94348 PetroChina L 中国 天然气价格形成 管输运价设计 Gas Price Formation in China· ~ Transmission Tariff Design 世界银行与中国石油联合报告 仇，isoJida铃d Joint Report of The World Bank and Petri低Jbina 石油工业出版社 - 、’←－－ : 1 翻书在跟编吕（ CIP）数据 中阔天然气价格形成管输运价~it／世界银抒与中国 石油联合报告．一北京：石油工业出版社， 2004.2 - ij I~泊N7 … 5021-4528 … 1 I. 管… II .斗2… 理．管道运输：油气运输一运价一研究二中国 : N .F426.22 ii 中肆版本留书馆 CIP 数据核字（2003 ）第 120606 号 ! ii il 出版发行：石油工业出服社 ! l （北京安窍门外安华里 2 区 1 号楼 100011) -- t 网址 t 胃背w. 伊tropub. com. en 总机：（ 010) 64262233 发行部：（ 010) 64210392 经 销：金属新华书店 { 印 酣：石油工业出版社印剧厂排版印刷 2004 年 2 月第 1 版 2004 年 2 月第 1 次印刷 787 × 1092 毫米开本 ： 1/16 印张 ： 25.15 字数： 345 千字印数： 1一份。船 书号： ISBN7 一 4528 … 1/fE·3169 定价： 40.00 元 〈如出现印肇质盘问题，我社发传部负责调换） 版权所有，翻印必究 版权 2003 - - 中国有抽天然气股份有眼公司 中华人民共和国，北京东城区安德路 16 号 t注界镰行 1818 H Street, N ，暂． Washington, OC.20433, U.S.A 保留一切权利 中华人民共和国印制 2003 年 12 月第 1 版 本报告提供的行业分析与研究成果， ι 旨在鼓勋中圄石捕天然气行 ~内部的讨论和评论，并向对行业改革感兴趣的其他国家有关各方分 发。 报告中的酶述和结论与中囱政府及其下属机构、市中自石抽～世界 银行及其附属提梅和执舒董事会成员或他的所代表的国家，以及报告 准备期间提供咨询的各部门专家无关。中国政府、中国石油、世界银 行对本出版物中数据的准确性不予保证，并且对使用他们产生的任何 茄果不负责任。 Copyright 2003 Petro<卫1ina No. 16 AnDeLu, Dongcheng District ，丑eijing , P.R.C The Word Bank 1818 日 Str臼t,N.W. Washington, OC.20433, U.S.A ALL rights reserved Manufactured in the P叙利e’ s Republic of China First printed Deo仅nbe主 2003 τhis report presents the results of a sector analysis and res础rch that is published to enco旧暗e discussion and comment within the oil and gas community in china and for dis皑白nation to 归rties int巳rested in 附tor reform in other countries. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this pa- p町 should not be attributed in any mann佼 to the Chinese Government , PetroChina, the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to mein- hers of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries 也ey re挥部剧， or 钮，ex院成s from the institutions consulted during the preparation of the report. The Chinese Gov时nment、 PetroChina: and the World B彼此 do not 伊arantee the accu玄机y of the data included in this publiction and ac- C巳:pts no respo~ibility what议冗ver for the consequence of their use. ... 前 本研究专拉于天然气管输这价设计，着重对定义各种输气服务及 设计管输份格所需要的各璜原则和方法进有探讨。这些原则和方法是 在为下潜天然气工业制定法律法规框架的青景下形成的，在函中留阔 务院掉改办经济体制与管理研究所、挝界银行以及基础设酶咨询服务 基金会于早期共同发表的报告中提出。。 本报告的即期目标是制定： (1 ）一部管道输气运份规翔，确立管理智遥远价设计的原则和自 标； (2）一份报告，详细描述为了采用在该管遥远价规则中规定的原 则和自标所需要的方法。 本研究的一个首要自标是：在将政策能制定与监管有效分离，以 及将政策制定和监管职能句将受到监管的企业所有权和管理也有效分 离的背景下，为上述iiJ获得的成果奠定基础。 本报告是在进界银有 EASEG 专题研究组组长 Noureddine Berrah 指导下爵王位腰间 Paul T. Hunt, Pet巳r .L. l\i扭恼和 Roland Priddle 执 笔完成的。中国石油的有关专家参加了本报告的讨论。感谢 Berrah 先 生对本报告所提供的帮助。苦席财务分新家她re Hei切er 租首席能槐 提济学家 Bent Svensson （αXPO）对本报告进行了审捕。部门代理主 任蜘hammad Farhandi (EASEG）在报告编写期前向研究组提供了有 益的指导。 本报告第一章规定了输气管道运份设计的基础并对输气管道运份 。 由世界银行与中爵国务院体改办经济体制与管理研究所级成的联合工作小组在基 础设施咨询服务基金的资助下，自 1999 年以来一直在进行石油和天然气行业的分析和研究 并已发表了两份报告 z 《中国石油天然气行业现代化结构改革和监管》〔2001 年 3 月〕和 《中国：长距离输气及城市配气的经济监管》〔2002 年 8 月〕。第三德关于下桥天然气行业法 律和监管框架的报告将很快发表。 设计崩处的法律、监管及商务框架环境进行了评论。由此引出第二章 中对规定输气管道远街设计原则和目标的“输气管道这份魏剔”的讨 论。在第三章对与制定一份“输气管道远街手册”有关的方法和问靡 进衍了讨论。 PREFACE 飞 Th.is study ’ is dedicated 如 gas transmission tariff design. It focuses on ·the principles and、 methods to. define· trailsmission services 缸ld requi纪d 如 design 位创四nission.t盯iffs. These principles and. methods 红e devel- oped in the context of the l哩islative and regt过ato巧F framework for the downstream g础 industry, developed in earlier reports published jointly by the Institute of Economic System Management of the 低一 Statewun崎 cil Office for Restructuring of the, Economic Sector 〈京::ORES) , the World Bank and 由e Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPI- AF) ~o The immediate o峙ective of this re如rt is to prepare: . ( 1) A Transmission 丁盯泪也de that would establish the p加ciples and o均ectives governing 始riff design; (2) A I问均rt detailing the methodo1鸣Y 指伊ired to apply the prin- ciples and o均ectives set out in the T盯活 G对e. This could also be de- scri核对部 a Tari百 Design Man叫： and An over … riding objective of the study is to develop the basis for th邸e deliverables in the context of an effective separation of po丑cy and regulation and an 叫ually effective separation of the配 functions from 出e own础hip and management of the busines甜s that w延i be re制ated. 0 JointWo嗣ngGroup o鸣anized by the World 挠nk and the Institute of Economic System and~阴阳拢。f the St础。uncil Office for R臼.truct股如g E伽时哥拉 S如tern under the h悦ic Private Infrastructure Advi础Y Facility has b础1 即1抽出lg oil and gas 即制拟ialysis and m剧rch since 1999 and has published 2 repor怨：“控lodern拔ngα也阻’ sOil 四d G础位当ctor: Structure Re- form and R略.ilation飞 March 2001, and “ China ：充础romic R·怨ulation of Long Dis姐ice G础 Tran翻草拟αi and Urban 也sDistrib浏阳，” A鸣ust2002. A 也剧民事。·rt on.the i略I and 吨ul翩翩 zy framework for the d仰恼归回n 阴阳伽 will be i酷程ed shortly. This report has been prepared for the World B忽:ik by three oonsul- tan蚀， Paul T. Hunt, Pet，εr L. Miles and Roland Priddle, under the di- rection of Noureddine hη础， Ta拉丁础m Leader, EASEG, the World B挝也. Petrochina ’ s Concerned experts have been involved all along in the discussion of the report. The authors wish 如 acknowledge the guid二 ance provided by Mr.· Berrah. The report was reviewed by Marc Heit- ner, Lead Financial Analyst and Bent Sven凶础， Lead 'Energy Eoonomist ( COCPO) . Mohat盟nad Farhandi, Acting Sector Director ( EASEG) provided useful guidance to the t创m during the preparation of the report. Chapter 1 sets out the basis of 组riff design and provides a review of the legal, l'唔ulatory and oommercial framework in which transmission t盯iffs ar它 designed. This le.a啦， in Chapter 2 , to a discussion of a “ Tariff Code” that sets out the principles and objectives of tariff design. Chapter 3 pre肥nts a discussion of methods and issues rel在ted 如 the development of a “Tari枉 Manual. ” ,,” 目录 Table ~f ~011tents 、 一’ 摄述…＂＂. ••.· ..................................................………….... .,.••.• ~ ( 1 ) EX阪1月'IVE SUMMARY …飞？…￥…......... '.'''""'·........... :……( 171) 第…章赞道运份设计基础........................…......‘….........…（ 7 ) 1 扭扭 BASIS OF TRANSMISSION TAR班事’ D~IGN .......... (180) 1.1 运价规则的菇围...........…......................... "! ..………" ( 7 ) 1.1 Scope of the Tariff Code 川............... ~ ..............….. (180) 1.1.1 北美式运价法巍…….. ~ .•• ~…： ........……...... ( 7 ) 1.1.1 A N。她 American Style Tariff COOe .. ~ ......... (181) 1.1.2 基于条锚的监管办法布基于许可证的监管办法 .. : ( 8 ) 上 1~2 · Rules - based 由d Licenses - based R啤ulatory . ’ Appr四.ches ........…........................................…. (181) 1.1.3 推荐使用基于许可证方法.........................…＇ ( 8 ) ·1.1. 3 Recammended Usεof License - based Approach .. (182) Ll.4 ...…….-••_ 运份娩则茹围的含义…...... - .......... ( 9 ) 1.lA ’ Implications for the Scope of the Tari在臼de . (183) L2 天然气供应、配送租运输的扮梅及运份............_....... ( 9 ) 1.2 pγices and Tar♀ffsfor ‘G臼臼Z拌均， DistribUtia民 · and T ranSmisSiati …·…………………. ;…·……….. (1_83] 1.2.1 价格与运拚.......... ~………...... iO 二........………（ 9 ) 一 1. 2 .1 Prices and Tariffs · · · · · · · ..….........….. . •. . •• . ( 183) 1.2.2 配气服务收费.........…..........……........... ( 10) 1. 2. 2 Distribution T，恒iffs ·· ······……·绷………........ (185) 1.2.3 管道运价：改革及转型的要求…，……......... ( 11 ) 1.2.3 Trar四nission T缸iffs: R·吨uirement for Reform and Transition .................................... (186) 1.3 建议的法棒法规框架.............................. ··•·····. ..•. ( 14 ) . 1.3 百iePro乡。部d Leg.在i and Regz出部ry FrameWork … (190) .n 1.3.1 分摄体制的作用. •.• •.• •. •... .•• •.• . •• •.• •. .... ••• .•• ( 14 ) 1.3.1 Roles 明t协 the'f丑erarchy ........................ (190) 1.3.2 立法的主要要素…….................... ·-· .•.. "...二（ 15) 1. 3. 2 Essential Elemen岱 of l略islation …．每......... (19写） 1.3.3 许可证发法制度……... . . . ••• ••. ••. ••• .•• .. . .. •••. ( 15 ) 1. 3. 3 The Licensing Regime · · · · · · •· · · · · · · · · ·….... ~ ..…( 192) 1.3.4 对其能支持性政策的要求….. : ...............…( 20) 1.3.4 R吨uirement for Supporting Policies .. "·" ·.... (199) 1.4 天然气行业的重组…. .• . •• •.• •• . •.• •.• . ••••• •.••.. ••. ••• . .• . •• ( 21 ) 1.4 G臼 Industry Restnκturi略…·….......... , ...…….. , •• (200) 1.4.1 上静与下静的分开…·…........………... '. •••. ( 21 ) 1. 4 .1 Separation of Upstream and Ibwnstrearn ……( 201) 1..4.2 商务安排及相关的规施…... .•. . •. . .• •.•••. •. •••• ( 21 ) 1. 4. 2 Commercial Arrangements and their R嘻ulation· .. (201) 1.5 .•,...........…( ＇管输服务的定义..................…. ._ •••.•.•.••_ 22) 1.5 ’ Definiti，棚。if Transmission 缸叫出 …·…..........….. (204) 1.5.1 才在歧视的原膊…….. •, ....…•.• ................... ,. . ( 23, ) 1. 5 .1 The Principle of Non - Discrimination ……”. (203) 1.5.2 输气相供应的一体化............... ~········＇.＂＂＂ (24) 1.5.2 Integrated Transmission and Supply ........…. (205) 1.5.3 业务分离的原因…......... "...........…......... ( 26) 1. 5. 3 Reasons for h 一 int略rating Activities· · ·· ..... · (207) 1.5.4 业务与服务分离.............…….......…........ ( 27) 1.5.4 加… integr我ted Activities and Services ·· · · ·· · · · (209) 1.5.5 吕定的容囊权………….........…….........….. ( 29) 1.5 .5 Finn Capacity Rights ............................. , (211) 1.5.6 可中断或“即期”服务…·…................…. ( 33) Interruptible or “也1 … Demand” Service ……（217) 1. 5 . 6 1.6 有关运价设计基础的结论…·．，．．．．．·………............... ( 36) 1.6 Conclusions 佣 the Basis of Tariff Desig:统…............. (222) 第二章定情规割的原贿........…........................….......... ( 38) 2 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVEIβPING TI董E TARIFF CODE .. (224) 2.1 运份设计原则........... "....................…............…·费（ 38) 2.1 Pr白d乡•les of Tar毛ff Design .. (224) 2.2 运价设计目标…........................ -· ................叶………. ( 38) 2. 2 Tariff Desi伊。也ljecti·咽革…………….......…··…….. (2＇.立的 2.2.1 资苦苦、分配雄事........................…….... :···.. ( 39 ) 2. 2 . 1 Allocative Efficiency ’........………·…. .• •• . •• . (225) 2.2.2 用户分配效率.... . ••• •. . . . •• ••. •• ••. . ••• . . •.• . . . . •. . ( 39 ) 2 . 2 . 2 Rationing Efficiency ……..... ... .... ... ... ...... (226) 2.2.3 生产效率............…..................................….. ( 40) 2 . 2 . 3 Productive Efficiency …..........…·…...........…. (226) 2.2.4 产品选择效率........ "...........................尸········· ( 40 ) 2. 2·. 4 Efficiency in Product 缸lection …................…（ 227) 2.2.5 足够的回报…….......................…............... ( 40 ) 2. 2. 5 Revenue Sufficiency · •· · · •· •· .. · · · · · •· .-. · · · •· · · · ·…. (228) . 2.3 期望的特征……..............“.... .._ ...….................... ( 41 ) · 2. 3 Desirable· Fe也tures ……·……………………......…（ 229) 2.4 结论................................. ~ ..…．．．．．．．．．．．．…－… H 刊也） ' 2.4 Conclusion ........... ~ .. ~·：…................... ,. ..........…. (229) 第：：：:i袁价格手册的制定....... ; ................. ( 43 ) .........….... ;.. ,... _ 3 ·DEVELOPING 白配 T础IFFMANUAL .......….......... (230) i ... 3.1 方法介绍…..........….......·.· •.••• ·; ........….......…....... ( 43 ) 3.1 ·.Oi四rview 呼 Methodology ……………··……......…. • （＇.药前 3.2 资产评拮..................…＇！ ............‘…............………( 44) 3~2 Asset Valuat阳军….； .........……........…........…......... (231) 3:2.1 历史成本的评估...........……...................... ( 46) 3.2.1 日istoric 臼st Yalu况ion .........…….........…. (234) 3.2.2 资产现值的评佑.................................... ( 47) 3.2;2 Current Cost Valuations …·….........…......... (235) 3.2.3 评估方法的选择….....................…......... (49) 3 . 2 . 3 Selection of Valuation Opt~on · · •· .. · · · · •• · ••.... · • ( 238) 3.3 与成本基础有关的因素.........….........…................. ( 50) 3. 3 Derivation of 即“st Base ………··…….......... ;.... (239) 3.3.1 折旧政策..........................…................. ( 50) 3 . 3 . 1 Depreciation Policy · •· •... •.. •· .. · · ·,· · ·…·…川…（ 239) 3.3.2 资金戚本.........…........... ;...................... ( 51 ) 3 •3. 2 ·C,ost of ............................…(242) Capi时··~······ 3.3.3 运行成本……................…......、...........·~ •.• ( 54 ) 3.3.3 句的ting Expendi阳出........................ ... (246) 3.4 成本基础的计算（或要求的投资回报卜................. ( 56) 3. 4 Projecti略必t G怒t Base (or Revenue R吨uireme耐〉 .. (248) 3.4.1 接人成本......... ;................ •.•• ....………….. ( 58) 3 . 4 .1 O:mnectiQns C.os毡，……................….，. ....... (251) 3.4.2 总成本基础……….. •.• ....…••,•• ...._ ........ •，•气…（ 58) ili 3.4.2 To臼i Wst Base ……,• ...... '. •.•..:..... •, .....川……（ 252) 3.5 成本分类及分配………····~·····~· ... , ..二........…......... ( 59) 3. 5 Classification and Allocation of OJsts · · .. · · · ·………. (252) 3.5.1 ”成本分类.......................…......... ........... ·( 59) _ · · · · · · · · · .. · · · · · ·………·~·· ... 3 . 5 .1 Cost ClasSification (252) 3;5.2 成本分醒……... ............ ............ ...... .••..•. ( 59 ) 3;5.2 All悦atingWsts …........... ,.: .".......……………. (253) 3.5.3 ＇成本分类及分配中的公平与效事.............. , ( 60) 3. 5. 3 Equitability v. Efficiency in Oassification arid ·. · Allocation ……·气•， ..... ; ~…... ..…..........…. ".....…{254) !I'" 3.5.4 解决公平与效率问题...........................…（ 62) 3. 5. 4 Resolving the Equitability v. Efficiency Debate .. (256) 3.6 价格设计．