Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 135706 – SN IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT IDA GUARANTEE NO. G-2220-SN ON A INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION PARTIAL RISK GUARANTEE IN THE AMOUNT OF UP TO EUR 36.5 MILLION TO GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAL and TOBENE POWER SA FOR THE SENEGAL TAIBA NDIAYE INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCER PROJECT (P143605) June 21, 2019 Energy and Extractives Global Practice Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective March 13, 2019) Currency Unit = EUR (Euro) US$1 = EUR 0.8855 SDR 1 = US$1.39 FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BOAD Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement West African Development Bank CPS Country Partnership Strategy DFI Development Financial Institution E&S Environmental and Social EHS Environmental Health and Safety EAIF Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EPC Engineering, Procurement, and Construction ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan FMO Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden Netherlands Development Finance Company GDP Gross Domestic Product GoS Government of Senegal GTI General Electric HFO Heavy Fuel Oil ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IFC International Finance Corporation IPP Independent Power Producer L/C Letter of Credit MPG Matelec Power Generation Company NPV Net Present Value OHS Occupational Health and Safety PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Outcome PPA Power Purchase Agreement PS Performance Standard SAR Societe Africaine de Raffinage African Refining Company SBLC Standby Letter of Credit SENELEC Société Nationale d’Electricité National Electricity Company of Senegal SNDES National Social and Economic Development Strategy (Stratégie Nationale de Développement Economique et Social) TP Tobene Power Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Louise J. Cord Senior Global Practice Director: Riccardo Puliti Practice Manager: Charles J. Cormier Task Team Leader(s): Manuel Berlengiero, Patrice C. C. Caporossi ICR Main Contributor: Tamaro Kane TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 4 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................4 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) .......................................9 II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 10 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 10 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 11 C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 13 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 15 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 15 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 17 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 17 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 18 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 19 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 19 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 20 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 21 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 22 E. GUARANTEE IN SUPPORT OF THE PROJECT ............................................................................ 23 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 24 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 27 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 30 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 32 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 33 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 35 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ..................................................................... 36 MAP .................................................................................................................................... 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name Senegal Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer P143605 Project Country Financing Instrument Senegal IDA Guarantee Original EA Category Revised EA Category A – Full Assessment N/A Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Republic of Senegal Tobene Power Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO Increase the power generated by Independent Power Producers. Page 1 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) FINANCING Original Amount (EUR) Revised Amount (EUR) Actual Disbursed (EUR) IDA guarantee 36.5 36.5 N/A Debt IFC A Loan 28.4 28.4 28.4 IFC B Loan 50.0 50.0 50.0 EAIF 25.0 25.0 25.0 FMO 25.0 25.0 25.0 Parallel Loan - BOAD 16.4 16.4 16.4 Total Debt 94.9 94.9 94.9 Equity MPG 28.5 25.4 25.4 IFC 3.2 3.2 3.2 Total Project Cost 126.7 million 124.4 million KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing December 19, 2013 November 2015 N/A January 31, 2036 May 30, 2016 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Amount Disbursed (US$, Date(s) Key Revisions millions) May 2015 N/A Include direct payment guarantee provision July 2017 N/A Post-closing Restructuring to allow for expansion KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory High Page 2 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$, millions) N/A SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Power Generation 100 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 100 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Vera Songwe Louise Cord Senior Global Practice Director: Jamal Saghir Riccardo Puliti Practice Manager: Meike Van Ginneken Charles J. Cormier Demetrios Papathanasiou, Manuel Berlengiero, Task Team Leader(s): Manuel Berlengiero, Patrice Patrice Caporossi Caporossi ICR Contributing Author: Tamaro Kane Page 3 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Context 1. Country context. The Republic of Senegal is a low-income country, with a population of about 13 million and an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$1,100 in 2013. A new administration came into power in 2012, consolidating Senegal’s reputation as a stable democracy. Despite the new government’s commitment to making Senegal an upper-middle-income country by the next decade, low growth equilibrium, high debt, large fiscal deficit, and low competitiveness presented a formidable challenge. 2. Growth averaged 4 percent between 2000 and 2010, below regional trends. An expansion of current spending between 2005 and 2012 under the previous administration’s ambitious program more than doubled the fiscal deficit. Total debt was increasing fast. Private sector participation in the economy remained low in the face of a poor investment climate, high vulnerability to external shocks, and feeble governance and accountability systems. With high electricity costs and the low reliability of electricity services, resolving the ongoing energy crisis was of top priority for the Government of Senegal (GoS) to respond to the demands of urbanization, a growing population, and a rising economy. 3. Sector context. At the time of the preparation of the project in 2013, the electrification rate in Senegal had doubled from 25 percent in 2000 to 50 percent—significantly higher than the regional average of 30 percent—although the rural electrification rate remained quite low at 25 percent. The country was exiting from the widespread energy crisis of 2011, which was among the factors responsible for the defeat of the previous administration in 2012. Generation relied on costly emergency power (150 MW in use), mainly oil-fired thermal generation owned by Société Nationale de l’Électricité (SENELEC) (528 MW installed capacity) and independent power producers (IPPs) (279 MW installed capacity), including imports from Manantali and Felou hydropower plants in Mali. When considering actual energy produced instead of installed capacity, despite only having two IPPs at the time1, 45 percent of electricity was produced by IPPs. This was partly because of the availability of only 64 percent of SENELEC’s generation capacity compared to 87 percent for IPP capacity. Improper plant maintenance and the ageing of existing infrastructure had rendered some SENELEC installations nonfunctional. 4. Senegal was one of the first African countries to introduce IPPs in the power sector. Senelec experience with IPPs, however, was mixed. A series of issues, such as unreliable fuel quality, grid instability, and general technical issues, impacted the reliability of the energy produced by IPPs. IPPs considered such issues to be outside their control, and therefore not their responsibility, causing prolonged negotiations with Senelec and other Government counterparts on potential solutions. Further, the institutional and financial framework needed to accelerate the development of IPPs and address the growing generation gap was missing. Due to the large concentration of production through oil-fired engines, SENELEC was suffering from one of the highest production costs in Africa at 35 cents per kWh against a regional average of 18 cents per kWh. A surge in oil prices led to capacity and fuel 1 The two existing IPPs were General Electric (GTI) since 1998 and Kounoune Power since 2008. Page 4 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) shortages, causing widespread blackouts. Consumers were therefore facing an already high tariff2, which coupled with widespread blackouts cause civil unrest. Trying to mitigate the situation, the Government adopted consumer protection policies that helped maintain tariffs at 30 percent lower than their cost- recovery value and provided revenue compensation to SENELEC to mitigate the policy’s impact on the utility’s performance. 5. The sector was thus characterized by a considerable financial imbalance with high tariffs that remained, nevertheless, too low to recover adequate revenue. SENELEC’s operations were supported by subsidies from the Government that exceeded 40 percent of revenues in 2012. Delays in the implementation of low-cost generation investments, poor sector governance, and underperformance of the utility left the country with around 90 MW of unserved energy demand. 6. To address the energy crisis, the GoS carried out a diagnostic exercise of the sector, which highlighted an increasing gap between fast growing demand and insufficient, costly, and unreliable supply of electricity, as well as SENELEC’s persistent financial difficulties, characterized by a significant operating deficit and high indebtedness. To tackle both technical and financial imbalances, the GoS developed a 2011 – 2015 electricity emergency plan, outlining the overall policy framework and strategy to steer the sector towards a sustainable path and ensure SENELEC’s financial and operational sustainability over the long run. The Tobene Power (TP) IPP was a key element to achieve these objectives and the aim was to have the TP plant replace all emergency rental generation by 2015. 