THE POLITICS OF THE SOUTH Part of the Sri Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessment 2005 David Rampton and Asanga Welikala 3 63056 THE POLITICS OF THE SOUTH PART OF THE SRI LANKA STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT 2005 By David Rampton and Asanga Welikala The governments of the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, in collaboration with The Asia Foundation and the World Bank funded this project. The contents of the studies should not be construed as reflecting the views of the five funding agencies. © Copyright 2005 Second Printing Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency The Asia Foundation Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland World Bank For reproductions of this publication please contact: 3 1/A Rajakeeya Mawatha Colombo 7, Sri Lanka Phone: +94 11 2698356 Fax: +94 11 2698358 www.asiafoundation.org All rights reserved Printed in Sri Lanka 1 | Contents Contents Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................................................. | 2 About the Authors................................................................................................................................................. | 3 Acronyms............................................................................................................................................................... | 4 Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................................. | 5 1. Understanding Nationalism in Sri Lanka: Actors and Trajectories..................................................... | 11 2. The Political Actors...................................................................................................................................... | 15 Overview of the UNP.................................................................................................................................... | 15 Overview of the SLFP.................................................................................................................................... | 19 The SLFP, the UNP, and Contemporary Peace Processes in Comparative Perspective.................. | 21 Overview of the JVP..................................................................................................................................... | 28 Political Constituency and Sources of Marginality................................................................................ | 29 The JVP's Nationalist Ideology and Attitudes to the Peace Process and Constitutional Reform...... | 33 Attitude to International and Civil Society Actors................................................................................... | 35 The Post-Tsunami Context and the JVP's Long-Term Political Prospects......................................... | 37 Incentives for the JVP as a Peace Stakeholder...................................................................................... | 39 The Patriotic National Movement: Aims and Constituents................................................................... | 42 Overview of the Sihala Urumaya/Jathika Hela Urumaya combine...................................................... | 43 The JHU's Socio-Political Constituency................................................................................................... | 44 The JHU, Sinhala Nationalism and Attitudes to the "Ethnic Conflict" and the Peace Process.......... | 46 The Rise and Fall of The JHU as a Sinhala Nationalist Organ............................................................. | 48 Incentives for the JHU/Sihala Urumaya as a Peace Stakeholder....................................................... | 50 Jathika Chintanaya: Aims and Strategies for Sinhala Nationalism..................................................... | 52 Overview of the Upcountry People's Front.............................................................................................. | 53 Organization and Constituency Base........................................................................................................ | 53 The UPF, CWC, Upcountry Tamil Nationalism and the Peace Process............................................... | 54 Incentives for the Peace Process............................................................................................................. | 56 3. Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................... | 57 4. Implications for International Donors....................................................................................................... | 61 Political Knowledge...................................................................................................................................... | 61 Aid Frameworks............................................................................................................................................ | 61 Engagement with Political Actors and Capacities for Peace............................................................... | 62 Civil Society, Education, Participation, and Confidence-Building........................................................ | 63 Transparency, Consultation, and Inclusivity............................................................................................ | 64 Bibliography........................................................................................................................................................... | 65 The Politics of the South | 2 Acknowledgements All views expressed in this study are the authors' and do not represent those of the commissioning agencies, the facilitators of this study, or those who were interviewed. We would nevertheless like to thank the following for their contributions to this study. First, Nilan Fernando, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, and Anthea Mulakala who provided feedback on earlier drafts of this report. Second, Alan Martin and Gina Genovese, who provided valuable editorial assistance. 3 | About the Authors About the Authors David Rampton is a visiting lecturer in the Development Studies and Politics Departments at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in history and politics and a Master of Science in political studies at SOAS, where he is currently engaged in doctoral research on the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and nationalism in Sri Lanka. Asanga Welikala studied for his LLB at the University of Hull. Since March 2000, he has worked as a research associate in the Legal and Constitutional Unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives in Colombo. He is also an occasional contributor to local and international magazines and newspapers. The Politics of the South | 4 Acronyms CFA Ceasefire Agreement CWC Ceylon Workers Congress CP Communist Party CPI Communist Party of India CPIM Communist Party of India (Marxist) CBM Confidence Building Measures PNM Deshahithaishi Jathika Vyaparaya (Patriotic National Movement) DJV Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (Patriotic People's Movement) EPDP Eelam People's Democratic Party EPRLF Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front GoSL Government of Sri Lanka IGOs Inter-Governmental Organizations ISGA Interim Self-Governing Authority IFIs International Financial Institutions INGOs International Non-Governmental Organizations JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) JHU Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Sinhala Heritage) JSS Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (National Workers Union) LSSP Lanka Sama Samaja Party LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MEP Mahajana Eksath Peramuna MSS Maubima Surakima Sanvidhanaya (Movement for the Protection of the Motherland) MSV Maubima Surakima Vyaparaya (Force for the Protection of the Motherland) NMAT National Movement Against Terrorism NSSP Nava Sama Samaja Party (The New Equal Society Party) NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations PA People's Alliance PLOTE People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam P-TOMS Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure PR Proportional Representation SU Sihala Urumaya (Sinhala Heritage) SVV Sinhala Veera Vidhana (Sinhala Heroes Forum) SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party TNA Tamil National Alliance TULF Tamil United Liberation Front UF United Front UNF United National Front UNP United National Party UPFA United People's Freedom Alliance UPF Upcountry People's Front 5 | Executive Summary Executive Summary This report is a contribution to a broader study entitled (SU), and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). The "Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka" capacity of these nationalist actors to mobilize Sinhala (Goodhand and Klem, 2005), which examines the peace nationalist sentiments poses deep problems for the process in Sri Lanka with a particular focus on future of the peace process as it threatens to draw international engagement. The report outlines the mainstream political actors back into more nationalist contemporary political dynamics of the "southern strategies for political survival. It also serves to challenge polity" in Sri Lanka through a map of the most the legitimacy of governing coalitions or, through the significant political actors and analyses the diverse and use of a coalitional veto, bring about governmental varying stances and incentives these actors have toward collapse for those attempting to move the peace process the current and future directions of the peace process. forward. The historical development of these political forces and parties is also charted in relation to their positions on The fieldwork and the bulk of the research for this past and current attempts to reform what has widely report took place over a three-week period between been conceived as an overly-centralized and unitary state March and April 2005, and involved interviews with structure, which has acted as a battleground of social, representatives and leaders of the political parties and economic, political, and cultural conflict encompassing movements discussed herein. Fieldwork trips to the ethnic and other socio-political dimensions. The study Nuwara Eliya, Galle, and Matara districts were also also focuses on the organizational capacities, mobilizing carried out, and interviews with residents of camps for strategies, and social constituencies of these actors, the post-tsunami displaced were conducted. The research pinpointing how shifts within these areas have impacted also included interviews with academics and their ideological approaches to formulating measures for representatives from Non-Governmental Organizations peace in Sri Lanka. (NGOs) and other civil society actors. We argue that the general trajectory in Sri Lanka, especially since the 1990s, has been for mainstream UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF actors to accept the necessity of constitutional reform as NATIONALISM IN SRI LANKA a means for resolving Sri Lanka's political crises. This has resulted in a shift from more overt and consistent When we investigate the role nationalism has played in articulations of Sinhala nationalist majoritarianism for disrupting the peace process, constitutional reform and, political legitimacy toward a theoretical, albeit not subsequently, the socio-economic development of Sri practical, consensus on measures for political devolution. Lanka, it is important to appreciate that the The report also highlights the way in which Sinhala phenomenon has not been written in stone throughout nationalist majoritarianism--while having been dropped the last several decades. Rather, one must recognize the to some extent by the United National Party (UNP) and constantly shifting force of this dynamic among different Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)--has been vigorously socio-economic forces and political actors at varying taken up by more overtly nationalist actors like the historical junctures. Nonetheless, one broad historical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Sihala Urumaya pattern that can be identified over the past 50 years is The Politics of the South | 6 that Sinhala nationalism first emerged as a link between It is for this reason that both UNP and SLFP politicians the center--dominated by the ruling elites--and the rural have been guilty of inciting Sinhala nationalist passions and village-level elites. This nationalist process did not and legislating from a standpoint that discriminates fully emerge until the 1950s, when it gained currency against minorities. Constitutional changes introduced by among the socio-cultural forces led by SWRD the United Front (UF) in 1972 and later in 1978 by JR Bandaranaike's pancha maha balavegaya. Jayawardene both infringed upon minority rights and formalized Sinhala Buddhist nationalism As a result, Sri Lanka witnessed the emergence of an constitutionally. That these were drawn up by SLFP-led elite reformism coalescing around conceptions of liberal and UNP governments respectively is testament to the democratic politics that remain ambivalent about, but complicity of both parties in "ethnic outbidding" in not divorced from, expressions of ethno-politics. A more their pursuit of state power. overt and forceful Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, inextricably tied to the notion of liberal democratic While the legacy of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism majoritarianism, also developed. Such majoritarianism remained with the SLFP well into the early 1990s, the disqualified minority rights and grievances, leading political rise of Chandrika Kumaratunga was to effect a Tamil nationalists to react to the dominance of their far-reaching change in the SLFP's stance on the ethnic Sinhala counterparts. It is from these origins that Sinhala conflict. Kumaratunga was able to persuade the southern nationalism attained hegemonic status in the South until constituency not only that Tamil grievances were at least the 1990s, and continues to influence political legitimate, but that a process of negotiation and events today. constitutional power-sharing would be necessary to sustain a durable peace. In its early stages, the SLFP-led People's Alliance (PA) government was successful in THE SLFP, THE UNP, AND CONTEMPORARY PEACE promoting its agenda of a non-nationalistic, rights-based PROCESSES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE resolution to the conflict - thanks in large part to the support of the media and civil society actors. A crude history of Sri Lanka might well conclude that the two mainstream political actors can be ideologically The SLFP/PA peace later unraveled due largely to the contrasted: the more Sinhala nationalist, statist, and pursuit of the dual-track "war-for peace" strategy and a social democratic vehicle of the SLFP and the more failure to win support for necessary constitutional Western-oriented, liberal, and free-market UNP. Such a changes; however, its considerable shift in political conception of the political landscape would not direction was to have far-reaching ramifications for the necessarily be wrong, but would be an analytical and a country. The mainstream parties both moved toward the historical oversimplification. For while the SLFP played center and distanced themselves, to some extent, from the central role in the institutionalization of Sinhala the more overt Sinhala nationalism that once suffused Buddhist nationalism's claims to social and political mainstream political discourse. A wide consensus dominance from 1956 onward, the UNP's response to gradually grew, including among the UNP, for a the SLFP was that of imitation rather than an attempt negotiated settlement and substantive political to provide democratic leadership that would foster devolution and constitutional change. Though ethnic reconciliation and pluralism. In that sense Sinhala consecutive elections saw power change hands to new majoritarian nationalism was taken up by both of the coalition governments, advances continued to be made - mainstream political actors out of political expediency, including the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) brokered by and very swiftly assumed hegemonic proportions. the UNP-led United National Front (UNF). More recently, the PA-led United People’s Freedom Alliance 7 | Executive Summary (UPFA) won office in 2004, with the SLFP sections of in Hill Country politics. The Upcountry People's Front the government making it clear they have not (UPF), for example, has brought about a more militant relinquished their desire to institute the far-reaching attitude to the ethnic conflict. While this positions the constitutional and devolutionary reforms that they had UPF as a strong stakeholder in the peace process, it may unsuccessfully attempted to table in Parliament in well herald the spread of further destabilizing and August 2000. fragmenting dynamics to the Hill Country if measures are not taken to dismantle the colonial legacy of Sri There are essentially three reasons to explain the political Lanka's unitary and over-centralized state. shift by mainstream parties. First, there was a realization that pursuing a war strategy had led to a military stalemate between the LTTE and the government - with CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM'S RETURN considerable detrimental effects on long-term economic JOURNEY growth. Second, there was recognition that a lack of proposals granting autonomy to the Tamil-speaking While the nationalist baton has been passed from the areas threatened the larger unity of the country. And mainstream parties to the more marginalized parties, the finally, the proportional voting system increasingly existing and widening inequalities of the South are also benefited the smaller and minority-based parties, making increasingly being expressed through the nationalism of it harder for mainstream parties to depend upon Sinhala such parties as the JHU and JVP. There are no current nationalist sentiments to win and maintain power. schemes for alleviating the kinds of inequality and poverty that feed into the JVP's support base. The mainstream parties, especially the SLFP, will face NATIONALIST ACTORS IN THE SOUTHERN POLITY diminishing electoral returns as long as they continue to fail to improve democratic and fiscal accountability or Though Sinhala nationalism has dominated Sri Lankan expand development priorities beyond the Colombo- politics since the 1950s, marginalized and centric and elitist networks that exist at present. underprivileged groups who have been educated and socialized into this hegemonic ideology have increasingly Despite this, mainstream parties will fight tooth and nail embraced it for their purposes as well. In this respect, to keep their constituencies (and their traditional nationalism has become a political vehicle increasingly clientelistic hold on power). In doing so, there is a emerging from the "marchlands and countryside" rather danger they might rely on the corruption and violent than necessarily from the center. It is frequently tied to intimidation of patronage-based politics or resort once unequal development and the politics of poverty, and as again to more extreme nationalist mobilizations to a reaction to the economic liberalization initiated by JR compete with their more overtly nationalist Jayewardene's 1977 UNP government. This process has counterparts. As a result, the mainstream parties often intensified rather than diminished over the years as the become willing parties to further rounds of ethnic- smaller parties take over the nationalist agenda outbidding and zero-sum politics. Examples of this increasingly abandoned by the mainstream parties-- include the failure of the Constitutional Bill of 2000, contributing to a significant, and potentially and the post-CFA negotiations of the UNF in 2002- destabilizing, nationalist resurgence in response to 2004. prospective solutions to the ethnic conflict. While the peace process is a necessary first step toward As a response to such Sinhala nationalist resurgence, the solving many of the aforementioned political and social southern polity has also seen comparatively recent shifts problems, it is clear that there are limits to the extent The Politics of the South | 8 mainstream parties are prepared to shift away from to ensure a more extensive and up-to-date Sinhala majoritarianism. Much of this failure by the knowledge of the political processes at work in the political leadership to find durable solutions to the southern polity and among the diaspora. current crisis lies in maintaining a patron-client political system that provides little scope for ideological or social 2. Aid Frameworks: transformation. The donor community needs to take account of the Most frameworks for constitutional change and peace effects aid and attached conditionalities have in have been developed on a narrow functional basis, most fostering nationalist sentiments and anti- noticeably by the UNP/UNF under Ranil globalization reactions that can debilitate the state Wickremasinghe, whose main concern appears to be to and undermine the prospects for peace. create a stable business environment for global and local capital within Sri Lanka. The result is that peace efforts 3. Engagement with Political Actors and Capacities and reforms favored by political elites have failed to find for Peace: purchase among wide sections of the South where "Ethnic outbidding" continues to undermine peace Sinhala nationalism is still a potent dynamic. bids and attempts at constitutional reform by mainstream political parties. Donors need to be Consequently, while the JVP and the JHU can be aware that nationalism is not the monopoly of any viewed as the most significant potential obstacles to the one party but a tactic often deployed to undermine peace process and political reform, we must be wary of peace processes and the political legitimacy of treating Sinhala nationalism as the sole domain of any opponents. Rather than privileging certain political political party. Nationalism in Sri Lanka, as elsewhere, is actors, the donor community should concentrate far too diffuse and volatile for such an analysis. Sinhala efforts on encouraging inter-party dialogue that nationalist politics is still a vibrant phenomenon that prevents the use of "ethnic outbidding" and continues to impact upon mainstream actors while at encourages mechanisms for power-sharing and the same time emerging from currents of enduring greater openness. marginalization and counter-nationalist reaction by minorities. Unless some form of devolution can break Past peace processes have concentrated too heavily the deadlock of this ethnic outbidding, the growth of on either Confidence Building Measures (CBM) or nationalism will continue unabated - a tendency that the preparation of transparent constitutional may tear at the diverse socio-political fabric not just of proposals, each at the expense of the other. Political Sri Lanka but of the southern polity itself. actors engaged in finding long-term solutions to the conflict should craft interventions that address these areas simultaneously. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DONORS The institutional capacities of traditional parties to mobilize in support of peace suffer when intra-party These findings have the following implications for governance frameworks are weak. Helping international donors aiming to support peacebuilding traditional parties overcome institutional limitations processes: would enhance the quality of democracy in terms of participation, deliberation, and informed choice. 1. Political Knowledge: As the JVP, and to a lesser extent the JHU, remain The donor community must develop mechanisms unreceptive to the frameworks of present peace 9 | Executive Summary efforts, we cautiously recommend the wider participation and consultation of external and internal actors that might be able to exert influence on such parties. Doing so could confer greater transparency, consensus, and legitimacy on a viable and enduring framework for peace. 4. Civil Society, Education, Participation, and Confidence-Building: Over the last two decades, public policy research and advocacy organizations have become key actors in the peace process. Programmatic support for such civil society actors is essential to ensure that they continue to generate policy options and act as rights watchdogs. 5. Transparency, Consultation, and Inclusivity: Nationalist discontent with the peace process by some opposition groups and segments of civil society has been fuelled by feelings that peace efforts lack transparency, consultation, and inclusivity. These feelings must be addressed, as they feed suspicion and destroy trust and confidence among opposition groups and civil society as a whole. This in turn can serve to legitimize antagonism toward peace and reform proposals and ultimately fan the flames of Sinhala nationalist protest. 11 | Understanding Nationalism in Sri Lanka: Actors and Trajectories 1. Understanding Nationalism in Sri Lanka: Actors and Trajectories This report forms a thematic contribution to the broader unchanged in the political vicissitudes of the island over study, "Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka" the last few decades. Rather, one must recognize the (Goodhand and Klem, 2005) and focuses on the political constantly shifting force of this dynamic among different dynamics of the "southern polity", particularly on socio-economic forces and political actors at varying nationalist undercurrents which continue to influence a historical junctures. Nonetheless, one broad historical wide range of political actors and their attitudes towards pattern that can be identified over the past 50 years is the peace process, devolution and constitutional reform that Sinhala nationalism first emerged as a link between and the cyclical impact that these dynamics in turn have the center and the state, dominated by the ruling elites, upon their social constituencies. Although, we argue that with the rural and village-level elites. This nationalist the mainstream parties, the UNP and the SLFP, have by- process did not emerge with full force until the 1950s, and-large recognized and accepted the need for when the void left by counter-colonial discourse which federalism and/or political devolution in order to break had imbued the reformism of Sri Lanka's political elites with the colonial legacy of an over-centralized state, our prior to Independence, began to be filled with the socio- perspective also stresses the capacity of smaller Sinhala cultural forces led by SWRD Bandaranaike's pancha nationalist parties like the JVP and the JHU to foment maha balavegaya. It should be noted that this nationalist and draw sustenance from nationalist mobilization. This dynamic operated through conceptions of a Sinhala results in the recycling of nationalist dynamics that can Buddhist nation and not, as in India, through a wider, once again recapture mainstream political actors as they Nehruvian, secular, all-India nationalism articulated seek to mobilize and secure electoral support and against a colonial power. legitimacy. As a result, the major focus of this report lies in the historical background, development and As a result, two political trends emerged in Sri Lanka. contemporary trajectory of both Sinhala nationalism and First, an elite reformism coalescing around conceptions the counter-nationalist reactions that it provokes amongst of liberal democratic politics that remain ambivalent the minority parties surveyed. about, but not divorced from, expressions of ethno- politics;1 and second, a more overt and forceful Sinhala Yet, when we investigate the role nationalism has played Buddhist nationalism, rather than an all-Ceylon in disrupting the peace process, constitutional reform nationalism, which becomes inextricably tied to the and, subsequently, the socio-economic development of notion of liberal democratic majoritarianism from the Sri Lanka, it is necessary to appreciate that the 1950s. The latter in turn served to disqualify minority phenomenon has not remained written in stone or rights and grievances articulated about those rights,2 1 For example, the way in which attempts to orchestrate some form of federal or other ethnically weighted solution to the problem of state power from the Donoughmore period up to Independence were consistently disqualified as "communal" within the rubric of liberal democratic majoritarianism. See J. Russell (1982) Communal politics under the Donoughmore Constitution, 1931-1947 (Tissara Prakasyayo, Colombo); M. Roberts (1994) Exploring Confrontation: Sri Lanka - Politics, Culture and History (Harwood, Switzerland), pp.249-268; and D. Scott (1994) "Community, Number, Ethos of Democracy" in Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.), pp.158-189. 