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Contents 8 Abbreviations 9 Acknowledgments 11 CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 15 CHAPTER 2: ENDOWMENTS 17 Health 17 Fertility 18 Teen Pregnancy 20 Maternal Mortality and Access to Health Services 21 Healthy Aging, Mortality, and Morbidity 24 Education 24 Gender Gaps in Enrollment and Attainment 26 Gender Gaps in Learning 27 Family Structure, Asset Ownership, and Mobility 33 CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES 34 Low Female Labor Force Participation 37 Individual Determinants of Labor Force Participation 39 Potential Barriers to Work 42 Gender Gaps in Employment and Unemployment 44 Gender Gaps in Earnings 47 Gender Gaps in Entrepreneurship 47 Performance Gaps between Male- and Female-Owned Firms 48 Can Training Interventions Improve the Performance of Female-Owned Firms? 48 Gender Gaps in Access to Finance 49 Gender Gaps in Financial Inclusion 52 Barriers to Women’s Access to Financial Services 57 CHAPTER 4: AGENCY 58 Legal and Institutional Framework for Gender Equality 58 National Legal Framework 61 Subnational Institutional Framework for Gender Equality 63 International Conventions 64 Assessing the Institutional Framework 64 Accessing Institutions and Using Property 65 Getting a Job and Providing Incentives to Work 66 Going to Court 66 Protecting Women from Violence 67 Social Norms 69 Violence against Women, Femicides, and Sexual Harassment 69 Intimate Partner Violence 70 Femicides 71 Gender-Based Violence and Improvements in Women’s Economic Conditions 72 Women’s Political Participation 77 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 78 Eliminate Differences in Endowments 79 Narrow Wage and Productivity Gaps between Women and Men 79 Diminish Gender Differences in Household and Societal Voice 80 APPENDIX A: DATABASES 81 References Boxes 42 BOX 3.1 ICT Infrastructure Can Help 59 BOX 4.1 National Planning for Gender Equality 45 BOX 3.2 Wage Gap Decomposition Using 65 BOX 4.2 The Ejidos and Comunidades System Matching, as Proposed by Ñopo (2008) 53 BOX 3.3 The Potential of Fintech to Close the Gender Gap in Financial Access Figures 16 FIGURE 2.1 Mexican Population, by Gender and 18 FIGURE 2.3 Fertility Rate in Mexico, by Ethnicity Age Group, 1950 – 2015 Group, 2015 17 FIGURE 2.2 Fertility and Infant Mortality Rates in 18 FIGURE 2.4 Child, Adult, and Total Dependency Mexico, 1950 – 2015 Rates in Mexico, Actual and Projected, 1950 – 2050 18 FIGURE 2.5 Adolescent Pregnancy in Mexico 39 FIGURE 3.8 Hours per Week Spent on Work, 19 FIGURE 2.6 Teenage Fertility Rate, Selected Caregiving, Housework, and Leisure in Mexico, OECD Countries, 2016 or latest available by Gender, Education, and Income, 2014 21 FIGURE 2.7 Maternal Mortality in Mexico and 39 FIGURE 3.9 Time Spent in Unpaid, Paid, and Total OECD Comparisons Work in Mexico and OECD, by Gender, 2015 21 FIGURE 2.8 Maternal Mortality Rates in Mexico, 40 FIGURE 3.10 Female Labor Force Participation by Ethnicity Group, 2012 – 17 in Mexico, by Marital Status and Presence of Small Children, 2005 – 17 22 FIGURE 2.9 Life Expectancy at Birth in Mexico, by Gender, 1950 – 2015 40 FIGURE 3.11 Factors Driving Women’s Decision Not to Work in Mexico, by Skill Level, 2012 22 FIGURE 2.10 Leading Causes of Death in Mexico, by Gender, 2017 40 FIGURE 3.12 Female Labor Force Participation in Mexico, by Skill Level, Marital Status, and 23 FIGURE 2.11 Incidence of Diabetes in Mexico, Children’s Ages, 2012 by Gender and Age Group, 2016 41 FIGURE 3.13 Factors that Would Induce 23 FIGURE 2.12 Prevalence of Obesity, by Gender, Nonworking Women to Consider Taking a Job Selected OECD Countries, 2016 in Mexico, 2012 24 FIGURE 2.13 Women’s Educational Attainment 42 FIGURE 3.14 Unemployment and in Mexico, by Age and Ethnicity Group, 2015 Underemployment in Mexico, by Gender, 25 FIGURE 2.14 Educational Attainment in Mexico, 2015 – 18 by Gender, 2016 43 FIGURE 3.15 Share of Mexican Workers in 26 FIGURE 2.15 Average PISA Mathematics Scores, Informal Employment, by Gender, 2015 – 18 by Gender, Selected Countries, 2015 43 FIGURE 3.16 Type of Employment in Mexico, 26 FIGURE 2.16 Gender Gap in Average PISA Scores, by Gender and Indigenous Status, 2016 2003 – 15 44 FIGURE 3.17 Shares of Men and Women Earning 27 FIGURE 2.17 Share of Male- and Female-Headed Labor Income in Mexico, 2016 Households in Mexico, 1990 – 2015 44 FIGURE 3.18 Sectoral Composition of 28 FIGURE 2.18 Single-Parent Households in Mexico, Employment, by Gender, in Mexico, 2018 by Gender of Household Head, 2015 45 FIGURE 3.19 Decomposition of Male-Female 28 FIGURE 2.19 Ownership of High-Value Assets Wage Gap in Mexico, 2016 in Mexico, by Gender, 2018 46 FIGURE 3.20 Decomposition of Male-Female 28 FIGURE 2.20 Ownership of Financial Assets Wage Gap in Latin America, 2016 in Mexico, by Gender, 2018 49 FIGURE 3.21 Evolution of Financial Inclusion 34 FIGURE 3.1 Long-Run Total Income Loss due in Mexico, by Gender and Area of Residence, to Gender Gaps in Labor Market Participation, 2012 – 18 Selected OECD Countries, 2010 49 FIGURE 3.22 Gender Gap in Financial Inclusion 35 FIGURE 3.2 Female Labor Force Participation in in Mexico, by Type of Financial Product and Area Mexico Relative to GDP and Fertility Indicators, of Residence, 2018 1900 – 2020 50 FIGURE 3.23 Percentage of Mexican Adults with 36 FIGURE 3.3 Female Labor Force Participation a Bank Account, by Gender and Area Trends in Mexico and Selected Countries, of Residence, 2018 1990 – 2020 50 FIGURE 3.24 Percentage of Mexican Adults 36 FIGURE 3.4 U-Shaped Relationship (Goldin 1995) with a Bank Account, by Account Type between FLFP and Income Levels and Gender, 2018 37 FIGURE 3.5 Regional and Ethnic Differences 51 FIGURE 3.25 Use of the Financial Infrastructure in Female Labor Force Participation in Mexico in Mexico over the Past Year, by Channel 38 FIGURE 3.6 Labor Force Participation in Mexico, of Access, Gender, and Area of Residence, 2018 by Gender, Age, and Educational Attainment, 51 FIGURE 3.26 Main Source of Emergency Funds 2000 and 2010 among Mexican Population with Access to Such 38 FIGURE 3.7 Share of Youth Not in Employment, Funds, by Gender, 2017 Education, or Training (NEET), Selected OECD 52 FIGURE 3.27 Use of Formal and Informal Credit Countries, 2017 and Savings in Mexico, by Gender, 2018 53 FIGURE 3.28 Percentage of Mexican Population 67 FIGURE 4.4 Change in Agreement with Selected with a Cell Phone, by Gender and Area Gender-Related Statements, Mexico, 1996 – 2012 of Residence, 2012 – 16 68 FIGURE 4.5 Agreement with Selected Gender- 54 FIGURE 3.29 Use of Internet and Mobile-Phone Related Statements, by Gender and Age Group, Services in Mexico, by Gender, 2017 Mexico, 2012 54 FIGURE 3.30 Reasons for Not Owning a Bank 68 FIGURE 4.6 Change in Agreement that Men Account in Mexico, 2017 Should Have Priority for Jobs When Scarce, 54 FIGURE 3.31 Reasons of Bank Account Holders Mexico, 1990 – 2012 in Mexico for Not Using Mobile Banking Services, 69 FIGURE 4.7 Agreement that Women Earning More 2018 than Husbands Is Problematic, Mexico, 2012 63 FIGURE 4.1 Municipal Institutions for Women 70 FIGURE 4.8 Lifetime Prevalence of Violence in Mexico, by Type and State, 2017 against Women Aged 15 Years and Older 64 FIGURE 4.2 Legal Barriers to Women’s Economic in Mexico Participation in Mexico and Other Country 70 FIGURE 4.9 Homicides in Mexico, by Gender, Groups, 2018 1985 – 2016 67 FIGURE 4.3 Indicators of Agreement with Gender- Related Statements, by Gender, 2012 Maps 17 MAP 2.1 Fertility across Mexico, by State 25 MAP 2.5 Gender Gap in Educational Attainment (Avg. Number of Live Births per Woman, in Mexico, by State, 2015 2009 – 13) 43 MAP 3.1 Share of Mexican Female Workers 20 MAP 2.2 Contraceptive Use by Females Aged in Informal Employment, by Region, 2018 15–49 Years in Mexico, by State, 2014 71 MAP 4.1 Prevalence of Domestic Violence 21 MAP 2.3 Maternal Mortality Rates in Mexico, Reported against Women in Mexico, by State, 2011 by State, 2018 22 MAP 2.4 Difference between Male and Female Life Expectancy (Years) in Mexico, by State, 2015 Tables 59 TABLE 4.1 Participants in the Institutional 62 TABLE 4.3 Status of State-Level Institutions Framework on Gender in Mexico, 2019 for Women in Mexico, 2019 61 TABLE 4.2 Roles in Institutional Framework for 80 TABLE A.1 Databases Used in the Mexico Gender Equality in Mexico, 2019 Gender Assessment Abbreviations ATM automated teller machine CEO chief executive officer ENDIREH National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships ENIF National Survey of Financial Inclusion Global Findex Global Financial Inclusion Database (World Bank) fintech financial technology FLFP female labor force participation GLAWLFV General Law of Access for Women to a Life Free of Violence GLEWM General Law for the Equality between Women and Men G2P government-to-person ICT information and communication technology INMUJERES National Institute for Women IPV intimate partner violence LNIW Law of the National Institute of Women NEET not in employment, education, or training OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PISA Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD) RCT randomized controlled trial 8 | Mexico Gender Assessment Acknowledgments This report was prepared by a World Bank team led by Gabriela Inchauste (lead economist, Poverty and Equity Global Practice) including Paula Torres Tavares, Nayda Almodóvar Reteguis, Laura Moreno, Eva Arceo-Gómez, Alejandra Ríos Cázares, Alma Santillán, Kiyomi Cadena, Mating Matsatsinyana, Leonardo Iacovone, and Belem Saucedo Carranza. Mary Anderson edited the report. The work was carried out under the guidance of Pablo Saavedra, country director for Mexico, and Oscar Calvo-González, practice manager, Poverty and Equity Global Practice. Aylin Isik-Dikmelik, Ana María Muñoz Boudet and Jonna Lundvall kindly peer-reviewed the document and provided valuable advice and suggestions that substantially improved the quality of the report. The team also received valuable advice and feedback from William Wiseman, Rafael De Hoyos, Katharina Siegmann, Zeina Afif, María Dávalos, Carlos Rodríguez Castelán, and Lourdes Rodríguez-Chamussy. 9 Chapter 1: Overview Gender equality is a key pathway to ensuring lasting Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun- poverty reduction and shared prosperity. Identifying tries and is especially frequent among poor, low-educated, the main gender gaps that a country faces, across dif- and indigenous girls. Second, although maternal mortality ferent domains, better informs policy design. To that ef- rates have declined, they are still very high in some regions fect, this report seeks to identify where progress has been and among vulnerable population groups, including rural achieved in increasing opportunities and outcomes for and indigenous women. Finally, the incidence of obesity women and men in Mexico and where further policy ac- is among the highest in the world, which is linked to high tion is required. It focuses on three areas that are critical incidence of diabetes and diabetes-related deaths, par- for gender-equal access to opportunities: (a) endowments, ticularly among women. When it comes to education, gen- such as health and education; (b) economic opportunities, der gaps in enrollment and attainment are still a concern such as access to labor, land, and financial markets; and in lagging regions, where women face an especially large (c) agency, including norms, representation, and freedom risk of dropping out, largely because of teenage pregnancy. from violence (World Bank 2012). The report takes ad- Tertiary education, although more common now than vantage of the existing literature as well as different sourc- ever before, is still far from being available to all women. es of publicly available data for the country and aims to Moreover, Mexico is among the lowest-ranking perform- provide a panorama of the prevailing gender gaps and ar- ers in international standardized tests among OECD coun- eas for work to close those gaps, covering a wide range tries, with girls underperforming more than boys, espe- of outcomes. As such, it seeks to serve as a guiding doc- cially beginning in upper-secondary school. Differences ument for policy action and dialogue, further research, in learning are reflected in educational choices, as women and public discussion. and men are still segregated across fields of education and areas of specialization. Beyond human capital endowments, Gender gaps have declined on many outcomes it is difficult to imagine that women can thrive without in Mexico. Fertility rates have declined, and the mater- access to productive inputs, including physical and finan- nal mortality ratio has more than halved since 1995. Life cial assets, particularly if they are the sole breadwinners. expectancy has continued to increase, with women now In 2018, 65 percent of women did not own a high-value asset. outliving men by about six years. Similarly, gaps in pri- mary and secondary enrollments have closed, while new Gender gaps in participation in the labor market and gaps are emerging in tertiary enrollments for boys as young entrepreneurship entail substantial economic losses women now dominate university enrollment. Female labor for women and their families in the form of forgone force participation has increased, and women have greater income, but they also imply large aggregate losses for access to finance. Moreover, Mexico has adopted legis- the economy (World Bank 2012). Mexico’s gender gap lation to promote women’s political representation, and in labor market participation is associated with a poten- there is evidence that some societal norms have evolved tial loss of up to 25 percent of income per capita. This is toward gender-equality principles, particularly among especially relevant in the current demographic context younger generations. of Mexico, where higher participation of all those in the economically active age group represents a unique win- Despite this progress, gender differences in endow- dow of opportunity for growth and savings. ments are still a challenge, and are particularly prob- lematic among rural and indigenous communities. Gender gaps in economic opportunities include low With respect to health, three issues stand out. First, teen- labor force participation, high levels of informality, age pregnancy is very high relative to Organisation for low-productivity entrepreneurship, and low access 12 | Mexico Gender Assessment to productive inputs. Only 45 percent of working-age Women’s agency in Mexico has improved in many Mexican women are part of the labor force, compared respects, but there are remaining concerns about wom- with an average of 51 percent in all Latin American and en’s ability to earn and control their income as well as Caribbean countries, 52 percent in the OECD countries, about violence against women. Mexico’s legal and insti- and levels of around 50 percent in Chile and 58 percent tutional frameworks promote gender equality in many in Colombia — two regional peers whose levels of female respects, including ensuring women’s access to institu- labor force participation in the 1990s were similar or lower tions, property, and justice. These frameworks ensure the to those of Mexico. These low levels of participation are political representation of women, allow women to build the result of gender differences in time use, gender differ- credit and to get a job, and protect women from violence. ences in access to productive inputs, and gender differ- However, more could be done to reduce barriers to work ences stemming from market and institutional failures and to ensure equal pay for equal work. Similarly, more (World Bank 2012). Differences in time use result primarily could be done to penalize and prevent sexual harassment at from differences in care responsibilities. Mexican women work and in public places. Beyond the legal norms, social spend 9 – 12 more hours a week than men in taking care norms about women’s role in society remain mixed and of children, depending on their level of education and could also pose barriers to work. For instance, 44 percent income. They also spend 17 – 26 more hours a week than of women still believe that children suffer when a woman men on household chores and have less overall time for lei- works for pay, and one in two women believe that “women sure. It is no surprise then that, for many women, the deci- earning more than their husbands is problematic.” Most sion to work largely depends on their household responsibil- critically, 66 percent of women aged 15 years or more has ities. Differences in access to productive inputs include less experienced some form of gender violence, largely at the access to physical assets (land, housing, and other property) hands of their spouses or partners.1 and to credit. Only 35 percent of Mexican women owned at least one high-value asset in 2018, and while 65 percent Supporting the equality of women and men is a smart had some form of financial product, only 31 percent owned development strategy for Mexico. Policy efforts must a pension fund, and only 26.5 percent had access to formal encompass the several fronts where barriers to gender equal- credit. Gender differences stemming from market and insti- ity persist, from influencing norms to ensuring equal access tutional failures are most evident by the fact that the gen- to opportunities. Eliminating differences in endowments der earnings gap cannot be explained by differences in indi- will require greater outreach to tackle teenage pregnancy vidual characteristics or by the fact that men and women and maternal mortality (particularly in lagging regions and work in different kinds of jobs. Similarly, most of the dif- in rural and indigenous communities); promote healthy ferences in performance between male- and female-owned lifestyles to reduce obesity and the risk of diabetes; facili- businesses cannot be explained by differences in the char- tate the transition from school to work; and improve wom- acteristics of owners or their firms. en’s access to productive resources. Reducing dispari- ties in economic opportunities will require greater access Gender segregation in access to economic opportu- to affordable, high-quality childcare and after-school nities in turn reinforces gender differences in time or full-time school programs; gender-neutral parental use and in access to inputs and perpetuates mar- leave policies and flexible work arrangements; soft- and ket and institutional failures (World Bank 2012). For hard-skills training for women entrepreneurs; and stronger instance, women are more likely than men to hold infor- mechanisms to foster financial inclusion, including through mal or part-time jobs. Because part-time and informal new technologies and emphasizing rural areas. Finally, jobs often pay lower wages than full-time and formal jobs, increasing women’s agency will require a multifaceted a high concentration of women in these lower-paying jobs approach to address gender-based violence, as well as inter- weakens the incentives to participate in market work and ventions that can shift aspirations, tackle information defi- thus reinforces the decision not to work. It is precisely cits, and ensure the effective implementation of the law. this interaction of segregation with gender differences in time use, access to inputs, and market and institu- tional failures that traps women in low-paying jobs and NOTE low-productivity businesses. Breaking out of this pattern 1. Partner violence data from the National Survey on the requires interventions that lift time constraints, increase Dynamics of Household Relationships (ENDIREH) 2016, women’s access to productive inputs, and corrects mar- National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): ket and institutional failures. http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/endireh/2016/. CHAPTER 1: Overview | 13 Chapter 2: Endowments Investments in human capital have a demonstrated societies in the long term. These gaps can play a relevant large impact on individuals’ capability to benefit from role in the intergenerational transmission of gender ine- life-long opportunities and to make a positive social and qualities (World Bank 2012) and bear substantial costs for economic contribution. Differences between men and societies. This chapter analyzes the access to and accu- women in basic endowments such as health and education, mulation of basic human capital endowments for men especially at an early age, can perpetuate gender gaps in and women in Mexico. This begins with health and edu- access to opportunity throughout the life cycle. The per- cation. The chapter then briefly discusses access to and sistence of unequal opportunities for women entails large ownership of other kinds of assets, including land, prop- costs, not only for individuals and families but also for erty, and other assets. FIGURE 2.1 Mexican Population, by Gender and Age Group, 1950 – 2015 111 108 Man Woman 105 102 99 96 93 90 87 84 81 78 75 72 69 66 63 60 57 Age 54 51 48 45 42 39 36 33 30 27 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 Percent of population 1950 1970 2000 2010 2015 Source: CONAPO 2018b. 16 | Mexico Gender Assessment HEALTH FIGURE 2.2 Fertility and Infant Mortality Rates in Mexico, 1950 – 2015 Mexico is a young country, undergoing a demographic 140 8 transition. Falling fertility and mortality rates at all ages imply that there is an impending young working-age pop- Infant mortality rate, deaths per 1,000 births 120 7 ulation bulge, placing the country at the “demographic Fertility rate, avg. children per woman window of opportunity.”1 This youth bulge could yield 6 100 important benefits in the development and growth pro- cess of the country. Demographic transition — caused 5 80 by medical progress, improvements in living conditions, 4 reductions in infant mortality, and increases in life expec- 60 tancy — has rapidly increased the older-adult population 3 (Figure 2.1). The share of adults older than 65 has had 40 a tenfold increase since 1950 (CONAPO 2018). 2 20 1 Improvements in control of communicable diseases and the changing demographic structure, compounded 0 0 by behavioral factors such as teen pregnancy, diet, and 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2005 2010 2015 2000 exercise, are shifting the priorities for a healthy society. Recent reforms have expanded access to health care sig- Infant mortality rate (left axis) Fertility rate (right axis) nificantly and improved health outcomes. National sta- tistics indicate that the share of the population without Source: CONAPO 2018a. access to health care has been halved in less than a dec- ade, falling from 38.4 percent in 2008 to 15.5 percent by However, there are important differences by socioeco- 2016 (CONEVAL 2017). However, an aging population and nomic group and geographic location: more children changing lifestyle factors are driving an increase in chronic are born per woman in rural areas and among women noncommunicable diseases and degenerative conditions, with less education. The fertility rate ranges from a high which is intensifying spending pressures on the health of 2.9 children per woman in the state of Chiapas, to care system, including for long-term care. From a gender a low of 1.5 children per woman in Mexico City (Map 2.1) perspective, reducing high levels of adolescent pregnancy, (CONAPO 2016). Indigenous women had a fertility rate of continuing to focus on maternal and reproductive health, nearly 4 children in 2015, compared with 3 for nonindig- and promoting healthy aging by tackling specific morbidi- enous women (Figure 2.3). ties and risk factors that affect men and women differently seem to be most critical. We review each of these in turn. MAP 2.1 Fertility across Mexico, by State (Avg. Number of Live Births per Woman, 2009 – 13) Fertility 1.4–2.0 2.0–2.4 2.4–2.5 With an estimated population of 127 million people, 2.5–2.7 more than half of whom are women, Mexico displays 2.9+ an average fertility rate that is aligned with the population replacement rate. The number of children born per woman has declined dramatically: from an average of 7 children per woman in the 1960s, it is currently close to the replace- ment rate at 2.2 children per woman on average (Figure 2.2) (CONAPO 2018a). The decrease in fertility relates to a wide range of proximate causes such as the decrease in infant mortality, a change in population policies during the 1960s, the widespread availability of contraceptive methods, higher educational attainment, and greater professional opportu- nities for women, which compete in time with their caring Source: National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (ENADID), National Institute of Statistics responsibilities (Chackiel 2004; Tuirán 2002). and Geography (INEGI). See http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/atlas_genero/. CHAPTER 2: Endowments | 17 FIGURE 2.3 Fertility Rate in Mexico, FIGURE 2.4 Child, Adult, and Total Dependency Rates by Ethnicity Group, 2015 in Mexico, Actual and Projected, 1950 – 2050 4.5 120 30 Child and total dependency ratio 3.9 4.0 Adult dependency ratio 3.6 100 25 Avg. children per woman 3.5 3.0 80 20 3.0 2.4 60 15 2.5 2.0 40 10 1.5 20 5 1.0 0 0 0.5 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2010 2000 2005 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 0 Nonindigenous Indigenous Child Adult Total Surviving children Children born alive Source: CONAPO 2018a. Source: Intercensal Survey 2015, National Institute of Statistics Note: The dependency ratio is the number of dependent individuals (in this case, children ages and Geography (INEGI). 0 – 14 or elderly adults) per 100 adults of productive age (ages 15 – 64) in the population. Both the decrease in fertility rates and the increase in life Teen Pregnancy expectancies lead to changes in the dependency rates of children and adults (Figure 2.4). Child dependency rates Although it has diminished in the most recent years, have been decreasing since 1970, from 97 dependent chil- the rate of adolescent pregnancy is still high and pre- dren per 100 adults in 1950 to 42 in 2015. However, the in- sents challenges to women’s empowerment, inter- crease in the elderly population has led to an increase in generational mobility, and poverty reduction. Just as the adult dependency rate, from 5.5 elderly adults per 100 the global fertility rate decreased, the teenage fertility adults in productive age to 10 per 100 in 2015. The National rate also fell, from a peak 157 births per 100,000 ado- Population Council (CONAPO) projects that the adult de- lescents in 1957 to 74 births per 100,000 adolescents in pendency rate will increase to 25 in 2050, a fivefold increase 2015 (Figure 2.5, panel a). However, important disparities since 1950, whereas the child dependency rate will to de- have continued across the population. There was wide crease to 27 children per 100 adults in productive age.2 Given heterogeneity across states, ranging from a low of 49.2 the gender division of labor, the increase in the adult de- per 1,000 adolescents in Mexico City to a high of 86.2 pendency rates could soon represent a barrier to female la- per 1,000 adolescents in Coahuila, one of the northern bor force participation. The supply of elderly care in Mexico states.3 Differences across ethnicity are even starker, with is very low, and because of Mexican family-oriented behav- 100.9 per 1,000 indigenous adolescents becoming moth- ior, the demand is also very low. As such, the burden of el- ers, compared with 58.4 per 1,000 nonindigenous ado- derly care will likely fall on women (Tuirán 2002). lescents (Figure 2.5, panel b). FIGURE 2.5 Adolescent Pregnancy in Mexico a. Teenage fertility rate, 1950–2015 b. Mothers per 1,000 teenager girls, 180 by ethnicity group, 2015 160 120 100.9 Number of births per 1,000 140 100 Mothers per 1,000 teenage girls 120 80 teenage girls 100 58.4 60 80 40 60 20 40 0 20 Non-indigenous Indigenous 0 Source: Intercensal Survey 2015, National Institute of 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Source: CONAPO 2016. Note: Teenage” is defined as 15 – 19 years old. Indigenous Note: “Teenage” is defined as 15 – 19 years old. population is defined as indigenous-language speakers. 