7. In October 2012, the GoS adopted a Letter of Development Policy for the Energy Sector. The Letter of Development Policy outlined the sector policy objectives of the newly elected government to reform the sector and improve its performance over time. The main axes of the Letter of Development Policy for the Energy Sector were: (a) ensuring energy security and increasing the energy access for all; (b) diversify the energy mix; (c) continuing and accelerating the liberalization of the energy sector by encouraging independent production and institutional reform of the sector; (d) improving the competitiveness of the sector in order to lower the cost of energy and reduce sector subsidies; and (e) strengthening regulation of the sector. 8. Project background. Construction of the TP plant was originally subject to a call for tenders in 2008, resulting in the award of the bid to the only complete proposal submitted. A rise in oil prices led the GoS to put the process on hold and shift focus to less-costly alternative sources of production, such as coal. In 2011, faced with delays in the implementation of these projects and the need to rely on costly emergency rental generation to address growing demand, the GoS decided to proceed with the project through a direct agreement, as an exception, with the previously selected sponsor and signed a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)3. In the short term, the TP project would provide access to lower-cost reliable electricity to help manage the supply challenges created by poor maintenance of existing infrastructure and the overloading of available installations due to the growing power demand. In the 2 The average electricity retail tariff was XOF 117/kWh (about US cents 24/kWh), which was nearly twice the average tariff in SSA (US cents 14/kWh). 3The PPA provides for the payment of capacity charges, energy charges, and fuel payments. The capacity and energy charges are split into local currency component and foreign currency component. Fuel payments were initially Senelec responsibility. The PPA was amended in 2013 to transfer the responsibility of sourcing fuel and associated logistics to TP with all related costs passed on to SENELEC. Page 5 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) long run, the flexible technology used in the TP plant would facilitate the integration of renewable energy in the grid and the plant would be converted to use gas, once it became available. The project would not only provide important baseload services to the network, but it would also become an important player in the diversification of the energy mix, once gas became available. 9. Rationale for World Bank support and contribution to the country’s higher-level objectives. The TP project was part of a suite of World Bank Group instruments supporting the energy sector reform. The Senegal Electricity Sector Support Project (P125565), approved in 2012, focused mainly on investments to improve the transmission and distribution network, sector planning, and SENELEC performance. Complementary to the Electricity Sector Support Project, the TP project helped bolster a key objective of the World Bank engagement in the energy sector to secure high-quality, reliable, and affordable energy. The project aimed to address both (a) a short-term need for baseload power to address the supply gap, serve as insurance for delayed commissioning of projects, and integrate intermittent energy sources and (b) a longer-term need to secure supply and shift the energy mix, once gas became available. Furthermore, the deployment of an IDA Guarantee (known at the time of appraisal as Partial Risk Guarantee) contributed to restoring investors’ confidence in the sector to crowd in private investment. The TP project was a key element in efforts to secure reliable modern energy services needed to meet the twin World Bank institutional goals of reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity. The project outcome of increased electricity production was also aligned with the objective of the GoS’s 2012 Letter of Development Policy for the Energy Sector to increase and ensure reliable supply of power, replace high-cost power sources, and increase private sector investment. The proposed operation contributed to the second pillar of the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS, 2013- 2017) and its objective, to facilitate access to energy services and reduce average energy generation costs. In addition, the proposed Project is in line with the CPS’s approach to mobilize substantial amounts of resources from across the World Bank Group. In addition, the TP project contributed to the achievement of the Africa Strategy’s growth pillar by increasing the reliable supply of electricity for growth and private investment through the use of market solutions to leverage financial resources. Theory of Change (Results Chain) 10. The TP project was a timely opportunity to secure reliable and affordable electricity to eliminate reliance on emergency power sources and draw private sector investment to the power sector. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to increase the power generated by Independent Power Producers. The project activity to achieve this PDO was the construction of a 96 MW heavy fuel oil (HFO) power plant (with a contracted capacity of 70MW at 91 percent availability) that could eventually be converted to gas in Taiba Ndiaye. The TP project was supported by the World Bank Group through an IDA Guarantee4 and International Finance Corporation (IFC) debt financing. As indicated in figure 1, the main outputs were identified as the electricity generated by the project and the number of electricity users who would benefit from this supply—indirect project beneficiaries. 4 The final amount for the Letter of Credit underpinning the guarantee was EUR 35.5 million. Page 6 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) Figure 1. Results Chain Activity Outcomes Outputs PDO/Outcomes Longer-Term Outcomes Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 11. The PDO as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is to ‘increase the power generated by Independent Power Producers.’ Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 12. The key outcomes expected from the project according to the PAD were (a) a direct impact on project beneficiaries, notably SENELEC and the GoS, with the provision of a cheaper source of electricity to replace expensive emergency diesel rental power plants; (b) an indirect impact on improving access to reliable service for all electricity users, including the poor who are particularly affected by supply limitations; and (c) a reduction in the need for public investment in the generation of electricity leading to a reduction in public deficit and the availability of funds for other social needs. 13. Outcome indicators to measure progress toward achieving the abovementioned outcomes were (a) the amount of electricity generated by the project annually (GWh) and (b) the number of indirect project beneficiaries, defined as all electricity users of the national interconnected system.5 Although several development impact indicators were tracked by IFC, these were not used for the assessment of progress toward the PDO in this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICRR). 14. There were three intermediate indicators to assess the progress of project implementation focusing on a target commissioning date, generation capacity constructed, and amount of private capital mobilized. Components 15. The TP project consists in the construction of a privately owned 96 MW6 fuel power plant in Taiba Ndiaye, Thies, approximately 90 km northeast of Dakar, Senegal. Project works included (a) the construction and installation of a combined cycle facility consisting of five gensets running on HFO with a provision for future conversion to natural gas and a steam turbine generator for improved fuel 5 The indicator did not include a focus on measuring impacts on the poorest segment of the population despite the wording of the expected outcome. 6 The capacity of the power plant was increase available capacity to 115 MW. However, the expansion was put into service after project closing and is not considered part of the original project. Page 7 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) efficiency, (b) the construction of network facilities to interconnect to the existing 220 kV substation, and (c) the construction of fuel storage facilities. 16. The power plant was developed by Tobene Power SA, an IPP 90 percent owned by Melec Powergen Inc—an affiliate of a well-known South-South investor, Matelec Group of Lebanon, with significant experience in Sub-Saharan Africa—and 10 percent owned by IFC. The TP project was developed under a build-own-operate model to sell electricity to SENELEC under a 22-year PPA signed in 2011. Initially structured as a power availability arrangement with fuel supply responsibility assigned to SENELEC and TP responsible for the provision of energy supply at agreed efficiency rates, the PPA was amended in 2013 to transfer the responsibility of sourcing fuel and associated logistics to TP with all of the related costs passed on to SENELEC. 17. The World Bank supported the project with an IDA Guarantee of up to EUR 36.5 million to cover risks from (a) nonpayment of PPA obligations by SENELEC and (b) nonpayment of certain force majeure and termination obligations by the GoS under the Government Guarantee. The IDA Guarantee backstops SENELEC and the GoS’s obligations toward the commercial bank issuing the Standby Letter of Credit (SBLC or L/C) to TP and covers a period of 22 years to match the term of the PPA. The guarantee puts in place a cost-efficient security instrument to lower the counterparty credit risks. In the case of a payment delay, the structure provides valuable time to sort out the irregularities while still being able to serve the debt and avoid a payment default. In this way, the L/C structure ensures the continuous operation of the power plant to provide electricity supply during an otherwise possible disruption period. The dire state of the energy sector was such that the IDA Guarantee was essential to create sufficient comfort to raise financing that would not have been available otherwise. SENELEC’s solvency relies heavily on government subsidies, the tariff compensation in particular, and its tight liquidity position makes it difficult to attract private sector project financing. The IDA Guarantee was key to reduce the overall risk of the transaction. 