2 This is nowhere more apparent than in D.C. Vijayavardhana's Revolt in the Temple, where the grievances of the Federal Party become expressions of "communalism," whereas Sinhala majoritarianism is the natural outcome of "democratic" politics. See D.C. Vijayavardhana (1953) Revolt in the Temple (Sinha Publications). The Politics of the South | 12 leading to a Tamil nationalist reaction to the dominance counter-elite political movements and strategies. It is of its Sinhala counterpart.3 Additionally, it should be only in this sense that we can locate the shifting noted that these Sinhala nationalist tropes did not dynamic of nationalism vis-à-vis, for instance, a party remain the exclusive prerogative of Bandaranaike's SLFP like the JVP. In this respect, Sinhala nationalism but also began to permeate the policies and political becomes a political vehicle increasingly emerging from culture of the established Left in Sri Lanka. This the "marchlands and countryside" rather than necessarily happened to the extent that both the Communist Party from the center,4 and thus frequently reactive to the (CP) and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) became forces of globalization that became ascendant after the more entrenched in the coalitional politics of the center, economic liberalization initiated by JR Jayewardene's dropping their struggles for linguistic parity of status 1977 UNP landslide government, and tied to uneven and the re-enfranchisement of the Upcountry Tamils and unequal development and the politics of poverty. after the 1956 period. As a result of these processes the This process has if anything intensified rather than SLFP-left coalition of the UF government came to diminished over the years and it is now clear that the power in the 1970 election, and produced a 1972 JVP has increasingly taken up the slack in nationalism constitution which clearly discriminated in favor of the left by the mainstream parties' retreat in the 1990s from Sinhala Buddhist majority. This was evidenced through more overt articulations of Sinhala nationalism. clauses asserting the need for the state to give Buddhism Consequently, if we are to define and understand the the "foremost place" and to "protect and foster" JVP, an analytical perspective on nationalism remains Buddhism at the same time as it removed the minority more useful than attention to the party's Marxism which safeguards that had been articulated in Article 29 of the has been lacking or superficial from its inception. This is Soulbury Constitution. This set in motion a series of not to say that recourse to Sinhala nationalist public policy changes through the 1970s pursued by the mobilization has disappeared in toto from the UF government of Sirimao Bandaranaike and additional mainstream parties' political arsenal or that this recession constitutional changes under JR Jayewardene's UNP of the nationalist effect is as a result of a seismic government in 1978, which exacerbated the centralizing hegemonic shift, but rather that this change has been and authoritarian nature of unchecked elite rule. It also necessitated by certain requirements of governance that resulted in the increasing politicization of all branches of will be discussed in greater detail below. the state and the continuing rise of Sinhala nationalism. Despite these changes in the general trend of Sinhala While Sinhala nationalism became hegemonic from this nationalism, we should nonetheless recognize that period, one of the patterns in its shifting trajectory is elements of the mainstream and middle classes have not that we increasingly see it not only articulated at the entirely exhausted or abandoned their recourse to center by elites, but also becoming a central trope of Sinhala nationalist mobilization. This dynamic has, for marginalized and underprivileged groups who had been example, underpinned the emergence and changing face educated and socialized into this hegemonic ideology. As of the Sihala Urumaya/Jathika Hela Urumaya (SU/JHU) a result, it is elites who are increasingly viewed as combine. This movement has also contributed to a "inauthentic" in terms of nationalism, allowing Sinhala significant pendulum swing in nationalist resurgence as a nationalism once again to become the vehicle for response to prospective solutions to the ethnic conflict - 3 See Anthony Jeyaratnam Wilson (1994) SJV Chelvanayakam And The Crisis Of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 1947-1977: A Political Biography (Hurst & Co., London) & Anthony Jeyaratnam Wilson (2000) Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins And Development In The Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries (Hurst & Co., London). 4 See T. Nairn (1975) "The Modern Janus," New Left Review, Vol. 1, No. 94, pp. 3-29 & T. Nairn (1998) Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited (Verso, London). 13 | Understanding Nationalism in Sri Lanka: Actors and Trajectories a process that gathered considerable momentum when Ranil Wickremasinghe's UNF government implemented the CFA with the LTTE in February 2002. This was perceived by the SU/JHU as a narrowing of the ground for nationalist mobilization in the mainstream parties themselves as they began to grope toward corresponding positions on the need for implementing a peace package and constitutional reform. For these social forces, nationalism became a vehicle for re-territorializing socio- political and cultural control over dynamics that political elites were seen to have relinquished to globalizing forces such as powerful donor states, aid institutions, NGOs, and, to some extent, the forces of multinational capitalism. The southern polity has also seen comparatively recent shifts in Hill Country politics to the extent that the UPF has adopted a more militant attitude to the ethnic conflict and the plight of Upcountry Tamils and toward potential solutions to the conflict, including a rapprochement with the LTTE. 15 | The Political Actors 2. The Political Actors OVERVIEW OF THE UNP5 formation of the UNP, therefore, was for political p- arties to be created to compete in the first general The UNP was formed just prior to Independence, election, as required under the new constitutional amalgamating a variety of loose organizations such as dispensation. the Ceylon National Congress and the Sinhala Maha Sabha. As these constitutive organizations were largely The UNP located itself to the right of center from its vehicles for political personalities of the time rather inception, and sought to fulfill the role of the Grand than mass-based organizations in their own right, the Old Party of moderate conservatism. The most embryonic UNP is perhaps better understood in terms appropriate analogy for the formative political stimuli of a coalition of leading political personalities behind the UNP is perhaps the British "One Nation representing the Ceylonese bourgeoisie, brought Toryism." Staunchly non-ideological, the UNP together by opposition to the radicalism of the Left.6 elevated pragmatism to a virtue. It sought to serve as As there was an element of disdain for the burgeoning an umbrella party around which Colombo and Western Buddhist revivalism represented by the Vidyalankara Province capitalists, as well as rural elites, could come monks7 as well, a conscious effort was also made to together on the shared interests of stability, strong include broad ethnic representation in the party's leadership, middle-class common sense, and an composition. This was achieved either through direct ostensibly cosmopolitan political outlook. The latter, co-option of ethno-political leaders or through however, was to prove superficial in the later dynamics electoral coalitions, although the advent of post- of Sinhala nationalism because the UNP was Sinhala in Independence ethno-nationalism was to divide the the same way that "One Nation Toryism" tended to be party's political organization along ethnic lines (De predominantly English. Because the conservatism of Silva, 1986). the southern polity sustains, rather than checks Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and its supremacist ethno- When the Soulbury Constitution was granted in 1947, religious worldview, electoral exigencies impelled the it discontinued the particular form of democracy UNP to be led by those forces. The UNP's association provided by the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931, with majoritarian excesses through democratic which was predicated on the absence of a party institutions, therefore, have early antecedents. political system. The Soulbury Constitution introduced conventional parliamentary government, necessitating Some of these characteristics were also the predominant the introduction of political party electoral democracy personal traits of the UNP's progenitor, D. S. (Jennings, 1948). The primary impetus for the Senanayake, who ultimately became the first prime 5 This section draws on a previous paper by Asanga Welikala. See Asanga Welikala (2004) "Sri Lanka: The Politics of Dual Mandate," South Asian Journal, September 28, 2004. 6 Michael Roberts (1999) "Nationalisms Today and Yesterday," in History and Politics: Millennial Perspectives. Essays in Honour of Kingsley de Silva (Law & Society Trust, Colombo); David Little (1994) Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.). 7 H. L. Seneviratne (1999) The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago University Press); W A. Wiswa Warnapala (1978) "Sangha and Politics in Sri Lanka: Nature of the Continuing Controversy," Indian Journal of Politics, Vol. 12, Nos. 1-2. The Politics of the South | 16 minister of independent Ceylon.8 A man relying on responsible for the disenfranchisement of plantation innate "native" shrewdness rather than intellectual Tamils and for opportunistic opposition to the achievement, Senanayake was a pragmatic and wily Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact--the earliest attempt at politician who was equally at home in constitutional devolution and power-sharing that may have provided a negotiations in Whitehall as he was in his country estate more viable framework for conflict management through ploughing paddy fields in the fashion of the lionized constitutional arrangements.10 While majoritarian peasant of Sinhala Buddhist lore. Senanayake's populism, as exploited by the SLFP-led Mahajana Eksath personality is better characterized by an avuncular ease Peramuna (MEP) in 1956, no doubt institutionalized with people than by academic accomplishments in the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist claims to social dominance liberal professions (at the time the natural resource pool and state power, it must be borne in mind that the UNP's from which politicians emerged) or oratorical gifts. response to the program of the MEP was that of imitation rather than an attempt to give democratic leadership to Senanayake's ascent to the undisputed leadership in any dormant forces of ethnic reconciliation and pluralism. Ceylonese politics during the empennage of British rule is It is difficult to imagine how a UNP government in due in equal measure to two factors. First, the shrewd 1956-1960 could have, given the nationalist hysteria capitalization of his role as minister of agriculture sweeping the electoral landscape of the South during that throughout the currency of the Donoughmore period, differed from the MEP with regard to linguistic Constitution conveyed to the Sinhala polity the evocative policy and attitudes to ethnic minorities and persona of the agrarian monarch of Sinhala Buddhist constitutional power-sharing. historiography. Second, he won the respect of British administrators as a dependable pair of hands and Indeed, an intensification of the conflict resulting in the trustworthy proxy in the context of the war effort during eruption of civil war during the 1980s occurred during a World War II, in stark contrast to the uncompromising period in which the UNP had unparalleled control over attitude of the Indian independence leadership.9 the institutions of the state. The UNP bears a significant share of the responsibility for the ethnic conflict as the However, the ethos of pragmatic ethnic accommodation authoritarian centralization of political power accorded that characterized the early UNP was forcefully displaced through the 1978 Constitution resulted in a brutal use by the dynamics of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, which of force to address Tamil insurrectionary activities, emerged as the key grounds for political mobilization after including the insidious encouragement of anti-Tamil Independence. In the context of majoritarianism mob violence during such incidents as the pogrom of untrammeled by institutional restraints or constitutional 1983.11 Likewise, the second insurrection of the JVP was culture, ethnicized electoral democracy drove political exterminated by the state apparatus controlled by the parties to focus on majority interests to the exclusion of UNP, employing both legal and extra-legal methods of minorities (Little, 1994). Hence, the UNP was extreme violence. 8 See Kumari Jayewardene (2000), Nobodies to Somebodies (SSA, Colombo); Michael Roberts, (1999) "Nationalisms Today and Yesterday," in History and Politics: Millennial Perspectives. Essays in Honour of Kingsley de Silva (Law & Society Trust, Colombo); David Little (1994) Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.). 9 See K. M. de Silva (Ed.) (1997) British Documents on the End of Empire: Sri Lanka (Series B, Vol. 2) Parts I & II (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London). 10 See Sunil Bastian (1999) "The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses - The Case of Sri Lanka," Working Paper 2, (Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford). 11 See A. J. Wilson (1988) The Break-Up of Sri Lanka (Hurst, London); S. J. Thambiah (1986) Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (University of Chicago Press). 17 | The Political Actors The UNP, however, has been consistent with its committee) and wider consultation depends on the founding vision to the extent that it retains the loyalty of leader's attitude to collegiality. There is certainly little or approximately 30% of the Sri Lankan electorate at any no role played by the grass-roots membership in these given time and remains the largest single political party areas, and party conferences and intra-party elections are in the country. As the principal right-of-center player in largely ceremonial affairs. In particular, financial Sri Lankan politics, the UNP is more pro-Western in its transparency and accountability are weak, and represent external policy than any other party and is generally a regulatory lacuna in financial integrity, both of the associated with a market-friendly economic outlook. All party and its individual members. Another institutional of its heroes - the former Chief Minister of Andhra handicap is organizational capacity in any number of Pradesh, Chandrababu Naidu, Singaporean Prime respects, from administrative arrangements to research Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysian Prime Minister and development. The legislative performance of Mahathir Mohammed - are the Asian Brahmins of free members in elected institutions such as Parliament and market capitalism and spectacular economic successes. provincial councils, as well as the political literacy of its This serves as a testament to its ultimate goals. grassroots activists, suffer as a result. In fact, the UNP's instinctive discomfort with overt ideological discourse However, the leader-centric nature of all political parties manifests itself in the use of the mocking appellation in Sri Lanka has meant that the party has changed its "Theory-karaya" for anyone seen to be overly interested nature from time to time in reference to its leader's in political discussion and debate. personality, preferences and imperatives, rather than on realignments based on membership desires. Detractors Interestingly, the UNP has been less diffident about would point to an undercurrent of dynastic politics in borrowing political tools and characteristics from the Left, the UNP as the vehicle of the Wijewardene family, even where the Left's culture of ideological and policy exemplified in the pejorative epithet that its acronym debate has been discarded. For example, in celebration of stands for "Uncle Nephew Party." While it is perhaps May Day, the UNP set up a communist-style youth more than a coincidence that all of its leaders bar two - corps, and has developed a presence in the trade union Ranasinghe Premadasa and D. B. Wijetunga (the latter sector with the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS-National heading only a brief transitional interregnum) - have Workers Union). In the 1970s, under the leadership of been related to the Wijewardene family, the intra-party the purported patron saint of capitalist "robber barons" J. culture of the UNP allows relative scope for democratic R. Jayawardene, such front-liners as Lalith leadership independent of dynastic ties than its principal Athulathmudali flirted with socialism. Despite the now opponent, the SLFP. unquestioned description of the Jayawardene administration as one of free-market capitalism, it only The UNP is perhaps the most organized political party retracted the state from some of its more interventionist next to the JVP, although this claim must surely not be economic roles introduced by an LSSP finance minister in overstated.12 It certainly functions with intra-party the previous regime. It did not question in any institutions and processes to a far greater extent than the fundamental way the post-war Keynesian consensus of the SLFP. But as with most Sri Lankan political parties, mixed economy as Thatcherism or Reaganonomics did. indicative standards of intra-party democracy are weak. Policy formulation and strategic and tactical decision- Indeed, the Premadasa administration is characterized by making remain the preserve of the leader (even though resistance to categorization along the right-left axis. It these are technically functions of the party's working was mercantilist in its promotion of industry and small- 12 Centre for Policy Alternatives (2005) Sri Lanka Country Report (CPA, Colombo); CPA and International IDEA Dialogue Workshop on Political Parties in South Asia, April 7-9, 2005, Colombo. The Politics of the South | 18 and medium-scale businesses, and as an aspect of its create a "Dharmista Samajaya" (Virtuous Society) in the populism, conceived a big role for the state in terms of campaign that brought him to overwhelming power in grand poverty amelioration schemes and the provision of 1977--actions that ultimately served to erode the housing for the poor. Premadasa in fact attempted a separation between the state and religion. The latter "triangulation," binding together non-elite example is symptomatic of an attempt to regain the constituencies between rich and poor, left and right, and nationalist moral high ground from a supposedly across the ethnic divide. The nature of the Premadasa "dharma-less" (as in godless) and "immoral" left, which state was in the classic paternalist mold of the Sinhala had attempted a doctrinaire reinvention of a society, to Buddhist nationalist ideal: patron and protector. the exclusion of its own glorious history, culture, and Moreover, Premadasa's non-elite personal background, language. Such an appeal to the Sinhala Buddhist ecumenical religious interests, experience in the volksgeist, while at the same time creating problems for multicultural milieu of central Colombo, and sense of the pursuit of pluralism and respect for minorities, empathy with the poor and disadvantaged enabled him cannot be explained away as Machiavellian electoral to conceive of a political worldview that, on one level, calculation, as it also demonstrates a potent went beyond parochial nationalisms (Roberts, 1994). identification with majoritarian nationalism (Little, 1994). This was nowhere more apparent than in the However, such a state could, when confronted with Sinhala nationalist battleground of the late 1980s over challenges to its own security, very easily turn predator. the threat to sovereignty represented by the Indo-Lanka This is precisely how the state responded to the Accord, when Premadasa competed with the JVP for the challenges of the JVP and Tamil militancy, mantle of nationalist and patriotic "authenticity."14 demonstrating the truism about the inherent menace of paternalism: there is a limit to its capacity for tolerance. In this sense, the UNP has historically demonstrated a powerful nexus with Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and, The retention of the pervasive state points to the under Premadasa at least, with a potent statist reliance, indeed encouragement of clientelism, and the developmental role as well. However, these facets of the partisan advantages of perpetual rule to be gained UNP were an ill fit with the Ranil Wickremasinghe thereby. In this way, the UNP's position in the right of UNP regime that came to power in 2001. It was a center does not necessarily denote an affinity with regime characterized by a seemingly doctrinaire position libertarian conceptions of limited government and on economic liberalization (reflecting the Washington individual autonomy per se. In a very Sri Lankan way, it consensus and embracing globalization); by bold moves can denote a much deeper empathy with Sinhala toward peace and constitutional reform (marked by the Buddhist nationalism's ideal state than the UNP's February 2002 signing of the CFA with the LTTE); and association with liberal capitalism would at times seem by an evident shift away from more overt or vocal to suggest.13 This explains, for instance, Sir John Sinhala nationalist mobilization. Nonetheless, as far as Kotelawala's totally unsuccessful attempt to make the UNP refrain holds (that it was unfairly robbed of political capital out of the extravagant government- delivering on its long-term economic program and sponsored Buddha Jayanthi celebrations in 1956; and J. consequential political dividends after it was thrown out R. Jayewardene's retention in the 1978 Constitution of of office in April 2004), it is to be expected that a future the "foremost" status of Buddhism, and his pledge to UNP administration would continue in basically the 13 See Sunil Bastian (1999) "The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses - The Case of Sri Lanka," Working Paper 2 (Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford); A. Shastri (1983) "Evolution of Contemporary Political Formation of Sri Lanka," South Asia Bulletin, Vol. 3, No.1. 14 See Ananda Abeysekara (2001) Colors of the Robe (University of South Carolina Press), pp.228-229. 19 | The Political Actors same policy directions in respect to peace, governance, By 1956, the year of the Buddha Jayanthi (the 2500th and the economy. It seeks in this context, not only a anniversary of the Buddha's birth), Sir John Kotelawala's parliamentary majority, but also the decisive instrument UNP had become widely discredited as inept, arrogant, of state power in Sri Lanka--the executive presidency--to and out of touch with the political aspirations of the get on with an unfinished job. Yet, at the same time, it people. This has to be understood in the context of the would be wide of the mark and far too hasty to conclude growing assertiveness of the vernacular village-level elites from this that the UNP had undergone some kind of of the Sinhala polity and of the kind of rural upheaval radical transformation in which the heady air of Sinhala that had brought the country to a standstill in the Left- nationalist mobilization had suddenly vanished led hartal of 1953. While the LSSP and the CP had ideologically from the UNP in toto because of dominated anti-colonial pressures and subaltern class Wickremasinghe's leadership skills. As we will see below, tensions until the 1950s, it was clear from Philip the relationship to nationalism is far more complex and Gunawardena's more nationalist-inspired split with the ethereal than can be gauged by a linear or historically LSSP that such discontents were now being translated progressive analysis of this kind, whether in relation to into the vehicle of Sinhala Buddhist revivalism. It was the UNP or the SLFP. equally clear, however, that this vehicle required a champion with wider appeal than Gunawardena could provide. Although a scion of the Bandaranaike- OVERVIEW OF THE SLFP15 Obeysekera clan, exemplifying the elite Anglicized ancien regime the new drivers of political change were The SLFP was founded by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in seeking to displace, Bandaranaike adroitly exploited the 1952, when he left the UNP and crossed over to the Kotelawala UNP's sense of alienation. He did this by opposition, following a UNP succession crisis in the building a broad coalition around the SLFP in the form wake of D. S. Senanayake's death. At the time of the MEP that cohered the forces of Sinhala Buddhist Senanayake's son Dudley, Sir John Kotelawala, and - nationalism, including Gunawardena's VLSSP more peripherally - Bandaranaike himself competed for (Viplavakari [Revolutionary] Lanka Sama Samaja Party) leadership of the party. At the core of the SLFP at its splinter, into an election-winning force (Manor, 1989). inception were the networks and organizational structure of Bandaranaike's Sinhala Maha Sabha. As its name In capturing state power in 1956, majority nationalism suggests it was an organization essentially espousing the democratized politics by giving a stakeholding to interests of the Sinhala community. Although a federalist subordinate classes in the Sinhala polity who had at the commencement of his career in the 1920s, hitherto been excluded, and who had previously lacked Bandaranaike changed into a more parochial Sinhala the confidence to challenge such elitist exclusion. The Buddhist nationalist, at least in public self-definition for formation of the Sinhala aspirational "ape anduwa"-- political advantage, during the 1930s and 1940s (Manor, "our government"--reinforcing belonging, ownership, 1989). Despite this some scholars have attempted to and affinity with the state gravely aggravated ethnic claim him as a historically misunderstood proto- tensions by rejecting legitimate stakeholding by consociational federalist for the duration of his political minorities in politics, nation-building, and political life.16 institutions. Although Bandaranaike attempted to 15 This section draws on a previous paper by Asanga Welikala. See Asanga Welikala (2004) "Sri Lanka: The Politics of Dual Mandate" South Asian Journal (WHERE), September 28, 2004. 16 See J. Uyangoda (1993) "Sri Lanka's Crisis: Contractarian Alternatives," Pravada 2, pp.5-11 and Michael Roberts (1994), Exploring Confrontation, (Harwood Academic Publishers, Switzerland), pp. 249-268. The Politics of the South | 20 address Tamil demands for regional autonomy through father to wife to daughter. It is perhaps unfair to speak dialogue with the Federal Party and to assuage the sense of the Bandaranaike dynasty as if it were entirely their of injustice caused by the Sinhala-only language policy, scheme to retain the leadership within the family. The the emotive potency of the political forces he himself Bandaranaike name exudes a tradition of public service had unleashed severely restricted his maneuvering space and charismatic leadership that the electorate has come and ultimately led to his assassination (Little, 1994). to expect. Indeed, all three Bandaranaike holders of the SLFP leadership have proven to be consummate The SLFP has a social democratic outlook relative to the campaigners and genuine electoral assets to their party. UNP. Two factors explain this: first, nationalization of private enterprises in the 1950s was a reflection of the At the same time, detractors would also make the point nationalism of the SLFP/MEP, in which the populist (as the UNP does so explicitly), that President state is instrumental in the welfare of its owners--the Kumaratunga suffers from such a sense of entitlement to Sinhala Buddhist nation--and their security has to be the leadership of the country that she would even guarded against the perceived machinations of contemplate a constitutional revolution in order to deracinated elites, conniving minorities, and perhaps continue in office after her constitutionally limited two even external foes. Second, the SLFP's capacity to oust terms are over. However unkind the imputation of the UNP from power has always depended on support motive, it is incontrovertible that Sri Lankan governments from the Left, most evidently in 1970-1977, when and political leaders have employed the most ethically doctrinaire socialism dominated the economic thinking indefensible methods to prolong incumbency. Sirimao of the UF government. Even in its relatively market- Bandaranaike gave herself two extra years (1975 - 1977), friendly phase from 1994-1995, the SLFP posited caring and J. R. Jayawardene extended the life of a parliament in welfarism as an equalizer to market forces: "the open which he enjoyed a five-sixth majority through a economy with a human face." The SLFP also associates referendum. In Kumaratunga's case, her government's itself with the non-aligned movement, and has taken Constitution Bill of August 2000 collapsed in Parliament international relations seriously, especially during the because of the president's plans to use transitional leadership of Sirimao Bandaranaike, when in the context provisions of the bill to give herself several extra years in of the Cold War some modest foreign affairs' successes office. In doing so, the UNP was given the opening to within the non-aligned movement and in the region dissociate itself from the bill, which it had spent five years were achieved. helping to draft in a parliamentary select committee. Such pernicious constitutional theories as the doctrine of The SLFP is the nonpareil of dynastic politics and necessity have been seriously entertained by her leader-centrism among political parties in Sri Lanka. Its government as possible modes of circumventing leadership is so closely identified with the Bandaranaike Parliament in the process of constitutional amendment, family that even the brief interlude led by outsider most earnestly in the aftermath of the general elections of Maithripala Senanayake only came about because April 2004. There is a reasonable probability that a Sirimao Bandaranaike had been deprived of her civic constitutional revolution may yet be attempted, with rights and was therefore unable to stand for public perilous consequences for the peace process, including the office. Otherwise, the leadership has devolved from validation of secession in the North-East.17 17 See for example: A. Welikala, (2004) "Mandate, Process and an Interim Constitution as Modus Vivendi," Daily Mirror (Colombo), March 26, 2004; Dr. J. Wickramaratne (2004) "People have a final say in adopting new Constitution," Daily News (Colombo), May 15, 2004; Dr. N. Jayawickrama (2004), "No legal basis for constituent assembly," Sunday Leader (Colombo), April 18, 2004; Prof. L. Marasinghe (2004) "Constitutionalism confused: the doctrine of necessity vs. Kelsen's pure theory of law," Daily News (Colombo), May 5, 2004; Dr. S. Liyanage (2004) "Constituent assembly as a parallel peace process," Daily Mirror (Colombo), June 26, 2004; Prof. L. Fernando (2004) "Legitimacy of a constitution," Daily News (Colombo), June 9, 2004; Statement by Prof. G. L. Peiris MP on behalf of the United National Party on the proposed Constituent Assembly to effect changes to the Constitution, April 25, 2004. The use of North-East throughout this report recognises the contested nature of the term. “Northeast” or “North and East” would denote different political approches to the aspirations of Tamil nationalism. 