18 | Mexico Gender Assessment FIGURE 2.6 Teenage Fertility Rate, Selected OECD Countries, 2016 or latest available 80 Births per 1,000 women aged 15–19 years 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Korea, Rep. Switzerland Netherlands Denmark Norway Japan Slovenia Sweden Italy Luxembourg Finland Belgium Iceland Austria Portugal Canada Australia Lithuania Greece United Kingdom Latvia New Zealand United States Turkey Russian Fed. Hungary Spain Ireland France Germany Croatia Estonia Czech Republic Poland OECD average Malta Slovak Republic Romania Bulgaria Chile Costa Rica Mexico Colombia Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Family Database 2016, http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm. Note: Data for Canada are from 2013. Data for Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico are from 2014. Data for Australia, Israel, Japan, and the United States are from 2015. Becoming pregnant during adolescence has negative years of age. The share of married adults did not increase effects on the opportunities of the mother. The high much during the second half of the 20th century, and con- rates of teenage motherhood among the indigenous pop- sensual unions remained stable (García and Rojas 2002). ulation and in southern states have led to a teen preg- López-Ruiz, Spijker, and Esteve (2011) use census data for nancy rate at the national level that is high by international eight Latin American countries and find that the stabil- standards. Early childbearing is high in Mexico relative ity of the average age at first marriage or union resulted to other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and from two contraposing trends: First, highly educated Development (OECD) countries (Figure 2.6), a challenge men increased the average age at which they formed their that is especially important to tackle given the association first union. At the same time, low-educated men and of these phenomena with poverty and lack of opportu- women decreased the average age at which they entered nities, as well as the concern that it may prevent women their first union, typically because they were more likely from taking full advantage of their human development to cohabitate in 2000 than in 1970. As such, the average assets and opportunities (Azevedo et al. 2012). In fact, of first marriage or union seems to be stable, but there Arceo-Gómez and Campos-Vázquez (2014c) find that is heterogeneity in the timing for those two groups. Pérez teenage pregnancy in Mexico decreases years of school- Amador (2012) finds an alternative mechanism that leads ing (by 0.6 – 0.8 years), lowers school attendance, and to heterogeneity in the intergenerational transmission reduces work hours. Moreover, teenage pregnancy is the of marriage timing: mothers who married young have chil- third leading cause of school dropouts among all students dren who also marry young, and the effect of the moth- and the second leading cause among girls (SEP 2012). Lack er’s age at first marriage on the child’s age at first marriage of aspirations and economic opportunities are assumed is larger than the effect of the mother’s education. The to play a crucial role leading to adolescent pregnancy, but timing of marriage is an important determinant of sev- the data suitable to test this as a potential determinant eral women’s outcomes, particularly as spousal respon- of early pregnancy are limited, resulting in scarce rigor- sibilities collide with school attendance or female labor ous evidence. market participation. Aspirations could be related to the timing of first mar- Contraceptive use is low, particularly in southern states riage. Quilondrán Salgado (2001) documented that dur- and among indigenous women. Nearly all women (98.7 ing the second half of the 20th century, age at first mar- percent) aged 15 – 49 years reported knowledge of at least riage for Mexican men remained stable at 23 years of age, one form of contraception in 2014, but only 51.6 per- while that of Mexican women increased from 21 to 22 cent used any method.4 Moreover, there are important CHAPTER 2: Endowments | 19 differences across states, with higher use in the northern Greater outreach on birth control methods, particu- states than in the south (Map 2.2). More dramatically, larly to rural and indigenous populations, could reduce as many as 10.7 percent of indigenous women did not the high rates of teen pregnancy. Strong cross-sectoral know of any method, compared with 0.8 percent of non- systems with built capacity among implementers as well indigenous women.5 These differences are also related as solid backing from a legal framework and its implemen- to levels of education: as many as 14.6 percent of women tation are needed. For instance, changes in education cur- without any education did not know of any method, com- ricula, while making contraceptives more available and pared with 5.2 percent with incomplete primary, 3.1 per- affordable, would require close coordination across sectors. cent with completed primary, and 0.6 percent with com- In addition, exposure to positive role models and infor- pleted secondary. mation on the consequences of early pregnancies could help, including information on the role of men and boys MAP 2.2 Contraceptive Use by Females Aged 15–49 Years in in any potential solution. One potential way of doing this Mexico, by State, 2014 is through educational entertainment. Studies have found that soap operas have positive impacts on fertility pref- 40.4–48.4% erences in Brazil (La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea 2012); 49.6–51.6% family planning in Tanzania (Rogers and Vaughan 2000); 52.5–54.6% gender norms in India (Jensen and Oster 2009); teen- 55.2–59.3% age pregnancy in the United States (Kearney and Levine 2014); and risky sexual behaviors in Nigeria (Banerjee, La Ferrara, and Orozco 2018). Maternal Mortality and Access to Health Services Maternal deaths have declined in Mexico, but they are still high relative to peer countries. The maternal deaths in Mexico from pregnancy, childbirth, or postpartum com- Source: National Survey of Demographic (ENADID) 2014, National Institute of Statistics plications have decreased from 86 deaths per 100,000 and Geography (INEGI). See http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/atlas_genero/. births in 1995 to 38 in 2015 (Figure 2.7, panel a). The small peak observed in 2009 resulted from the influenza out- Knowledge about contraceptives is slightly higher among break, which disproportionately affected adults in produc- teenagers than among older women, but only half of sex- tive ages, and pregnant women were particularly vulner- ually active teens use them. One out every five teenage able (Fernández Cantón, Gutiérrez Trujillo, and Viguri girls and one of every four teenage boys are sexually ac- Uribe 2012). Women now give birth in better medical facil- tive (INEGI 2017). As many as 98.2 percent of women aged ities, and more of them have medical surveillance during 15 – 19 years know of at least one contraceptive method. their pregnancies. Despite these improvements, Mexico However, only 55 percent of teenagers used a contraceptive still has high maternal mortality rates relative to other in their first sexual relation, according to the 2014 survey, OECD countries (Figure 2.7, panel b). up from 38 percent observed in 2009. Contraceptive use during the first encounter is lower among indigenous wom- Moreover, there are important differences in maternal en, those living in rural areas, and those with low levels of mortality across ethnicity and regions. The outcome of education (CONAPO 2016). Only 4 percent of women with maternal deaths reflects a combination of social inequali- no education, 16 percent of women in rural areas, and 11 ties that characterize the country in multiple dimensions. percent of indigenous women used any form of birth con- Rural, poor, and indigenous women experience lower lev- trol in their first sexual encounter, compared with 39 per- els of access to care and obstetric services. Mortality rates cent of urban women, 36 percent of nonindigenous wom- among indigenous women are twice as high as among non- en, and 42 percent of women with secondary education indigenous women (Figure 2.8). There are also important or more (CONAPO 2016). One-third of teenage girls who differences across regions. As of December 10, 2018, mor- did not use contraceptives did not plan to have relations, tality rates ranged from 2 per 100,000 births in Colima to but as many as 18 percent of them claimed they did not 69 per 100,000 births in the State of Mexico and 72 per use contraceptives because they wanted to get pregnant. 100,000 births in Chiapas (Map 2.3). 20 | Mexico Gender Assessment FIGURE 2.7 Maternal Mortality in Mexico and OECD Comparisons a. Mexico, 1985–2015 b. Mexico and selected countries, 2015 120 80 Maternal deaths per Maternal deaths per 100,000 births 100,000 births 100 60 80 40 20 60 0 40 Poland Korea, Rep. OECD Uruguay L. Amer. & the Caribbean Peru Turkey Thailand Chile Mexico Malaysia Argentina Colombia 20 0 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Source: World Development Indicators database, https://wdi.worldbank.org. Source: WHO et al. 2015. Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. FIGURE 2.8 Maternal Mortality Rates in Mexico, by MAP 2.3 Maternal Mortality Rates in Mexico, by State, 2018 Ethnicity Group, 2012 – 17 Maternal mortality, per 100,000 live births 7 Maternal deaths per 100,000 births 2 72 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Indigenous Non-indigenous Source: Estimates using National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) administrative data on deaths and population estimates from 2015 census data. Source: Observatory of Maternal Mortality in Mexico (OMM), http://www.omm.org.mx/index. Note: Indigenous population is defined by indigenous-language speakers. php/indicadores-nacionales/boletines-de-mortalidad-materna/2018. More can be done to ensure that women receive the Healthy Aging, Mortality, and Morbidity care they need regardless of where they live. Despite advances in the coverages and public spending on health, Overall mortality rates have decreased in Mexico, result- Mexico continues to face important challenges in ensur- ing in an increase in life expectancy at birth. As mortal- ing equitable access to quality health services. The geo- ity rates have declined since the 1950s, life expectancy has graphic distribution of public health resources does not increased. Improvements in living standards and in the reflect the needs of the population because transfers availability of health care helped boost life expectancy dur- to states, despite improvements, fall short in equalizing ing the second half of the 20th century in Mexico as in the local resource availability and spending needs. In addi- whole region. Life expectancy at birth is higher for women tion, financial management capacity varies across states than for men (Figure 2.9), with the gap between female and is especially low in the poorest regions, contribut- and male life expectancy growing from 2.8 years in 1950 ing to the overall inefficiency of the sector (Knaul et al. to 6.9 years in 1982, and it has fluctuated between 5.1 and 2012). A strong and well-integrated primary health care 6.2 years since then. In 2015, the last year of data, the differ- system is critical. To improve equitable access to health, ence was 5.7 years. The trend seems to have slowed down a primary-care-based model where local entities respon- in the early 2000s and particularly after 2005. However, sible for managing care are strengthened and have clearly there is substantial heterogeneity across regions, with larger defined roles could help. differences between men and women in some northern CHAPTER 2: Endowments | 21 FIGURE 2.9 Life Expectancy at Birth in Mexico, MAP 2.4 Difference between Male and Female Life by Gender, 1950 – 2015 Expectancy (Years) in Mexico, by State, 2015 90 4.0–4.4 80 4.5–4.9 5.0–5.4 Life expectancy at birth, years 70 5.5–5.9 60 6.0–6.4 6.5–6.9 50 40 30 20 10 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2005 2010 2015 2000 Source: CONAPO 2018a. See http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/atlas_genero/. Male Female Note: Map indicates the difference between men’s and women’s life expectancy by subtracting Source: CONAPO 2018a. men’s life expectancy (in years) from women’s life expectancy (in years). states and across southern states than in central Mexico its levels in the 2000s. Canudas-Romo, García Guerrero, (Map 2.4). Moreover, there is a worrisome trend in recent and Echarri-Cánovas (2015) analyze the reasons behind years: male life expectancy dropped by one year between the stagnation and drop of male life expectancy. They find 2006 and 2015, while female life expectancy dropped that the most likely culprits are the obesity epidemic and by half a year over the same period. the increase in homicide rates since the “War on Drugs” began in 2007. The authors estimate that if it had not been Increases in life expectancy have slowed recently, in part for the War on Drugs or the obesity epidemic, male life because of the rising homicide rate in the case of men expectancy would have been two years greater. Aburto et al. and increases in deaths from diabetes in the case (2016) further claim that homicide rates slowed down the of women. Although the homicide rate is not among the increasing trend in women’s life expectancy. The increase highest in the region, it has increased substantially from in violence and its effects on life expectancy and quality of life is not trivial. In another paper, Canudas-Romo et al. FIGURE 2.10 Leading Causes of Death in Mexico, (2017) estimate the increase in the years of life living with by Gender, 2017 perceived vulnerability of violence. They find that, in 2014, women’s life expectancy at age 20 was about 60 years (and Aggression for men, 55 years), 71 percent (64 percent for men) of which Accidents would be spent with perceived vulnerability to violence in the state, and 26 percent (20 percent for men) of which Influenza and pneumonia would be spent at home. Increases in life expectancy among Liver disease Mexican women also seem to have slowed down, possibly Lung disease because of a combination of higher homicide rates and Vascular disease increases in deaths due to diabetes (Aburto et al. 2016). Malignant tumors Diabetes and heart disease are the leading causes of Diabetes death among women. By 2015, all five leading causes of Heart disease death in Mexico were noncommunicable diseases. For both men and women in Mexico, the leading causes of death 0 20 40 60 80 are heart disease and diabetes (Figure 2.10). However, the Deaths, thousands incidence of diabetes is significantly higher among women. Male Female The latest estimates show that 10.3 percent of women had Source: INEGI 2018. diabetes in 2016, up from 7.6 percent in 2006 (Figure 2.11). 22 | Mexico Gender Assessment This is higher than the prevalence among men, which and 15 percent of adult women comply with the recom- increased from 7 percent to 8.4 percent between 2006 and mended levels of physical activity, compared with 21.8 per- 2016 (INSP 2016). Men have a higher risk of heart or liver cent of boys, 70 percent of teenage boys, and 14 percent disease and are also at higher risk from fatal accidents or of adult men (INSP 2016). Moreover, households tend to various forms of aggression (see chapter 4 for evidence have high levels of consumption, particularly of foods with on violence and homicides). high fat content and sugary beverages. This is true in urban areas but is also becoming more common in rural areas. The high prevalence of diabetes is related to the inci- dence of obesity, which is among the highest in the world, Obesity is also a source of gender disparities in the particularly among women. The high prevalence of obe- labor market. There is evidence on the existence of sity begins at early ages. For instance, 33 percent of young obesity-related discrimination against women, but not girls (ages 5 – 11) and 39 percent of teenage girls (ages against men. Campos-Vázquez and Núñez (2018)but also 12 – 19) were either overweight or obese in 2016, up from on the labor market outcomes of individuals. Using anthro- 32 percent and 36 percent, respectively, in 2012 (INSP 2016). pometric data and the body mass index (BMI analyze the As a result, between 1988 and 2016, the prevalence of effect of obesity on wages. They find that obese women have women ages 20 – 49 who are obese has more than tripled lower wages than nonobese women, while obesity has no (INSP 2016). As many as 7 out of every 10 women above 18 effect on male wages. Moreover, in a correspondence study years of age are considered overweight in Mexico, includ- of discrimination in two Mexican cities, Campos-Vázquez ing 33 percent considered obese, which is high compared and González (2018) find that obese women have a lower with men (24 percent) and among the highest rates in the probability of being called back for an interview than their OECD countries (Figure 2.12). The prevalence of overweight thin counterparts. They do not find any such effect for men. and obese men and women is higher in urban areas than in rural areas, although it has been rising in all regions More can be done to promote healthy eating and exer- and particularly among women and in rural areas (INSP cise habits, and to diagnose diabetes and treat symptoms 2016). High levels of obesity are associated with low lev- early. The Mexican government has responded by launch- els of physical activity and poor diets. Only 12.7 percent of ing a National Strategy for the Prevention and Control girls (ages 10 – 14), 51 percent of teenage girls (ages 15 – 19), of Overweight, Obesity and Diabetes (Government of FIGURE 2.11 Incidence of Diabetes in Mexico, FIGURE 2.12 Prevalence of Obesity, by Gender, by Gender and Age Group, 2016 Selected OECD Countries, 2016 35 OECD average 30 Turkey United States 25 Mexico New Zealand 20 Chile Percent Canada 15 Spain France 10 Italy Switzerland 5 Japan 0 10 20 30 40 0 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70–79 80+ Total Percent Age group, years Male Female Source: World Bank Gender Statistics, 2016: https://databank.worldbank.org/ Male Female Total data/source/gender-statistics. Source: INSP 2016. Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. CHAPTER 2: Endowments | 23 Mexico 2013). There have been considerable efforts to raise awareness of the importance of healthy eating with ongo- EDUCATION ing radio and television campaigns as well as programs to help citizens monitor their health,6 reduce their calo- Gender Gaps in Enrollment rie intake, and incentivize exercise.7 Moreover, the 2014 and Attainment tax reform included an increase in excise taxes on sug- ary beverages. Early evaluations showed decreased con- Mexico has closed the gender gaps in primary, second- sumption for two consecutive years and increased water ary, and tertiary education enrollment. According to the consumption during the same period (Batis et al. 2016; latest intercensal survey (in 2015), women on average have Colchero et al. 2017). Moreover, microsimulation analy- 9.0 years of education compared with 9.3 years for men,8 sis suggests this reform could reduce obesity prevalence reflecting important increases in school enrollment for by 2.5 percent, preventing 86,000 – 134,000 cases of di- women. Currently fewer girls than boys are out of school, abetes (Barrientos-Gutierrez et al. 2017). There may be which points to a closed female gender gap and the poten- room for further raising these taxes. In conjunction with tial of a newly emerging gap in which boys are at a disad- the efforts for a well-integrated primary health system men- vantage. In fact, World Bank Education Statistics show tioned earlier, efforts to evaluate existing programs could a tertiary graduation rate in 2016 of 28 percent for women, help to inform further efforts to improve healthy lifestyles, compared with 23 percent for men, and a completion rate including actions to promote physical activity and nutri- for lower-secondary education of 92 percent for girls com- tional education. Special attention is especially needed pared with 86 percent for boys.9 However, there are impor- in rural areas and among adolescent girls. Moreover, la- tant differences across regions and population groups. For beling of nutritional information has been shown to im- instance, in Chiapas the illiteracy rate is as high as 5.17 per- prove healthy eating (Rayner et al. 2013), with front-of- cent for women, compared with 3.85 percent for men.10 pack interpretive labels such as traffic light labels being Indigenous women are much more likely than their nonin- more effective in increasing the selection of healthier op- digenous counterparts to have less than a primary education, tions (Cecchini and Warin 2016). Finally, efficient regu- and only a small share have tertiary education. Although lation of junk-food marketing directed at children and there are substantial differences across age cohorts — with reduced industry interference in labeling could reduce younger cohorts having higher levels of education than conflicts of interest and improve the implementation of older cohorts — the differences between indigenous and public health policies (Barquera et al. 2018). nonindigenous women remains (Figure 2.13). FIGURE 2.13 Women’s Educational Attainment in Mexico, by Age and Ethnicity Group, 2015 a. Indigenous b. Non-indigenous 100 100 4 2 2 9 5 4 4 5 3 15 13 14 11 90 8 90 20 17 15 13 9 11 22 16 12 80 17 16 80 14 22 19 21 18 21 21 13 70 23 70 24 17 30 28 29 60 29 60 22 Percent Percent 50 30 50 29 29 34 33 83 29 40 40 33 28 74 66 33 25 30 57 30 49 22 20 44 20 20 35 19 37 16 29 10 22 10 12 21 11 15 4 7 9 0 0 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 Age group, years Age group, years Less than primary Primary Secondary High school College or more Source: Intercensal Survey 2015, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). 24 | Mexico Gender Assessment Women now dominate the university population. FIGURE 2.14 Educational Attainment in Mexico, According to National Association of Universities and by Gender, 2016 Institutions of Higher Education (ANUIES) data for the 2017/18 academic year, women represent 50.3 percent 12.6 Complete tertiary 11.9 of college enrollment, 55.2 percent of graduate enroll- 9.1 Incomplete tertiary ment at the master’s level, and 48.8 percent of graduate 8.2 enrollment at the doctoral level.11 Creighton and Park 14.2 Complete secondary 14.6 (2010) point out that, in the 1990s, the educational gen- 40.8 Incomplete secondary 40.0 der gap closed and even reversed. They find that federal 12.3 programs aimed at school construction during the 1960s Complete primary 13.2 were responsible for eliminating the gender gap in edu- Incomplete primary 8.1 8.5 cational progression. In fact, a reverse gender gap in ter- 2.8 tiary education is being documented across middle- and Never attended 3.5 high-income countries around the world for the 1980s 0 10 20 30 40 50 cohort (Ferreira 2018; Narayan et al. 2018). In East Asia Percentage and the Pacific, 30 percent of women in the 1980s co- hort have completed tertiary schooling, against 29 per- Male Female cent of men. In Latin America, it is 21 percent versus Source: National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) 2016, National Institute 18 percent. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, it is 42 of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Note: Data are for the population aged 15 – 65 years. percent versus 38 percent. In high-income countries, it is 54 percent versus 44 percent — and that 10 percentage point gap reflects steady growth for each decadal cohort MAP 2.5 Gender Gap in Educational Attainment in Mexico, since the 1950s. We now live in a world where women by State, 2015 and girls remain clearly disadvantaged in terms of edu- Years cational opportunities in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia but where men 0.01 0.76 and boys are disadvantaged in Japan, most of Europe, and the Americas. Some have pointed to gender differences in gang membership and exposure to crime and violence as a cause — a factor relevant in much of Latin America and the Caribbean (Ferreira 2018). However, there are important differences in educational attainment across regions within Mexico, with women facing especially high risks of dropping out of second- ary and tertiary education in some regions. Although the gender gap for primary and secondary attainment has been nearly eradicated (Figure 2.14), this changes at the tertiary level, where women’s attainment levels are lower Source: Intercensal Survey 2015, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). than men’s. Moreover, there are important regional differ- See http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/atlas_genero/. ences. Educational attainment is generally lower in south- Note: Map indicates the difference between men’s and women’s (age 15 or older) average years of formal education by subtracting the years of women’s education from those of men. ern states for both men and women, but the gender attain- ment gap is especially large in some states, such as Chiapas, where women have almost one year less formal education the 2011 Social Mobility Survey (EMOVI) data and a pro- than men (Map 2.5). pensity score matching, they also estimate that teen- age mothers have one less year of education in the long Female educational attainment is significantly affected run. As such, early motherhood has an important effect by teenage pregnancy. Using the Mexican Family Life on women’s educational outcomes. Unfortunately, the Survey (ENNViH) panel data and a differenced propen- usual surveys do not ask men about their own fertility, sity score matching, Arceo-Gómez and Campos-Vázquez and thus we cannot draw any conclusions on whether (2014c) find that teenage pregnancy reduces school attain- early parenthood affects women disproportionately more ment by 0.8 years of schooling in the short run. Using than it affects men. CHAPTER 2: Endowments | 25 Gender Gaps in Learning reading. The upper-secondary test covered about the same age group as those who take the PISA exam. These results Mexico is among the lowest-ranking performers in inter- suggest either that gender stereotypes regarding subject national standardized tests among OECD countries, par- preference for boys and girls exhibit themselves during ticularly for women. There is a growing consensus that high school, or that younger cohorts do not exhibit such quality, rather than quantity, of education is an important gender stereotypes. driver of economic well-being (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008, 2012). One typical way to measure quality and actual FIGURE 2.16 Gender Gap in Average PISA Scores, learning outcomes is to compare outcomes of standard- 2003 – 15 ized tests. Mexico is a low performer in the OECD’s stand- 20 ardized Programme for International Student Assessment Gap in scores (avg. male score minus (PISA) tests, demonstrating relatively low levels of learning 10 for 15-year-olds across mathematics, reading, and science (Figure 2.15). Scores for females are especially low in math avg. female score) 0 and science but tend to be higher than scores for males in reading (Figure 2.16). As much as 11 percent of the varia- −10 tion in student performance in science is attributed to dif- −20 ferences in students’ socioeconomic status, and disadvan- taged students are about 2.5 times more likely than their −30 more advantaged peers to be low performers in science. However, the relationship between socioeconomic status −40 and performance is weaker in Mexico than on average Math Reading Science across OECD countries (OECD 2016a). On a national stand- 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 ardized test, Campos-Vázquez and Santillán-Hernández (2016) found that girls in primary and lower-secondary Source: PISA International Data Explorer, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): http://piaacdataexplorer.oecd.org/ide/idepisa. education scored higher than boys in both reading and Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. PISA tests 15-year- math. However, in upper-secondary education, boys scored old students in participating countries every three years in mathematics, reading, higher than girls in math, and girls outperformed boys in and science. FIGURE 2.15 Average PISA Mathematics Scores, by Gender, Selected Countries, 2015 560 540 520 500 Average score 480 460 440 420 400 Israel Italy Austria Latvia Mexico Chile Turkey Hungary Greece United States Slovak Republic Spain Luxembourg United Kingdom Portugal Iceland Czech Republic France New Zealand Australia Sweden Ireland Germany Poland Belgium Norway Denmark Slovenia Netherlands Canada Finland Switzerland Estonia Japan Korea, Rep. Male Female Source: PISA International Data Explorer, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): http://piaacdataexplorer.oecd.org/ide/idepisa. Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. PISA tests 15-year-old students in participating countries every three years in mathematics, reading, and science. 26 | Mexico Gender Assessment Differences in learning are reflected in educational of high school and university education, as well as about choices, because women and men are still segregated their life expectancy and the funding opportunities they across fields of education and areas of specialization. might tap to attend higher education. Avitabile and de PISA asks students about their interest in science and found Hoyos (2018) find that the intervention led to a positive no gender difference in their preferences to study science. and significant impact on standardized test scores and However, once one disaggregates science into engineer- self-reported measures of effort for girls. This is in line ing and health-related subjects, women exhibited a high- with earlier work on giving students information about the er preference for health-related majors, while men pre- labor market returns to different education levels, which fer engineering-related majors (OECD 2016b). Consistent showed that altering perceptions can improve students’ with these findings, Figueroa Pilz and Ortega Olivares attainment in basic education (Jensen 2010). Moreover, (2010) found that women are still very underrepresent- information interventions can improve outcomes through ed in physics and mathematics majors at the National a cumulative effect on student behaviors. Bustelo, Ferguson, Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the largest and Forest (2016) conducted an experiment that provided public university in Latin America. Bustelo, Ferguson, and information regarding vocational orientation to students in Forest (2016) point out that women are overrepresented high school. They found that, in the treated group, women in the lowest-paid occupations and underrepresented in were more likely to pick science, technology, engineering, the highest-paid occupations. and mathematics (STEM) majors. A comprehensive approach to improving the equity of the education system has yet to be defined and imple- mented. Mexico’s 2013 education reforms introduced key FAMILY STRUCTURE, ASSET changes to the sector’s financial and personnel manage- OWNERSHIP, AND MOBILITY ment strategy, establishing a professional system for hir- ing, evaluating, training, and promoting teachers and Beyond human capital endowments, it is difficult to providing full autonomy to the National Institute for imagine that women can thrive without access to pro- the Evaluation of Education (Government of Mexico ductive inputs, including physical and financial assets, 2013). However, further action will be necessary to con- particularly if they are the sole breadwinners. As fer- solidate these gains and address remaining challenges. tility rates have declined, the structure and composi- This should include leveraging performance incentives tion of households have also been changing over time. to improve teacher quality and realigning the national More than half of Mexican women aged 15 years or old- education budget to provide a more equitable distribution er are married or cohabitating.12 However, there has been of resources. The latter is problematic because investment a notable increase in the share of women aged 15 years per student at the basic education level in relatively afflu- or older who are divorced or separated in the past few ent areas such as Mexico City and Nuevo León is above decades (Navarro, Narro, and Orozco 2014). As a result, the national average of roughly Mex$20,000 per year, the share of female-headed households has increased whereas in Guerrero, Chiapas, and Oaxaca, the poorest from 17 percent to 29 percent between 1990 and 2015 states in Mexico, investment per student is significantly (Figure 2.17). By 2015, slightly more than half (53 percent) below the national average (World Bank 2016). Addressing of all female-headed households were also single-parent this concern would involve adjusting intergovernmental transfers for education, making them more based on needs FIGURE 2.17 Share of Male- and Female-Headed (per student) and incorporating a stronger equalization Households in Mexico, 1990 – 2015 component for lagging states. 