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． η ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．“约 3. 6 Tariff Desi伊…·……··………··……......…….... "...恼创 3.6.1 邮票法……..........................…...........…（ 63) 3.6.1 p，础tage Stmnp …….. ... .•• .••. ••• .•.••• .• .••• .•. ... (259) 3.6.2 路径法.................. "..............….........…( 64) 3.6.2 Path-B部ed …......................................…. (259) 3.6.3 区域定价法....................…............................怜的 3.6.3 Zonal Tariffs ....................................... (262) 3.6.4 人口／出口定份法...............................….·....... ( 67) 3.6.4 Entry把》cit Pricing ··· ·····……..................…. (263) 3.6.5 份格设计方法的选择…….......................….. ( 68) 3.6.5 也lection of Design Option · · · · · · · · ·…...........…( 264) 附件 1 联邦能嚣管理委员会法规第 284 部分….................. ( 69 ) APPENDIX 1: PART 284 OF TI扭汇ODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS · · · ··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·想…........….........:……. (265) 酣件 2 许可证最件来剖................. ~ ......…" ........……....... (104) APPENDIX 2: SO岛缸翠XAMPLES OF LICENSE CONDIDONS .. (306) 甜件 3 输气监管方法.......... " ..............….... •••.•…........ ••• ••• ••• ( 123) APPENDIX 3: TRANS岛flSSIONREG盯LATORY I宜。王NIQUES .. (335) 醋件 4 通用条敬和条件.....................................……........ (134) APPENDIX 4: GENERAL TERMS AND CONDIDONS ········· (350) 附件 5 费量分配．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．鑫……………‘……….. (166) APPENDIX 5: CAPACITY ALLOCATION …..........…..........…( 394) 概 述 ψ 穹 本报告探讨输气管道运货设计，其背景是中面的天然气工业正在 发展以及出前中盟国务院体改办经济体制与管理研究所恨刀班时、 世界银行和3基础设施咨淘服务基金会（ PPIAF）组成的联合工作小组 在共同发表的多帮报告中提出的根关政策如监管方式。 一方面可以着到存在一种对于将供气的专营权与…体化结梅结合 在一起〈至少在→段时间内）的商业需要，主要是给予投资者对自气 自到天然气’处程厂直至终端批发用户的域甫或工厂门站的一定程度的 控制极（以及由此而来的确定性九 另一方面，既要保留的政策目标每捂： ＼①分离输气与错气业务 It{ 明确识别各自的成本，即使在将天然气 和输气作为一种“捕锦式”b 服务出售的情况下。由此就可以对自然垄 惭菌素进行适当的监臂，并为解除擂绑和逐步的甫场开放做准备。’ 是＼②确立非歧视原赌，“这样当竞争出现时，新的市场进入者就能静 相信，在管道公司拥有自己的供销网络的4情况下，他的有平等的进入 权获取管道服务。 就便起管道的输气运份来说，仍然存在→些相互冲突的目标需要 去解决： '· ' 命运价收费必须是以能够完全校自有效发生的成本， 19,摇投入的 股本金成本， ι 但是另一方面， ＠运份收费也应维持在较低水卒以便使天然气有市场竞争力和能 够供城市配气公碍和工业大用户去购买，同时也给天然气生产者提供 可以鼓励其进一步勘探和开发的枚人流二 ＠运份结梅J1i对提高天然气的利用军事提供强烈的激励作用，较高 的使用率将会降能输气的单位成本d 这样项自的风险将会辞低，从商 可以使管道联目获得更高比僻的贷款融资，从商降假投资者处于风险 的股本金投入的数量以及股本金的风险，并进商降银单位运份。 ＠问时，通过使用较高出销的照付不议购气合同来转移风险也不 应造成削弱工业用户和城市配气公司财力的后果。 在考虑到这些目标的背景下，本报告的目的是为以下最终的成果 奠定基瑞： ①一部管道输气运拚规则，确立管理智道运街设计的原则相目 栋； ：＠一份报告，详细描述为了采用在该管道运份规则中规定的原则 和目标所需要的方法。 ' .1. 辅气垣价设计基础 由于远街会影llf每收益和利润的“底线”，许多管道运输公司都趋 向于开始对输气运价进行设计。但是，如果对将启用于该运拚设计所 处的法律和监管框架没有清踏的指导，输气远价设计也无浩有效地进 衍。 e 在较早的报告中推荐采用许可证的方法来进行监管，；为建立中国 的监管和商业模式提供了？种有效和合适的手段，这些模式在在美详 尽的运份规则或监管法规中有详细的说明。 本报告通过以下颇序按分析的重点逐渐集中于输气运价的设计 上： ①建立监管部门和颁发许可证制的立法： ②许可证条件的定义租细发许可证； ＠发展各种商业模式，以便监管o t> 运输与供气业务的分离； t> 提供输气服务的运营规赔或通用条件和条款。4 2. 原则和目标 运价设计的原则和自都应集中于取得经济效率的关键方面，同时 也能确保产生的收益足以收回那些谨慎而又有效率地发生的戚本卢布达 到这些目标的运份根据定义将是反映成本的和完歧挠的运价。但是为 了获得这些目标的益处，也需要权衡是否会削弱，“对用户友好”的某 些特点，这些特点位摇易予理解和应用 7 透明、曰：预础性和适应性。 • 2 • 最后一点，输气服务的运份设计应有利于用户使用该输气系统，有利 于形成供气中的竞争。 3. 运份设计方法 在运份设计方法的鞋架内有各种方案相方法可供选择。但…开始 就应对需道锯的关键步骤和将导致最合适结果的选择方案达成一致意 见。 (1 ）为一个非拇梆式运输公司导出成本基础 戚本基础的主要组成部分包括： ①资本收益（我前）； ②折 IE; ＠操作与维护成本。 前两个部分需要对资产原值（等于已使用的资本〉进行评估，并 评f古暗时间及资本成本的变化该资产原值将如雨变化。 1) 资产原锺 在选择用于监管自的的确定资产原值的方法时有两个问题需要解 决：第一个问题是确定资产原值；第二个是确定该资产原值将怎样随 时间而变化。在某种意义上，目前这个防段对于第二个问题关注得较 少。如果确定了资产原值 i 采崩确定该资产原告主跑时间发生变化的每 …种方法都将生成其资本费用〔折i日和净资产收益］谎，每一资本费 用流都将有一条弓之间的曲钱。如果对资本成本采用一致的佑算方法并 使用一般的投资因牧期限，每一资本费用流的理佳都与该资产原谊招 商。 经常有人主张用于监管自的的资产评佑方法不应偏离企业进行财 务报告时所采用的方法。如果这两种方法是相同的，资产评估可能是 较方便的，但是没有醒自认为为什么一套单独的监督账户的基础应与 时务报告的基础相同。当两套服之间有清睹的审计朦络，就不存在任 何问题。即使在北美，在那里监管部门为了执行监管以及受监管的企 业为了准备财务报告各自使用历史戚本，但对成本和费用的处灌方式 各不相间，因此在多数情况下需要保存一套单强的监管班户。 就西气东输管道项自由言，设定资产原值应是比较简单的，因为 • 3 . 在管道试运行并投产后该资产原值将是从在建工程转移过来的建设成 本。就现有的输气系统商言，工作将不会那么简单，这嚣要提据可得 到的资料和数据并根据具体情况进行详细的分析。但是，最苦要的目 标是要确保所选择的评估方法能够生成可以反映出提供输气服务的经 济成本的资本费用。保证维持评估挫理方式的一致性也是重要的。在 采用评估方法出现差异时，这些差异应该是透明的，无懈可击。 2 ）括 IS 在挺IS方面有两个问题需要赔答：应在多长期眼内收回期韧投 资？应采用什么方法计算年度折！日费？ 在一条管道技术寿命终结前，诙管道将在经济上成为多余的这种 几率极小的情况下，采用技术寿命作为适当的投资由收期是一般横 树。 可 DJ采用各种茹 IS法，每种方法都将产生不同的投资国收曲线。 但是，不能孤立地考虑挺i臼曲线。重点应敢在包括了折1日和投资收益 在内的年资本费用曲线上。 3 ）资本成本 大多数监管委员会被要求允许运输公司在服从监管的前提下获得 一个“合理的资产枚益率气就天辑气来说，考虑到风险既是输气行 业的内在性质又是监管过程本身施加的，合理的枝益率可以定义为投 资者要求获得的与所承担风睦相适应的收益率。这种许可的收益率常 常被称作加权平均资本成本（ WAfX），它是以贷款和股本金各自占 融资总额的比例为权重计算出来的平均资本成本。 WACC 通常是以 实际税前收益率的形式出现的。 资本资产定价模型（CAPM）正在作为一种优先考虑的分析工具用 以撑靴亿，对在该模型中TE.使用的参数佳也正在开始达成一致。 的营业支出 任何监管制度的一个目栋是向受监管企业提供激励措施使其有效 率地运膏。运输公司显示其正在而且将有效率地运营，这将是很必要 的。监管者一般需要审查受监管企业旗割的和实际的操作和维护支出 之间的不一致情况，并告tl定应如何处理这些差异的规则。 • 4 • ～－一 一一～十一一一 －一一→一一一一 。）导出成本基础 在本报告中采用了基于实际计划投益率（中国石油提出为 12%) 的实际不变运价。这样设计是为了在中国石油提出的计划评估期投因 资本和营业费用。根据所提供的关于贷款服务要求的数据，假定投资 者将对剩余收益率和收益由钱表示满意。采用资产余值法o (FCM) 用于中国石油假定的资产寿命期得 tl:l 眉定资产原告革和年括1日费。这样 就可以生成一条资本费用的详细菌线。 上述做法提供了一个初步（组还不完全适当）的基础去考虑对运 价监管的应用。 CPI-X 激励形式的运价监管己作为最适当的机制提 出。所建议的韧期远价机制i简单假定 X 等于零，在达到句期韧投资有 关的容量利用水平之前的这一段时间内，监管者可能会琦此方法感到 满意。而后，或者在此之前，条件许甫的话，监管者将决定 X 为正值。 (3 ）成本分类和成本分配 总成本是由经过分类的固定戚本和可变成本所构成。对输气系统 商言，固定成本一般趋向于占总成本的 90% 以上。戚本分类是使运 份结椅与戚本结构相一致的第一步。 基于经济的和公平的标准，戚本将根据各种类别的容量使用棱分 配至tl相关类别的托运方。在确定由具有不同负荷特征的托运方支付的 最终运份中这是极为关键的一步。被分配给容主建费和离品费的商定戚 本军口可变成本的比剖是运价设计的一项职能。 直接的固定变动（ SFV）法←一被认为在经济上是有效串的一一 将所有的固定成本划入容量费。这种方法向饵负荷系数用户全年收取 他们只在一天或两天使用容量的全部戚本费用。容最转让或容量交换 机制的发展合天才保负荷系数托运人使用的非高峰期盟主运容量予以补， 偿。在还没有这些就甜的情况下，有可能把留定戚本的一部分挝人商 品费。这就可以使典型的直接固定变动（ SFV ）容量巧商品比从 90: 10 转变为 70: 30 或 65: 350 在过搜阶段把最初的比销定为 65: 35 可能会比较合适，随着时间的推移逐渐变至与 SFV 相符的比例。 @ 这种方法考虑了将减少资产量更换成本掬技术进步因素。 . 5 • 成本分类和指成本划分为容量部分和商品部分提供了设计两部制 运价的基础，两部制运价是指琦输气预约容量收费和对在该年内使南 该容量收费。 对初期中国现有的输气系统来说，这撞机制的发展将需要时间， 但在设计管输运价水平和结椅时，可以谨慎地尝试梅想未来的商业和 监管模式。这里为了进行解释，使崩了直接眉定变动法。 （的这价设计 设计运价的一个重要考虑因素是运价与距离的关系。这里存在荫 个极端：一种情况是不论远距长短均按岗一挥准收费的邮花费率运 份；另一情况则是点三军点运份，试图包罗从每一进气点至每一提气点 的距离对整个戚本的影响。 “区壤运价”这个术语被用于擂述这样一个系统：在这个系镜内 对经过不i苟地理区域的交易采用不国的运份，但对在同一个区域内的 既有交易均采用相同的运份。它包括将临近的进气点和提气点辘组分 旺。在某种意义上，这是一种区域之间与距离相关，区域内果用部花 边仕的混合运份。从经济学的角度者，一个运价取决于迸出点的精礁 结合的“单纯”基于路径的运拚制不大可能会比区域击tl有更鼓薯的优 越性，因为区域制基于许多旺域，；在以包罗所有关键的成本要素。区 域运份在反映成本准确性方国的任何不足可以通过以下几个方面得到 更多的补偿：在进气点幸在提气点设立上的灵活程度，挺进建立市场中 心和活跃的管道容最二级市场的潜力以及简单易行性和可预测性的增 扭。 本报告建议中属有关当局等虑对中居班有的长距药管道系统采用 区域运价。区域运价提供了有效的手段对输气系统收费并且最终也推 进了这些生产或市场中 JL＇的出现。 • 6 • 章 第 管道远价设计基础 本章讨论在制定运份规剧和这份子册时需要考虑的一些问题如选 择。由定义运价规则的部盟和潜清一些有关天然气定价和运份的术语 开始，回顾了现行的管道运价设计方法（见 1.1 节和 1.2 节）。由于 本研究的一个总目标是制定出一套有别于政策和法规的管道远费定价 方法， 1.3 节介绍了早先报告＠中推容的法律法规框架建议的几个重 要方面。为了使政策的制定能赶上市场开放的步伐并使其遵照有关法 律法规程架，天然气行业需要进有重新整合，这种在框架实施前业务 能继续整合和囊组的含义在 1.4 节中进有阐述； 1.5 节随后又更详细 地研究了运输服务的定义，最后在 1.6 节给出结论。 1.1 运价强则的菇自 对运价规姆的作用和范围进行定义的方法可能有多种，这是由 在广义上“海份”（ t在riff）可以用来描述一项服务提供的条件和条款 以及它的价格，在北美尤其如此。在美眉，运输服务的监管“价格” 被统称为“费事”（ ra时，在如拿大经常将它们称为“运费”（ tolls) o 1.1.1 北美式远价法规 中国石油已将美国联邦能源管理委员会发布的联邦管理法规中第 284 部分提出来作为西气东辑项目运份管理办法的一个参塔，这些法 规指导的是“在 1978 年颁布的天然气政策法案和有关当局管理下的 天然气的特定销售和运输”，这些法旗的副本在前件 1 中提供。 这些法规十分详尽地列示了受联邦监管的运输和储存企业的极科 和义务，这些法规规定了用于指导运输体系日常运营的持业规定的性 质。 @ 觅前言中的注脚。 . 7 • 1.1.2 基于条倒的蓝管办法和基于许可证的监管办法 有关部门在世界银行和基础设施咨诲服务基金会（ PPIAF)9 联 合工作链的支持下进行的调查和分析得出这样的结论，用如此详细和 规定性的方法来管理中国下潜天然气行业是不适宜的，这一结论是基 于对中国天然吨转业和法规挺架现除段的发展以及行业所面临的困难 的了解。联邦管醒法规是任过括当长的时间才制定出来的，可以肯定 的是如果美国政策法规当局在 25 年前就知道他钉现在知道的事情， 那么现今的这个版本就会大不相同。这…结论也是基于有另一种可选 择的监管方法，这种方法正成功地应用于环境与中国情况梧类似的国 家里但并非北美。 为了便于讨论，将北美的方法描述为“基于条例”的方法，将另 一种方法称为“基于许可证”的方法。两种方法的应用都将达到一个 竞争的天然气报发市场的关键准政策自标，并且这两种方法有许多共 同的特性。不向之处在于它们采用的手段不同盟采用的方式也不同。 基于许可证方法的主要特性见下面的 1.3 节。 1.1.3 推荐使用基于许可证方法 建议使用许可证的方式界定天然吨市场参与方（钮括那些可以使 用运输系统的天然气托运人〉的权利如义务，它们将列法出法规应府 的方法和市场参与方需要制定并遵守的商务安排及业务规范的种 类＠。这种方法的一个重要 Jz:射点是市场的参与方将根据它衍许可证 的条件及所受到的监管以一种咨诲的方式制定商务安排。 这种方法比规范性的基于条例的方法克许有更多的商务自主性， 对于天然气市场和法规正处于发展和健全过程中的中国，这种额外的 商务自主性是必要的。另外，在决定建立一种天然气监管机制后，击！！ 走一套综合的、详细的和具指导性的法规还将有一段时间。再者，当 制定法规时，为那些将受法规管制的业务制定一套适宜的行业规则和 商业安排也是合理的。 @ 觅前宫中的注掷。 @ 许可证也将包括解决耳其邦管理法规中提到的这些问题的条款。 . 8 • 1.1.4 运价颊，则龙爵的含义 基于许可证方法的应用提供了挂理联邦管理法规第 284 部分提到 的所有问题的手段和方法，主要的手器和方法将在 1.3 节中进一步讨 论。这意味着相对于这窑用于碍出管输监管份格的方法的原则和目标 商霄，在这里运份蝇则定义的施围可能很窄。 1.2 天然气供应、配迭租运输的价格及运价 在此阶段澄清与天然气价格和天然气运份有关的术语是有益的。 ？这有助于鉴别哪些是由法规监管的价格，哪些二是由竞争确定的价格以 及嘟些思管是由竞争磷定的但还是受法规监管的价格（至少在一殷时 期内〉。这也提棋了机会来审视目前的管道运价定价方法。 1.2.1 价格与这价 关于天然气价格形成中的术语“运价”和“价格”现在还没有一 敦的准确定义。为了这椅报告后酷的讨论，建议当价格是由供需关系 决定时使用术语“讲格”，这一价格可棋是在一个清斯界定的市场中 以标准住的产品或服务由一个单糙的买方朝一个单独卖方谈判后形成 的，也可能是由许多买方和卖方通过讨价还价形成的。 在不存在竞争和没有可能性（或有限的可能性）发展竞争的市场 环境时使南术语“运价”，这发生在具有自然垄断特性的业务及引人 竞争对经济无益的业务中，这就是为什么运价是专为垄断业务设计 的，如天然气运输如配遂，目的是使设计的“这价”尽可能地接近在 竞争市场下所形成的价格。 对这些运价实行监管是因为从事垄断有为的行业是不会有意朝着 反映竞争’情况下结果的方向设计运价并生产产品（或服务）的数蠢和 质盘。事实上，一个盈斯者几乎总会想办法设定一个比竞争的市场中 会出现的拚格高的运价（但僚的数量和质量），这样垄断者就能将它 的利益最大化。既然垄断者要么能设定价格要么能确定数最（但两者 不能都用时做到），运价的监管应当通过价格自动确定数量。然醋， 垄断者还可能针对一个特定的供应最降低服务质量，蓝管就椅应有能 • 9 • 力加强服务摆量的最｛目标准。 基于这一点，“埠价”可以被辑：为“监管偷格飞最初，在从纵向 …体化的自然聋睹到操铁垄断的转变过程中，将被考虑的唯一“椅 格”是天然气供应的批发价，如果有证据表明是供气方拥有市场极 力，那么达到这一“价格”的方式就可能受到i监管。所有的其他“价 格”将被监管并且也有可能被辑：为“运份”。这些运份包括本研究报 告要重点研究的管道远倍以及向城市配气公司（ UGDC）的用户收取 的捆绑式配气和供应服务的收费。 . 尽管这如报告呈现的分斩范围只到城市班气公司的城市门站结 束，还是有必要就如下方面插入一些评论： . 城市配气公司的有效发展： @ 城市配气公司提供的运输与销售捆绑式服务的定价： 在市场进一步开放时非擂掷输送服务的定铃。 L2.2 配气服务收费 在一个特定地理区域内配气公司之间（涉及管两系统的部分或全 部）进行竞争对经济是无益的，对于这一点，很久以来就扫得到公 认。其结果，盟气管网系统具有自然垄酣特匪旦出一家公司提供服务 并制定收费份格也是合理的。另外，按照用户：自费影式或要求将用户 分类有利于收费传格的设计并可避免单独谈判合同时产生的交易戚 本；再者，设计一种收费结构可以减少发生在用户之间不公正的歧视 事件。 正锥世界土的许多其他管辖枝，在中国，可以设想在一个特定的 地理区域内城市盟气公司将拥有强家专营权向低用蠢的措良、商业和 行政事业单位提供捆绑式天然气销售如配气服务，有时被稀为“特许 权”的这项权利可以是国家政府机关、省政府机关或市政府机关授予 的，这些用户将为此项捆梆式服务支付一个单麓的收费价格，但这… 收费份格将受到监管。要解决有关距气系统的自然袭斯特段和在一个 特定应墙内供应天然气的独家专有权问题就要出台一毒法规，可以预 见，城市配气公司将被要求将其输配布天然气供应的业务戒本分开， 以使法规更加有效并能就每项服务向用户提出一个收费价格。 • 10 • 长期以来一直建议由城市配气公司服务的大工业用户应有就会接 触到竞争的天然气供应离，这将使竞争的天然气市场的规模得到j 新段 性的有序扩大，这还将最大眼度地蜡少有了竞争天然气供应商时可能 出现的异常情况。换！如，大部分大用气量用户都是由输气系统直供的 并且在大多数情况下都将有就会接触到竟争的供应商。程不管怎样， 一些大用气量用户还是要由城市配气公可供吨的，当允许类似的或用 气最较小的用户接触竞争供应商时（实际上他们的位置靠近管输系 统〉，前止这些大用户接触竞争的供应商报难说是合理的。这些用户 将直接就天然气供应签署合同并从城市配气公司那里寻求院气服务， 这就进一步解释了将配吨服务成本计算、收费傍格设计分开的原因。 就像巳辑发生在英国和正发生在美国、如拿大和模大事j亚的情出 一样，可以预见最终所有的用户都将接触到竞争的供应商，强计到 2007 年许多歌溯国家都会是这种情况。但此矜模式只有在天然气批 发（揽蠢侠应）市场有效地运转并已充分评估了到达所有用户的成本 和利益时才可效仿。 在这份报告中特别要位意的是对于配气系挠枚费价格设计的紧迫 性远不如管道运价设计，尽管目前的重点是在管遥远价设计，但有关 原则和方法的许多讨论对配气收费价格设计同样有效。 1.2.3 管遥远价：改革及转型的妥求 在罢王清了天然气价格与运份概念的关键 lK到后，现在可以审视一 sltili 下： . • 中国现盼段提供的辘气服务； 天然气辑送与天然气勘蠢侠应的定份；及 ＠保证有效市场开放要求的改革的姓质。 (1 ）…体化服务 在现盼段，中国的主要陆上石油天然气公司（中石油和中石化） 提供着被称为捆绑式一体化揽聋供应的服务，这是一种“批量住在” 服务，大批量的天熬气交付给了城市配气公司和与管输系统相连的大 -- 用气撞用户，这是一项结合了（或捕绑了〉管输服务的捆绑式天然气 供应服务。这个捆弊的性质只是“一体化”服务性质的一个方面，这 11 zfgli -- 项管输业务不论纵向还是横向都是一体的。纵向一体化是指出一个企 业完成开采、净化。和输送等一系列业务椅成；横肉一体化可以描 述为输气的操作、储气设施的运行及在管输系统设计和安全的参数藏 围内保持天然气供需的持揍平衡。 另外，在颈期到天然气需求会增长时，相应地管输容蠢也需要增 加时，就要对管输系统扩容或增容。也许在这种需求的增长不会出现 时，管输企业就要承担无法从这项投资中收到适当的回报的风险。没 有什么有效的机制来确保管输容量将桂使用或为此付出的戚本将被回 收，这实际上也抑制了为维持管输系统的物理完整性和确保提供的服 务质盘器进行资本性支出和营业性支出的积极性。如果运输公司对其 已经投入的资金的自牧毫无保障可言，那么也就投有动力去进一步投 入资金维持系统的运行。最后，这个行业的特点在于非相互连接的管 输系统，其复杂性是从单1虫的管钱到广泛的省内连接或跨省连接的管 输系统不等。 1在智商气东输项自将主要作为一个非相互连接的系统遥 有，但它将拘成管输容量的主要增长。一个管输系挠的复杂程度与其 天然气接人点的数量和提气点数擎的多少有关，以及与通过室主换方式 〈而不是容易追踪的点到点的天然气流动）输送天然气的程度有关。 尽管投资的规模很大旦进气点到提气点的距离很长，西气东输项目至 少在开发初期不会成为一个复聋的输气系统。 (2 ）指与李价与蓝管价格 目前的这种就管输服务如批最天然气供应分射制定管道运价如天 然气气价的方法确实显呆了非捆绑的一些方丽和戚本基础的分离，屠 家计委（ SDPC玩的赞格可制定天然气净化后和将天然气lA井口输 。 据了解并不总是进行夭然气净化，…些管输系统运送呈长经处理的天然气给最终用 户，这样用户就不得不安装一套小规模的天然气处理设施。尽管这些用户避免了向运输公 司交净化处理费，但到最后却要支付更多的辛苦用，安装和运苦苦他们自己的处理设施的成本 主耳比运输公商在系统入口处提供天然气处理（净化）服务的费用裔，另外流入管道系统的 未经处理的天然气会腐蚀损坏管道系统 D 通过管输服务质量量和可靠性的降低、维护开支的 增加利六修更换费用的提前发生，这会增加未来的成本。 .JI 由于改革与经济窒组因务院办公室和困家经贸委的一些部门与国家计委会并了， 国家计委（ SDPC）已经被更名为周家发展与改革委员会（SDRC），但在报告中我们继续沿 用了国家计委的叫法。 • 12 • ”’ 送到城市配气公商（ UGDC）的城市门站及与管道系统梧连的大用量 用户的工厂门的执行价格，天然气价格将围绕同样是由价格司制定的 指导井口价在一个受限制的菇围内通过谈判磷定。这种方法的主要问 题是无法在知这些擂导价和执仔份格在何种程度上反挟了供应的天然 气的经济价值和提供服务的成本。当气份背离了经济价值且执行价格 背离了经济成本时，必然辱致生产技资和消费的能效。 (3 ）转嚣的要求 这种性质的销效率是经济学家最担岳的，从经济主理论上讲，它们 将导致资摞的错误配置，在现实中，这是所有市场参与方所关心的主 要问题。例如，当井口指导拚加上天然气管输、配气的成本后，将影 成一套针对；最终用户的价格，然而，计算得出的这些价格尊竞争燃料 的价格相比可能高于或锻于用户愿意文件的价格。如果价格高于用户 愿意支付的水平，天然气在市场七的渗透力就会非常有限，且将无法 获得天然气带来的战略上的、经济上曲和环保上的益处，从经济角度 i二说，可开采的天然气销量将被锁定、或开果不足及低效开果。另一 方面，如果拚格低于商户愿意支付的水平，就会导致资摞方韶的边费 和资源莉甩的保效，造成为满足这部分不经济的额外需求而进行投资 上的液费和低数，为满足这项额外的、琅费的投资将发生在生产、运 输和配气领域。这两种情况都将造成严重的损失，应当尽量避免。 按照此种方法，极少有可能获得生产、投资手持使用前费的最珑水 平。另外，还没有形成一种内部就翻来确保当与最位水平发生锦离 晖，市场参与者将会采取措施以达到一种平有的和有效的平衡。因 此，有必要制定并应用一些能确定天然气供应链每个阶段的准确的成 本租价值的方法。 有关“天然气价格彭成”的一份单独的报告审挠了不间的用来确 定天然气供应链的每个阶段的天然气价债和街格的机制，这就要求开 始从现在的执行价将自批发竞争转型。由成藕理论的应用程广泛的国 际惯例得知，确认发生在管输中的经济成本以及这些成本如何转化为 运扮方弱，在这方面形成一个统一意见琦向批发竞争转型是有帮助 的。 • 13 • 只有伴髓下述事件的发生，这些方法才能成功地得到应用： ’ . • 一套具有激励、控制和指导作用的法律法规； 现有天然气企业．的内部重组： 对所提供的服务重新进行定义。 以下三节将怯次讨论这些问题。 1.3 建议的法律法规模架 这个框架是由分银的法律法规蓝管和商务手段组成，有些是薪制 定的，有些是天然气立法接校的。 下图对此进行了说明。 分级的法规监管和商务手段 许可证 商务和法娩监管安排 mi.1 分级的法规监管和商务手段 1.3.1 分组体制的作组 政府负责天然气立法的起草、制定如执有（连同政策说明〉是对 天然气行业重组的一种雄进器。这项立法需要组建监督委员会，作为 对行业进有重组和监管的运行手段。对天然气有业下静雇有政策职责 负责的政府部门〈政府“职能部门”），在听取了监管委员舍的意见 后，将向下潜天然气企业发放必须的第一批许可证。 这些许可证中将包含有关被监管企业的权利和义务的标准条款， 监管委员会将根据被监营企业的许可证申请自由修改这提条款，这种 14 自由当然还要受限于天然气立法中确立的申请过程如程序。 为了履行具体的许可证条款，每个受监管的企业还需怯据法规监 管郭控制多样化的组合，设计出具体的商务安排。对于一个管输企 业，商务安排的内容包括行为规范（确保管输费天然气供应业务的有 效分开），操作娓琼（管理智道系统准入朝使用的业务筑范）和管辘 服务明细表及价目表。 以下两节叙述立法的主要要素并讨论许可证授予体系。 1.3.2 立法的主要要素 国际经验表明，实现对天然气行业的重组需要下列要素： • 白的的陈述； • 在中国政府内部确定一个制定能源政策的职能部门： ’ ’ 监管委员会的组建： 为通过管道系统输送、铺存、配送和花远天然气的业务建立 一王军通过许可证界定的制度； • 授校给琅能部门以便： I> 向监管委员会提供公开的政策捂导； I> 公布许可证标准条款； 各 界定符合直接签署天然气供应合同条件的用户（有资格 的用户）的种类；及 t> 不时地揭赞这一界定。 • 授予委员会瞌管的权力有： t> 发放、修改或撤3肖许可道： 和 对已获得许可嚣的实体进行调查辛苦其是否违规； I> 监控天然气市场的运行’情况，当有证据表明市场极力在 起作用时，对供气合同的谈判进行干预。 