18. The project also benefited from IFC debt financing and co-development through IFC InfraVentures. As a mandated lead arranger, IFC’s role in the project was critical both to providing competitive long-term funding in an environment where it would not be possible to obtain it in the commercial market and to mobilizing parallel long-term funding from other multilateral institutions. The project’s financing plan was completed by an IFC A loan of US$28.5 million, a B loan of EUR 50 million mobilizing the Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) and Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), and an interest rate swap on the Euro loans. IFC also arranged local currency financing from Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD) for an equivalent of EUR 16.5 million. IFC co- developed the project with the project sponsor under InfraVentures, converting development fees to equity investment for a stake of up to 10 percent. TP was the first IFC InfraVentures project to be commissioned globally and to have started delivering energy to the grid. Given the implication of multiple WBG entities in the project, any actual, potential, or perceived conflicts of interest was managed in accordance with the WBG’s guidelines for management of inter-institutional conflicts of interest. The TP project was expected to cost EUR 126.7 million, but actual costs were 2.6 percent lower at EUR 123.4 million. Page 8 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 19. There were no changes to the PDOs and outcome targets during implementation. Revised PDO Indicators 20. There were no changes to the PDO indicators during project execution. Revised Components 21. There were no revisions to the components of the project during implementation. Other Changes 22. A project restructuring targeting only the structure of the guarantee was processed in May 2015 to (a) incorporate the direct payment guarantee option made available by the expansion of the scope of World Bank Group guarantees under OP/BP 10.00 (Investment Project Financing) and (b) include changes to the previously approved IDA Guarantee deemed necessary to reflect the results of the negotiations. 23. When the project was originally approved in December 2013 (FY13), the World Bank’s operational policy framework (OP/BP 14.25 [Guarantees]) limited the provision of guarantees to cover debt service defaults caused by the government failure to meet its obligations toward the Project. The FY14 World Bank's Operational Policy Framework on Guarantees expanded the scope of guarantees for Investment Project Financing to cover payments default of non-loan related government payment obligations. The inclusion of this option allowed incorporating a provision for converting the previously approved SBLC PRG structure into a direct payment guarantee structure if needed. This modification did not lead to any increase in IDA’s financial exposure, changes in covered risks or guarantee period. 24. Another project restructuring was carried out in July 2017, post-closing, to accommodate a series of amendments to the legal agreements related to the IDA guarantee. The amendments were required to reflect an expansion of the electricity production capacity of the TP project to 115MW. Long term financing for the expansion was arranged with the same structure and financiers as the original project. Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 25. The 2015 restructuring of the guarantee structure was needed to address the mismatch between the duration of the PPA and the duration of the L/C. During project preparation, expectations were for the term of the L/C to match the duration of the PPA, but the local commercial bank market was not able to provide the desired maturity. Citibank was selected as the L/C issuing bank, having provided the most competitive offer, but could not provide an L/C with a term exceeding 10 years. Although the Guarantee Agreement allowed for the continued rollover of the L/C to an aggregate maximum period of 22 years, neither TP nor its senior lenders were prepared to accept the risk that Citibank would not extend or renew the L/C. In this context, if SENELEC was then unable to find another Page 9 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) commercial bank to provide the L/C for the remaining term, it would be in default of maintaining satisfactory security for payment obligations. To prevent such default, it was thus agreed among all parties that should this rollover risk materialize, the IDA Guarantee would transition to a direct payment guarantee structure in favor of TP to replace the original guarantee structure. A process for the extension, renewal, and/or replacement of the original L/C has been established and will be closely monitored as the expiry date draws closer (October 25, 2025). Only if these measures fail to secure a replacement L/C, IDA will enter into a direct payment guarantee agreement with TP on the condition that the PRG is terminated. 26. The second restructuring was carried out post-closing to approve a series of amendments to the legal agreements underpinning the guarantee and provide IDA consent for the proposed extension pursued by the sponsor after project closing. The proposed amendments to the guarantee documents were largely of a technical nature to ensure consistency between the guarantee documents and the project agreements. The modifications did not entail any change to the PDO or the financial exposure under the guarantee. While the success of the original project was likely a determining factor to push the extension forward, the ICR analysis did not take it into account given it was completed and put in commercial services after project closing. 27. Both restructuring processes did not have any impact on the theory of change, as the first restructuring enabled the project to proceed to financial closure and achieve the expected results as per the original theory of change, while the second restructuring was post-closing to allow investments beyond the original project scope. II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating Rating: High 28. The relevance of the PDO to the most recent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)7 is rated High. In alignment with the National Social and Economic Development Strategy (Strategie Nationale de Développement Economique et Social, SNDES) for 2013–2017, the first pillar of the Senegal FY13–FY17 CPS focuses on accelerating growth and generating employment to parallel the SNDES pillar on Growth, Productivity, and Wealth Creation. As a key factor for growth, improvements in the energy sector are at the core of this strategy. The TP project PDO directly contributes to achieving the CPS outcome of improved access to affordable electricity by enabling private sector participation in the sector and facilitating access to sources of reliable electricity at low cost. In the recent Systematic Country Diagnostic8 paper, opening up the energy sector to IPPs remains a critical part of the GoS’s strategy to achieve greater access and affordability of energy services and boost Senegal’s competitiveness for private sector-led growth. 7 World Bank. 2013. Senegal - Country Partnership Strategy for the Period FY13–FY17 (English). Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/527551468103763222/Senegal-Country-partnership-strategy-for-the-period- FY13-FY17 8 World Bank. 2018. Senegal - Systematic Country Diagnostic (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/336611539873310474/Senegal-Systematic-Country-Diagnostic Page 10 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) 29. The TP project remains a key element for the sector by (a) addressing the supply/demand gap, (b) acting as a form of insurance should there be delays in the materialization of other generation projects, and (c) fitting within long-term plans for the development of gas. When the project was developed, SENELEC had 294 MW of generation capacity available and two IPPs in operation contributing 120 MW—Kounoune Power and GTI Dakar. Leveraging unique structuring capabilities to enable IPPs in Senegal, the involvement of the World Bank Group was an important source of comfort and political/regulatory risk mitigation for the sponsor and other lenders. 30. The PDO remains consistent and highly relevant with the Government’s past and present objectives to increase access to reliable and affordable electricity through strong private sector participation in the energy sector. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome RATING: High 31. The PDO was to ‘increase the power generated by Independent Power Producers.’ The main outcome indicator from those included in the Results Framework of the PAD used when assessing the achievement of the PDO is the amount of electricity generated by the project annually (GWh). Results indicate a high level of accomplishment with electricity generation exceeding the target by 35 percent. The results framework targets were based on the contracted capacity of 70 MW under 91 % availability. 32. Commercial operations for the project were achieved in simple cycle in March 2016, 8.5 months ahead of the PPA contractual requirement of November 2016 with the successful certification of a plant capacity of 73.45 MW, and project costs slightly below budget leading to a mobilization of capital below targets (see discussion under the M&E section below). Installed capacity of the plant (96 MW) was 37 percent higher than the PPA contractual commitment of 70 MW availability. This was a strategic decision by the sponsor to cope with the PPA availability requirement in light of concerns regarding grid stability, high ambient temperatures, and fuel quality. The plant has been operating consistently well and at a level exceeding PPA contractual requirements. Availability has remained close to 99 percent against a PPA obligation of 91 percent and the dispatch rate is healthy (despite being less than expected in 2016 and 2017). In 2016, TP generated 352.3 GWh of electricity—approximately 10 percent of the total distributed power in Senegal—whereas availability was 576.8 GWh.9 33. The project’s strong record led to the award of an expansion project in 2015 to increase available capacity to 115 MW and monetize the spare capacity that was already installed. This expansion improved the competitiveness of the project with regard to the merit order while saving money for SENELEC with a drop of about 5 percent in the levelized tariff. A free reserve margin of 10 MW was made available to SENELEC for peak season evenings corresponding to about 1.5 percent of Senegal’s installed capacity. The expansion project was financed by the same financiers of the original project (including IFC) and successfully implemented. The combined 115 MW plant is now fully operational after the beginning of commercial operation of the expansion in December 2016. 9 2017 actual data indicated in table 1. Page 11 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) 34. A number of project related agreements underpinning the IDA guarantee needed to be modified to give effect to the expansion which required IDA consent. Formal approval was provided to proceed after thorough review and clearance of all documentation. This originated the need for the post-closing restructuring of July 2017, whose objective was to amend the legal agreements related to the IDA Guarantee for consistency and reflect the expansion of the plant installed capacity from 96MW to 115MW. This restructure and the proposed amendments to the legal documentation did not result in any change in IDA financial exposure under the guarantee, PDO or theory of change. Risks were not expected to change materially with no change to the maximum guaranteed amount, and improvements in both macroeconomic performance and the utility’s position. IDA provided its consent to the expansion. 