21 | The Political Actors However, the SLFP's reliance on patronage, individual constitutional power-sharing. Associated with the leadership, charisma, and star players has also suffused SLFP-led People's Alliance (PA) were the Sri Lankan the second tier of the party, with such figures as Felix peace constituency--journalists, academics, NGOs, and Dias Bandaranaike, C. P. de Silva, Maithripala civil society activists--who were instrumental in Senanayake, T. B. Illangaratne, Mahinda Rajapakse, S. sourcing the PA with conceptual arguments and B. Dissanayake, and Mangala Samaraweera. rhetoric with which to pursue an aggressive policy on a Consequently, the SLFP's organizational capacity is negotiated peace. In its early stages, the PA government perhaps one of the weakest among Sri Lankan political was characterized by successful initiatives designed to parties. All indicators of intra-party institutions and inform the southern polity about non-nationalist, democracy point to a disappointing score card, with a rights-based explanations of conflict formation and the lack of clarity on such basic information as membership means of resolution. While this bid for peace and figures. Less surprisingly, financial information is even constitutional reform soon collapsed into the mire of a more obscure. The uneasy relationship between the "dual track" "war for peace" strategy, the PA was and SLFP and JVP within the current UPFA government is continues to be intellectually committed to a not only due to fundamental policy incongruities; there negotiated peace along federalist lines. Nevertheless, as is also a dimension of SLFP insecurity in the face of the with the UNP, the SLFP/PA have not entirely departed JVP's much publicized organizational efficiency. In fact, from moments of Sinhala nationalist strategy and even Lakshman Kadirgamar, foreign minister, mobilization. This has been most apparent in attempts presidential confidant, and key architect of the UPFA, to shore up a flagging parliamentary majority through has described his own party as "tired, flabby, and agreements with the JVP while in office and in corrupt." Such an indictment from within its own ranks attempts to undermine the UNP-led peace bid of 2001 is telling of the wider political crisis that currently to 2004 in the run up to the UPFA electoral victory of afflicts the SLFP. Many of the party's difficulties lie in 2004. Such machinations are evidenced through both balancing its role as a party of governance and its forging of the UPFA coalition and participation in constitutional change with a "traditional" image that has Sinhala nationalist mobilization through movements been associated with statism and Sinhala Buddhist such as the Patriotic National Movement (PNM). nationalism. It is an impediment that has recently assumed heightened proportions due to the concomitant rise of the JVP as a party that fulfils all the SLFP's past THE SLFP, THE UNP, AND CONTEMPORARY PEACE strengths with new vigor. PROCESSES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Although the legacy of its leadership of Sinhala What we have so far traced is a brief overview of the Buddhist nationalism remained with the SLFP well UNP and SLFP parties and their relationship to the into the early 1990s--during which time it opposed state, society, nationalism, development, and the even a limited scheme of devolution offered by the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka. However, more detailed Thirteenth Amendment and the Indo-Lanka Accord of analysis of contemporary attempts at peace negotiation 1987--a far-reaching change in the SLFP's stance on and constitutional reform is also required in order to the ethnic conflict has occurred. Beginning in 1993, understand the current dynamics and contexts for Chandrika Kumaratunga's SLFP was able to persuade peacebuilding, and what lessons might be learned from the southern constituency that Tamil grievances were past attempts to institute radical change into the legitimate and that a sustainable, durable peace could hitherto predominantly majoritarian machinations of the only come about through a process of negotiation and southern polity. The Politics of the South | 22 As we have stated above, the PA's ascent to power Following the intensification of the conflict in the 2000- initially spelled the demise of a period of UNP rule that 2001 period, the southern electorate gave a clear had been characterized by authoritarianism, brutal mandate to Wickremasinghe's UNP led-coalition, the counter-insurgency practices, and a lack of respect for UNF. The coalition included the Sri Lanka Muslim human rights issues. Accordingly, Kumaratunga's ascent Congress, Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), and UPF; to power was a revitalization both for the SLFP and for as well as the support brought over by several prominent the civil society groups in favor of a meaningful peace PA politicians, who in crossing over to the opposition in process.18 Nonetheless, despite the PA's commitment to June 2001 had caused President Kumaratunga to lose peace, negotiations broke down due to the LTTE's her parliamentary majority. Consequently, a period in intransigence as well as the government's incompetence which the PA had been associated with constitutional in the "talks about talks" during early 1995. This overhaul had passed without any of the objectives of the spawned a policy realignment in the PA--the "war for dual track strategy having been achieved, leaving the peace" strategy-- that called for a "dual" approach to SLFP in some disarray. It was in this context that the solving the ethnic conflict: defeat or contain the LTTE limited engagement for cooperation between the PA and militarily while offering the Tamil people constitutional JVP referred to above was first envisaged, whereby the options for meeting legitimate aspirations for regional JVP would vote with the government on critical issues, autonomy. This "dual track" strategy resulted in the without joining the government or accepting executive worst intensification of the military conflict, which office. This was the so-called "Parivasa Anduwa" occurred between 1995 and 2001. It ended with what (probationary government), which held on for a few has been described as a stalemate by PA apologists, but months before the political fallout of the airport attacks which--in view of the significant gains of the LTTE and precipitated a general election and the installation of the the inability of the state to reassert itself in the North- UNF government. Consequently, the SLFP began to East--in fact created a parity of military strength and a rely on the JVP to shore up its flagging political balance of political power that enabled the LTTE to condition, while the JVP simultaneously began to eat conclude a ceasefire agreement in early 2002 with the into the SLFP's constituency. The JVP has succeeded in new UNP government. The LTTE would not have this regard because it was not afraid to vocalize its entered into a ceasefire agreement from a position of allegiance to an undiluted Sinhala nationalism and a military weakness.19 The pursuit of this "dual track" critique of devolution and constitutional change. In "war for peace" strategy also led to the departure of doing so it capitalized on the groundswells of Sinhala significant civil society figures that had helped to sweep nationalism in a way in which the SLFP, as a party of Kumaratunga's PA coalition into power in 1994. At the governance, was increasingly constrained from doing. same time the PA's draft constitutional bill of August 2000 was derailed by the UNP, Sangha, and JVP Consequently, the UNP won the general elections in opposition (Ghosh, 2003, p.189). While the latter had December 2001 on a platform of negotiating a peaceful justifiable reasons for opposing it, this was nonetheless settlement to the ethnic conflict. While this might be seen yet another example of the mainstream parties' eternal as a testament to the radically changed ideological nature tendency to try and undermine each other in the pursuit of the UNF approach to the peace process, we should of power and at the expense of constitutional reform. understand instead the series of interlocking dynamics, of governmental and economic necessity as well as historical 18 It should also be noted that the PA campaign encouraged the return of the JVP in the South (albeit under a different moniker) as part of its strategy to discredit 17 years of UNP rule. 19 See T. Ferdinands, K. Rupesinghe, P. Saravanmuttu, J. Uyngoda & N. Ropers (2004) The Sri Lankan Peace Process at a Crossroads (CPA, Colombo). 23 | The Political Actors contingency that faced the UNF regime at the time. First, from Kumaratunga's strategy had only added to the the UNP under Ranil Wickremasinghe emerged as a party recognition that a military solution was no longer a that had returned to the mold of business-oriented and viable long-term solution to Sri Lanka's political, anglicized elite leadership after the statist, populist, but economic, and social problems (Uyangoda, 2005). The ultimately authoritarian leadership of the Premadasa years. war appeared basically unwinnable. It was also highly This process began in the early 1990s with Premadasa's apparent among a wide range of commentators that demise and the formation of the Democratic United some level of fragmentation of a unitary Sri Lanka was National Front off-shoot. It signaled a tension between, on inevitable. If any unity was to be preserved, they argued, the one hand, the more anglicized "traditional" UNP elites federalist and devolutionary solutions should be found and the populist style and support-base of Premadasa; and, in conjunction with peace talks with the LTTE.23 on the other, between the more functional business- oriented factions of the party and Premadasa's statist and Another factor at play was the system of Proportional interventionist approach.20 The UNP under Ranil Representation (PR) introduced by Jayawardene in Wickremasinghe has come to embody a particularly open 1978. As this system increasingly benefited the smaller response to globalization, linking a section of the Sinhala and minority-based parties, the mainstream parties were elite to the forces of global capital in a way that is no no longer as able to depend upon Sinhala nationalist longer as reliant on nation-state conceptions of ethnic out-bidding to carry them through elections and development as it was under Premadasa, for instance periods of office. What has become increasingly clear is (Uyangoda, 2005). As a result, the UNP, for pragmatic that with PR the mainstream parties have had to operate and functional reasons, saw "negotiated peace as the only without significant parliamentary majorities and so, have way forward for Sri Lanka's further integration with the relied on many of the smaller and minority parties to act global economy."21 This facilitated an easy rejection of as kingmakers for the establishment and maintenance of Kumaratunga's "war for peace" strategy in the interest of government (Goodhand et al., 2005, pp. 24-26). This long-term economic growth and development. has brought the UNP and the SLFP away from more vehement and overt Sinhala nationalist mobilization To the UNF coalition it was also painfully obvious that toward the center-ground in order to court the minority Chandrika Kumaratunga's strategy, while no doubt parties for coalition making. At the same time it has creating a thriving militaristic war-economy,22 was also proved a Sisyphean task to introduce constitutional responsible for the huge loss of life among the poorest change due to the impossibility of attaining the requisite sections of society, and had stifled economic alternatives two-thirds majority in Parliament. It is in this static available to Sri Lanka's economy. Moreover, it had not political context that the baton of overt nationalist provided any way out of the country's highly uneven mobilization has been passed to the smaller and more development, poverty, and economic vulnerability. The extreme nationalist actors like the SU/JHU and the JVP. military stalemate and "strategic symmetry of power The Urumaya combine can also be seen as emerging between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE" resulting genealogically out of the UNP constituency and the 20 For example, this view is taken by K.D. Bush (2003) The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read between the Lines (Palgrave Macmillan, London), pp.58-59. 21 J. Uyangoda, "Three Years after the Ceasefire Agreement: Where have we gone?" Daily Mirror (Colombo) March 18, 2005. 22 See K.D. Bush (2003) The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read between the Lines (Palgrave Macmillan, London), pp. 158- 159. See also D. Winslow and Michael D. Woost (2004) "Articulations of Economy and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka" in D. Winslow and Michael D. Woost (eds.) Economy, Culture and Civil War in Sri Lanka (Indiana University Press, Bloomington), pp. 1-30. 23 See for instance the remit of the Mangala Moonesinghe Committee, which aimed to find a political solution to the ethnic question in order to "prevent the disintegration of the nation" in P. Ghosh (2003) Ethnicity versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka (Sage, New Delhi), p.142. The Politics of the South | 24 alienation caused by the UNP's decisive shift toward the developing long-term institutionalized frameworks for need for constitutional reform, as well as a peace process peace. that, in turn, inflamed the "small islander" insecurities at the heart of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.24 Nevertheless, the UNF initiative can also be criticized on a number of counts. It is clear that the government at that Consequently, the UNP shift and passing of the Sinhala time deliberately set out on a peace process with a tabula nationalist baton cannot be read as sprouting from a rasa regarding what constitutional framework might form radical ideological transformation within the support the basis for discussion. As one scholar has noted, "the base or even membership of the party. Rather it must be implication was that constitutional changes should follow seen as a pragmatic response to changes in the political, from rather than precede talks with the LTTE" (Ibid, p. social, economic, and military landscape at the time. It 160). The UNP approached talks with only one is therefore not possible to claim (as some have done precondition: to avoid the disintegration of the Sri Lankan within the party)25 that the UNP will not undergo state. While this might seem a pragmatic approach to another pendulum swing within its own ranks or policy peacebuilding, what actually transpired was that the GoSL perspectives when Sinhala Buddhist undercurrents again hesitated in drawing up anything other than a very bubble to the surface. Indeed, as long as Sinhala minimalist proposal that was "primarily administrative in nationalist undercurrents and anxieties exist within the nature" and written from within the existing constitutional southern polity, the UNP like every other actor will have structure (Ferdinands et al., 2004, p.18). This handed the to respond to them through appeasement, initiative to the LTTE who responded by placing the confrontation, or isolation. Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) on the table - an undiluted maximalist, ethno-nationalist framework that The UNP-led UNF administration took substantial risks began to unravel the basis for peace talks in the southern during the peace process between 2001-2004. The initial polity due to the hostile response it received in the media signing of a ceasefire agreement and the building of a and among moderate and nationalist elements. While the consensus between the Government of Sri Lanka earlier PA peace initiative floundered by failing to (GoSL) and the LTTE regarding the form and implement an environment for peace and CBM, the implementation of CBM (including the basis for third opposite was the case with the UNF initiative. This may party mediation and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission’s well have undermined Wickremasinghe's peace process, peace monitoring), resulted in the longest ceasefire in which ultimately strayed from the principles outlined in the history of the conflict. The initial fruit of this the Oslo communiqué. framework had "immediate, visible, and positive impacts on lives and livelihoods throughout the island" (Bush, Second, what the UNP did not do--particularly in the 2003, pp.158-159). There was a gradual island-wide areas of building public support for federalism in the demilitarization and in conflict-affected areas there was South and attention to human rights issues--is also the less restricted movement of people and goods, as well as subject of debate.26 Noteworthy in this regard is the fact some limited aid and reconstruction. This has been that there is no indication of an idealistic commitment to characterized as a "development for peace" initiative in constitutional reform and multiculturalism or grandiose which the normalization, economic development, and visions of ethnic reconciliation and justice within the de-escalation of conflict created a more stable context for UNP. Rather, what is evident is the primacy of a 24 Authors' interview with Bradman Weerakoon, March 2004. 25 Authors' interview with Hemakumara Nanayakkara MP, March 2004. 26 Authors' interview with Prof. G. L. Peiris MP. 25 | The Political Actors functional attitude to conflict resolution. The ceasefire inability to cooperate on governance on the basis of and negotiations on a constitutional settlement then equally valid popular mandates enjoyed by both became merely necessary steps for the restoration of branches of the state. The PA and the UNF are, as can political stability and the absence of a costly war. As such be gathered from the preceding discussion, conspicuous they were subordinated to the primary project of by their relative congruity at the policy level. In this economic reform and acceleration--aims that genuinely sense, the Sri Lankan political party system, reinforced interested the UNP. What must also be understood is that through the pressures of PR, has come to resemble the the UNF-led peace bid can be seen to have been West, wherein political competition is most intense in excessively economic in its thrust and lacking in the battle for the center. However in Sri Lanka, the consultation and transparency. In that sense it repeated "center" is an elusive territory that the two parties the classic economistic misunderstanding that presumed sometimes contemporaneously occupy, depending on that "rapid economic growth would be a more effective who is more "radical" or "conservative" on a given issue. antidote to the 'ethnic conflict' than debating Thus the political center is elastic at the same time as it constitutional issues." It is an assumption that was itself is nebulous, in that it may include nationalism as well as based on "the idea that economics could be separated pragmatism, or deregulation (as a feature of the from politics--that developmentalism bore no relationship commitment to the free market) as well as protectionism to governance" (Goodhand et al., 2005, p.19). (as an aspect of social democracy). Neither of these political or economic debates is understood in Sri Third, one can also cite a flaw for which both of the Lankan democracy as even remotely dichotomous or mainstream parties must be held partially accountable-- even particularly contradictory, which is what makes the failure to cooperate on the implementation of the centrist party political behavior so difficult to subject to peace process in the context of an unprecedented Western-style understanding. political landscape. While the hybrid Constitution of 1978 conceptually contemplated the possibility of This is perhaps to be expected in an essentially oppositional parties controlling the executive and conservative polity that has hitherto tended to choose legislative branches,27 this was the first time that it had governments on personalities and mundane issues of in fact occurred. It therefore occasioned a thorough re- immediate concern, rather than on ideology, conviction, evaluation of the political principles and the or rational persuasion. It is thus no surprise that while constitutional rules of engagement between the two the conservative ontology can quite comfortably branches, where a system of "cohabitation" perhaps not accommodate nationalism, which thrives on either side unlike the type the French had developed during the of the ethnic divide, political parties have learned that 1980s would be made possible.28 other types of doctrinal rigor (i.e., socialism, liberal democracy) must be sacrificed at the altar of electoral What happened instead was an uneasy and at times success. On the question of the ethnic conflict and confrontational relationship between the president and means of its resolution, the positions of the PA and the cabinet enjoying a parliamentary majority. It is UNF have largely always been the same. Both agree that worthwhile revisiting some of the reasons for this there is no military solution to the conflict and that a 27 See H. M. Zafrullah (1981) Sri Lanka's Hybrid Presidential and Parliamentary System & Separation of Powers Doctrine (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur); R. Edrisinha (2000) "Constitutionalism and the Constitutional Evolution of Sri Lanka: 1948 - 1999," 5th Lecture in the Lectures on Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia Series (Law & Society Trust, Colombo). For a general introduction to Sri Lanka's constitutional law and structures, see J. A. L. Cooray (1995) Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri Lanka (Sumathi, Colombo). 28 See for a contemporary account of the vision of the constitutional drafters A. J. Wilson (1980) The Gaullist System in Asia: The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978) (Macmillan, London). The Politics of the South | 26 political settlement must be negotiated between liberalization embodied in the "Regaining Sri Lanka" principally the government and the LTTE. Both parties document, and claimed that capitalism of the kind recognize that third party facilitation is necessary in the promoted by the UNF benefited only the affluent. This peace process, and have recognized Norway as best- struck a resonant chord among a wide constituency of placed to play that role. They also agree that a Sri Lankans belonging to the lower middle class, fundamental restructuring of the state with substantial working class, and the peasantry for whom welfare and devolution to the regions is central to a successful government spending cutbacks had impacted on the cost political settlement. of living. They were also dismayed that the greatly expected dividends related to the cessation in hostilities It would thus appear that there were wide areas of and economic growth had not borne fruit. The fact that congruence on which the PA and the UNF could have the UPFA pursued an argument on economic issues is come to an interest-based accommodation for the noteworthy for several reasons. First, the UNP has been purposes of the peace process, if not a comprehensive traditionally perceived as the party of economic agenda for cohabitation government. That this did not competence. Second, the UNF government, in happen, despite previous attempts at agreements,29 undertaking tough structural reform and tight fiscal points to the zero-sum nature of Sri Lankan democracy discipline, made the fatal mistake of not explaining to the public why the measures were necessary or how the in which political parties cannot conceive of sharing measures were meant to deliver tangible results to the credit for popular achievements. This culture is so people. This allowed the UNF's opponents to exploit pervasive that it has been part of the improperly the people's sense of alienation and disgruntlement to rationalized democratic value system upon which the maximum benefit. institutional structure of the Sri Lankan state, in its several incarnations, has been grounded since Most significantly, the UNF's failure to convince the independence. It continues to ensure that succeeding public of their economic program points not only to that generations are continuously robbed of opportunities to party's unsuccessful public relations, but also to the nature remedy that anomalous value system, to make the state of the polity's expectations of the state in the economic work for citizens as a whole, rather than just for the life of the community. As discussed before, in the political political class that controls public institutions. imagination of the people, the state is seen as both protector and patron; such attitudes toward the state are Finally--while we have touched on the primacy of the relatively munificent. This is in contrast to most modern economic sphere vis-à-vis the UNF-led peace process-- constitutional states in which dominant constitutive what is also clear is that economic performance in assumptions with regard to state formation are by nature combination with the aforementioned factors also played a part in undermining the UNF regime, and with it suspicious of political power and its wielders, particularly Wickremasinghe's peace bid. Although there are no in relation to the economic freedom of individuals. In Sri longer great differences between the SLFP/PA and the Lanka, however, any administration that is inclined UNP/UNF in respect to the economy (other than the toward deregulation, competition, global capital; and PA being more social democrat in outlook and the UNF wants to cut back welfare, subsidies, and government more free-market oriented), this did not prevent the spending, runs a risky political gauntlet. economy from becoming a major source of political tension in the general elections of 2004. The UPFA Previous UNP administrations that boasted of economic attacked the UNF's doctrinaire program of economic accomplishment have achieved that success through a mixture of authoritarianism and steamrolling reforms 29 Liam Fox attempted to mediate such an agreement between Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe in 1997. 