1.3.3 许可证发放制度 许可证发鼓制度是使下潜天然气行业发展成有效运行的天然气南 场结构的关键手段。 (i ）许可证的定义及关于许可证的一些限制 • 15 . 天然气法要求管输、储气和配气企业以及天然气托运人每一方都 持有一个许可证，这为行盘带来并操持一个“非一体化结梅”是必要 的，市目前该行业的特点却是…个从天然气供启立〈生产〉、到集气、 净化和长距离运输的铁向一体化。一个被授予许可证的管输企业将为 天然气托边人提供输气服务，而不允许该企业购买、销售或做天然气 贸易，团此它也不可能成为天然气托运人＠。 醒气企业将继揍 i每一些在它有］服务盟内的有资格房户〈和它们的 提运人〉提供一种非描绑式的黠气服务，以及向其他不符合资格条件 的用户提供一种细郡的配气供应提务。这就意味着配气企业许可证的 持有者也可以持有一个天然气托运人的许可证来向其捆绑服务月户供 气。如果一个配气企业决定向其服务区内的有资格用户供成天然气， 则要考虑建立一项分离的天熬气供应业务，这是它告］申请自己作为天 然气托运人的许可证所必须的。 天然气托运人即是腾买、销售或做天然气贸易的任何一方，托运 人需要将天然气从一个地方转运到另一个地方以使交易完成，“天然 气输送”和“天然气托运人”的概念是直接棒随输气、配气〈自然提 斯）和拉发零售供应（操纵袭新〉的分离而来的。一个被授予许可证 的天然气托运人将不被允许拥有或运营运输天然气的管输系统＠。 ( ii ）管输企业许可涯的授予 没有明确要求罔种业务活动的许可证要采照统一的条款，它有可 能包括其他额外的条款，按照具体情况制除或修改一接条款，然而以 一蕃基本的针对某项业务的许可证中出现的有代表性的条款作为起点 还是合理的。为了方便起兑，这套基本条款被称为许可证的栋准条 款。管输许可证的标准条款可以阳为四类，这些分类包摇如下具体的 条款： • 一般性监管条款。 @ 允许购买天然气供自己使用或应付损耗，以及为了系统平衡的怪的购买或销f整天 然气，但那属于它参与天然气交易的范围。 @ 允许也同一个企业对分离的业务板挟持有不同种类的许可证，但监管委员会必须 对两个业务板块分离后的效巢感到满意。 . 16 • t> 定义： t> .提供并保留记录： t> 向监管委员会提供信息； t> 向天然气托运人提供信息： t> 进入的权力； t> 许可证持有人向监管委员会付款； t> 许可证的分躁。 这些条款与提供准入服务的任意管网运营公司（如天然气、水、 电倍和电力）的许可证中出现的条款相类似。要求保留记录并提供信 崽对受监管的行业来说是至关重要的条敖，因为在监管机构所能得到 的信患和被监管企业所掌握的信息之间总是存在严重的不对称，因为 如果需要保证天然气供应的安全性和可靠性的话，安全上没有问题的 天然气管道公司可能会接接子进入校（接入到与它们的管肉相连的消 费者财产上〉。有→牵清晰的程序规定许可证持有者应交的费用，敖 项如何文件及随着时间的撞移这一收费是如何变化的，对许可证持有 者和监督机构都是有科的。监管机构还要盟控许可证的分深以确保竟 争没有受到不适当的摄制或市场权力没有增长。 ·管输服务。 t> 运行规范： t> 管道系统安全标准 E t> 部准的执行。 锋一千许可证持有者都将被要求编制一个运行规则，它将列出规 菇管输服务的业务要求，在北荣这可能类包i于国定输气服务合同的有 代表隘的…般性条件和条款，在英国这可能就成为像管网规则一样冗 长陌复杂的文件。。 管遥远营企业有必要制定出客现的系统安全都准，这些经常被界 定为天然气需求达到高峰时和持载的大需求量时系统的雄气容量。需 。 管网规则的主姿文件包含了 20 几个部分和几百页纸，管网规则的一个综述可以从 W曹w. 衍栩栩心丸础技上下载。 • 17 • 要确定这些标准的凡点理由如下：它1n为运行和投资政策提供了一个 基础；它有］为评结运营企业的执行情况设走了部准；并且它们也为管 道系统的所有用户提供了必须遵循的统一标准。在一些托运人不愿为 维持这些栋准金额支付成本的情况于（因为他们可能满足于一个较低 质量的服务），就有必要强制执有这些标准以确保不会对系统的其俭 用户造成不良影响。 在一些实俯中，监管机梅可能不满意于管输服务合间中确定的足 以去鼓励或强迫管输企业达到高标准2lk绩的奖惩机制。报晓显，解决 办法是确保甜走出足静清曦的合向来达到操作的高标准。然离，特裂 是在与行.!I主建组相关的转型时期，需要监管机梅确定并强制执有标 准，并对没有达到要求的企业进行惩罚。例如，监管机梅可以设定与 运输公司答复服务申请所需花费的时间有关的标准，与通知其系统进 行施工和维棒的程序有关的标？段和与该项工程有关的短供期限积程度 有关的标准。 ’ 管道运价o !> 天然气托运人的运价和运栓的眼制： !> 有关对制定运检方法的责任； !> 连接费。 管道运份的水平和结构都受限于法规，假如采用具有代表性的会 计年度，那么运份的水平可能就要每年调整一次。然而，可能在相当 长的→段时间里管输结构不会有很大的改变旦有关运价结梅存在着广 泛的统一意见。在管输企业提交的运份计算方法初步挺得监督机梅的 挝准后，采用激崩价格监管方式的主要优点之一是监管机构可以就某 一特定时期的运份水平建立正式的监管控制。从理论上讲，这样会削 减法琪的革团和力震，在这段时期里〈通常称为制控制期”），管输企 业有义务将这个活铃保持在监管规定的最高告格之内。不管怎样，如 果它更加密效（如将其成本辞低到监管抗梅预期的水平以下〉，就应 允许被蓝管企业通过降低成本在取额外科竭。 伴瞄着这种蓝管影式，价格控制是作为许可证条款的形式耀走出 来的，并应监管的费力要一直延伸到控制期结束之前，来确定下一个 18 . 期间的份格控制参数并相应地修改许可涯的条款。将解决管输企业接 人政策的许可证条款包括在内也是合理的，否商可能会由于一个“公 共服务义务”（ PSO）被迫问意免费连接位于天然气管道一个特定距 离内的预期的天然气消费者，然而，一个管输企业数迫执行这种公共 服务义务的情况并不经常发生，｛亘在配气企业却比较常见。在多数情 况下，管输企业会想办法从…个新接入的用户那里回牧为连接该用户 商发生的成本，然商连接发生的真实净成本捞及为保证天然吨能输送 给新用户的系统可使黑容量，并与运份的结梅有关。如渠系统有足静 的票i余睿量能确保向新连接的用户输送天然气丽不需要为新接人点的 上静扩容支付额外的资金或运行费用，那么就织会发生接人的路工戚 本。另一方醋，如果需要为新接人点的上带扩容支付额外的资金或运 营费用，那么管输企业就会想办法从新月户那里四收除了接人施工成 本以外的这些费用。 许可证的条款会要求管输企业制定处理这种接人情况的政策〈或 程序〉，政策中将会列出一系列程序来越范： 一一新接入的申请和新接人的施工； …一如街礁定薪接人点上攒发生的额外资金或运行费用（如果 有）： 一一这些费用是如何回收的；以及 一一在确定接人净成本时，是如何将从新接人用户那里获得的额 井边份收入考虑在内的； ’ 管道系统投资。 > 管道的施工； [> 长期发展报告。 从理论及实践角度，很雄证明授予一家管输企业的（冉二个特定 地理区域内或向不同种类的用户或在一个特定时期内或是所有这些的 不同组合）独家赣气权是正当的。事实上，不论从经济角度还是从可 操作性角度，给予现存的管输企业独立建设井边营输气管道的校力是 可行的，另外，政策制定者和监管者都认为通过管输企业来按制市场 力量的作用是一个有效手载。“旁路”｛在巳有的管道系统旁边建一条 19 • 新管道〉的威胁经常被用来迫使不惜嚣的管输企业以一种反映成本的 管道远拚提供非鼓视d隘的准入服务，也在一个较长时期内提供了促进 管道与管道竞争的基础。 管输企业许可证的标准条款的程但j见酣件 2o ( iii ）天然气托运人许可证的授予 并非所有的管辖权都要求授予天然气托运人许可证，然南要求这 样做的两个重要理由如下：第一，授予许可证制度使监管委员会有极 用非拉视和透明的标准来判定所有天然气市场参与方（不托运天然气 的天然气消费者除外）是否适宜。倒如，天然气托运人有权参与制定 由管输企业和配气企业提供的服务的条款和条件，但许可证的条款会 要求需要许可证的天然气挺运人必须执行，候i如： • 遵守提供服务的条款条件： • 及时向管输企业和配气企业提供有关他们服务要求的相关信 息，以便使管输和配吨企业能安金有效地运营他们的管道系 统。 这些条款在商务和合同安排影成过程中是尤为重要的，就像中国 目前的情况，它也许不能证明能及时有效地改善合同，但当一个天然 气托运人违反了许可证条款时，就可授权监管机构去进有调查，如果 这种违反条款的说法被证实了就可立即对这种有为进行严惩。这种授 予监管机构的权力可以保证不吁靠的供应商不被鼓励进入市场。 1.3.4 对其他，支持性政策的要求 除了建立这个监管框架既要求的立法的起草、制定和执行，还要 求制定并执行一些政策，自便有助于立法作用的有效发挥及竞争性天 然气市场的发展。 这些政策包括： ’ ’ 但进本土天然气储量的勘探与开发； 允许新的生产商进入石油勘探和开发行业； • 确保新的生产商如供应商克歧视地进入上带集气管钱如净化 设施： • 清除获取外部天然气供应的障碍 2 • 20 • 确保电力行业的重组相监管不会限制应混合燃料发电方面天 然气的有效使用； ’ 提使与天然气竞争的~器科定街的经济合理性； ’ 促进城市配气企业的公司化改造； @ 完善与城市配气公司有关的键廉、安全、技术标准、环境与 理划方面事务的法撑法规。 1.4 天然气行业的重组 以上所描述的法律法规桂架的建立为现存的（和正在形成中的〉 天然气行业的重坦提供了基础，天然气衍业的重组又是向竞争性的天 然气市场转型的需要。然而建立这个桂架是要花费一些时峙的， f旦开 始向竞争性的天然气市场转嚣的进程是不能延误的，如果延误就会距 碍天然气在使用方菌的十分必要的扩张，并可能陷入一种使天然气行 业在组织和行为方面业已存在的低效事得到巩固并长久地存在下去的 危险境地。下面两个小节讨论对天棋气行业进有重组的特险，这种章 程可能是行业自身发趣的，也可能是有足够力最来拾行这种改革的主 要内容的政府机构发起的 D 1.4.1 上潜与下潜的分开 首要的关键问题是在净化厂的出口处将上潜生产、集气相净化业 务与下静的运输秸配气~务分开。 天然气生产商的主要职责是将符合管输质量要求的天熬气交付到 管输系统的入口处，一般认为管输系统的人口与净化厂的出口是在向 一地点，这种分开使天熬气集气管线中未经赴踵的天然气和捋合管输 质蠢要求的天然气之间形成一个清新的界段。在存在多个气四、生产 商或供应商的情况下，确定天然气管输系统人口的位置是有意义的， 这将为天然气交易如所有权的转移提供应分点。 1 栩 4.2 商务安排Z主持关的规花 需要解决并制定的一些主要的组织问题租商务安排，已经在上面 的 1.2 节中提割了，如操作规期和管遵运铃规射。这些商务安排最终 . 21 • 将受眼于法规的监管与法珑的控制。在法娟的监管和控制之间不可能 进行精磷地区别，但有必要对这种区别做一些解释。新有的商务安排 最初都是出受监管的企业起草的，并提交给监管机构批准。如果监管 机构没有被授权或选择了不直接干预，但又需要他｛口批准和就某些特 殊问题发表意觅，就会形成法规茧管。在其他情况下，监管机持将就 受监管企业提交的商务安排做出有约束力的决策，这时就会产生法规 控制。这经常发生在对管遥远街水平及所提供的服务的股量与特性进 行监管的情况下。 这种受器是于法规，蓝管或法规控髓的主要商务安排已在先前的《中 医下游天然气经济监管报告》。中进行过讨论，在本章中有关监管技 术的部分在阳件 3 中又提了出来，它许论了主要商务安排，郎 ’ 保证输吨业务与供应业务有效地分开； . 量 、J 在分离南属于一个公司的两个业务板块时，经常通过一 个行为规划的应用将其分开。 省g定王若管道系统准人的条件与条款有关的业务施落和程序； .J 通常被称为操作规赔（在美E曾被称为一般条件与条款〉。 对所提供的管输服务进行定义： .J 这个内容通常在管输服务协议中列出。 对这些离务安排制定过程中出现的一些问题的讨论见陆件 3o 1.5 管输服务的定义 适当的管道运价设计需要对进行收费设计的服务有一个清晰的定 义。有可能列举出用于指导管输服务定义的元数个原则，然而下一小 节讨论的非歧视原划包含了所有其他的原则，并被应用于诗姑从一个 捆郡的一体化输气、储存和供应服务肉分离的每种单项服务转型的含 义。 @ 中国长距离管道和城市就气管网的经济监管，由世界银行、中因思务院体改办经 济体制与管理研究所和基础设施咨询服务基金子 2002 年 8 月联合究成。 • 22 • 1.5.1 非歧视的原则 对于受jj监管的服务，非歧挠原则适用于对其定义和定价。“i攻 翻”这个词如此频繁地民一种吸义词被使用井已被撞踊 jJ失去了它原 有的意义，以至于接快就失去了它应有的准确性和有效性。尽管非歧 视原赔还没有丢失它词义的关键部分，但却有必要对这一术语的使用 作一些说萌。 对于受监管的服务，可能会区别出两种类型的歧视一一允许的歧 视和不允许的歧视。不允许的歧视最常接用来描述不适当的如不公正 的歧视，由于虽而易见的原因，它引起了更多的在意；不允许的或视 是指对于受监督的业务，控啤让一个用户进入、限制用户的使用或增 如向用户收取的服务成本的任何行为或不为行为，而类似的限制却没 有用于其他用户。有必要让服务在数量、质最或戚本上的任何盖到都 建立在客观的有可识别的基础上，先诗的歧视和不允许的歧视的定义 是与这项要求相联系的。如果这样的一种基础得到了证实，那么这种 歧视就可能被视为是先许的了。 在管输有业早期的非捆绑阶段，引起有关就提指挂的主要原因是 管输业务板块与相关的（或甜属的）供服业务板块之间的不适当（或 被断定为不适当）分离。以前作为一体化的管辖业务可能会阻止与它 的相关供应业务形成竞争进市减少其市场份额的天然气托运人的进 入，或自其相关供应业务毅块提供比其他托运人更钝惠的条件。其方 式从通过提供劣鼓的或高价的服务直接拒绝进入，到肉其供应业务板 块提供有关天然气托运人保密的营销信息。 即使是在服务的数量、贯主建或成本之l泻的差别有客满的和可识别 的基踞的情况下，托运人想要找出理由指控管输业务歧视也并不国 难。在许多情况下，这将棋运输公司确信有必要将管输业务租供应业 务街底分开，并为每项业务在战略上和管理上制定一个适当的中心， 以避免陷入元体止地法律纠翁。它还同时鼓励管输企业提供标准化的 管输服务并使它们完全透明。在一些居家，有关的定份和服务制度已 经被提升到原则的高度，但在多数’情况下，是为了防止出现不允许的 歧视。挺进管输系统的梧互连接租共商操作是诙等“原赔”的一个例 • 23 • 子。阻止或推迟原先相互未连接的管输系挠的相互连接是一种睦止或 推迟托运人进入的有效办法。与此相提假，在管输系统的相互连接方 嚣，在技术和操作标准或天然气魏格方式达不成一致意见，也是一种 拒绝和摄制进入的方法。这两个例子都属于不允许的歧槐。 当然，如果向每一个托运人提供服务的成本存在差异，就允许智 输企业在托运人之间就枉校的费用采用“歧视”性政策。需要强调的 是，只有当管输业务如供应业务之间严格地分离时，才能证明这种 “歧祺”是合理的。 1.5.2 输气和供应的一体化 在考察非摧绑〈管输和供应分离情况下的）服务的定义之前，有 必要对捆绑服务做一些回顾，这有助于澄清非捆绑的含义。 自 1.2 纷出了在管输与供虚捆掷方式下，是如何对天然气的供应 与需求进行管理，以便向需求负荷期间曲线相匹配的。 宵。V 因幅叙察囚段 11427 40 53 66 7992105llBL'l1441 吕7170 183196 209 222 2362毒83612712•7"台0313 326339 及边在揭 时间（d) 自 1.2 管输供应捆绑下的负荷期限曲镜 这个需求负荷期间曲线是由国定需求和可中断需求（天然气的供 应~可中断为基础〉组成的。为系统设计和操作哥的，需求负荷期间 掏钱通常是按照在摄端需求情沮下的可能性估计的，这些极端的需求 情况是提据高略目需求盘和高峰需求期间来确定需求量并且是按照典 型的，恶劣天气情况考虑的。管遵容最水平是按照最大固定需求〈或高 • 24 • 峰日需求）设计的，对于某些系统，它的需求负荷系数（事均每日 求量除以高峰臼需求主意〉远远超过管道容最水平的 50% ，通常按照 或接近高峰际困定需求最来设计。对于其他一些需求最荷系数锻于或 刚好达到 50% 的系统（如程例中说明的），策略性的考虑是设置一些 液化天然气储罐＠，在高峰期注人系统，可以替代有限天数内〈如 5 ～ 10 天〉的管输容量。 吕标是最大限度地利用所提供的管输容最。通过最假眼度地减少 所提供的管输容量〈例如使用上述方法）可以达到这个目标，在可i可 断基础上销售天然气也王可以达到这个自郁。当堕定需求的水平下降， 管辖容景是可获得的，在可中断基础上销售天然气可以充分利屑管输 容量。 不管怎样，这是与天然气的戚本和储气的成本紧密相关的。生产 商或供应商提供的在管输系统人口处的天然气成本将趋向于直接随着 这种供应的波动部变动，这种供应的提动是需求鱼荷系数的倒数，它 被定义为最大每日主意黠以平均每日量（年合同量除以 365 天〉，这种 接功越大，单位成本就越南。在吁中酣基础上销售天然气，在高i璋需 求期间使用储存的天然气井在非高峰期重新将储罐注满将会减少供应 搜动的幅度，由此减少天然气单位成本飞 储气也为全年在平衡和运行上提供了调节余地，以便解决不可琐 期的供应短缺或需求量增如。在运输与供应捕魏方式下，可 lU 根据储 气设施的成本和特性以及可中新供气合同的条款来确定是否需要起用 储气设施来支持可中斯供气需求。在自 1.2 中，可中晰的供气是在引 人储气设施前就巴结束。不管怎样，如果错气设睡在高路需求时期格 近时已悻满了气I主运臂高对储气设施中有足够的天然气来满足高峰期 需求充满信心的话，他可能会选择用锚气设施中的天然气继赣冉一些 。 在英国，瘤子将天然气在非高峰期液化、储存并在高峰时输送出去的液化天然气 设施位于管输系统的来端。在其他国家一些储气设施也用子类似鼠的。 @ 这些错气设施和其他那接托运人可以自行决定注气和辈革气的储气设施之间的差异 是 TSO 必须控制液化天然气的使用输出以支持管输系统，受储存容盘、供应能力、注入和 提气方商的具体条件和技术条件的限制，所有的其他储气设施都应能提供非捆绑的储气服 务。 • 25 • 或所有吁中断用户供气。另外，为了保证供应的安全性，可能会建设 超出运蕾计划要求的储气设蝠，这部分容量也可能被用来支持可中断 用户的供应飞 1.5.3 业务分离的原国 1.5.2 节中需要描述了关于管输和储气容量的提供与结持、管输 和锚气系统的运营以及天然气魏买和供应完全是一体的系统。从一种 纯粹的工程或技术角度者，这种一体化水平是十分合理的；然商从经 济的角度看，它存在着严寰的缺陷，茵为这种一体化不允许由市场的 力量〈由多个供应商和买家互动形成的力量）来决定供应的和消费的 天然气数量。 正如在报告“中国天然气价格形成”中讨论的那样，天然气价格 形成机制的同种主要方式是趋向于采用天然气供应、输送和营销系统 一体化的、摆绑的模式。第一种是市场价值定拚法，在这一方法中要 确定终端用户的价格，该街格尽可能地接近用户愿意支拧的水平。这 就在天然气供应链上产生了假效及超额（不应得的）利润好障制了在 提供给终端用户的服务质景和菇圈方韶进行改革和选择。第二种方法 的终端价格是基于按黑成本如成法制定的井口骨，这种方法造成最终 消费和投资上的扭曲，并且也眼制了改革和选择。国际能验表明这些 缺陷的不利影响超过了自业务一体化带来的器由经济。 对这些不利影替自理解曲不踏增强以及在计算机和信息技求方面取 得的重大进步〈降低交易成本）己经激崩决策者进行天然气行业重 组，特别是在营输行业逐步引人竞争。天然气有]I:: 的发展带段~及为 它建立一个适宜的、永久性的法律法豌挺架的进程可能会影嘀引人竟 @ 在许多欧洲国家，为了保证供应的安全性建设了大容景的储气设施。随着时间的 推移，欧盟成员国依赖国外供应商（如阿尔及科泼、俄罗斯、挪威和利比亚）供应天然气 的依赖性越来越强并且还将继续稽强。这个额外部储存容盘就在这些气源中的一个或几个 持续停供时使用。然而在许多情况下，来自这个额外灼储气设施的天然气被整年用于供应 可牛所天然气。滔此，就能在…个稳定的基础上有效地向技术上为河中断的大用气簸用户 供气，大用气最用户京受了一个价格可以与王震燃料：自竞争的几乎稳定的供气，这样运输公 司能保持销傻蠢，增加型号求负荷系数并获得一个较低的天然气单位成本。像石f防产品价格 变化…样，大用气逢周户支付的价格趋向于围绕实际供应成本变化，但所有其他用户支付 的价格则都高于实际的供应成本。 • 26 • 争的速度。另外，大墨慕端设搞攻自谨镇的、注重实效的风声言分盟与 管理（如西气东输项目），可能会在项目的早期开发如实施阶段引导 投资者在天熬气供应链上寻求一个朝对高水平的纵向及横向一体化， 因政策制定者通常也会对此让步。 承认可能存在减援引人竞争速度的菌素并不能证明新建的和已有 的管输系挠采取一体化方式就是正当的。一体化在最辑被认为是必要 的，这有助于天然气行业的发展及扩张，然而，持键的一体化会产生 “既得利益”，它不利于竞争性天然气市场的兴起并拒绝了由此带来的 能化嚣的经济效益。正如联合工作组〈川吧。〉报告中推罪的，应立 即采取措施妇j联哪些业务是可以引人竞争的并开始为它的引人创造条 件，这些措施的实行要伴随着适当的法禅法规程架的建立。 下一小节考虑了自一个管输和供应一体化的公司从事不向种类的 业务并判斯： . • • 1.5.4 受眼于法规监管措施，在嘴些方面可以较快地白人竞争； 在哪些方面无期隐地受限于法规控制； 在嘴些方面将最如受眼于法规控制，妇随着时间的推移将寻 i 人受限于法规监管的竞争。 业务与服务分离 在以前的讨论中， 5 种主要的运辅导错存…体化业务日被明确： ’ ’ 输气容蠢的提供和维持； 错气容量的提供与维持； • 在系统人口处瞬买天然气井在提气点供应天然气来保证系统 中棋需之间持续的平衡与诗润；连罔 ’ 在确保维护系统安全性和完整性的同时，以一种使系统的天 然气输入与输出保持平衡的方式来运营管输系统；及 ’ 支持前两项业务的错气设施的运营。 在分离的过程中，第一个关键步辘是从储运设施的提供、雄护和 运营中将天然气购买和天然吨供应分开，达到这一吕标的方法已经在 。 见前言中的注脚。 ‘ τ1 上面的第 1.3.2 节中讨论过了，在这个阶段依然认为其他四项业务还 是一体的。 正如第 1.4.2 节中提到的，要求制定具体的商务安排来确保在这 种分离之后管输系统能有效地发挥作用，这些具体的商务安排将典型 地依据运行规则来制定，这搓运行规则将包括如下关键性商务特征以 便使天然气管输企业提供非捆缆式的运辅导储气服务： (1 ）必须允许管输提供者（丁P ）向天然气捂运人定义并分配管 输权（并且在理想情况下，这挫权利应该是可以转让的，以 确保有效地费用）： (2 ）所有的托运人必须一致闰意道守安全标准，管输提供者有责 任达到在投资运输容量和俄储气容量方面的任何共同安全 标准； (3 ）天然气托运人必须向管输系统运营商（ TSO）及时通知他们 摇定的输入输出章，要求的输入输出必须符合他们的输气权 且必缆遵守 TSO 的输气计划和安排； (4 ）挖运人必须提供一些输入输出的灵活性（或建立一个与 TSO 有关的机制以确保这种灵活性），以便使 TSO 能确保 系统安全性如完整性得以维护；并且 (5 ）丁so 和托运人必须制定一种程序并且要达成一致意见，以 便解决气流（通过 TSO 计量）的计划与实际之间的不平衡。 前面的两点与容量的提供、维护和分配有关；盾商王点是关于托 运人利用容量来确保管输系统安全有效地运行。这一组特点将管输提 供者和管输系统运营商的作用区别开来，通常这些功能会…直保持作 为…个整体直到一蜡受限于法姆拉制的输气和储气的分离措施完成。 一般来说，这种情况会持续到分离过程的第二个步骤。 紧随分离的初始阶段和销气业务的分开，储气服务能够出一个垄 新的实体提供，结果是他们也将受到与管辖系统闰种类型的法规控 醋。随着时间的推穆，当锚气服务的价值与提供这项服务的其他可选 择建径相比更如明确时，法规控制的程度就将被削弱。竞争服务包含 新错气设施，在天然气生产方面波动的增加以及大用气璧用户的自行· • 28 • 中断。 与 TP 和丁部分离有关的第三阶段的分离可能要花些时间，但 已经被很好地建立起来的非捆绑式的管输企业却在日益增加。在这种 情况下，就容量的确定、分配和定价市言， TP 将雄续受法规的控制， 但只要…个功能完备的、获得一致同意的运营规则一出台，丁so 就 将只受到法规的盟管。 北美管道公甫的一般条件和条款（等问于运行规划〉的范例可以 参见睛件 4o 1.5.5 固定的容堂权 管输企业（罔样适用于现有的管辑企业和像西气东输这样的新项 目）的主要作用是提供符合托运人要求的输气容量。其恤商家的经瞌 表明固定容量权是发展竞争的先决条件。消费者和供应方自然不愿意 签订骂法保证交付前合间。因此，这样的保证对所有第三方交易（这 种交易通常属于短期合问〉都是必要的。怎样在天然气托运人中界定 并分配这些容量校将决定提供服务的帮障和需要设计的运份种类。 为此，需要考虑 Pl 下四个问题： • 现有容量的分程； • 新容蠢的获得及定价； @ 剩余容量的确定与分配； ’倍怠披露的要求。 下面对上述每个问题依次做些分析。 (i ）现有容擎的分配 对于现有的管输系统，可以使用不同的机制来授权使用可用的管 道容量，包括“先到先服务”的政策、结签或不离类型的拍卖。从效 率、才在歧视和促进竞争角度，这些方案的吸引力还取决于现行的市场 条件＠。这些可埠方案将在附件 5 中更全面的综述，酣件 5 也讨论存 。 在某接情况下，方法的选择并不爱耍。如果输送容露并不缺乏，通常可以做到输 送容攘的有效分配。在这种情况下，所关注的目标是输送军事髦的价格具有竞争性和公平性。 但是，按照中国天然气消费的增长趋势，输送容盘将会出现不足。输送管线之间的有效究 争，也可以确保输送容寰的有效和公平分配，但对中国近年来不会有什么影响。 • 29 . 在活跃的二级管道容量市场的益处。 如来容量短缺并且不存在管道之闰竟争的话，那么现有容量的分 配就可能出现效事链和俄歧视的危险。活跃的容量极二级市场的存 在（像附表 5 讨论的那样〉最终能使容盘有效地分缸，但却不能防止 容量在走份上的歧视或解决在容量市场中的市场权力问题。在这种情 况下，分配存量权中所使用的方法就~关重要了。 每一种方法都有它的结点租缺点，优缺点的比蠢试具体的市场条 件：可不阿。“先到先服务”方法在市场发展的早期有不利的方醋，但 这可以通过建立一个“开放期”得到解决。如果能够采取严格的安全 擂施来防止槛用，建议采用担卖的方法而不是抽装。一旦市场发育完 全，这些方法都是可以考露的。 在容量缺乏的基础上，管输企业或有权拒绝进入管输系镜。但 是，一个由于缺乏管输容量商拒绝进入它的系统的管输企业，应该将 支持它的容量搪塞的证据公开，并且应当做必要的投资〈假定进行这 种投资在经济上是合理的和俄托运人愿意支付费用）。容攀枝的最树 分配议及对提供额外的酣定睿蠢的相关要求，如果被证明在满足系统 进入需求方面是低毁的，就可槌要求在现有的容量拥有者中提行“不 使用即失去”。此外，监督’部门应该对最近签署的可能企图防止剩余 容量产生的长期合同进行密切监视。 ( ii ）使用新容盘及新容量的定份 为了保证投资适当地提前进行，在如始容量的捷用接近可供使爵 的总景时，就成该制定有关系统扩容的计划。在这→所载，应该允许 新的托运人在一个固定基础上按照与现有托运人完全一样的条件预定 …部分这样前新增容量。这可能并不简单。 ～手投认为，这种额外容最增加的成本低于初始容量。的成本 （在每单位的基础上），因此，有人会争议，寂得这种额外睿壁的容量 。 情况并不总是这样警由于规模经济的影响，管输企业可以较低的单位成本增加容 囊，并允许智输企业在相当长的…段时间里这样傲。但是，最终这些规模经济不再发挥作 用，新增容盘成本将会等于或高于原有的成本水平（考虑过渡期技术进步对成本影响的调 整）。 . 30 • 权的运份Jil低于在得最初的容最权的运份，这被称为新容量的“新增 定价”。 然市，在大多数情况下，新增容擎较低的增量成本却是糠自初始 容最扩张的规模经济。如果没有却始容量的拥有者的初始投资，也就 不会有新增容量较低的增盘成本，因此，如果初始容量的据有者不能 从管输容盘的扩容中得到任何好处，就是不会平的。此外，由于是作 为更大的系统（这个系统属于单一的系统运营商〉的一部分，新增容 量可能会具有更高的使用价谊，初始容量的拥有者由于先许使用他钉 拥有的容量来增加新增容量的价锺商成获得样摆。很难在原有的和新 增的容量权的拥有者之间将成本和利益最化并分配。因此，为了对初 始投资的系统使用者进行补偿，重新平衡管道运份是有道理的，这样 就出现了一个比初始运价低但均由新增戚本算出的运价高的平均运 价，被称为“滚动”定价。 当一个以市场为基础的分配新增容量权的体系与一个活跃的容量 极二级市场建立起来后，就可能对新增容量采用“增盘”定价。随着 上述安排趋于完善，“摇动”定份就成为像一可行的选择。。 ( iii ）乘i余容量的确认和分配 非歧视原鹏和确保管输企业执行琦藤有的和新增的固定容量分配 的有关义务，要求管输企业只要有可使用的容景就应提供。回此这个 要求每含着这样一种义务，郎一旦有可使用睿最，就必须出让剩余的 固定容量。 剩余容量的分配是至关3重要的。剩余容量发生的情况包括当合问 期满时，或当用户选择更换义务供应商。原有容量拥有者在任何情况 下都不享受特殊优惠待菇，如权利自动更新或卒有“第一挺绝权’！来 更新合同。 基本的要求是，当一个与管输企业有联系的供应商的用户选择更 换供应商时，管横企业截然提供所嚣的管输容量。不能期望用户的天 然气消费总量会增如。