35. It should be noted that finalizing financing arrangements for the TP project took almost two years leading to delays in the disbursement of investment funds. The project output results outlined in table 1 and timeliness of the project are thus largely due to the sponsor’s willingness to take on the risk of financing construction with equity before financial close and their decision to build capacity significantly larger than the contractual obligation. There were delays under the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contract of approximately two months due to the late availability of capital, but this did not affect the performance of the project given the head-start taken by the sponsor to pre-finance construction. Private capital mobilized for the project (as per the PAD and thus without consideration of the expansion) was lower than the target due to cost savings with realized costs below estimates. The PPA effectiveness conditions were only met in November 2015. As a result, the intermediate indicator to complete commissioning tests by August 2015 was not achieved with these tests only completed in March 2016. Table 1. Project Outcomes PDO Project Indicators 2017 Target 2017 Actual To increase the power Amount of electricity generated from the 558 GWh per year 751 GWh per generated by project (GWh) year Independent Power (35% surplus) Producers Indirect project beneficiaries 1.17 million 1.33 million Intermediate Results Commissioning test completed Yes, August 2015 Yes, completed in March 2016 Generation capacity of conventional 70 MW 96 MWa generation constructed under the project Exceeded target by 37% Private capital mobilized US$172 million US$168 million (project below estimated costs) Notes: a. Plant installed capacity stood at 96 MW but targets were measured against the contractual guaranteed availability of 70MW. Extension of capacity to 115 MW (not within the scope of results assessment in this report) was put in commercial service in mid-2017; b. Number of indirect beneficiaries continued to grow, reaching 1.45 million in 2018. 36. With electricity demand growing at an average of 30–40 MW per year between 2012 and 2015 and delays in the commissioning of other projects, the TP project was a timely resource for the GoS to Page 12 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) address the energy supply gap. The TP project represented approximately 13.7 percent of Senegal’s available capacity in 2017 when considering the original project (96 MW) only and 16.5 percent if the expansion (115 MW) is included. As the most efficient thermal power generation in Senegal, TP has displaced expensive rental units as well as older, more expensive, and inefficient plants. Although power rental has not been entirely replaced, in large part due to high demand and major incidents on production parks, a reduction of 72% in power rental was noted in 2017. The plant will possibly still be sufficiently cheaper than other options even after a series of newer plants are built. The combined project’s steam recovery system allows for best-in-class fuel efficiency thus contributing to the reduction of Senegal’s power generation costs and improving the overall financial sustainability of the electricity sector. As part of the negotiation underpinning the expansion of the project, the variable component of the tariff of the project was reduced due to economies of scale, further improving the plant’s competitiveness. Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 37. The PDO to ‘increase the power generated by Independent Power Producers’ was achieved with the target for the key PDO indicator for electricity generated from the project exceeded by 35 percent before project closing. In addition, the number of indirect beneficiaries was exceeded due to the exceeded target of electricity generated from the project. In 2017, independent production had increased to 47 percent of the total production. Based on the TP project’s status as a key element of the World Bank’s engagement in the sector and its strong performance, a plant extension project was awarded by the GoS to the sponsor. Thus, the PDO was achieved but with some delays in finalizing financing documentation leading to a shift in the project implementation calendar by one year. It is expected that the project will continue to perform successfully. Electricity supply has grown substantially in recent years (26 percent from 2010 to 2016) but has not kept pace with peak demand (32 percent over the same period) which presents a continued opportunity for significant impact in the sector. In particular, the plant continues to have a key role in the provision of baseload power. With these considerations, the rating for PDO achievement is High C. EFFICIENCY Assessment of Efficiency and Rating Rating: Substantial 38. Economic analysis. The project’s economic analysis was reassessed using actual values to determine whether the rate of return was in line with expectations in the PAD. The projections were based on assumptions that project costs remain within budget with at most 5 percent in cost overruns and commissioning is completed on time with a maximum delay of 1 year. The actual economic internal rate of return (EIRR) and net present value (NPV) of the project using real values for the two years of operation up to the project closing date are lower than the appraisal estimates but remain largely positive—details available in annex 4. 39. Dispatching has been below projections partly due to load demand required for the testing and commissioning of the Contour Global Cap des Biches power plant in 2016 and in 2017. This outcome is also partly due to TP’s fuel supply challenges affecting peak production and a low aggregate demand in production from its rank in the merit order. A lack of sufficient fuel stock from the fuel supply company, Page 13 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) Societe Africaine de Raffinage (SAR), in 2017 limited TP’s generation at peak evening hours during the high demand October–December season. Further, fuel prices rose by, on average, 33 percent for HFO and it should be noted that TP’s delivered fuel cost is higher due to the costs of transport given that its site is a bit farther in comparison to other plants. Network constraints further required SENELEC to dispatch some remotely located plants thus affecting the higher merit order of plants such as TP. It is also possible that SENELEC does not account for the full costs of variable operation and maintenance in their own plants’ variable costs which affects the merit order. 40. Ongoing delays and technical challenges in the operation of lower-cost plants such as the Sendou coal power plant are expected to improve TP’s dispatching in the near term. In the long term, the plant is competitive enough to maintain satisfactory dispatching and will be important to manage intermittence of renewable integration and fulfill peak demand. The plant is also expected to be converted to gas, which could further improve its dispatching potential over time. Table 2. Comparison of Economic Analysis Results in PAD (2013) and Actual (2017) PAD Projections Actual Difference NPV (XOF, millions) 102,982 95,803 (7,179) NPV (US$, millions) 233 216 17 EIRR (%) 30.5 28.5 −2 41. Despite the commissioning of the project before contractual requirements and the lack of a cost overrun, it must be noted that there were important challenges in the implementation of the project. While the project company was ready to advance with project construction and Board approval for the IDA guarantee and IFC investments was obtained in December 2013, the Loan Agreements and Project Agreement for the guarantee were not signed until August 2015. IFC first disbursement was only achieved in September 2015 and the guarantee effectiveness in November 2015. These delays were in large part due to the following: (a) PPA effectiveness. The PPA for the project was not granted under a normal tendering process with unclear effectiveness conditions that were only finalized at an advanced stage of the due diligence process. Because of subsequent delays, the sponsor chose to take on the risk of financing construction before financial close which helped keep the project time line on track but affected the financing documentation process negatively leaving few options to adjust the PPA. (b) Fuel pricing. The PPA was modified to transfer fuel sourcing responsibility from SENELEC to TP with costs passed on to SENELEC. As the ensuing contract would be established between the sponsor and the supply company, it was important to negotiate and secure a presidential decree to legally establish that the sponsor would be subject to the same pricing as SENELEC. As discussed in the PAD, fuel pricing was a key factor in the profitability of the project and so this exercise was essential and set a precedent for future IPPs. (c) Guarantee. The original intention of the IDA Guarantee was to replicate the structure of the Thika IDA Guarantee project (P122671). However, the instrument itself was not well known to government counterparts, which were more accustomed to regular Bank’s loan programs. Agreeing and processing the GoS’s first IDA Guarantee led to an extensive Page 14 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) number of iterations. In addition, the term of the L/C issued did not match the tenure of the PPA leading to the need to develop a new structure to address the risk that the original L/C is not renewed at expiration. The rollover risks, perceived to high by sponsor and lender, also caused lengthy negotiations, and it was resolved by the consideration of the direct payment guarantee structure. 42. Delays in the Mauritania Banda Gas Project imports and in the commissioning of the Sendou coal plant along with major incidents in key plants have led SENELEC to seek additional means to address rising demand. The utility again sought recourse in emergency rental units for 94 MW and kept high-consuming thermal power plants dispatched. TP has taken on a stronger role as baseload power with a larger and more stable fuel supply reserve and the cost-savings advantages to stem from the expansion of the plant. D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING Rating: Satisfactory 43. Overall outcome rating for the project is Satisfactory. The project’s design was appropriate, and the objective remained highly relevant at the closing of the project. Further, the achievement of the objective was efficient. As a combined result of decreased oil prices since appraisal and savings from new and upgraded generation plants such as TP, the financial performance of the sector has improved, and direct subsidies have been reduced from 2.4 percent of GDP in 2012 to 0.4 percent of GDP in 2015 and close to 0 in 2016. The main shortcomings were with regard to the delays in obtaining key project documents approvals, finalizing documentation and in reaching effectiveness and financial close, but those did not affect the achievement of the PDO. E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) Gender 44. No gender impacts were incorporated in the design of the project nor monitored during implementation. Institutional Strengthening 45. Senegal had previous experiences with IPPs, including with IFC involvement. On the other hand, the TP project was the first benefitting from an IDA guarantee. As the first IDA Guarantee, the preparation process was lengthy. A lack of central coordination across government institutions to expedite consultations and an overall lack of experience with the instrument made it difficult to move forward more efficiently. Similarly, commercial banks in Senegal did not have previous experience with the instrument. All parties agree that the experience gained through the preparation of the TP project has strengthened the capacity of associated public institutions. Experience gained in the management of these contracts, civil works, and environmental and social (E&S) safeguards has been applied to the development of new projects. The negotiation of this IPP project provided valuable experience that facilitated the development of a series of subsequent IPP projects (such as the Scaling Solar IPPs). Page 15 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) 46. The development of the project also highlighted a gap in the legal framework with regard to the pricing regulation for fuel inputs. The provision of the same pricing to IPPs as is provided to SENELEC for fuel sourcing is a key accomplishment with significant impact on the returns for the TP project as well as all future IPPs. The project’s success in securing this pricing agreement through legislative modifications supported by a presidential decree is a strong and lasting contribution to the improvement of the institutional framework to attract more IPP investment. Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 47. The PRG for TP served as an important credit enhancement mechanism to mitigate the low creditworthiness risk of SENELEC as sole power off-taker and thus facilitate access to project financing for the construction of the plant. The PRG aimed to backstop certain payment and termination obligations under the PPA and thus protect TP from the risk of Senelec and GoS’s failure to provide timely payments. Involvement of the World Bank helped draw in financing needed for the project and strengthen commitment to abide by international standards. The guarantee support provided comfort to crowd in future investments. Equity investment for the project represented 25 percent of the financing and was provided by Matelec Power Generation Company (MPG) and IFC, whereas the debt financing representing 75 percent was provided by IFC, FMO, BOAD, and EAIF. 48. The project is considered to be a precursor of the Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD) approach. First, it represents an example of best practice collaboration between IDA and IFC. Since the beginning of the discussion about the potential WBG support to the project, the IFC and IDA teams have worked very closely together. In term of internal processing, the project piloted a fully integrated approval process, with join decision meetings and joint IDA-IFC Board for the final approval. Both IDA and IFC intervention were presented jointly in the same project documents. Second, the strong WBG engagement in the project, at all stages, provided adequate comfort to the sponsor to proceed with the project construction on bridge financing even before the formal WBG approval of the interventions. This in turn allowed the project to proceed as per the initial schedule, meeting the Government tight deadline for new generation and allowing to improve Senegal’s perception of IPP performances. Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 49. Reducing the costs of electricity production and expanding access to modern energy services are at the heart of the GoS’s strategy to increase productivity and reduce poverty. The TP project has played a central role in not only increasing the supply of reliable electricity from IPPs—installed IPP capacity stood at 120 MW at appraisal and TP has to date added 115 MW in generation capacity (including the expansion) —but also increasing the affordability of electricity by providing an alternative to costly emergency rental units. 50. TP has developed a local development committee composed of local leaders, the mayor, and representatives from key women and youth groups to promote local recruitment and maximize positive social impacts. The project constructed a football field for the local youth to encourage sports within the community in coordination with local officials. The project is also working closely with the community to identify opportunities to invest in, addressing educational needs both for formal education and local koranic schools. Meanwhile, TP has responded to a request to fund temporary classes and contributed to the expansion of the capacity of existing schools. Page 16 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 51. There are no other unintended outcomes and impacts. III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION Project Design 52. The project was designed as a timely response to an ongoing energy supply crisis that led to reliance on costly emergency energy sources. Its simple single objective and component structure clearly addressed the Government’s priority focus on attracting private sector investment to increase access to affordable quality electricity. Flexibility was further built into the project to help mitigate and address potential risks resulting from a mismatch between the duration of the L/C and the term of the PPA thus improving the efficiency of the project instrument. 53. The World Bank Group had previous experience working with the sponsor in the Kounoune Power project and drew the following lessons from that experience and overall experience in the Senegalese energy sector, which were outlined in the PAD and incorporated in the design of the project: • A high-quality sponsor is an important determinant of the long-term success of an IPP. • The World Bank Group has an important role in ensuring that investment decisions are made based on technical, financial, and economic merits. • Sector reforms rely on the strength of political will. • Appropriate risk sharing is essential for the sustainable development of public-private partnerships. The risk allocation could be found in the original Project Appraisal Document (p.15). • Lacking performance on E&S issues by the sponsor in Kounoune Power highlighted the stringent requirements needed under TP for conformity. Readiness for Implementation 54. Having been designed by the sponsor in response to a previous call for proposals (see context above), the TP project was thoroughly well designed with the most up-to-date technical international standards and was ready for construction. Construction management contracts were also well advanced at the time of appraisal. The project’s readiness was further illustrated by the project company’s ability to advance funds to proceed with construction prior to financial close. As previously mentioned, delays in project implementation fueled from the extra time needed to revise and approve underpinning agreements, related to fuel pricing and PPA effectiveness. Page 17 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) 55. Following World Bank Group operational policy on guarantees, the IDA Guarantee in support of the TP project was only submitted for Board approval once its structure had been well defined even though negotiations had not been completed. The need for changes to the PRG structure after Board approval resulted from the reluctance of TP and its financiers to take the risk that the L/C supported by the IDA guarantee would not be available for the entire 22 years of the PPA. To mitigate this risk, the guarantee structure was modified to incorporate the possibility of covering payments directly to TP if the SBLC was not available. The 2014 reform of the guarantee policy framework made possible this change in the guarantee structure. B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION (i) Factors subject to the government and/or implementing entities control 56. Coordination and engagement. The review and approval process during negotiations were lengthy and burdensome partly due to a lack of consolidated coordination across relevant public institutions. The project could have benefited from the identification of a focal point in charge of accelerating processes and pushing forward key project actions to avoid administrative barriers and reduce implementation obstacles. 57. Safeguards. With multiple subcontractors on-site, it was particularly important that the sponsor had all of the core elements in place to ensure full compliance with safeguards requirements and closely monitor its partners on-site. Project monitoring during construction (prior to the effectiveness of the IDA guarantee) was led by IFC with support from the owner’s engineer. The IDA E&S specialists worked closely with IFC counterparts to supervise safeguards. Nevertheless, the project company’s need to strengthen the monitoring and fulfilling E&S safeguards requirements were brought to light during the investigations that followed a first fatal accidents on-site. The incident (followed by a second one which also caused another fatality) and related issues are discussed in the safeguards section. (ii) Factors subject to World Bank control 58. Adequacy of supervision/adequacy of reporting. There was a long period after Board approval during which the set of legal documents underpinning the IDA guarantee was being negotiated, but no Legal Agreements were signed, nor was the project effective. The focus of the World Bank’s supervision and mission was mainly on ensuring the adequacy of sector policies and performances to support the guarantee and achieving the guarantee signature, effectiveness, and project financial closing with limited reporting on project construction as this was done independently by the sponsor on its own bridge financing. On the other hand, IFC closely followed up the monitoring of financing and construction activities, as the sponsor, EPC contractor, and lenders carried out various periodic progress reports enabling the supervision of project activities. Page 18 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 59. The key outcome indicators to be monitored for the TP project were appropriate, specific, easy to quantify, and directly linked to the PDO. Given the very straightforward and specific PDO, these indicators, focusing on total power generated by the project and the total number of electricity users to benefit from this electricity, are considered to be adequate. A set of intermediate results indicators aiming at monitoring the project’s progress during project implementation complemented these outcome indicators. Overall, the project M&E was well designed. 60. The indicator aiming to measure the amount of capital mobilized was nearly achieved at 98 percent with US$168 million mobilized against a target of US$172 million. This target was not fully achieved for positive reasons, because efficient procurement led to cost savings in the project. Project restructuring could have been completed to revise the project target given these savings. 