27 | The Political Actors past the opposition. The last UNF administration lacked The opportunity afforded by the 2001 dual mandate for control of the decisive institution of executive political forging a national consensus regarding peace and power: the presidency. This disallowed it from seeing prosperity dissipated with the UNF's peace strategy, as it unpopular reforms to fruition. On the other hand, the was perceived by a significant section of Sri Lankan growth and development strategies of the last UNF society to have fallen at the feet of an LTTE-scripted administration did not seem to focus on the poor in the ISGA agenda. The party was also seen as having failed to way its predecessors had done, with the result that its engage in social consultation or political cooperation economic policy lost wider popular support among fixed over peace or development. Nor were they seen as income groups like wage-earners and public-sector having pursued an economic policy that benefited employees as well as the rural population dependent on people beyond a narrow Colombo-centric elite. All of the agricultural economy. By contrast, the UPFA came these perceptions fuelled the defeat of the UNP and a up with a wildly populist set of promises on welfare narrow UPFA victory in the 2004 election. measures that an electorate less naïve about macroeconomics would have scoffed at. As a result, the peace process--under the guidance of a Notwithstanding the implausible nature of those UPFA coalition split between the broadly pro-federalist promises, that the people endorsed the program points PA and the thoroughly unitarist and integrationist JVP-- not merely to ignorance. It is a telling example of the had to be recommenced from new political coordinates. common person's perception of the ideal role of the Many observers were skeptical about the coalition's state in his or her life and economic wellbeing. ability to overcome internal divisions considering the JVP's hostility to both constitutional change and the This conception of the state was also partly a result of LTTE as a negotiating partner. Until the tsunami struck, the fact that politicization of Sri Lankan society occurred the peace process remained fairly static and rumors of a largely at the hands of the Left, due to its anti-colonial return to war by the LTTE circulated. In this context it political mobilization agenda in the pre-independence has been widely recognized that the tsunami's period. Even thereafter, when it was clear that Sri destructive impact also occasioned a potential revival of Lankan independence merely meant the transfer of the peace process through the Joint Mechanism for Aid power from one elite to another, the Left's influence on distribution--what is now known as the Post-Tsunami popular mobilization has been clearly evident. The Operational Management Structure or P-TOMS)-- nature of the communist state is very similar to the which the president pledged to sign despite JVP threats paradigm of statehood in the collective social memory of to leave the UPFA coalition. pre-colonial politics in Sinhala society. As mentioned before, the state is big and generous--a protector and a During the writing of this report, the JVP walked out of patron; and political relations are essentially clientelist. the government over the Joint Mechanism issue, but the In post-colonial Sri Lanka, the "bourgeois" parties (the president went on to sign the P-TOMS agreement. SLFP and UNP) merely exploited the clientelist political Despite the government's power base being reduced to a notions of the people to their advantage by indulging in mere 79 seats with the threat of further defections, the P- generous welfare programs. Here we mean not justified TOMS forms a much-needed operational basis for kick- investment in health, education, and infrastructure that starting the peace process. Without it a return to conflict a post-colonial nation-building project must necessarily would be increasingly likely. Due to the UPFA's current undertake; but imprudent spending on direct hand-outs disintegration, the passage of the P-TOMS framework unlinked to productivity or efficiency. In their most and the sustainability of the government, both require extreme form this included government subsidies for the tacit support of the UNP-led opposition. Although consumer goods and services. this has been forthcoming, it has also been accompanied The Politics of the South | 28 by criticisms from G.L. Pieris and the UNP over the attempt that ended in failure and a brutal counter- content of the P-TOMS document, specifically the lack insurgency.31 In 1977 what remained of the JVP of Sinhala representation proposed in the main aid body. leadership was released, and between then and 1983 the Moreover, reports of overtures from the president for the party underwent a phase of democratic politics with formation of a joint UNP-SLFP-led national government modest but not insignificant success. In the aftermath of have also received a lukewarm reception from the UNP, the anti-Tamil pogroms of "Black July" 1983, the JVP who are keen to hold a presidential election before was used as a scapegoat for this event and proscribed, making another bid for parliamentary power. They are forcing the leadership underground.32 Between 1986 and also threatening another round of "Jana Bala Meheyuma" 1989 the JVP once again engaged in a more protracted (People's Power protests) to this effect. In this context, and sustained insurrection, which almost succeeded in while the P-TOMS provides an aid distribution capturing state power but eventually, through tactical framework that might conceivably operate outside the and strategic miscalculation, spawned a counter- usual cycles of ethnic outbidding, it remains to be seen insurgency that matched if not outdid the insurgency in whether a more congenial spirit of cooperation between its brutality.33 these two parties has been effected in the short to medium term. It is against this background that the role However, after the landslide electoral victory of the PA of nationalist actors and their impact on prospects for government in 1994, the JVP once again resurfaced as peace should be contextualized. an officially recognized political party engaged in electoral politics.34 In the October 2000 general elections it won 10 seats, establishing it as the "third force" in Sri OVERVIEW OF THE JVP Lankan parliamentary politics at the expense of the "Old Left" and the Tamil parties (CP, LSSP, Tamil United The JVP or People's Liberation Front originated in the Liberation Front [TULF], and Eelam People’s 1966-1967 period as a splinter group from the Democratic Party [EPDP]). In the 2001 election, the Communist Party (Peking).30 It engaged in a rapid and JVP expanded its electoral base further, returning 16 widespread political mobilization in the Sinhala- MPs to Parliament and building its electoral mandate dominated rural areas of the South during the late still further in the April 2004 election on a coalition 1960s, with a leadership base among educated rural ticket with the PA as the UPFA, when the JVP captured youth who had benefited from the advantages of 39 seats. The JVP has also demonstrated significant expanding state-sponsored university education. The successes in local government elections, capturing movement soon undertook an insurrectionary strategy in Tissamaharama Pradeshiya Sabha in 2002, along with April 1971, attempting to take state power through a 219 other seats and 80 provincial council seats in 2004. "one-day revolution" tactic centered on the capture of rural police stations throughout the country. It was an 30 The CP (Peking) was itself a breakaway faction from the CP Moscow that had occurred due to the coalitional political strategies of the "Old Left." 31 Between 3,000 and 8,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the counter-insurgency, which included extra-judicial killings and, on more than one occasion, large-scale massacres of low caste groups. 32 In addition to the JVP, the CP and the Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP) were also proscribed. 33 The insurgency and counter-insurgency are believed to have resulted in over 60,000 deaths. Many of the deaths were largely attributable to the increasingly indiscriminate ferocity of the military and paramilitary forces of the counter-insurgency. By the end of November 1989, almost the entire upper leadership of the JVP had been executed or had gone into hiding and exile. 34 The JVP captured a Hambantota seat for Nihal Galapatti, contesting under the banner of the National Salvation Front/Progressive Front at this time. 29 | The Political Actors POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY AND SOURCES OF south-western areas of the island in the immediate MARGINALITY environs of Colombo and more peripheral rural and dry zone districts like Anuradhapura, Hambantota, Interpretations of the JVP's support base, ideology, Pollanaruwa, and Matara. The latter have consistently tactics and strategy tend for the most part toward several formed the geographical core of JVP strength whether in distinct sets of explanation. First, many commentators periods of electoral or insurrectionary activity. These emphasize the structural facets in the origin, ascendancy disparities have sustained a view in the rural South that and endurance of the JVP which gave rise to and development in the southern polity is Colombo-centric continue to sustain the economic, socio-cultural and while the peripheral areas of the country suffer from political alienation of Sinhala youth in the South. These unequal access to a range of resources. It is a disparity structural dynamics have been variously interpreted as perfectly captured in the rural slogan, colombata kiri, deriving from a number of overlapping sources of apata kekiri.37 However, semi-urbanized constituencies marginality. This is evidenced by sources of "structural in and around Colombo have now also increasingly unemployment" among predominantly rural, Sinhala become areas of JVP electoral strength. Part of the thrust university-educated youth, arising from the exhaustion away from a concentrated rural base is reflected in the of the post-colonial state in Sri Lanka and its inability to JVP's fairly recent rise in union politics. The party's make room for the distribution of employment and Inter-Company Employees Union, for example, has goods to this social stratum. The exhaustion of the state extended into almost every sector of the economy with in this regard cannot be understood without also over 150 branches and is beginning to emerge as a comprehending the context of a vulnerable agro-export dominant force in industrial relations in some sectors of and garment-export oriented economy susceptible to the economy.38 Additionally, the shift to urbanized and world price fluctuations that have forced finance semi-urbanized constituencies within and around ministers to go to the Bretton Woods institutions for Colombo can also be explained as a result of newly loans since at least the 1960s. Some of these perspectives urbanized and educated groups with greater literacy and also stress the JVP's origins and endurance as the wider access to the media who are willing to challenge outcome of processes of rural class formation and the dominance of the mainstream political parties' competition,35 in which the JVP has become the engine clientelist ties. for the discontent of both the subaltern and poorer rural classes, especially small-holder and landless rural farmers Third, the JVP also arises from cultural marginality in as and their offspring, the nirdhana pantiya (dispossessed far as the "Sinhala-only" language changes instituted classes) of the southern polity.36 after Bandaranaike's pancha maha balavegaya electoral victory of 1956 served to ghettoize many of the Sinhala Second, there are serious developmental and rural youth strata within frames of vernacular education. infrastructural disparities between the more developed Meanwhile English continued to operate as a dominant 35 See P. Alexander (1981) "Shared Fantasies and Elite Politics: The Sri Lankan 'Insurrection' of 1971" Mankind Vol.13, No.2, pp.124-129; T. Marks (1994) Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (Frank Cass, London). It should be noted that both these writers stressed mudalali and pelantiya class tensions underlying the 1971 insurrection. 36 See J. Uyangoda (2003) "Social Conflict, Radical Resistance and Projects of State Power: The Case of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna of Sri Lanka" in M. Mayer, D. Rajasingham-Senanayake, Y. Tangarajah (eds.) Building Local Capacities for Peace: Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka (Macmillan, London), pp.37-64. 37 A phrase that can be liberally rendered: "As Colombo gets milk, the rest must make do with water." Cf. Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth (Government of Sri Lanka, 1990). 38 For example, the JVP have control of those unions in the energy and petroleum sectors, which are currently threatening strike action (March 2005). The Politics of the South | 30 and necessary resource for access to employment and and exit from the party has been described as a social mobility.39 At the same time, education and "revolving door" or "a nest in which the educated rural socialization into the vernacular-speaking Sinhala youth are ideologically incubated" resulting in massive Buddhist strata of the South has also drawn Sinhala turnover of personnel whether in the aftermath of youth into politico-cultural preconceptions of a Sri insurgency or during periods of engagement with Lankan state framework, which is frequently perceived electoral politics (Chandraprema, 1991, p. 74). as necessarily unitary and redistributive. It is also seen as a protective framework for the Sinhala nation and the Fourth, the nature of dominant political culture in Sri Buddhist religion. Consequently, a deep nexus has Lanka, the failures of democracy, the historical hardening always existed between the spheres of educational of clientelistic politics, corruption, and politically inculcation into Sinhala Buddhist culture and the motivated thuggery have also served to disqualify origins, growth, and nurture of the JVP. The vernacular mainstream politics among politically active youth from schools and universities of the country serve to operate rural areas. That the JVP offers alternative channels of as sites of party recruitment through the twin arms of mobilization that do not operate through rent-a-crowd or the Inter-University Students Federation, or Anthare as it "strong-arm" politics has thus become attractive to rural is popularly known, and the Socialist Students' Union. youth in the South and in the universities. Additionally, This has also contributed to fiercely hostile attitudes to while the JVP historically has been no stranger to the privatization of services and to social policy political violence of an often-extreme form, the party has liberalization, especially in regard to the provision of attempted to portray itself in its current electoral phase as university education.40 Despite the admiration for JVP disciplined, non-violent, and with a reputation for self- cadres' organizational capacities and their struggle for renunciation and integrity.41 For instance, JVP MPs and social justice, it is widely recognized, despite the local government officials claim to sacrifice their salaries university connection, that the JVP's intellectual and to the party coffers, drawing instead a stipend from cultural horizons have remained consistently restricted collective funds. JVP MPs' capacity to use Parliament for throughout their history. It is a factor that bodes ill for the representation and relaying of constituents' interests their capacity to think imaginatively and innovatively in a way that is absent from the parliamentary debates with regard to a range of policies--from the economy to undertaken by other political party candidates should constitutional reforms and the peace process. From this, also not be overlooked. Additionally, JVP claims of a one can clearly explain how wider intellectual and sizeable and highly organized cadre base have been cultural self-development frequently brings about large- substantiated by the mobilization of some 10,000 Sahana scale defections and departures from the party rather Seva Balakaya (Social Relief Force) cadres for post- than the possibility of notable internal shifts in party tsunami social relief. The JVP's organizational structure is policy. It is for this reason that the point of entry into also of a classic Bolshevik cellular structure built around 39 The persevering significance of English in this way has been characterized as the neo-colonial dominance of the "kaduwa" or sword of English. See S. Perera (1995) Living with Torturers and Other Essays of Intervention (ICES, Colombo), pp.37-45. 40 The universities have been beset by violence in the weeks in which the fieldwork for this report was conducted over these issues and related violence between SLFP and JVP factions within the universities. Cf. Interview with PDP, Colombo University Student March 11, 2005. 41 While the issue of privilege and perks for MPs and ministers has come under recent scrutiny with the use of luxury vehicles, the charge of non-violent politics is generally confirmed by election complaint statistics from non-partisan election monitoring bodies. For example before the UPFA was formed, in the 2002 local elections, the UNP and the PA registered 405 and 143 alleged incidents of violence while the JVP registered just 14 incidents. In the General Elections of 2001 the figures for alleged incidents were 1,284 for the PA, 751 for the UNP and 9 for the JVP. See Final Report of Election-Related Violence by the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) - Local Government Elections 2002 (CMEV, 2002) and Final Report of Election-Related Violence by the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) - General Election 2001 (CMEV, 2002). It should be noted however that university politics in which the JVP also play a powerful role through the Inter-University Students Union is characterized by frequent eruptions of violence. 31 | The Political Actors the principle of "democratic centralism" among the students and secular disciplines) among bhikkus 1,000 to 2,000 full-timers and 20,000 members.42 implemented in the post-independence years. It is in this However, while this might afford some substance to the context that the former monastic Buddhist colleges like JVP's adherence to democratic principles, it is also widely Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara, which were awarded recognized that the party offers almost no space for university status after 1956, became centers of JVP activity public political dissonance or dissent from the party line, for the "1971" generation. The nexus between the JVP even between local and leadership levels.43 Nevertheless, and younger generations of monks has also been a what is clear is that the JVP's organizational structure consequence of socio-economic, cultural, and caste and political culture remain radically at odds with the tensions and resentment borne of the hierarchical nature of shape and style of the mainstream parties. These the Sangha--which junior and novice monks feel toward organizational dynamics are also clearly an attempt to their elders in the pirivenas, pansalas, monastic chapters, take the moral high ground in a situation of widespread and other walks of Buddhist clerical life in Sri Lanka. disillusionment with the state of political culture in Sri Consequently, the JVP has always maintained a separate Lanka. However, only time will tell whether the JVP can organizational section for monks within its party structure. maintain this trend or whether it will be sucked into the shape and form of the predominant, pre-existing political At one time, there had been considerable disapprobation culture through their engagement with electoral politics for the JVP among the older and senior theras, particularly and the fruits and privileges of office. After all, one of the of the Asgirya and Malwatte Chapters - especially over central reasons behind the JVP's ability to mobilize and accusations of a JVP attack on the Dalada Maligawa in the organize in this way has been its past marginalization late 1980s. Despite this, since the 1980s there has been a from political power that affords it little other recourse considerable rapprochement between the JVP and the than to such "weapons of the weak." elder Sangha with a noticeable shift on both sides in which the JVP leadership seeks the blessings of the Sangha and Fifth, it is clear that the JVP's support base among the engages in bodhi puja rituals to the same extent as is Sangha has also expanded considerably. The JVP has common among other party leaders. This reconciliation is always had a significant influence among the younger a testament to the deeper nexus forged between the JVP generation of bhikkus and this pattern was present even in and Sinhala Buddhist nationalist sentiment. the early insurgency years of the 1971 generation when pansalas became hiding places for both JVP cadres and There is some speculation that the JVP have also weaponry, despite there being considerable ambivalence extended their support base among the military and that toward the Sangha among the JVP leadership at this time. this has been a growing tendency within the party since The attraction of the JVP for these younger, junior monks the 1980s period when significant ambivalence toward has always been based on the common social origins in the the JVP among different strata of the military hierarchy rural and vernacular-educated spheres of Sinhala society brought about a considerable reluctance to engage in shared by both such sections of the Sangha and lay JVP violent counter-insurgency tactics against the cadres. It also has its roots in the widening of access to movement.44 Accordingly, it is quite clear that, aside university education (including increased contact with lay from the JVP's vocal brand of "patriotism," its anti- 42 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe, March 19, 2005. 43 Cf. interviews with SD March 16, 2005, March 23, 2005, and SF March 10, 2005. 44 It has been claimed that the turning point only came when anti-JVP forces issued Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV) threats and "chits" against military personnel and their families that spawned the ferocity of the counter-insurgency on a wider scale. Cf. fieldwork in Anuradhapura District, 2002. See also A.C. Alles (1990) The JVP, 1969-1989 (Lakehouse, Colombo), pp. 310-312. The Politics of the South | 32 LTTE stance, and its enduring and often-invoked praise mass-elite, and center-periphery conflictual dynamics for the security forces, there is also a social nexus cannot be rejected outright.47 Indeed, occasionally between the JVP and the social strata within Sri Lanka informants sympathetic to the JVP have expressed who constitute the core recruitment material of the resentment against a perceived caste nexus of what are military services. Indeed, it has been asserted by some called the three "Cs"--Colombo, Catholic or Christian, commentators (including in discussion with the authors) and (the "C" that is a "K") Karava. The importance of that the JVP has infiltrated the Sri Lankan Army to the this is that it underlines how the view that the JVP are captain-level45--a tendency for infiltration of military now expressive of caste dynamics below the classic KSD services by "fundamentalist" forces that is by no means a triangle, that had previously underpinned elements of the novel phenomenon in South Asia.46 The potential Old Left, cannot be simply dismissed.48 Caste evolution of a JVP-military nexus in this way could itself perspectives on the JVP stress the difficulties facing overt prove problematic for the peace process in a crisis lower-caste electoral mobilization in a context where the situation and is more likely to add to the pressure of a Goyigama constitute roughly half the Sinhala electorate. return to a "war for peace" strategy should the nexus be This can be used to explain the consistent recourse to reinforced. Although it may currently be an extreme nationalist tropes and symbols in JVP mobilizations in interpretation and somewhat premature, in a worst-case which deeper problems of social injustice and inequality scenario one could not entirely rule out the future remain obscured. In this sense caste remains the "inner development of military coup dynamics in a context of courtyard" in Sri Lankan politics, a taboo area that heightened political instability. nonetheless underpins the struggles of subaltern movements like the JVP while also explaining their Finally, a number of commentators (for example, Ivan, consistent recourse to Sinhala nationalism rather than to Kapferer, Jiggins) have asserted that the JVP cannot be mobilizations based on the social fissures that underpin understood unless one also understands the historical their constituency.49 In this way Sri Lanka is unable to potency of caste politics in Sri Lanka. Such politics unify to solve the ethnic problem, as caste fissures are operate through KSD (Karava, Salagama, Durava) and consistently retranslated into Sinhala nationalist lower caste (for example, Batgam, Wahumpara) blocks dynamics. Such a crisis in Sinhala identity sustains the against forms of caste political domination from the inability to overcome Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism upper strata (Goyigama) within Sri Lanka's inverted and its detrimental effects upon the polity as a whole. pyramidal or hourglass-shaped caste structure. While the JVP themselves reject a caste-based analysis of their A number of scholars have emphasized that the JVP is mobilizations (a tendency reinforced by the combined radically agency-driven, voluntaristic, and a party of influence of Marxism and Buddhism), the possibility that action and not ideology with an immense capacity for caste networks have been (and may still be) operative at a political entrepreneurship.50 Despite this, it is clear that background level in a way that also interlocks with class, the party has nonetheless sustained itself (even after the 45 Cf. interviews with SD March 16, 2005 and March 23, 2005. 46 See Tariq Ali (2001) "Bitter Chill of Winter," London Review of Books, Vol. 23, No. 8, April 19, 2001. 47 Cf. interview with VI March 16, 2005. 48 Fieldwork, 2002. It should be noted that the informant, a JVP supporter, was echoing the views of Nalin de Silva, the Jathika Chintanaya ideologue. 49 See J. Uyangoda (2000) "The Inner Courtyard: Political Discourse of Caste, Justice and Equality in Sri Lanka" Pravada, Vol. 6, Nos. 9 & 10. 50 See M. Moore (1993) "The JVP in Sri Lanka: Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries," South Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 596. For the view that the JVP are a party of action and not ideology, see G. Samaranayake (1999) "Political Violence in Sri Lanka: a Diagnostic Approach" Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 111. 33 | The Political Actors death of Wijeweera) through many of the previous moments of Sinhala nationalist mobilization aforementioned structural dynamics. Moreover, the that date back to the 1960s when anti-Indian ideology that underpins and sustains the JVP's political chauvinism found expression in the fourth class of the cohesion lies not so much in the doctrines and theories panti paha, the series of lectures that formed the of Marxism as in the more affective and emotive appeal recruitment vehicle of the party. This lecture, "Indian of Sinhala nationalism. Additionally, it should be Expansionism," built upon a Chinese Communist Party recognized that the JVP has taken on the mantle of perspective of India's long-term strategy, which Sinhala Buddhist nationalist mobilization discerned political and economic designs of regionalist proportionately, to the extent to which both the UNP expansionism emanating from the subcontinent. In the and the SLFP have begun to distance themselves from context of the JVP, the lecture also labeled the an overtly Sinhala nationalist position.51 In a sense, this Upcountry Tamil estate workers as a "fifth column" in can be interpreted as arising from the JVP's capacity-- Sri Lanka, whose political interests were inimical to the because of its vernacular, lower-class, and rural roots--to revolutionary strategy of the JVP and whose sufferings articulate a more potent discourse of nationalist were supposedly not as great as those of Sinhala chena authenticity in opposition to what it has consistently and smallholder farmers in the South. described as the inauthentic, decadent, deracinated, and corrupt politics of Sri Lanka's elites. So, while a gradual Notwithstanding this, the JVP entered a more internal transformation is no doubt accompanying accommodative phase toward Tamil minority interests increasing exposure to the spheres of political office, during the 1977 to 1983 period, when both Rohana unless these underlying dynamics of inequality are Wijeweera and Lionel Bopage articulated the need to addressed, it is unlikely (in the foreseeable future at recognize the potential legitimacy of the Tamils' right for least) that this will also result in a shift away from the self-determination.52 However, this momentary shift was JVP's recourse to forms of Sinhala nationalist undone after Bopage's 1984 resignation from the party mobilization. The fact that the JVP walked away from over this and issues of party mobilization and the UPFA coalition in June 2005 over the Joint organization. As a result the JVP once again returned to Mechanism issue, when there was much debate about a position that rejected the right to self-determination the possibility that they would remain in office, is a for Tamil minorities (Wijeweera, 1986). During the testament to this fact. period of the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987 and the 13th Amendment proposals for measures of provincial autonomy, the JVP mobilized vociferously against any THE JVP'S NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY AND such devolutionary consideration to the Tamil ATTITUDES TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND communities. This was done both as a single political CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM force and through other nationalist organs or front organizations such as the Maubima Surakima Vyaparaya It is through the political vehicle of Sinhala nationalism (MSV - Force for the Protection of the Motherland), the that the JVP have increasingly sought legitimacy as Maubima Surakima Sanvidhanaya (MSS - Movement for guardians of the territorial integrity and unity of the Sri the Protection of the Motherland) and the Deshapremi Lankan state. While we can say that this JVP ideological Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV - Patriotic People's Movement). framework has hardened in recent years, it builds upon 51 Cf. Authors' interview with Gunadasa Amarasekera March 17-18, 2005. 