2015 71% 29% Within this broader approach to improve educational 2010 75% 25% outcomes, reducing gender gaps in educational attain- 79% 21% 2000 ment and learning will require additional efforts. For 1990 83% 17% instance, in 2009 the Mexican Secretariat of Public Education, attempting to improve on-time graduation 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 and learning outcomes in high school, designed and piloted Percent an intervention aimed at students entering 10th grade. It Male Female provided students with a range of gender-specific informa- Sources: General Census of Population and Housing (1990, 2000, and 2010) and tion about the average earnings associated with completion Intercensal Survey 2015, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). CHAPTER 2: Endowments | 27 households, while single-parent households made up In 2018, 65 percent of women did not own a high-value 18 percent of all households, highlighting the increas- asset. According to the National Survey of Financial ing prevalence of single-parent households headed by Inclusion (ENIF) in 2018, 58 percent of men owned at women, which reached 85 percent in 2015 (Figure 2.18).13 least one high-value asset, but only 35 percent of wom- Education plays an important role in this trend because en did. The largest gap (of 23 percentage points) is for women with higher levels of education have greater abil- the ownership of a vehicle, followed by the ownership of ity to decide their marital status. As many as 34 percent a house (a 15-percentage-point difference) (Figure 2.19) of married women either had no schooling or only pri- (CNBV 2018). Similarly, as detailed in Chapter 3, women mary education, and 36 percent had incomplete second- are much less likely to own a financial asset, either in the ary education in 2016.14 In contrast, only 5 percent of di- form of a bank account, a pension fund, or an insurance vorced or separated women lacked education in 2016, policy (Figure 2.20). and as many as 33 percent had completed secondary or tertiary education. However, there are important gener- FIGURE 2.19 Ownership of High-Value Assets ational differences, with older women in general having in Mexico, by Gender, 2018 lower levels of education. In addition, 29 percent of un- 70 married women ages 25 – 34 have a postsecondary edu- cation, compared with 24.5 percent of married women. 58 60 Percentage of adult population FIGURE 2.18 Single-Parent Households in Mexico, 50 by Gender of Household Head, 2015 41 40 35 36 15% 30 26 20 13 13 Single male 10 5 Single female 0 Any asset Land Vehicle Housing 85% Men Women Source: CNBV 2018, based on National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, Source: Intercensal Survey 2015, National Institute of Statistics and Geography National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). (INEGI). Note: Adult population ages 18 – 70 years. Gender inequality in asset ownership matters because FIGURE 2.20 Ownership of Financial Assets it leads to differences in economic opportunities, in Mexico, by Gender, 2018 increases vulnerability to shocks, and leads to differ- 60 ences in social capital. First, not only are assets a means of production (capital), they also produce “rents (hous- 31 50 Percentage of adult population 35 ing and land), interest (savings), and profits (land and business assets), or components of income” (Deere, 40 46 Alvarado, and Twyman 2012, 4). Second, given the infor- 49 30 23 mation asymmetries in the credit markets, gender inequal- 28 ity in asset ownership leads to gender inequality in access 20 to finance because assets are used as collateral for credit (Eswaran 2014). Third, property can cushion households 10 to economic shocks, and in individual-based approaches, this would extend to the capacity of the individual to man- 0 age these shocks. As such, asset property is an indica- Bank account Pension fund (Afore) Insurance tor of how vulnerable an individual is to poverty (Deere, Men Women Alvarado, and Twyman 2012). Finally, assets also “gener- Source: CNBV 2018, based on National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, ate status and social advantage” (Deere, Alvarado, and National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Twyman 2012, 5). Note: Adult population ages 18 – 70 years. 28 | Mexico Gender Assessment Asset ownership for women in rural areas often relies Women have lower social mobility than men, but this on inheritance. It was not until 1971 that the land reform is because women at the top of the distribution are admitted gender equality in the rights to apply for land.15 more likely to become less well-off than their house- In rural areas, 37 percent of men own land, while only 25.6 hold of origin. Among men, intergenerational reproduc- percent of women do (CNBV 2018). Most rural women who tion of economic advantage is much more prevalent than hold land have inherited it (63.6 percent), while fewer than intergenerational reproduction of poverty (Torche 2015). one-third have purchased it (28 percent). Similarly, al- The opposite is true for women: their chances of remain- though more women than men own animals (56 percent and ing poor if they come from a disadvantaged household 44 percent, respectively), those owned by women tended are higher than their chances of retaining privilege across to be of lower value (hens and chickens) than those owned generations. For indigenous women, there are overlapping by men (cows and horses).16 Absence of property owner- disadvantages so that 47 percent of indigenous women ship and control matters for women’s agency because as- in the poorest quintile stay in their same quintile, com- sets boost voices and bargaining power in household deci- pared with 23 percent of men (Torche 2015). These differ- sion making, improve access to capital, and increase overall ences in social mobility are larger among married individ- economic independence (World Bank 2012). uals than single individuals, suggesting that rich families tend to inherit to the married male heirs more than to their Gender differences in human and physical capital asset married female heirs. These findings fit into what would accumulation affect not only present-day welfare but also be expected from traditional social norms, in the sense the chance for upward social mobility. Parents’ education that families inherit to their sons because men are the and occupation, as well as living in rural areas, are the cir- ones bound to provide for their families, whereas daugh- cumstances that explain most of the inequality in access ters are provided for by their husbands. to quality education in Mexico, suggesting that important barriers remain for intergenerational mobility. Parker and Women’s human and physical capital endowments deter- Pederzini (2001) find that the schooling gender gap is larger mine their ability to participate in economic growth for children whose parents have low levels of educational and shape the quality of future generations. Differences attainment. They also find a reverse gender gap in urban between men and women in basic endowments such households where the father is not present, suggesting that as health and education, especially at an early age, can boys undertake some of the breadwinning responsibilities lead to the perpetuation of gender gaps in access to oppor- of the absent father. In the case of women, having young tunity throughout the life cycle. As the next chapter shows, children in the households increases the gender gap, sug- these gaps in endowments are further accentuated by dif- gesting that women also take up caregiving responsibilities ferences in access to labor markets, entrepreneurship, that limit their educational attainment. In fact, Duryea and access to finance. However, gaps in endowments et al. (2011) found that the education gaps that persist are in health, education, and other assets entails large costs, concentrated among older children of low-income fami- not only for individuals and families but also for socie- lies and indigenous populations. ties in the long term. NOTES 1. The United Nations Population Division defines the window 5. ENADID 2014. of opportunity as a period in which (a) the ratio of the 6. See, for example, “Chécate, mídete y muévete” (“Check, population under 15 years of age is less than 30 percent of measure and move”): http://checatemidetemuevete.gob.mx/. the total population, and (b) the ratio of population aged 65 7. See, for instance, “Muevete en bici” (“Move by bike”): years and older is under 15 percent of the total population. https://www.sedema.cdmx.gob.mx/comunicacion/nota/ 2. Adults of productive age are those 15 – 64 years old. celebra-once-anos-el-paseo-dominical-muevete-en-bici. Children are those 0 – 14 years old. The elderly are those 8. Intercensal Survey 2015 data from the National Institute aged 65 years or older. of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): http://en.www.inegi. 3. National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (ENADID) 2014, org.mx/programas/intercensal/2015/. National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): 9. See World Bank Education Statistics: https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enadid/2014/default. https://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/ html. education-statistics-%5e-all-indicators. 4. Data from National Survey of Demographic Dynamics 10. Intercensal Survey 2015, INEGI. (ENADID) 2014, National Institute of Statistics and 11. College enrollment data from “Higher Education Geography (INEGI): https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ Statistical Yearbook 2017/18,” National Association enadid/2014/default.html. of Universities and Institutions of Higher Education CHAPTER 2: Endowments | 29 (ANUIES): http://www.anuies.mx/informacion-y- were single or widows with a family under their care. servicios/informacion-estadistica-de-educacion-superior/ This reform also allowed any adult man to apply for land, anuario-estadistico-de-educacion-superior. independently of whether he was married or not. Hence, 12. Estimates using data from National Household Income the land kept a gender asymmetry in the rights to land and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) 2016, National Institute based on marital status and household headship. It was not of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): http://en.www.inegi. until 1971 that the land reform admitted gender equality in org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/historicas/enigh/. the rights to apply for land. The 1971 law even contemplates 13. Single-parent household data from the 2015 Intercensal the possibility that women may engage in sharecropping Survey, INEGI: http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ if they cannot exploit their own land because of their intercensal/2015/. household duties (something that was previously prohibited 14. Estimates based on ENIGH-NS (New Series) 2016, INEGI. for everyone). 15. Almeida (2012) describes how Mexican laws gradually 16. Module on the Situation of Goods in the Home (MSBH) allowed women to own land. The Mexican Revolution’s 2015, pilot survey conducted by National Institute of land reform in 1917 gave access to land to men. The Statistics and Geography (INEGI): https://www.scribd.com/ 1927 land reform allowed female access to land if they document/330690112/MSBH-Boletin-y-Nota-Tecnica. 30 | Mexico Gender Assessment Chapter 3: Economic Opportunities Economic opportunities lead to dignified lives and ena- ble people to fulfill their individual and social potential. LOW FEMALE LABOR FORCE Equality in opportunities to access productive employment PARTICIPATION and income generation is not only about fairness. Gender gaps in labor market participation and entrepreneurship The loss associated with the gender gap in labor market are common across countries. These gaps entail not only participation for Mexico is 22 – 25 percent of income per substantial economic losses for women and their families capita. Inequality in labor participation comes at a high in the form of forgone income but also losses in aggregate cost. If working-age women who are not participating in the terms for the societies where women are deprived of those labor market were to do so at the same rates as their male opportunities (Cuberes and Teigner 2016; World Bank counterparts, there would be a gain equivalent to 25 per- 2012). This is especially relevant given Mexico’s demo- cent of Mexico’s output per capita (Cuberes and Teignier graphic context, as it represents a unique window of oppor- 2016). This is one of the largest average total missed gains tunity for growth and savings through higher participation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and of all those in the economically active age group. This chap- Development (OECD), comparable to 33 percent in Turkey ter examines differences in access to economic opportu- and 21 percent in Italy (Figure 3.1). More recently, Cuberes nity between men and women in Mexico around (a) labor and Teignier (2018) have focused on Mexico and have market participation and employment, (b) wages and used detailed information on men’s and women’s partici- earnings, (c) entrepreneurship, and (d) access to finance. pation in household production (household chores, child FIGURE 3.1 Long-Run Total Income Loss due to Gender Gaps in Labor Market Participation, Selected OECD Countries, 2010 35 30 Percentage of income per capita 25 20 15 10 5 0 Israel Japan Canada Australia Denmark Portugal United States United Kingdom Austria Slovenia Hungary Luxembourg Ireland Greece Korea, Rep. France Switzerland Germany Estonia Belgium Spain Slovak Republic Poland Czech Republic Chile Italy Mexico Turkey Iceland Finland Norway Netherlands Sweden Source: Cuberes and Teignier 2016. Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 34 | Mexico Gender Assessment and elder care services, and so on) and their productivity Spain started at about the same participation rates in 1990. in that sector. They assess the quantitative effects of gen- By 2017, however, Ireland and Spain had participation rates der gaps in entrepreneurship and workforce participation 8 percentage points higher than Mexico’s. Similarly, among in Mexico, but in contrast to the earlier work, they also Latin American countries, Mexico had an FLFP rate in 1990 account for the potential contributions made by women that was slightly higher than in Chile, Colombia, and Costa to overall production by including the value in household Rica, but by 2017 the gap between Colombia and Mexico production. In line with their earlier work, the occupa- was around 14 percentage points, and between Chile and tional choice model predicts substantial net losses in the Mexico, 6 percentage points (Figure 3.3, panel b). country’s income per capita. They find that the gender gap associated with low female labor force participation (FLFP), Female labor force participation is not only behind its entrepreneurship, and self-employment in the Mexican peers but also below expectation given Mexico’s level of labor market leads to a 22 percent loss in income per cap- development. Mexico is slightly below the predicted level ita, almost twice as high as that in the United States (12.8 of the quadratic fit that describes Goldin’s U-shaped rela- percent). Most of the income loss in Mexico is generated tionship between FLFP and income levels. Goldin (1995) ex- by the extremely large gap in labor force participation. plains that the U-shaped pattern is due to the dominance of income or substitution effects at the different development Female labor force participation has increased with eco- levels. If Mexico were in the average, its FLFP rate would be nomic development, but it is still low relative to com- about 3 – 9 percentage points higher depending on the sam- parable countries. FLFP increased from about 18 per- ple (Figure 3.4). Goldin’s U-shaped pattern between FLFP cent in the early 20th century to 45 percent in 2017. As the rates and log income per capita also holds at the munici- country started to develop post-Revolution, women started pal level within Mexico. FLFP first decreases as we increase to work for pay (Figure 3.2, panel a). Moreover, fertility rates income per capita, and then increases for higher incomes. dropped after reaching a peak in 1960 (Figure 3.2, panel b). However, the relationship changed between 2000 and 2010, After 1970, female participation increased, and fertility rates from a clear U-shaped relationship in 2000 to a slanted U in dramatically decreased. However, relative to other coun- 2010. This could result from an increase in overall income of tries in the world, Mexico has a low FLFP rate (Figure 3.3, the population, so that the stage in which FLFP rate decreas- panel a). Among the OECD countries, Ireland, Mexico, and es because of the income effect has attenuated in Mexico. FIGURE 3.2 Female Labor Force Participation in Mexico Relative to GDP and Fertility Indicators, 1900 – 2020 a. FLFP and GDP per capitaª b. FLFP and fertility rates 55 8 55 7 50 50 7 1990 international dollars ($1,000) 45 45 6 Participation rate, percent Participation rate, percent 40 6 40 Number of children 35 5 35 5 30 30 4 25 25 3 4 20 20 15 2 15 10 10 3 1 5 5 0 0 0 2 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 2020 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2010 2000 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 2020 1970 1980 1990 2010 2000 Participation rate GDP per capita Participation rate Fertility rate Sources: FLFP rate data from 1900 – 80 censuses, ENIGH 1979, ENEU 1989 – 04, and ENOE 2005 – 17; GDP per capita data from Maddison Projectb version 2010; fertility rate data from 1930 – 40 censuses and National Population Council (CONAPO) data 1950 – 2015. Note: ENOE = National Survey of Occupation and Employment. ENEU = National Survey of Urban Employment. ENIGH = National Household Income and Expenditure Survey. FLFP = female labor force participation. Series are not homologated. a. GDP per capita is measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. b. Historical statistics from the “Historical Statistics of the World Economy,” Maddison Project Database, version 2010: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/historical_statistics/horizontal- file_02-2010.xls. For more information, see the Maddison Project: https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison. CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 35 FIGURE 3.3 Female Labor Force Participation Trends in Mexico and Selected Countries, 1990 – 2020 a. Mexico and other OECD countries b. Mexico and other Latin American countries 80 70 Peru Iceland 70 Colombia Paraguay 60 Uruguay Canada Ecuador Denmark Bolivia 60 Participation rate, percent United Kingdom Participation rate, percent Belize United States Brazil Germany Panama Ireland Honduras Spain Chile Slovenia Nicaragua 50 France 50 Argentina Japan Costa Rica Poland Belgium Guatemala Greece 40 Italy 40 Turkey 30 20 30 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 Mexico Other selected OECD countries Mexico Other Latin American countrie Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, from World Bank data (originally from ILOSTAT database, International Labour Organization). Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. FIGURE 3.4 U-Shaped Relationship (Goldin 1995) between FLFP and Income Levels a. Global, 2017 b. Mexican municipalities, 2000 and 2010 90 100 90 80 80 Female labor force participation Iceland 70 Peru Bahamas, The 70 Participation rate, percent Haiti Switzerland Canada Norway 60 60 Colombia United States Ireland 50 Spain Luxembourg 50 Chile Belgium 40 Mexico 40 Guatemala Italy 30 Turkey 20 30 10 20 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 10 Income per capita (log) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 2000 2010 Log GDP per capita Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using data from the Population and Housing Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using World Bank data. Census 2000 and 2010, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Note: GDP per capita is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in 2011 Note: Sample restricted to women aged 15 – 64 years. The line represents a quadratic fit international U.S. dollars. on income per capita. 36 | Mexico Gender Assessment FIGURE 3.5 Regional and Ethnic Differences in Female Labor Force Participation in Mexico a. By state, 2018 b. Indigenous and nonindigenous, 90 by age group, 2015 Labor force participation, percent 80 50 70 Labor force participation, percent 60 40 50 40 30 30 20 10 20 0 National Ciudad México Colima Sonora Baja California Guerrero Yucatán Sinaloa Nayarit Chihuahua Jalisco Aguascalientes Tamaulipas Morelos Tlaxcala Nuevo León Querétaro Quintana Roo Coahuila Oaxaca Estado de México Guanajuato Durango Zacatecas Michoacán Baja California Sur Campeche Puebla Hidalgo Tabasco Veracruz Chiapas San Luis Potosí 10 0 60–64 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 Gap Male LFP Female LFP Age, years Source: National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) 2018 (January – March), National Institute Indigenous Non-indigenous of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Source: Intercensal Survey 2015, National Institute of Note: LFP = labor force participation. Rates are for men and women aged 15 – 64 years. Statistics and Geography (INEGI). There is heterogeneity in FLFP across regions, while in- gender gap in participation diminished between 2000 digenous women have much lower rates of participation. and 2010. Women exhibit increasing participation rates as There are important differences in FLFP across regions: the they get more educated. This increase is relatively higher gaps are largest in Tabasco, Veracruz, and Chiapas, while than the increase in male participation rates, and thus the differences are relatively small in Mexico City, Colima, the gap between men and women decreases as they get and Baja California (Figure 3.5, panel a). Indigenous wom- more educated. Moreover, unlike men, the participation en have much lower levels of participation compared with of women in the labor market seems to be determined by nonindigenous women at all age cohorts but especially the socioeconomic conditions of their households of ori- among women of childbearing age (Figure 3.5, panel b). gin. Higher educational attainment of a woman’s father is correlated with a greater likelihood of her participation What explains the low rates of female labor force par- in the labor market (Campos-Vázquez and Vélez Grajales ticipation? To some extent, participation rates vary with 2014; Moreno 2017). individual characteristics, including age, education, and ethnicity. However, there are also barriers to participa- Age also matters, with lower participation during the tion that go beyond individual determinants, including reproductive years. The gender gap follows an M-shaped caregiving and other household responsibilities. In fact, pattern with age: it opens up during the late twenties, a large part of the literature on FLFP in Mexico focuses on reaches a local maximum around thirty, decreases and childbearing-related restrictions. We review each of these reaches a local minimum in the mid-forties, and then in turn. The next chapter reviews the regulatory framework increases again to reach a global maximum during the late that allows women to work and then discusses potential fifties, to finally decrease again. However, the trough in the barriers that derive from social norms. M for women with college or more is almost nonexistent. Note that the first peak of the M is reached at older ages as people get more education. This is possibly a result of Individual Determinants of Labor Force delayed fertility. Finally, the second peak appears in the Participation late fifties independently of the educational attainment. The gender gap in labor force participation is lower A large share of Mexico’s youth is not in employment, among individuals with higher education, but the education, or training (NEET), and most in this group are gap is still around 17 percentage points among 35- to women. Mexico has one of the biggest gaps between the 54-year-olds with tertiary education (Figure 3.6). The male and female NEET populations in the OECD (Figure 3.7). CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 37 FIGURE 3.6 Labor Force Participation in Mexico, by Gender, Age, and Educational Attainment, 2000 and 2010 a. All b. Primary or less c. Lower-secondary 100 100 100 80 80 80 60 60 60 Percent Percent Percent 40 40 40 20 20 20 0 0 0 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Age, years Age, years Age, years d. Upper-secondary e. College or more 100 100 80 80 60 60 Percent Percent 40 40 20 20 0 0 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Age, years Age, years Male 2000 Male 2010 Female 2000 Female 2010 Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using data from the Population and Housing Census 2000 and 2010, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Note: The sample consists of women and men aged 12 – 70 years. FIGURE 3.7 Share of Youth Not in Employment, Education, or Training (NEET), Selected OECD Countries, 2017 50 45 40 Share of youth, percent 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Switzerland Austria Luxembourg Belgium Finland Canada Denmark Sweden Spain France Italy Portugal Ireland Slovenia Netherlands Norway Iceland Germany United Kingdom Lithuania OECD average Australia Israel United States Latvia Greece Poland New Zealand Slovak Rep. Czech Republic Hungary Estonia Costa Rica Colombia Turkey Mexico Men ages 15–19 Men ages 20–24 Women ages 15–19 Women ages 20–24 Source: World Bank calculations based on OECD 2018 database, https://data.oecd.org/. Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 38 | Mexico Gender Assessment As many as 39.6 percent of women aged 20 – 24 years are of balancing multiple obligations and acts as a barrier “NEETs” (as commonly called), compared with 9.4 percent of to women’s entry in the labor market.3 men in the same age group.1 Similarly, 21 percent of women aged 15 – 19 years are NEETs, relative to 8.1 percent of men Most importantly, the burden of caregiving falls squarely in the same age group. The large difference is related to on women. Men spend more time at work, while women early pregnancy, with 35 percent of the NEET population in dedicate a substantially more time than men to child, Mexico having had children as teenagers, and 64 percent of adult, and elderly care activities. Mothers face especially them (mainly women) being responsible for taking care of high barriers to paid work, regardless of their level of edu- family members (Novella et al. 2018). For any given cohort, cation or their income status (Figure 3.8). For instance, a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of youth low-income women work nearly as many hours as men in the NEET population predicts a 7 percent reduction in but spend substantially more time providing childcare and earnings for that cohort 20 years later (De Hoyos, Rogers, undertaking household chores, regardless of their level of and Székely 2016). The negative income effect of not being education. More generally, women have less time for lei- engaged in education or work also harms equity, because sure. These gender disparities are high by OECD standards close to 60 percent of the NEET population in Mexico is in (Figure 3.9), and they have implications not only for gen- the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. der equality but also for children’s well-being. For exam- ple, maternal employment is strongly negatively correlated with child poverty across countries (Thévenon et al. 2018). Potential Barriers to Work As such, marital status and the presence of small chil- Beyond individual determinants of FLFP, multiple bar- dren are important FLFP determinants. Single women riers hinder women’s entry into the labor force. Women with small children have the highest participation rate shoulder nearly 77 percent of all unpaid housework (between 56 and 58 percent), followed by single women in Mexico. The average woman spends six hours each without small children (Figure 3.10). The gap between day doing unpaid housework, compared with an average single women with and without small children is around of two hours for men. A large household labor burden pre- 4 percentage points, and their participation rates have sents a serious challenge for women attempting to attend changed little between 2005 and 2017 (1 – 2 percentage school or to work a full- or even part-time job. Moreover, points). Married women without children have participa- almost 30 percent of employees in Mexico work long hours tion rates of 44 – 48 percent, while married women with (more than 40 hours in a usual week),2 far above the OECD small children have participation rates of 35 – 40 per- average of 13 percent, which compounds the challenge cent — a gap of around 8 percentage points. FIGURE 3.8 Hours per Week Spent on Work, Caregiving, Housework, and Leisure FIGURE 3.9 Time Spent in Unpaid, in Mexico, by Gender, Education, and Income, 2014 Paid, and Total Work in Mexico and OECD, by Gender, 2015 45 40 700 35 580 607 30 600 466 487 Minutes per day 25 Hours 500 20 400 15 10 300 5 200 0 100 Work Childcare Other care HH Chores Leisure Work Childcare Other care HH Chores Leisure Work Childcare Other care HH Chores Leisure Work Childcare Other care HH Chores Leisure 0 Men Women Men Women OECD average Mexico High education High education Low education Low education and low income and high income and high income and low income Time spent in unpaid work Male Female Time spent in paid work Time spent in total work Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using data from National Survey on Time Use (ENUT) 2014, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Source: OECD 2017 database, https://stats. Note: HH = household. The sample is restricted to people aged 15 – 64 years. “Low-education” women are those who completed oecd.org/. lower-secondary school (nine years of schooling, the mean in Mexico) at most, and “high-education” women are those who Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co- completed more than nine years of schooling. operation and Development. CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 39 FIGURE 3.10 Female Labor Force Participation in Mexico, The decision to work changes substantially after moth- by Marital Status and Presence of Small Children, 2005 – 17 erhood. Before marrying, 63 – 64 percent of women work full-time, compared with 11 percent of high-skilled and 64 15 percent of low-skilled women who do not work at all Participation rate, percent 60 56 (Figure 3.12). Once married, only 57 percent of high-skilled 52 women and 44 percent of low-skilled women continue 48 working full-time. The number further decreases for moth- 44 ers of children less than one year old, with 40 percent 40 of high-skilled and 35 percent of low-skilled women con- 36 32 tinuing to work full-time. Employment increases again 28 when children attend kindergarten, and, rather surprisingly, 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 decreases when children attend primary school. The avail- Single without small children Single with small children ability and reliability of day care and after-school care mat- Married without small children Married with small children ters, as recently shown by a finding that the slight increase in the propensity for women to be employed after the global Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) 2005 – 17, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). financial crisis was partly related to an increase in the avail- Note: The sample consists of women aged 15 – 64 years. Small children are defined as younger ability of day care facilities (Cardoso et al. 2018). However, than 6 years old. Married women are either married or cohabitating. women’s decisions to work are not just about the availability of care: as many as three-quarters of working high-skilled In fact, the most important reason for the low FLFP rate is women do not pay for caregivers for their children.4 the lack of trust in childcare services. As many as 41 per- cent of low-skilled women and 32 percent of high-skilled Moreover, having multiple children substantially women say their decision not to work is driven by the reduces the likelihood of labor force participation. lack of reliable childcare (Figure 3.11). Interestingly, as Cruces and Galiani (2007) estimate the effect of fertility many as 15 percent of low-skilled women and 10 percent of high-skilled women note that they are “not allowed” to FIGURE 3.12 Female Labor Force Participation in work by a family member. Mexico, by Skill Level, Marital Status, and Children’s Ages, 2012 FIGURE 3.11 Factors Driving Women’s Decision Not to Work in Mexico, by Skill Level, 2012 …before marrying 63 11 …before motherhood High-skilled 57 18 Other 27 18 …child ≤ 1 year old 49 30 Don't know how to seek work 13 16 …children in kinder 50 12 Too old to work 15 …children in primary 43 6 15 Poor pay/bad hours 25 …before marrying 64 15 19 10 …before motherhood 44 31 Not allowed by family Low-skilled 15 …child ≤ 1 year old 35 46 Unreliable childcare 32 41 …children in kinder 42 24 Poor public transport 9 9 …children in primary 39 13 Unsafe being out alone 7 10 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent 0 10 20 30 40 50 Percent Full-time Part-time Didn’t work High-skilled Low-skilled Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using the Labor and Social Co-Responsibility Survey (ELCOS) 2012, National Institute of Statistics and Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using the Labor and Social Co-Responsibility Survey Geography (INEGI). (ELCOS) 2012, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Note: The sample is restricted to people aged 15 – 70 years. “Low-skilled” women Note: The sample is restricted to women aged 15 – 70 years. “Low-skilled” women are those who are those who completed lower-secondary school at most (nine years of schooling, completed, at most, lower-secondary school (nine years of schooling, the mean in Mexico), and the mean in Mexico), and “high-skilled” women are those with more than nine “high-skilled” women are those with more than nine years of schooling. years of schooling. 