61. The limited number of indicators is consistent with the nature of large private infrastructure projects with many other monitoring mechanisms including the EPC, sponsor, and lenders’ engineering supervision, construction reports, and safeguards reports. The number and the types of indicators selected were perceived to be adequate. The overall M&E design is considered satisfactory given its relevance, simplicity, and efficiency in monitoring key outcomes. M&E Implementation 62. Data to monitor results through the identified indicators and overall project implementation was collected from SENELEC, TP, and an independent lenders’ engineer contracted by IFC. Detailed annual reports from SENELEC describing energy movements within its network and providing detailed dispatching results and costs for individual power plants facilitated the assessment of performance. In addition, periodic operational progress reports from TP provided details on PPA invoicing and payment records as well as progress throughout the construction and commissioning phases. The owner’s engineer delivered construction reports to monitor implementation. M&E Utilization 63. While project indicators were limited in number and scope (mainly oriented to measure the achievement of development objectives during project operation), they provided a broad and adequate framework for monitoring different aspects of the project’s progress and taking corrective actions on the plant’s construction and its impact. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 64. The design of M&E for the project is sound and was sufficient to assess the achievement of the development objective. It is therefore rated High. Page 19 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE Safeguards 65. The TP project was classified as a Category A operation due to its scale and nature. In term of safeguard, the project was innovative for the Senegal context, as it already applied the more stringent Performance Standards already used by IFC (more similar to the recently approved Environmental Social Framework requirements) rather than the Bank’s safeguard policies. Five performance standards (PS) were applicable to the project: (a) PS 1 - Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts; (b) PS 2 - Labor and Working Conditions; (c) PS 3 - Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention; (d) PS 4 - Community Health, Safety, and Security; and (e) PS 5 - Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement. The Environmental and Social Action Plan and Environmental and Social Review Summary for the project were disclosed at the InfoShop in June 2013. The project was however expected to have limited E&S impacts that could be managed through the existing project design and management plans developed in the scope of the project as guided by the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment/Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). 66. A fatal accident on-site in December 2015 highlighted noncompliance with PS 2 with lapses on contractor management, adequate supervision of site activities, and training on occupational health and safety (OHS). These shortcomings were identified through an in-depth World Bank Group due diligence undertaken after the incident. Timely communication with lenders and the World Bank Group was lacking and control over the implementation of OHS measures needed to be reinforced by the sponsor. A detailed action plan was prepared after this fatality to address these shortcomings and was fully implemented by TP. 67. The action plan included implementation of a revised E&S management system with the objective of improving OHS/environmental health and safety (EHS) practices through capacity building of all workers and more stringent supervision of performance on-site. EHS teams were strengthened with the addition of three new supervisors to enhance round-the-clock monitoring and the extension of TP’s contract with an EHS consulting company that provides oversight for ESMP compliance. EHS manuals were updated to strengthen policies for EHS presence during works. Induction training for contractors, short safety information for short-term visitors, and a rigorous regular training schedule for all workers on-site—including daily 10-minute security trainings—were put in place. Work permits and rapid risk assessments were enacted to regulate activity on-site and ensure proper supervision by signatories. The number of cameras on-site was significantly increased to provide coverage of key hazardous sites. The communication protocol, grievance redress mechanism, and safety systems (24- hour ambulance, in-house medic, and records of injuries) were improved. 68. Despite these precautions, a second fatal accident occurred on-site in the construction area for the expansion of the project in September 2016. Communication on this incident was immediate and three missions were undertaken after the incident to complete a root cause analysis and assess OHS performance. An independent EHS audit was conducted in November 2016. All investigations concluded that the application and monitoring of OHS/EHS standards was appropriate and there were no shortcomings that may have contributed to the second accident. Additional improvements recommended by the missions were implemented following this second fatality. IFC appointed an Page 20 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) independent E&S consultant to undertake portfolio oversight during the project’s first years of operation and until all E&S gaps are closed. 69. Because of these incidents, overall safeguards performance was viewed as an important issue in the implementation of the project. The implementation of the action plan developed after the first incident and general improvement in the sponsor’s E&S performance following these incidents indicated appropriate management of safeguards. Fiduciary 70. There are no traditional financial management issues as there are no IDA-financed procurement or procurement-related disbursements under the project. Should the IDA guarantee be called, IDA would disburse to the L/C bank and the Government would then be obligated to repay IDA in accordance with the terms of the Indemnity Agreement between GoS and IDA. 71. The procurement guidelines applicable to the guarantee underpinning the TP project were defined in "World Bank's Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" dated January 2011, para 3.18. This requires that goods and services must be procured with due regard to economy and efficiency. The overall procurement of the TP Project met general principles of industry-wide standards of economy, efficiency and transparency for this scale and timing of procurement. Actual project costs are in line with projects of this type elsewhere in Africa. 72. In 2008 SENELEC issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) to two prequalified candidates for a power plant located in Taiba Ndiaye. TP was the only bidder to submit a complete and responsive proposal. The Project was therefore awarded to the MPG/Man Diesel consortium. The process was later canceled because of the GoS's decision to explore alternative sources of production particularly gas and coal that would in the GoS's view mitigate increasing fuel prices. Later in 2011, given the non-availability of gas and delays in coal projects implementation, SENELEC decided to reengage on the Project and submitted an application to the Direction in charge of Public Procurement Monitoring to conclude the PPA by mutual agreement between TP and SENELEC based on an exception included in the Public Procurement Code. C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 73. World Bank performance during project preparation was adequate, particularly in an emergency context with sustained pressure from the Government to quickly address the need for an increase in the availability of affordable electricity. The project design effectively addressed a strategic objective for Senegal that would remain a relevant priority for the next decade, in the least. The design of the guarantee was adapted to match the complexity of the context within which the TP project was developed and to provide flexibility to mitigate potential future risks. The guarantee contributed to the structuring of a comprehensive financing plan and provided enough comfort to leverage over EUR 120 million in equity and debt. World Bank performance on quality at entry is rated Satisfactory. The project Page 21 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) was considered very innovating as precursor of the MDF approach and the close collaboration between IFC and IDA. Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 74. World Bank Group supervision activities were mostly through the monitoring of energy sector fundamentals, overall construction progress, assessment of guarantee obligations, and broad coordination with other stakeholders. The supervision for the plant construction was led by IFC as lead arranger and co-developer of the project through an independent owner’s engineer. As a part of the World Bank’s overall sector monitoring activities, the task team maintained oversight on sectoral issues relevant to project performance. The team has also showed proactivity with the first restructuring, finding a solution to the complex issue of the L/C and PPA tenure mismatch, which risked putting the whole project and Bank’s support in jeopardy. Supervision missions, especially joint lenders’ supervision missions were limited during construction. The available documentation, including reports from the sponsor and IFC, has been used for this report. 75. The presence of task team leaders locally facilitated the broad monitoring of the project, Following the first accident, enhanced supervision was put in place for a year. Joint World Bank Group E&S supervision missions were conducted and an independent E&S consultant was appointed to ensure portfolio oversight during the first years of operation and until all E&S gaps were closed. The team showed proactivity and innovation in addressing complex health and safety issues, which are a widespread concern in Senegal. 76. Nevertheless, the quality of supervision could have benefited from a more concerted approach between development financial institutions (DFIs) involved in the project. Given the number of lenders involved in the project, a coordinated effort to hold periodic and consistent supervision missions could have helped speed up processes, improve communications among the various stakeholders, and harmonize engagement with the sponsor, which felt fatigued by the monitoring requirements of multiple stakeholders. Further, detailed documentation of IDA supervision activities during construction is lacking and a progress report should have been filed in the World Bank’s information repository system on a regular basis. 77. Given the nature of the project, and according to the explanation in the previous paragraphs, World Bank supervision performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 78. Despite overall efficient achievement of project outcomes, shortcomings in the quality of supervision, especially during the construction phase, are present as outlined. Overall rating for World Bank performance is therefore Moderately Satisfactory. D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME Rating: Modest Page 22 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) 79. The risk to development outcome for the project is assessed, including risks against issues that may lead to the need to call on the IDA Guarantee. 