMAN	45	15,054	HIGH	5,970,000,000
33	Aceh Utara	LANGKAHAN	23	13,159	HIGH	3,430,000,000
34	Aceh Utara	SAWANG	39	26,212	HIGH	5,930,000,000
35	Aceh Utara	NISAM	44	34,264	HIGH	6,900,000,000
36	Aceh Utara	SIMPANG KEURAMAT	16	9,098	HIGH	2,390,000,000
37	Aceh Utara	SEUNUDON	33	22,881	HIGH	5,150,000,000
38	Aceh Utara	SYAMTALIRA BAYU	49	19,627	HIGH	6,630,000,000
39	Aceh Utara	KUTA MAKMUR	39	18,660	HIGH	5,540,000,000
40	Aceh Utara	MATANGKULI	72	25,120	HIGH	9,730,000,000
41	Aceh Utara	PAYA BAKONG	39	12,097	HIGH	5,160,000,000
42	Aceh Utara	BAKTIYA BARAT	27	16,942	HIGH	4,020,000,000
43	Bener Meriah	PINTO RAME GAYO	5	4,087	MEDIUM	540,000,000
44	Bener Meriah	TIMANG GAJAH	15	26,641	MEDIUM	1,720,000,000
45	Bener Meriah	SYIAH UTAMA	16	8,696	LOW	1,060,000,000
46	Bireuen	PEUDADA	44	24,910	HIGH	6,570,000,000
47	Bireuen	PEUSANGAN SIBLAH KRUENG	19	10,525	HIGH	2,940,000,000
48	Bireuen	PEUSANGAN SELATAN	19	11,181	HIGH	2,820,000,000
49	Bireuen	GANDAPURA	38	15,109	HIGH	5,340,000,000
50	Bireuen	SAMALANGA	46	23,017	HIGH	6,650,000,000
51	Bireuen	MAKMUR	26	13,021	HIGH	3,800,000,000
52	Bireuen	JEUMPA	40	30,760	HIGH	6,390,000,000
53	Bireuen	JEUNIEB	39	20,655	HIGH	5,780,000,000
54	Bireuen	JULI	21	24,443	HIGH	3,420,000,000

55	Bireuen	JANGKA	45	25,639	MEDIUM	4,620,000,000
56	Gayo Lues	TERANGON	16	9,916	HIGH	2,350,000,000
57	Gayo Lues	PINDING	9	4,664	MEDIUM	880,000,000
58	Nagan Raya	SEUNAGAN TIMUR	35	11,025	HIGH	4,710,000,000
59	Nagan Raya	BEUTONG	28	10,618	MEDIUM	2,600,000,000
60	Pidie	MILA	20	11,937	HIGH	3,100,000,000
61	Pidie	GEULUMPANG BARO	21	9,346	MEDIUM	2,080,000,000
62	Pidie	MANE	4	9,064	HIGH	680,000,000
63	Pidie	BANDAR DUA	45	18,631	HIGH	6,310,000,000
64	Pidie	SAKTI	49	20,501	MEDIUM	4,680,000,000
65	Pidie	GEUMPANG	5	6,740	HIGH	830,000,000
66	Pidie	TITEU/KEUMALA	31	14,411	MEDIUM	3,080,000,000
67	Simeulue	TEUPAH SELATAN	16	6,780	LOW	1,100,000,000
			1,724			**217,380,000,000**

ANNEX B: SUPERVISION MISSIONS - TIMING AND TARGET LOCATIONS

No.	Kabupaten	Sub-District	Intensity	Allocation	Supervision		
					Nov 06	Mar 07	Sep 07
1	Aceh Barat	SAMATIGA	LOW	2,410,000,000			
2	Aceh Barat Daya	BABAHROT	MEDIUM	840,000,000			
3	Aceh Barat Daya	TANGAN TANGAN	LOW	1,580,000,000			
4	Aceh Besar	MESJID RAYA	LOW	970,000,000			
5	Aceh Besar	KRUENG BARONA JAYA	LOW	910,000,000			
6	Aceh Besar	DARUSSALAM	LOW	2,020,000,000			
7	Aceh Besar	SUKA MAKMUR	LOW	2,350,000,000			
8	Aceh Jaya	KRUENG SABEE	MEDIUM	1,840,000,000			
9	Aceh Selatan	KLUET TIMUR	MEDIUM	800,000,000			
10	Aceh Selatan	TAPAKTUAN	MEDIUM	1,700,000,000			
11	Aceh Selatan	SAMADUA	MEDIUM	2,800,000,000			
12	Aceh Selatan	KLUET SELATAN	LOW	1,210,000,000			
13	Aceh Singkil	LONGKIP	LOW	690,000,000			
14	Aceh Singkil	SULTAN DAULAT	LOW	1,240,000,000			
15	Aceh Tamiang	MANYAK PAYED	MEDIUM	3,880,000,000			
16	Aceh Tengah	KEBAYAKAN	LOW	1,380,000,000			
17	Aceh Tengah	LAUT TAWAR	LOW	1,130,000,000			
18	Aceh Tenggara	LAWE ALAS	LOW	1,690,000,000			
19	Aceh Timur	BANDA ALAM	HIGH	2,240,000,000			
20	Aceh Timur	JULOK	HIGH	5,140,000,000			
21	Aceh Timur	RANTAU SELAMAT	HIGH	2,280,000,000			
22	Aceh Timur	PEUREULAK BARAT	HIGH	1,740,000,000			
23	Aceh Timur	PEUREULAK	HIGH	5,200,000,000			
24	Aceh Timur	PANTE BIDARI	HIGH	3,610,000,000			
25	Aceh Timur	INDRA MAKMU	HIGH	760,000,000			