所有其能方面都保持不变，“剩余”容蠢的形 @ 输气系统的按人成本将在本报告的后面章节中单独讨论。 ’ 31 • { 成只是由于用户决定更换义务供应商。一般认为这种情况在市场开敖 早期会经常出现，对于例外情况的要求只有在极特殊情况下才被允 许，并且要求管输企业提供详细的支持证明。 这瑕义务的一个重要组成部分是关于每个系统中与固定容量权目 前的或未来的分配有关的信息公开。 。的信息披露的要求 首先是要求管输企业应全苗、详锚地披锺管输容量使用情况历史 的和当前的数据。以前的容量使用情况为结计现在和未来的使用情况 及预割乘i余容量的可使用情况提供了…个基础。这样的基础有助于第 三方和监管者监督对资期容量的利用存在任向过高估计的企图。如果 颈醋的容量使用情况与以前的使用情况差距悬殊，就要求管输企业提 供客混的理由。在可能捞及商业敏感信患的地方，只应该对监管者或 解决纠捞的部门按露倍患，但是，在其他d情况下，或在这些部门认为 不梅成敏感商业信息时，企业就应向公众披露。 关于现在和未来容量使用的信息可能在西方即具有商业敏感性。 下商举例予自说明。 倒→，某一新进入的供应离正在与一个原有义务供应菌的房户谈 判，并要求从梧关管输企业取得国定容量。如果这一倍，患被传递到原 有义务供应商，将剌激采取掠奇’性定份，阻止用户转向新供应离。解 决这一问题最有效的办法就是执行输送业务与供气业务在法律上的完 全分离。然雨，在这两项业务还没有完全分离的情况下，有力地执行 《行为兢期》也可能有效士在避免商业敏感信息的争论。 候j二，某制造商计划扩大其某一工厂的经营规模，西南要求其供 应商贾留为未来蔚增的容量，但他不愿意将其扩建计提透露给他的竞 争对手，自此管输企业应只公布数据指出是哪一个时段及目前就那一 时鼓分配的理定容量，而这些容量持有人的身份是没有必要公庸的。 英脑在这方醋的实践就是一个很好的倒子。管输企业 Transco 公 布可蹄输气容量的详蝠信息，包括每年公布的“十年规划”，对未来 十年输气容量的扩容情况做出预期，它也给第三方提供计算就程序， 使得第三方可以模拟天然气管输容量并对可能出现的限制做出班测。 • 32 • 1.5.6 可中断或“即期”服务 对所葫定的自定容量的使用会随时间推移发生较大变化，这反挟 了天然气供应与蠕求之间的按动。这种波动是很难预踢的，因此需要 预留一些圈定容量，这些预留容主意在某些时接是民霞的。这峰数量可 观徨数量不定的闲景容茧的存在，使得主运输公司豫了满足眉宽容主意 权，还可以提供短期的吁中新〈即期）服务。经验表明，天然气鼓销 商对这种服务非常感兴趣，并且可以提高辑送容蠢的利用率和市场的 琉动性。 (i ）可中睽服务的意义 短期的可中断服务可以从多方fili能进竞争。首先，它有利于天然 气现货市场的发展。如果没有可中断服务，各市场参与方只能从现货 交蜀中得到商定容量权。如果容量市场还不是非常完善，在短期内就 银难迅速得到所需要的容量。因此，短期的可中晰服务对于现货市场 的发展是非常重要的，现货市场日出现在其他国家。 其次，如果能够获得这种超摆容蠢，可以减少那些为了降雨竞争 风险而蓄意盟职空闲容量的行为。如果没有短期的可中断服务，睦积 容量就会主运碍其它各方有机会使用这部分容量。即使市场中有围棋容 量的枉为，可中惭服务的存在将为各方提供使用运输系统的另一种手 段，这将使进空闲容量在二级市场的交易并提高了市场的提动性。 第三，如前所述，提棋可中断服务可 ITT 踉轻各方民对可用固定容 嚣的衡量存在争议市带来的负面影响。例如，由于已签约用户的全部 容量在需求高峰时期全部都使用了，管道企业将拒绝璀键提供其他进 入服务，这就可能引起争端。那些寻求进入的用户可能蛙议接受这种 决定，解决争端的过程相当复杂：由于双方对需求高梅时期的署法不 间，他们将梅出可用容盘的不同估荠站果，而且他们琦于可以承受的 输送容量的眼减量也存在不同的意见。义务供!JI商可能会提出不承担 任何风险的条件，即坚持他不能向一位新加入的客户提供固定的进人 权除非窑户百分之百的肯定这个固定容量去绝对不会中新，同时新如人 的客户可能建议一些较小但并非为零的风险是可以接受的。可中断服 务的提供可以最大眼皮地搞少这种纠纷。如果寻求进人的一方按说服 • 33 . 飞 在管道中有足够的辑余容量，那么它就会闰意购买可闰断容最陌不是 由定容量，因为它可能无法预翻到重大的中断。 这种避免纠铃的形式可以通过下述方式得到改进，那确保中断的 原因是透明的、在现的和容易被各方证实。通过按中断的可能性不同 提供多种可中断服务，也有助于保证对中断有校大捏’妮的用户比对中 断不太提心的用户获得供气位先权。要每买中断可能性较高的服务支付 较少的服务费事但是会比购买中断可能性较低的服务先中联供气，这 样的安排存在于天然气市场和电力市场。 ( ii ）实践中的可中断供气服务 由于可间断租其他翠期服务班倒造的拚值，可以设想在一个竞争 的市场中据有固定容量的离家将十分乐意提供它们，语此，在一个完 全成熟市场中，在那里固定容量权可以户泛地获得以及可自在活跃的 二级市场中交易，是没有必要要求提供可间断供气服务的。要组买固定 容量的第三方自然有动力提供接近于替代可中断服务的短期服务，因 此，在有活跃的容量权二级市场的地方，与这样的第三方竞争就意味 着管输企业没有理由再保留可中惭服务，并a旦会窍觉主动地以市场价 提供服务。 然而，为了在中国达到天然气行业政策目择，应要求管输企业在 内完全竞争市场的转型过程中提供吁中踏供气服务，直到一个活跃的 工锻容蠢市场的兴起，管道企业才有动力拒结提供可中断服务。 在这个转盟阱段提供短期吁中晰服务的义务也是从提供非歧视服 务的要求商来的，短期可中断服务通常可以隐含地ffl于主人羁于管输企 业的供应企业，对西气东辑项目来说就是挠…销售公司，如果合资公 司的参句方对容量有一令在短期基础上的不可预蜒的需要，银明显， 管输企｝｛主将提供这一容量。在这种情况发生的地方，非歧视的原则就 要求智输企业内其他黑户也提供相间的可中断摄务直到一个活跃的二 级市场的兴起来确保相同的服务也会提供给其他各方。 不管怎样，只有当预定了足够的目定容盘来保证提供固定管输服 务的成本得自回收时，提供可中醋管输服务的要求才能被提出。 ( iii ）吁中踹Bil务的分配和定拚 • 34 • 由于可中酣服务能被拥有容量权的商家以竞争的方式在天然气市 场中提供，那么就需要辑程它的价格。然而在转塑时期，如果可中断 供气服务的收费价格不受监管，管输企业就可以从中赚取辈斯科润， 为此就应由监管就槐确定i在费价格并定出收费的最高上限。可中醋服 务的最钝价格应定在提供这项服务的成本（等于为或发生的可变成 本）和固定容量服务价格之间。原员t 上，应通过应用“拉姆其定拚 (R缸nsey pricin ＠的经济原理芦定确切的最拢份格，然离事实上由 于所要求的信患而无法采用。所以允许管道自主定扮是符合逻辑的， 但更有商个约束条件：一是最离限椅，另一个是收入分配机制，向 lifil 定容蠢持有人分配出售可中断服务嫌取的净收入中的绝大部分。 国，一般要求管道运营商将由售可中斯服务收入的 90% 分配给留定 容量持有人。 最高限拚是为了防止滥收费＠，由于耳中惭用户并不主要求管道系 统扩容，因此可中监号容量比国走容量在计价时应事受一个折扣。在留 给管输企业一搓提供可中断服务的财政激励政策的同时，收入分配机 制避免了管道企业的收费过度并将可中酣服务利润引向拥有自定容嚣 的高家。由于倍息上的不对称使得我们提难确定…个管输企业是否将 它所有的来使用管输容量靠出来供使用，财政激励政策就是必不可少 的。牧人分配机制也为固定容量的拥有者提供了额外吸引力，从而有 动力确保管输企业提供可中新服务。 收入补偿机制也能防止可中惭服务定价方醋的歧视。如果管输企 业向所有花运人〈包摇它的关联供应企业〉收取的运拚离子可变或 本，服务的成本就是册有托运人偿付的运价，但对于关联供应企业来 说仅仅是个转移，这种拧款的转移经常在关联方之间发生，并且会计 ！席会将固定的管理费用和资本费用在这些交易之间分配，但是从任济 角度，合并公司幸运用剩余管输容量的唯一成本是短期可变成本。在这 @ “拉姆其定价”是一种由于需姿回收固定成本，边际成本定价方法不切实际的情况 下确定价格的方法（或更一般地说，就是筹集超出边际成本的资金，例如，在税收优化理 论中它首先被应用）。在拉姆其定价法下，遂过对需求援缺乏弹性的那些产品或服务设定箴 高的价格←一成本加成，固定成本以最小限度的经济失真进行回收。 @ 设定最高限价应被作为一个在活跃的二级市场成熟之前转型过程中的措施。 • 35 • 种情况上，拥有管道和其相关企业单位的公词使用耳中新服务的戚本 显然低于第三方，并且这将引起琦其他托运人的歧挠。不管怎样，收 人分配机制确保管擒企业收取的支付给它的关联供应企业的费用不仅 仅是一种件款转移。这种收入分配机制可以在非歧揽的基础上向拥有 圈定管输容量的离家分配吕定成本回收中的绝大部分。 一个有效的短期可中断服务要求定期公开有关容建可使用的信 息，上前提到的有关商定容量权的问样的兢点谁适用于这里。 2主义务 供应商占有这部分信患时，披露该信息的义务就出非歧视的原则雨 来，它与用来证明拒组进入是正当的信息条款是一致的，也与内管输 和配气企业提供是够的倍，息来保证管输系统的有效使用的条款是一致 的。再者，援露信息要以避免泄露商务敏感信息的方式进行，递过将 倍息限制在仅披露可使用容量的总量可以达到这个目的。 总之，可中断管输服务的发展是市场开放和引人气与气竞争的重 要方面，即使要求提供吁中期管输服务的潜在可能性没有立即出现， 也有必要确保建立的商务和合间安排不会妨碍将来这种服务的提供。 …旦预定了足够的自定容量以确保合理的成本回收，并且新的供 应商进入了市场，提供可中断输气服务的潜在可能性就将出现。给定 管输系统的运营商占有的高质量的信息，对于管输企业提供这项服务 能够有更好的理解（如上睡提到的〉。然雨，受系统运营商孰行的计 划安排的限制，托运人可能准费在他们之间建立一个非正式的场外交 易（ OTC），信息发布的要求将随兴起的服务本踵的不同富有所不间。 1.6 有关嚣恰设计基础的结论 以许可证为基础的监管方式提供了一个在中国制定法规监管和商 务安排的有效的适宜方法，该法规监管和商务安排在北美的运价规期 或蓝管规则中进行了详细说明。 战照如下次序，逐步将分析的焦点过接到管道远街的设计： @ 建立监管杭构和许可证制度的主要立法； • 许可证条件的定义和许在1证揭发放；以及 • 制定商务安排，以便将 36 > 管输与供应业务分开，以及 > 提供管输服务的运行规则或一般条件与条款。 如果没有一个清断的适用于管道运价设计的法律和监管框架作指 导，管道远扮设计不可能有效地进行。 卒报告中建议的方法和描述的管道运份设计是与法律法规监管植 架及在平先联合工作组（ JWG）报告＠中提出的和在本章中总蓓的 法规监督和商务安排相适应的，这就使运街规则必续把重点放在运份 设计的原则和自替上，下一章将讨论这些问题。’ :•/' ,. @ 兑童在言中的注脚。 • 37 • 第二章 定价规则的原则 本报告所定义的“运褂规则”用于确定西气东输项白的输气价格 设计和储气价格设计的原则、商标剧所采用方法的某些适当特点。琦 于如何将这一兢则应用于现有的运输系统也将给予关注。本章介绍了 定价规则中应包括的原腾、目挥幸口适当的特点。 2.1 远椅设计藤则 正如前面的 1.5 节庆述，这份设计的最高原期就是无歧视原翔。 这意味着如果离个经销商接受完全相同的服务，就应该支持阿样的赞 格。如果管输企业对每个经销商采用不同的价格，就被视为不免许 〈或不适当）的i歧视的首要证据。确保价格反映成本，可以最有效地 避免这种不被允许的故挠。换句话说，无故挠原周的应用要求债格反 映管辖企业在为经销商提供服务时所发生的成本。这一原则（和相应 的成本配比要求）就是详细论述运份设计目标的基础。 2.2 运价设计目标 天然气输送具有自然垄断性。因此，为了保障公共利益，防止在 市场上招有垄断地位的管道业主滥用其垄断权， f普续进行管制＠。管 制的目的是替代天然气市场竞争，以实现以下目标： 首先，产品的总生产量是有效率的。当用户所消费的最后一个单 位产品的价值等于其拚格，当所生产的最后一个单位产品的戚本等于 其边际成本时，社会总剩余达到最大。这通常草靠为“资、源盟置效E蒋” 其次，所生产的产品盖在用户之词合理地进行分配。这型产品仅 @ 这一问题曾经被广泛讨论，在联合工作组报告的第一置在做出建议。参见报告《中 国长输管道夭然气运输及城市天然气就送的经济管制》，没界银行、中国商务院体改办经济 体制与管理研究所和基础设施咨询服务基金会， 2002 年 8 月。 • 38 • 在那些支付意愿离子产品价格的黑户之间分醒。这濡常称为“分配效 率”。 第三，总生产成本最抵。每个生产商都足最降假其生产成本，生 产商数最适当，目此，每一单位产品以最保平地或本生产。，这通常称 为“成本或生产效率”。， 2 2.2.1 资费、分配效率 难以实现资摞分E效率通常与垄路普及存在市场权力有关。垄斯集 圈可以将价格提高到边际价格之上，容户的支付意嚣也超过了边陆成 本，这降低了社会总剩余，但撞断集团由于其所占社会总剩余位比例 提高而获得了要多曲利益。 在管道运输价格设计中，面；榻的挑战是如何管制份格使它接近长 期边际成本（ L她在C）。北美的管制经验表明，~·管道运输份格等于 其长期边际成本时，投资凹援可能高于市场水平。然而，…些花美院 研究试厨证明管道输送船长期边际成本句长期平均成本比较接近。 为了实现资源配置效事，某类服务价格和不同地区的价格应尽量 基于其成本定铃。 2.2.2 用 P 分配效率 这牵挂梦到在短期内，将来自管闷的一定数蠢的产品在管网所服务 客户之间进行分配。当分配这些产品使它对赂户的价佳达到最大时， 就实现了用户分配效率。 运街设计问题在于平衡解决这一事实：一方商不国的管两用户认 为输送服务给它衍制造不同的价链，另一方面管商管制遵锚的基本公 众利益原赔要求对接受同等条件输送服务的所有人牧取衙样的街格。 为了实窥公平，避免不适当的歧视，各天熬气运输公司应该是指 互魏立的合同执行方，他们根据合闰条款为购买输送睿髦的用户提供 服务，民有效撞实现供需平衡，即实现用户分阻效率。。 。 报告中对此问题将作进一步详细讨论。 • 39 • 2.2.3 生产效率 生产效率就成本效率要求在生产一定数量的产品时（对西气东输 项吕，每年输送 120 ｛，乙立方米天然气），使用尽盘少的资捺；同时也 要求王军鳖高效率地使用与生产相关的各种要素〈劳动力和资金〉。如 果这两个条件中的任何…个不能满是，这些产品就不是用最低成本生 产的，也就不具成本效率。 运价设计所遇费的主要问题是， （北美）传捷的“投资回报率” 管制方法以戚本加成法为基础，几乎没有激励实现生产效率，因此， 受管制的奎斯管阔的建设和边行程有可能不具成本效率，通常导致多 计资产（术语“金盘子”）和高价取得管愕运行街需要的各种要素 〈劳动力、购买的物品和服务）。 为了实现生产效率，定栓机帝！！应该是“绩效管制，，，丽不是 报E韩管制，， 80 2.2.4 产品选择效率 如果产品之闰存在盖艇，产品选择效盖在就很重要并应受到关注。 不爵的天然气赣送服务在可靠性、茵的地和季节性等方面都存在差 别，保证服务和可中新服务到用户来说显然是两种不同类型的服务。 产品选择效率要求所能提供的服务类理班与新需要的服务类型相 鞠合。如果为所有需要保证容量服务的经销商提供同样可靠性的摄 务，意是可能不能实现产品选择效率。不同经销商对所需盟务的可靠性 要求可能离于或能于标准的输送服务条款中蔚规定的可靠’险要求。 实际中的解决办法是，设计特定的服务，以便最大限度地满是用 户撞求。这需要时间，对用户需求进行更好能了解以及与用户的充分 协商。 2.2.5 足够的回报 应该允许受管制的运输公司提据其预爵的雄气量收取相应的费 用，从而得到足够的枚人以回收其包括合理投资图捏在内的全部合理 。 此问题在报告中作详级分析。 • 40 • 成本，这一点很重要。这些需要回收的成本当然包括以轩IS 培式反映 的投资回牧、借人资金的成本、运行布雄护成本以及技资回报。 传统的北柴管制中按照“公平自报”确定输气价格，这一回报参 考那撞存在市场竞争并且风险与管向公司同等的其它经济部门的回接 来确定。在“回报率”和“激励型管制”模式中，计算价格时首先要 评千古受管制企业需要达到的利揭水平。 为实现以上目栋，运输公司应以第…年的收入状况为基础确定价 格，还应王震计自己第一年和后续各年所需要的资金和运行成本。这些 建议是为了保证运输公司取得足够的国报＠。 为了鼓励运输公司在第一年以后钙能维持生产效率（第 2.2.3 节），联合工作组建议，管制委员会应该对价格计算期内中国天然气 输送行业的技术进步状况进行资计，考虑技术进步后，实际合格将呈 现逐年下降趋势（对管网用户有事J) ，但间时可以激励运输公司进一 步提高效率并超出管制委员会庆贺计的技术进步水平，从而增加运输 公司的利润。 2.3 期盟的特缸 如果价格的设计完全满足上述目标，这种价格必定将充分反映成 本并且是二芭拉榻的。然而，花费很大的力气充金实瑰上述目标可能是 不太现实的，自此，有必要根据一串标准对价格设计方法进行评饼。 这些标准可以称为是价格加f适当但不是绝对必需的特点。价格设计 的这些特点应该是： 回客满，易于理解和采用； ’透明： 回可琪觅J腔： 圈可适应性。 @ 此问题在报告中作详细分析。 • 41 . . 2.4 结诠 确定定赞规则时，价格设计的原理和目标应集中在实现经济效率 的关键问题上，同时，确保产生的技人足以自放其成本，该戚本的发 生遵循谨慎性原则，并且是有效率的。能够实现这提目标的赞格必定 反映成本，是无歧视的。然而，实现这些目标所带来的收益锥对需要 句降低“用户友好”特点〈如易于理解布采用，透明！可豫见性和可 适应性）的成本权普普考虑。本报告强葱i撞荐并遵循这种分析方法。 . 42 • 第二章价格手册的制定 3.1 方法介绍 铃格设计模型的主要嚣的是： 1. 允许运输公司盟收运行戚本，并获得足够和可靠的投资 自报： 2. 反映所提供服务的戚本结椅。 为达到这接吕的，必须完成如下所述的五项主要工作： • 资产评估的管制。无论是电力、水、天然气还是按路，所有 的前络部需要投入大规模的、长期的、专用的和不可逆转的 投资c 这些投资所产生的年回收资本（投资回报和折i臼〉构 成输送企业每年成本的很大一部分。对这些投资进行适当评 估是建立基础成本和推导价格的一个主要方醋。这种评估将 受到管制约束，但是要求进行资产评位是输送企业的职责。 ’ 基础成本的接导。基础成本的主要组成部分是： I> 技资四报〈税前基础）： P 街I日： I> 运行和维护成本。 , 根据这些因素可以得到每年要求的收入京平，再根据茄预撰j能产 品产盏，就可以确定产品的价格水平。如图 3.1 历示。 ＠！成本分类、戚本分配及价格设计。这项工作确定了输气的价 格结构，其所包含的任务是： I> 将基础成本分为固定成本和变动成本； I> 将醋定成本和变动成本分配到j容量费用和商品费用中： I> 根据各分类成本和输送睿寰的使用，计算输气价格。 资产评估、基础成本的计算租费格设计，这二三个最主要的任务可 43 管制的资产价值 团 3.1 确定的价格水平 分多步来进行。这种定价方法在建立正式的管割据架以前会受政策和 管制的混合制约，提供运输方采用这种方法进行输气价格的设计具有 很重要的意义。 3.2 资产评估 有些国家运输公向和供气企业是相互分离的，有些型家奶 la采用 …体化结构，为了进行价格设计和拚格管制，需要评估输气系统的资 产价倍。在这点上各器由于情况不同丽存在较大的差别。原剿上，应 该采用会计方法进行计算或者在法律文件里直接规定其份值。商实际 上，与受管制和受竞争制约的分离盾的运输公司和供气企业梧比，一 体化盖新企业的投资者单是倾向于高估其资产的价值。 因此，政府决策部门面临一个南难的抉择。一方面，它们希望思 量扩大一体化企业经费所能带来的好处；另一方面，它们又希望引进 竞争和现代管制方法；但罔时它ff] 也意识到这两个臼挥存在相互冲 突。如果企业为垄断的…体化企业，政府决策部门由于担心企业的垄 断利益受到侵害而不愿意理竞争和管制的需要强追企业分离其业务。 企业分离潜在的风险是，它可能会推迟投资者继续进行投资或参与将 来的业务。通常政肃决策部门（和立法部门）常常不管这个问题，而 44 把它转移给管制抗梅处理。管制机构翔和南各种各样的方法来腰仔政 府决策部门这一未尽的职责。 这在往造成有关以下几方面管制的不确定性： 自业务拆解的必需范围； 由输气系挠资产的初始评估； 菌对现有技资和后结投资因收的保证。 输气业务租供气业务的挥解对于避免利益冲突来说是必不可少 的，商这些利益冲突会降锻整个供气链的效率。娃亭的获得可以通过 批发市场中的竞争和单鲍的输气服务，这已在有搓国家中获得证实。 但业务挥解会导致规模经济的损失租交易成本的增加，必须对商者进 行和j弊比较分析。同时，业务拆解也有可能被认为侵祀了那些输气系 统原始投资者的财产权，这兰是按资者投资辅气系统的目的是为了自己 使用。另一千主要问黯是，业务挥解脐带来的提高效率的好处需要花 上一段时间才能显现出来，而重组所需要的成本几乎马上就要发生。 这种效益和成本的不同步，以及由于使租费才产权而引起的相关问题， 常常使得政府决策部门在确定业务挥解的必需在盟和对解捆后运输公 司进行初始资产评信时我豫不决。 最桂的解决办法是让一体化的输气和供气企业认识到，将企业完 全分离最络将对输气相供气企业双方有利叹这与各企业的战略及管 理目标…经营效率和盈利一是一致的。管制机梅可以利用某些激励手 段和拉制手投保使这些企业尽早认识到完全分寓所带来的好处。 但是，管制抗梅不应该将它幻的主要精力放在雄气系统（或其他 现有的商场参与方〉身上，以假使用户更换其拱气商。这有时被称为 “为竞争商引人竞争”＠。 。 1吉97 年，英国天然气公司自愿成立部分分离的英国天然气交易企业 Cen泣ica，它 是作为一个独立的公共服务有限责任公司来运行的，并揭有自己独立的证券交易。其他的 企业，其中包括管道企业 Tran棚，作为另一个独立的公共服务有限责任公词来运行。在北 美，有许多类似的管道企业与其附属交易企业启动分离的例子。 @ 这会走向另一个极端。琉有的供气商可能会给最终用户设定一个较高的价格，轰 到新参与方进入市场并开始竞争以后，才将价格说被到竞争时的低价格水平。见例，必£red E.K必放所著“燎赂消费翁避免竞争”，《电力期刊＞. 1999 年 5 月，第 88～ 90 页。 • 45 . 这个极端的例子不应掩盖这一事实：在天然气供应键中超额利润 的存在常常会挺得管制者进行干预。如果揭除这些越额利掏能够真正 提商效率，那么这种干预是合理的。但是应该注意到这种超额科揭可 能有效激腾新参与方进入这一市场。。当行业进行重组时，天然气供 应链中超额利润存在的区域和器由将在行业垄断部分和竞争部分之间 转移并发生变化。团此，特别是在重雄的过按时期，管制机构成关注 对新参与方的有效散励。 在中国，现有输气系统的资产评佑问题很可能比西气东输项吕的 资产评估问题更难解决。合资集居需要对西气东输项目进行拐始的资 产评估，政府决策部门和管制机构将对这一评估进行后续审查井有可 能修正这一评估结果。资产评估有两种方法。第一种是基于原始的资 产黝最成本进有评结；第二种是基于利用各种方法测得的资产现镜进 仔评估。 3.2.1 历史成本的评估 一般情况下，资产评估的“原始或本”〈或净投资）挥准等于所 有资本资产的原始购置成本减去黑积拆！日。因为这样定义的资产价值 等问于相对明确的“胀国价值”〈或公司资产负锻表累的相应数据）， 所以利扉原始成本进有资产评估不会引摇摆大争议，产品铃格可以基 于原始成本计算得到。 科用原始成本栋准（也善本为历史成本会计）进行资产评估不需要 确定资产的“最佳性”和它们现在的提济街值。通常认为资产每年都 要贬值一部分（会计术语中的苦！剖，最终未折！日完的资本则表现为 公司的负债，债权人为投资方＠，缸这些负债都己到期。由此，轩 l日 （按资的返还〉相投资回报就构成了价格计算中投资的这一部分。 。 二十世纪 80 年代中期和 90 年代，牛国电力行业实行“新电厂嘀政策”：为进入 市场的新电广提供激励机制，允许其取得离的图报。这造成了电力市场短缺。这项政策在 2002 年通过在发电厂引人竞争而得以改变。 4撞 当然，如果长期债务完全还清，企业完全依蓝蓝股东投资〈对风险资本密集程度较 低的企业来说是不太可能的〉，将不存在进行债务磁资的负债。 • 46 • 3.2.2 资产或值的评估 资产现值的评估方法有三类，它们在经济自辉、合计目标和管制 吕标等方面各有侧重： ’ 茧量是成本法是指囊新建立（或替1-t ）…个完全相爵的金 业所花费的成本； 帽 改进的童呈建成本法是新建一个新型企业替代原有的企 盘，并提供完全相同的服务所花费的成本； • 资产余锺法。资产余值的意思是指，在不自业主分配利 油和业主不再追如投资的情况下，财务期末与财务期初 相比，净资产增蜜的财务价值或货币化价值。这避常去 除了通货膀胀因素。 , 重置成本法 通过确定现在2茸茸每项注册资产的成本来佑计重置成本，这是一 个耗时耗力的工作。实际上需要定期做这种工作，比方说，每五年一 次。对中间各年，需要考虑各项成本组成部分（钢铁、原材料和设 备、劳动力和项自管理、租借悟道路通行权等）的价格指数来估算盘 置成本。通过这项工作可得到按现行成本建寰所有资产的总现佳，再 考虑祟职折1日的调整，可结计得到按现有成本计算的净资产现值。通 常称这种资产评估方法为嗨证运营能力的完整佳”· (OCM）。它在 囊置、“如新”的基础上对资产进行再评估，并且带虑重量租重修的 费用以雄护“如新”的运营能力。 从会计角度看，支持采用原始成本标准进有资产评佑的人认为： 与科南重置成本法得到系统的“真实和公平”的价值所带来的好处相 比，这种方法的代份太太。另外，这费结计值都是带有主观性的，很 难建立一个适琦不同时间段的再评估的基础。 采用重置成本法进行资产评信能够更好地反映提供输送服务的当 前成本。支持这种方法的人认为：原始或本可能比蠢寰成本要锻得 多，才智应计算得到的份格要能得多，因此，基于原始成本支持较链的 费用就难以四枚金部的现行戚本。这会导毅两种类型的｛底数惑： 目 由于用户不按黑现行成本支付其消费，会造成消费的浪 • ·47 费； 踵这种溺费量上涨的压力会导致新投资的过度增加。 改进的重置成本法 这种方法的目的是评结输气系统的新型等价资产（主祖EA）的价 8 值。随着时间的推移，天然气市场的供求方式将发生变化，相应辙气 系统要进行扩展，因此系统结构就去色不可能像原来确定的天然气供求 市场时那样没有变化。另外，随着时间的推移，由于技术进步的影 响，实际成本3呈现下阵趋势。 从在济和管制角度来看，采用改进的重置成本法可以结算输气系 统的“有争议的”纷佳。这意味着这些资产的价值班等闰于锻麓的市 场新参与方可能进行的投资，新参与方将提供与现有者同等水平和数 量的产品。 从会计角度甚或任济角度来讲，支持采用原始成本标准进行资产 评桔的人认为：除了与重量是成卒法具有问样的问题之外，改进童置戚 本法常常需要对运输公司的管道系统重置成本进抒十分详细的工程分 析。另外，这将使得技资者承捏重大的附加风险。 资产余值法 资产余值法主要用于巳上市企业的市场资本化方面。股东愿意支 付的企业股票份格乘以发行的股票数，再如上贷款方提前准备支付的 资金总数等于企业的市场份筐。这是对企业净资产价值的合理辑始信 计。随着时间的推移，韧始净资产费值可用通货膀胀指数进行调整。 通货膨胀指数，例如消费给格指数，是投资者计算其投资真实栓值时 最常用的紫缩指数。 这种方法的另一个优点是：与囊置成本法相比，艺可以反映由于 技术进步而造成的“持有翻失”。技术进步可成降｛最重置的真实成本， 这在运用重置成本法（或改进的重置成本法〉重新估算企业对于股东 的价值时有所反映。比较资产余值法得到的净资产131装置成斗立法得到 的净资产，就反映了这种“持有损失拌的程度。从管散i角度看，股东 蒙受这些报失，会跨低受管起！公词降低单位成本的职极性。市采用资 产余值法对资产进行评估，可使受管制公司保护它的股东使其免受这 • 48 • 一一 样的持有损失。 虽练这种方法在理论上是十分吸引人的〈英国的天然气秘电力管 制扭梅 Ofgem 和其他管制者，都已经采纳了这种方法），但是还是存 . 阮 、二 在…些问题。如果企业没有上市，那么就需要应用前文提到的方法之 ~ 一来得剖资产的初始赞值。如果运输公司作为上市公司，但它隶属于 更大的一体化天然气或天然气石插企业〈如中国石油的输气业务那 样），就难以确定运输公司占整个市场资本化的合理错额。同样难以 决定的是：应该选择什么时候（以什么价格）的市场资本化水平作为 管制中的资产如始价值。 3.2.3 坪估方法的选择 在选择管制中的挣资产份值评估方法时，有两个问黠需要解决。 第一个是设定裙始傍假，第二个是确定这个初始价镇如何随时间变 化。在某种意义上，本阶段不需过多关注第二个问题。如果己经确立 裙始净资产价镜，那么初始价值随时间变化的任何一种方式都会产生 各自的四牧资金流（净资产价植的折回和国报），并且每一种资金就 都有不陀的模式。如果采用一致的方法对资金成本进行估算，并采用 同样的投资自收期，那么每一种资金流的现值将句初始净资产价值租 闹。资产价销的变化和回收资金的模式将在下文讨论，它攒及折！罚及 资金成本。 常常有人主张为管制国进仔的资产评估不应该铺离企业做财务报 表时所采用的方法。如果这两种方法栩阔，可能会很方便，但是，要 求管制胀自在企业的财务报表采用同一套会计科目标准，这是没有道 理的。只要这两牵标准能够相互对应，有公开透明的审计逍踪程序， 采用不同的栋准就不会有什么问题。即使在北笑，管制者和企业在管 制张自租企业会计提表中分别采用历史成本进行记胀，在大多数’请血 下，需要保持一套单独的管制账目。 