80. With ongoing operation issues in the operation of the Sendou plant, delays in the development of other generation projects, and a steadily increasing energy demand, TP will likely remain a key resource for baseload in the near term and a peak load resource in the long term. Dispatching has remained above the switching value rate of 45 percent of available power and is expected to remain significantly above the switching value of 15 percent dispatch (corresponding to peak plant use) post 2020. When gas becomes available, the plant will be converted to align with this new resource, further improving its merit order position and dispatching over time and making it integral to the long-term sectoral plan. The project would not only provide important baseload services to the network, but it would also become an important player in providing flexibility to the network. 81. SENELEC’s financial performance and payment track record has been improving but remains vulnerable to issues outside of the utility’s control: (a) SENELEC’s financial performance is still very sensitive to oil price fluctuations and fuel costs have increased recently; (b) the growing amount of state arrears, for compensation on the full cost of tariffs and value added tax reimbursement, is constraining cash flows; and (c) the GoS’s decision to decrease tariffs by 10 percent in January 2017. 82. With regard to oil price fluctuations, an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism was built into the end-user tariff to help mitigate this risk. The status of compensation arrears and revenue management for SENELEC is also closely monitored by the World Bank Group and will continue to be the subject of close collaboration with counterparts on budget support reforms. TP provides important flexibility in the handling of electricity demand and will be a key partner for SENELEC in managing the power system’s overall stability and reliability. The GoS’ commitment to the development of the energy sector and promotion of private sector participation in generation activities is strong. In light of these factors and the performance of the project to date, the risks to the development outcome are Modest. E. GUARANTEE IN SUPPORT OF THE PROJECT Impact of the Guarantee in Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 83. The TP IDA Guarantee was designed to protect the project company from nonpayment of certain PPA obligations by SENELEC and nonpayment of certain Government Guarantee obligations by the GoS (see discussion in Components section above). The utility, SENELEC, was not financially viable and was highly dependent on Government subsidies to support operations at the time the project was developed. As a result, IDA Guarantee coverage and World Bank Group involvement, in particular, was essential to provide investors with sufficient comfort to provide the financing needed for the project. As mentioned above, the project was very innovative in anticipating the MFD framework approach and close relation between IFC and IDA teams during preparation and implementation. Role and Value of the Guarantee in Addressing Critical Risks and Improving the Overall Sustainability of the Transaction 84. The TP IDA Guarantee was an important credit enhancement mechanism to mitigate the low creditworthiness risk of SENELEC and reduce overall risk for the transaction. It replaced the payment Page 23 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) security structure (cash collateral) originally envisioned in the PPA. The IDA Guarantee aimed to backstop certain payment obligations under the PPA and protect the project company from liquidity and certain termination risks. In particular, the IDA Guarantee covered risks of (a) nonpayment by SENELEC of its payment obligations under the PPA and (b) nonpayment by the GoS of its payment obligations under the Government Guarantee, which includes capacity charges, variable energy charges, fuel and logistics payments, and termination payments. Key Issues or Events that May Arise in the Future that Could Lead to a Potential Call on the Guarantee 85. The TP project was commissioned in March 2016 and has been operating successfully as discussed above. As indicated in paragraph 70, provisions have been made to closely monitor SENELEC’s performance and the performance contract under the Senegal Electricity Sector Support (P125565) Project, and budget support programs further facilitate supervision of the utility’s financial health. The GoS remains stable and economic performance has been strong. Reforms are expected in the energy sector in the scope of budget support programs and the newly signed (December 2018) Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact II between the U.S. Government and GoS. These reforms align with the project’s objectives and underlying supporting strategies and are expected to reinforce expected impact of the project. V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 86. A number of lessons have been drawn from experiences during preparation and implementation of the project, as detailed in the following paragraphs. 87. Government commitment and efficient coordination is crucial to successfully implement IPP projects on time. In large infrastructure projects, particularly with the level of complexity of the TP project (multiple lenders, multiple commercial agents, mismatch between duration of the L/C, and the duration of the PPA), strong Government commitment and the existence of an institutional focal point or champion is essential to ensure successful preparation and implementation. These projects often require the Government to review and coordinate approvals for a variety of legal and financial documentation. The existence of a focal point to help expedite processes and remove obstacles will not only help avoid procedural delay but also address challenges that the public sector is better suited to tackle—such as permits and legislation. Having the Government play a strong coordinating and enabling role is critical to create a strong business environment within which the private sector can thrive. 88. Similarly, greater coordination among financiers is important to facilitate collaboration. With many lenders, close collaboration and coordination is important to avoid subjecting the client and other partners to multiple parallel procedures and limit inefficient bilateral iterations. The nomination of lead arrangers is a good way to achieve this, but there should be a concerted effort to streamline communications and harmonize positions where possible to avoid dissonance at advanced stages of preparation. This is particularly true during project supervision, where enhanced coordination among DFIs would have been particularly useful in optimizing supervision resources, improving communications between all parties, and, to the extent possible, harmonizing criteria. 89. The guarantee is key instrument to be deployed to support private interventions in a sector undergoing reform. After the 2011 energy crisis, the Government launched a significant reform effort to Page 24 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) turn around the electricity sector. In support, the Bank deployed a wide array of instruments targeting the sector, including Investment Project Financing (IPF), Development Policy Financing (DPF), and guarantees. In such context, the guarantee is key to provide a risk mitigation mechanism for private sector and increase its appetite to invest in a reforming sector. As such, the Tobene IPP project, and its supporting guarantee and IFC investment, was a piece in a larger puzzle of reform measures that the Government of Senegal was implementing to turn around the country energy sector. Embedded in a broad suite of WBG support, guarantees can be a powerful instrument in mitigating the power sector's financial and institutional risks for investors in the sector. While the guarantees do not directly address the financial viability of the energy sector, it can contribute to restoring investors' confidence in a country and a sector. It is also important to note the flexibility of the guarantee instrument, especially after introduction in 2014 of the direct payment option, which in Senegal was able to address the outstanding issues allowing the project to proceed. 90. Upstream collaboration between IFC and Bank was key for the success of the TP project. The TP project is an example of successful WBG collaboration. The IFC and Bank team worked closely together from the project identification stage to ensure a smooth project preparation and implementation. The project piloted a WBG approach to jointly prepare projects, during which some of the decision and credit committee meetings were co-chaired by decision-makers from both institutions. The project was also presented for final approval to a joint-session of the IFC and IDA Boards of Directors. Collaboration with IFC in Senegal, however, went beyond this specific transaction. The regular exchanges of information, within the requirements of each organization’s policy of information disclosure, and the coherent WBG approach to sector policies, allowed for the development of a Join Implementation Plan which laid out the WBG overall strategic approach for the energy sector in Senegal (of which the TP was a key element) and provided the framework for intervention of each World Bank entity. This upstream framework was key in supporting a smooth development of the TP project. 