52 See L. Bopage (1977) A Marxist Analysis of the National Question of Sri Lanka (Niyamuwa, Colombo) and L. Bopage & R Wijeweera (1975) The Policy Declaration of the JVP (Ginipupura Publications, U.K.). The Politics of the South | 34 The analytical thrust of Wijeweera's move once again to followed by the ruling United National Front, the a more Sinhala nationalist position was that calls for country faces the prospect of losing its territorial autonomy for the North and East of the country were integrity..."55 As critics from within the PA at the time merely an imperialist conspiracy to split the Sri Lankan stated, a coalition formed with the JVP--a party proletariat through spurious racial categories that unreceptive to the LTTE, to ISGA, and to federal ultimately served the ambitions of the Western states devolution--could present a potential obstacle to and India's "Cholan" ambitions. Wijeweera attempted constitutional reforms and to attempts to take the peace to legitimize this position through recourse to an negotiations forward. While this presented a new analysis of Lenin's discussion of the national question. obstacle to the possibility of the PA being able to deliver As he himself put it, "we know very well that the a peace package, some critics point to President division of the country and decentralization are Kumaratunga's vacillating commitment to the peace completely opposed to the class aims and necessities of process as an equally enduring problem impacting on the proletariat" (Ibid). the likelihood of meaningful negotiations. When the JVP resurfaced after the bishana-samaya Although the UPFA coalition won the April 2004 election period, it held an internal debate on the national on a slender majority--with the JVP holding 39 seats and 4 question. Debate revolved around whether the party ministerial portfolios--it is clear that the JVP had the should adopt a Marxist or nationalist stand on the potential to act as a veto block from within the walls of the question of minorities, or a Rosa Luxemburg or government. As international and national pressure on the Leninist-oriented stand on the question of self- government to move peace negotiations forward increases, determination.53 Additionally, Dr. Vickramabahu including $4.5 billion in Tokyo Conference aid, the cracks Karunaratne and other Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP) and fissures in the UPFA coalition have begun to appear. delegates were invited to attend the JVP national In February 2005, the JVP parliamentary group leader and congress in Tangalle in May 1995, where all of the publicity secretary, Wimal Weerawansa, called on the speakers were heavily critical of a military solution to the government to withdraw from the ISGA framework, conflict.54 However, once the PA government announced which it considered contrary to the letter of the MOU. its devolution proposals, the JVP began to criticize a This prompted the president to call their bluff and federal or devolutionary solution to the ethnic conflict. demand their departure from the coalition. Aside from a brief sojourn on a common Left platform in the presidential election of 1999, this has remained What is clear from the UPFA's predicament at the time their position ever since--whether articulated against PA is that the JVP remained unmoved by the urgent need or UNP-led governments. Although the JVP were rivals to bring the peace process forward. They continued to to the SLFP in opposition to the UNF in the 2002 reassert their opposition to negotiations on the basis of period; they signed an MOU with the SLFP in January ISGA and reiterated that both the LTTE and the Tamil 2004 to form the UPFA, in the context of a stalled National Alliance (TNA) were undemocratic and not a peace process, rising prices and union unrest. The text of legitimate entity for the GoSL to conduct negotiations the MOU asserts that "as a result of the wrong policies with.56 Additionally, the JVP rejected a federal 53 See Dr. Sunil Ratnapriya (1996) "Peace: Possibilities and Obstacles." Proceedings of the International Conference on the Conflict in Sri Lanka Peace with Justice (Canberra, Australia). 54 Ibid. 55 See SLFP-JVP "Memorandum of Understanding" (January 2004). 56 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva March 10, 2005. 35 | The Political Actors framework for Sri Lanka and argued that the only and civil society actors. Such institutions and actors are acceptable devolution as far as it was concerned was to frequently characterized as a threat to the sovereignty the local administrative district levels and below--not and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. In the past, the unlike the panchyat system.57 This is once again reflective JVP have been critical of IFIs such as the World Bank of the JVP's obsession with unitary state power rather and the International Monetary Fund because these than with any devolutionary framework that could institutions are perceived to encourage liberalization and meaningfully deliver a response to the current ethnic privatization as well as attempt to dismantle areas of conflict. It is a perspective on the state that has clearly small-holder agriculture that remain contentious in fuelled the perpetuation of Sinhala Buddhist terms of the JVP's traditional rural power base. This is majoritarianism.58 In the same vein, while the JVP especially true for the paddy and chena farming that claims to be "the only party to have publicly stated that remain symbolic Sinhala nationalist tropes (wewa, the State should not have a language or a religion,"59 the chaitiya, and yaya), which the state encouraged fact that this claim to secular status was immediately historically through numerous colonization and large- qualified by Somawansa Amarasinghe's assertion that scale irrigation projects.61 Indeed, it should be noted that "the majority in this country are Sinhala Buddhists" and the JVP launched its dahasak wew or "one thousand that "one should not forget the fact that this country has tanks" rehabilitation project in August 2004 in a culture built on Buddhist values and this was a Kurunegala. By doing so the JVP indicated its continued tolerant society," speaks volumes about the nature of the outward commitment to this form of state-sponsored JVP's secularism.60 For secularism without a viable agricultural development and this particular support constitutional framework for political autonomy and the base. However, despite the JVP's support for a more protection of human rights through a combination of a commanding economy and the strengthening of small- federal framework and a series of checks and balances to holder agriculture, leader Somawansa Amarasinghe the executive and legislative branches of governance, is indicated that the party recognizes the necessity of little more than a guise for persisting ethnic international institutions and the need for access to majoritarianism. international finance. So the party is not against these institutions per se.62 ATTITUDE TO INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL In this context, the recent attack on the World Bank SOCIETY ACTORS Country Director should not be read in the context of a gratuitous attack on the institution of the World Bank The JVP have long maintained a reputation for hostility itself. Rather, it was an attack on the Country Director's to International Financial Institutions (IFIs), Inter- perceived treatment of the LTTE as a state-like or quasi- Governmental Organizations (IGOs), International state institution, through which aid can legitimately be Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), NGOs, channeled to the North-East. In other words, as with 57 Ibid. 58 See for instance, A. Welikala (2002) "The Devolution Project in Sri Lanka: Two Nations in One State?" Liberal Times, Vol. 10, No. 3. D. Scott (1994) "Community, Number, Ethos of Democracy" in D. Scott (ed) Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.), pp. 158-189. 59 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva, March 10, 2005. 60 Ibid. 61 See, for example, M. Moore (1998) "Ideological History of the Sri Lankan Peasantry" Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 179-207. 62 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva, March 10, 2005. The Politics of the South | 36 Wimal Weerawansa's recent criticisms of Kofi Annan, LTTE, being bearers of foreign and corruptive values the attack on the Country Director remains an attack on and lifestyles, or being traitors to the Sri Lankan nation perceived threats to Sri Lanka's political and territorial (drohi). These attacks culminated in a rabid and fanatical integrity rather than necessarily on the economic and assault by Weerawansa during the course of a PNM developmental vision of the World Bank as a whole. meeting at Maharagama in April 2005. In his address, While we are not suggesting that a fundamental Weerawansa encouraged his audience to "spit on NGOs overhaul of the JVP's statist macro-economic policies are and stop them from walking on our streets. Donor on the cards in the immediate future or that the JVP countries and their NGO agents are holding this have engaged in a miraculous volte face on Bretton country to ransom, telling the government to set up a Woods policies, it is clear that the experience of political joint tsunami relief mechanism with the LTTE. It is office has softened their once uncompromising hostility something that can be done through the Sri Lankan to such institutions. The experience has opened them up state machinery. There is no need for a joint to the potential of dialogue and the possibility of a long- mechanism."64 Weerawansa went on to accuse foreign term transition on economic policy even if the centrality NGO workers of being "crows who had come to Sri of unitary nation-state power will be difficult to dispel Lanka in search of dollars."65 Weerawansa then went on from such a vision. to attack Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda; Kumar Rupasinghe of International Alert; Dr. Pakkiyasothy In the same way, the JVP's attitude to INGOs, NGOs, Saravanamuttu of the Centre for Policy Alternatives; the civil society actors, academics, and think-tanks is driven late journalist Taraki; Jehan Perera of the National Peace by the same ideological commitment toward the re- Council; and the politicians of the Left, Vasudeva territorialization of power within the unitary framework Nanayakkara and Wickramabahu Karunaratna; whom of the Sri Lankan nation-state. In discussions with the he accused of being covert NGO puppets. authors, the JVP leadership again stated that they are not against NGOs per se but that they differentiate When one analyses the JVP stance on international between NGOs such as Care International, who adhere NGO and civil societal actors, it appears that their to a non-political mandate (and with whom the JVP outlook is structured from a background dichotomy of have worked in the post-tsunami context), and NGOs political and non-political opposites. The political sphere such as World Vision (which it should be noted is also a should remain the exclusive domain of "democratic" and Christian organization). The JVP perceive the latter as "accountable" political actors and figures; while NGOs having a political agenda in Sri Lanka that transgresses and civil societal actors--who have received no such Sri Lankan governmental sovereignty and being mandate from the "people"--should stick to clearly therefore politically unaccountable and illegitimate.63 demarcated non-political, humanitarian, relief and developmental mandates.66 Additionally, during the period in which this report was written there were numerous attacks on civil society While the JVP's perspective on this issue raises serious figures (including spokespeople for think-tanks, concerns about their narrow conception of the academics, and NGO officials) by the JVP press. They "political" and their commitment to freedom of speech were variously described as being in league with the among civil society actors as a whole, it should 63 Ibid. 64 Cf. "JVP slams NGOs, western countries for meddling," Tamilnet April 7, 2005 (www.tamilnet.com). 65 Cf. "Weerawansa lashes out at INGOs, NGOs, RINGOs, GRINGOs and BINGOs," Lanka Academic, April 7, 2005. 66 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva, March 10, 2005; and with Somawansa Amarasinghe, March 19, 2005. 37 | The Political Actors nonetheless not be dismissed out of hand. It is relevant shifted toward a pro-Indian position in terms of both a to the broader debate about the extent to which donor preferable potential mediator to the peace process and in states, international actors and NGOs should continue terms of foreign policy alignments as a whole. This to contravene traditional notions of sovereignty and the reflects a mutuality of interests--with India wanting to extent to which aid should remain harnessed to ensure that a potentially destabilizing separate state of conditionalities like "good governance"-or, in the Sri Tamil Eelam does not appear at the foot of India, while Lankan context, to "progress in the peace process." This the JVP are keen (for obvious reasons) to enlist the is especially relevant in the fragile post-tsunami context external support of a powerful regional state actor that is of widely acknowledged state incapacity.67 While the opposed to Eelamist aspirations. Consequently, the JVP maintenance of such conditionalities may be intended to have been keen to develop good relations with the contribute to the strengthening of human rights within Indian High Commission and to lobby for an Indian developing world contexts, they may nonetheless be role in the peace process.69 counterproductive in as far as they lead to the reinforcement of nationalist agendas against a perceived "imperialist" cosmopolitan agenda imposed by THE POST-TSUNAMI CONTEXT AND THE JVP'S dominant states and NGOs--a situation which will have LONG-TERM POLITICAL PROSPECTS been exacerbated and not improved by the tsunami. The recent plan to create a parliamentary select committee to The recent political juncture is one in which the JVP police aid and NGOs, spearheaded by JVP heavyweight has sought to secure political capital and legitimacy Nandana Gunatillake, is a testament to the political through its swift reaction in the wake of the Asian polarization over aid that has taken place in Sri Lanka.68 tsunami. It mobilized 10,000 cadres of the Sahana Seva Balakaya (Social Relief Force),70 a relief force that The JVP also remains highly critical of Norway's role as provided medical aid, well purification, relief camps, the mediator in the peace process. It constantly questions distribution of food, and other emergency supplies. It Norway's agenda and propagates the notion that also engaged in reconstruction work including the Norwegian mediation is partial to the LTTE's interests rebuilding of the Galle Bus Stand, repairs to the Sri and their ultimate objectives of creating a separate state-- Lankan railway network, and provision of temporary a perspective that is not confined to the JVP. housing to the displaced.71 Somawansa Amarasinghe Considering the JVP's history of anti-Indian states that while the Sahana Seva Balakaya is not a mobilization--dating back to the "Indian Expansionism" governmental organization, it is nonetheless the JVP's class, and continuing with the agitation against the organizational strength that has made up for other Indo-Lanka Accord and the presence of the Indian Peace parties' lack of organizational capacity and helped to Keeping Force--the JVP has ironically but very firmly thus far avoid serious food riots in the South.72 Based on 67 For a broader discussion of these issues in the Sri Lankan context, see N. Wickramasinghe (2001) Civil Society in Sri Lanka : New Circles Of Power (Sage, 2001); for the recent post-Tsunami context, see G. Frerks and B. Klem (2005) "Muddling the Peace Process: Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation in War-torn Sri Lanka" (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands). 68 The appointment of the Parliamentary Select Committee is scheduled for early May 2005. 69 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva, March 10, 2005. 70 The Sahana Seva Balakaya was not created in response to the 2004 tsunami but in relation to droughts and floods in different areas of the South in 2003. 71 Cf author's interview with PB, Matara District Organiser of the Sahana Seva Balakaya, Weligama, March 2005. 72 Ibid. The Politics of the South | 38 our brief fieldwork in the South and also from reports of independent social relief work while still a member of post-tsunami protests emanating from Galle and Matara the UPFA coalition.74 This suggests that the former among other places, dissatisfaction and frustration with scenario of expanded JVP legitimacy is far more likely. the level of governmental intervention in the South has been high and the atmosphere in social relief camps is From both the post-tsunami situation and the JVP's highly charged. Comparing testimony from displaced departure from the UPFA coalition in June 2005 over people in both a JVP relief camp and from an NGO the Joint Mechanism issue, it is clear that some observers tented camp, all the interviewees charged the have underestimated the party's long-term strategy and government with negligence and failure in solving their impact upon political culture in Sri Lanka. One of the long- and short-term problems while praising the JVP arguments constantly made is that the JVP are being for their relief and reconstruction efforts.73 Additionally, drawn into mainstream political culture through their those displaced in the tented camp also aggressively exposure to the fruits and spoils of coalitional office. indicated their intention to vote for the JVP in any From this it has been varyingly interpreted that the JVP subsequent election without being directly asked about will either fall into a decline in the same way that the such intentions. The post-tsunami context may well Old Left parties did from the 1970s onward;75 or that have provided an occasion for the JVP to prove its these processes may lead to an internal transformation organizational capacities and commitment to social relief and moderation of the party away from more radical at a moment of sharp crisis, and may serve to expand its and nationalist politics. However, what has perhaps been popularity and political constituency in any future overlooked is the impact that the JVP will continue to election. have on political culture and political processes in Sri Lanka. It is quite clear, as the JVP's Joint Mechanism While the JVP may have expanded its political departure demonstrated, that the party's short-term legitimacy in the face of government failures in the post- interest in portfolio and office is not as extensive as some tsunami situation; it is also possible that while the JVP have suggested--a point Somawamsa Amarasinghe was aid effort has been welcomed in areas where it has been keen to emphasize in an interview with the authors.76 operative, due to the crisis context it may not necessarily Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the JVP's long-term have extended the party's political constituency in any goals are to maintain its staunch resistance to both the significant long-term way. A more extreme interpretation Joint Mechanism and ISGA and to achieve its stated is that the JVP may have discredited itself through a political objectives at the helm of a future government. perceived naked attempt to exploit the post-tsunami crisis for political aims and through its partnership in a However, there was a broad consensus among academic government that is widely perceived to have dragged its and media commentators during the fieldwork period feet and provided little other than food stamps to those that, in the event of another general election, the JVP most seriously affected by the tsunami. However, would not retain its current 39-seat position. There was fieldwork indicated a high level of differentiation among agreement that its seat count would fall to perhaps the informants between the JVP on the one hand and the region of 20 to 25 seats. The authors' own prediction is UPFA government on the other, indicating that the JVP that the JVP's future electoral gains will be considerably managed to accrue most of the political capital from greater than this. In the context of another Sinhala 73 Cf. author's interviews conducted in the Sinigama area, Galle District and in Weligama, Matara District, March 2005. 74 Cf. author's interviews in Matara and Galle Districts, March 2005. 75 Cf. author's interviews with SF, March 9, 2005 and interview with VI, March 16, 2005. 76 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva, March 10, 2005. 39 | The Political Actors nationalist upsurge in response to P-TOMS and the reputation.77 In this sense, it is clear that their time continuing failure of the mainstream parties to cooperate in office has been significant. in government, it is highly likely that the JVP will At the same time, however, since the JVP have continue to disembowel the SLFP's political constituency. taken up the slack left by the UNP and SLFP Moreover, the prospect of a realigned JVP-SLFP coalition parties' relative move away from a Sinhala at the next election, with the JVP in a much stronger nationalist position, they still act as the most position, is no longer unlikely. Disillusionment with the significant political movement fomenting active clientelism of the mainstream parties, the SLFP's own opposition to current frameworks for the peace political crisis, the structural inequalities outlined above, process. They also serve to mobilize more passive along with the JVP's capacity to assume the moral high- opposition to the peace process as well--a block ground of nationalist authenticity and ascetic discipline, within the southern polity that is considerable and all remain key ingredients in the almost inevitable should not be underestimated.78 During the period political ascendancy of the party. of fieldwork for this report the JVP held their own series of polls in regional meetings in March 2005 that asked for a democratic consensus on whether INCENTIVES FOR THE JVP AS A PEACE the JVP should leave the government at that STAKEHOLDER juncture ("no"), whether they should oppose ISGA ("yes"), and whether they should oppose the joint While it is quite clear from the preceding pages that the mechanism for relief and reconstruction ("yes"). JVP remain critical of the peace process in its currently While this revealed the JVP's willingness to criticize envisaged frameworks, there are a number of possible the government from within (where it could act as a areas that offer potential space for maneuver. The more effective veto block without having to bring prospects for such openings include: about another potential election and the possibility 1) The JVP as a democratic and/or nationalist entity? of another UNP-led administration), it is clear that First, it is clear that a more open, electorally- the Joint Mechanism issue provided an unmissable oriented JVP has been a step forward in the relative opportunity for the JVP to maximize political stability of the southern polity. This is especially mileage out of vocal Sinhala nationalist true in comparison to the violent dynamics at work mobilizations against the Joint Mechanism. It was in the bishane period (1987), when Sri Lanka last to this extent that they were willing to follow had the opportunity to implement a solution to the through their threat to walk out of government. ethnic conflict. The JVP have also shown some 2) The Referendum: In interviews with the authors, willingness to engage in dialogue with international the JVP indicated that should a referendum be held actors and diplomatic representatives from differing on the issue of federalism and the abolition of the ideological hues so they may present their own executive presidency, the JVP would fiercely contest perspective on the Sri Lankan situation. This is it on the basis of a challenge to a federal motivated in response to their perception that the constitution, but they would nonetheless support a Sri Lankan media distorts their standpoint, thus referendum result whatever the outcome would be.79 posing a major obstacle to both their political It should also be noted that in the past the JVP growth and the development of their international 77 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva, March 10, 2005; and with Somawansa Amarasinghe, March 19, 2005. 78 See Centre for Policy Alternatives (2004) Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices Survey on the Sri Lankan Peace Process (KAPS) (CPA, Colombo). 79 Cf. author's interview with Somawnsa Amarasinghe, March 19, 2005. The Politics of the South | 40 have stated that this referendum is unnecessary as from CPIM recently gave a Kandiah memorial the framework for peace lies outside the coalitional lecture on federalism in Colombo and it is MOU, and that the president already chose to understood that the CPIM have attempted to disregard the abolition of the presidency in the post- engage the JVP in some kind of dialogue on the 1994 period. potentialities of a federal solution to Sri Lanka's 3) Federal Devolution: The JVP have some clearly current crisis, reportedly without success.80 circumscribed power bases in areas that suffer from While the Communist Party in Sri Lanka also highly uneven development, and the centralized maintains a dialogue with the JVP, a familiar story polity continues to exacerbate this unevenness. In has emerged from an interview with a Communist this sense the LTTE and the JVP can be seen as Party representative in Sri Lanka.81 Although the mirror images of each other, and it would seem a JVP have built bridges with the NSSP over the logical corollary that the JVP would be willing to issue of conflict and the national question in the indulge some form of symmetrical political past, for instance, this momentary shift came at a devolution or regional autonomy from which it time of JVP convalescence after the 1980s would benefit in terms of a political power base. insurrection. It is now quite clear that the JVP This should be considered in the same way that the currently remains unmoved on this issue and no Communist Party of India (CPI) have profited if amount of intellectual badgering seems to produce not thrived historically through power bases in any shift or signs of a willingness to change. While Kerala and West Bengal. However, what is clear this failure of dialogue with other Marxist from the JVP's consistently negative response is that movements is perhaps a sign of the intractable their attachment to the centralized polity clearly nature of the JVP's position on the national outweighs any imaginative response to a federal question in Sri Lanka, it is not completely solution at the present juncture. Although it surprising as the emergence of the JVP power base remains clear, to the authors at least, that the JVP's has frequently been at odds (and rarely in tactic is not necessarily one of instrumental cooperation) with rival Left movements. However, manipulation of nationalist issues, but of a more as long as the JVP maintains good relations with hegemonic depth of nationalist affect, this does not, these movements there is still the potential for however, exclude the possibility of a future shift as it dialogue on the question of federalism. is clear that the JVP have shifted on a number of 5) The JVP and the "national question": It should be policies in the past (for example, the 1977-1983 noted that the authors have attempted to emphasize policy on the national question). the varied historical attitude of the JVP on the 4) Dialogue with Marxist movements: As a party with national question to the JVP leadership themselves. claims to a Marxist heritage, the JVP still maintains Indeed, in the 1975 to 1983 period the JVP a dialogue with both the CPI and the Communist attempted to articulate the genuine grievances of the Party of India (Marxist) (CPIM); and both parties Sri Lankan Tamil population in Lionel Bopage's "A recently invited the JVP to their party conventions Marxist Analysis of the National Question" and for the first time. Additionally, Sitaram Yechury Wijeweera's "Policy Declaration." 82 However, upon 80 Cf. authors' interview with KL, March 14, 2005. See also "No objection to 'confederation' in Lanka: Sitaram Yechury" in Hindustan Times, August 11, 2004; P.K. Balachandran (2005) "Indian Reds build bridges with Lanka's controversial JVP" Hindustan Times, May 30, 2005. 81 Cf. authors' interview with DG, March 2005. 82 See L. Bopage (1977) A Marxist Analysis of the National Question of Sri Lanka (Niyamuwa, Colombo) and Bopage, L. (1975) The Policy Declaration of the JVP (Ginipupura Publications, Colombo). 