对西气东输项自南言，它的如始净资产价信的确定比较商单，在 管道究工并开始投运以后，基于在建工程究工报告计算得到的建设成 本就是它的树始净资产赞佳。但对现有的霄’道系镜来说，情况就没那 么简单了，需要根据已有的信息和数据逐个案例进行详细的分析。总 • 49 • 的目标是要确保厨选用的评结方法得茧的回 i投资金能够反映输气~务 的经济戚本。保证各革中评估方法的一军史性也是非常重要的。虫在应用 评估方法ill 现变化时，这些变化应该是费晰的租佳得起推敲的。 3.3 与成本基础有关的照素 3.3.1 拚 1日政策 与利润相对店，括！日是投资成本随时间的逐步回校，它是对资本 资产损路程度的费量，也是职累资金更新或重置资产的…种内部机 制。街！日仅能用于回收投资。资本资产的损辑是一个技术和工程问 题，它仅与资产技术寿命内部投资或锺揍投资决定扭关。更新或重量是 资产的决定最终是由企业所有者做出。 涉及折嚣，需要回答两个！可题：初始投资的酣校期有多长？堕用 何种方法来计算年轩旧费用？ 折 18 期 对于特定的资产，它的技术或物理寿命为投资由收期的上限。资 产的经济窍命要短搓，指的是资产册提供的服务能够继旗产生其全部 经济价值的时期。然而，不同的投资者和融资方琦投资由收期有着他 们各自的看法。例如，银行希望尽快由收资金来使风险最小化。锦若 股东白不能将风险转移给黠人，为了尽量降锚未回收投资的风险，并 得到适当的报麟，他1n可能会延迟投资囚校期。 嚣气东输项目是具有重大发展潜力的核，心输气工程，因此应按照 它的技术寿命来确定技资回校期，这一吕 i段期可能是 40 年或者更长， 它取决于正在进行的设计试验。当然，组成管道系统的不闰种类的资 产拥有不同的技求寿命，例如，具有活动部分的设备，例如茧缩挠， 比起管道来说寿命要更短。每项资产都将按它自己的折 rs 率进行提 IS ，而平均折旧期可依据各项资产的新旧情况计算得到。 挤 18 方法 无论是用原始成卒还是现行戚本作为资产评估标准，直线折i且是 对长寿命资产进行拆 i目的最常用方法。一旦确定了一种资产的折旧 期，年折 i自费用就等于初始价谊除 ITT轩！日期 α 当使用现行成本评信方 . 50 • 一… 法时，初始资产价值、年折！括费用和累棋折！自等需要用选定的价格指 数进行溺整。在折！日期期末，总累积折！日等于按通货路胀调整后的初 始资产扮值。 为纳载自的括前提存的计算方法可能与这种方法有所不同，这将 影响公司射务报表中的一些会计科目，但并不影R自在管制员长自中采用 直线折！日方法。可是，在计算税前资金成本时，需要计算受管制企业 的实际边际就率。 i跺直线折旧外，另一种主要折 i日方法就是“经济折阳”。这种方 法的目的是再现竞争市场中的均衡价格模式，也郎，，按不变价格计算 得到的价格应保持恒定。按照“经济折i臼”方法得3薄的各年折 IE! 费用 是间接计算出来的。首先计算为了回收投资和必要的投资回报，国得 到一个每年惺珑的资金流（按不变价格），然应减掉各年投资回报使 得蛮j年轩 IS 费用。 经济折旧方法有许多优点，钮捂： 瞌 如果用这种方法时能静考虑不周阵期建设成本的通货瞎 胀，那么针琦日有管道和新建管道计算得到的折！自费用 不会有太太旺别； • 郎使各年的送气景不间，采用这种方法可以得到各年稳 定的生rr 旧费用。倒如，假定在管道使用的前凡年送气最 较低，利用经济拆旧方法可保证这挫送气量不需支付更 离的价格。更确铺地堤，这种方法可以将部分投资回收 就在程后送气最较高的时期来完成，确保接通货膨胀器 整后的单位送气蠢的费用在整个轩i吕期保持不变。竞争 市场中的价格也有类假的特点。 然离不应孤立地考虑折旧，而是应该把重点放在包含折 IS和投资 回报的年资本收入之上，这就需要考虑资金成本，它是确定合理的投 资回摄的基础。 3.3.2 资金成本 大多数管做j委员会应该先许受管制企业的资产能够有嗣合理的四 报率”。对天然气企业来说，考虑到输气行业自身的特点和管制委提 • 51 会进有管制脐带来的风险，这一合理的回报率可定义为企业融资方要 求企业给予的回报基础上考虑风险理素调整后的资金由提率。这样的 国报率常被称为资金戚本。 一般来说，企业的风险越大，要求的资金成本就越高，这是因为 融资方主要求获取更高的面提来补偿他们所承扭风撞。保持企业能静得 到合理的高于资金成本的投资回报，这是决定企业财务生存能力的主 要因素。 由于大多数企业的融资钮括债务和权益两部分，所以资金成本是 债务成本相权益成本的如极平均盟，其中校建反映了企业的负债比。 债务资金成本 一个受管制企业的债务成本通常是以下几方面的，器和： J 圄 无岚险投资项目如政府横券等，投资者茄要求的不变价 格税前韶报；加上 罩 在企业带债的债务和j率基础上的某一额度，这一额度反 映了企业的资｛蒜皮。 在这里，有争议的主要部题是无风险资产的期限。一方面，有人 主张无风险资产的期限应该反映企业资产的可用寿命，对输气项自来 说可能是 40 年或者更长。他1fJ认为在资产的生产寿命内莓年都应宿 舍理的收入，这一收入能够支付每年的资金戚本。 另一方面，也有人认为无风险资产的期限应姐一些（递常为 3 ～ 5 年），这样才能与管制者建新词整价格水平的期限相一致。 权益资金成本 有银多种方法可以用来桔算税前权益资金成本，这些方法的复杂 程度有所不同： • 来瑞国内或回际上“罔等风跄”待业的王可比韶报。使理可比 四报的一个难题是不同的风险因素如管制3委员会的不同管制 政策将导致资金成本存在较大差躬。更常用的是采用国内或 留际上该有业更长期的国报作为不变价格的资金戚本更为合 适，尽管也可以根据该行业的风险菌素对国报进有相应调整 得到不变价格的资金成本。 • 52 • . 殷和j增长模型，这种方法是基于未来红利的期望锺进行计算 的。美国管制委员会很多都采用这种方法，但是刚上市的公 . 萄园抉乏红利支付的历史数据丽不能使用这种方法。当母公 碍和子公司闰为受管制企业时，也不能使眉这种方法。 资本资产定价模型，在计算自报率时，考虑在权益资本市场 投资的就会成本、市场自身变化以及保留权益资金在公司所 不可避免的风险等。这种方法是模大利亚和英国计算资金成 本的现有“传统明智”方法。这两个国家的管制委员会f境内 于使用资本资产定价模型，至少把它作为模念桂架。牵挂而这 种方法尽管在原理上得以承认，但人们对结计各主要参数的 方法也是有争议的。历史资料和未来发展之间的关系值得探 讨：资金戚本是为了吸引未来资本所期望得野的回援。如果 风壁挂因素发生变化，那么主要参数的历史扶况就可能无法反 映其未来的特枉。有些风器是如管制委员会的管制风跄就很潜 在资本资产定价模型瞿架中予以反映。 虽然确定权益资金成本是影确更长期输气椅格的最重要的主盖住工 作之一，但是它ti!是最陋难的盏化工作之一。 就氯 税后如权平均资金成本是投资者崽意对企业进仔投资所必需的投 资回报。为了得到程后加权平均资金成本和纳税，企业必须保证有一 定的税前国报率。两者之间的差值为税负。税负的多少与政府的税收 政策和企业的税集状况有关。根摇法律规定的税收体系计算税负〈法 定拉负〉比校容易，但是一个企业的实际纳税（有效税收〉将考虑许 多其他因素，但i如是否有投资补贴等。 管制者做向于采用财务模型模摇企业各年的资金流，在此3基础上 结算企业的实际税负。对于西气东输项自来说，这可能也是最合适的 方法。 负镇沈 债务与权益之比决定了计算如权平均资金成本时，权益资金自报 和债务成本之间的较重。管制者更多关在基于管制资产允许的总国接 • 53 • 水平，而不是该企业各投资方的回援。因此，在决定如伺将这部分兔 许的回报在校益持有者和愤务持有者之间进行分重己的时候，或者在决 定企业资产负债表的结构时，管制者所远到的作用有酿。 但是，管制者的目标是先许受管制企业得到他所需要的那部分财 务收入。在融资结持不是最佳的情况下，会导致资金戚本增加，这部 分增细的戚本可能得不到偿还。自此，霄’制者力求基于有效的或“最 梭的”负债比结算资金戚本，这样在管制者确定加权平均资金成牢之 前，受管制企业有激励挥能其负债比，从商企业可以在活期逐步提高 负债比，以增如股东回援。霄’制者可以要求受管制企业保持一定的投 资资倍等级来拇制这种情况的发生。 3.3.3 运行成本 任何管制最i度的目的都是为了激励受管制企业提高运营效卒。举 须保证西气东辑项嚣的主运营是有效率的。一殷商宫，管制者必须对受 管制企业的运行租维护费用进行监察，如果实际费用与预计费用出现 偏差，必须由！定如何处理这些偏差的有关规章制度。 出现这种偏整的主资原商组括： 自耕格影嘀，预泪？按资回报或经营效率时使用的价格指数 具有不确定d性，其意外变动可能导致这种价格影嘀（也 郎，企业的采购赞格链于原来按价格指数倍算的翻翻 但）。 醺 送气量差异，比方说，由于实际需求与预期不智，那么 增减送气容量的投资就会高于或锻于预计值。 翻 没有达到商定的服务质壁都准，对这种情况要进行惩 罚。例如，由于实际投资不足导致服务质量的路化。 噩 效率提高，对这种情况要进行奖励。尽管实际投资缸子 预计锺，但仍提供了同样段量和数量的服务。 然醋，对成本关系的分析，特别是运行和雄护费用与服务质蜜之 间的关系，是管制中比较难也指对校新的一个领域。霄’甜者很少舍去 试图搞清造成实际运行费用和预澳！运行费用差异的原四。管制者更愿 意在决策时设定实际运行费用的允许茹器（从而→次性消除这种差 • 54 • 异〉，或者在一定时期内逐渐消除这种差异。 在决定这些分析的深度时，大多数管棋者都会权衡和弊，对可能 带来的益处租获得有用结果的可能性以及所要花费的代价进行比较。 …斡方法是提据有效率的运仔成本市不是企业实陈的或预现！前戚本 （这其中可能包括一些纸效串的成本开支）确定企业运行成本的允许 菇圈。这种方法就提出这样一个问题：主运行成本在街种水平下是有效 率的。至少有两种方法可以解决这个闰题。 第一种方法，与相假回家类似的受管制企业比较，为企业设定一 个需要达到并能够达到的努力目标。以参考企业为基准设定容许企业 得到的收入，这将强有力地散励企业提高其运营效率，但是选择哪种 参考企业来设定运输公司和配气企业的这行戚本标准，就不能不是管 制者的任务。在许多国家，同一盟内有多个天然气输送金业，就可以 选择某一个企业作为参考企业。如果情况不是如此，那么就可能需要 与周际上的企业进行比较。但是这种方法可能不能简明，因为有接多 ayilia 因素会影响企业可控的运行成本，南这些因素在这种方法中很难考虑 完全。这些因素包括人口密度、网络规模、网络已使用的年限、气 JIB 候、地形特缸和鼓务质量的差别等。 其次，这种方法要求受管制的企业按成本有效亭的方式运营，但 这种有效率的戚本是基于对参考企业的成本进仔估算得到，这种估算 具有可疑性和主现性。如果受管制企史的运营效卒超出管由j者规定的 水平，商且效率提高班带来的好处能移归企业事有，就可以激励企业 提高效率。运营效事提高脐带来的好处是由运输公司租用户共辜的。 如果管制者将受管制企业厨能达到的最高运营效率定为基准，那么就 会丧失激励功能，因为企业即使运营有效率也很难回较其成本。 与选择参考企业作基准的方法梧比，另一种方法是：基于对金行 业或全社会范围内劳动生产率和资本生产率等因素的发展变化趋势的 客观判断，来判斯企业未来的运仔成本，以此作为确定企业未来运行 戚本的故据。与费用参考企业的运营效卒并进仔适当谓整的方法桔 比，这种方法引起的争议较小。然部，对当前运营状况较差的企业来 说，不能采用这种方法，因为这些企业的运行成本中但捂瑭有的（在 • 55 靠 大的）无效率支出。 3.4 或本基础的计算｛或要求的投资盟报｝ 天然气运输公司需要进行多年的基础戚本测算，蹦算时要考虑输 气价格的稳定性并保证成本的自收。可以班计对未来投资和容许运行 戚本将会有多种形式的管制干预，而管制者容许的年资本回收模式是 影响基础成本计算的主要因素之一。留 3.2 为资产戚本在 40 年内回 收时各种年资本国枝的模式。 20.00 鼠 郭 富 15.00 也的’ \ 。饨， 怜 10.00 叙 ~ Im 汾 5.00 o.oo• 1 章 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718 蜂拥部主2 23 24 器国 2728 四捕事132 部： 时间（年｝ 说明毫不受价格 WAC£=7% ；通胀率＝3草 g 技术进步＝l. 侃 留 3.2 年资本回收模式 有四种模式： 靡不变价格一一基于“经济提 i臼”方法： 自班行成本……基于资产余佳法（ FCM); 噩珑行成本一一基于保证这营能力方法（优M); 圄历史成本。 这些模式是对初始给催明确的单个资产商富的。为便于比较，假 • 56 设不变价格晓前如权平均资金成本为 7% ，总通货膳胀率（例如，以 清费价格指数的变化百分比来度最）为每年 3% 。历史戚本模式开始 年份的资本回收最是这几种模式中最高的，然后逐年线性下择；基于 资产余值法计算的现行成本模式各年资本国收保持相对稳定，开始年 捞逐渐增加，然后逐年下降，总平均值为初始投资的 10% 左右。不 变拚格模式开始年份的资本部收量最镖，然后逐年随着假定的通胀率 持续上升。当用名义税前加权平均资金戚本来进行贴现时，这三种模 式都得到同样的现值。基于保证运营能力方法的现行戚本模式各年的 资本回收都低于2辈子资产余锺法计算的结果，且随时前两者提距越来 越大。这种模式假定技术进步是以每年 1.5% 的班度使摞资产贬值 的，并在资产再评估的时候考虑了这一菌素。结果显示投资者蒙受的 “持有损失”为基于资产余值法的模式与基于保证运营能力模式之间 的差距。因此，这种模式不能回收这些持有摆失，它的现但也低于其 他三种模式。 考虑不同资产的不同投产时间，采用不同方法得到的资产回收并 不像图 3.2 那样有这么大的差距，有时不同方法得到的总资产回收是 非常接近的。各年总的资产拥收代表了运输公司用于雄护和扩大输气 ij 服务起围的后按投资。这意味着，与选择辑始资产评估方法相缸，为 ?! 计算资产由收选择适合的方法时需要对可科用的数据耕信息进行详细 ili 地分析。 ; 本研究建议基于不变价格项目留报率（由中国石油假定〉来确定 e --- 一个假定的瞌气价格。在中国石蜡设定的 24 年项目评钻期内，基于 这一价格回收投资和边有戚本。锦若能得到使务偿还方面的相关数 ltj 据，投资者应该会对计算得羁的回摄事和回摄方式感到满意叭净醋 ilati 定资产和年折18费用可根据中国石油假定的资产寿命期使用资产余值 法计算得到，这就碍到各年资本因收模式。 --’ 这为价格管制提供了一个和始的基础，尽管可能并不完善。价格 • li1然这种方法有其潜在不足，但由于缺乏主要数据和参数，不能采用其他更有效 方法。在中图使用这种方法，由于对运输商进入市场的限制，需考虑投资者’的公正的需求。 • 57 • 控制的 CPI-X 激励方法是比较先进的也是最合适的一种机制。建议 在初始的街格机击！！中走 X 为 0 ，在韧始投资的管网输送能力还没有充 分利爵之前，管制者应该对这种方法感到满意飞之后，或者自环境 需要，管制者可以设定 X 为某一正撞。 3.4.1 接入成本 接人费府向新用户收取，并为运输公司提供了另一种收入来嚣。 在确定要求的收入水平时，需要考虑接人费用。而接人输气系统是一 种型嵌行为，它应受到管制＠。在设定天然气的输气价格时，房收取 的接人费用必须从资产中扣踪。 一个3重要的问嚣是决定哪些戚本需要通过接人费用来由载： . 回 “读”展收费，只因收连接薪用户的直接费坦和当地费用（供气 管道和仪表等费用〉 “深”层q交费，除了枚取上述费用外，输气系统其他部分需要进 行改造的费用也从中回收。 运输公司喜欢采黑深层收费方法〈或者强行深层收费｝，目为深 层收费可以确保础校实陈成本，从商降｛或企业的风险，但这种方法为 新用户设走了进入市场的撑碍，并合降f民供气企业的市场份额。然 而，除了大用户以井，新用户接人导致的输气系统进行相应改造商发 < 生的附如费m 品最较少，大多数小用户的影嘀可以，每略不计，这意味 着使用深层较费不是成本有效的。要确定这些附加费用也是相当翻难 的，因为网络路“深”，这些费用就为路多的用户所分摊，变成太多 数用户的共同戚本。采用深层收费缺乏透明度，存在费用不公平分配 的风险。因此，建议使用浅层故费，将输气系统梧应改造费用向所有 用户自收＠。新有要求进行业务拆解的回家都采用这种方法。 3.4.2 总成本基础 必须注意：即使运输租存储业务是一体化的，也必须分别确定它 。 墨西辛苦的能源管制机构他EiE在考虑采用这称方法。 @ 但是，接人服务也可以进行竞争。在接入服务究争市场建立以后，可能不需要进 行管制。 @ 采用这种方法需要考虑电厂等大用户的意见。 • 58 • 们各自的基础戚本。 3.5 戚本分提及分现啕 确定基础成本之后就可以设定扮格水平。在确定价格结掬之前首 先要辙两项工作一基础成本分类及分配。 3.5.1 成本分类 基础成本包括固定戚本和变动成本。固定成本定义为无论多少送 气量或产量，都保持不变的成本和费用。在较短时间内，回定成本保 持不变。这些戒本包括劳动力工资、’企业办公费用和与资本扭关的成 本如设备投资、折旧、利息、投资回报和所得税。后三种戚本〈折 1日、投资应报布公司所得税〉椅成固定戚本的主要部分。通常这搓戚 本指的是“与容量把关”的成卒，因为它们与运播公司提供服务的输 法容量直接相关。变动成本与设备的利用率或蓝花，这些成本基本上 是与压缩站业务相关的。 成本分类是良好的价格设计的开端。在分类过程中将各项成本分 离出来，这使得设计出来的价格比没有分类时更加经济有效，并更能 保证尉务安全。在竞争性市揭中，为了使价格能更好地反映所提供服 务的成本，价格通常包摇多个组成部分，特别是关于“提前支付”部 分。分类就是使输气价格能够做到这样的常用方法一一提价格结构和 i 成卒结梅相匹配。 3.5.2 成本分配 下一步工作是将固定成本和变动或本在容量费用和商品费用中进 行分配。 ι 基于经济效率和公平原则，根据各类经销商的容量利用特点，可 以将成本分配给各类经销商。这是确定具有不同负荷串的提销商所支 付的最终份格的重要一步p 将国定戚本和变动成本按比僻分费已到容蠢 费用和商品费用中，这是价格设计的功能之一。 成本分前这个过程使经销商使用输气系统的特性与为他的提供这 种服务的戚本相匹配。将成本直接分配给那些必续为此付费的用户， • 59 • 换言之，核心工作是确定经销商承担相应成本的次序。 3.5.3 成本分类lil分配中的公平与敖且在 美国在从 20 散纪 40 年代早期到 20 世纽 90 年代大约 50 年的时 间里，戚本的分类和分配一直是他创争论的主题，并在不踏修正当 中。无论是在输气和供气捆都在…起的时候，还是在后来的 20 世纪 80 年代中期输气供气开始拆解的时候，椅格设计所基于的服务成本 和管制都一直是天然气市场参与者租管制者的关注焦点。 争论常常针对公平与效率阔的权衡。为说明这个问题，囱 3.3 拮 述了天然气市场参与者所关住的两个重要问题。 分类 ！变动 i 固定 分配 商品 容蠢 户 低负负担荷的察成用本 , 增加 降低 ,... 利 公湘苟风的险 'l: 降低 增加 圈 3.3 成本分类及分配 第一个水平条代表输气系统的典型成本分类。一般来说，单成本 的可变部分占 5% ～ 10% ，在某些系统中，这一比倒可能更低。第二 个水平条代表这些成本在商品成本和容盘成本间的分配。这是一个南 部制价格，其中商品成本通过使用量（送吨建或者吉普量）价格回收， 单位为元／立方米或元／百万焦耳；容量成本通过预约（容最或需求） 价格回收，单位为元哺峰日〈或高峰小时）立方米／月或元／高峰 E （或高梅小时）百万焦耳／丹。 竖直或表示在商品和容最成本阔的分配。它的留示位置表明，除 变动成本外，部分固定成本被分配到商品成本里。国竖直线可以左右 • 60 • 格动。如果移到最右端，结果就是一部制给格，这是中理现在常甫的 方法，价格和费用都表示为元／立方米。这是公平的极端懵况，不论 天然气经销商何时从输气系统抽取天然气，还是此时为保证运输所承 担的费用是多少，天然气经销商为每立方米天然气支付的价格是一样 的。 “效率”的极端情况出现在将坚直线在移，直至u容量／商品成本分 盟与固定／可变成本分类线重合的时候。这就是份格设计的直接回走 变辑法（ Straight Fixed Vari品le, S队巧。美器联邦能源管盘！委员会 (FERC) 1992 年第 636 条法令要求使用这种方法（能证明运用这种 方法会扭曲价格的情况舔外） o SFV 这个术语的原义精确描述了这种 方法：固定成本全部“直接”分院给容盏，商变功成本全部、“直接捍 分配结商品。 有关效率的争论在于辙气容量的提供是为了满足商峰时的容赣需 求。｛居负荷率的经销商（例如，城市供气公司或他们的供应商）对该 峰值需求的贡献比例高于其他经销商，如大工业用户和发电厂（或能 们的供应商〉。固定戚本是为了提供〈和维护〉输气容量。因此，低 负荷事经销商分担固定或本国收的比倒也应高于其他〈较高负荷串 的〉握销商。 SFV 方法通过分配固定戚本精变动戚本，来确保肇销 商所承担的回牧戚本跟运输公萄为他们提供服务所花费的成本相对 应。这种方法对于阻止低负荷率用户浪费性消费而导敖赣气容量增 加， e 是银有效的。这种方法tlillJI且提高分配效事，目为城市供气公词 为其用户提祺供气服务的保证且在花较高，它在高峰负荷时所用的输送 容量的价值应高于其他经销商。 这在圈 3.3 中也可以说明。 ~g受直线左移， f睦负荷率经销商承握 的戚本增加。当竖直线右移时， f~负荷率经销商承担的成本下降，较 高负荷事提销商补贴了锯负荷率经销商，部运输公商也蒙受更大的和 润风险。 i盖过收取团定容最费或保证金所回收的成本比例越镖，公泻 需要从送气量上因牧的成本就越高。这个问题的重要性随着价格结持 或价格管制的不同市各异。这将在下一章做进一步讨培。 • 61 • 3.5.4 解决公平与效率问题 巳经有两种方法用于解决这个问题。第→个方法出现在发达国家 向市场开放的过按期；第二种出现在市场开放的进一步发展过程中。 向市场开姓的过渡 在过渡期，“公平与效率”争论的各种解决办法都倾向于减少低 负荷旦在经销商所承担的成本。虽然 JfISFV 方法分配成本可以达到效 率标准，但是这种方法不是完全公平的。如果将瞄定或本分配给容 量，这身盟定成本就与输气容量在负荷高峰时期的可居率相关，那么 纸负荷率在销高将按他们在峰值时刻所使用输气容量的份额成比例地 承担固定成本的国歧。然而，运输公司在负荷低信时也可以使用这部 分容量（此时低负荷率经销商不使用）来增加或扩展他向其他经销商 提供的输气服务，或者提供可中新输气服务。参晃前文 1.5.4 节。 在缺乏正式的容量转让或其能类嚣的协议，为提用保负荷率经销 高所占有的保证容撞权进行补偿的时候，有可能将部分固定成本分霞 至u 商品成本中，这使典型的 SFV 方法中容量哺品比从 90:10 变为 70 :30 或 65=35。。如果不是立刻使用 SFV 方法，而是想办法给最负荷 率经销商一定的补偿，那么要确定合适的分摊比例就不太容易。在过 夜期内，将初始比率设为 65:35 可能是比较合适的，然后跑时i海逐渐 将它增却到每 SFV 方法一致的比率。 市场开敢的进…步发展 …且已经将输气容量极分韶给经销商，而且可以在流洁工级市场 交基这些容盘权，那么就不会存在公平与效率的争论。据负荷率提销 商可以在就动二锻市场交易他｛门的容量权，从市场中获得揭人对使用 这些容量权的相应补罄。另外，随着时坷的姓移，经销商将会努力引 导其黑户的用气特性，从南能达到他们所期望的负荷率。这意味着应 @ 英固和其他欧洲各腿也存在对成本分配的争论，尽管他们所争议的程度不同。 阔天然气运输及存储公司（ BG丁＆别在 20 世纪 90 年代不考虑成本分配，直接采用 so:so 的容量嘀品成本比例。对于输气业务，这一比例逐步过渡到 65:35 并最终为 90:100 爱尔 ~采用 90:10 比例，而法国、比利时、卢森堡、荷兰和德国决定采用 100% 容数价格回收 全部成本〈包括憾定成本和变动成立在）。 • 62 • 用 SFV 方法，就不必关注低负荷率经销商在负荷低谷时期所保留的 容量权的使用问题。 使用 SFV 方法为输气业务的进一步发展提供了基础。上文第 1.5 节讨论了将运输公司进一步拆解成输送服务提供方（丁刊和输送 系统运营服务方（TSO): TP 提供奉自维护输气容量，按 100% 容主主拚 格回收固定戚本： TSO 负责输送系统的运行，按管制中的激助政策 回收变动成本。 对中国现有的输气系统来说，要发展到这一阶段需要花费一些时 间。但是在设计输气价格的拐始水平和结掏时，试囱考虑未来的商业 和管制安排是一种谨慎的做法。 3.6 价格设计 将成本进行分类、并分配到容量和商品成本中是设计南部告！！拚格 的基础。 有多种铃格设计方法可以考虑，但是普璋使用的有回种： 回郎票法： ’ 路径法： 嚣区域定价法； 圈出口一人口法。 本章对这些方法在现有输气系统中的应用提出了一些建议。－ 3.6.l 邮票法 在鲍粹的邮票法中，所有交易都按肉样的输送价播技费，商不考 虑注人点和提取点的不同。由自票价格设计被由于自收使用输气系统的 平均成本。对天然气端输来说，“纯粹”邮票法的变通包括：与注入 点租摄取点无关的固定容盘费用，部上涵盖输送变动成本的商品费 用。而商品费用与注入点和提取点的位置相关。对复杂网技系统来 说，确定天然气输送路径既不重要也很菌难，邮票法也许是适用的。 可是，对像西气东输项目这种长距离送气系统来说，输送距离是决定． 戚本的章要因素，采用邮票法就不太合适。 . 63 . 伞 3.6.2 路径法 路径法是指根摇合闺中班定的送气路程确定不用价格的一种方 法。利用这种方法，根据天然气注入点和提气点位置就可以构成费格 矩障，如因 3.4 所示。 进气点（ Xl铲 ma) I1 12 I,, （伺倒 01 T11 T12 T1. 02 T21 T22 T2m X也V叫M 飞扩瑞 T1J o. T.1 r.2 Tno 面 3.4 路径法告格矩阵 路经法最明显的一个例子是使用与距离相关的价格，如图 3.5, 3.6 邪 3.7 所示。 进气点（ Xl06m3) I1 I,, 。1 PVn PV12 PV1,, 倒 'b 02 PV2绚 x PV21 PV 22 A运 矿 PViJ 联 o. I PV.1 PV.2 … P弘 说明 s一些 DPViJ 河以为零，如果进气点和提气点之间没有逍遥 00 3.5 高峰时器送气量矩悴 • 64 • 进气点（ Xl06m3) k篮 I1 12 Im 01 DPV11 DPV12 DPV1,, 百 02 DPV21 DPV 盟 DPV 植 'b ’X 叫 、”’ 4晨 DPV1; 署这 旷 0n I DPV.1 DPVn2 … i DPV;,,. 说明z一些DPV与可以为霉，如果进气点和提气点之间没有遥遥 图 3.6 高峰时段迭气途经距离矩阵 对一个具有多蠢注入点和提气点的输送系统来说，一定比例（最 高可达 100% ）的睿盘成本可以通过与距离有关的容量价格回收。因 为容量可能与高峰时的天然气流量相关，所以建立高峰时段送气量矩 阵如商 3.5o 相攘的高峰时段送气途经距离矩眸如图 3.6o 将这些组阵的相应 元素梧乘得到距离…送气量矩阵（团 3.7）。 与距离相关的窑盘成本器以捍PViiDPV夺得到与距离相关的‘容 • 65 量价格，单位为元／（自高峰立方米×千米×年〉。这…价搭乘以高峰 时途经距离矩阵，就得到各路径的容量给格矩阵，单位为元／〈日高 梅立方米×年），与周 3.4 的矩阵类似。 对年送气室主也可进行类似的计算，对在人点和提取点之阔的每条 路径，将与距离相关的商品成本分配到与距离相关的商品价格中〈单 位：元／m3 ）。 往前看，这种方法可 w:作为多年弱确定价格的基础，因为这种方 法具有“基于成本定价”的内在机理。它还拥有无需“干涉”就能自 动组进天然气合理旋向的佳，点。虽然路径法具有良好的理论依据，｛旦 是实施起来并不理想。在实践中总是权德理论上的控济效司法和实施上 的简易灵活性来选择路径法还是其他方法。 换！如，纯粹的路径法要求的计算比较复杂，易受注人点或提取点 分布变化的影响，计算得到的骨格比较复杂。另外，过于关注具体路 径梧应降借了在人点租提敢点 l诲的灵活性，那这是经销商所希望的特 点。此拌，这种方法会降低对输送容量建进行交易的能力从暗降低输送 容量工级市场的潜在流动性。最后，尽管这种方法是基于戚本进行定 价，但这也并不绝对，臼为阿络服嘉戎本在其中就没有考虑。流动工 级市场是充分考虑这些成本、解决这些问题最有效韵方法。 因此，权衡程论与实际实施，来后更简单一费的方法比较好一 些。区域定价方法就是一个例子。 3.6.3 区域定价法 \ 区城定拼法是指不同地理区域采府不同的交易椅格，而间一个在 域内采用辑用的交易傍格的一种方法。涉及上文的回 3.4 茧i 圈 3.7, ‘这种穷法包括将距离较近的注入点和提取点按区域分缀。在某种意义 ，这是区域i写采用与距离相关拚格，而向一区域内采用邮票法的结 合。从经济的角度来看，纯粹的路径法与注人点和提取点的确切位置 有关，但如果在区城价格法中将区域划分得较为详细，能够!1K住各区 域的主要成本决定菌素，结粹的路径法并没有什么忧势。区域定价法 不能详细反映成本的缺点，可通过它的注入点租提取点方醋的灵活 性、建立输送容量的流动性二级市场的可能性以及它的能单和可预捣 . 66 • 性等提点得至u 弥补。 3.6.4 入口／出口定价法 “人口／出口”收费方法是对天然气网络各注入，在或者提取点设定 一个单端的价格。对每一人口（或撞人〉点，人轩容量价格为一个单 一的数字，例如，单位为无（／高峰日立方米×啊，它与所注入天然 气的预崩或实际提取点无关。可菇，每个人口点都可以有不同的人口 价格。出口容量价格也是这样。 