91. Flagship projects are an important opportunity to set important precedents for long-term impact in the sector. The TP has allowed many important lessons to be learned by doing. First, negotiations provide a key platform to identify gaps in the legal and institutional framework of the country. As in the past, SENELEC was the key electricity producer, it benefited from a special price for fuel. This created a disadvantage for the development of private sector generation in the country, as IPPs using the same fuel technology were likely to be always paying higher regulated fuel price. Though efforts to secure the same fuel pricing for same-technology IPPs as that offered to SENELEC prolonged negotiations, the success achieved in securing this key change in Senegalese legislation will incentivize private sector participation in generation. Second, the structuring of the whole project, with multiple lenders and IDA, has significantly increase the Government capacity of developing IPPs, both in term of project finance requirement as well and contract development. For instance, if construction begins before main effectiveness conditions are met, provisions should be made to allow the PPA to be adjusted at a later stage, avoiding the prolonged delays suffered for the Tobene IPP. Given the PPA was granted under unique emergency provisions rather than under a normal tendering process, the conditions for effectiveness remained unclear until an advanced stage of the lenders’ due diligence, leading to substantial delays. In such unique cases, flexibilities should be built into the process to allow for modifications in key documentation at a later stage. Given the Government priority to develop new form of electricity generation through private sector, the lesson learned during the structuring the Tobene IPP will be easily applicable to new IPPs. Finally, the learning-by-doing in term of project Page 25 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) supervision (including E&S aspects) has provided a best practice framework to be followed for future projects and IPPs in the country. Page 26 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Amount of electricity GWh 0.00 558.00 751.00 generated from the project 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Indirect project beneficiaries Number, 0.00 1.17 100.00 1.33 millions 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Page 27 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Commissioning test Y/N N Y Y completed August 2015 March 2016 Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Generation capacity of MW 0.00 70.00 96.00 conventional generation constructed under the 31-Dec-2017 project Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Private capital mobilized US$, millions 0.00 172.00 168.00 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Page 28 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective/Outcome 1 Increase the power generated by Independent Power Producers 1. Amount of electricity generated from the project (GWh) Outcome Indicators 2. Indirect project beneficiaries (millions) 1. Commissioning test completed (Y/N) 2.Generation capacity of conventional generation constructed under Intermediate Results Indicators the project (MW) 3. Private capital mobilized (US$, millions) Key Outputs by Component 1. Construction of power plant (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) Page 29 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Manuel Berlengiero and Demetrios Papathanasiou Task Team Leaders Patrice Claude Charles Caporossi Senior Infrastructure Finance Specialist Teuta Kacaniku Energy Finance Specialist Mark Walker Counsel Issa Maman-Sani Environment Specialist Salamata Bal Senior Social Development Specialist Seynabou Thiaw Seye Project Assistant Lu Ha Senior Program Assistant Supervision Demetrios Papathanasiou (until July 2015), Manuel Task Team Leaders Berlengiero (from August 2015), Patrice C. C. Caporossi, Manuel Luengo Senior Energy Specialist Sidy Diop Senior Procurement Specialist Fatou Fall Samba Senior Financial Management Specialist Teuta Kacaniku Energy Finance Specialist Demetrios Papathanasiou Practice Manager Mark Walker Chief Counsel Ruma Tavorath Senior Environmental Specialist Peter F. B. A. Lafer Senior Social Development Specialist Aminata Ndiaye Bob Program Assistant ICR Manuel Berlengiero Task Team Leader Patrice Caporossi Co- Task Team Leader Tamaro Kane ICR Author Aminata Ndiaye Bob Program Assistant Page 30 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) B. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation/Supervision Total 121.87 863,051.87 ICR Total 6 907,042.28 Page 31 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Actual at Project Percentage of Amount at Approval Components Closing (US$, Approval (US$, (US$, millions) millions) millions) Component 1 40 40 100 Total 40 40 100 Page 32 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 1. An economic analysis of the TP project was conducted to assess project outcome efficiency. The same methodology used in the PAD was maintained in this assessment for consistency. 2. Given that the PPA negotiations were quite advanced at the time of appraisal, the main factor explored in the economic analysis of the project was a potential variation in the price of fuel. The PAD explored two scenarios: (a) Scenario 1: Fuel cost parity was achieved and the TP project obtained fuel at a price on par with that of other plants in the system or (b) Scenario 2: TP is subjected to a fuel premium and fuel price costs 5 percent higher than SENELEC’s other power plants thus lowering the plant in the merit order. 3. Economic efficiency. Economic analysis at appraisal concluded that the EIRR for TP under Scenario 1 with fuel price parity was 30.5 percent, and under Scenario 2 with a fuel price premium would be 24.5 percent. The NPV was estimated to be US$233 million under the fuel price parity scenario and US$143 million under the fuel price premium scenario. The project was expected to remain highly economically viable despite construction delays or cost overruns. The second scenario in which the project would be subjected to a fuel price premium had a considerable effect on the NPV and was further highly sensitive to variations in project costs and delays in commissioning. Nevertheless, the plant was expected to be dispatched at a high level in the long run due to rising demand. 4. With fuel price parity, the project’s higher efficiency was expected to improve its position in the generation merit order because of its expected lower generation costs relative to SENELEC’s power plants. Most of these economic benefits were limited to the first years of operation before the commissioning of the Sendou I coal project. It was expected that with substantial coal generation, HFO plants would be dispatched less. In the case of TP, the eventual availability of gas meant that the plant would overall remain high in the merit order as it continued to align with sectoral needs and the long- term strategy. 5. Costs. Actual project costs decreased by 2.6 percent relative to the estimates during project appraisal. The details are provided in table 4.1. Table 4.1. Change in Project Costs (EUR, millions) Appraisal Actual Change (percentage) EPC contract 93.2 93.30 0.0 Construction management 1.0 1.00 0.0 Land 0.8 0.35 −56.0 Import duties/taxes/stamp 3.1 3.30 +6.5 Development costs 4.2 4.20 0.0 Financing costs 6.3 5.40 −14.3 Debt Service Reserve Account 5.5 7.80 +42.0 Working capital/fuel 7.7 3.00 −39.0 Page 33 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) Contingencies 5.0 5.00 0.0 Project total cost 126.7 123.40 −2.6 6. The main drivers for the lower costs of the project were due to lower costs for land acquisition, working capital, and fuel. On the other hand, financing costs, were higher than budgeted. The project became fully operational with excess operational cash. The project was able to secure fuel price parity with rates at par with SENELEC’s other plants. Despite expectations that its higher efficiency would make the TP plant more competitive, it ranked 7th in the 2017 merit order behind three of SENELEC’s HFO plants (C4, C6, and C7), the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Senegal (OMVS) Manantali and Felou plants, Contour Global Cap des Biches plant, and the Malicounda solar plant. 7. Actual economic performance. Based on the actual values indicated, the EIRR and NPV of the TP project are estimated as in table 4.2. Table 4.2. Project Economic Indicators Appraisal Actual EIRR (percentage) 30.5 28.5 NPV (2013 US$, million) 233 216 NPV (2013 XOF, million) 102,982 95,803 8. The EIRR and NPV of the TP project demonstrate a robust economic performance despite being lower than the appraisal estimates. The cost of the project was slightly less than estimated with savings in land acquisition and fuel. Most of the economic benefits were expected to accrue during the first two years of operation, before the commissioning of the Sendou coal plant, but dispatching remained below expectations. The displacement of TP in SENELEC’s merit order was not due to the coming on-line of the Sendou plant, as expected, but instead due to dispatching needs to commission Cap des Biches and other plants in the first year and fuel supply constraints in the following year. Results indicate that the project remains an important component of least-cost generation with significant contribution to increased electricity generation. 9. With ongoing operation issues in the operation of the Sendou plant, delays in the development of other generation projects, and a steadily increasing energy demand, TP will likely remain a key resource for baseload in the near term and a peak load resource in the long term. Dispatching has remained above the switching value rate of 45 percent of available power and is expected to remain significantly above the switching value of 15 percent dispatch (corresponding to peak plant use) under post-2020 uncertainty. 10. Actual financial performance. The project remains financially sound with operating cash flows in line with expectations to cover debt service and regular dividend payments. SENELEC’s payment track record is satisfactory. Results of the analysis are not included due to confidentiality requirements. Page 34 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS The ICR was reviewed by local counterparts and stakeholders and the few editorial comments received from partners were incorporated in the text. Page 35 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) • Guarantee Agreement. 2015 • IFC. Tobene Power Credit Note – IRM Memo. 2013 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM3. 2015 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM11. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM13. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM14. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM12. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM15. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM16. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM17. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM19. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM20. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene EPC Construction Report. CM21. 2016 • IFC. Sargent and Lundy. Tobene Project Evaluation and Preconstruction Due Diligence Report. 2013 • Indemnity Agreement. 2015 • Power Purchase Agreement. 2011 • Project Agreement. 2015 • SENELEC. Annual Report 2016 • SENELEC. Annual Report 2017 • Tobene Power. Semi-Annual Review of Operations. June 2016 • Tobene Power. Semi-Annual Review of Operations. June 2018 • Tobene Power. Semi-Annual Review of Operations. December 2017 Page 36 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) • Tobene Power. Semi-Annual Review of Operations. December 2016 • Tobene Power. Semi-Annual Review of Operations. June 2017 • Tobene Power. Annual Environmental and Social Performance Monitoring Report. 2017 • Tobene Power. Annual Environmental and Social Performance Monitoring Report. 2016 • World Bank. Action Plan for Improving OHS Systems – Management Memo. 2017 • World Bank. Post-Closing Level II Restruture Memo. July 2017. • World Bank. Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Production Project Appraisal Document. 2013 • World Bank Aide-Memoires and briefing notes (2015, 2016 and 2017, when available) • WBG Joint Implementation Plan 2016 Page 37 of 38 The World Bank Taiba Ndiaye Independent Power Producer Project ( P143605 ) MAP Page 38 of 38