40 | Mexico Gender Assessment on female labor supply for Argentina and Mexico. In the FIGURE 3.13 Factors that Would Induce Nonworking Women case of Mexico, they find that having more than two chil- to Consider Taking a Job in Mexico, 2012 dren reduces the FLFP rate by 6.3–8.6 percentage points. 80 Using the same research design and census data from 1970 65 to 2000, Gómez and Madrigal (2017) find that FLFP has 70 73 60 65 become more sensitive to having more than two children 60 over time: in 1970, having a third child induced a decrease 50 in FLFP of 4 percentage points; by 1990, the decrease was Percent 40 10.8 percentage points; and in 2000, it was 12.5 percentage 27 points. They conclude that the opportunity cost of addi- 30 31 24 22 20 23 tional children has increased over time. 20 10 9 7 8 10 Given their household responsibilities, women are selec- tive in terms of the hours of work they are willing to ac- 0 Fitting Good Location Health Fringe Training Other cept. The characteristics of a potential job must be such schedule pay care benefits that they would allow a woman to fulfill her other respon- High-skilled Low-skilled sibilities. In fact, 65 percent of nonworking low-skilled women and 73 percent of nonworking high-skilled wom- Source: Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018, using the Labor and Social Co-Responsibility Survey (ELCOS) 2012, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). en note that they would consider taking a job if it would Note: The sample is restricted to nonworking women aged 15 – 70 years. “Low-skilled” women fit their schedule (Figure 3.13). In fact, when asked, over are those who completed lower-secondary school at most (nine years of schooling, the mean in 60 percent of women are willing to work in the morn- Mexico), and “high-skilled” women are those with more than 9 years of schooling. ing (when children are at school) but are less willing to work during the afternoon or evening (Arceo-Gomez and which was implemented between 2006 and 2017. The Santillán 2018). This consideration is more important than school day in traditional elementary schools lasts 4.5 hours, payment, although women’s reservation wage is also like- whereas the full-time school day lasts 8 hours. They found ly to be a constraint. that this full-time school program increases FLFP by 5.5 percentage points and weekly hours of work by 1.8 hours. Given these restrictions, policies that improve childcare access are likely to have a positive impact on female labor Similarly, more could be done to promote gender-neutral force participation. Calderón (2015) evaluates the effect parental leave policies and flexible work arrangements. of Mexico’s Estancias Infantiles (“Children’s residence”) As discussed in Chapter 4, the legal framework provides program on the FLFP rate.5 Because of this program, child- measures that allow women to work, but more could be care availability doubled between 2007 and 2010. The effect done to provide flexible work arrangements that ensure of the program depends on the intensity of the expansion: that women can meet their household responsibilities. For women who faced an increase of fewer than 10 childcare example, Nordic countries have directed their family poli- spots per 1,000 eligible children increased their labor cies to support working parents of small children through force participation by 1 – 5 percentage points; in contrast, expansion of childcare facilities and reliance on short but women who experienced an increase in childcare supply generously paid parental leave for both parents, includ- of more than 40 spots per 1,000 eligible children increased ing quotas to encourage fathers to share childcare duties their labor force participation by 5 – 17 percentage points. (Thévenon 2011). Similarly, in richer East Asian countries, the emerging practice is to adopt bundled packages of In addition, after-school programs and longer school measures that aim to stimulate FLFP, especially after child- days could also help to increase the willingness of birth. In 2007, Singapore introduced a package of train- mothers to fully participate in the labor market. In ing programs, flexible work arrangements, targeted active the absence of reliable childcare, mothers of young chil- labor programs and work fairs, and other measures (Ma dren may wait until their children attend school in order 2010). Since the mid-1990s, the Japanese government has to return to work. Gelbach (2002) found that mothers moved toward policies that increase coverage of day care of 6-year-old children have greater participation than and family centers, provide employer incentives to become mothers of 5-year-olds because children enter elementary more family friendly, and promote greater involvement of school at age 6 in the United States. In the same spirit, fathers in child-rearing, all of which combined may have Padilla-Romo and Cabrera-Hernández (2018) estimated reversed the increasing trend toward childlessness among the effect of the full-time schools program in Mexico, younger Japanese women (Ma 2010; World Bank 2015). CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 41 Finally, more could be done to reduce transportation costs. Job location and commuting time could also pose GENDER GAPS IN EMPLOYMENT a barrier to work, particularly in large urban centers. AND UNEMPLOYMENT Nearly a third of women who currently do not work would consider taking a job depending on the location of a poten- Women who do decide to participate in the labor market tial job (31 percent of low-skilled women and 27 percent may not necessarily want or have access to a full-time high-skilled women, as shown in Figure 3.13). This find- job, because unemployment and underemployment ing points to the time and cost that women face in com- rates are higher for women than for men. Although the muting to a job given their other responsibilities. A few difference in unemployment rates is not wide, it becomes studies investigating the effect of urban public transpor- quite significant once partial employment (or underem- tation on outcomes for women find that access to speedy ployment) is considered. For instance, although the unem- and reliable transportation is highly desirable for everyone, ployment rate was 3.8 percent for women compared with especially if designed in gender-sensitive ways (Riverson et 3.3 percent for men in the third quarter of 2018, when par- al. 2006). Similarly, telework options could help women tial employment is considered, this increases to 13.4 for who can work from home (Box 3.1). Better transportation women compared with 6.5 percent for men (Figure 3.14).6 and information and communication technology (ICT) Moreover, when comparing the educational level of unem- options may also reduce safety concerns that discourage ployed women to that of men, 52 percent of unemployed women from entering the labor force or that limit them women had completed tertiary education relative to only from working outside the home. 45 percent of unemployed men. Moreover, large gender gaps persist in workforce engage- BOX 3.1 ICT Infrastructure Can Help ment because many women are informal or unpaid workers. Female total employment rates are compara- Access to ICT infrastructure is important to access labor, credit, and insur- tively low (42 percent in Mexico, compared with an aver- ance markets. For instance, Dettling (2017) finds that exogenously deter- age 48 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean in mined high-speed internet use leads to a 4.1 percentage point increase 2017) and much lower than those of men (76 percent in in labor force participation among married women in the United States. Mexico and 76 percent in the region). Employment in the In Mexico, around 50.5 percent of men and 49.5 percent of women informal sector is much more prevalent for women than had the ability to use a computer in 2017.a To the extent that telework for men (Figure 3.15). Self-employed women tend to be becomes a more regular type of employment in Mexico, it could sub- own-account workers and are more likely to work infor- stantially improve labor force participation of women. mally (often as domestic workers). Moreover, there are a. National Survey on Availability and Use of ICT in Households (ENDUTIH) 2017, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): https://datos.gob.mx/busca/ important differences in the share of informal women dataset/encuesta-nacional-sobre-disponibilidad-y-uso-de-tic-en-hogares-endutih. across regions, ranging from a high of 76 percent of work- ing women in informal employment in Chiapas to a low FIGURE 3.14 Unemployment and Underemployment in Mexico, by Gender, 2015 – 18 a. Unemployment b. Unemployment and underemployment 5 16 14 4 12 3 10 Percent Percent 8 2 6 4 1 2 0 0 2015 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Q3 2015 Q4 2016 Q1 2016 Q2 2016 Q3 2016 Q4 2017 Q1 2017 Q2 2017 Q3 2017 Q4 2018 Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2015 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Q3 2015 Q4 2016 Q1 2016 Q2 2016 Q3 2016 Q4 2017 Q1 2017 Q2 2017 Q3 2017 Q4 2018 Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 Males Females Source: National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE), National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Note: “Underemployment” refers to the employed population that has the need and availability to offer more hours of work. The sample included only working-age people (aged 15 years or more). 42 | Mexico Gender Assessment FIGURE 3.15 Share of Mexican Workers in Informal MAP 3.1 Share of Mexican Female Workers in Informal Employment, by Gender, 2015 – 18 Employment, by Region, 2018 31 Female Informality rate 30 34 80 29 28 Percent 27 26 25 24 23 2015 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Q3 2015 Q4 2016 Q1 2016 Q2 2016 Q3 2016 Q4 2017 Q1 2017 Q2 2017 Q3 2017 Q4 2018 Q1 2018 Q2 Males Females 2018 Q3 Source: National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), using National Source: National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), using ENOE 2018Q1 data. See Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) data. http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/atlas_genero/. Note: Figure shows percentages of males and females aged 15 years or more. Note: Figure shows percentages of the female population aged 15 years or more. of 34 percent in Chihuahua (Map 3.1). However, the larg- FIGURE 3.16 Type of Employment in Mexico, by Gender and est gender gaps in the share of informal workers are in the Indigenous Status, 2016 northern states such as Sonora, Baja California Sur, and Nuevo Leon, where men are more likely than women to Non-indigenous 6 72 14 5 3 Women be formally employed. Indigenous 8 59 22 9 2 Indigenous women are more likely to be unpaid Non-indigenous 7 78 8 24 Men or self-employed. Only 59 percent of indigenous women Indigenous 10 71 11 5 3 are wage workers, compared with 72 percent of nonindige- 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 nous women (Figure 3.16). In contrast, as many as 22 per- Percent cent of indigenous women are self-employed, and 9 per- cent are unpaid family workers, compared with 14 percent Employer Salaried worker Self-employed and 5 percent of nonindigenous women, respectively. Not salaried Unemployed Source: World Bank calculations based on National Household Income and Expenditure Survey Gaps in the ability to generate income are especially (ENIGH) 2016, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). high among older people and those with secondary edu- Note: Age range 15 – 65. cation. Among individuals aged 30 – 34 years, the share of men earning labor income is 35 percentage points higher particularly if they are young (ages 20 – 30) and have low than women — a gap that increases to 38 percentage points levels of education.7 among people who are 55 – 59 years old (Figure 3.17, panel a). The share of men with a completed secondary degree Gender differences regarding employment are also ev- who generate an income is 34 percentage points higher ident when examining the types of work and sectors than the corresponding share of women, although this where women work. Although 74 percent of all employed trend can also be observed to a lesser extent among those Mexican men are regular employees, this is only the case with incomplete secondary education, primary education, for 71 percent of working women. This disparity is relat- or higher education (Figure 3.17, panel b). The gender gap ed to a sharp contrast in participation as unpaid family only decreases for men and women with tertiary education: workers: 7 percent of employed women are in this cate- the share of men with a tertiary degree who are employed gory, compared with only 3 percent of men.8 The share of is 14 percentage points higher than that of women with self-employed women (22.4 percent) is roughly the same the same level of education. Indigenous women are less as the share of self-employed men (22.6 percent). However, likely than nonindigenous women to earn labor income, there are important differences in terms of the sectoral CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 43 FIGURE 3.17 Shares of Men and Women Earning Labor Income in Mexico, 2016 a. By age b. By level of education 100 87 90 Complete tertiary 74 80 58 Incomplete tertiary 42 70 89 60 Complete secondary 54 Percent 50 75 Incomplete secondary 43 40 88 30 Complete primary 47 20 87 Incomplete primary 45 10 0 74 Never attended 40 60–64 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 0 20 40 60 80 100 Age range, years Percent Male Female Male Female Source: National Household Income and Expenditure Survey — New Series (ENIGH-NS) 2016, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). composition of employment. A higher proportion of em- ployed women than men are engaged in wholesale and re- GENDER GAPS IN EARNINGS tail trade, domestic work, education, and health, while As in many other countries, women in Mexico earn on a substantially higher share of employed men than wom- average less than men, even after controlling for the en work in agriculture, construction, transport, and, to same level of education, for work in the same sectors some extent, manufacturing (Figure 3.18). or occupations, or for work within the same type of company. Men earn 9.6 percent more than women on FIGURE 3.18 Sectoral Composition of Employment, average.9 However, this does not control for differences by Gender, in Mexico, 2018 in observable characteristics, such as the level of edu- cation, type of job, or sector of employment. There is Agriculture and fishing a large literature aiming to assess the size of the gender wage gap in Mexico, controlling for these factors (see, for Construction instance, Alarcón and McKinley 1994; Brown, Pagán, and Transport and communication Rodriguez-Oreggia 1999; Calónico and Ñopo 2009; Pagán and Ullibarri 2000; and Popli 2008, 2013). Most of this Mining and electricity analysis finds large wage gaps that cannot be explained by Manufacturing differences in observable characteristics or by differences in the kinds of jobs that men and women take. Public administration Finance, professional services The wage gap can be decomposed between the por- tion that is explained by individual characteristics and Hotels and restaurants the portion that cannot be explained. Once all observ- Other services able characteristics are accounted for, the “unexplained” portion is often associated with discrimination. In what Social work follows, we examine wage differentials across the popu- Wholesale and retail lation using the 2016 National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) and apply the Ñopo (2008) 0 5 10 15 20 25 matching decomposition technique (Box 3.2). Share of total employment, percent Male Female After comparing men and women with the same char- acteristics, the gender earnings gap is even higher than Source: National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) 2018Q3, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/app/ when looking at simple averages. To explain this, first note tmp/Infoenoe/Default_15mas.aspx. that wages in female-dominated jobs were 2.1 percentage 44 | Mexico Gender Assessment BOX 3.2 Wage Gap Decomposition Using Matching, as Proposed by Ñopo (2008) The methodology proposed by Ñopo (2008) is a nonparametric matching decomposition methodology that extends the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition often cited in the literature (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). In contrast to Oaxaca-Blinder, wage differences are not linked to Mincerian wage equations, but rather use a matching technique to allow for the possibility that the groups may not be completely comparable, simply because there are some jobs that are not common to both men and women. For instance, the construction industry may have jobs that are male-dominated and not comparable to any job where there are women. Similarly, there may be few men working as nurses. Jobs that have both men and women are in the “common support.” The set of jobs in the common support are defined by type of employment, the size of the firm, the sector, and the location of employment, including a distinction by federal, state, and urban or rural zone. Individual characteristics include age, civil status, and educational level. The Ñopo (2008) wage gap decomposition technique matches members of both groups (for example, females and males) with the exact com- bination of observed characteristics. The technique decomposes the observed wage gap (Δ) into four additive elements: ΔX: The wage difference attributed to the differences in the distribution of characteristics of males and females for which the characteristics lie in the common support. ΔM: The wage difference due to the existence of a combination of characteristics met by men but not by any woman (that is, male-dominated jobs versus the common support). ΔF: Analogously, the wage difference due to the existence of women with a combination of characteristics not met by any man (that is, female-dominated jobs versus the common support). ΔO: Finally, the residual: the proportion of the wage gap that cannot explained by the set of observable characteristics. This could be related to unobservable characteristics, such as levels of ability, but it could also be due to discrimination. points lower than those that are common to both men and FIGURE 3.19 Decomposition of Male-Female Wage Gap women, partly helping to explain the wage gap (Figure in Mexico, 2016 3.19). However, differences in the distribution of char- acteristics between men and women across jobs that are 9.6 common for both men and women should favor women. 2.1 This is because women working in jobs that are com- mon to men have relatively higher levels of education −6.0 −1.7 and other favorable characteristics, implying that women 15.3 should earn salaries that are 1.7 percentage points higher −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 than men. Similarly, male-dominated jobs had wages that Percent are 6 percentage points lower than jobs that are com- mon to women, an effect that adds to the unexplained Total wage gap ∆ characteristics in common support portion of the wage gap. The result is that 15.2 percent ∆ Female support ∆ Male support Unexplained of the wage difference cannot be explained by observed Source: Estimates using World Bank — SEDLAC (Socio-Economic Database for Latin America individual characteristics or by the differences in the sec- and the Caribbean) harmonization based on the National Household Income and Expenditure tors and types of employment that men and women have. Survey — New Series (ENIGH-NS) 2016, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). In other words, there is a sizable “unexplained” portion Note: The wage gap decomposition considers the following controls: age groups; education level; region; urban and rural classification; marital status; type of work (employer, salaried of the earnings gap. This decomposition at the national worker, self-employed); hours of work; size of firm; and the 1-digit ISIC (International Standard level is consistent with a recent review of public sec- Industrial Classification) sector of activity. tor salaries at the federal level, which found that male employees earn more than female employees perform- a semiparametric decomposition of the gender wage gap. ing the same tasks in 66 percent of 117 positions across 19 They find evidence of sticky floors and glass ceilings in departments (Jiménez and Sánchez 2018). In fact, female 1990. However, they find that the glass ceilings break dur- public sector workers earn 91 cents for every peso earned ing the next two decades, while the sticky floors are per- by male workers, but the gap can be as high as 30 per- sistent over time. In their analysis, human capital endow- cent in some departments. ment differences lose explanatory power, and by 2010 most of the wage gap is due to differences in returns. A correc- These results are in line with other work for Mexico. For tion for participation selection shows that if all women instance, Arceo-Gómez and Campos-Vázquez (2014a) were to work, the gap would be even higher, which is evi- use 1990, 2000, and 2010 census data to estimate dence of positive selection of women into the labor force. CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 45 The large unexplained wage gap in Mexico is in line Dark-skinned and married women are especially suscep- with other countries in Latin America. As in the case tible to discrimination. The attribution of the unexplained of Mexico, working women are typically better educated gender gap to discrimination relies on strong assump- than working men, and as such, the distribution of char- tions about the lack of omitted variable bias in the esti- acteristics in the common support tend to favor women mation of the wage equation. To better uncover discrimi- (Figure 3.20). Similarly, male-dominated jobs have lower nation in the Mexican labor market without having to rely wages than jobs in the common support in most countries on assumptions, Arceo-Gómez and Campos-Vázquez except Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. In con- (2014b) ran a correspondence study in Mexico City. They trast, female-dominated jobs often receive higher wages sent around 8,000 fictitious resumés responding to around than jobs in the common support. For instance, in con- 1,000 online job advertisements. All the characteristics trast to Mexico, wages in female-dominated jobs in Bolivia, in the resumés were randomized, but they were particu- Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru are larly interested on the effect of gender, marital status, and higher than wages in the common support. What is clear physical phenotype. They found that both race and gen- is that in all cases in Latin America, the unexplained wage der have a large effect on the callback rates for women but gap is high and can range between 6 percent (Honduras) not for men. Dark-skinned women need to send 18 per- and 29 percent (Uruguay). These estimates are also in line cent more resumés to get the same number of callbacks with similar estimates for the European Union. The unex- as white-skinned women. In addition, married women plained portion of the wage gap ranges from just above need to send 25 percent more resumés to get the same num- 10 percent in Belgium and Croatia to over 30 percent in ber of callbacks as single women. No other characteristics the Czech Republic, Norway, and the United Kingdom in the resumés affected the callback rate, including type (Inchauste, Munoz-Boudet, and Buitrago Hernandez 2018). of college, experience, major, and command of English. FIGURE 3.20 Decomposition of Male-Female Wage Gap in Latin America, 2016 Uruguay 2016 D=8.9% 29 Bolivia 2016 D=10.3% 27 Peru 2015 D=20.5% 25 Chile 2016 D=19% 25 Brazil 2016 D=11.9% 22 Paraguay 2016 D=11.9% 21 Colombia 2016 D=0.7% 19 Nicaragua 2016 D=1.9% 19 Costa Rica 2016 D=−9.1% 19 Ecuador 2016 D=4.1% 16 Mexico 2016 D=9.6% 15 Guatemala 2016 D=1.8% 14 El Salvador 2016 D=0.5% 12 Panama 2016 D=−6.4% 11 Argentina 2016 D=−3.9% 9 Dominican Rep 2016 D=6.6% 7 Honduras 2016 D=−7.6% 6 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 Percent DM: unmatched characteristics of men DF: unmatched characteristics of women DX: differences in the distribution of characteristics common support Wage gap D0: unexplained Source: Estimates using World Bank — SEDLAC (Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean) harmonization circa 2016. 