要千古算人口…出口价格，首先要钱次佑算从每个垃人点到每个提 取点的输气戚本。这些成本可以通过研究最近的天然气合南中所定的 实际成本得到，或者通过估计每个人口点和出口点阔的输送长期边陈 戚本得到＠。与上文播述的路径矩阵不向，当特定的注入点相拙取点 闰不存在直接送气时，路径法矩阵中出现零，部本方法中所有的人口 点和出轩，点之间都要估算一个输送戚本。 使用最小工乘法可以结算 m 个人口价格和 n 个出口价格，累棋 生成 n × m 输送成本矩阵。可是，为了得到’！在…解，必Z震预先确定 某个人口或出口的成本，或者对人口和出口成本间的分配做出初始假 定。 人口、出口价格的计算基于拐始的假定得到一套’撞一解，这将降 低它的客观性。这种方法，特到是英盟将这种方法与长扇边际成本桔 算蜡合采用时，消耗了大量的时间和资掘。显然这种方法具有灵活简 单的特点，组它得到的价格并不反映成本。另外，在英国＠已经将 这种方法句名义国家平衡，点（ National Balancing Point, NBP ）的模念 相结合，英国今天、明天和未来市场中都采用这种方法。这已经租碍 了英菌天然气流动现货市场的发展，并服碍了英国天然气市场进入新 兵欧圳市场。 关于西气东输项目，这种方法几乎毫无肃处。也不太可能呆用这 种方法对现有系统进行拚格设计。 0 BGTran隅采用后一种方法。 @ 荷兰和意大利也有同样的想法，他们采用了入口一出口法的一种变通。 • 67 • 3.ι5 价格设计方法的选择 在这菌种方法中，区域价格法封西气东输项自来说是最适合的。 不足为奇的是，这种方法也是北美长距离输气中使用最广泛的方法。 …方面，这种方法体现了价格反映成本的原期；另一方菌，这种方法 具有简单、灵活租可颈捕的特点。更重要的是，这种方法有利于挺进 赣送系统中特定区域天然气市场以及输送容量二级市场的影成。。 @ 当预留了足够的保证容最以确保提供这种保证输送服务的成本得到图收时，就需 要设计可中斯输送服务价格。 • 68 • 附件 1 联邦能源管理器员会法规第 284 部分 A 节总则和条件 第 284.1 条定义 (a）输气告插销存、交换、四输、盖换或其他运输方法。 (b）相应的州监管机椅指在该分i境内监管如i 内管道公司和地方黠 气公词的州立机椅。当涉及费事如收费使琦本词时，织指那 些基于服务成本制订费率和收费的机构。 (c）市场中心是措在不同条管谦交汇处进行天然气购买和销售的 地区。 [ 44 FR 52184, 1989 年 9 月 7 日，根据 636 号令棒改， 57 FR 13315, 1992 年 4 月 16 日］ 第 284.2 条退款叙利息 (a）退款。对根据本条款规定进待的任何销售、运输或转让历收 取的费率或费居，超出本条款兢定授权的费事或费用部分， 都应退还。 (b ）利息。根据本条规定的所有退款必须包括根据本章第 154.501 条（的款所确定的利息数额。 [ 44 FR 52184, 1979 年 9 月 7 日， 44 FR 53505, 19γ9 年 9 丹 14 吕修改； 273 号令， 48 FR 1288; 1983 年 1 月 12 日； 581 号令， 60 FR 53072, 1995 年 10 月 11 日］ • 69 . 第 284.3 条 《天然气法》蜡予的权限 (a）《天然气法》第 1 条（ b）款规定，如果州际天结气运输和销 售依据《天然气政策法》第 311 条或第 312 条得到授权， 《天然吃法》的条款和该法案赎予联邦能源管理委员会的权 限将不适用于任何如i 际天然吨运输或销售。 (b）《天然气法》规定，如果由于本条（ a）款的规定，〈天然气 法》的条款不适用于知i 薛飞天然气运输或销售，“天然气公司” 〈定义见该法案第 2 (6 ）款）应不包捂由于从事或涉及如i 际 天然气运输或销售的任何人。 (c）《天然气法》不适用于根据《天然吨政策法》第 311 (a）款 授权专门用于输气的设菇。 [ 44 FR 52184, 1979 年 9 丹 7 日，根据 581 号令修改， 60 FR 53072, 1995 年 10 丹 11 日］ 第 284.4 条 报告 (a）报告使用百万英热单位仙似勤的。依据本条款规定既有提 交的援告必续用百万英热单位何感但tu）来表示天然气的 数量。如'IMBtu 为一百万英热单位。一英热单位或 Btu 为将 一磅纯净水的温度从华民 58.5 度加热到 59.5 度所需要的热 ，根据本条（ b）款和（ c）款的规定确定。 (b）计量。在本条（ c）款中明礁规定的标准条件下，一立方英 尺天然气所含的英热单位是，在与空气梧肉的温度及常压条 件下，该立方英尺天然气完全燃烧所产生的英热单位数量， 此时燃绪后的产物冷却蓝天然气和空气的初始温度而且通过 该燃’庭所生成的水凝结成被态。 (c）标准条件。按本条（ b）款，标准条件是：在相当于华民 32 度时 30 英寸水银柱的压力下以及标准重力（ 980.665 立方 厘米句句条件下，华民 60 度时天然气与水蒸气馄和。 [581 号令， 60 FR 53072, 1995 年 10 丹 11 日］ ’ 70 • 第 284.5 搔进一步的条款蒋条件 g 联邦能挥、管理委员会可以按照法规或法令预先就本条款授权的天 然气交易实施进一步的条款和条件，如果委员会认定这提条款布条件 是适当的。 第 284.6 条费率解释 (a）程序。位服本章第 385 部分 L 节中的规定，管道公司可阻获 得有关特别费率和费用是否符合本条款要求的解释。 (b）撞址。费率解释龄要求应寄往以下地址：华盛极 OC20426, 联邦能源管理委员会总理事会办公室，法规第 284吨条解释。， 第 284.7 条囱定输气服务 (a）周定输气的可用性。 (1 ）根据本部分 B 节或 G 节的规定，提供输气服务的州际 管道公可必须提供圈定输气服务，暗且这种服务要与 任部销售服务指分离。 (2 ）搜据本部分 C 节中的规定提供输气服务的知i 内管道公 可可以提供吕定雄气服务。 .. (3 ）盟~输气服务虫在指：这种输气服务不受另一客户侥先 校利离求或另一种输气服务类别的眼制，与任伺其他 类别的周克服务一样有前锋的优先枝。 〈的在 1992 年 5 月 18 日提供固定傍气服务以及根据本部 分 B 节或 G 节规定提供固定雄气服务的州际管道公 司，必须提供国定擒气服务，在这种康务中国定托运 人可以在不被罚款的靖况下每天提取其回定的校益气。 （扮无歧视准人。 (1 ）根据本部分 B 节、 C 节或 G 节的规定，提供圈定输气 服务的邦际管道公司或判内管道公商必须提供无歧视 性或无位先的固定输气服务，包括所提供的服务质量、 . 71 服务期限、种类、价格或准备输送的天然气气最、客 户分类上，都没有任掏盏别和优先。 (2 ）提据本部分 B 节或 G 节的规定，提供盟定输气服务的 州际管道公司必须在每一种固定输气服务中对既有的 供气提供质璧相同的服务，无论这费天然气是从管道 公司还是从其他卖方处购买。 (3 ）根据本部分 B 节或 G 节的规定，提供盟定输气服务的 州际管道公司在其运价表中不可以包括任街禁止发展 天然气市场中心的条款。 (c）合理的营运条件。 与本条（ b）款的内容相一致，管道公司可以对依据本条款 提供的任何服务实施合理的营运条件。这些条件盘、须由该管 道公司作为其输气运拚衰的一部分备寨。 （的分割。根据本部分 B 节或 G 节的规定提供输气服务的知！际 管遵公司必须先许托运人利用其已签合同获得的固定输气容 量，该托运人可将该容量分割成几部分供自己搜捕或将该容 量转让给替代托运人，｛区条件是该容量分割从营运角度看是 可有的。 (e）预约容最费。在用户购买固定输气服务时，管遵公司可以向 挺举人收取预约容最费作为提供这种服务的条件。除了按照 本部分 C 节规定的管道公司外，如果收取预约容量费，该班 约容最费必须钮含用于该固定输气服务的金部器定成本，除 非联邦能源管理委员会允许该管道公司副收两部费率内气最 部分中的一部分圈定成本。贾约容置费可以不包括没用于固 定输气服务的任何可变成本或圈定戚本。撑了本款规定的以 外，管道公司可以在假据本部分 B 节、 C 节或 G 节规定所提 供的任再输气服务的费率中不包括最摄穰度账单或最低提气 量条款，或其他任何具有保证收益影响的条款。 （£）限制。不要求按照本部分 B 节、 C 节或 G 节的规定提供服务 的人提供任何超出其输气能力的输气服务或是需要建设或购 • 72 秘 买新设施的输气服务。 联邦能摄管理委员会第 284.8. 条 [436 号令， 50 FR 42493, 1985 年 10 月 18 日］ 辑者注：关于影响第 284.8 条的联邦柱册援引案例，参见受影响 的 CFE 章节的清单，该文出现在印刷卷宗通过 GPO 路在进入阅读帮 助一节中。 第 284.8 条 向炖际管道公司转让前走输气容最 (a）搜据卒部分 B 节或 G 节的规定提供固定服务的州际管道公 可必须在其母费表中包含一种机锚，使固定托运人可以向读 管道公司转让圈定输气容蠢，并使该管道公司按本条规定离 出售诙器定输气容量占 (b）必须允许固定托运人在不受转让条款或条件限制的前提下永 " 久或姬期转让其全部或部分输气容盘。…个圈定托运人可以 安排一个替代提运人从管道公司处获得出其转让的输气容 量。． (c）除了本条（ h）款规定的以外，一个想要转让其任何或全部 圈定输气容蠢的固定托运人必去员将其转让输气睿量的条款和 条件通知管道公司，该回定托运人还必续通知管道公可其指 定的并依照其特别规定的条款和条件获得所转让睿量的替代 托运人。 (d）管道公司必须在一个互联网址上并在一器合理的时间内通摄 对转让或掏买输气容最提出的报份、该报价的条款和条件以 及在本条（ b）款中指定的替代托运人的姓名。 (e）管道公司必须将转让的输气容量分配给出价最高（不越过最 高费事）且提布满足任何其他转让条款和条件的人。如果出 椅最高且满是条款和条件的不止 1 个人，那么转让的输气容 量可议棋据管道公商运价表提供的摹础进仔分配。提条件 是：如果在本条（时款中错定的替代托运人出价最高，则 • 73 • 该输气容量必须分配给该指定的替代托运人。 (f) 除非经过管道公司闰意，否则托运人转让容擎的合自将一直 有效，从转售给替代托运人中既获得的净收益记人转让托i运 人的预约容蠢费。 (g）根据本部分 B 节或 G 节的规定提供圈定输气服务的升l 际管 道公苟的国定纪运人，在必要时，提据〈天然气政策法》第 7 条，可授予一定极限的公益必要设施通用许可证书，只用 于按照本条进行商定输气容景的转让。 (h) （口商定托运人向替代托运人转让输气容量 31 天或本j!J 31 天或者按照适用于转让的最高这价费率在任何期跟自替 代托运人转让输气容量，不需要遵守本条（ c ）到（ e) 款规定的通告和竞价要求。按本款规定进行的转让可以 不越过最高费事。按强本款进行的固定输气容撞转让遥 告必亵尽快在管道公司的电子公告上公布，雨旦转让交 易开始运 48 小时之内必须公布。 (2 ）当按照本条 h (1 ）敦进行的转让低于最高运份费率时， 在不符合本条（ c）到（ e）款的要求的情况下，固定芫 运人不可属腾、延期或以其他方式继楼以提于最高远街 费灌进有转让。在第一次转让期结束后 28 天之内，固 定挺运人不可以低于最高运份费串的条件将其输气容量 再转让给按照本款规定的同一个替代托运人。 (i）最高运份费率上限的放弃。 直到 2002 年 9 月 30 帘，最高运份费率才应用于期限不到一 年的输气容量转让交易。按照本节也） (1 ）款的规定，对 以适用的最高运价费率要求提供管道服务，免除擒气交易所 需的公布通告和竞价要求，但这一规定在最高运份费率上限 生效时将不予以应用。关于按原本节（ h）款进行的 31 天之 内的转让，（ h) (2 ）款的要求将适期于所有此类转让而不考 虑所收载的费率高棋。 [636 号令， 57 F:丑 13318, 1992 年 4 月 16 日，根据 636-A 号令 74 修改， 57 FR 36217, 1992 年 8 月 12 日； 577 号令， 60 FR 16983, 1995 年 4 月 4 日； 577-A 号令， 60 FR 30187, 1995 年 6 月 8 缸。 提据 637 号令重新设计租修改， 65 FR 10220, 2000 年 2 月 25 日； 637-A 号令， 65 FR 35765, 2000 年 6 月 5 13 J0 第 284.9 条可中雕输气服务 (a）可中断输气的可用性。 (1) 按照本部分 B 节或 G 节的规定提供固定输气服务的州 际管道公司还必须按照 B 节租俄 G 节的规定提供可中 断输气服务，陌11这种服务要再任何售气服务相分离。 (2 ）按黑本部分 C 节提供输气服务的州内管道公司可以提供 可中断辑气服务。 (3 ）可中断输气服务是擂用于提供输气服务的容量受到另一 用户或另一类服务优先权的限制，其得到的输气服务钝 先提别｛乐于另一期户或另一类服务的优先级剧。 (b ）关于包含在第 284.7 条（ b ）、（ c）有（ f）款中的无i吱视准 人、合理营运条件及限制巍定，适用于根据本节规定提供可 中断服务的管道公司。 (c）旗约睿主意费。又才可中新输吨服务不收取王震约容量费。根据本 节规定提供输气服务的某个管道公苟的费事，可以不包摇最 保额度跟单或最低提气量条款，或其他任街具有保证收益影 呐的条款。 [436 号令， 50 FR 42494, 1985 年 10 月 18 日］ 蝙者注：关于影日自第 284.9 条的联邦注册援引案例，参觅受影响 的 CFE 章节的清单，该文出现在印刷卷宗通过 GPO 路程进入商读帮 现…节中。 第 284.10 条费事 （ε〉适用性。提据本部分 B 节和 G 节的规定对提供输气服务收 联的任何费率必须被据费率明缅表确立，该费率明细表在开 ·才5 • 始提供此类服务之前要在联邦能摞管理委员会备案并符合本 节的规定。 (b）费事目惊。必须设计用气高峰期和非高峰期的最高费率以达 到以下三个自栋： (1 ）高蜷期输气服务费率应使容量定囊分配； (2 ）非高峰期固定输气服务费率和在高峰期或非商峰期可中 断输气服务的费率应使管输量最大化； (3 ）通过以最高费率在高峰期或非商埠崩对固定输气服务与 可中断输气服务提供经过计糙的单位服务囊，应达到管 道公司分配给固定辑气服务与吁中新输气服务的收益要 求。 (c）费率设计。 (1 ）体积费率。 除了第 284.7 条〈时款规定的以外，扇子根据本节提 供服务巳备案的费率必须是一部锚费率，包括了分配至 该服务的戚本即实际购买的该服务的预计单拉服务景， 但可以不包括需求费、最低额皮虫草单或最低提气量条 款，或其他任何具有保证收益影响的条款。该费率1必须 分别确定出用于输气、储气和集气的戚本。 (2 ）基于预计的单位服务量。 必须设计提据本节条款提供服务的已备案的费事 IV. 便被 据预计的单位服务量来国收服务成本。按照第 284.7 条 (e）款确定的分重己给预约容量费的固定戚本应与管道公 词所接受的计却指定气量一起使用以计算出，单位预约容 量费。应使用乘i余的固定戚本和所在可变成本确定根据 预计输气量计算出的体积费率。截据本节备案的服务费 率预计提供的单位服务撞只可以在依据《天然气政策 I 法〉第 4 节规定的最绒费率申报中改变。 - (3 ）由于时问和距离造成的费率差异。 s 依据本节备案的服务费率必须在提供服务的成本中合理 • 76 • - z ! 反映出于以下原因造成的实质性差异： (i ）提供的辑气服务是在高峰期还是在非高暗期； (ii ）提供输吨服务的距离。 （的费事的成本基础。． 。）必须设计依据本节备案的最高费率以单位费率方式 专门去回收那费远三百分配给读费寻盖房适用的服务的 成本。 (ii ）依据本节备案的最｛路费事必绩以适当分配始该费率 所适用的服务的平均可变成本为基础。 (5 ）费串的灵活性。 (i ）依据本节备案的任何费事晓细表都必颈说明一个最 高费率和一个最低费率。 (ii) (A）除本条（ d) (5) (ii) (B ）款的规定外，管道 公词可以向个别用户收取既不高于该项服务 B 各案的最高费率也不低于最低费率的费率。 (B）如果管道公司没有按照本部分 G 节中的规定 持有通用资格证书，在涉及其市场销售关联公 司的交易中，诙管道公司收取的费事不可以低 于其与非销售关联公司交易班要求的最高费 率。 (iii ）管道公司可以不提出锋订或设计新的费率，以回 i段在以前实行的费率中来由收的成本。 [436 号令， 50 FR 42493, 1985 年 10 月 18 日，在 50 FR 52274, 1985 年 12 月 23 日惨政； 53 FR 22163, 1988 年 6 月 14 日； 522 号令， 55 1夜 12169, 1990 年 4 月 2 曰： 581 号令， 60 FR 53072, 1995 年 10 月 11 日。按据 637 号令聋新标出和惨改， 65 FR 10220, 2000 年 2 月 25 日。〕 第 284.11 条得合环境保护要求 (a）枉伺被照第 284.3 条（ c）款、本部分 B 节或 C 节中规定授 • 77 • 权的进行管道设蝇建设或拆踪后废弃的任何摇动都应遵守本 章第 157.206 条（ b）款条款和条件的规定。 (b ）理先造告。 (1 ）总则。除本条（ b) (2 ）款规定的以外，在开始管道建 设之前至少 30 天，有关公司必须通报联邦能源管理委 员会关于本条（ a）款中所述的任何活动。 (2 ）倒外。如果项目成本不越过本规章第 157.208 条〈的 款中表 I 第 1 栏中班娱定的戚本限额，无需本条（ b) (1 ）款中所述的颈先通告。 (c）嚣先通告的内容。 本条（』） (1 ）款中所述的旗先通告必续包含以下信息： (1) 简要描述将要建设的设施或拆除废弃的设施〈包括管 道直径和长度、压辖机功率、设计输景和建设戚本）： (2 ）证实符合本章第 157.206 条（ b）数每→条的规定； (3 ）美国地质勘棋！局最新 7.5 分钟系列地摇揽i量囱显示这 主要设施的位置； （的描述府于土壤使蚀控制、建新植被和维护、溪流和漫 地穿越等的程序。 〈的报告要求。 每年 5 月 1 日之前，公司必须提交年度报告〈按照本章第 385.2011 条有关电子媒体要求，提拱电子般及七份纸质提告），列出 在上一公历年中本条（ a）款中所述的各项活动及已完工情况以及根 据本条（ b) (2 ）款规定无需预先通告的活动。对每项活动，该公司 都必须包捂本条（ c）款中蔚述的所有信息。 [544 号令， 57 FR 46495, 1992 年 10 月 9 日，提据 581 号令修 改， 60 FR 53072, 1995 年 10 月 11 S; 603-A 号令， 64 FR 54537, 1999 年 10 丹 7 日］ 第 284.12 条管道业务经营相信息标准 (a）电子公告。按据卒革a条款或其远街表要求如i 际管道公司在电 • 78 • 子公告上显示倍患时，该营造公司必须在其电子公告上提供 以下使用特征： (1 ）踊户下载； (2 ）电子公告显示信息每日备份，必魏可让用户对至少 3 年 的信患进行查阅； (3 ）从吕前文档中清i东巳完成交易的信患； (4 ）在以前登载的信息条目之前显示最新的信息项； (5 ）有在我帮助和使用户能够查询到特定交易全部信息的搜 索功能；设置菜单允许用户分射进入有关阅页了解可用 输气容嚣的遁告、销售关联公司的折扣信息、销售关联 公司容最分黠记录以及行为标准信患等。 (6 ）当根据本条（ c) (3) (i ）款提供了所有相关信患时， 管道公司根据本款提供信息的义务终止。 (b）气体工业部准委员会（ GISB）挥准的参考文献。 (1) 按照本部分 5 或 G 节的规定输送天然气的州路管道公 商必须遵守以下商业惯例如天然气工业标准委员会颁 布的电子通筑标准，包括以F汇总参考： (i ）与指定气量有关的标准（ 1999 年 8 月 31 日 1.4 版〉； (ii ）流动气体相关棋准（ 1999 年 8 月 31 日 1.4 戚）， 但标准 2:3.29 和 2.3.30 除外； (iii）开交发票相关标准（ 1999 年 8 月 31 日 1.4 版〉； (iv）电子交付机制辑关标准（ 1999 年 11 月 15 日 1.4 报），但标准 4.3.4 除外： (v）容量转让相关标准（ 1999 年 8 月 31 吕 1.4 版）。 (2 ）这一套汇总参考是联邦注册部门根据 U.S.C.552 (a) 布 1 CFR51 条款批准的。从位于梅克萨斯州 77002 休 斯敏 3625 房路易斯安娜 1100 处的天然气工业标准委 员会可获得这些标准的复本。这些复本可能会在联邦 能自尊管理费员会公共参考文献现档案雄护部门（ 888 ’ 79 • First Street, NE 俑， Washington; DC 20426 ）及联邦注 册办公室（ 800 North Capitol S仁， NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC）受到检查。 (c）营业实践和电子递讯要求。 提据本部分 3 节或 G 节规定输送天然气的州际管道公司搭须遵 循以下要求。本款中各项法规采用的结略诸如定义都包含在天然气工 业辑：在委员会的标准汇总参考中。 (1 ）指定气量。 (i ）臼内指定气景。 (A）霄’道公司必须在为可中断输气服务托运人安排指定 和计划气肇之前位先安排周定输气服务托运人提 交的白内指定气蠢的供气时间表。由于供应器定输 气托运人的日内指定气建而不得不减少可中睽输气 服务托边人的计划气盘时，必窥预先通知可中既输 气托运人该减少的输气量，而且必缆告知该扭运人 在其气莹减少的那天是否实施罚款。 (B）在天然气流功之前一天提交的日内指定气盘将在当 日 9 点钟开始生效。 (ii）容量转让指定气嚣。管道公臼必须允许在得已转让容最 的托运人在获得容景之后在尽可能平的时间内提交指定 气章，如果管道公司要求该替代托运人签署合同，这份 合国必颈在通知管道公前该转让后一小时之内缔结，但 是签署合同的要求不能妨碍该替代托运人在~可能早的 指定气景时间内提交摇定气量。 (2 ）流功气体。 (i ）费远平衡踌议。管道公司必须在其管道系统与另一个州 际或~·M 内管道公司的系统之i司的既有交汇点处都签署营 运平衡蜘议。 (ii ）不平衡供吨的瑕网与买卖。管道公司必须制订条款，允 许托运人及其代理？中抵该托主丢人持有的与管道公司的不 • 80 • 阿合同中出珑的不平衡气囊，在该不平衡气量对该管道 公司的输气系统具有相假的营运影响的情况下，允许他 {f] 与其他挺运人买卖不平衡气量。 (iii ）不平衡气量管理。在其远街表中订有不平衡气量罚款 条款的管道公司在营运可有的情况下，必续提供临时 储存、出｛音或其他服务，以帮助其托运人提高管理输 气不平衡的能力。管道公司还必须为其挂运人提供从 其他供吨方获得类恕不平衡管理服务的抗会，并且无 歧辑或无优惠地向那些利用其他供气方的托运人提供 输气准入和其他管道服务。 (iv）运营应急措令。管道公司必须采取各种合理的行动尽 最减少运营应急指令（ OFO）的发出军在负面影自由，或 者采取其他措施以应对在其管道系统上发生的不利运 宵事件。管道公司必须在其费率表中针对这些措施开 始如终止的时间制订明确的标准，商且必须及时提供 信患使托运人能够尽最减少这些措施的负西影略。 (v）罚款。管道公司吁以在其费率表中包含输吨罚款提仅在 必要时去租止对可靠服务的损害。管道公司可以不留存 净罚款收入，但必续以管道公司费事表中规定的方式把 这整收入记入托埠人的踩上。在其费率表中包含罚款条 款的管道合玛必须定期南花运人提供思可能多的有关每 个花运人的不平衡气量和超量情况以及管道系统不平衡 输气情况的倍息。 (3 ）通讯楼议。 (i) (A）管道公司提供的所有电子信息和进行的电子交易都 必须在公共互联网上进抒。管道公司必续按照要求 提供使南互联网工具的私人网络连接方法、互联网 白录服务以及互联网通讯胁议，商且管道公可必续 向这接陶络提供全部的电子信息无歧视准入。管道 公司可以较取合理的费用来回收提供这种互联的成 . 81 本。 (B）管道公司必须在 2000 年 6 月 1 日前执行此项要求。 (ii）管道公玛必须灌守下列在管道公苟同站上公开披露信息 的文件要求： (A）文件必续是在公共互联网上使用市售浏宽器公众 可以进λ的，不设置口令或其他准人要求： (B）用户必须能够用所选择的词汇在线搜索强i完整的 文件，能够复制所选择的部分文件： (C）肉站上的文件应可以直接下载，国无需用户先看 到阿站上的文件。 (iii ）如果管道公司使用数字或其锦标识来代表倍患，那么 用户必须可以得到j 该数字或其锦标识以及所代表信息 的电子对照表，其费用不应超出合理的运送和处理费 道醋。 （的〉管道公司对所有信息都必绩提供相同的目 ' rr吉克需 考虑提供信息的电子格式Q (v）营造公司必须对显示的所有信息和根据本款进行的电子 交易信息保留三年，并且必须能够’段复拍手等现所有此类 的电子结息和文件。管道公司必须便这些归档信息以合 理的费用就可以电子版的形式获得。 (vi ）管道公司必颈在其互联网站上发布营运输气j眠序〈订 单〉、关键的期限及其锦关键事顶的速知，并且必须向 受影确方以其选择的下述方式发送上述遥知〈以电子 邮件的形式或者直接将通知传至该方的互联网℃RL 地 址〉。 〔 587 号令， 61 FR 39068, 1996 年 7 月 26 白，根据 587-B 号令 修改， 62 FI之 5525·, Feb. 6, 1997 年 2 丹 6 A; 587- c 号令， 62 FR 10690, 1997 年 3 月 10 A; 587-G 号令， 63 FR 20095, 1998 年 4 月 23 日； 587-H 号令，的 FR 39514, 1998 年 7 月 23 日； 587 … I 号令， 63 FR 53576, 1998 年 10 丹 6 日； 587-K 号令， 64 FR 17278, 1999 • 82 • 年 4 月 9 日。按据 637 号令重新栋注和修改， 65 FR 10220, 2000 年 2 月 25 百； 637-A 号令， 65 FR 35765, 2000 年 6 月 5 吕； 587 … M 令， 65 FR 77290, 2000 年 12 月 11 臼〕 第 284.13 条 对知i 际管道公司的报告要求 根据本部分挂节或 G 节的规定提供输气服务的州际管道公司必 须遵守以下报告要求。 (a）相互参照。管道公需视情况许可必须濡守本规章第 161 条、 第 250 条自及第 260 条的要求。 (b ）关于摆定输气服务和可中断输气服务的报告。好i 际管道公司 必须在其互联同站上发布如下信息，并以可下载文件的格式 提供信息〈依照第 284.12 条〉，而且从信息发布之日起 90 天之内必须保持这些信恳的准人查阅。 (1 ）对于管道商定服务在及根据第 284.8 条进行的容盘转 让交易，管道公司盆、续在进行交易的第一次气量指定 之前发布关于每一份服务合同或修改服务合同的下述 结息： (i ）托运人的合法全称，根据该合同获得服务的托运 人身价证号，如果涉及输气睿量转让那为转让托 运人的合法全稼和身份证号，或指出管道公司是 输气容量的出售者； (ii ）根据该合国得到j 服务的托运人的合同号，此外， 对于转让交易，则为转让托运人合同的合同号： (iii ）每个合同收取的费率； (iv）最高费卒，组容量转让交易不受限于最高费卒， 适用于比较销售管进服务的最高费事； ( v）合阿期照； (vi ）合同规定的接收和交付点和区城或区段，包插每 一交接点、区域或区段的行.ill!:i庭用ft码； (vii ）合同数量或体积转让数最； • 83 • (viii）适用于容量转让的特殊条款和条件，包括合同 与管道公玛远街偏离的所有方面以及与管道雄 气合院有关的特别细节，包括台词是否为议价 费率合肉和适用于轩扣输气合同的条件等； (ix）管道公司与托运人之闻是否有关联关系，或者转 让托运人与爱让托运人之间是否有关联关系。 (2 ）对于管道可中新输气服务，管道公司在提据可中断输 气服务协议进行第一次气量指定服务之前必须每日发 布如下信息： (i ）得到服务的托边人的合法金名称和身扮证号： (ii ）校取的费率； (iii ）最高费事： (iv）合同规定的接收和交付点和区域或区段，钮括每 一交接点、区域或区段的行业通用代码： (v）托运人有权输送的气最： (vi ）与该输气楼议有关的特别组节，包括适用于折扣 输气合间的条件以及该协议与管道公司运价销离 的所有方爵： (vii）托运人与管道公司是否有关联关系。 (c）用户索引。 (1 ）在每个公茄季度的第一个营业窍，外i 际管道公司必、续向 联邦能摞管理委员会提交一份与委员会的要求内容一致 的依据合同截止到该季度第一个营业目的所有自定输气 租储气用户的索引。提交该索引的要求和格式将自委员 会来制订。根据第 284.12 条菜靡的标准，用户索引还 必须公布在管道公司互联网页上，并可以从互联网站上 下载，下载格式与委员会制订的格式租一致。在下一个 事度的用户索引公布之前，管道公司互联简页上公有的 信患必须…直保留。 (2 ）对于每个接受固定辘气或储气服务的托运人罗府户索引 . 84 • 必须钮括以下这些信息： (i）托运人合法的全名称和身岱证号； (ii ）正在提供服务所适用的运份明细表编号； (iii ）合同铺号： (iv）合爵的生效日期和终止 Z 期； (v）对于输气服务，舍前的最大日输气量〈指定的计量 单位〉；琦于储气服务，最大的错气量（指定的计 盏单位）； (vi) 合同适用的接收如交付点和区域或区段，这接点 和区域或区段所具有的接收和交付能力，包括每 ’一交接点、区域或区段的行业通用找码： （悦。