26	Aceh Timur	SIMPANG ULIM	HIGH	2,890,000,000			
27	Aceh Timur	PEUDAWA	HIGH	2,510,000,000			
28	Aceh Timur	IDI TUNONG	HIGH	3,290,000,000			
29	Aceh Timur	MADAT	HIGH	4,110,000,000			
30	Aceh Timur	RANTAU PEUREULAK	HIGH	3,410,000,000			
31	Aceh Timur	NURUSSALAM	HIGH	5,860,000,000			
32	Aceh Timur	DARUL AMAN	HIGH	5,970,000,000			
33	Aceh Utara	LANGKAHAN	HIGH	3,430,000,000			
34	Aceh Utara	SAWANG	HIGH	5,930,000,000			
35	Aceh Utara	NISAM	HIGH	6,900,000,000			
36	Aceh Utara	SIMPANG KEURAMAT	HIGH	2,390,000,000			
37	Aceh Utara	SEUNUDON	HIGH	5,150,000,000			
38	Aceh Utara	SYAMTALIRA BAYU	HIGH	6,630,000,000			
39	Aceh Utara	KUTA MAKMUR	HIGH	5,540,000,000			
40	Aceh Utara	MATANGKULI	HIGH	9,730,000,000			
41	Aceh Utara	PAYA BAKONG	HIGH	5,160,000,000			
42	Aceh Utara	BAKTIYA BARAT	HIGH	4,020,000,000			
43	Bener Meriah	PINTO RAME GAYO	MEDIUM	540,000,000			
44	Bener Meriah	TIMANG GAJAH	MEDIUM	1,720,000,000			
45	Bener Meriah	SYIAH UTAMA	LOW	1,060,000,000			
46	Bireuen	PEUDADA	HIGH	6,570,000,000			
47	Bireuen	P. SIBLAH KRUENG	HIGH	2,940,000,000			
48	Bireuen	PEUSANGAN SELATAN	HIGH	2,820,000,000			
49	Bireuen	GANDAPURA	HIGH	5,340,000,000			
50	Bireuen	SAMALANGA	HIGH	6,650,000,000			
51	Bireuen	MAKMUR	HIGH	3,800,000,000			
52	Bireuen	JEUMPA	HIGH	6,390,000,000			
53	Bireuen	JEUNIEB	HIGH	5,780,000,000			
54	Bireuen	JULI	HIGH	3,420,000,000			

55	Bireuen	JANGKA	MEDIUM	4,620,000,000			
56	Gayo Lues	TERANGON	HIGH	2,350,000,000			
57	Gayo Lues	PINDING	MEDIUM	880,000,000			
58	Nagan Raya	SEUNAGAN TIMUR	HIGH	4,710,000,000			
59	Nagan Raya	BEUTONG	MEDIUM	2,600,000,000			
60	Pidie	MILA	HIGH	3,100,000,000			
61	Pidie	GEULUMPANG BARO	MEDIUM	2,080,000,000			
62	Pidie	MANE	HIGH	680,000,000			
63	Pidie	BANDAR DUA	HIGH	6,310,000,000			
64	Pidie	SAKTI	MEDIUM	4,680,000,000			
65	Pidie	GEUMPANG	HIGH	830,000,000			
66	Pidie	TITEU/KEUMALA	MEDIUM	3,080,000,000			
67	Simeulue	TEUPAH SELATAN	LOW	1,100,000,000			

ANNEX C: COMPLAINTS HANDLING FLOW-CHART



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