46 | Mexico Gender Assessment Gender wage gaps are not unique to Mexico, but address- businesses could be a key source of job creation and inno- ing them will require interventions that are tailored vation, as well as a way to address inequalities. Calderón, to the country context. Beyond formal legislation that Iacovone, and Juarez (2017) differentiate between female ensures equal pay for equal work (see Chapter 4), there entrepreneurs who started their businesses out of necessity must be efforts to ensure that hiring women does not cost (for lack of other alternatives) and those who started them more than hiring men. This includes allowing for parental because they recognized a good opportunity. On average, leave policies, telework policies, and retirement policies these opportunity entrepreneurs have higher profits, better that are gender-neutral. Moreover, there is some evidence management practices, and higher cognitive and selected that the presence of female managers reduces the gender noncognitive skills. The main characteristics that differ- wage gap (Gagliarducci and Paserman 2015; Hirsch 2013; entiate firms born out of necessity from those born out Magda and Cukrowska-Torzewska 2018). If all or a por- of opportunity are the management practices and certain tion of the gender pay gap is due to discrimination, the business characteristics and skills of the entrepreneurs. presence of more women at the management level could However, this discriminant analysis is only partially suc- help to narrow gaps. One potential explanation for this cessful, which implies that unobservable characteristics is that women may be more likely than men to promote can also determine the decision to set up a business and female-friendly workplace policies such as the provision the firm performance. To the extent that entrepreneurs of childcare (Stumbitz, Lewis, and Rouse 2018). A sec- born out of necessity have low productivity and low prof- ond potential explanation is that female managers may be its, it would be advantageous both for themselves and for better at mentoring other female workers (Athey, Avery, overall economic growth if they were to move to produc- and Zemsky 2000). A third possible reason relates to the- tive wage employment. Is this more relevant for female ories of labor market discrimination, which predict that entrepreneurs than their male counterparts? To assess this, if women are less likely than men to discriminate against we focus on performance gaps between male-owned and other women, organizations that employ more women female-owned microenterprises. should have a smaller unjustified gender wage gap (Magda and Cukrowska-Torzewska 2018). Performance Gaps between Male- and Female-Owned Firms GENDER GAPS Microenterprises led by women are smaller and have IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP lower productivity than those led by men. Total annual sales and gross profits of Mexican firms managed by men Entrepreneurship is another avenue for women to enjoy are 130 percent higher than those managed by women economic opportunities and contribute to economic (Mendoza et al. 2018). Similarly, a recent baseline report growth. Women entrepreneurs can contribute to their of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) for the High Impact household economic well-being through their own labor, Entrepreneurs Program (HIEP)11 shows that a firm led by but as the heads of productive firms, they can also be an a woman chief executive officer (CEO) makes Mex$3 mil- engine of growth and a source of employment. lion to Mex$4 million less in revenue on average than a sim- ilar firm led by a man (Mendoza et al. 2018). When this However, there are few female entrepreneurs in Mexico, difference is controlled by sector, the effect is even larger. most of whom operate in the informal sector. The data In addition, there is a negative relationship between firms for the third quarter in 2018 show that only 2.5 percent of with a female CEO and firm size: on average, firms led by working women are employers, representing only 22.2 per- women have fewer employees than firms with male CEOs. cent of all employers.10 Female entrepreneurs are 56 per- Moreover, a female-led firm is negatively associated with cent less likely than men to operate in the formal sector the firm’s reported investment and value of assets.12 and 63 percent more likely to be informal entrepreneurs (Fareed et al. 2017). This is consistent with other coun- Female-owned firms can be quite innovative even out- tries in Latin America (Bruhn 2009). side of male-dominated sectors. For instance, the base- line report of an RCT to evaluate the HIEP analyzed 859 Although entrepreneurship holds great promise, the firms, of which only 172 were led by female CEOs (Mendoza efforts of some female entrepreneurs could be misallo- et al. 2018). If male-dominated sectors are defined as those cated if the business is born out of need rather than in with more than 80 percent male CEOs,13 then 57 percent response to an economic opportunity. Female-owned of female CEOs in this sample led firms in male-dominated CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 47 sectors. The proportion of female-owned firms that have taking personal initiative) could increase business prof- developed or introduced a new or significantly improved its (Campos et al. 2017). product is higher in the male-dominated sectors (Mendoza et al. 2018). However, the proportion of female-led firms Soft-skills training may need to complement other forms that introduced a new marketing strategy is 15 percentage of training to ensure effectiveness. An RCT in Mexico pro- points higher in the non-male-dominated group. vided business training (“hard skills”) and personal initi- ative training (“soft skills”) to female microentrepreneurs However, most of the difference in total annual sales and to differentiate the impact that both types of instruction gross profits cannot be explained by differences in the have on firms. It also aimed to assess whether outcomes characteristics of firms. Female managers in Mexico are improve by targeting subgroups of women (World Bank 8 – 9 percent less productive than their male counterparts. 2018a). Women were classified into “low-productivity” and A Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gaps in perfor- “high-productivity” entrepreneurs. After the training treat- mance finds that 55 percent of the annual sales gap and ment, women had a deeper knowledge of their businesses 61 percent of the gross profit gap cannot be explained by and have improved their practices — mainly in their ac- differences in the characteristics of firms or their man- counting methods. The treated female CEOs are more like- agers (World Bank 2017). If microenterprises have their ly to have a formal registry, have more access to financing own website or if they have a checking or savings account, channels (either through selling or using credit), work few- the gaps widen. er days per week, and in some cases have decided to close their business. The latter outcome reflects a higher per- ception of the opportunity cost of closing their business- Can Training Interventions Improve the es and moving into the labor market, as women placed Performance of Female-Owned Firms? a higher value on the minimum amount of money they would accept as a monthly payment. Taking the course al- lowed women leading low-productivity enterprises to re- Training in hard skills may not be enough to improve alize that their businesses were not sufficiently profitable the performance of female-led enterprises. Two types and to decide to close them. These outcomes should sup- of interventions aimed at increasing the business skills port higher productivity and higher levels of well-being for and managerial capital of microentrepreneurs have been female microentrepreneurs and their families. evaluated: (a) providing microfirms with external consult- ing services (Bloom et al. 2013); and (b) providing busi- ness and financial training directly to microentrepreneurs (Calderón, Cunha, and De Giorgi 2013; Drexler, Fischer, GENDER GAPS IN ACCESS and Schoar 2011; Karlan and Valdivia 2011). Both have TO FINANCE been found to have a significant positive impact on prof- its. These interventions assume that managers and busi- Access to finance is another critical element for wom- ness owners lack certain abilities and posit that provid- en’s access to economic opportunities. Closing gender ing specific training can improve business outcomes like gaps in financial inclusion could have positive effects in sales, profits, and survival probability. However, there smoothing consumption, providing security, increasing is opposing evidence that the mean effects of business saving and investment rates, and managing economic training might be small and not significant, with greater risk. The evidence shows that having access to and use returns concentrated in high-potential entrepreneurs, of a range of financial services not only enhances the who are most likely to adopt entrepreneurial practices contribution of female-owned business to growth but and earn higher profits after training (Calderón, Cunha, also contributes to women’s empowerment, allows for and De Giorgi 2013). In addition, previous business train- better use of resources, and reduces the vulnerability of ing interventions have been found to be particularly inef- their households and businesses (Aker et al. 2016; Ashraf, fective in increasing firm size and survival probability for Karlan, and Yin 2010; Delavallade et al. 2015; Dupas and female-owned microbusinesses (De Mel, McKenzie, and Robinson 2013; Prina 2015). Therefore, closing the gen- Woodruff 2012) and have struggled to prove sustained der gap in access to finance can enable economic growth, impacts on business profitability and growth (McKenzie inequality reduction, and social inclusion. This section and Woodruff 2014). In fact, traditional business train- assesses the differences in financial inclusion between men ing may not have any significant effect on any business and women in Mexico and identifies some of the barri- outcomes, while soft-skills training (such as to encourage ers that women face. 48 | Mexico Gender Assessment Gender Gaps in Financial Inclusion issuing debit cards to beneficiaries of the largest conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in Mexico — Prospera — who The gender gap in financial inclusion has narrowed be- were previously receiving their benefits directly deposited tween 2012 and 2018, mostly driven by a large increase into a Bansefi account but had no associated debit card.16 in access for women in rural areas. This report measures The card enabled account holders to withdraw cash and financial inclusion as the ownership of any of the follow- check balances at any automated teller machine (ATM) and ing financial products and services: bank account, for- encouraged the use of other financial products. Because mal credit, insurance, or pension fund, as measured by beneficiaries of the CCT program are all women and most Mexico’s National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF). of them live in rural areas, the distribution of debit cards Between 2012 and 2018, financial inclusion improved for had a large effect on reversing the gender gap in rural ar- both men and women, while the gender gap decreased by eas. In fact, Bansefi serves 22 percent of the entire female 2.4 percentage points (Figure 3.21).14 The share of wom- population. Moreover, other government initiatives such en who reported owning any financial product increased as the Comprehensive Financial Inclusion Program also by 13 percentage points (from 52 percent to 65 percent) contributed to reduce the gender gap. Launched in 2014, while it increased by 11 percentage points for men (from this program provides financial education, credit, pro- 61 percent to 72 percent). This was largely driven by an grammed savings, insurance, and other products and ser- increase in rural areas, where the percentage of women vices to beneficiaries of social programs — the vast major- with at least one financial product increased by 23 per- ity of whom are women (CONAIF 2017). centage points, effectively reversing the sign of the gen- der gap in rural areas. In 2018, 58 percent of women in Although men have greater access than women to sav- rural areas owned a financial product compared with 56 ings accounts and formal lending in urban areas, the percent of men, up from 35 percent and 41 percent, re- opposite is true in rural areas. Both men and women had spectively, in 2012. greater access to services in urban areas than in rural areas in 2018, but although 80 percent of men had access to at FIGURE 3.21 Evolution of Financial Inclusion in least one financial product in urban areas, only 69 percent Mexico, by Gender and Area of Residence, 2012 – 18 of women did so (Figure 3.22).17 In contrast, women in rural 90 81 80 FIGURE 3.22 Gender Gap in Financial Inclusion in Mexico, 80 72 72 71 70 69 by Type of Financial Product and Area of Residence, 2018 70 65 65 61 61 57 55 56 58 90 60 52 80.3 Percent 50 80 41 40 35 70 30 69.0 56.7 58.0 60 53.9 20 Percent 50 56.1 10 40 32.1 33.4 34.6 0 43.4 31.2 2012 2015 2018 2012 2015 2018 2012 2015 2018 39.1 30 20.9 National Urban Rural 29.4 18.2 20 25.7 Men Women 20.0 20.7 17.9 10 15.9 Source: National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2012, 2015, and 2018, of the 0 National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the National Banking Any financial product Bank account Credit Insurance Pension fund Any financial product Bank account Credit Insurance Pension fund and Securities Commission (CNBV). Note: Financial inclusion is measured by the ownership of any financial product (savings account, credit, insurance, or pension fund). Survey covers the adult population aged 18 – 70 years. Urban Rural The large increase of financial inclusion for women in Male Female rural areas can be explained by the digitalization of gov- Source: National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, National Institute of Statistics and ernment transfers. The Mexican government has shifted Geography (INEGI) and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). toward electronic government-to-person (G2P) payments, Note: Financial inclusion is measured by the ownership of any financial product (including which includes social transfers, pension payments, and savings accounts, access to credit, insurance, and pension funds). Survey covers the adult wages.15 In particular, since 2009, the government began population aged 18 – 70 years. CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 49 areas were slightly less financially excluded than men; 58 as shown earlier, women are more likely to work in the percent of rural women had at least one financial product informal sector so that they would not be paying social compared with 56 percent of men. Women in rural areas contributions, which would exclude them from pen- had lower access than men to bank accounts (20 percent sion benefits. for women versus 31 percent for men), but they had sim- ilar access to formal credit and insurance. Access to for- mal credit was driven mostly by the expansion of micro- Use and Expansion of the Financial Infrastructure finance, which was aided by lower transaction costs and information asymmetries derived from the group-lending Greater financial inclusion has come through an ex- model. In fact, in 2018 about 15 percent of women receiv- pansion in bank accounts. The share of women with ing formal credit in rural areas received a group loan.18 This a bank account increased by a very significant 16 percent- was five times higher than the 3 percent observed among age points (from 30 percent to 46 percent) between 2012 rural men. Compartamos is the largest microlender in and 2018, compared with a 4 percentage point increase Mexico; in December 2017 it had 2.4 million clients, of for men over the same period (Figure 3.23).20 Most of this whom 90 percent were women. However, a recent RCT of increase took place in rural areas, where women hold- an expansion to microcredits in Compartamos found no ing accounts went from 19 percent to 42 percent over the evidence of transformative impacts on microentrepreneur- same period. As noted above, this increase is associated ship, income, labor supply, expenditures, social status, or with the delivery of government transfers through elec- subjective well-being (as measured by 37 outcomes across tronic payments. A larger percentage of men than wom- these six domains) (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2015). en who reported owning a bank account have a payroll account — that is, a “checking” account where employ- The largest gender gap in financial inclusion is related ers deposit their salaries (Figure 3.24). About 63 percent to access to a pension fund. The largest gender of men who declared having a banking account had some gap — concerning access to a pension fund or savings form of payroll account in 2018, compared with 42 per- for retirement — is 18.6 percentage points in rural areas cent of women, reflecting the large gap in labor force par- and 17.6 percentage points in urban areas, which results ticipation in the formal sector. In contrast, about 27 per- in a higher poverty risk for women at old ages.19 One fac- cent of women who reported owning a banking account tor that might explain this gender gap is the higher labor had an account that was used for government transfers, force participation of men relative to women. Moreover, compared with 7 percent of men. FIGURE 3.23 Percentage of Mexican Adults with a FIGURE 3.24 Percentage of Mexican Adults with a Bank Account, by Gender and Area of Residence, 2018 Bank Account, by Account Type and Gender, 2018 60 Investment fund 48 50 46 46 Fixed-term 42 42 42 40 38 Checking 36 32 30 Savings Percent 30 26 Gov. transfers 19 20 Pension 10 Payroll 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2012 2015 2018 2012 2015 2018 Percent National Rural Men Women Men Women Source: National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, National Institute Source: National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the National Banking and Securities of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). Commission (CNBV). Note: Type of banking account for those who reported having one. Survey covers Note: Survey covers the adult population aged 18 – 70 years. the adult population aged 18–70 years. 50 | Mexico Gender Assessment Despite improvements in the financial infrastructure Only one in five women in Mexico are able to obtain emer- aimed at increasing access in hard-to-reach communi- gency funds to deal with an unexpected shock, and most ties, a larger percentage of rural women still use bank of these funds come from friends and family. According branches more than other channels. In the past dec- to the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion Database ade, the financial landscape in Mexico has been altered (Global Findex), 33.8 percent of men in 2017 were able by a sharp expansion of the financial infrastructure and to come up with emergency funds, while only 20.8 percent of the availability of products and services.21 New legis- of women could do so, putting women in a more vulner- lation increased the accessibility and convenience of fi- able situation.22 The main source of emergency funds for nancial services with point-of-service (POS) stores and women come from social networks such as friends and ATMs. However, in 2018 a larger percent of rural women family (40 percent for those who were able to raise emer- (30 percent) continued to use bank branches more than gency funds) (Figure 3.26). In contrast, the main source other channels (28 percent for POS stores and 22 percent of emergency funding for men is labor income (for 37.5 for ATMs) (Figure 3.25). In contrast, ATMs were the most percent of men). Interestingly, 17.5 percent of women con- common channel used by urban women: 52 percent re- sidered a formal loan from a bank, employer, or private ported using one over the past year. Thus, so far, channels lender as the main source of emergency funds as opposed designed to increase financial access have been primarily to only 12.2 percent of men. beneficial to those with greater financial knowledge and capability, mostly in urban areas (Reddy, Bruhn, and Tan FIGURE 3.26 Main Source of Emergency Funds among 2013). However, this could change in the future. Empirical Mexican Population with Access to Such Funds, evidence shows that customers start taking advantage of by Gender, 2017 reduced transaction costs associated with new low-cost 100 technologies only after trust is established (for instance, 3.9 2.9 5.4 90 17.5 by monitoring balances through ATMs) (Bachas et al. 2018). 12.2 80 Other FIGURE 3.25 Use of the Financial Infrastructure 70 21.6 Sale of assets in Mexico over the Past Year, by Channel of Access, 60 Loan from a bank, employer, Percent 37.5 Gender, and Area of Residence, 2018 50 or private lender 70 40 Labor income 58 40.0 60 52 49 53 30 19.6 Family or friends 47 50 44 36 20 Savings Percent 40 31 32 30 28 10 21.4 30 22 17.1 20 0 10 Men Women 0 POS ATM Bank POS ATM Bank Source: Global Financial Inclusion Database (Global Findex) 2017, World Bank, store branch store branch https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/. Note: Survey covers the population aged 15 years or more. Urban Rural Men Women Women have lower access to all types of credit. Women Source: National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, National Institute have less access than men to informal credit in low- and of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). middle-income countries (Ongena and Popov 2016). Mexico Note: “POS store” refers to small, point-of-service (POS) stores and pharmacies is no different: while 27 percent of men used informal cred- that deliver banking services, also known as corresponsales bancarios. ATM = it in 2018, only 25 percent of women did so.23 More wor- automated teller machine. Survey covers the adult population aged 18 – 70 years. risome is that 46 percent of women lacked access to any type of credit in 2018 (Figure 3.27, panel a), limiting their Ability to Deal with Unexpected Expenses business opportunities and options to deal with unexpect- and Shocks ed expenses. In fact, earlier work has documented that female-owned firms are less likely to obtain bank loans than Financial inclusion can help to reduce poverty by provid- their male-owned counterparts (Love and Sánchez 2009). ing ways to survive economic shocks such as unemploy- Providing women greater access to the formal financial sys- ment, drought or floods, the loss of a breadwinner, or pre- tem represents an unexploited profitable market for finan- venting people from falling into poverty in the first place. cial institutions. Evidence suggests that women have lower CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 51 default rates and thus require lower capital reserves. On They find that greater access to the financial system for average, loans would require 4 percent less capital due to low-income men and women has had a positive, but dif- nonperforming loans from women (CONAIF 2018). ferentiated, impact on employment. For women, it has increased the opportunity for salaried employment. For Although informal savings have declined substantially, men, it has encouraged the creation of new businesses, women tend to save more using informal channels, mostly of an informal nature. Moreover, the expansion while men are more likely to use formal saving services. of financial services led to higher income levels for both According to the 2018 ENIF, 31 percent of both men and men and women, but this increase was twofold higher for women saved using informal channels, down from 47 per- women than for men (about 9 percent for women and 4.8 cent and 49 percent in 2015, respectively (Figure 3.27, panel percent for men). Fareed et al. (2017) find that financial b). Women tend to use informal channels more frequently, inclusion (measured by a financial inclusion index) is pos- including tandas (Mexican term for informal Rotating itively linked with entrepreneurship and can open eco- Savings and Credit Associations [ROSCAs]), “under-the- nomic opportunities for female entrepreneurs. However, mattress” savings, family and friends, or buying assets. In the positive relationship does not hold for women entre- contrast, men are more likely to use more formal savings preneurs working in the informal sector or for women mechanisms such as commercial bank deposits. Although working in the commerce sector, highlighting the entry empirical evidence shows that women tend to save more barriers, including financial, and problems pertaining to than men with respect to their income level (GBA 2015), financial literacy. This finding could be related to the fact, the ENIF 2018 evidence from Mexico shows that only 15 as discussed earlier, that many women are informal entre- percent of women save using formal channels. preneurs “out of necessity” rather than in response to an economic opportunity. FIGURE 3.27 Use of Formal and Informal Credit and Savings in Mexico, by Gender, 2018 In particular, only a small share of women own high-value assets that could serve as a collateral for a. Credit b. Savings a loan. Unequal access to credit is largely driven by in- 50 46 35 31 31 33 31 40 equalities in high-value assets, such as houses and land, 30 40 23 that serve as collateral to secure loans (as shown in chap- 25 20 2725 Percent Percent 30 20 16 15 ter 2, Figure 2.19). 20 20 17 15 13 12 10 10 5 However, new technologies such as data-driven lending 0 0 can reduce heavy collateral requirements and increase Only Only Both None Only Only Both None financial inclusion of women. Financial institutions hold informal formal informal formal plenty of information on their customers that is barely Men Women used (business cash flow, assets, education, employment, Source: National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, National Institute of Statistics and and so on). This information could be used to construct Geography (INEGI) and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). an algorithm to predict the creditworthiness of new bor- Note: “Use” refers to whether the person saved or had credit over the past year. The main sources of “informal” financial services include family, friends, tandas (Rotating Savings and rowers instead of relying on high collateral (Box 3.3). This Credit Associations, [ROSCAs]), savings associations, buying or selling assets, and pawn shops. technology could help to bridge the asymmetry between Survey covers the adult population aged 18 – 70 years. borrowers and lenders through credit scores that deter- mine the probability of defaulting on a loan. Barriers to Women’s Access to Financial Services Despite a sharp increase in the availability of financial products and services as well as the increase of account The expansion of financial services has opened eco- ownership in recent years — particularly among women nomic opportunities for women, although not neces- in rural areas — financial inclusion regarding the use sarily as entrepreneurs. The recent increase of access to of financial products remains a challenge. In 2018, only financial services in Mexico has received attention from 41 percent of the women who declared having a bank the academic literature, studying its impact on the labor account had used it in the past year, and 60 percent own- market. Bruhn and Love (2011) study the effect on eco- ing a debit card did not use it to purchase goods.25 It is crit- nomic opportunities for the poor of a massive increase ical to go beyond access to foster the use of financial prod- in banking services in Mexico due to the 2002 opening ucts and services. Expanding access to savings through of Banco Azteca, which targets low-income households.24 one-time account openings through G2P transfers is not 52 | Mexico Gender Assessment enough to foster account use and affect welfare (Dupas et al. 2018). BOX 3.3 The Potential of Fintech to Close the Gender Gap in Financial Access It is important to raise awareness and educate the newly Innovation plays an important role for financial inclusion and reducing banked on financial literacy. Women are less financially gender disparities by bridging underserved and hard-to-reach popula- literate than men on average and are less familiar with tions. Technology penetration is relatively high, and innovative finan- banking and financial terminology (OECD 2013). As finan- cial technology (fintech) companies continue to emerge in Mexico, with cial products become more broadly available, financial 238 registered start-ups in 2017a offering services including peer-to-peer capability is crucial in accelerating the financial inclu- lending, credit scoring, payments, crowdfunding, and digital currencies. sion of women.26 Although the effectiveness of financial Moreover, in Mexico there are currently 54.8 million smartphones and literacy programs remains inconclusive for the full pop- 44.4 million households with internet access.b ulation, they do have an impact on certain groups such Fintech start-ups in Mexico are developing new technologies that could as those with low initial levels of education and finan- reduce gender gaps in financial access by using administrative or “Big cial literacy (Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2011) or the youth Data” on borrowers that can replace traditional collateral. This would (Bruhn et al. 2013). For instance, financial education particularly benefit financially excluded women because they are less sessions for rural farmers increased take-up rates for likely than men to own high-value assets that can be used as a collat- insurance in China (Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2013). eral. For example, Konfío is an emerging fintech company in Mexico that offers microcredit at lower rates than traditional banks, using pre- Similarly, financial messages delivered through a popu- dictive algorithms that allow credit to be approved in just a few hours. lar soap opera in South Africa improved desirable finan- cial behaviors such as borrowing from a formal financial New technology can simplify procedures and reduce costs to comply with regulations. Old technology and tight regulations may reduce access institution instead of from other, higher-cost options to formal financial services for low-income individuals (including rural (Berg and Zia 2013). women, who often lack documentation) and impose additional pro- cesses that make financial services more expensive. Fintech simpli- Beyond training, the new alternative forms of digi- fies operational processes and allow more detailed, less costly ana- tal finance open a new set of services, channels, and lytics that enhance transparency while also maintaining the personal value opportunities for women. Evidence has shown privacy and security of the financial activity. In addition, fintech has that digital payments increase security, privacy, and changed cross-border and remittance payment services, offering better control over the funds received, especially for women and cheaper services while lowering the cost to comply with regulations. (Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk 2009; Duflo 2012; Dupas a. Fintech start-up data from Finnovista Fintech Radar México, and Robinson 2009; Morawczynski and Pickens 2009). https://www.finnovista.com/. Similarly, the growth of the fintech industry could reduce b. Technology access data from the National Survey on Availability and Use of Information Technologies in Households (ENDUTIH) 2016, National Institute of the gender gap in financial inclusion thanks to a greater Statistics and Geography (INEGI): https://datos.gob.mx/busca/dataset/encuesta- availability of digital technology (Box 3.3). The percent- nacional-sobre-disponibilidad-y-uso-de-tic-en-hogares-endutih. age of people who own a cell phone has increased rap- idly between 2012 and 2016, particularly in rural areas. Rural women increased access to cell phones by 16.7 per- FIGURE 3.28 Percentage of Mexican Population with a Cell centage points, whereas rural men had a slightly higher Phone, by Gender and Area of Residence, 2012 – 16 increase, of 17.5 percentage (Figure 3.28). Moreover, there 95 90.0 are also important differences among women, with 80.3 89.5 90 86.0 85.6 percent of indigenous women having cell phones com- 85 83.4 82.7 pared with 87.9 percent of nonindigenous women in 2016, 80 77.0 76.6 72.6 72.5 Percent although this gap has declined since 2012.27 Despite wom- 75 en’s greater access to mobile phones, men are more likely 70 65 than women to use digital payments and mobile services. 