说明合同中是否包括了己任谈判过的费率； “ii）管理托运人输气服务的代理人或资产管理人员的 、姓名； (ix）管道公司与托运人之间或管道公司与捂运人资产 管理人员或代理人之间是否有关联关系。 (3 ）本款提白的要求不适用于仅与依照第 284.8 条进行容 盘转让有关的合同，但如果这种容最转让是永久性的 跺外。 (4）不要求按照本款的规定公布新提交用户索引的管道公 司，必须摄据委员会规章第 157 部分及在本尊重第 154.111 条（盼和（ c）款的理定，遵守适用于输气和 销售的公布和提交甩户索引的要求。 (5 ）关于电子索引的要求可从位于华盛按特区 20426 的联 邦能源管理委员会信息服务部公共参考及档案维护分 部得到。 (d ）可用容量。 (1 ）根据第 284.12 条的规定，如i 部管道公司必续提供互联 阿地址、百下载的文梢格式~及使用户无论在何时…且 容量计划做出就能平等及时地获取与班有可用输气服务 • 85 • 有关的信怠，这些信息包括假不眼于接投点的可用容 量、干线管道的可用容最、交待点的可用容盘、储气库 的可府容量、该容盏是否可~从管道公司直接获得还是 要通过容量转让挟得、管道系统上的每个交接点或区我 的总设计容盘、无论在何时容最计划做出后每个交接点 或区段的计划赣量、所有计划的或实陈的储运服务提耗 及服务能力的减少。 (2）在每年的 3 丹 1 目前，外i 际管道公司必须提交一份年度 报告，在报告中给出在有代表性的合理运行假定工况下 管道系统的高蜷吕倍计输气能力、估计错气能力和储气 设施的最大日交件能力以及将该容最分别分起给该管道 公司提供的各种自定服务用户的数量。 (e）半年储气报告。在每个天然气错存注入或采出季节结束的 30 天内，捕际管道公司必须由委员会提交一份储气业务的 报告。这捞报告必须在高级官员宣誓的约束下签署，包括一 份原件和 5 份与原件内容完全一致的复印件；报告对天然气 储存注人或采出进行总锚，钮摇以下一些内容： (1 ）每个向储气库注入和俄采出天然气的用户的身告，并 说明他们与卦！际管道公玛是否有关联关系； (2 ）进行错气注入或果出服务所执行的费事明细表： (3 ）适用于每个储气用户的最大储气量及最大白果出量： （的每个储气用户在整个储气摆阔向储气库注入和1或从中 果出的气景： (5 ）在住人只础期间从每个错气用户收取的单位费用布总 收入，并注明在整个注入／果出期韶所允许的折扭范围。 （£）旁行通知。向位于地方配气公司服务区域的用户提供输气 （储气除外）服务并且将不会向该配气公司交付该用户天然 气的州际管道公司必摆在开始该输气服务后的 30 天内肉联 邦能源管理委员会提交一倍声明，说晓该管道公苟已在开始 读辑气服务前书茵通知地方配气公甫以及该地方配气公司相 • 86 • 关的监管挽构有关思建议的输气情况。 〔 637 号令， 65 FR 10221, 2000·年 2 月 25 日？根据 637~A 号令 修改， 65 FR 35765, 2000 年 6 月 5 日 1，；。 第 284.14 条 〈保留） B节 由分i 际管道公司输送某些天然气 飞， 'I 第 284.101 条适用性 .B 节贯翻实览《天然气政策法》第 311 (a) (i ）载，适用于代表 (a）任前卦i 内管道公司或 (b）任f吁地方配气公司 4 的任何卦i际管道公司进行天然气输送。 第 284 .• 102 条 出如陈管道公司输送天然气 (a）棋据本条（ d）、（ e）款、 B 节中的其他规定以及本部分 A 节 中的条件，在无需事先得到i委员会同意的4情因下，州际管道 公司被授权代表以下这些公司输送天然气： (1 ）任何辩内管道公司；或 (2 ）任f吁地方配气公司。 (b）依据 B 节规定收取的输气费率不应超过依据 A 节确定的公 正合理的费率。 (c）根据 B 节的规定，从事输气业务安撑的州际管道公理必续掖 照本章第 284.13 条和第 284.106 条的巍定提交报告。 (d）并不是代表州内管道公司或地方配气公司或提据本条款的授 权输送天然气，除非： (1 ）该如！内管道公司或地方配气公司在某一点上对天然气有 实际监护权并且输送天然气：政 (2 ）该知i 内管道公司或地方配气公司可能在外！际管道公司输 • 87 • 送天然气之前、期鹊或之后，在某一点上对该天然气有 所有权，这种所有权与其作为州内管道公可或地方配气 公司的地位和职能有关；或 (3 ）在某一点上将天然气交付结踊户，这些用户或是位于璀 方班气公司的服务区内，或是实际上能移直接从州内管 道公司接收交件的天然气，商且蛇肉管道公萄或地方配 ？气公可证明其代表该用户在接受如l 陈管道公商正在提供 的输气服务。 (e）根握本条的越走，如i 院管道公司必须取得其托运人的证明， 该证院应包括足够的信息以证实其服务的质量。在开始本条 (d) (3 ）款描述的输’气服务之前，州际管道公司必须钱据本 条（ d) (3 ）款规定从地方配气公司或如i 内管道公肖耳挺得既 要求的证明。 ’1161EZ [436 号令， 50 FR 42495, Oct. 18, 1985 年 10 月 18 白，根据 526 笔，飞 号令修改，但 FR 33011, 1990 年 8 月 13 日： 537 号令， 56 FR50245, h6gala 、 1991 年 10 月 4 自； 581 号令， 60 FR 53072, 1995 年 10 丹 11 吕； 637 『1185ediet 号令， 65 FR 10222, 2000 年 2 月 25 日〕 ’ EeljIa 第 284.103 条至第 284.106 条（保留〉 ，，i， 2 C节 由井！内管道公司输送某些天然气 第 284.121 条适用性 C 节贯期实施｛天然气政策法》第 311 条（ a) (2 ）款，适黑子 代表 (a）任何如i 际管道公司：或 (b）任何出如i 际管道公司提供服务的施方配气公司 的任何判内管道公理进行天然气输送。 . 88 • 第 284.122 条出判内管道公司输送天然气 (a）遵照本条（ d）和（ e）款曲规定、 C 节中的其他规定并考虑 本部分 A 节中的适用条件，在元需事先得到委员会批准的 情摄下，井i 内管道公司可以代表以下公词输送天然气： (1 ）任何州际管道公司；或 (2 ）任掏出州际管道公司提供服务的地方配气公司。 (b ）假据 C 节授权收取的输气费率不应超过依据第 284.123 条 巍定的公平公正的费率标准。 (c）根据本教授权从事州内管道输气业务安排的如i 内管道公司必 须提据第 284.126 条的规定提交接告。 (d）并不是代表开！原管道公司或由州际管道公向提供服务的地方 配气公诗或者根据本条款的授权输送天然气，踪非： (1 ）该州际管道公司或地方配气公司在某…点上对天然气有 实际监护权并且输送天然气；或 (2 ）诙井i 际管道公司或地方配气公得可能在判内管道公可输 送天然气之前、期肉或之后，在某一点上对该天然气有 辟有枝，这种所有权与其作为州际管道公司或地方配气 公司的地位和职能有关。 [436 号令， 50 FR 42495, 1985 年 10 丹 18 日，根据 537 号令修 改， 56 FR 50245, Oct.4, 1991 年 10 月 4 日； 537-A 号令， 57 FR 46501, 1992 年 10 月 9 臼； 581 号令， 60 FR 53073, 1995 年四月 11 日］ 第 284.123 条费率和收费 (a ）通则。接据第 284.122 条（ a ）教授权输送天然气的费惑和 收费应依照本条（ b）款确定的是公正公平的费率和收费。 (b）费率的选择。 (1) 报提本章第 284.7 条和第 284.9 条中的条件，知i 内管道 公司可以选择： • 89 • (i）根据以下使用方法来确定其费事基础： ’飞'A）在设计费事时要因收铝合在一份当时己生效的 南于城市门站服务的周定售气费率明细表（该 ：费率明细表也申报给相关的知j监管机构〉内的 集吨、处理、加工、运输、交待或类假服务 〈包括错气服务）的成本；或 华（ B）确定将包含在提供城市门站天然气服务的配气 公司费率内的并被判相关监管机构所准许的补 贴；成 在i）使用己包含在一带当时已生效的用于井l 内输气服务 的输气费军事现细表〈该费率明细表巳申报给相关的 知监管机掬）中的费率，而且判内管道公司确定该 捕内雄气服务包含前服务与依据 C 节规定的服务 有可比性。 (2) (i）如果判内管道公司不打算根据本条（ b) (1 ）敏的兢定 进有费率选择，那么知内管i草公前就应通过自委员会提 交建议的费率和收费以及表明建议的费率和收费是公卒 和公正的资料，向委员会串请批准其提议的费率和收 费。每提交…岱批准请求者在班同时擞付根据本规章第 381.403 条规定的收费，或者战照本规章第 384.106 条 规定请求放弃。在提交批准申请嚣，知l 内管道公司可剖 开始输气最务并按提议的费率较费，但只限于偿还款。 (ii ）在委员会收到被据本条（ b) (2) (i）款提交的申请 150 天以弱，申请中提议的费帘将视为是公正如公平的，商 且该费事金额不超过舟内智遵公司提供类企i稽气最务所 允许i段取的数额；除非在 150 天内，委员会延长付诸实 施的时间或挺起诗讼，在诗讼过程中所有有利害关系的 当事方都将给予杭金可以书面摸口头方式陈述自己的班 点、数据和论据。在诉讼过程中，委员会或者将批准该 • 90 • 费率，或者不批准该费事并责令连同利息一起返坯巳确 定为超出公平和公正的费事金额的部分，或者是超出判 内管道公司提供类叙服务所允许收取的费用。 (iii）根据本教批准或不批准…项输气费事的委员会令取代 根据本条（ b) (1 ）款确定的费事。 (c）牧人处理。委员会认为对在根据第 284.122 条（ a ）款授校 下的州内管道公司通过运输天然气所收取并根据本条（ b) (1) 教计算出来的一切牧人，卦！有关监管机构已经或将要予 以考虑，茵的是确定好i 内管道公吨；与州内房户提供输气服务 收取的费用。 (d）假定。如果判内管道公司正在收取的费率是按据第 284.123 条（ b) (1 ）款计算的，那么收取的费率就可议假设是： (1) 公正和公平的；和 (2 ）没超过如际管道公司提供类假输气服务所允许收取的费 率布拉费。 (e）申报要求。在开始新服务的 30 天内，故照本节的规定从事 天然气运输业务的卦i 内管道公司都必须由委员会提交一份声 明，声明中应载述管蕴公司将如柯从事天然气输送虫务，包 括运营条件，如康景栋准和托运人的财务能力 α 声明中还必 筑包含该如i 内管道公司根据本条（ b）款所选择的费事。，如 果管道公司改变其管道运营条件或改变根据 C 节规定的费率 选择，那么在运霄条件改变或费率选择改变开始后的 30 天 内，该管道公司必须对上述声明做出修正并将这提修正申 援。 [ 44 FR 52184, ,1979 年 9 月 7 白，在 44 FR 66791 修改， 1979 年 11 月 21 日； 394 号令， 49 FR 35364, 1984 年 9 月 7 日； 436 号令， 50. .FR42496, 1985 年 10 月 18 自； 50 FR 52276, 1985 年 12 月 23 白： 581 号令， 60 FR 53073, 1995 年 10 月 11 日］ ; 91 • 1 ( 第 284.124 条 条敖租条件 钱据本节授权输送天然气的合同应规定天然气输送业务应服从本 节的条款规定。 第 284.125 条 〈保留〉 第 284.126 条 报告要求 (a）旁行通知。依照第 284.122 条规定，向位于地方配气公司服 务区域的用户提供输气（储气除外〉服务并且将不会向该配 气公司交付该用户天然气的判内管道公司必须在开始该输气 服务活的 30 天内向联邦能源管理委员会提交一份声畴，说 明该管道公司已在开始该输吨服务前书韶通知地方配气公司 以及该地方配气公司相关的监管机梅有关已建议的输气情 斑。 (b ）年援。在每年的 3 月 31 日以前，州内管道公司都必须向委 员会和相关的好11监管机构提交年度报告，该报告包含提据第 284.122 杂在上一年度提供的每破输气服务（储气除外）的 信息如： (1) 接受输气服务的托运人姓名； (2 ）服务类型（如固定的或可中断的输气服务〉； (3 ）托运人的输气总盘α 如果是固定输气服务，报告中应分 别说明预约气疆和实际管输量： （的从茹运人收取的总收入。如果是固定输气服务，报告中 应分别说明预约气量收入和实际管输i投入。 (c）半年储气报告。在每个天然气储存注人或果出香节结束的 30 天内，炜内管道公商都应向委员会提交一告提据第 284.122 条授权提供储气业务的报告。这褂报告必绩在高级 官员宣誓的约束下肇署，包括一份原件和 5 份与原件内容完 全一致的复印件；报告对天然气错存注入和果出进行总结， • 92 • 包括以下一些内容： (1 ）每个向储气捧注入考Ill!或采出天然气的用户的身份； （引以前曾我准的错气注人或采出费率单据； (3 ）适用于每个错气用户的最大错气赣及最大日果自盘； (4 ）每个错气用户在整个错气期间向储气库注入和钱从中 来出的气蠢； 〈盯在注λ泛采出揭间从每个储气琦户收取的单位费用幸口总 软入：以及 (6 ）卦i 内管道公司所报告的与德气相关的注入／果出输气援 务的梧关单据号码。 (d）终止通告。在于衷据第 284.122 条授权的输气业务（储气磁 外）终止活的 30 天内，卦i 内管道公司必续向委员会和栩关 的州监管挠，椅提交一份声明，向委员会提交的声明出一份服 件和 5 份与原件内容一敖的复印件组成，声明中应包含以下 结息： (1) 输气交易指定的单据号码勒交易的终止日期； (2 ）棋擂交易安排的总输气量； (3 ）收取措总收入；以及 (4 ）…份声明，旺明该输气服务是根据该单据中以前公布的 条款和条件提供的。 〔436 号令， 50 FR 42496, Oct. 18, 1985 年 10 月 1s a ，在 50 FR 52276 穆改， 1985 年 12 JJ 23 a; 636 号令， 57 FI之 13317, 1992 年 4 丹 16 日； 581 号令， 60 FR 53073, 1995 年 10 月 11 野］ D节 由井i 内管道公司进行某些天然气销售 来摞： 44 FI之 12409, 1979 年 3 月 7 日，另有往明除外. 44 FR 52184, 1979 年 9 另 7 日蒙新指定。 • 93 • 第 284.141 条适用性 D 节贯翻实施《天然气政策法》第 311 条（的款，适用于自如！ 内管道公需销售某些天然气给： (a）州际管道公司：和 (b）由州际管道公司提供服务的地方配气合司。 第 284.142 条由师内管道公商销售天然气 在没有事先得到委员会推准的情况下，任前州内管道公商都可以 向任何如l 际管道公司或任何由外！际管道公商提供服务的地方配气公商 销售天然气。故据本节知i 内管道公司收取的费盖在不得超过合向中已谈 判过的气价加上报提第 284.123 条确定的公正和公平的管输费率。 [581 号令， 60 FR 53073·; 1995 年 10 月 11 日］ 第 284.143 条－第 284.148 条 〈保留〉 E 节－ F 节 （保留） G 节通用许可证书 授权知i 际管道公司代表其他公司进行某些输气业务 以及接权地方配气公司进行服务， 第 2制 .221 条通用：自判陈臂’道公司代表其他公商输气 (a）通用许可证书。任何师际管道公词都可以根据本款申请一岔 通用许可证书，授权其故据本节代表其他公司辑送天然气。 根据《天然气法》第 7 条的规定，授予依据本款的公益必要 设施证书。 （时申请程序。 • 94 • (1 ）提据本款提定申请适用许11Ji:iE书必须以电子文件形式提 交。电子申请文件的格式可从联邦能摞管理委员会结阜 服务部的公共参考资料与档案维护分部寂取，地址是华 盛摇 20426 号。 E扫请文件必须包括： (i）该如部管道公司的名称：和 （吕）该州际管道公司的…份声明，表示该公司将遵守本 条（ c）款的条件规定。 〈盯在收到掖据本款规定提交的申请后，委员会将根据《天 然气法》第 7 条（ c）款和本娟章第 157.11 条的规定举 行听证：如果是由于公益必要设施的需要，委员会将根 据本节规定向炜际管遵公司颁发通用许可证书，授权该 管道公司运输天然气。 . (c）一般条件。根据本节规定授予的任柯通用许可证书都应服从 －本部分 A 节中规定的条件。 (d）疲弃或放弃的事先批准。 (1 ）除了本条（ d) (2 ）款的规定外，在合阿条款到期或根 据本条规定授予证书商援权开展的每一单油输气业务终 止后，依照《天然气法》 7 条.（ b ）款的规定对放弃输 气服务授权。。 (2 ）如果个别输凭安排是合阿期眼为一年或一年以上的固定 输气服务，则本条（的（ 1 ）款的规定不适用，商且商 定托运人： (i ）行使合闰权利继镇获得该输气服务；或 Gi) 发出通知告知：该固定托运人希望继镇其输气安 排，将使其盟定输气服务的最长期限和最高费率与 第 284.10 条规定的适用最高费率担一致，并与任 何希望获得盟定输气容量的其他人给管道公司在制 订管道费率期间提出的报份相当，商且该固定托运 人腰衍句该报价的期限相一敖的合向。理定托运人 要取得该种钝先取舍权的资格，其合同必须为连续 • 95 • 12 个月或更长时间的输气服务合同并且为该服务 支付适用的最高费率；组合同期限超过一年而又不 可能连续 12 个月提供Bit务的合同除外，该类合间 将受限于位先取舍棋。 (e）普通证书的可用性。 本节并不排除知i 际管道公司申请用于特殊输气服务的单项公益必 需设施证书。 （£）参照。 (1 ）任何自州路管道公司提供服务的地方配气公商都可以申 请通期许可证书以完成依据本规章第 284.224 条规定 的某些服务。 (2 ）任挥师际管道公司都吁以根据委员会规章第 157 部分 F 节中的规定申请通用许可证书以建设或获得和追营根据 第 284.223 条兢定提供输气服务所必需的某些天然气设 趟。 (3 ）本规章第 157.208 条提供自珍授权，可以建设、获得、 运营、置换和重新配置本规章第 157.202 条定义的某些 合格设施， 1！！须服从本规章第 157.208 条〈的敖租第 284.11 条详结规定的摄制条件。 （的交待点的授权须服从第 157 .211 条（ a) (1) 款启动授 权的眼制以及依据第 157 .211 条（ a) (2 ）款和第 157.205 条规定的预先遥知程序。 (g ）灵活的接收点授权。 (1) 在托运人的要求下以及没有预先遥知的情况下，依照本 条款授予证书进部授权去输送天然气的卅际管道公司可 以： (i) 在某一特殊接牧点，减少或停止接收供应商的天然 气：和 (ii ）在某…特殊接收点，开始或增加从该棋应商或其他 供应商接收天然气。 • 96 • (2 ）在依据本款对接收点气最主支新分配后，邦际管道公苟且厅 接收的天然气总气量不得越过其提据本条款援予的证书 代表托运人可以辑送的天然气总气量。 (3 ）摄据本款规定可以整新分配气量的接收点包括第 157.208 条规定的合格设施，根据按照本规章第 157 部 分 F 节颁发的证书巳授极可以建设和运营这些设施。 (h）灵活费告交付点授权。 (1 ）在托运人的要求下以及没有班先混告的情况下，依照本 ．条款授予证书进而授权去输送天然气的炖际管道公海可 以： (i）在某…特殊交付点，藏少或停止交付天然气；和 (ii）在某一特殊交付点，开始或增加交付量。 (2 ）在经过交付气蠢的重新分配盾，开i 际管道公司交付的天 然气总气露不得超过其根摇本条款颁发的证书代表托运 人输送的天然气总气量。 (3) ＇.根据本款提定可以意新分配吨盘前交件，也包括仅截照本 规章第 157.211 条以及第 157.205 条规定能贺先通知条 件授权建设和运营能合格设菇。 [436 号令， 50 FR 42496, 1985 年 10 月 18 日，报掘 433 … A 号令 修改， 51 FR 43607, 1986 年 12 丹 3 自： 636 号令， 57 FR 13317, 1992 年 4 月 16 日； 636-A 号令， 57 FR 36217, 1992 年 8 丹 12 白； 581 令， 60 FR 53073, 1995 年 10 月 11 吕； 603 号令， 64 FR 26610, 1999 年 5 月 14 自； 637 号令， 65 FR 10222, 2000 年 2 月 25 臼； 637-A 号 令， 65 FR 35765, 2000 年 6 月 5 日〕 第 284.222 条 （保留） 第 284.223 条通过代表托运人的知际管道公司输气 根据 G 节的规定和本部分 A 节中的条件，在没有资先遥告军军委 员会批准的情况下，假期第 284.221 条的规定已取得证书的任何舟部 • 97 • 管道公司授枝在任意期间内为任智托运人、为该挺运人或其他人的程 何最终用途输送天然气。 〔 436 号令， 50 FR 42497, 1985 年 10 丹 18 骂： 50 F丑 45908, 1985 年 11 丹 5 El ，在 50 FR52276 修改， 1985 年 12 月 23 吕； 537 令， 56 FR 50245, 1991 年 10 月 4 日； 581 号令， 60 FR 53074, 1995 年 10 月 11 白： 637 号令， 65 FR 10222, 2000 年 2 月 25 吕］ 第 284.224 条 由地方配气公带输送租销餐某些天然气 (a）适用性。本条款适用于自判际管道公司提供服务的地方配气 公苟，包摇由于《天然气法》第 1 条（ c ）款的规定离不受 联邦能掠管理委员会校服约束的个人。 (b）通后许可证书。 (1 ）任何自州际管道公司提供殷务的撒方提气公司或任何 Hinshaw 管道公司都可以根据本条款的规定申请通用许 可证书。 (2）在根据本条款的规定申请证每菇，将依黑《天然气法》 第 7 条（ c）款、本章第 157.11 条及本章第 385 部分 H 节中的规定进行听证。 (3 ）如果是由于自前或将来的公益必需性设施而提出要求， 委员会将依据本条款向该地方配气公司或自我shaw 管 道公暗授予适用许可证书。该证书将授权该地方配气公 司从事被据《天然气法》由委员会管辖的天然气销售或 输送业务，而该施方配气公司销售或输送天然气的道胞 和方式持本部分 C 节和口节中搜权给外i 际管道公司从 事这些业务的菇围和方式相同，但本条〈功（ 2 ）款规 定的除外。 (c）申请程序。帘请通用许可证书必须向时撤纳本规章第 381.207 条规定的费用，或者提交位照本章第 381.106 条做 出的自动弃权诉状，并应说明： (1) 申请人准确的法律名称；主要紧营地点：公司是否是个 • 98 • 人、合快、集团或其他类型的公司；公司依井i法棒组建 戚授权所在的好i ；对费卒船运扮规则有管辖权的机构； 与该申请人联系时的联系人姓名、职务和通信地址： (2 ）天然气量，包括： (i) 在最近 12 个月内，申请人在列肉或知i 边界是接收 的气盏；和 (ii ）由于〈天然气法》 1 条（ c ）款的辑定，从委员会 《天然气法》管辖权中免除的气量〈如果有的话）： (3 ）在向一时间崩眼内，申请人从所有来摞接收的天然气总 气量； (4 ）根据《天然气法》第 1 条（ c）教引用联邦能糠管理委 员会所有当前有效的免费声明（如果有的话〉； (5 ）一扮声明表示申请人将遵守本条（ e）款规定的条件； (6 ）提据本规章第 157.9 条的考虑，一份要适合在联弗拉册 (FEDERAL REGISTER ）上公布的遥告，该通告要简 要她总结出在申请中陈建的事实，以便使公众熟悉其蒲 团和目的：和 (7 ）一椅声明，说明在其提供服务计算费率时既使用的计算 方法，依据第 284.123 条或本条（ e) (2 ）款选择费率 计算方法并利用当前数据能用其计算方法进行一个实倒 计算。如果接据本条（时（ 2 ）款进行费率选择，该声 明应包含如下现自〈反映 12 个月的情况，用以证明在 最近的由相关知i 监管机掏批准的费率案销中提出的成本 是正畴的〉： (i) 总的经营收入： (ii ）购气成本； (iii ）配气成本（§括分摊给配气业务的共词成本部 分）： (iv）棋据销售、输气布交换分类别的管道系统输气量； 以及 . 99 . I (v）一份提据本条（ e) (2 ）款规定以单位收入基础确 定输吨戚本的研究报告，包括辅崩研究工作的论 文。 〈的证书的作用 6 (1 ）根据本条款规定取得的证书将授权证书持有人从事本规 章部分 C 节如 D 节中规定授权的交易类型。 (2 ）接受证书或被据下文的授权从事业务将： (i ）摄据《天然气法》第 1 条（ c ）款的规定，不会自lj 弱任何可能适用于证书持有人的排他性极科的持续 有效性，以及’ (ii ）不会使证书持有人受到j 《天然气法》赋予委员会的 权利的约束，但强制执仔该证书的条款和条件所必 需的约束跺外。 (e）一般条件。 (1 ）根据通用许可证书授权的任何交易必须采用与怯据本部 分 C 节租 D 节中规定潜炖际管道公商授权进行交易所 采用的相同的费率和收费、条款和条件棋及接告要求， 但本条〈的（ 2 ）敬的规定除外。 (2 ）费率选择。如果证书持有人没有任何门站服务的辑仔费 旦在在相应的异i 监管机梅备案，则该证书持有人可以在第 284.123 条（ b ）款明确说明的费率选择方法中选定， 缸前提是： (i ）证书持有人的现行费率已经指应的知！监管机构披 准。 〈技）计算出输吨的费率和收费，采用的方法是：通过计 算珉行费率生成的证书持有人如权平均年单位技人 （每百万英击各单位），该收入应可以收回集气、处 理、加工、输送、交付或类似服务（包括错气服 务〉的成本；以及 。ii ）联邦能摞管理委员会已拉准了本条妇） (2 ）款明 • 100 • 确规定的费率和技费的计算方法。 (3 ）体积翻定。提据通用许可谊书销售的或分配的天然气气 量不得超过从乡H 挥管道以外来源获得的气量。 (4 ）提交报告。肉联邦能酒、管理委员会提交的每联单数交易 的报告，都应参照授予通用许可证书程序过程的记事表 (5 ）运价巍员。申报。本规章第 154 部分的运价姐姐申报要求 不适用于通用许可证书授载的交易。 （£）萤先准予放弃。依据《天然气法》第 7 条（ b ）款的规定， 当根据本条通过通用许可证书授校的每一单结业务安排的合 向条款至u期后，就可以授权敖弃输气服务和锚售业务。 (g ）没有通用许可证书的 Hinshaw 管道公司。被据本条款没有 获得通用许可证书的 Hinshaw 管道公词将不授权进行根据本 部分 C 节和 D 节的规定州际管道公司可以进行的天然气的 销售或输送。 〈且）定义。只用于本条款： (1) Hinshaw 营造公明是指任简从事天然吨输送业务的人， 仅仅由于依据〈天然气法》第 1 条（ c）款的规定商不 受《天然气法》授予委员会的权限的约束。 (2 ）如i 陈供气是指可~直接或间接地从下嚣的渠道获得天然 气： (i ）好i 际管遵公司系统提气；或 。i ）自 1978 年 11 月 8 日开始承诺或专供始判际商业的 天然气储量。 [ 45 FR 1875, 1980 年 1 月 9 臼，根据 319 号令修改， 48 FR 34891, 1983 年 8 月 1 臼； 48 FR 35635, 1983 年 8 月 5 击； 433 号令， SOFR 40346, 1985 年 10 月 3 日。根据 436 号令囊新都岳和穆改， 50 FR 42497' 42498, 1985 年 10 月 18 日； 478 号令， 52 F丑 28467, 1987 年 7 月 30 日； 581 号令， 60 FR 53074, 1995 年 10 月 11 吕］ • 101 • ι11811 ！ l － ei43飞 1 4 ，－ t！ 第 284.225 条至第 284.226 条（保留） 42IP2321699 第 284.2罚条 自知内管道公司进行的某些输气 (a）通用许可证书。通用许可证书或嵌据本条款旗发给接投产自 联邦水域、邻近蛇的陆上或近海的天然气的外i 内管递公前， 但前提是： (1 ）该如！内管道公司接收的天然气必须来自集气公司或其他 如i 内I 管道公司； (2 ）该判内管道公司在管道公司运行所在的判向最终用户或 其他判内管道公司交拧天然气： 。）自在同→头！’的的最终用户最终使用天然气。 (b）有效臼期。如果一个判内管道公司自 1992 年 2 月 1 a 起提 供如本条（ a ）款拮述的辘气服务部且战据本部分 C 节第 284.122 条的规定该输气服务是不具有资格的服务，就应依 据本条（ a ）款旗发通居许可证书给该如j 内管道公司，该通 用许可证书的生效臼萌为 1992 年 2 丹 1 日。如果一个州内 管道公词自 1992 年 2 月 1 日韶还没有提供如本条（ a）款描 述的输气服务，成顽友通用许可证书给该州内管道公词，通 用许可证书生效的日期应为该管道公司开始进仔依据本部分 C 节第 284.122 条的规定原为不具有资格的输气踉务的音 期。 (c ）接受证书。如果一个州内管道公司在 1992 年 2 月 1 日以后 继揍提供本条（ a）款描述的输气服务，而依据本部分 C 节 第 284.122 条该服务为不具有资格的服务，或者该管道公司 自 1991 年 11 月 4 日出后就开始了这种输气服务，那么依据 本条该井i 内管道公司就视为已接受了 i最后许可证书。 (d ）条款和条件。