41 | The Political Actors being presented with the idea that this was a varied from the UPFA government. However, the JVP historical perspective on the national question that have consistently maintained that if the LTTE were could potentially be revived, Somawansa to enter the democratic fold its position would Amarasinghe immediately countered that there was radically change. For the same reasons the JVP (like no shift in position. Rather, different ideological the JHU) have also been keen to develop relations currents had always been at work and Bopage's with alternative Tamil political parties such as the ideological influence was ultimately defeated EPDP. Progress was made in this area in May 2004 (having only three votes at the central committee when the JVP and EPDP agreed to embark on a level) once it was put to the democratic test. Such a joint program articulating the need for a solution to perspective reinforces the idea that the JVP's Sinhala the ethnic conflict, setting out their opposition to nationalism is deeply embedded, although the fact the ISGA proposals and the LTTE's claim to be the that Somawansa Amarasinghe is also viewed as one "sole representatives" of the Tamil people.85 While of the chief proponents of the Sinhala nationalist this might suggest that there is room for maneuver position should not be overlooked.83 So, once again, among the JVP on the issue of northern and eastern internal changes in the party leading to policy shifts autonomy, the bond between the JVP and the cannot be entirely ruled out. EPDP is probably more reflective of a mutuality of 6) The JVP and the LTTE--unexplored empathy: interests in opposing the LTTE and of the JVP's One other perspective is that the JVP and the respect for a party that had until very recently acted LTTE share much in common and are in fact as a surrogate armed wing of the Sri Lankan mirror images in relation to the Sri Lankan state. government in the North-East. Additionally, the According to this argument, if a space for JVP have also been keen to establish relations with understanding could be carved out between these Anandasangari since his split with the LTTE, again two actors, the potential for peace could be because they see him as a potential political augmented. Although there is little doubt that alternative. At the same time, it does demonstrate members of the LTTE and elements sympathetic to that changes within the LTTE, could herald a shift the LTTE hold the JVP in a sympathetic light, we in the JVP's attitude towards actors who they might have found little evidence of the reverse at present. perceive as having a legitimate role to play in the While there is an obvious recognition that the peace process. LTTE are an efficient organization,84 there is little 7) International Relations and the JVP: As previously other evidence of admiration on the part of the JVP. stated, the JVP remain hostile to Norwegian This is mainly because the JVP now point to the involvement as mediators in the peace process. This LTTE's lack of democratic accountability and is based largely on the feeling that the Norwegian military structure as the main reason for censure on government is partial to the LTTE and toward the their part. These factors also account for the JVP's ISGA framework. The JVP have alternatively rabid opposition to the Post-Tsunami Operational suggested India as mediators, as Delhi remains Management Structure (P-TOMS) for aid hostile to the creation of a separatist Eelam power distribution signed by the LTTE and the GoSL in base that might destabilize the Indian polity. June 2005--an issue that prompted their departure However, given the obvious lessons of South Asian 83 Cf. authors' interview with UG, March 21, 2005. 84 Cf. author's interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe and Tilvin Silva, March 10, 2005; and with Somawansa Amarasinghe, March 19, 2005. 85 See "JVP-EPDP talks cordial" in Daily News (Colombo), May 25, 2004. The Politics of the South | 42 history, it remains highly unlikely that India would forces such as the MSS, MSV, and DJV organs of the wish to be too closely involved unless the political Indo-Lanka Accord period. Many commentators feel situation in Sri Lanka were to seriously deteriorate that the formation and use of these organizations is a further. Other alternative external actors that might means for separating the use of an ultra-nationalist present opportunities for a potential dialogue with vehicle from the JVP per se (in order to present a secular the JVP are China (as the party tends to maintain non-nationalist face to the world beyond Sri Lanka). As close links with Chinese Communist Party and the PNM is a diasporic organization with branches in upholds China as a paradigm for Sri Lanka's France and the U.K.,87 our perspective is that only an developmental future) and Japan, to which the JVP incredibly naïve observer would not see this connection, sent a diplomatic mission in June 2005. especially considering the pivotal and vocal role played by Wimal Weerawansa, the JVP Communication Secretary. As such the PNM serves two primary THE PATRIOTIC NATIONAL MOVEMENT: AIMS functions for the JVP. First, it enables the JVP to widen AND CONSTITUENTS its reach to figures and groups who might otherwise be reluctant to associate with the JVP because of its violent As the PNM (Deshahithaishi Jathika Vyaparaya) is for all past and a lack of connection on their part with its social intents and purposes a limb of the JVP, a fuller constituency. It also serves to forge political bridges with treatment of this movement will not be required other other political actors and nationalist figures. Second, the than to outline the participants involved and the PNM acts as a vehicle for mobilizing and reinforcing the movement's aims and strategies. The PNM is the latest emotive and affective appeal of Sinhala nationalism at a in a series of political sidecars that the JVP has wider level than simply through the JVP. In this way it mobilized as a vehicle for articulating its nationalist works to try and set a Sinhala nationalist context, project and it is clear that the movement's aims remain platform and agenda for electoral and political struggles, firmly embedded within this nationalist agenda: within which the JVP can thrive and indeed outdo their 1. "To resist any attempt at the division of the country Sinhala nationalist rivals such as the SU/JHU. It is not in the name of devolution of power. To preserve surprising, therefore, that Wimal Weerawansa put down sovereignty of the Nation and the territorial the UPFA's 2004 electoral victory and political integrity of the country. revitalization of the executive to the success of the 2. To resist the neo-colonial economic exploitation PNM.88 that is being carried out by Western powers. To save The PNM initially coalesced in 2002 as a loose, JVP-led our economic resources, our land, rivers and forests organ opposing Ranil Wickremasinghe's peace process from being usurped by foreign powers. and did not officially establish itself until 2003. The 3. To resist the cultural invasion aimed at destroying movement drew on a wide circle of participants from the our National identity and our cultural heritage. To JVP, the MEP, and the SLFP; the clergy; and Sinhala preserve our civilization and culture."86 academics, artists, and intellectuals such as Wimal Weerawansa, Arjuna Ranatunga, Wijedasa Rajapakse, The JVP has a long history of using alternative Elle Gunawansa, Gunadasa Amarasekara and platforms to reach out to a wider socio-political set of Buddhadasa Vithanarachchi. While the aforementioned 86 Cf. http://www.pnmsrilanka.com/aboutus.htm 87 The PNM opened these branches in November 2004, an event that the author observed. 88 "Weerawansa whacks left and right" Daily Mirror (Colombo), October 26, 2004. 43 | The Political Actors are members of the PNM Executive Council, marches OVERVIEW OF THE SIHALA URUMAYA/JATHIKA organized by the movement against the UNF-led peace HELA URUMAYA COMBINE process also attracted the support and participation of political figures like Dinesh Gunawardana of the MEP Although there is a clear overlap between the JHU's and and Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Bandaranaike and the JVP's current ideological platform--the former Dilan Perera of the SLFP. In this respect, the movement espouses a radical Sinhala nationalist program--it is clear served to bring figures from the JVP and the SLFP that there are significant differences between these two closer and therefore may have been of great significance movements. They remain archrivals, and have clear in bringing about the UPFA coalition between the SLFP differences in their social constituency base and political and JVP. While it is perhaps correct to say that the UNP genealogies.91 It is worth tracing some of the historical and SLFP elites have broadly moved away from a background to the emergence of the current Urumaya Sinhala nationalist position, one should also recognize avatar. In doing so, one must examine not only the that movements like the PNM remain attractive vehicles emergence of the Sihala Urumaya itself, but also the for members of the SLFP who remain sympathetic to political milieu out of which some of its leaders nationalist aspirations. It should be understood as well emerged--a context in which the JVP once again plays a that the PNM has also been deployed by the PA/SLFP-- central role. for the normal political practice of undermining the UNP's own attempts to resolve Sri Lanka's conflict and Some of the central figures in the current JHU (namely as an electoral strategy for the resumption of power. This the Venerable Athuraliye Rathana Thera, Champika is clearly evident from the notable drift away from the Ranawaka, and Udaya Gammanpila) were once JVP PNM by PA members in the aftermath of the 2004 organizers,92 and were active during the 1980s agitations electoral victory.89 The PNM has also been part of a against the Indo-Lanka Accord. At that time, Ranawaka closer rapprochement between the JVP and one of the and Rathana were ideologically aligned to both Jathika leading and most influential Sinhala nationalist schools Chintanaya and (as Inter-University Students Federation of thought, Jathika Chintanaya, with Gunadasa leaders) to the JVP. They were also active in the Amarasekara forming a close ideological bond with the Deshapremi Sishya Vyaparaya, the student arm of the movement for the first time.90 As the PNM is radically JVP-led nationalist front, the DJV.93 However, opposed to the devolution of power, it is clear that few if Champika Ranawaka was to play an integral part in a any incentives toward the peace process can be foreseen. split with the JVP over two issues. First, Ranawaka had a Despite this, the movement gives us a powerful sense of dispute with Wijeweera over the JVP's ideological path, the extent to which Sinhala nationalist mobilization has declaring Marxism dead and urging the JVP to become key to the JVP. wholeheartedly embrace nationalism as its central ideological engine--a line Wijeweera refused to countenance.94 Second, the JVP's decision not to 89 Cf authors' interviews with Gunadasa Amarasekara March 17-18, 2005. 90 Ibid. 91 It should be noted that prior to the SU's first participation in an election, the JSS attempted to form a broader SU alliance with the Sinhalaya Mahasammatha Bhumiputra Party or Sinhala Sons of the Soil Party and the JVP without success. 92 Udaya Gammanpila and Champika Ranawaka were JVP members while at school. 93 Cf. authors' interview with UG, Colombo March 21, 2005. 94 Ibid. The Politics of the South | 44 support Mrs. Bandaranaike's candidacy for the 1988 chairman, secretary and national organizer respectively.96 presidential election triggered a final split between the The SU also relied on the political experience and JVP and Jathika Chintanaya and SLFP-aligned unions fundraising capacities of SL Gunasekera, and (Chandraprema, 1991, p. 117). After the split, Karunaratne, both seasoned politicians. The former was Ranawaka and Rathana established the Janatha Mithuro a long-time member of the SLFP, while the latter had ("Friends of the People") organization, which been leader of the nationalist Hela Urumaya faction represented an admixture of environmental lobbying within the SLFP until his 1993 switch to the UNP. with socialist and nationalist politics. However, the Almost immediately the party gained one seat from the deeper plunge into Sinhala nationalist politics only came national list in the 2000 election after polling 127,863 after the dissolution of the Janatha Mithuro and a votes (1.47% of the vote). Although the party suffered drawing together of a number of Sinhala organizations an initial setback in the 2001 election when it lost all its into the National Movement Against Terrorism seats, it recovered in the April 2004 election after a (NMAT) in 1998, led by Champika Ranawaka. Among fusion of the SU and the Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya the organizations were the Jathika Sangha Sabhava or (National Sangha Congress - JSS) led to the adoption of Buddhist Monks Council, which is a cross-nikaya the JHU label. It also benefited by fielding bhikku association, and the Jathika Daham Guru Sabha or candidates in almost every electorate in the country in National Association of Dhamma School Teachers. The the aftermath of the Venerable Soma's death. The JHU NMAT received considerable support from the Sinhala subsequently won 9 seats--three from Colombo District; small-trader business community under the umbrella of two from Gampaha; one from Kalutara and the Kandy the Sinhala Veera Vidhana (Sinhala Heroes Forum - District respectively; and two from the national list.97 In SVV). The SVV promoted a military solution to the doing so, it seemingly secured its place at the heart of Sri ethnic conflict, and mobilized vigorously against the Lanka's political existence. LTTE, the peace process, and minorities.95 On the latter score it was particularly opposed to political parties such as the CWC and policies that were perceived as THE JHU'S SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY beneficial to minorities, such as the Equal Opportunities Bill of 1999. Although many of the JHU parliamentarian monks themselves have rural origins, the JHU/SU combine As a consensus among the mainstream parties grew for must be seen as a primarily urban and suburban the need to formulate a constitutional response to the phenomenon. This is clear from its past and present ethnic conflict, the NMAT and SVV coalition began to electoral constituencies (primarily located in and around sense a political space for a more directly political Colombo), and with symbolic support bases such as the Sinhala nationalist organ--beyond the use of civil society Sri Vajiraghana temple in Maharagama. The latter and lobby groups such as NMAT and the SVV. On remains closely tied to the non-Siyam Amarapura nikaya April 26, 2000 the SU was established. SL Gunasekera, with which (alongside the Rammana nikaya) almost all Tilak Karunaratna and Champika Ranawaka assumed the JHU monks are affiliated. While the JHU may the key positions of the party at the outset, serving as appear on the surface to represent the interests of the 95 For instance, SVV organized a campaign directed against Tamil expansionism in Colombo in 1999 and a march organized by the SVV in June 1999 on this platform ended up in an attack on the CWC office in Colombo. 96 See Mahinda Deegalle (2004) "Politics of the Jathika Hela Urumaya Monks: Buddhism and Ethnicity in Contemporary Sri Lanka," Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 5, No. 2. 97 Ibid. 45 | The Political Actors Sangha in politics, the Sangha itself is obviously driven The Urumaya combine is built upon very middle-class by pre-existing political differences and affiliations. As foundations, with considerable financial and media such the decision to exclusively field monk candidates resources mobilized both in Sri Lanka and among the can be seen as not necessarily an expression of "bhikku diaspora.101 Moreover, its pre-existing political affiliations politics" as a whole but rather as the exploitation of the are closer to the UNP, as is illustrated by Tilak Sinhala Buddhist swing caused by the Venerable Soma's Karunaratne's previous role in the party. In this sense, death in 2003. This nationalist upsurge inspired the lay while the JHU/SU movement stressed the need for the leadership of the SU to stand aside for an exclusive revitalization of a "national economy" built on the candidacy of monks in the April 2004 election. glorious Sinhala past of hydraulic civilization and Additionally, "the JHU monks by and large came into agriculture with a focus on self-sufficiency in food, this prominence outside the hierarchical structures of the quest for economic autarky is not all encompassing and Sangha" as many of them were involved in high profile, has been qualified in the SU manifesto by a relative public and media-driven preaching and rituals and were openness to foreign investment: accustomed to life in comfortable urban contexts, despite their rural origins (Frydenlund, 2005, p. 15). In "We do not see multi-national companies and foreign that sense they were expressive of the dynamics of investors as devils," party secretary Karunaratne told "protestant Buddhism"--of the monk who is active in Aratuwa, a Sinhala business newspaper. "Within this the world to the extent that politics is no longer a globalization, [we] are working confidently with the proscribed area of activity, and in which a far more private sector, and accept the necessity of foreign aggressive but less dependent relationship is forged investment. Although we have accepted that the public between the laity and the Sangha.98 sector and private sector should function at the same level in the economy, we are not of the opinion that the In this sense the JHU is representative of a modern public sector must control industry and business..." Sinhala Buddhist nationalism tied to the spread of print (Senaratne and Jayasekera, 2000). and televisual media. It is also a more aggressive "evangelical" religious dynamic that has been especially While the JHU/SU evidently have a potent tendency prolific among the urban and suburban middle classes toward the re-territorialization of political power as a rather than being expressive of "traditional" Buddhist reaction to the forces of globalization, their perspective values or of the interest of the Sangha as a whole. It is on the revitalization of state power (unlike that of the also clear that the party's membership and support base JVP) is mainly concentrated on the politico-cultural is comprised of Sinhala professionals, intellectuals,99 rather than economic sphere. It is a stance that reflects business community leaders, and members of the armed their solid constituency in the business and professional services.100 This is apparent from the connection between classes and which, despite the elements of small business the JHU and organizations like NMAT and the SVV, as mentality that persevere in the combine, places them well as from the lay figures in the Urumaya combine. close to the UNP's brand of globally connected business 98 See H.L. Seneviratne (1999) The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (University of Chicago); R. Gombrich & G. Obeyesekere (1988) Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.). 99 For example, Professor Piyasena Dissanayaka, Professor C. M. Madduma Bandara, Professor A. D. V. de S. Indraratne, and Dr. Ranjini Ratnapala. 100 For instance at its inception Major General Thilak Paranagama and Lieutenant Colonel Anil Amarasekera were appointed as deputy presidents. 101 This accounts for the SU and the JHU's capacity to mobilize widely and speedily in elections since 2000 and to have fielded 252 monk-candidates in 21 of the country's 22 electoral districts. There have also been allegations that Thilanga Sumathipala, whose family owns a chain of betting shops in Sri Lanka, funded the JHU in the 2004 election and that the party received prominent exposure through the TNL, Maharaja, and Swarnavahini networks. The Politics of the South | 46 interests. It also serves as yet another facet of the and to lobby (like the JVP) for the protection of the enduring relationship between the JHU/SU and the unitary state and Sri Lankan national sovereignty. UNP. Indeed, one extreme interpretation that was reinforced by the "speaker election" incident of 2000 is Unlike the JVP, the SU and the JHU have an apparently that the SU and the JHU are no more than a UNP clear and transparent 12-point program articulating their decoy created to draw voters away from other Sinhala main demands around the central theocratic pillar of the nationalist rivals such as the MEP or the JVP.102 While dharmarajya (righteous state or rule) concept, aimed at this interpretation is extreme, it does articulate the restoring the Buddhasasana (mission of the Buddha) at truism that the JHU is ultimately a UNP constellation. the apex of the Sri Lankan state. We have briefly Bearing this in mind, were the JHU to collapse, condensed the program below: depending on the political context, membership and 1) That Sri Lanka should be a Buddhist state and support would probably be reabsorbed back into the should be ruled according to Buddhist principles UNP. However, considering the JVP's rapid expansion while simultaneously safeguarding the rights of other and the current attempts at constitutional reform and religions and combating "unethical conversions" peace processes pursued by mainstream parties, the 2) Sri Lanka is and should remain a unitary state possibility that these nationalist elements may find an 3) That the national civilizational heritage of the ideological hearth in the JVP cannot be entirely ruled country is that of the Sinhala majority out. 4) That rulers should adopt the universal dharmaraja concept of Asokan rule, which should apply to all THE JHU, SINHALA NATIONALISM AND ethnic groups equally ATTITUDES TO THE "ETHNIC CONFLICT" AND THE 5) That the government should have supervisory and PEACE PROCESS monitoring control over all activities and monetary transactions of NGOs and INGOs in Sri Lanka, The SU and the JHU mobilize primarily on a Sinhala especially in the context of these institutions' use of nationalist platform based on the perceived premise that educational programs for proselytization the southern polity is excessively dominated by minority interests. This assertion is based on the belief that 6) That a decentralized administration (grama rajya minority-based parties such as the TNA and the Hill sankalpaya) should be adopted according to the Country Tamil parties are alleged to have a principle of grama rajya (village rule) and that a disproportionate influence on the proportional electoral devolution of power in the currently proposed system and coalition politics. According to this view, forms are imported concepts the minority and mainstream parties (the SLFP and the 7) That development should be based on the natural UNP) have succumbed to the agenda of the LTTE, habitat, animals, and humanity of Sri Lanka and on Western governments, NGOs, and INGOs. Meanwhile, a Buddhist-oriented national economy that the interests of the majority Sinhala community are empowers local farmers and entrepreneurs sidelined. The party was established to fill a void in the 8) That an educational system suited to Sri Lanka polity and "to represent the silent majority who do not should be developed based on the traditional really have a voice," as one member of the JHU put it,103 102 For instance, MEP leader Dinesh Gunawardana, after having his invitation for the SU to contest under the MEP banner refused, asserted that the SU was only mobilizing on behalf of the UNP. Nalin de Silva has also made similar allegations. See Walter Jayawardhana (2004) "Monks voting with TNA is unacceptable" Asian Tribune, April 24, 2004. 103 Cf. author's interview with UG, Colombo March 21, 2005. 47 | The Political Actors hierarchies of duty and obligation between parent People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).105 and child, teacher and pupil etc. Additionally, the party rejects any proposal for self- 9) That Sri Lanka as the land of dhamma should build determination on the part of Tamils or other minority ties with other Buddhist countries as well as with groups. The reasoning behind this is that the JHU do non-Buddhist neighbors and seek to spread not recognize Tamils as a "national minority" in the Sri Buddhism globally Lankan as opposed to Indian context but as an "ethnic minority," which automatically disqualifies the Tamil 10) That a Buddhist council should be established and struggle for autonomy. Moreover, the JHU has been maintained for the supervision of the Sangha, and pressing for a de-merger of the Northern and Eastern the 1957 and 2002 Buddhist Commissions should Provinces (which were merged subject to a referendum be adopted in 1987) in order to undermine the claim that these are 11) That the moral rights of women and the status of "Tamil Homelands."106 motherhood should be protected 12) That the media should be governed by Consequently, the JHU, like their Sinhala nationalist "independent, free, and ethical principles"104 nemesis, the JVP, remain incontrovertibly hostile to the LTTE, which they perceive as an undemocratic, Consequently, the JHU presently remains embedded in unrepresentative, illegitimate and unaccountable terrorist a characteristically Sinhala nationalist conception of the organization that violates human rights. They also Sri Lankan state--one that is Asokan, unitary, munificent believe that Prabhakaran and the Vanni LTTE remain and protective of the language, religious rights, and opposed to a peaceful solution to the current conflict. agricultural and entrepreneurial foundations of the Alleged evidence to that effect lies in Prabhakaran's Sinhala people. Such a conception inevitably precludes assertion to Anita Pratap107 (and to the world media at the possibility of entertaining (at least in their current the ground-breaking press conference of 2002) that a stance) the viability of meaningful constitutional reform military struggle for the defeat of the Sri Lankan Army or of a federal solution to the current ethnic conflict. In will secure a more legitimate Tamil state and that Eelam fact the JHU does not even recognize an "ethnic still remains the ultimate goal of the LTTE.108 conflict" as such. Instead they assert that the current Furthermore, the JHU (like the JVP) remains hostile to crisis is the result of an upper-middle class failure among the ISGA framework for peace talks, stating that it is Tamil political leaders in Sri Lanka (and among the merely an attempt to turn a de facto LTTE-led Tamil diaspora) to retreat from a colonially privileged position. nation-state into a de jure state.109 The JHU also feel that They also argue that the LTTE, with the aid of "peace- the GoSL has not exploited to the fullest the lobbying NGOs," maintain their dominance over the opportunity presented by the LTTE split, arguing it Tamil populace through coercion and the suppression of served as an occasion to destroy the Vanni LTTE in the democratic alternatives such as the EPDP and Eelam East. 104 See Mahinda Deegalle (2004) "Politics of the Jathika Hela Urumaya Monks: Buddhism and Ethnicity in Contemporary Sri Lanka," Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 81-2. 105 Cf. authors' interview with UG, Colombo March 21, 2005. 106 This became one of the conditionalities along with the abandonment of the principle of autonomy for an unfulfilled JHU's participation in the UPFA. 107 See A. Pratap (2001) Island of Blood: Frontline Reports from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan & Other South Asian Flashpoints (Penguin, New York). 