60 55.7 According to Global Findex, the percentage of adult men 55.1 55 (aged 15 years or more) with a mobile account increased 50 from 4.1 percent in 2014 to 7.1 percent in 2017, while the Men Women Men Women Men Women percentage of adult women with a mobile account went National Urban Rural from 2.8 percent to 4.2 percent over the same period, 2012 2014 2016 thus increasing the gender gap (by 1.6 percentage points) Source: National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) 2012 – 16, National in 2017.28 Moreover, a larger share of men than women Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). use digital technology to make payments, pay bills, and Note: Survey covers the population aged 12 years or more. CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 53 make online purchases (Figure 3.29). The largest ser- FIGURE 3.29 Use of Internet and Mobile-Phone vice is digital payment, with 36 percent and 28 percent Services in Mexico, by Gender, 2017 of men and women, respectively, having used this ser- vice over the last year. Made or received 36 digital payments 28 Used the internet 15 Finally, more needs to be done to foster trust in the to buy something online 12 financial sector. Still one in four people in Mexico lack enough trust in the financial system to open an account, Used the internet 11 to pay bills 8 and about 18 percent of account holders do not trust Used a mobile phone 7 mobile services. In 2017, 26.7 percent of the unbanked or the internet to 7 population (aged 15 years and older) declared the lack of access an account trust in financial institutions as a barrier for owning an 0 10 20 30 40 account in Mexico (Figure 3.30).29 More recently, a 2018 Percent survey showed that out of the 31.5 million people with Men Women a bank account (of whom 15.4 million are women), 73.4 Source: Global Financial Inclusion Database (Global Findex), World Bank: https:// percent (23.2 million) do not have cellular banking.30 Of globalfindex.worldbank.org/. these, 18 percent declared this was because of a lack of Note: Survey covers the population aged 15 years or more who report using mobile trust (Figure 3.31). money service in the past 12 months. FIGURE 3.30 Reasons for Not Owning a Bank Account FIGURE 3.31 Reasons of Bank Account Holders in in Mexico, 2017 Mexico for Not Using Mobile Banking Services, 2018 Prefer other options Insufficient funds % % % Lack of trust Accounts too expensive % It’s too complicated Lack of trust Don’t know how to contract it Too far away % Cellular does not allow Lack of documentation % Don’t know the service Family member has an account % No internet Religious reasons % Bank does not allow Do not need an account % Other 0 10 20 30 40 50 Percent Source: National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018, National Institute Source: Global Financial Inclusion Database (Global Findex) 2017, World Bank: of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the National Banking and Securities https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/. Commission (CNBV). Note: Survey covers population aged 15 – 18 years who do not have Note: Survey covers population aged 18 – 70 years who have a bank account but do a bank account. not use mobile banking services. NOTES 1. “Youth not in employment, education or training (NEET),” 5. The Estancias Infantiles program aimed to support OECD database: https://data.oecd.org/youthinac/youth-not- working mothers and single parents through access to in-employment-education-or-training-neet.htm. In Latin childcare and child services (“Children’s Residence America, this population is alternatively referred to as Program to Support Working Mothers,” Actions “ninis” for “ni estudia ni trabaja.” and Programs, Welfare Secretariat website: https:// 2. In Mexico the average usual weekly hours worked is 45.6, www.gob.mx/bienestar/acciones-y-programas/ one of the highest among either OECD or all Latin America estancias-infantiles-para-apoyar-a-madres-trabajadoras). and Caribbean countries (OECD database, http://stats.oecd. 6. Employment, unemployment, and underemployment data org). from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment 3. OECD Better Life Index: http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org. (ENOE), National Institute of Statistics and Geography 4. Estimates based on data from the Labor and Social (INEGI): http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/ Co-Responsibility Survey (ELCOS) 2012, National Institute regulares/enoe/. of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): http://en.www.inegi. 7. Estimates based on National Household Income and org.mx/programas/elcos/2012/default.html. Expenditure Survey — New Series (ENIGH-NS) 2016, 54 | Mexico Gender Assessment National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): 16. Bansefi (Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros) https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enigh/nc/2016/. is a government bank created to increase savings and finan- 8. Employment data from the National Survey of Occupation cial inclusion among underserved populations. With only 500 and Employment (ENOE) 2018Q3, National Institute of branches nationwide, however, many beneficiaries incurred Statistics and Geography (INEGI), http://www.beta.inegi. large transaction costs. In 2016, 82 percent of Bansefi clients org.mx/app/tmp/Infoenoe/Default_15mas.aspx. were women, and 63 percent were part of the CCT program. 9. Wage gap estimate using World Bank–SEDLAC (Socio- 17. ENIF 2018. Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean) 18. Group lending refers to loans, mostly targeted to a group harmonization based on the National Household Income of women, that do not require collateral but rather a joint and Expenditure Survey–New Series (ENIGH-NS) 2016, liability of the group. National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). 19. ENIF 2018. 10. Data on female employers from the National Survey of 20. Financial inclusion data from ENIF 2012 and 2018. Occupation and Employment (ENOE) 2018q3, National 21. Since 2002, Mexican banking authorities have supported Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): http:// legal changes to permit specialized banks, such as en.www.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/regulares/enoe/. Banco Azteca and Banco Walmart, to operate from 11. The High Impact Entrepreneurship Program, run by the stores that have a strong physical presence throughout National Institute of the Entrepreneur (INADEM) in the the country. Furthermore, in 2009, legislation was Ministry of the Economy, aims to support Mexican small passed to provide an enabling framework for third and medium enterprises through a matching-grant scheme parties (such as stores or pharmacies) to deliver banking to potentialize their development and increase their ability services. See the law: http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle. to succeed. The targeted firms are start-ups and more- php?codigo=5306829&fecha=16/07/2013. established but still young (“scale-up”) firms that offer an 22. Data on access to sources of emergency funds from the innovative product, service, or business model with high 2017 Global Financial Inclusion Database (Global Findex), potential to compete globally and generate high impact in World Bank: https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/. economic, social, and environmental outcomes. 23. Credit access and usage data from ENIF 2018. 12. There is some international evidence that firms tend 24. Banco Azteca, belonging to retail giant Grupo Electra SA, to hire female CEOs in times of crisis, such that firm opened its first branches inside chain stores. It opened 800 performance is in part preestablished before women take branches simultaneously in 2002 (Bruhn and Love 2011). over their management. Moreover, this negative selection Starting from this infrastructure, it was able to open a large in performance impinges on women, such that they are number of branches at once. It now has independent bank also more likely than men to be fired for the firm’s negative branches in addition to the ones in stores. performance — a phenomenon called “glass-cliff effects” 25. Data on financial services use from ENIF 2018. (Ellemers et al. 2012). However, no similar work has been 26. Financial capability is understood as the ability of conducted for Mexico. consumers to make sound financial decisions and use 13. Definition from the National Survey of Enterprise financial products effectively and responsibly, as defined by Financing (ENAFIN) 2015, National Institute of Statistics Reddy, Bruhn, and Tan (2013). and Geography (INEGI): http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/ 27. Estimates from the National Household Income and programas/enafin/2015/. Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) 2012, 2014, and 2016, National 14. Financial access data from the National Survey of Financial Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): http:// Inclusion (ENIF), conducted by the National Banking and en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enigh/tradicional/2014/ Securities Commission (CNBV) and the National Institute default.html. of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): http://en.www.inegi. 28. Global Findex database 2017: https://globalfindex. org.mx/programas/enif/2018/default.html. worldbank.org/. 15. G2P is often considered as the first step in building the 29. Data on barriers to opening an account from the Global infrastructure and public-private partnership crucial to Findex database 2017. advancing financial inclusion (Cozzo 2013). 30. Data on mobile banking services use from ENIF 2018. CHAPTER 3: Economic Opportunities | 55 Chapter 4: Agency Women’s agency refers to their capacity to make choices The commission’s main purpose was to coordinate federal free of constraints and to transform those choices into agencies under the objectives established by the National actions, so they can take advantage of the opportuni- Program (a precursor to the National Institute for Women ties societies offer. Women’s constraints to agency, in the [INMUJERES], which was established during the Vicente form of social norms or institutional biases, often under- Fox administration in January 2002). lie discriminatory practices that prevent their equal access to endowments and economic opportunities relative to men in all areas of life, and from the womb up to old age National Legal Framework (World Bank 2012). Agency is thus the key basis for women to stand on an equal footing with men in society, because it Law for the Creation of INMUJERES will largely affect decisions on human capital investments and, ultimately, women’s chances to become active social Beginning in 1991, four main pieces of legislation were and economic agents. This chapter first reviews the legal, approved, providing structure to the institutional frame- institutional, and policy framework for gender equality work for gender equality. The first was the Law of the in place in Mexico, as a key element of the enabling envi- National Institute of Women (LNIW), approved in January ronment for agency by Mexican women. The chapter then 2001, which established that all federal agencies, the fed- explores the existing differences in agency between Mexican eral legislature, and the federal judiciary must include men and women in three areas: social and gender norms, a gender perspective in the planning and implementa- violence against women, and political participation. tion of all policies, programs, and institutional actions.1 This was the first effort to introduce gender mainstream- ing in Mexican public administration (Box 4.1). The LNIW LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL also determined that INMUJERES must oversee compli- ance with gender equality goals from all federal agencies, FRAMEWORK FOR GENDER with the power to make observations and comments to EQUALITY the legislature and judiciary. The Law’s reach was solidi- fied with the important mandate that INMUJERES draft the The debate over the need for gender policies began in the National Program for the Equality between Women and late 1970s but was unstructured until the mid-1990s. In Men (PROIGUALDAD) as part of the national planning pro- response to the resolutions of the First World Conference cess (which occurs during the early stages of each pres- on Women held in Mexico City in 1975, as well as the de- idential term). mands of incipient social movements, a dialogue on wom- en’s access to economic opportunities began. However, INMUJERES’s main purpose is to promote government the movement stalled because of the severe economic cri- actions to prevent discrimination, create equal oppor- sis that hit the country throughout the 1980s. It would be tunity, and foster conditions that facilitate equal partic- more than a decade before women’s issues would become ipation of women in the social, economic, and politi- a matter of public policy requiring state intervention. The cal realms. The LNIW determined 24 specific institutional first efforts to structure such an intervention appeared responsibilities that cover everything from planning, budg- during the Ernesto Zedillo administration (1994 – 2000) eting, implementation, and evaluation to the direct over- with the inception of the National Women’s Program sight of policy interventions to abate gender disparities. 1995 – 2000 (Programa Nacional de la Mujer) and the The mandate of INMUJERES is twofold: The first is hori- establishment of the National Commission for Women. zontal, involving the promotion of gender mainstreaming 58 | Mexico Gender Assessment BOX 4.1 National Planning for Gender Equality Between 2001 (the year INMUJERES was founded) and 2018, Mexico’s National Program for the Equality between Women and Men had three components: • National Program for Equal Opportunities and No Discrimination against Women (PROEQUIDAD), 2001 – 06a • National Program for the Equality between Women and Men, 2008 – 12b • National Program for Equal Opportunities and No Discrimination against Women, 2013 – 18.c These programs were important guiding documents for federal intervention and coordination and served as a reference for state and municipal governments, because they contained and developed general strategies, programs, and actions aimed to achieve gender equality. These pro- grams also designated the federal agencies that would have a more prominent role in the implementation of policy interventions. a. See http://cedoc.inmujeres.gob.mx/documentos_download/100517.pdf. b. See http://www.hacienda.gob.mx/LASHCP/equidad/marco_legal/100919.pdf. c. See http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5312418&fecha=30/08/2013. across federal agencies (and the successful coordination executive branch, its scope is broadly defined and cov- between them). The second is vertical, involving the sup- ers all policy areas. The second trait involves its leader- port of policy interventions with a gendered perspective ship structure, as an agency headed by a president who and their corresponding institutional development at is elected by the executive from a short list of candidates the state level. Since its inception, INMUJERES has been elaborated by its Governing Board (the main administra- the central piece of Mexico’s institutional framework tive authority). The Governing Board is composed of most for the advancement of women as well as the coordina- of the cabinet secretaries, representatives from the fed- tion point for all federal government actions to promote eral legislature and judiciary, and two advisory councils of and achieve gender equality. Two institutional traits of representatives from civil society organizations and aca- this agency deserve further emphasis: The first involves demia (Table 4.1).2 Membership in the Governing Board its unique design as a decentralized agency under the of INMUJERES is noteworthy as it reflects the agency’s main executive office (which facilitates its influence on policy purpose: (a) to coordinate all federal actions and (b) to making). Because it depends directly on the head of the promote national policy on gender issues. TABLE 4.1 Participants in the Institutional Framework on Gender in Mexico, 2019 National System for National System INMUJERES the Equality between to Prevent and Eradicate Participant Governing Board Women and Men Violence against Women Executive power Inmujeres (president) PRESIDENT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Consejo Consultivo Consejo social Secretary of the Interior PRESIDENT Secretary of Foreign Affairs Secretary of National Defense Secretary of the Navy Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection Secretary of the Treasury and Public Credit Secretary of Welfare (Social Development) Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary of Energy CHAPTER 4: Agency | 59 National System for National System INMUJERES the Equality between to Prevent and Eradicate Participant Governing Board Women and Men Violence against Women Secretary of Economy Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food Secretary of Communications and Transportation Secretary of Public Functions Secretary of Public Education Secretary of Health Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare Secretary of Agrarian Development Secretary of Culture Secretary of Tourism Executive Office of Legal Advice National Council to Prevent Discrimination National System for Comprehensive Family Development National Commission for Development of Indigenous People Executive’s Office Energy Regulatory Agencies Autonomous organizations Attorney General National Commission for Human Rights National Institute of Elections Supreme Court of Justice Federal Judicial Council Chamber of Deputies Senate State level Mechanisms for the Advancement of Women in the States Sources: Law for the Creation of the National Institute of Women, General Law for the Equality between Women and Men, and the General Law of Access for Women to a Life Free of Violence. Note: Blue cells designate participation in a given gender framework. General Law for the Equality between Women harmonization of guiding principles such as the standard- and Men ization of definitions in affirmative action, discrimination against women, gender equality, substantive equality, gen- The second and probably most relevant legislation is der perspective, and gender mainstreaming. It guides the the General Law for the Equality between Women and basic coordination mechanisms between federal agencies, Men (GLEWM), which was approved in August 2006.3 but more importantly, it strictly mandates clear execu- Several features of this legislation have a major impact tion frameworks for federal, state, and municipal govern- on the institutional framework for gender equality. ments. The Law also forced the federal executive branch The Law’s provisions are mandatory for all levels and to develop a National Policy for the Equality between branches of government — a feature that supports the Women and Men, which comprises two components: 60 | Mexico Gender Assessment (a) the National Program for the Equality between Women TABLE 4.2 Roles in Institutional Framework for Gender and Men, and (b) the National System for the Equality Equality in Mexico, 2019 of Women and Men.4 A trusted institutional coordina- tion system between and across branches of government Role Equality Violence (as well as at the federal level), the National System is National Institute the centerpiece of the National Policy (Table 4.2). Its Planning Ministry of the Interior for Women principal goals are to promote equality and the advance- ment of women as well as to increase awareness and National System to Prevent, Treat, Punish foster a change in the stereotypes responsible for gen- All federal agencies and Eradicate Violence der violence.5 The GLEWM’s reach does not remain at against Women the federal level: the Law also mandates that all state Implementation governments must develop a system for gender equal- National System for the ity and appropriate the necessary funds for any policy Equality of Women and Men interventions needed to achieve those goals.6 Finally, the Subnational systems Subnational systems GLEWM grants full oversight authority to the National Commission of Human Rights. National Institute Secretariat of the Interior Oversight for Women and evaluationa National Commission General Law of Access for Women for Human Rights to a Life Free of Violence Source: General Law of Access for Women to a Life Free of Violence (GLAWLFV): http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGAMVLV_130418.pdf. The third important piece of legislation was the a. Budget oversight also comes from the Supreme Auditing Institution, the Secretary of Public General Law of Access for Women to a Life Free of Functions, and for some programs, the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Policy. Violence (GLAWLFV), approved in February 2007.7 This Law’s objective is to establish coordination guidelines and government actions aimed to reduce gender dis- for federal, state, and municipal governments to prevent, parities, discrimination against women, and violence treat, punish, and eradicate violence against women. The against women. These reforms prohibit the future reduc- GLAWLFV has several traits that make it unique among tion of those resources. The Federal Law on Budget and gender equality laws. It establishes a National System to Fiscal Responsibility thus secured the incorporation of Prevent, Treat, Punish and Eradicate Violence against policy interventions in different areas of government to Women to foster specific implementation mechanisms at improve the status of women and in several ways specifi- not only the national level but also across state govern- cally involved different agencies in developing policy inter- ments, as it directly mandates state “mechanisms for the ventions to reduce gender disparities. Beyond the policy advancement of women” (Table 4.1).8 Like the GLEWM, interventions, the reforms secured financial resources to the GLAWLFV standardizes definitions (mainly of the develop all strategies, actions, and public policies estab- types of violence against women), mandates the draft lished in national programs — something that had been of a comprehensive program, and requires state govern- erratic in previous years despite the allocation of specific ments to develop state-level systems. It also emphasizes budget line items since 2008. the collection, management, and effective use of data for policy planning and implementation. Most impor- tantly, the GLAWLFV establishes that the federal govern- Subnational Institutional Framework ment must guarantee budget allocations to secure both for Gender Equality the functioning of the National System and the imple- mentation of the GLAWLFV National Program. At the subnational level, the development of an insti- tutional framework advanced at a much slower pace.9 The first state-level institution for women was created Federal Law on Budget and Fiscal Responsibility in the southern state of Guerrero in 1987 (the Guerrero Secretariat for Women). Other states, however, did not fol- The fourth critical piece of legislation is included in low suit until the late 1990s. In 1997, the state of Querétaro the Federal Law on Budget and Fiscal Responsibility, established the State Council for Women, and in 1998 with particular focus on the 2012 reforms that mandate the states of Colima, Sonora, and Quintana Roo cre- the allocation of federal resources to policy programs ated their respective state agencies. Between 1999 and CHAPTER 4: Agency | 61 TABLE 4.3 Status of State-Level Institutions for Women in Mexico, 2019 State Year of inception Status as January 2019 State Year of inception Status as January 2019 Aguascalientes 2001 Morelos 2002 Baja California 2001 Nayarit 2003 Baja California Sur 1999 Nuevo León 2003 Campeche 2001 Oaxaca 2000 Chihuahua 2002 Puebla 1999 Chiapas 2000 Querétaro 1997 Coahuila 2001 Quintana Roo 1998 Colima 1998 Sinaloa 2000 Ciudad de México 2002 San Luis Potosí 2002 Durango 2000 Sonora 1998 Guerrero 1987 Tabasco 2001 Guanajuato 2001 Tamaulipas 2005 Hidalgo 2002 Tlaxcala 1999 Jalisco 2001 Veracruz 2007 Estado de México 2000 Yucatán 2002 Michoacán 1999 Zacatecas 1999 Secretariat of State Decentralized agencies of state public administration or the office of the governor Decentralized agencies of the secretariat of government Decentralized agencies of the secretariat of social development Dependent Offices Source: Update of Ríos Cázares 2017. 2000, another 10 states created comparable institutions. which theoretically would grant them a greater influence In 2001 (the same year INMUJERES was founded), 7 more on policy.10 states created institutes for women. By 2007, all 31 states and the Federal District (now Mexico City) had devel- At the municipal level, there has also been progress to- oped institutions devoted to the advancement of women ward institutional development. Mexico is composed or women’s issues (Table 4.3). However, state institu- of 2,457 municipal governments (not evenly distribut- tions for women vary in their status within the state pub- ed among states). The latest numbers from the National lic administration hierarchy. There are 7 states that have Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) indicate that a secretariat for women, 11 where the institute for women 35.6 percent of municipal governments have a women’s is- has the same administrative status as INMUJERES, and 12 sues office.11 Of course, there is ample disparity among where they operate as decentralized agencies under either states. For example, in the states of Colima and Tabasco, the Secretariat of the Interior or the Social Development practically all municipal governments have an institute Secretariat. Only the Institute for Women in the state or office for women’s issues. On the opposite end of the of Tlaxcala has a lower status, as a dependent agency under spectrum, the states of Campeche, Oaxaca, and Sonora the governor’s office. In recent years the trend has shifted have similar institutions in fewer than 10 percent of their toward transforming these institutions into secretariats, total municipalities (Figure 4.1). 62 | Mexico Gender Assessment FIGURE 4.1 Municipal Institutions for Women in Mexico, by Type and State, 2017 600 100 90 Percentage of municipalities with 500 80 Number of municipalities a women’s issues office 70 400 60 300 50 40 200 30 20 100 10 0 0 Guerrero México Querétaro Durango Michoacán Quintana Roo Zacatecas Chihuahua Jalisco Guanajuato Morelos Aguascalientes Hidalgo Sinaloa Baja California Colima Tabasco Sonora Campeche Oaxaca Nuevo León Chiapas Puebla Nayarit Coahuila Yucatán Tamaulipas Veracruz Baja California Sur Tlaxcala San Luis Potosí Number of municipalities Municipal institutes or offices for women Percentage of municipalities with a women’s issues office Source: National Census on Municipal and Delegational Governments 2017, Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). International Conventions to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish, and eradicate such vio- Mexico is a signatory to several international conven- lence.14 This could include penal, civil, administrative, tions that aim to eradicate gender discrimination and and any other type of domestic legislation provisions prevent violence against women: that may be needed to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women. The state is also bound to • As a signatory to the United Nations (UN) Sustainable establish fair and effective legal procedures for women Development Goals (SDGs), Mexico is committed to gen- who have been subjected to violence, including, among der equality in all its dimensions (SDG 5 on Gender other things, protective measures, a timely hearing, and Equality) along with other development goals, many effective access to such procedures. Finally, the state of which will help to ensure that women have access is bound to establish the necessary legal and admin- to economic opportunities.12 For instance, efforts to istrative mechanisms to ensure that women subjected reduce poverty (SDG 1) and improve access to quality to violence have effective access to restitution, repara- health (SDG 3) and education (SDG 4) will help to ensure tions, or other just and effective remedies. that women can fully participate in economic life. Despite advances in institutional coordination, there • As a signatory to the UN Convention on the Elimination of are financial and capacity constraints that continue all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) since to pose barriers to effective implementation. Legislation 1981,13 the state has committed to (a) incorporate the in Mexico has anchored advanced mechanisms of institu- principle of equality of men and women in its legal sys- tional coordination to solve problems of gender discrimina- tem, abolish all discriminatory laws, and adopt appro- tion and gender violence against women. Moreover, there priate ones prohibiting discrimination against women; is secondary legislation that secures funds for policy inter- (b) establish tribunals and other public institutions to ventions that pursue similar goals. There are, however, two ensure the effective protection of women against dis- major challenges to this institutional coordination: First, crimination; and (c) ensure elimination of all acts of most of the institutes for women at the federal and state discrimination against women by persons, organiza- levels face serious constraints on financial and human tions, or enterprises. resources. Second, at the subnational level, there are seri- ous doubts about the institutions’ capacity to influence • As a signatory to the Inter-American Convention on the public policy, because their limited resources tend to force Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against them to focus on specific issues — mainly, prevention and Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), the state is bound attention to the female victims of gender-related violence. CHAPTER 4: Agency | 63 Moreover, there are concerns over the effectiveness of the labor market (Calvalcanti and Tavares 2016). To under- efforts toward gender mainstreaming and oversight. At stand where laws facilitate or impede women’s economic the federal level, it is unclear whether INMUJERES has been participation, the World Bank’s Women, Business and the successful in the evaluation and oversight of gender main- Law 2018 identifies barriers to women’s economic partici- streaming across federal agencies. Recent research shows pation and encourages the reform of gender-differentiated that there is no consensus among federal agencies regard- laws across seven indicators (World Bank 2018d). Based ing the scope, reach, and mechanisms to make gender on these indicators, this work provides scores across 189 mainstreaming a basic rationale for government and pol- economies including Mexico (Figure 4.2).15 Scores are icy decisions (Martínez Medina 2019). A final challenge is obtained by calculating the unweighted average of scored that the allocation of funds to specific projects lacks effec- questions within that indicator and scaling the result to tive oversight instruments, which makes unclear whether 100, where 100 indicates a perfect score. Scores for Mexico federal agencies have indeed adopted gender mainstream- show that despite progress toward gender equality, legal ing (CELIG 2018). barriers to women’s employment and entrepreneurship in some areas persist. ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONAL Accessing Institutions FRAMEWORK and Using Property International benchmarking is useful to assess the effec- Mexico’s legal and institutional framework promotes tiveness of the existing institutional framework. Legal gender equality in many respects, including ensuring gender differences can decrease female labor force par- women’s ability to access institutions and property. ticipation and undermine gross domestic product (GDP) The principles of gender equality and nondiscrimina- growth (Gonzales et al. 2015). For some economies, a large tion are enshrined in the Mexican Constitution.16 The fraction of country differences in output per capita can be Federal Civil Code gives married and unmarried men attributed to gender inequality, and many countries can and women equal ownership rights to property and in- increase such output by discouraging gender barriers in heritance. Women are also eligible to land rights in the Ejido system (Box 4.2), but men receive more family prop- FIGURE 4.2 Legal Barriers to Women’s Economic Participation erty through inheritances than women do (Almeida 2012). in Mexico and Other Country Groups, 2018 Further, the law recognizes women’s nonmonetary con- tributions within marriage, which may positively affect 100 women’s access to property. 90 Mexico has also adopted legislation to promote wom- 80 en’s political representation. The laws in Mexico establish 70 a 50 percent quota for women on candidate lists in elec- 60 tions for national and state parliaments17 and municipal Score 50 councils.18 The same laws establish sanctions for noncom- 40 pliance with these quotas. However, there are no reserved 30 seat quotas for women in national parliaments or in munic- ipal councils. Nor are there any financial incentives for 20 increasing women’s representation on candidate lists. The 10 principle of equality is at the core of arguments in favor 0 Accessing Using Getting Providing Going Building Protecting of gender quotas. One area where Mexico could enhance institutions property a job incentives to court credit women women’s leadership in the private sector is through quo- to work from violence tas for women on corporate boards. Gender quotas can Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean help increase female representation at the highest levels OECD high income of government and the private sector. However, only 11 economies worldwide have gender quotas on corporate Source: World Bank 2018d. boards. Such diversity has been linked to better company Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Scores are obtained by calculating the unweighted average of scored questions within each indicator and scaling performance, including in areas such as greater returns the result to 100 (a perfect score indicating no limitation). on sales and assets (World Bank 2018d). 64 | Mexico Gender Assessment BOX 4.2 The Ejidos and Comunidades System Mexico has a unique land tenure system: the communal property system of ejidos and comunidades.a This structure includes different types of property: public property, private property, and communal property. Fifty-three percent of Mexico’s total land is communal property compris- ing 29,441 ejidos and 2,344 comunidades (communities). In addition, 62 percent of Mexico’s forests are under a communal property structure (the remaining 32 percent belongs to small private owners, and 6 percent is public property in the form of forest reserves) (World Bank 2018b). Ejidos are societies made up of peasants who were handed land by the state through the Agrarian Reform introduced after the Mexican Revolution with the Constitution of 1917 (Article 27). Within a single ejido, no community member (ejidatario) may own a parcel greater than the equiva- lent of 5 percent of ejidal or community lands. If an ejido member dies, parcel rights are transmitted via a succession list, including names and the order of inheritance preference. Where such a list does not exist, first the spouse or domestic partner, then a child, parent, or other person who depends economically on the parcel will be granted land rights. In the case of comunidades, the community member can also assign own- ership or usage rights to relatives and residents recognized by the communal commissariat. In 1927, women were deemed eligible to have land rights, conditional on their status as single or widowed with a family in their charge. The Agrarian Law reform of 1971 granted women (a) the right to own land under the same conditions as men, (b) the right to speak and vote in assem- blies, and (c) the right to be eligible for representation positions under the same conditions as men. Furthermore, the 1971 reform established that every community must have an “Agricultural and Industrial Unit for Women,” known as “parcels of women” (parcelas de la mujer), exclu- sively for the productive use of women. (However, in 1992, the new Agrarian Law eliminated this obligation.) Nevertheless, today only 19 per- cent of community land corresponds to these parcels (most of them in Yucatán, and the fewest in Chiapas). Many of these parcels are either far away from the households (thus impeding women from using them daily), are tilled by men, or are used for agricultural purposes (like cat- tle) that traditionally are not women´s duties. In 1992, constitutional reforms ended the agrarian partition and introduced changes to the social property regime, giving legal certainty to own- ers, establishing limits in the extension of the grounds, and granting community members the right to purchase, sell, or lease their lands and to hire labor to work in the plot. Land tenure is rare for women. The 1992 land reform introduced a de facto asymmetry in land possession, given that women had less in eco- nomic resources to acquire land. Of the 4.2 million Mexican ejidatarios or community members with land titles, only 19.8 percent were women in 2015, which negatively affects their right to vote in assemblies and decision-making power. Twenty-three percent are property owners but do not have rights over common resources, and 42 percent are “settlers,” meaning they are inhabitants recognized by the Assembly without private property rights or common use and without voting rights (Almeida 2009). Furthermore, only 12.5 percent of the 350,000 representa- tives, incumbents, and alternates in management positions in local assemblies and governing bodies are women. Land tenure is linked to a vote in assemblies and decision-making power (World Bank 2018c). When men are absent because of migration, separation, death, or illness, women are not automatically granted legal land tenure to become landowners (ejidatarias or comuneras). Only through inheritance or a specific legal land-title change can a woman become a landowner of a par- cel owned by her husband (although, many times, the husband decides to bequeath the land to his son). This explains the low rate of women who have decision and land rights in Mexico (19.8 percent) and why most of these women are aged 63 years or more and widowed (Aguilar, Siles, and Castañeda 2014). At the same time, the plots women own are smaller than those of men, measuring 2.8 hectares on average com- pared with 5–10 hectares (World Bank 2018c). Sources: Agrarian Law of 1992; Serna de la Garza 2007. a. Comunidades are nuclei of populations with juridical personality and holders of agrarian rights, integrated by people who claimed land, and who had titles on the land of which they had been stripped in the past. Getting a Job and Providing in access to credit. Women can also leverage repayment histories of utilities and retail transactions to access credit. Incentives to Work Given the aging population, Mexico could improve its laws Mexican legislation also provides measures that allow by ensuring that employers provide leave for employees women to work and build credit. Legislation includes to care for sick relatives. Such provisions can ensure that measures to support childcare (including tax deductions women and men who increasingly have to balance employ- for childcare payments), and working mothers are guar- ment with care responsibilities for children, sick relatives, anteed an equivalent position when they come back from and the elderly can continue to work. maternity leave. Additionally, the law in Mexico makes both preschool and primary education free and compul- However, legal barriers to women’s employment and sory. Mexico’s legal framework further includes a nondis- entrepreneurship in Mexico persist. Among the Women, crimination provision based on gender and marital status Business and the Law 2018 indicators, Mexico scores 78 CHAPTER 4: Agency | 65 on legal barriers to getting a job, as shown earlier in figure and less expensive and can benefit women in the process 4.2 (World Bank 2018d). According to Mexico’s GLAWLFV of accessing legal remedies.25 Mexican law also estab- (Article 11), any type of gender discrimination is consid- lishes the Family Courts to deal with cases of marriage ered a form of violence in the world of work. Additionally, or divorce, child custody, and requests for protection the Federal Labor Law (Article 133) prohibits employers from violence.26 Further, women’s access to justice can or their representatives from refusing employment because be hindered by limits on their voice and representation of gender and explicitly prohibits the dismissal of pregnant in judicial institutions. In Mexico, only 2 of the 11 justices workers.19 Moreover, it entitles nursing mothers to have on the Supreme Court are women, none of whom is the break time for nursing at work. However, the law does chief justice.27 The average percentage of female justices not explicitly prohibit prospective employers from asking on constitutional courts globally is just 24 percent, and a woman about her family status during the hiring pro- only 32 economies have female chief justices, including cess, and parents are not entitled to flexible work arrange- for the first time Australia, Kosovo, Norway, Poland, and ments — arrangements that could benefit both businesses the Seychelles (World Bank 2018d). and employees by reducing operational costs and turn- over expenses and improving productivity and work-life balance. Similarly, although Mexico’s Federal Labor law Protecting Women from Violence (Article 86) mandates equal wages for equal work, it does not establish the broader principle of equal remuneration Mexico has strong legislation overall to protect women for men and women for work of equal value in accordance from violence, but there are no laws specifically protect- with the International Labour Organization (ILO) stand- ing women and girls from sexual harassment in public ard.20 In Latin America and the Caribbean, such laws places. Violence against women both reflects and rein- exist in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Grenada, Guyana, forces inequalities between women and men and under- Paraguay, Peru, and St. Lucia. Legally mandating and mines women’s economic empowerment by limiting their enforcing laws that ensure that men and women receive ability to exercise agency and make choices. In addition equal remuneration for work of equal value is critical to negative psychological and health impacts, it can pre- to ensure that women’s time and talents are valued equally vent employment and block access to financial resources. to those of men. Mexico provides 84 days of paid maternity Mexico’s Federal Penal Code and the GLAWLFV establish leave21 and also grants new fathers 5 days of paid paternity comprehensive legal protection for women against differ- leave.22 However, it does not mandate paid parental leave, ent forms of violence, including domestic violence. The which can provide more time off for both mothers and legislation offers protection for spouses and family mem- fathers to care for their children. Such policies have the bers, as well as for former spouses and unmarried intimate potential to enable greater sharing of childcare and family partners, from physical, sexual, economic, and emotional responsibilities between the parents and have the poten- abuse, and it has established specialized procedures for tial to reduce discrimination against hiring women who dealing with domestic violence cases, including protec- are of reproductive age, given that they have the potential tion orders for victims that enable removing the perpe- to equalize the cost of hiring women relative to hiring men. trator from the home and prohibiting contact on request of the victim. Additionally, Mexico explicitly criminal- izes domestic violence and marital rape.28 Moreover, the Going to Court laws in Mexico criminalize sexual harassment in employ- ment, including in the context of education.29 However, Mexico’s legislation ensures that women have access the law does not provide for civil remedies for employees to justice, as it mandates legal aid in civil or family affected by such cases, which can provide for compensa- matters and in criminal matters.23 Mexico’s Law of the tion or the recovery of monetary damages for victims of National Human Rights Commission establishes an anti- sexual harassment. discrimination commission that can receive complaints of gender discrimination by both public and private Even so, there are often large differences between the actors.24 Such commissions exist in 41 percent of econo- existing laws and their implementation. Despite strong mies in the Latin America and Caribbean region and in existing legislation protecting women’s rights and prevent- 60 percent of high-income Organisation for Economic ing violence against women, enforcement varies widely Co-operation and Development (OECD) member econ- and largely depends on social norms, as discussed in the omies. Laws in Mexico establish access to a small claims rest of this chapter, pointing to potential gaps between court or fast-track procedures, which tend to be faster the de jure laws and the de facto practices. 66 | Mexico Gender Assessment SOCIAL NORMS FIGURE 4.3 Indicators of Agreement with Gender-Related Statements, by Gender, 2012 Beyond the legal norms, social norms can have important impacts on the ability of women to choose freely. Social Job best way for woman to be independent norms determine socially acceptable behavior (Sunstein Being a housewife as 1996) and are defined as “a deviation from rationality, fulfilling as paid job Labor Market whereby individuals’ actions are not purely motivated by When jobs are scarce, give men priority a desired outcome, but rather confounded by what others Woman earning more than are doing” (Elster 1989). Social norms can alter individ- husband is problematic uals’ behavior or preferences through feelings of shame, Men better business executives exclusion, anxiety, or guilt (Elster 1989; Ostrom 2000). For Men better political example, contraceptive use can be discouraged by local leaders norms related to family size and wives’ obligations to pro- Child suffers with Children working mother vide children (Rutenberg and Watkins 1997). Social norms University education not only influence how others treat women and what they more important for boys expect from them but also influence women’s self-concept 0 1 2 3 4 by defining how they should act within their social group. fully agree fully disagree Fear of sanctions and stigma often leads women to abide by social norms, thus reinforcing gender bias by perpet- Men Women uating a stereotype of the ideal woman. Stereotypes con- Source: World Bank calculations from World Values Survey Association 2012. tinue to exist because acting or thinking differently from Note: Figure shows the mean value of responses to each indicator. Survey covers adults aged the stereotype breaks a social norm. As social individu- 18 years and older. als, breaking the social norm is something that carries a heavy cost (Bohnet 2016). when a mother works for pay, but this fell to 44 percent of those surveyed in 2012 (WVS Association 2012). A pro- Views about women’s economic participation remain gressive transformation is more evident when examin- mixed not only among Mexican men but also, although ing responses by age group, because younger generations’ to a lesser extent, among women. Men and women alike views are more likely to conform to gender-equality prin- agree with the importance of a university education for ciples. For instance, younger people are the most likely boys and girls, and they largely agree that women can to disagree with the statement that “children suffer with be as effective as men as business executives and polit- a working mother” or that “being a housewife is as fulfilling ical leaders, although in all cases men’s agreement lags slightly behind that of women (Figure 4.3). In 2012, most FIGURE 4.4 Change in Agreement with Selected Mexicans agreed that “having a job is the best way for Gender-Related Statements, Mexico, 1996 – 2012 a woman to be an independent person” (65 percent of 45 women and 57 percent of men).30 Similarly, 75 percent 40 of women and 67 percent of men disagreed with the idea Response in agrrenent, percent that “men should be given priority over women in times 35 of job scarcity,” although this belief could be tested during 30 times of economic hardship (as further discussed below 25 and shown in Figure 4.6). However, when it comes to 20 household responsibilities, as many as 43 percent of men 15 and 44 percent of women still believe that children suffer 10 when a mother works for pay. 5 However, some societal views of the role of women 0 have evolved toward gender-equality principles. For 1996 2000 2005 2012 instance, a lower share of the population than in the past University education more important for boys believes that university education is more important for Men better political leaders boys than for girls, or that men are better political lead- Source: World Bank calculations from World Values Survey Association 2012. ers (Figure 4.4). Similarly, 76 percent of the population Note: Figure shows the mean value of responses to each indicator. Survey of adults aged 18 surveyed in 1990 agreed that preschool children suffer years and older. CHAPTER 4: Agency | 67 FIGURE 4.5 Agreement with Selected Gender-Related FIGURE 4.6 Change in Agreement that Men Should Statements, by Gender and Age Group, Mexico, 2012 Have Priority for Jobs When Scarce, Mexico, 1990 – 2012 80 Responses in agreement, percent 70 80 60 70 50 60 Responses, percent 40 50 30 40 20 30 10 0 20 Men Women Men Women Men Women 10 Child suffers with Being a housewife Job best way for working mother as fulfilling woman to be 0 as paid job independent 1990 1996 2000 2005 2012 18–29 30–49 ≥50 Agree Disagree Neither Source: World Bank calculations from World Values Survey Association 2012. Source: World Values Survey 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2012. Note: Figure shows the mean value of responses to each indicator. Survey of adults aged 18 Note: Figure shows the mean value of responses. Survey of adults aged 18 years years and older. and older. as a paid job.” Consistently, agreement with the state- Moreover, the country continues to combine egalitar- ment that “a job is the best way for women’s independ- ian views in some areas with unequal views in others. ence” declines with age (Figure 4.5). Patriarchal and conservative values are still prevalent in Mexican society. For instance, as described in chapter 3, Changing norms are transmitted from generation to gen- women limit their labor supply because of their caregiv- eration. Campos-Vázquez and Vélez-Grajales (2014) show ing responsibilities, and some women report that they do that women married to men who had working mothers not work because they do not have permission from their have a higher probability of participating in the labor mar- spouse, or some other relative, to engage in work for pay ket than women married to men who had stay-at-home (Arceo-Gómez and Santillán 2018). mothers. They also find that having a working mother-in- law increases female labor force participation by 15 percent- In fact, male control over household resources remains age points. Their regressions control for the labor partic- the social norm and can be a source of conflict. Half ipation of the wife’s mother and hence somehow control of Mexican women agree with the statement that “women for the wife’s own preferences. They also find that having earning more than their husbands is problematic,” while a working mother changes men’s gender preference toward only 37 percent of men agree (Figure 4.3), hinting at poten- a more egalitarian division of resources for schooling and tial reasons for domestic violence (as further discussed chores within the household among his children. Hence, in the next section). Large differences between male and living with a working mother changes the social norms female views on this persist across age and level of educa- regarding gender roles, and these changes are reflected tion, with this view being slightly more prevalent among in the next generation of households. younger and less educated women (Figure 4.7). In addi- tion, there is some heterogeneity across regions in Mexico: However, when there is economic strain, social norms in the state of Hidalgo, only 16 percent agree that women can revert to traditional values. For instance, 71 percent earning more than their husbands would be problematic, of the population disagreed with the statement that “when but this rises to as many as 70 percent in Colima and jobs are scarce, men should have priority” when surveyed Nayarit (WVS Association 2012). Varley (2010) argues in 2012, similar to the levels observed in 1990. But in the that women have a “secondary relationship to property” 1996 survey round, which coincided with an economic crisis, that stems from the sexual division of labor. According only 5 percent disagreed with the same statement (Figure to this cultural norm, men are in charge of providing 4.6). Similarly, a larger share of the population agreed with sustenance and housing, and hence all deeds to produc- the statement that “university is more important for a boy tive assets and homes should be in the man’s name. The than a girl” during the 1996 round (32 percent) than during households in her qualitative study seldom contested the 1990 round (28 percent) or the 2012 round (21 percent). this notion. 68 | Mexico Gender Assessment FIGURE 4.7 Agreement that Women Earning More than Husbands Is Problematic, Mexico, 2012 a. By gender and age b. By gender and education level 60 University, with degree 51 49 48 Some university 50 Complete secondary Responses in agreement, percent 40 37 37 38 Incomplete secondary Complete technical 30 Incomplete technical 20 Complete primary Incomplete primary 10 No formal education 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 Men Women Responses in agreement, percent 18–29 30–49 ≥50 Men Women Source: World Bank calculations from World Values Survey Association 2012. Note: Figures show the mean value of responses to each indicator. Survey of adults aged 18 years and older. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, violence in a public space.31 Data from the National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships (ENDIREH) FEMICIDES, AND SEXUAL on the prevalence of gender violence show that the over- HARASSMENT all reported violence fluctuated from 66 percent in 2006 to 67 percent in 2016 (Figure 4.8). Despite the existing legal protections, gender-based vio- lence is recognized by government and nongovernment Domestic violence not only hurts women but also actors as an area where urgent action is needed. Although has consequences for children’s cognitive behaviors Mexico (as well as 18 other countries in the region) have and health as adults and entails important economy- specialized legislation on femicide (ECLAC 2018) — the wide costs. Exposure to IPV has been linked with a mul- killing of a woman or girl, in particular by a man and on titude of adverse health outcomes for women, including account of her gender — impunity and lack of adequate acute injuries, chronic pain, gastrointestinal illness, gy- enforcement of laws still represent challenges in urgent necological problems, depression, and substance abuse need of action. Gender-related killings are often the last (Campbell 2002; Coker et al. 2008). Mental health con- in a series of violent acts that go unrecognized and unad- sequences for women include increased risk of depres- dressed. In most countries, the proportion of women who, sion, post-traumatic stress disorder, and substance abuse having experienced violence, sought help of any sort does (Devries et al. 2013; Ellsberg et al. 2008; Taft and Watson not reach 40 percent (World Bank, forthcoming). 2008). Women exposed to IPV also have higher work ab- senteeism, lower productivity, and lower earnings than Intimate Partner Violence working women who are not beaten (Duvvury, Minh, and Carney 2012; Vyas 2013). Moreover, children whose moth- Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is the most common ers experience IPV suffer important health effects compared form of gender violence in Mexico, although the most with children who do not, such as higher infant mortali- recent information available shows that the incidence ty rates (Jejeebhoy 1998), lower vaccination rates (Kishor of violence from other aggressors has increased. Among and Johnson 2004), and lower birth weight (Campbell women aged 15 years or older, 66 percent have experienced 2002). And children exposed to violence at home show at least one violent incident, 44 percent have suffered impaired socioemotional functioning and educational out- IPV, and 34 percent of women have experienced sexual comes in adolescence as well as lower job performance, CHAPTER 4: Agency | 69 FIGURE 4.8 Lifetime Prevalence of Violence against Women Aged 15 Years and Older in Mexico a. By type and perpetrator, 2016 b. By type, 2006–16 70 66 80 70 67 66 60 49 60 50 41 50 46 49 44 41 40 34 29 40 34 30 30 29 30 24 20 20 10 10 0 0 Emotional Physical Sexual Economic Total Emotional Physical Sexual Economic Total or patrimonial or patrimonial Total Spouse/partner Other 2006 2011 2016 Source: National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships (ENDIREH) 2006, 2011, and 2016, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). job stability, and earnings into adulthood (Holt, Buckley, experienced domestic violence are more likely to expe- and Whelan 2008). In addition, medical research from rience domestic violence themselves. Beyond the human high-income countries has established a link between ex- costs, violence incurs major economywide costs, includ- posure to domestic violence as a child and health prob- ing higher expenditures on health service provision, for- lems as an adult: men and women who experienced vio- gone income for women and their families, decreased lence in the home as children are 2 – 3 times more likely productivity, and negative effects on human capital for- than those who did not to suffer from cancer, a stroke, or mation (Klugman et al. 2014). cardiovascular problems, and they are 5 – 10 times more likely to use alcohol or illegal drugs (Felitti et al. 1998). Numerous studies also document how experiencing vio- Femicides lence between parents as a child is a risk factor for women experiencing violence from their own partners as adults as The prevalence of femicides in Mexico has shifted over well as for men perpetrating violence against their part- time, in line with broader violence, but there are large ners (Hindin, Kishor, and Ansara 2008; Jeyaseelan et differences across federal entities. The number of hom- al. 2007; Kishor and Johnson 2004; Koenig et al. 2006). icides among males is much higher than among females, Indeed, in the context of Mexico, Sánchez Argüelles (2018) but the trends follow the same pattern (Figure 4.9). Along found that women whose mothers and grandmothers with male homicides, female homicides have increased FIGURE 4.9 Homicides in Mexico, by Gender, 1985 – 2016 30,000 5,000 4,500 25,000 Number of female homicides 4,000 Number of male homicides 3,500 20,000 3,000 15,000 2,500 2,000 10,000 1,500 1,000 5,000 500 0 0 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1986 1987 1988 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Male (left axis) Female (right axis) Source: ONU Mujeres, SEGOB, and INMUJERES 2017. 70 | Mexico Gender Assessment since 2007 when a crackdown against Mexican drug cartels MAP 4.1 Prevalence of Domestic Violence Reported against began. However, there is wide heterogeneity across states. Women in Mexico, by State, 2011 In 2011, the lowest reported prevalence of at least a sin- Percent gle incident of violence against a woman by her spouse or partner was in Chiapas, Campeche, and Baja California 52.4 79.8 Sur; the highest prevalence was reported in Mexico City and the states of Mexico, Jalisco, and Aguascalientes (Map 4.1). In 2010, the ratio between the highest female homicide rates (in Chihuahua) and the lowest (in Yucatán) was 108.32 By 2012, this ratio decreased to 18.1. The most recent data show that in 2016, the ratio between the state with the highest rate of female homicides (Colima) and the lowest (Aguascalientes) has increased again, reaching 27.3. Large differences in femicide rates across states could respond to differentiated policies and implementation efforts across states, pointing to potential lessons learned that could be helpful in reducing violence against women. Source: National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships (ENDIREH) 2016, National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). See http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/atlas_ Gender-Based Violence genero/. Note: Map shows the percentage of married or cohabitating women aged 15 years or older who and Improvements in Women’s report having experienced physical or sexual violence by their partner in the last 12 months. Economic Conditions no effect between higher female labor force participa- Women’s economic status — as measured by female tion and domestic violence as measured by female homi- labor force participation or their potential earnings rel- cides. However, she does find an increase in domestic vi- ative to men — may have an impact on gender violence. olence against women of low socioeconomic status; in The effect of women’s employment on gender violence is other words, an improvement in female economic sta- ambiguous.33 On the one hand, the marital dependency tus leads to an increase in violence against women of low theory establishes that working women are less depend- socioeconomic status. Similarly, Terrazas-Carrillo and ent on their partners and thus are less likely to tolerate IPV McWhirter (2015) find a positive correlation with age, ed- (Rodriguez-Menes and Safranoff 2012). On the other hand, ucation, husband’s employment status, children birthed, the resource theory posits that violence is a result of ine- and gender role attitudes and a negative correlation with quality of resources. Thus, men who cannot derive power a history of physical and emotional abuse. Their main re- from their economic resources will resort to violence as sult is that woman’s employment status has no explanato- a dominance mechanism in the relationship (Atkinson, ry power once they include a measure of coercive control Greenstein, and Lang 2005). Feminist theories also pre- in the regression. As such, they conclude that the mediat- dict that working women will experience more violence, ing factor behind the positive correlation of women’s em- given that men may perceive their masculinity as threat- ployment status and violence is the ability of men to ex- ened by their weaker relative economic status within the ert coercive control over working women. More research household (Larsen 2016). needs to be done to disentangle the effect of the econom- ic status of women on gender violence. The empirical evidence is not clear regarding whether greater female employment and labor income reduce Cash-transfer programs may empower women by gender-based violence. Using data from the National increasing their command over household income, Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationships hence reducing physical violence, but they can also (ENDIREH) 2003, Villareal (2007) found that female labor lead to greater coercive behavior and emotional violence. force participation reduces IPV. Similarly, Rojas Estrada Angelucci (2008) exploits the change in women’s nonla- (2018) estimates that a decrease in the gender wage gap34 bor income from their participation in Mexico’s Progresa/ is associated with a decrease in female homicides in ur- Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program to ana- ban areas. In other words, as women’s opportunities im- lyze changes in household consumption patterns. She prove relative to men, they are less likely to experience finds a 15 percent decrease in the husbands’ alcohol abuse, fatal gender violence. In contrast, Hackett (2018) finds but the program has heterogeneous effects on husbands’ CHAPTER 4: Agency | 71 aggressive behavior: whereas those in households that women’s economic dependence on men (Ellsberg et al. received small transfers decreased violence by 37 percent, 2015). For instance, programs in Kenya and Uganda sought those in households that received large transfers and had to empower adolescent girls through training in life skills, traditional gender preferences (reflected by a larger age self-defense, and vocational training. Findings from ran- gap between husband and wife and lower educational domized controlled trials showed large reductions in co- attainment) increased their aggressive behavior. In the lat- erced sex (in Kenya, a 60 percent decrease in sexual as- ter case, husbands may perceive that their identity as pro- saults of girls in the intervention group compared with viders is being threatened by the enhanced economic sta- those in the control group) and improved knowledge of tus of their wives. Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro reproductive health (Bandiera et al. 2012; Sarnquist et (2013) revisit the effect of Oportunidades on domestic vio- al. 2014). Group-based relationship-level interventions lence and find that women who receive the program have working with males and females are also promising. For a 40 percent less chance of physical domestic violence but instance, at two years after the Stepping Stones interven- are more likely to be victims of emotional violence. The tion in South Africa, men’s self-reported perpetration of authors explain that their findings could be a result of the physical and sexual IPV was significantly lower than that use of threats as a coercive means to extract rents from of men in control villages (Jewkes et al. 2008).35 There are their wives. Finally, Balmori de la Miyar (2018) studies also potential benefits from integration of violence pre- how Oportunidades changed the reporting of domestic vention into existing development platforms. For instance, violence to the police. First, he reports, only 20 percent of the IMAGE intervention in South Africa combined micro- IPV victims reported this crime to the authorities in 2006. finance with 10 participatory training and skills-building He attributes the low reporting rate to social norms such sessions on the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), as “shame, family rejection, children’s future, and per- cultural beliefs, communication, and violence. After two sonal disregard to women’s rights” (Balmori de la Miyar years, a cluster-randomized trial showed a 55 percent re- 2018, 74). Using the 2006 ENDIREH, he finds an increase duction in reports from women of physical or sexual part- of 30 percent in the reports of IPV to the police relative to ner violence, with economic assessments that suggested those who did not receive Oportunidades. He explores the the intervention is cost-effective (Kim et al. 2007).36 This mechanisms behind this result and finds that it is a com- program is being scaled up in South Africa and is being bination of assimilation of female rights and a changed expanded to Peru and Tanzania (Ellsberg et al. 2015). In equilibrium in the marriage market (more divorces and addition, in terms of the potential preventive effect of fewer reconciliations). response mechanisms, there is fair evidence to recom- mend comprehensive police and justice sector interven- Finally, there is some evidence that the change in di- tions that start with a robust legislative framework and in- vorce laws have led to an increase in IPV. García-Ramos clude interventions such as protection orders (Kelly et al. (2019) estimates the effect of a divorce law change on 2013) along with proactive arrest, specialized courts, pa- IPV in Mexico. To estimate the causal effect, she exploits ralegal or lay support, and training for police and the ju- the state variation in the introduction of unilateral and diciary (Jewkes et al. 2015). Finally, there is evidence that no-fault divorce laws, which decrease the cost of marital shelters (Cesario et al. 2014) combined with gender and dissolutions. Using three waves of ENDIREH (2003, 2006, economic empowerment interventions are also promis- and 2011) and a difference-in-differences strategy, she fo- ing (Jewkes et al. 2015). cuses on the change in divorce laws that took effect in Mexico City in 2008, followed by Hidalgo in 2011. She finds that sexual, emotional, and economic violence de- creased but only when they are unrelated to physical vio- WOMEN’S POLITICAL lence. Overall, she finds an increase in physical violence PARTICIPATION from these law changes. She explains that her findings are consistent with a male backlash from the threat to their Finally, a key test for women’s agency is their participa- dominance or control over the marriage. tion in politics and their ability to voice their views. As noted earlier, the 2014 General Law on Institutions and International experience shows that it is possible to Electoral Procedures establishes a 50 percent quota for prevent violence against women and girls. The most women on candidate lists in elections for national and successful programs not only challenge the acceptability state congresses as well as for municipal councils.37 Since of violence but also address the underlying risk factors these quotas have been in place, there has been important for violence, including norms for gender dynamics and progress in the number of women elected to the federal 72 | Mexico Gender Assessment Chamber of Deputies and cabinet positions, but women in the legislatures tend to move according to what the are still underrepresented in the public sphere at the sub- party leader demands. As a result, Zetterberg (2008) alerts national level. The federal Congress consists of 50 per- us to the dangers of these undemocratic nominations: cent women, in line with quotas recently implemented, “quota” women may be more likely to be seen as tokens and and for the first time in history, women fill 8 out of 19 less likely to push political agendas concerning their rights ministerial cabinet positions. This is no small change. In and well-being, given that these women are just inserted fact, Mexico now has the world’s fourth largest share of into a male-dominated political process with rules insti- women in parliament.38 Meanwhile, the proportion of tuted by men (Baldez 2006). An expression of this token- women elected mayors and chief of delegation increased ism and marginalization was recently described in the from 3.5 percent in 2005 to 14 percent in 2017. Although Washington Post (Hinojosa and Piscopo 2018). After the this is a significant increase, it still seems low in compar- 2002 quota, the parties let women run in districts that ison with the progress achieved in the federal parliament. they knew they were going to lose. There was also a phe- nomenon known as Juanitas: female legislators on the bal- Mexico is achieving gender parity in political life thanks lot who resigned in favor of a male substitute. There was to quotas recently being enforced, but there is a risk that a subsequent pushback by female politicians, who brought women are marginalized rather than exerting real influ- about the increase of the quota in 2009 to 40 percent, ence, at least in the short run. Zetterberg (2008) ana- and in 2014 to 50 percent. Although the federal Congress lyzes whether women who got their seats through a quota is balanced, women are left out of powerful positions are more likely to be tokenized, marginalized, or invisi- in the legislature’s commissions. Beer and Camp (2016) ble. He compared two states — Zacatecas (with gender find that, to be nominated, women need more legislative quotas) and Michoacán (with no gender quotas) — and and party experience than male senators. However, they finds no difference in female roles within the legislatures. also find that since the implementation of gender quotas, However, because candidates are selected based on con- more women from different backgrounds have gained nections and loyalty to the party leaders, and not through access to senate seats, that discrimination against women a politically competitive process, women end up being decreased, and that women do not rely more on political treated the same way with or without quotas, as the parties connections to gain power. NOTES 1. The LNIW was reformed in April 2012, June 2015, and 7. The GLAWLFV has been amended 11 times through March February 2018. See Article 30 of LNIW: http://www. 2019. See http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/ diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/88_160218.pdf. LGAMVLV_130418.pdf. 2. This Governing Board is composed of the secretaries of the 8. GLAWLFV, Article 36-XIII. following secretariats: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Treasury 9. This paragraph is based on Ríos Cázares (2014). and Public Credit, Social Development, Environment and 10. Despite this trend, there are reforms that could be Natural Resources, Economy, Agriculture, Livestock, Ru- considered setbacks, such as the conversion of the State of ral Development, Fisheries and Food, Public Education, Mexico Institute for Women (IMM) into the State Council Public Functions, Health, Labor and Social Welfare, and for Women and Social Welfare. This reform changed the Agrarian Development. It also includes the Attorney Gen- focus of the institution by adding the task of monitoring eral, the National Institute of Indigenous People, and the the state policy for the elderly. National System for the Integral Development of the Fam- 11. Data on municipal-level institutions for women from ily. Additionally, this board includes 16 members from an the National Census on Municipal and Delegational advisory council and a social council. The board also in- Governments 2017, Institute of Statistics and Geography cludes 2 representatives from the Supreme Court of Jus- (INEGI): http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/programas/ tice, 2 representatives from the Federal Judicial Council, 6 cngmd/2017/. members from the legislative branch, 3 representatives from 12. “Sustainable Development Goal 5: Achieve Gender the political parties with highest representation, and 1 rep- Equality and Empower All Women and Girls,” resentative from the rest of the political parties with rep- Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, United resentation in the upper and lower Chambers. Nations: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg5. 3. The GLEWM has been amended nine times through March 13. For more information and CEDAW-related documents, 2019. See http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/ see “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of LGIMH_140618.pdf. Discrimination against Women,” UN Women website: 4. GLEWM, Article 18. https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 5. GLEWM, Article 26. 14. For more information and related documents, see 6. GLEWM, Article 15. “About the Belém do Pará Convention,” Organization of CHAPTER 4: Agency | 73 American States (OAS) website: http://www.oas.org/en/ 24. Law of the National Human Rights Commission (1992; last mesecvi/convention.asp. amended June 25, 2018): http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/ 15. Women, Business and the Law looks at the legal framework doc/normatividad/Ley_CNDH.pdf. applicable to the main business city of each economy. In 25. Organic Law of the Superior Court of Justice, Article 71: Mexico, the legislation examined is that applicable to Mex- http://www.aldf.gob.mx/archivo-5e3d020a6a72b8aa0d75a ico City. Fifty questions are scored within the seven indi- 5f7aee6f66f.pdf. Also see Commercial Code, Article 1340: cators. The scored questions fall into three categories: (a) https://www.profeco.gob.mx/juridico/pdf/c_comercio.pdf. those with explicit gender-based differences affecting wom- 26. Organic Law of the Superior Court of Justice, Article 52. en’s entrepreneurship or employment, (b) those reflecting 27. “Meet the Court,” Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation: the absence of laws protecting women, and (c) those exam- https://www.scjn.gob.mx/conoce-la-corte. ining institutions or processes that are likely to help wom- 28. Respectively, Federal Penal Code (Articles 343 Bis. – 343 en. Project data are also available for an additional 116 Ter.) and Federal Penal Code (Articles 265 and 265 Bis.): questions that were not scored. More information on the http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/9_051118.pdf. scoring and scored questions can be found in World Bank 29. GLAWLFV, Article 13: http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ (2018c, 2 – 3 and box 1.1), and details on the methodolo- LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGAMVLV_130418.pdf. Código Penal gy and scoring of each question are available in the “Data Federal, Art. 259 bis Notes” chapter (World Bank 2018c, 42 – 57). 30. Responses from the World Values Survey 2010 – 14, Wave 16. Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 6 (WVS Association 2012). The survey measures the (February 5, 1917): http://www.sct.gob.mx/JURE/doc/ beliefs, values, and motivations of respondents selected cpeum.pdf. Article 1: “[…] Any discrimination based on in nationally representative samples, while also collecting ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disability, social socioeconomic data from those respondents. Estimations condition, health conditions, religion, opinions, sexual include average weights and consolidated categories for preferences, marital status or any other that threatens analysis (education level and scaled responses). human dignity and has the purpose of nullifying or 31. Partner violence data from the National Survey on the undermining the rights and freedoms of individuals is Dynamics of Household Relationships (ENDIREH) 2016, prohibited.” Article 4: “A man and a woman are equal National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): before the law. It will protect the organization and http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/endireh/2016/. development of the family.” 32. Data on homicides of females from the National 17. See the 2014 General Law on Institutions and Electoral Population Council (CONAPO) data sets: https://catalogo. Procedures, Articles 232–234: http://www.diputados.gob. datos.gob.mx/dataset/proyecciones-de-la-poblacion- mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_270117.pdf. de-mexico and https://datos.gob.mx/busca/dataset/ 18. See the 2010 Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures proyecciones-de-la-poblacion-de-mexico-y-de-las- of the Federal District, Articles 292 and 296: http://www. entidades-federativas-2016-2050. infodf.org.mx/nueva_ley/14/1/doctos/CIPEDF.pdf. 33. See the literature cited in Villareal (2007). 19. Federal Labor Law (April 1, 1970; last amended June 34. The gender wage gap is a measure of the relative economic 22, 2018): http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ status of women and sends a signal of the potential relative pdf/125_220618.pdf. status that women could achieve if they worked. 20. Established by the Equal Remuneration Convention, 35. Stepping Stones is a participatory HIV prevention program 1951 (No. 100), Article 2(1), . For more information, see that aims to improve sexual health through building strong- the ILO supervisory comments on Mexico’s compliance er, more gender equitable relationships (Jewkes et al. 2008). with the Convention: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/ 36. The IMAGE Project is a community-based HIV and gender- en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_ based violence prevention program. See http://www. COMMENT_ID:3296225. image-sa.co.za/. 21. Federal Labor Law, Article 170. Note that this is below the 37. General Law on Institutions and Electoral Procedures, standard recommended by the ILO’s Maternity Protection Articles 232 – 234: http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ Convention of 2000 (No. 183), entered into force on LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_270117.pdf. Code of Electoral February 7, 2002: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/ Institutions and Procedures of the Federal District, Articles en/f ?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C183. 292 and 296: http://www.infodf.org.mx/nueva_ley/14/1/ 22. Federal Labor Law, Article 132(XXVII Bis). doctos/CIPEDF.pdf. 23. Federal Public Defense Law, Articles 1, 4(I), and 38. “Women in National Parliaments” data set as of November 4(II): http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ 1, 2018, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU): http://archive. pdf/106_170616.pdf. ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. 74 | Mexico Gender Assessment Chapter 5: Conclusions and Policy Mexico has made great strides in reducing gen- • Provide reproductive education to teenage boys and girls, der inequalities, but differences in endowments, low particularly in rural areas and among indigenous popu- female labor force participation, low productivity, lations. Strong cross-sectoral systems with built capac- and gender-based violence are still of concern. This ity among implementers and solid backing from a legal assessment highlights a few priorities for gender equal- framework and its implementation are needed. For ity in Mexico. Teenage pregnancy, high levels of obesity instance, changing educational curricula while also and diabetes, and high maternal mortality rates in some making contraceptives more available and affordable regions limit women’s health endowments. Similarly, would require close coordination across sectors. In low learning outcomes in math and science and highly addition, exposure to positive role models and informa- gender-segregated fields of study are of concern for edu- tion on the consequences of early pregnancy — includ- cational endowments. Low earnings and low productiv- ing the role of men and boys in any potential solu- ity reduce the incentives for women to participate in the tion — could help. One potential way of doing this is labor market and reflect systematic constraints and bar- through educational entertainment. riers that require decisive policy actions. Moreover, high levels of violence against women continue to reflect impor- • Promote healthy lifestyles and physical activity to reduce tant constraints to women’s agency. The following policy risk of diabetes. More can be done to promote healthy tools may be helpful in strengthening gender equality and eating and exercise habits and to diagnose diabetes and overcoming multiple barriers that women face to access treat symptoms early. Efforts to evaluate existing pro- economic opportunities. grams could help to improve healthy lifestyles, includ- ing actions to promote physical activity and nutritional education. Special attention is especially needed in rural ELIMINATE DIFFERENCES areas and among adolescent women. There may be room for further raising excise taxes on sugary beverages and IN ENDOWMENTS junk food. Moreover, efficient regulation of junk-food marketing directed at children and front-of-pack inter- • Ensure that women receive health care regardless of where pretive labels, such as traffic light labels, could be most they live. Despite advances in the coverages and public effective in increasing the selection of healthier options. spending on health, Mexico continues to face impor- tant challenges in ensuring equitable access to qual- • Facilitate the transition from school to work with job ity health services. The geographic distribution of and life skills training. This could include encourag- public health resources does not reflect the needs of ing women to enter nontraditional fields of study and the population because transfers to states, despite providing them with information on what their lives improvements, fall short in equalizing local resource could look like under alternative choices. These kinds availability and spending needs. In addition, finan- of programs could be coupled with internships, men- cial management capacity varies across states and is toring programs, network building, and other activi- especially low in the poorest regions. A strong and ties that may be part of active labor market policies. well-integrated primary health care system is critical. To improve equitable access to health, it is important • Improve women’s access to productive resources. Ensuring to strengthen a primary-care-based model where local that women have access to land and other physical entities responsible for managing care have clearly assets will ensure that they have economic opportuni- defined roles. ties. This involves ensuring that social norms do not 78 | Mexico Gender Assessment preclude women from accessing property. This could also be given to mentoring programs and network- include access to new digital technologies. For instance, ing platforms. greater telework opportunities and access to infor- mation and communication technology (ICT) could • Greater access to mobile banking and new financial instru- improve female labor force participation. ments could improve financial inclusion for women. New technologies such as data-driven lending can reduce heavy collateral requirements and increase financial NARROW WAGE AND inclusion of women. Evidence has shown that digital payments increase the security, privacy, and control PRODUCTIVITY GAPS BETWEEN over the funds received, especially for women. WOMEN AND MEN • Expand access to affordable, quality childcare and after-school or full-time school programs. Robust evi- DIMINISH GENDER dence in low- and middle-income countries as well as DIFFERENCES IN HOUSEHOLD high-income countries demonstrates that investing in AND SOCIETAL VOICE early childhood education has a significant impact on children’s development and their long-term labor and • Addressing a “continuum” of gender-based violence that income outcomes. Affordable childcare reduces wom- goes from discrimination to domestic violence and femi- en’s home-care burden and increases the opportunity cides requires a multifold policy approach combining social cost of leaving the labor force. and situational prevention with effective implementation of criminal justice. The most successful programs not • Promote gender-neutral parental leave policies and flex- only challenge the acceptability of violence but also ible work arrangements. The legal framework provides address the underlying risk factors for violence, includ- measures that allow women to work, but more could ing norms for gender dynamics and women’s economic be done to provide flexible work arrangements that dependence on men. Group-based, relationship-level ensure that women can meet their household respon- interventions that work with males and females are also sibilities. For example, Nordic countries have directed promising, as are programs that integrate violence pre- their family policies to support working parents of small vention into existing development platforms. children through expansion of childcare facilities and reliance on short but generously paid parental leave, • Reducing gender-based violence requires ensuring access including quotas to encourage fathers to share child- to efficient and effective judicial systems. Prevention pro- care duties. To reduce gender wage gaps, formal legis- grams need to be combined with enforcement of the lation that ensures equal pay for equal work must be law. This includes enabling women to request protec- accompanied by efforts to ensure that the cost of hiring tion orders with proactive arrest, along with providing women is not higher than the cost of hiring men. This access to specialized courts and paralegal or lay sup- includes allowing for parental leave policies, telework port. In addition, training for police and the judici- policies, and retirement policies that are gender neutral. ary could help. Finally, specialized shelters combined with gender and economic empowerment programs • Provide soft and hard skills training for women entre- can help ensure that women are willing to come for- preneurs. Traditional business training may not have ward and ask for help. any significant effect on any business outcomes, while soft-skills training, such as to encourage tak- • Monitor and address areas where men and boys are at a dis- ing personal initiative, could increase business prof- advantage. In some areas, men and boys are at a disad- its. Focusing support on high-potential entrepreneurs vantage or risk becoming disadvantaged. Two key areas may also be warranted while also helping women who are the lower rates of enrollment in higher education lead low-productivity enterprises to realize they may among the younger generations and the higher hom- be better off closing their businesses if not sufficiently icide risk. It is important to monitor these rising ine- profitable. Apart from training, consideration could qualities and address their underlying causes. CHAPTER 5: Conclusions and Policy | 79 APPENDIX A DATABASES TABLE A.1 Databases Used in the Mexico Gender Assessment Abbreviation Name Period of reference National Association of Universities and Higher Education Institutions, ANUIES 2017/18 http://www.anuies.mx/ Census General Census of Population and Housinga 1990, 2000, 2010 CNGMD National Census of Municipal and Delegational Governmentsa 2017 ELCOS Labor and Social Co-responsibility Surveya 2012 ENADID National Survey of Demographic Dynamicsa 2014 ENDIREH National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relationshipsa 2006, 2011, 2016 ENIGH-NS National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (New Series)a 2016 ENIF National Survey of Financial Inclusionb 2012, 2015, 2018 ENOE National Survey of Occupation and Employmenta 2005–18 ENUT National Survey on Time Usea 2014 World Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean, circa 2016 Bank–SEDLAC https://datacatalog.worldbank.org Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank, Global Findex 2017 https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/ Intercensal Survey Intercensal Surveya 2015 OECD Data Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, https://data.oecd.org/ 2018 OECD Family Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Family Database, 2016 Database http://www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm OMM Observatory of Maternal Mortality in Mexico, http://omm.org.mx 2018 PISA Programme for International Student Assessmentc 2003–15 WVS World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2012 WDI World Development Indicators, http://wdi.worldbank.org 2015 World Bank World Bank Gender Statistics, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/ 2016 Gender Statistics World Bank World Bank Education Statistics, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/ 2016 Education Statistics a. Database is produced by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), https://www.inegi.org.mx/. b. ENIF is jointly produced by INEGI and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). c. PISA a program of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), http://www.oecd.org/pisa/data/. 80 | Mexico Gender Assessment References Aburto, J. M., H. Beltran-Sanchez, V. M. Garcia-Guerrero, Unpublished working paper, Center for Research and and V. Canudas-Romo. 2016. “Homicides in Mexico Teaching in Economics (CIDE), Mexico City. Reversed Life Expectancy Gains for Men and Slowed Ashraf, N., D. Karlan, and W. Yin. 2010. “Female Them for Women 2000–10.” Health Affairs 35 (1): 88–95. Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product Aguilar, L., J. Siles, and I. Castañeda. 2014. “Igualdad in the Philippines.” World Development 38 (3): 333–44. de Género y REDD+: Análisis del Marco Jurídico y Athey, Susan, Christopher Avery, and Peter Zemsky. 2000. 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