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. The Politics of the South | 48 The JHU also appear to remain as hostile to NGOs and late 2003 in the aftermath of the death of the Venerable international actors as the JVP. As demonstrated by their Gangodavila Soma, a popular Buddhist preacher and "Twelve Point Programme," the transgression of bhikku who was able to reach a wide audience through sovereignty by such actors remains as high on the JHU the electronic media and his uncompromising agenda as on that of the JVP--despite a history of castigation of the generally corrupt state of politics in hostility and mutual infiltration between these two the South. Soma also preached vociferously against Sinhala nationalist actors. In this regard, it should be Christian churches and NGOs, seeing them as "the noted that the JHU feel that they have successfully used instruments of a diabolical conspiracy by Christian the promotion of a radical Sinhala nationalist agenda to powers to convert and corrupt the Sinhalese Buddhist push the JVP to articulate an even more hostile line to public."111 This upsurge also emerged at a time of ISGA and a federal solution than would otherwise have financial hardship and rising prices in the country been the case. While there is a profound academic alongside the destabilizing dynamics and uncertainty of debate beyond the scope of this report as to the extent of a stalled peace process in which the UNF government Sinhala nationalist hegemony in the South as a whole,110 was unable to capitalize on the vision of the 2002 it is nonetheless clear that a number of political, CFA.112 All these factors may well have combined to economic and socio-cultural factors can coalesce to produce the potency of the sudden nationalist turn and produce significant pendulum swings toward a Sinhala expressions of dissatisfaction with the UNF government. Buddhist upsurge. It must be recognized that these Much of this lay in their perceived failure to engage in features of the Sri Lankan polity are not static but part consultation with the people or the president over the of a highly dynamic and variable phenomenon. nature of the proposals for interim administration in the North-East. Indeed, it became not uncommon for Ranil Although the JHU have contributed to a rightward shift Wickremasinghe to be depicted in the media as more within the JVP and the southern polity as a whole, our sympathetic to the cause of Tamil Eelam than to the opinion is that the JHU as it currently stands is no concerns of the southern electorate. He was portrayed as longer as significant a long-term potential spoiler of the a leader who had handed the interests and control of the peace process as it may have seemed in April 2004 when country's future to INGOs and powerful donor states it won nine seats in the election. Our reasons for this pressuring for a solution to the ethnic conflict, and as assessment will be expanded upon below. the helmsman of a government that had done little for development and growth in the South outside of a narrow elite section of the Colombo-centric business THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JHU AS A SINHALA community. NATIONALIST ORGAN In this more turbulent situation, a series of attacks on The JHU fielded bhikku candidates in the 2004 election Christian churches immediately followed Soma's death in the context of a sudden upsurge of Sinhala Buddhist in December 2003. They continued well into the 2004 nationalist passions. This nationalism had emerged in period resulting in at least 170 recorded acts of violence 110 Again the CPA Social Indicators survey remains of use in this respect as it clearly demonstrates the existence of significant opposition to the peace process in the South. See Centre for Policy Alternatives (2004) Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices Survey on the Sri Lankan Peace Process (KAPS) (CPA, Colombo). What such empirical studies cannot gauge is the extent to which political leadership can swiftly produce a counter-hegemonic position to the claim that the South is Sinhala nationalist in orientation. 111 See "Sri Lankan president warns against anti-Christian violence," Christian Solidarity Worldwide, January 19, 2004 (www.csw.org.uk). 112 See J. Uyangoda (2005) "Where have we gone? Three years after the Ceasefire Agreement" Daily Mirror (Colombo), March 18, 2005. 49 | The Political Actors against Christian churches.113 NGOs (such as World influence and future electoral prospects considerably Vision) were also targeted with anti-Christian posters, more tenuous than a year ago. Among the setbacks was slogans, and acts of violence. The JHU/SU combine the split suffered by the SU in October 2000 on the obviously attempted to make the most of its links with question of who should take up their single Venerable Soma, which were formally established parliamentary seat won in that year's election. A faction through the Maharagama Temple connection, and the led by Ranawaka and the NMAT sought to remove the affiliation of his Jana Vijaya Foundation with the SU in party chairman, SL Gunasekera, from his unanimous 2002. To this extent they have even claimed his support nomination to the seat by the SU's central committee. from beyond the grave. Indeed, it is the SU who Ranawaka blamed Gunasekera for the poor showing in contributed massively to the continued fanning of anti- the elections and accused him of lacking nationalist Christian flames, passions, and violence and who were authenticity; casting aspersions on his religious views (or instrumental in the campaign for the tabling of an "anti- lack of them), his consumption of alcohol, and his conversion bill" in 2004 that was in the end ruled alleged use of English over Sinhala.115 This led to the unconstitutional.114 departure of a more restrained variety of Sinhala nationalism championed by the SL Gunasekera faction. However, the JHU influence on the political process has In its place, the right wing of an already ultra-nationalist been such that the minister for Buddha Sasana, Ratnasiri organ began to assert control over the Urumaya Wickremanayake, also tabled a government anti- movement. conversion bill, the "Act of Safeguarding Religious Freedom." Ironically, this bill is viewed as even more The JHU were also beset by scandal when two dissident stringent than its predecessor, with potential penalties of JHU monks, Aparekke Pannanada Thera and Kathaluwe up to five years imprisonment or a Rs. 100,000 fine for Rathanaseeha Thera, resigned from the party in close "unethical" conversion offences. Penalties increase to succession. They accused the party of corruption and seven years imprisonment and a Rs. 500,000 fine in the bribery and continue to criticize the party for falling case of minors. Evidently, both bills were targeting the into the trap of SU manipulation. The monks then perceived inducement to conversion of poorer Buddhist mysteriously disappeared immediately prior to the communities by Christian evangelical organizations and election of the parliamentary speaker and then emerged NGOs. A law that potentially contravenes human rights to vote with the government for DEW Gunasekara (CP articles on freedom of religion may consequently and UPFA) as speaker. This prompted the JHU to cast seriously affect relief and reconstruction efforts on the the two decisive votes, alongside the UNF and the TNA, part of Christian aid groups and charities in Sri Lanka, for a UNP-affiliated candidate, WJM Lokubandara. It and could also augment rather than diminish religious was a move that was perceived, particularly among strife in the country. fellow nationalists, as contrary to the electoral will of the country and to the supposed principles of the JHU. In Despite the continuing impact of the JHU on the Sri doing so it rekindled suspicions that elements within the Lankan political landscape, the Urumaya combine has party still seemed to uphold UNP interests. These suffered a series of setbacks and scandals since its events led to a series of attacks on JHU-affiliated inception. This has rendered the JHU's current political temples in the South and are perceived to have widely 113 Source: National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka. 114 The JHU's "Prohibition of Forcible Conversions of Religions Bill" was tabled in July 2004, but was judged unconstitutional as it breached articles protecting freedom of religious expression. 115 See http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/dec2000/sri-d04.shtml The Politics of the South | 50 discredited JHU claims that it was acting above the JHU could have a political resurrection. As such, it is political fray and in the general national interest. worth considering the potential incentives there may be Furthermore, defections from the JHU/SU combine for the JHU in regards to the peace process. have continued with both Thilak Karunaratne returning to the UNP fold and Gampaha District MP, Kolonnawe Sumanagala Thera, announcing his resignation from INCENTIVES FOR THE JHU/SIHALA URUMAYA AS party politics in October 2004. One interpretation of A PEACE STAKEHOLDER these continuing splits in the party is that they represent 1) It is clear that the JHU/SU and their satellite a political divide between the lay leadership of organizations have taken on a consistently negative Champika Ranawaka and the bhikku legislators in the role vis-à-vis the issues of minorities, the peace party. process, prospect of a federal solution, and ISGA. They have also proved hostile to recognizing the Consequently, the JHU is deemed to have been widely LTTE as a legitimate actor and repeatedly attack discredited in both political circles and among the wider and marginalize ethnic and religious minorities and public. They are also seen to have brought the their political representatives, including Sri Lankan controversial image of bhikkus in politics into sharp and Hill Country Tamils, Muslims, and Christians. disrepute. This may suggest several things--including As the JHU clearly seeks to control and challenge that the JHU's long-term prospects have been seriously the activities of INGOs, NGOs, international and undermined, that the Urumaya organ therefore no inter-governmental actors, and foreign mediators longer poses as serious a threat as spoiler to the peace (such as Norway), it is clear that they remain a process, or that support for the movement may swing highly antagonistic force and a potentially serious back to the UNP or even to the JVP. Nonetheless, it is obstacle as far as the aid community is concerned. possible that the Urumaya elements may regroup and This movement has consistently vied for a military reassert their influence on the political landscape in a solution, making it (alongside the JVP) opposed to revitalized and novel shape. The possibility of an the peace process in its current form. While it must Urumaya revival received a considerable boost in the be stated that the JVP are a more significant recent negotiation and signing of the P-TOMS political actor and thus potential opponent to the agreement between the GoSL and the president. The peace process, the JHU/SU's capacity to wield a JHU along with the JVP were at the forefront of disproportionate influence on the political protests and mobilizations against the aid mechanism, landscape should not be underestimated. It can be including high-profile fasts-unto-death by Athuraliye reasonably argued that the JHU have also pushed Rathana Thera and Omalpe Sobhita Thera of the JHU the JVP itself in a more Sinhala nationalist direction and four other monks. There have also been rumors with the latter party seeking to mobilize the Sinhala circulating in the press that the JHU has been engaging nationalist block in competition with the former. in negotiations with the JVP regarding the formation of 2) Having said that, the JHU/SU have differences with a coalition and the fielding of a common presidential the JVP. Considering the refractory nature of candidate. Such a possibility, however, has been swiftly JHU/SU's stance, they are ironically endowed with dismissed by the JVP who are more likely to seek a greater transparency of aims and potential for political partnerships with the Muslim parties and the dialogue than the JVP. The JHU/SU have always MEP.116 However, the current Sinhala nationalist promoted their ideas in a clear and accessible way upswing once again poses at least the possibility that the 116 See, for instance, Namini Wijedasa (2005) "JVP rules out deal with JHU" Sunday Island (Colombo), July 3, 2005. 51 | The Political Actors and (unlike the JVP) do not deny, disguise, or 3) What is also clear from discussions with the JHU is attempt to dilute their Sinhala nationalist discourse that there is some history and continuing dialogue through recourse to the homogenizing rhetoric of between the JHU/SU combine and political pseudo-Marxist platitudes about universal man. In alternatives to the LTTE. While groups like the this respect, when donors confront the spectra of EPDP and the EPRLF may be regarded as the JHU/SU combine, there can be a clear paramilitary arms of the Sri Lankan state perspective of where the movement lies in relation (including by many donors and NGOs),118 since to a viable peace process. Some of this may have to the CFA it is claimed that these groups have been do with the broader cultural horizons of a movement disarmed and represent an alternative to the LTTE. that is to a great extent related to the Sinhala diaspora They have claimed a willingness to engage in the and has greater access to the English media--in spite electoral process and in a dialogue with JHU of its small world nationalist pretensions. While we members. As a leadership-level representative of the are not for a minute suggesting that these cultural JHU put it: horizons moderate the exclusionary potency of "long- "I have a very close rapport with the alternative distance" nationalism, the ability to enjoin and Tamil groups. Recently at an EPDP workshop I mount a dialogue is clearly there. This is not a far- said, 'Convince me your struggle for federalism is fetched view. A study on the role of the Sangha in the correct.' I have been supporting EPRLF since my peace process indicated that even nationalist monks school days. I was a strong Leftist in my schooldays. have, at times, been susceptible to ideological I was supporting Eelam and EPRLF."119 movement on the peace process (Frydenlund, 2005, Though such a stance does not preclude the p. 30). This is also echoed by the words of a senior possibility of a dialogue about autonomy for the JHU representative: North-East with non-LTTE groups, at the same "We, the JHU, are willing to change our stand if time it makes the possibility of the JHU/SU somebody proves us wrong. The day that we are engaging in a dialogue with the LTTE highly convinced or proved that we are wrong, we are improbable. willing to change our stand… We are not 4) As mentioned above, it should be clearly recognized supporting the Sinhala cause just because we are that the JHU/SU dynamic has been ebbing over the Sinhalese in a very tribal way. We are supporting it last year, as has the context for its initial potency. It because we think it is the correct perspective and if is clear that over the past year, influential figures somebody convinces us that it is wrong, we will associated with the JHU/SU movement have left in accept that. We strongly believe that we must crush considerable numbers. Due to its increased lack of the LTTE. That is the true liberation for Tamils, political influence it may, therefore, be more apt to true independence for the entire country."117 describe the JHU as an organization that will be Nevertheless, it is clear from the same quote that more effectively isolated than accommodated in any the JHU/SU see the LTTE as one among a meaningful peace process. Nevertheless, it is contending range of arch adversaries and this has perfectly possible that, as the implementation of a serious implications for a peace process in which the joint aid mechanism and the peace process is rolled LTTE play a leading role. 117 Cf. interview with UG, Colombo March 21, 2005. 118 See UTHR (2004) 15 Years After Rajani: The Continuing Cost of Dissent (UTHR, Colombo). 119 Cf. interview with UG, Colombo March 21, 2005. The Politics of the South | 52 forward, the Urumaya combine may attempt to between kingship and righteous rule; and engender an forge closer links with the elements that oppose attachment to the unitary state and, of course, a rabid these aims--including ironically those minority hostility to any project of devolutionary constitutional parties that the Urumaya have frequently attacked.120 reform. It might be assumed from this that the JHU/SU As stated above, the vicissitudes of Sinhala and Jathika Chintanaya have a natural ideological nationalism show that the pendulum can swing proximity and it is indeed clear that after Champika swiftly; and that the potential for a grass-roots Ranawaka and Athuraliye Rathana Thera left the JVP, mobilization of Sinhala nationalist opinion has not they aligned themselves for a time with the Jathika completely dissipated among the JHU/SU's social Chintana Parshadaya.122 However, the relationship soured constituency; and, therefore, the social context for over disagreements on long-term Sinhala nationalist donors must be seriously considered before strategy and Nalin de Silva has since remained hostile to completely writing off such dynamics and their the JHU/SU. This recently led to accusations of UNP potential for regeneration. subterfuge in the strategies of the party. It is interesting to note for the purposes of this report JATHIKA CHINTANAYA: AIMS AND STRATEGIES that for most of the 1980s both Nalin de Silva and FOR SINHALA NATIONALISM Gunadasa Amarasekera remained critical of the JVP-- despite the party's frequent appeal to Sinhala nationalist As Jathika Chintanaya is not precisely a political discontent and interpretations of support association but more a school of thought led by two (Chandraprema, 1991, pp.110-117). For the proponents intellectuals--author Gunadasa Amarasekara and Nalin of Jathika Chintanaya, the JVP's revolutionary Marxism de Silva, who heads the think-tank Jathika Chintana was also a Western dilution of the true potential for Parshadaya--this section will remain very brief. Sinhala civilizational consciousness. However, while Nonetheless, we will outline the central alignments Nalin de Silva still refuses to shift completely on the between the ideological program and political actors we question of the third generation of the JVP (again have discussed because the movement has a profound censuring the party for their continued adherence to influence on both cultural and political facets of Sinhala Marxism), over the last three years Gunadasa nationalism. The term Jathika Chinatanaya was first Amarasekara has been eager to hitch the Jathika coined in Gunadasa Amarasekara's Sinhala journalistic Chintanaya bandwagon to the JVP.123 For Amarasekara, articles in the 1980s and is best translated as the mainstream parties no longer have any nationalist "civilizational" or "national consciousness." It refers to a dynamics and the JVP, with Weerawansa at the program of regeneration of traditional Buddhist social ideological helm, has taken up the Sinhala nationalist and political values as a bulwark against the perceived cause to potent effect. Such a turnaround is notable, as socio-culturally deleterious impact of capitalist and it has formed a vital political bridge between an older Western influences.121 Such conceptions once again serve and more established generation of Sinhala nationalism to reproduce Sinhala Buddhist nationalist associations and the JVP's youthful "patriotic" cohorts. It also 120 In April 2005, the JHU invited the JVP and all political parties who were against the Joint Mechanism to join forces. See "JHU to join JVP against the joint mechanism" Daily Mirror (Colombo), April 26, 2005. UPFA Cabinet Minister, Ferial Ashraff's National Unity Alliance also voiced objection to the "joint mechanism." 121 Cf authors' interviews with Gunadasa Amarasekara March 17-18, 2005. 122 Cf. authors' interview with UG, March 21, 2005. 123 Ibid and cf. author's interview with Gunadasa Amarasekara, 2002. 53 | The Political Actors confirms the authors' interpretation that the JVP party fell into a momentary decline after Kader, remains the most significant contemporary Sinhala Tharmaligham, and Chandrasekaran were detained for nationalist actor and that its nationalism is deeply allegedly harboring Varathan who was accused of ideologically embedded. It is also clearly taking up the bombing the Joint Operational Command in Colombo. baton of Sinhala nationalism increasingly discarded by the mainstream parties due to their general consensus on Nonetheless, in 1993 Chandrasekaran became the first the need for a devolutionary solution. For these reasons provincial councilor to win a seat while still in also, the JVP remains the most significant opponent to detention. In the 1994 general election, he worked the current frameworks for the peace process. alongside the PA, won a seat, and became minister for estate housing until his resignation in the course of the term. The UPF then became active members of the OVERVIEW OF THE UPCOUNTRY PEOPLE'S FRONT UNF alliance in 2001 and though Chandrasekaran became minister of social development he earned The UPF is a small but not insignificant Hill Country disapprobation in some circles by being the first Tamil political party that emerged as a splinter group minister to publicly engage in a Pongu Thamil address from the CWC, the leading political organization in 2003. Since the UPFA came to power, the UPF representing the interests of the "Upcountry" Tamils. have maintained their political alignment with the The UPF emerged in 1989 when Periyasamy UNF, lobbied vocally for a resumption of peace Chandrasekaran, a CWC organizer, Urban Council negotiations, and continue to maintain close relations representative and energetic social activist became with the LTTE. disillusioned with the CWC's failure to nominate him for the provincial council elections of 1988 and the general elections of 1989. In founding the party, ORGANIZATION AND CONSTITUENCY BASE Chandrasekaran joined forces with Kader (an Upcountry Marxist intellectual and former activist in the Ceylon The CWC and the UPF have broadly similar roots in Teacher's Union), Tharmalingham (a school principal), that they operate out of similar Upcountry Tamil and a group of activists who had previously been constituencies and remain heavily dependent on union connected to the Gamini Yapa group and the Upcountry activities for funding, training, organizational dynamics, Mass Organization.124 The party was initially unable to and international linkages. Indeed, despite the massive register independently and therefore ran in the 1989 decline in union membership in recent years it is widely elections under the anchor symbol of the People’s recognized that any political force seeking to mobilize Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) with the Upcountry vote will not succeed without also laying Umamaheswaran's blessing. While they failed to capture down what is termed as the twin "tracks" of Hill a seat, the UPF nonetheless managed to amass 10,000 Country "railway politics."125 Although the UPF first votes in their debut general election. They also began as a political party rather than a union, it soon succeeded in splitting the Upcountry vote in the district recognized the essential necessity of forming the so the CWC also failed to obtain a seat. After capturing Upcountry Workers' Front-- the second-largest estate three seats in the local government elections in 1991, the union with an estimated 45,000 members and 100 full- 124 Cf. authors' interview with Lawrence, March 20, 2005. For further background, see also UTHR Bulletin No.4 "Sullen Hills: the Saga of Up Country Tamils," (January, 1993). 125 Cf. authors' interview with Lawrence, March 20, 2005, and P.P. Devaraj, March 15, 2005. The Politics of the South | 54 time union workers,126 many of whom received their beyond the desire for holding ministerial portfolios and training within the CWC.127 In terms of social bargaining for access to equal citizenship entitlement, constituency, the Upcountry people must be socio- employment, and development projects from the economically differentiated. There is a significant, electorally dominant parties or coalitions. Nonetheless, socially mobile, and growing urban and trading class of since the CWC entered electoral politics in 1977129 it has the Upcountry populace in both Colombo and in the become renowned for its political opportunism and towns of the Central Province. However, the majority of capacity to work with either of the two mainstream Upcountry Tamils are still employed on the estates parties. As a result it plays a significant role in coalition- despite the fact that there is an increasing trend for making and breaking,130 and can effect clear differences younger generations to shun estate work and the social of emphasis and nuances in the approach of these two stigma that accompanies it. Where possible, people parties--especially with regards to Tamil identity and the prefer to move out of the estate sector. In this sense, peace process. Indeed, what is clear is that the UPF's despite their slowly increasing mobility and social stance on the national question has, to some degree, differentiation, both the CWC and the UPF still have departed from that found in the genealogy of both their their organizational roots in the estates where the left-wing and CWC roots. This is evident in the fact depressed state of Upcountry Tamils is most that they have, at least rhetorically, discarded the concentrated and evident. This is so despite their reductionist Marxist economic platitudes that assert that recognition that the socio-economic conditions and economic change with other proletarian forces should be political rights of all Upcountry Tamils need improving-- the primary objective of Upcountry Tamil people. They whether they are living in the Hill Country areas, have also modified their approach to the national Colombo, or the North-East. question in the aftermath of the successive targeting of Upcountry Tamils by Sinhala chauvinist violence in 1977, 1981, and 1983. More recent examples of ethnic THE UPF, CWC, UPCOUNTRY TAMIL violence, including attacks orchestrated by the NATIONALISM AND THE PEACE PROCESS NMAT/SVV combine in 1998 and the aftermath of the Bindunuwewa massacre in 2000, have also influenced Some informed critics view the UPF and the CWC in their change in position. For the UPF then, the the same light, as parties whose central concerns problems of the Upcountry Tamil constituency are no remained tied to "immediate political objectives." Their longer to be contained within a "citizenship" paradigm. actions are also considered a form of political As a result, the leadership base of the party took up a "bargaining" that "fits in very well with the current state more militantly Upcountry Tamil nationalist platform of politics in Sri Lanka." The present leadership, after having forged links with the Eelam Revolutionary however, is criticized for "not having a long-term vision Organisation of Students, EPRLF, and PLOTE in the and is not capable of developing a long-term vision"128 late 1980s. 126 Cf. authors' interview with Lawrence, March 20, 2005. 127 Cf. authors' interview with P.P. Devaraj, March 15, 2005. 128 Ibid. 129 Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman had been a government-nominated representative for the CWC since the 1960s but it was only in 1977 that he won on an election ticket. 130 It should be noted that the CWC briefly walked out of the present UPFA coalition in late February 2005, over reported disagreements over the Upper Kotmale Dam project and a series of other conditions that had sealed their participation in the coalition. 55 | The Political Actors The essential difference between the UPF and the CWC Upcountry devolution when constitutional reform is is that they no longer claim to see the citizenship issue seriously discussed.133 and the gradual equalizing of status to be the main aim of an Upcountry Tamil political party. They have The emergence of a deeper LTTE/Upcountry nexus has instead opted to emphasize that their suffering at the not surprisingly triggered criticism from Sinhala hands of Sinhala chauvinism--as well as their long-term nationalist quarters that are eager to read into it an educational, employment, infrastructural, cultural, LTTE infiltration of the Hill Country districts. It has political, and developmental deprivations--can only be also brought about condemnation from Arumugam answered through recourse to a federal or devolutionary Thondaman who accuses the UPF of over-extending its restructuring of power. In this, the UPF operate a dual connections and support to the LTTE. He asserts that strategy of clearly demarcating and differentiating the the UPF are losing sight of the separate issues at stake needs, identity, and rights of the Upcountry Tamils from and of potentially subjugating Upcountry Tamil interests those of the Northern and Eastern Tamils. At the same to the will of Prabhakaran. In response, the UPF have time they actively forge links with and support the stated that the relationship is not so much a case of struggle for autonomy articulated by the Vanni LTTE. instrumental design but a result of a gradual evolution In the eyes of the UPF, the essential demand and due to the rising numbers of Upcountry Tamils in areas solution for the Upcountry Tamils (as well as the LTTE) of the North-East such as the Vanni. This happened is for territorial devolution and the carving out of a subsequent to the forced migrations and colonizations "devolutionary unit." The UPF has published this that took place after the land reforms and food crisis of proposal in its manifesto commitments, presented the 1973-1974; and then the series of anti-Tamil pogroms idea to the Parliamentary Select Committees on of 1977, 1981, and 1983, which seriously affected the Devolution and responded to the gathering of Hill Country districts.134 It is also evident that suggestions for constitutional reform in 1994. On all Northeastern Tamils are also present in the Hill Country occasions, according to the UPF, it failed to produce any in sizeable numbers, with 41,445 "Sri Lankan Tamils" notable response other than a deep reluctance on the residing in Nuwara Eliya alone.135 According to the UPF, part of the GoSL to introduce yet another dimension although the Upcountry Tamils are a separate national that might be perceived as a potential source of ethnic community, a bond has been developing between the fragmentation/balkanization within the Sri Lankan communities because of this increasing interpenetration polity.131 It was also touted that should the territorial of the communities, their shared Tamil speaking devolution unit prove impractical, the UPF would background and experience of oppression. The UPF- explore the possibility of Pondicherry-style enclaves.132 LTTE nexus is expressive of these dynamics.136 The party also indicated that their commitment to Yet while Thondaman has condemned the UPF's forging a bond with the LTTE is based on the latter's proximity to the LTTE, the CWC has also long forged pledge to lobby on behalf of the UPF proposal for connections with Tamil militant groups, attempted to 131 Cf. authors' interview with Lawrence, March 20, 2005. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 See for example, Oddvar Hollup (1992) "Ethnic Identity, Violence and the Estate Tamil Minority in Sri Lanka," Round Table, No. 323, July 1992. 135 Sri Lanka Census of Population and Housing, 2001 (Government of Sri Lanka, 2004). 136 Cf. authors' interview with Lawrence, March 20, 2005. The Politics of the South | 56 appease Prabhakaran, and supported the LTTE's ISGA from making in-roads into the Hill Country. It therefore framework for the peace process. Indeed the pursuit of remains to be seen if the UPF will contribute to a more ISGA became one of the publicly pronounced potent politics of nationalist affect in the Upcountry conditions for the CWC's entry into the UPFA coalition Tamil constituencies or whether, as with the CWC, the in September 2004. Indeed, since the 1980s the CWC party is based on the patronage networks and political have regularly made loud noises in support of an bargaining that has hitherto characterized the CWC. On autonomous region in the North-East without allowing the latter score some commentators have interpreted the this stance to affect its immediate political interests and historical trajectory of Estate Tamil politics as a simple decisions. Although the CWC was one of the principal substitution of the union for the kangani system. actors involved in the Vaddukodai Declaration of 1976, Nonetheless, having finally overcome the first legacy of it is quite clear that the CWC went its own way in the the historical hurdles left by the disenfranchisement of aftermath of the declaration, partly due to its newfound the citizenship acts of 1948 and 1949,138 Upcountry place in electoral politics. Bearing in mind the influence Tamils now form a significant voting block within a that the LTTE has come to wield over the TNA, the number of electoral districts. As a result they have even CWC is thus concerned with protecting the autonomy greater political prominence than simply Thondaman's of its power base from the potential encroachment and capacity to act as political kingmaker, and therefore their suzerainty of Prabhakaran. The CWC also feels role in relation to the peace process will become ambivalence about the prospect of constitutional and increasingly significant. electoral reforms. Minority parties currently benefit under the proportional and presidential system and may, therefore, lose out under currently proposed changes. INCENTIVES FOR THE PEACE PROCESS India's interest in keeping the LTTE, ISGA, and the UNF at bay may also have influenced the CWC's While the CWC is locked into the status quo as far as the current political tactics.137 peace process goes, the UPF is willing to entertain the ISGA framework for negotiations, with the understanding It is also clear that the influence of the Tamil media, the that the LTTE will bring its request for a devolutionary history of conjoined suffering, the interaction between unit for the Upcountry Tamils onto the agenda for the different Tamil communities, and the restlessness of constitutional reform. In this respect the UPF offer little a younger generation of Upcountry Tamils have all in terms of potential obstacles to the recommencement of played their part in producing an empathy with the peace talks on the basis of continuity with the UNF LTTE among the constituency base of the Upcountry regime. In fact Chandrasekaran himself attempted, Tamils. This has played a major part in both the unsuccessfully, to bring Weerawansa and the JVP to the rhetorical strategies of the CWC and the more deep- table with the LTTE in 2004 on the basis of ISGA. seated alliance of the UPF. The latter appear to be Consequently, the UPF had been willing to take asserting a more potent support for a devolutionary initiatives with the UPFA in order to revive the peace solution and leaning toward a stronger relationship with process, despite remaining aligned with the UNF. The the LTTE and the UNP coalition. Yet support for UPF's peace strategy presently remains unproblematic, a autonomy in the North-East by both the UPF and the factor that may swiftly change if Upcountry Tamil issues CWC can also be interpreted as an attempt to steal the are not mooted when frameworks for constitutional thunder of Tamil nationalism and prevent the LTTE change are seriously discussed. 137 See Tissaranee Gunasekera (2004) "The Importance of Being Thondaman" Asian Tribune, December 9, 2004. 138 See Amita Shastri (1999) "Estate Tamils, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 and Sri Lankan Politics" Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 8, No.1, pp.65-86. 57 | Conclusion 3. Conclusion From the foregoing analysis, it is clear the mainstream unevenly due to the rapid circulation of modern parties (the SLFP/PA and UNP/UNF) have shifted on communication, capital, and socio-cultural flows. This the whole toward a common platform that recognizes can often lead to potent nationalist reactions seeking to the need for consociational constitutional reform and re-territorialize these flows politically, socially, culturally, the negotiation of a peace process on the basis of and sometimes economically in order to reassert control autonomy for the North-East. This consensus has come over what is essentially a very disorganized phase of late about despite the fact that attempts to implement such a capitalism. Accordingly, globalization may "produce solution by each party have been frequently derailed by strong political reactions asserting the normative the opposition benches. Although this shift has authority of the local and the national over the global occurred at the level of political leadership and among and the international" (Ong, 1999), which a more statist wide sections of Sri Lanka's elite, it does not in any way approach was once more able to, if not resolve, then at signify that Sinhala nationalist majoritarianism is in the least contain. process of finally being effaced from its long hegemonic sojourn in the southern polity. The dynamics behind Additionally, because disparities are exacerbated within this perseverance are complex but for the sake of "given" national spaces, cosmopolitanism may swiftly understanding we can break them down into a four-fold, become a cultural marker for the elite, just as nationalist overlapping schema. cultural authenticity often plays a similar role for subaltern groups. This is especially true if they are First, decades of potent socialization through familial, ghettoized within the socio-cultural vernacular or religious, educational, and media practices have resulted economically operative frameworks that the elites are in a Sinhala Buddhist nationalist hegemony that spans the keen to reinforce upon everyone but themselves. It is for political, socio-economic and cultural landscape of Sri this reason that we argue, with Tom Nairn, that much of Lanka. It has resulted in these practices and apparatuses the thrust of nationalism comes increasingly (but not being reproduced and deeply permeating wide levels of exclusively) from the "marchlands and the society, especially the vernacular strata. The Knowledge, countryside."139 As nationalism frequently emerges with Attitudes, Practices Survey on the Sri Lankan Peace overt force from the margins and peripheries in a global, Process attests to this, and while we are not suggesting national, and local sense, explanations of this that this vision of the world goes uncontested or that it is phenomenon cannot simply be reduced to economic structurally rigid or static, our view is that it ebbs and factors. While the differing constituencies of the flows in reaction to events, as one would expect. In that JHU/SU and the JVP attest to this, it is unmistakable sense Sinhala nationalism is still in the room of Sri that the JVP's more potent political presence and Lanka's political house and like an unwanted guest is also reproduction of this Sinhala nationalist seam has keeping long and unsocial hours. emanated from a profound socio-economic and politico- cultural disarticulation within Sri Lanka. This Second, it is clear that the increasingly globalized world disarticulation is operative through class, caste, cultural, operates to break up nationalist space very suddenly and linguistic, center/periphery, and mass/elite differences 139 See T. Nairn (1975) "The Modern Janus," New Left Review, Vol.1, No. 94, pp. 3-29 & T. Nairn (1998) Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited (Verso, London). The Politics of the South | 58 and disparities in which the JVP has positioned itself as dynamics of the JHU and, more significantly, through a more "authentic" nationalist voice because of its the JVP. There is, as it stands, no current scheme for traditionally marginalized power base. In a situation in alleviating the kinds of inequality and poverty which elites have shifted their general position on the (infrastructural, socio-economic, political, and cultural) peace process, the JVP have served to crowd the that feed into the JVP. As such, mainstream parties nationalist stage--their "moral" and "sovereign high (especially the SLFP) face a future of diminishing ground." This has been done in a context in which electoral returns as long as they maintain their poor donor states, lending institutions, NGOs, and the flows record of democratic standards, accountability, and of global capital and cultural currents have all increased respect for moving developmental priorities beyond the their influence within Sri Lanka, thereby deepening the Colombo-centric and elitist patron-heavy networks that perceived transgression of the country's sovereignty. exist at present. In the current context the JVP will expand and, if past experience is anything to go by, In this landscape a division has opened up between the prove a worthier representative of most of its political project of the "cosmopolitan" elites who are constituents than has been the case with mainstream attempting to move the political scene toward a federal parties. At the same time, as traditional holders of or devolved solution and social forces within the South, government, the mainstream parties will fight tooth and socialized into the ideological hearth of Sinhala nail to keep their constituencies; and, unless there is a nationalism, who see this as a step toward the radical change, may continue to rely on the corruption disintegration of Sri Lanka. As a result of the and violent intimidation typical of patronage-based disarticulation and failure to overcome the politics in the past. Similarly, there are concerns that aforementioned disparities, a potent bridge has been mainstream parties may resort once again to more created between uneven development, poverty, and extreme nationalist mobilizations to compete with their socio-political and cultural marginalization in the South more overtly nationalist counterparts. This can lead to and nationalist dynamics. In the case of the JVP at least, cycles in which, for instance, bold attempts to rush it continues to sustain the party's grassroots support and through peace and constitutional reform packages expanding power base. This is not to say that the JVP without sufficient social inclusivity, participation, and are absolutely inimical to peace in Sri Lanka but that consultation may continue to be undone by opposition their vision, along with that of the JHU, is presently from an admixture of the opposing mainstream party trapped within the "integrative, evolutionary" scheme and/or the nationalist parties. In this context, that denies "difference" and attempts to challenge the mainstream political actors often become willing parties problems of Sinhala majoritarianism from within that to further rounds of ethnic-outbidding and zero-sum power structure (Ghosh, 2003, pp. 23-34). It is a stance politics. We have already seen this in the graveyard of that has proved consistently fruitless and ultimately the Constitutional Bill of 2000, the post-CFA reinforces majoritarian dominance. negotiations of the UNF in the 2002-2004 period, and the UNP's refusal to entertain the idea of a national Third, while we have argued that the baton of UNP/PA government after the departure of the JVP in nationalism has been passed from the mainstream parties June 2005. Once again, Sri Lanka falls victim to the such as the UNP and the SLFP to the once more zero-sum game and "ethnic outbidding" of Sri Lankan marginalized parties such as the JHU and the JVP; it politics. must also be appreciated that there is a return journey here in as far as the combination of existing and While the peace process is a necessary first step toward widening inequalities that exist in the southern polity solving many of the aforementioned political and social have come to be expressed through the vocal nationalist problems affecting the current crisis, the shift away from 59 | Conclusion Sinhala majoritarian mobilizations has not been Sinhala majoritarian and unitary state. Consequently, sufficiently accompanied in any sustained way by a while the JVP and the JHU can be viewed as the most counter-hegemonic, participatory project, relaying this significant potential opponents of the peace process and ideological shift to wider levels of society.140 Much of this political reform, we must be wary of treating Sinhala failure in political leadership has been due to the nationalism as the sole domain of any political party. perseverance of patron-clientage as the predominant Nationalism in Sri Lanka, as elsewhere, is a far too political thread that runs vertically from the state diffuse and volatile phenomenon for such an analysis. through the social body. It is a mode of politics that The JVP (and to a lesser extent the JHU/SU) will provides little scope for ideological or social continue to mobilize on Sinhala nationalist demands, transformation. but they will also seek to move the political spectrum in their favor by recruiting mainstream political actors onto All too often initiatives for peace and constitutional their nationalist platforms or through nationalist change have been developed on an excessively narrow bandwagons such as the PNM. The drafting of the Anti- functional basis, most noticeably of late, by the Conversion Bill is a perfect illustration of nationalist UNP/UNF under Ranil Wickremasinghe. The latter's movements' enduring influence on mainstream political peace initiative fell prey to the overriding interests of a actors. For such reasons, Sinhala nationalist politics is party that is representative of a "stratum of the Sinhalese still a vibrant phenomenon, impacting on mainstream ruling elite" that "is linked to global capital and no actors as well as producing currents of enduring longer views the state from the outdated paradigm of marginalization and counter-nationalist reaction by national sovereignty" (Uyangoda, 2005). In this regard minorities. This is evidenced, for instance, by Upcountry the UNP/UNF strives to create a stable landscape for Tamil political parties such as the UPF, who have the long-term interests of global and local business demanded devolutionary autonomy and forged stronger within Sri Lanka. Similar concerns have not been political bridges with the LTTE. Unless some form of entirely absent from the agenda of the SLFP/PA, where devolution can break the deadlock of this ethnic far greater attention is paid to meeting both ends of the outbidding, the growth of nationalism will continue political spectrum, including the nationalist and global unabated--a tendency that may tear at the diverse socio- currents. Such pressures evidently produced greater political fabric, not just of Sri Lanka but of the southern tensions on the forging of the UPFA coalition with the polity itself. JVP and did not greatly improve the consultative mechanisms for the peace process. The result is that the agenda of constitutional reforms and peace favored by political elites has not been effectively translated to wider sections of the South where Sinhala nationalist mobilization and affect is still a potent dynamic, albeit one that is subject to shifting pendulum swings. In this, both the JVP and the JHU have played a role in fomenting opposition to consociational and devolutionary frameworks for political reform. In doing so they reproduce the dynamics of Sinhala nationalism and the concomitant desires for the preservation of the 140 The early period of the PA coalition's rise to power and initial time in government in the mid-1990s can be seen as a more thoroughgoing attempt at a consultative, educational project but it was not sustained. 61 | Implications for International Donors 4. Implications for International Donors These findings have the following implications for Rather than taking nationalist actors simply at face international donors aiming to support peacebuilding value, efforts should be made to create an awareness that processes: improves judgments about the appropriateness and timing of donor interventions in situations of tension and potential conflict. Moreover, there should be a POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE clearer perception of the capacities for peace among the spectrum of political actors. The donor community must develop mechanisms to ensure a more extensive and up-to-date knowledge of the political processes at work in the southern polity and among the AID FRAMEWORKS diaspora. A sensitivity to the nuances and complexities of political processes will lead to a heightened The donor community needs to take account of the effects understanding of the deep nexus between poverty, aid and attached conditionalities have in the debilitation of uneven development, social exclusion and conflict the state and in the fostering of nationalist and anti- dynamics--not just in relation to the North-East but in globalization reactions that ultimately combine in their the South as well. Doing so will significantly open the effects to undermine the prospects for peace. One of the potential space for developments among the depressed central tensions that emerge from an analysis of communities of the Upcountry Tamils. This approach nationalist actors such as the JVP, the SU and the JHU can also contribute to a deeper understanding of conflict is the evident hostility of these political actors to IFIs, within a global framework and prevent donors from IGOs, NGOs, and INGOs. Indeed, their hostility falling into the trap of seeing such dynamics through an extends to any national or international actor who is excessively "internalist" lens. Similarly, it might avert perceived to transgress the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. interventions that fail to look below the edifice of Such attacks have been taken to the level of an art form nationalism at the socio-cultural, economic, and political by the JVP's propaganda secretary and parliamentarian, cracks and fissures that nationalism seeks to paper over Wimal Weerawansa, and are emblematic of a nationalist but which frequently feed into its dynamics. In this reaction to the way in which humanitarian aid and sense, it can lead to a more sophisticated analysis of development assistance have increasingly become conflict that looks at intra-group dynamics rather than focused on non-governmental bodies. In this respect, accepting the veneer of "ethnic conflict" at face value. while Weerawansa's attacks can be read on one level as examples of indiscriminate, fanatical and insular An ongoing, politically informed approach could also nationalism, they nonetheless reflect some of the debates enhance conceptions of the vicissitudes and micro- that have ranged about the way in which aid political shifts that may be hostile to frameworks for organizations have contributed to a transnational peace; for instance, the upswings and downswings of reconfiguration of the world order and subsequent nationalist agitation and upheaval and the movements concerns over the loss of state sovereignty.141 While few that feed into and away from nationalist positions. would argue that a return to an outmoded concept of 141 For a discussion of this in the Sri Lankan context, see N. Wickremasinghe (2001) Civil Society in Sri Lanka: New Circles of Power (Sage, New Delhi). The Politics of the South | 62 sovereignty is possible, there are nonetheless deep sharing and greater openness. The authors feel that a concerns about the way in which this process has also deeper knowledge of the political actors (including those played its part in reducing the state's developmental role, nationalist parties that are gaining political ground) will capacity, and responsiveness. It is an issue that has engender a more in-depth appreciation of the capacities certainly taken center-stage in the post-tsunami context. of the diverse actors involved in the spectrum of Sri The increasing introduction of "governance" principles Lankan politics. In the course of this study we have and conditionalities to aid frameworks has also obviously attempted to delimit the varying incentives toward contributed to such concerns. engagement with the peace process that exist among these forces. The overriding conclusion is that almost all Consequently, as part of the project of strengthening of the significant political parties discussed (with the conflict resolution and the peace process within the SCA exception of the JVP and the JHU) are potentially open project as a whole, the authors stress the need for the to direct engagement with the process and to a dialogue donor community to take account of the effects aid and about the possibility of federal frameworks. attached conditionalities have on the Sri Lankan state. In this context, aid has been accused of reproducing cycles However, one of the central findings in this report is in which the government is debilitated and caught that the process of "ethnic outbidding" continues to between the need to succumb to transnational and undermine peace bids and constitutional reform by international pressures while juggling the rise of mainstream political parties. While there has been some nationalist and anti-globalization reactions and positive movement here (for example, on the P-TOMS agitations such pressures provoke. This has been agreement), donors need to be aware that nationalism is evidenced by tensions between the state and NGOs in not the province of any one of the mainstream parties. which the former attempts to place controls and Rather it has been deployed by both the UNP and regulation on the latter. The NGOs respond by taking SLFP-led coalitions as a tactic for undermining peace on a hostile and antagonistic stance, including refusing processes and political legitimacy, thereby contributing dialogue with the state. The authors, therefore, suggest to the sustenance and reproduction of destabilizing greater dialogue between these sectors that act to delimit Sinhala nationalist dynamics. In this context, the donor the "circles of power" in a more responsible, transparent, community should not privilege any one of the political and mutually acceptable fashion. We also stress the need actors. Instead it should encourage inter-party for implementing "initiatives that help to build a strong, communication and dialogue, including attempts by legitimate and responsive state" (Goodhand, 2001, p. government and opposition coalitions to enter into and 112). honor agreements designed to prevent the use of such tactics (for example, the 1997 U.K.-mediated bipartisan agreement). In the interests of long-term political ENGAGEMENT WITH POLITICAL ACTORS AND cooperation, donors should also continue to encourage CAPACITIES FOR PEACE mechanisms for power-sharing and greater openness. Donors need to be aware that nationalism is not the Political actors engaged in finding long-term solutions to the monopoly of any one party but a tactic often deployed to conflict should craft interventions that address confidence- undermine peace processes and the political legitimacy of building measures and transparent constitutional proposals opponents. Rather than privileging certain political actors, simultaneously. One of the problems with past peace the donor community should concentrate efforts on processes discussed in this report is that they have leaned encouraging inter-party dialogue that prevents the use of too heavily in the direction of either CBM (for example, "ethnic outbidding" and encourages mechanisms for power- the UNF 2001-2004) or on the preparation of clear and 63 | Implications for International Donors transparent constitutional proposals (for example, the percolated down to the grassroots. This may explain how PA 1994-2000), at the expense of the other. Political the UNP's remarkable track-one achievements in 2002- actors engaged in finding long-term solutions to the 2004 could not be transformed into broad public ethnic conflict need to recognize the importance of support for peace. addressing both areas simultaneously, as it is crucial to the creation of an environment conducive to dialogue, Wider participation by and consultation with external and negotiation, and development. internal actors might influence parties that remain hostile to peace. This could confer greater transparency, consensus, Helping traditional parties overcome institutional and legitimacy on a viable and enduring framework for limitations would enhance the quality of democracy in peace. While we have concluded that the JVP, and to a terms of participation, deliberation, and informed choice. lesser extent the JHU, remains opposed to the In respect to the traditional parties--the UNP and SLFP- predominant paradigms for a peaceful solution, there are -it should be noted that institutional capacities and a range of actors that have the potential to play a role in intra-party governance frameworks are weak. opening up the space for dialogue and engaging with the Mobilizations in support of peace suffer as a result. We peace process. External actors who maintain contact note that there are several handicaps common to both with and/or influence over the JVP include China, parties that impair their ability to function as effective India, and the CPIM; while internal players include the actors in Sri Lanka's multi-party democracy. Left parties in Sri Lanka (the CP, LSSP, NSSP) and personalities such as TULF's V. Anadasangari. Bearing in These include an absence of transparency and mind some of the criticisms we have raised about past accountability; over-centralization of decision-making failures in encouraging wider participation in and power in hierarchical leaderships preventing consultation about the peace process, an expanded role participation and diversity; the lack of structures, for building peace capacities among a wider range of initiatives, and incentives for building policy actors could confer a greater transparency, consensus, development capacities; and a lack of even marginally and legitimacy on a viable and enduring framework for satisfactory frameworks for financial transparency and peace. accountability. There is an alarming lack of capacity and incentive on the part of elected members of these parties to employ democratic institutions in the conduct of CIVIL SOCIETY, EDUCATION, PARTICIPATION, politics and the advancement of party interests. AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING Consequently, legislative institutions such as Parliament and provincial councils become regressively irrelevant, an Programmatic support for civil society actors is essential to executive-centric political culture develops, and political ensure that they continue to generate policy options and act competition is increasingly conducted outside as rights watchdogs. Bearing in mind the concerns set out institutions. Helping the traditional parties overcome above, it must be reiterated that expansion of democratic these disabilities would enhance the quality of politics to include civil society actors as legitimate democracy in terms of participation, deliberation, and stakeholders in public policy debates must be informed choice. It is also worthwhile to bear in mind encouraged. During the last two decades Sri Lanka has that these two parties command between them the seen the establishment of several public policy research confidence of approximately 60% of the electorate. By and advocacy organizations that are key actors in the any standard, this is a formidable constituency for peace, peace constituency. Programmatic support for these if only the party leaderships' stated commitment for a organizations is essential to ensure that they continue to negotiated settlement along federalist lines can be generate policy options and act as rights watchdogs. The The Politics of the South | 64 media, too, has played a similar role and requires continued support. However, civil society must not be defined to include only certain types of organizations to the exclusion of others. Local-level and community-based organizations are pivotal allies in peacebuilding efforts but are currently suffering from many of the same capacity problems as traditional political parties. 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