按照本条款判内管道公司的通居许可证书输气 权贱的应与本部分 C 节中规定的所有条款布条件栩一致， 但依照本条款的服务不必代表白州岳飞管道公司提供殷务的州 102 . 内管道公司藏地方配气公司进行。 (e）瑛先准予敖弃。战据《天然气法》第 7 条（己〉款的规定， 当根据本条通过通用许可证在授挠的每…单掠业务安排的合 闰条款到期后，就可以授权放弃输气服务。 的证书的作用。接受依据本条款颁发的证书或从事棋据本条款 授权的业务，将不会使证书持有人受到《天然气法〉戴予委 员会的权利的约束， f且强制孰行该证书的条款程条件所必需 的约束除外。 [537 号令萝 56 FR 50246, 1991 年 10 另 4 日，根据 544 号令修 改， 57 FR 46501, 1992 年 10 月 9 日： 581 号令， 60 FR 53074, 1995 年 10 丹 11 日］ H节 州际管道公司输气容量的分配 来探： 636 号令， 57 FR 13318, 1992 年 4 丹 16 日，另有注明的除 外。 第 284.241 条 适用性 H 节适用于根据本部分 B 节和 G 节的规定提供输气服务的任街 州际管道公司。 第 284.242 条 上带管道回)E输气密聋的分配 根据本部分 B 节和 G 节的旗定，提供自定输气服务的知i 器管道 公司必级将其所有上捞管道的固定输气睿量〈包捂合同储气）无歧视 性地分配给其固定托运人，二毛论该回走输气容量是根据规章第 284 部 分还是第 157 部分取得的授枝。授权上带管道公商并要求其允许下静 管道公司将其睦定输气容最分配给于游管道公宵的民定托运人。 • 103 • 、 附件 2 许可证条件未倒 下述的许可证条件要点勾勒出作为输气公司许可证（即敖责运输 天然气的实体将被授予许可证）标准条件的革例。这些条件与错气或 者配气企业许可证的条件很相似。此处的用语摘自英国锻制的条件。 您可以在 αgem （英菌天然气工业的政府监督部门〉的同站： www. ofgem. gov. 略中找到由英国出版发有的标准许可证条件。 控制进入输气系统的条件 输气~务分立重量 1. 许可证持有人应该留存正确的会计胀自以及其她记录，并且 这接近录的格式应使其管道服务业务的收入飞成本、资产以及负镜或 者可合理归入其管道服务的业务与该许可证持有人的其他业务的会计 记录格式可以分开识别。 2. 在文才段落（ 1 ）的普遍有效性没有任韧影暗的前提下，只要合 理实施，获得许可证的人应在连载’性的基础上，并以其会讯报在其 输气业务方Iii做出如下准备一一 （司在获得许可旺的初始时期以及每一个后续会计年度，编制会 计报衰，包括～一 (b ）损益艇 (i ）…给资产负债表，包括有关玲在该年皮年初相年末资产负 债表中显示的净资产进行调整的必要细节；以及 ( ii ）一份即期现金流量表，包捂肘（ i ）和（ ii ）款中所提明 的会计报表的调整，并且在每一个会计年度的最如六个月（自初始日 期当天或第二百开始〉，销辑一份中期损益帐。 3. 根据。） (a）鼓编嚣的会计报表店一一一 (a）陈述井清楚地显示管道服务业务或者可合理归j离于管道服务 业务的成本〈包括茹i町、收入、所周资产以及负债，并且分崩以适 104 • 当的详细程度来显示所有收入、戚本、资产或者负债的金额，这些金 额或是一一 ( i ）从许可证持有人其能业务中收取或者支付的：或者是 ( ii ）许可证持有人的输气业务和其千商业务！可的费用分障；同时 说晓这些收费或者分摊费用的基础； (b）只要实际合理可行（如果许可证持有λ是…家被要求准备年 度总账的公可）一一叫 (i ）该会计报表中涉及有关业务的内容应与许可证持有人按照 〔具体指定中国涉及管理财务会计报告的相关法律或者通用的辑关国 际原划及标准］编制年度总贱所渺及到的业务内容相向。 4. 除非得到监管委员会的认可，否则，许可证持有人不得改变 自韧期或前一财务年度（根据其体情况丽定）输气业务会计报表所采 用的费痛或者分摊的基醋，商而改变初期开始后任何财务年度其输气 业务会计报表所采用的牧费或分摊基础。 5. 就被据段落。） (a）款缩制每一份会计报表哥霄，许可证持 有人将获得一份由适当的审计赔提交给天然气监管委员会的审计报 告，在审计报告中，该审计师应该声明他的观点一一这套会计报告’ (a）是否充分披露了许可证持有人输气业务的财务事喂，是否得 合事许可证条件，并是 （』）从真实与公允的角度披露该输气业务的收入、成本、资产及 负愤，或者可合理归入该项业务的收入、或本、资产及负债。 6. 在切实可行的情况下，许可证持有人应向监管委员会提交一 份每套财务会计报告的副本，和本文中段落。｝（材和段落（5 ）所 要求的审计师报告以及提交一份段落。） (b ）所要求的中期损益表， 缸无论如何不得迟于一一－ (a）在报表编制期结束以后六个月，提交每套会计援我以及此蛙 所捷的审计赔审计报告，或者 （局在中期损益表编制完成后两个月，提交摸益表。 7. 许可证持有人应以其合理观点并以能够保证会计报告充分公 开性的方式，公布段落。） (a）所要求的会计报表，因此，会计报 = • 105 • 一 告的公布日期不得返于一一 (a）会计接告所及许可证持有人会计年度的年度报告公布时间， 或者 (b）该会计年度结束启六个月（或者撞管委员会认可的更长时 间），以较早的为准： 捏在故照段基（ 3) (a）公布此类内容将或者也许会严建影嘀以 及不利影确到j许可证持有人的利益的情况下，本节应不要求根据段落 。） (a）分别公布任钝费用或者分摊费用的数额或其计提基础。 .8. 段落（ 7 ）限制性条款所引起的关于此类公布事宜是否会或者 可能对许可证持有人产生严重或不和影响的任何问题，均应该由盟管 委员会决定。 9. 在本条中，在许可证持有人为一家［指定参考中自辑关公司 法］含义内的公司时，“合适的审计l)ijj＂指的是被任命为审计翔的人。 “会计（时政）年度”与〔指定参考中国相关公司法］中该词的含义 相同，缸在上述相关法律不适用的情况下睽外，此时，“财政年度” 挡的是以，〔日期］或者是许可证持有人在通知中指定并提交给监督委 员会的其他日期； 邮韧始自期”指的是在该指定自开始的程期或者 （如果稍后〉在许可证生效以及许可证持有人的后镇财政年度开始以 前剧结束的日期：关于业务的成本或者债务或者可合理归属于该业务 j 的成本或镣务的参考数据应解释为不包括不只与该业务有关的税款、 资本镜务及其科，患；关于损益表或者现金流报表的参考数据也应予以 朝虚地解释。 输气业务的经营 1. 许可证持有人应以精心计划的方式来经辞其输气业务，以确 保一一 (a）许可证持有人或者段落〈？）中所提及的任何人或者 (b）任胡天然气托运人或者天然气供应商均不得获取不公平的商 业利益，特别是包括那些从住惠或者歧视a性安排中获得的任何商业利 益，商且如果在许可证持有人夜得此类利益的4情况下，诙商业利益也 应与其某一业务南非输气业务有关。 • 106 • －一一一 2. 按照段落（幻的巍窍，许可证持有人将揭力确保…一一 (a）不得将与其输气业务有关或者来启输气业务的信息予以披 露，嚣的是为了许可证持有人或者段落（ 7 ）中所提到的任何人的经 营利益。 (b ）不得将来自其辘气业务的信息用于自许可证持有人经营的任 街贸易业务或（只有该许可证持有人有权利取得该项利益）段落（ 7) 中府提到的任何人所任营的任邮费易业务。 3 ，段落（ 2）不选用于下列各境一一一 (a）在监管委员会同意的情况下， (b）为了此目的，天熬气托运人或者天然气供货商巳书面同意可 以使用或者按露与该托运人或供货离有关的信，非 (c）为了使段落（？〉中所提到的人能够与许可证持有人达成辘 气协议成者使该协议生效，使F草或者披露该信息是必要直在利的； (d）千在据本许可证的其他条件，如器藩。） (a）中既提到的， 已公布或经票求市披露信怠，或者 (e）该信息（即非违背本许可证条件的原因）属公知道畴。 4. 在此条件下，“资磊业务”意指导在中国境内获取以及处理天 然气有关的活动，或者指句一家输气企业协商进行输气安排、由该企 业通过其管理前管道系统来输气或者南其管道系统提取天然气的活 动，组以下情况除外一一 (a）该贸易业务与打算在中国境外天然气消费的输气活动有关， 该业务在监管委员会颁布的本许可证条件中巳指定，或者 (b）对许可证持有人醋霄，这些业务与其管道系统的有效运行或 者对该管道系统天然气损辑进有补充有关。 运行守则 1. 许可证持有人应确定有利于促进达到下列自辑的有关事宜的 输气安排（与标准条件 3 租 4 有关的事宜除外） （在）许可近持有人有效、经济墙运有其管道系统； (b ）符合子段（ a）的要求，有效地履行了其本许可证项下的义 务； • 107 • (c）符合子段也）和（盼的要求，确保相关托运人之闻以及梧 关供气商之问的有效竞争， (d）自下文起，上述在部称之为“相关自如”。 2. 许可证持有人应一一“ (a）准备一告文件（在本许可证条件中称为“运行守则”）隔述 （与许可证持有人认为在该文件中适宜能述的其能任何的商务安排条 款一向）符合段落 (1 ）要求的商务安排条款，缸是这些条款要与根 据标准条件 5 或者 6 监管的事宜有关，或者包含在本监管委员会为本 许可证条件之目的部指定的除议中，或者此类等级的她议或者描述d性 文件中，并且 (b ）将其剧本提交拴监督委员会。 3. l豫了监管委员会认可的其他情况之外，许可证持有人应只能 达成符合该边有守则任何相关规定的输气协定安排。 4. 如果运行守期的一条规定要求：在该规定明确指明的情形下， 由许可证持有人按据该规定确定某一事倒是否有利于挺进相关目标的 实珉，那么由此所产生的关于许可证持有人悬否巳能满足了该项要求 的问题，将由监管委员会做出决棋。 5. 许可证持有人应建立并培持段落（的中厨提及的程序，以便 修改主运行守则，从而能够为实现相关自挥提供便利。 6. 段落。〉中所指的程序是为了←一 （在）评审远有守赔； (b）由许可证持有人或者相关扭运人为其修改事宜提出建议； (c）充分公开这提建议，特别是嘉轩起所有相关托运人的注意， 并且将建议书副本发送给任何天然气托运人或者其他索取该建议书的 人； (d）寻求监管委员会对与任何此类建议书柜关联事宜的观点； (e）考虑某…相关托运人或者任伺天然气托运人或者其他（如果 实施该建议）可能受到袁大影响的人班作出（而不是退出〉的与该建 议将有关的陈述，而且 （£）在监管委员会同意由于事关紧急可能需要修改运行守则的情 • 108 • 况下，经费员会批准，可以排除、加快或者变更任何在其他情况下本 来适用的特定程序性步骤。 7. 许可证持有人将一一 (a）准备一份文件（“修订规则”〉，阐述依据在蔼（ 5 ）确立能程 序，并将其副本提交监管委员会； (b）不得更改修订规期，除了←－ ( i ）在与所有相关托运人磋商并考虑了自该相关托运人所做的 任何陈述之后； ( ii ）在将该磋商以及就有关陈述所作出的考虑意见的报告提交 给监管委员会之后，并且 ( iii ）得到监管委员会的首肯，然后 (c）将所作出的任何修改之剧本提交给监管委员会。 8. 许可证持有人不得修改运行守则，除非←一一 （ ε〉为了符合在落（ 10) (b）或者（ ll ）的要求，或者 （划在得到监督委虽会认可下，将提交给监督委员会γ份修改副 本。 9. 在［负责键靡及安金之法定机持］按照本段落之要求向许可 证持有人发出关于保护公众安全兔受天然气在其管道系统中输送发生 危险的通知，商且对运行守捕的楼改〈与相关目标始终保持一致〉也 能够适当培处理该事宜的情况下，许可证持有人应根据镑改规则提出 修改建议，如果所做之惨政与这些白棋保持一致，就应认为巳满足丁 关于惨改班有辑于实现相关自标的要求。 10. 在按照修改短期提出建议书以便修改运行守则的情提下，许 可证持有人应一一” (a）尽可能早地道知监管委员会一一 (i ）提供建议书的细节； ( ii ）在出某一相关托运人做出建议书的情提下， 5注注霖备选建 议书以修改运行守则中出许可证持有人对朝同事宜已撤出的穆政； (iii ）提供与这些建议书有关的天然气托运人或者其他人所做陈 述的详细’情况： • 109 • Civ ）说明银据其辛苦法是否瑾该或者不应该进行建议的修改； (V ）说明搜据其看法能够证明对建议的锋改做出调整或者不做 出调整的各种因素，并且 (Vi ）按照惨政旗则，也可能棋擂要求需将此类详情提供给监督 委员会；并且 (b）遵守监管委员会发出的任何指令，报提依照（ a）款给监管 委员会发出的通知中所叙述的建议书对运行守赔进有修改；按照监管 委员会的观点，与现有运行守爵的规定或者任前可替代的建议相比， 该建议书应该如段需（ 5 ）中所述更加有利于实现相关自糕。 11. 许可证持有人成一一一 (a）编写并发布不时修改或变化的运行守则及螃改规副摘要，要 按照监管委员会可能不时揭示的第式及方式来进行； (b ）将不时修改的运行守期爵本或者巳变寰的修改规期剧本寄给 提出要这费副本并为此也许需要向许可证持有人支持费用的人，该费 用金额不应超过监管委员会可能不时批准的为此吕的的费席金额。 12. 该静改甥则所引趣的任饵问题若涉及一一 (a）如果实姐该建挠，天然气托运人或者其他人是否可能受到修 改运行守则建议书的重大影碗，或者 (b ）许可证持有人是否已适当考虑了有关此建议的陈述以及棋摇 楼改规周作出的跺述，这提问题进出监管委员会来确定。 管理题恰媲剥的条件 天然气托边人应付的运费 1. 许可证持有人道自监管委员会提交以下陈述： (a ）按照与详细说明的天然气托注入达成的输气胁定安排，在不 同的特定情况或者情况说明下准每收取的费用，并且 (b）根据段落（ 5 ）或段落（ 6) （被情况而定）中提到的方法， 说畴确定这些费用采用的方法和故掘的原则，在不会给段落（ 2 ）带 来损害的前提下，如果费用以及确定这些费用采用的方法和极据的照 揭发生了变化，在费用改变生效以前〈或如果费用改变不合王震可行〉， 但只要今后费用改变合理可行，许可证持有人就应该将芦萌修改本提 • 110 • 交给蓝管委员会，或者如果监管委员会认可，将能够反映这些修改的 前述声明的修改本也提交给监管委员会。 2. 许可证持有人 (a）应把有关其正在考虑改变的、段落（ 1) 中所提到的管输费 的建议书通知以及这接建议书〈如果实施的话〉对这整费用的影哨的 预提j提交给监管委员会，并且在执行建议书爵的至少 150 天内思一切 努力来提交这些通知及预测。 （时在确定实施这些建议书来更改段落。）中所提费用的情况 下，应将其决定及执行建议书的日期通知给监管委员会，除非经监管 委员会同意，否殿，该执行前期不得迟于在将本子段所要求的通知提 交给监督委员会以后一个月。 3. 许可证持有人将一一 (a）以确保信息充分公开的方式按照段落（ 1 ）和（ 2 ）的要求公 布所提交的声畴或声明的修订或增补本或者发出的通知 (b）将上述公布的声明、｛彦订、增补或者通知发送给任柯提出查 看它们的人。 4. 除非在得强j监管委员会认可的其他情提下，否则许可证持有 人将只能达成确保费用将特合截据段落。） (a）在达成拚议以前先公布的声明的输气协定安排，或者 (b）在不时拟议变瑜的费用开始变动以前，出于本段落能自的， 在该声明须受限于在辑关时间 LU 前所公布的修订本的情况下，按照段 落（ 3 ）以前所发布芦明的参带数据m被解释为巳锋订的该声明的参 等数据。 5. 俄摇撞落（时，许可证持有人应…一ι (a）建立一套方法，通过这套方法来显示段落（ 1) (a）中所提 到的费用的确定方法和依据原姆（得到监管委员会认可的其他情况除 夕竹，并且 (b）遵守这牵己建立能按照标准条件 4 的要求不时进行修改的方 法。 6. 如果在指定日黯 i且前，许可证持有人已经建立了一套方法来 111 建示与段落（ 1) (a）中所提到的确定费踊采用的方法和依握的原则， 雨时，监管委员会也已经批准了此套方法〈“旧的方法勺，那么，只 要许可证持有人一直采琦该方法（仍须进行任何必要的惨改〉一一而 (a）段落（ 5 ）将不适用，而且 〈卧在旧的方法适用（的须进行任部必要的修改）的任何情况 下，许可证持有人应遵守此方法，并不时按照标准条件 4 来对此进有 修改。 7. 在投何情况下，许可证持有人愿意肇署与段落（ 10 ）所提到 的设施有关的储气楼议一一 (a）如果按握这蜡协议，收费不受依据段落（ 5 ）所建立的方法 或者 i目的方法（舷情血商定）的支配，许可证持有人应避免不适当的 位先选择或者不适当的歧视其达成这些如议的条款， (b ）如果这拉拉费或者按照输气协议丽昨储气协议收取的任何费 用，不受前述条款的支起，那么只亵合理可行，许可证持有人就应确 保在其达成的储气协议条款与其达成的输气协议条款之间不会捞及不 公平的交叉补贴。 8. 应南蓝管委员会来判定第（ 7 ）段落中的不公平交叉补贴所引 起的问题。 9. 段落（ 1 ）至段落（ 5 ）中的故费参服方法不包括←一－ (a）与为了平蘸许可证持有人的管道系统而获取或赴置天然气有 关的收费，或者 (b）在蓝管委员会已认可的某些事宜方面，确定的收费参摆方法 应是通过参照运行守则中陈述的螺定来确定的软费，如前房述，本条 件及标准条件 4 中界定的收费参照方法包括收费可出确认的方式，但 不包括标准条件 6 含义内的追加费腥的参照方法。 制定远给方法的义务 1 ，除非许可证持有人得到监管委员会的赞同不进舒修改，否则 按照段嚣。〉（出的要求，许可证持有人应不时对按照标准条件 3 中段落（ 5 ）所建立的方法进行修改，或者按情况而定对段落（ 6 ）中 提到的出的方法（此处称为“方法”）进行惨改，这也可能是为了实 . 112 • 现相关目标所需要的。 2. 来征得监管委员会的教准，许可泣持在人不能对该方法进行 修改，睦非许可证持有人巳经 （功就建议的修改方案与相关托运人进枉过磋商，并允许他的在 不少于 28 天的时间 lE提交书面陈述材抖，并且 (b ）；每监管委员会提交一扮报告说明 (i ）初始建试修改的条款， ( ii ）相关托运人所作出的陈述（如果有的话〉，以及 (iii ）由于将关托运人街作出的陈述， E京建议惨政的条款的任何 改动，但条件是在该报告提交监管委员会已过去那天后，监管委员 会未给予许可证持有人任何关于不得进行修玫的指辰。 3. 被摇战落（ 4 ）的要求，许可证持有人在每个公历年都应提交 给监管委员会一俭关于在当年 10 月 1 13 以前的 12 个月中采用费m计 算方法的申请，同时还应该提交一份声明，说明 (a）按许可证持有人的观点，在该相关期限内已实现的梧关吕 标； （怕是否通过修改该方法这些日稀可~更易于实现，同时 (c ）如果的确如此，出于眩目的$l该进有的静改内容。 4. 关于本许可证生效的公茄年…一 (a）如果许可赶在当年 10 月 1 日或之后生效，别段落（ 3 ）将不 适埠，或者 (b）如果许可证在 10 月 1 日以前生效，期段落（ 3 ）将生效，如 同该自提前 12 个月，并将参考日期替换为许可证生效自远的前述日 期。 5. 弦据段落（ 6 ），在需（ 1) 和（ 3 ）中的“相关目标”意摇下 列自标一一 (a）与制定费翔的该方法桔符合，这些费用能够反映许可证持有 人在输气业务中发生的成本； (b ）持合子段（在〉而且该方法适当考虑了输气业务的发展； (c ）具有一致性并与读方法相符合 . 113 • 该方法有助于天然气托运人之间和供气商之间的在效竞争。 6. 一般国育 （司在采用该方法语y定的费用或者从这些费用获得的收入，依据 本许可证的任细条件（棕准条件 3 楼外）没有受到控制或眼制的情况 下，以及 (b ）监管委员会没有认可在特定的期踉内本段不应该适用或者按 照不满意的条件己认可本嚣，期“相关目标”应该包括下苑吕栋，即 采那该方法制定的费用（较取每项费用并逐年收敢），允许许可证持 有人只能从其输气业务获得合理的利润，然雨，出于本段落的白的， 下列各项应该略去一一 ( i ）在都准条件 6 指定的时闰内，为了某一地区的利益，与管 道施工有关的业务目的市发生的成本； ( ii ）通过收费（在栋准条件 5 的含义内｝即从该项业务中挺得 的收入，都准条件 5 的任倒规定对该收费都具有效力，而且前提是在 自前指定的一个地区内； ( iii ）通过追加收费的方式从该项业务中在得收入（在都准条件 6 的含义内），以及 。V ）与摆议开发一个地区但目前并没有指定一个对该地区的土 地有较益的人有关的许可证持有人进行的支付，而不是通过合理智虑 著 土地权益或者向许可证持有人提供的货物或服务，就本段来讲，“成 本”和“收入”握的是根据成计髓确定的成本租技人。 7. 许可证持有人瑾遵从监管委员会不时发出的指法，要求许可 证持有人←一 (a）依据段落（ 8 ）和（引来发布监管委员会在该指令中可能 具体指明或描述的信崽…一如许可证持有人在其输气业务中所发生的 任割成本，或者有关按照段落（ 1) 不时进仔静改的运费方法的信息， 同时 (b）指令中也可能具棒说萌发布信息采用的格式和方法以及发布 的旗率。 8. 根据段落（ 7 ）不应要求许可证持有人公布任何信息或者文件 114 . 一一一，一一一一－一－一一一一一 (a）不能强制许可证持有人举证或在民事诉讼开庭以前出示的信 息或文件，或者 (b ）如果信，息中包含着与为标准条件 6 之目的暂时指定一个地区 的管道施工所发生的成本有关的倍息或者在指定该撒 g后为管道施工 做准备新产生的成本信怠。 9 鲁在按照段落（匀的要求公布任何筒，息过程中，许町证持有人 应尽可能注意信息中不要包括与任何人的个人事务有关的任何问趣， 因为公开这搓问题将或可能会严重和有害地影响其利益。 10. 将由监管委员会来判定由段落（ 9 ）所产生的任何问题，却 是否公开与任何人的个人事务有关的任何问题将或可能会严重和有害 地影响其利益。 辑气题务的价格陆靠自 1. 在制定自〔管输费年起始日］起生效的使用其输气系统的价 格时，许可证持在人应采取辟有合璋的步辍以确保自［公式年起始 自；或之后开始的每一公式年中，其每一能盘单位的平均输吨给格不 得超过按照下列公式计算出的每能量单位［或者每兆焦耳］的最高平 均输气价格一一 Mt ：“十旦旦ι主〉十 Kt 在 100 ' 佳自〔公式年起始目］开始的公式年， Mt寸的值将为［〕 RMB 其中 Mr ＝在公式年 t 的锋能量单位最高平均辑气价格 Kt=4导能量单位的修正系数〈元论其为 iE数或者负数）比 照公式年 t 来确定，可以从下列公式得出 Kt 口（ Tt-1 - ~←1M叫“十丰〉 Qt 100 其中 M Qt ＝公式年 t 中认定的输气数f爱 . 115 • Qt… 1 ＝公式年 t-1 中认定的雄气数量 了叫二公式年 1 ← 1 的输气收入 在本条件下的该公式中…一 CPit 口消费者价格指数百分比变化（无论是正数还是负 数），该价格指数是公式年 t 中已公布或者已确定的 〔月份名称］价格指数与旦公布或者已磷定的前一月 ［月份名称］的价格指数之比值； It ＝在 Kt （不考虑 It 的影响〉为正数的情况下，公式年 t 中的利率百分比与平均特定利率加 3 的值栩等，或者， 在 Kt （不考虑 It 的影响〉为负数的情况下，与早均特 定科率梧等。 2. 在本条件中： “每能量单位的平均输气价梅”指的是，在任剖公式年，该公式 年的雄气较人除以该公式年认定的输气盘； “零售价格指数”捕的是由［负责公布盟家统计数字的梧挫机梅］ 每月公布的捞及所有商品能消费街格指数，或者一一 (a）如果任何年中的｛月份名称］的该月价格指数不会在［~月 十接下来的 3 个月］的最后一天予以公布，出监管委员会在与许可证 持有人协商后判定该月（或数另）的赞格指数在该情影下是否恰当； 或者 (b）如果价格指数的基础发生了本质变化，出监管委员会在与许 可证持有人协商后确定其她指数在该情形下是否恰当； “托运人”捕的是与许可证持有人进行安排将天然气引人输气系 统、通过输气系统交付或者从输气系统中提取天然气的任街天然气托 运人； “特定利率”指的是在开始进行计算期间，［既定的受管制商韭银 行的名草草］的现行基本科率 “提棋输气服务”指的是为了收益和报酬承担和震行以下约定： (a）通过输吨系统输送天然气；以及 (b ）为了防止许可证持有人为他人从输气系统提取的天然气逃 116 • 逸，但与为了输吨系统的有效滋行或为了对该输气系统的天然气损耗 进行置换黯获取或处理天然气有关的约定除外 i “输气数量”指的是已提取的、以能量单位计算的天然气的愚蠢； “输气收入”指的是在向托运人提供输气服务过程中所挟得的营 韭额（以应计制为基础计算〉但不包括与以下各项有联系的营At额： (a）与提供或进行修改雄气系统进气点或取气点有关的施工； (b）为了输气系统的有数运行而按取或者处理天然气： (c）从不是提据托运人通埃既要求的撞吨服务中获得的营业额； (d）包括在上述子段作）内，出许可证持有人按照许可证持有 人运有守则规定所进行的收费或者向其支付的费用中摸取的营业额。 (e）从在标准条件 6 含义内的追加拉费中获取的营业额； (f）表示句出于标准条件 24 中段糯（的和（ 5 ）而要求放弃的 补黠或者收费（天然气看成还尚未从其管道系统提走〉相等始收入； 或者 (g）从按照特别条件 19 达成的合间攻下提供紧急雄修服务收取 的费用中获取的普韭额； 提是，为了计撞在任何公式年飞在该年中自输气系统提取的天然 气直接进入储气设施，完全或者主要甩子结气之路的）的输气量或大 眉户气盘，应该仅考虑再下连两者坷的盖额量相等的气主意（丐能为负 值）＇： （门在该公式年中，从擒气系统提取直接进入到该错气设施中 的天然气数量；和 ( ii ）在该公式年中，从该储气设施进入到输气系统的天然气数 量。 3. 揉非监管委员会部意许可证持有人可以不按照上述要求傲， 否期，许可证持有人应参照监管费员会对以下问题的判定：棋擂段菇 (2 ）中“输气收入”的定义，为了收益和报酷i承租和腹行…项给定是 否是一艘由托运人要求的类型，或者提供任何输气服务是否是一般要 自托运人提出要求。 4. 如果在任何公式年中，每能最单位的平均输气价格越过得能 117 • 量单位最高平均输气价格 4 个吉分点以上，用许可证持有人应向监管 委员会提交一份解释说明，在下一个公式年，许可证持有人应不再提 价，除非 (a）许可证持有人己论证并使监管委员会比较满意：在下一公式 年中每能量单位的平均输气价格将不可能超过得能建单位的最高平均 输气赞格，或者 (b）能许可证持有人申请，监管袭员会同意该提价。 5. 如果在任何连续两个公式年中，每能量单位平均输气价格吕 超过怨能麓单位最高平均输气价格的总金额，已连载第工个年度超过 每能量单位最高平培输气给格百分之五以上，姆在下一公式年中，如 果监管委员会提出要求，许可证持有人应调整份格，使每能量单位平 均输气街格〈根据监管委员会的判断〉不太可能超过下一公式年中每 能最单位的最高平均输气价格。 6. 在许可证持有人，眩据标准条件 3 项下的输气收费发布任何声 明政者修改或者增补声明的情况下，许可证持有人应在进行上述发布 的前 28 天以内向监管委员会提交一一 (a）一份关于在准备生效的输气收费变动的公式年中以及下一公 式年中每能量单位最高平均输气拚格以及传格将成的书面预割报告； (b）一份关于在准备生效的输气收费变动的公式年前一公式年中 每能蠢单位最高平均价格以及其价格构成的书面倍算报告，除非在发 布输气收费摇议的变动之前已由监管委员合提交了关于第一个提到的 公式年中输气收费变动符合下面段落 10 的声明。 7. 如架在任街公式年开始的前二个月内，许可证持有人没有公 布或者使该软费变动生效，划许可证持有人在向监管委员会提交一份 在该公式年的每能最单位最高平均输气价格以及价格构成书器预瓣。 8. 在提交前述旗割报告的同时，应该同时提供一提必要倩怠， 使监管委员会能够基本认可这些预测报告是在一个一致的秦基础上准备 的。 9. 在一公式年结束后的六个星期以内，许可证持有人应该由监 管委员会提交→份葬明，说明提据其观点在该公式年中上述段落 4 和 118 • 5 是否适用以及对在下一公式年中可能的 K古董做出最佳预测。 lQ. 在每一公式年结束后的三个月内，许可汪持有人应；如监管委 员会提交一份声明，说晓该公式年的输气收入以及输气盘。 11. 上述子段（ 5 ）提到的声明要附有审计报告，根据审计师的 观点，该声明根据本条件的要求公正地提供了输气收入2运输气髦的数 字。 管理投资的条件 长期发爵声踊 1. 许可证持有人应道守监管委员会的指盐，按照指示中可能具 体说明的格式准备一份声明，说明在 10 月 1 日起首的连续 10 年每一 年中的如下预摇信患一一 (a）可能使用的枉何强立管道系统，包括自许可证持在人所运行 的高压管道以及可能使居的如段蓓（ 6 ）所提到的管道设施，以及 (b）该管输系统和管道设路可能的发展，许可证持有人预期在确 定接人该管道系统的输气费和执行输气梅定时应对此不时予以考虑， 这将有前于那些考虑寻求将其管道与许可证持有人的管道系统相连接 的人，在鉴好IJ和评估这样做的机会的过程中与许可证持有λ达成输气 拚定，或在合理预期每年的供气越过口齿焦的前提下寻求与许可证 持有人的管道系统相连接。 2. 除非监管委员会同意许可证持有人不这么做，否则，许可证 持有人应以年度为基础准备一份按照载落（ 1 ）编制的声明的修订本， 以确保卫吁掺订之声明中的信息〈在实际可行的情况下〉为最新信息。 3. 按照与下醋段落（ 4 ）梧一致的要求，许可证持有人应一一 (a）向监管委员会提交一份按照载蔼（ 1 ）准备的声明报告黠本， 以及按摆在藩。〉准备的声明惨订本； (b）按黑监管委员会指萃的形式及方式，公布声明摘要或者（依 情况商定）公布声萌修改本，这将有助于相关人决定是否要求提供子 段（ c）中斯捷裂i 的修订本，词时 (c）准备一份声明剧本或者锋订本，在切实可行的’请况下，该惨 订本不包捂段落（的中所提到的任何问题，并将此剧本发送给任何 • 119 • 索取人，索取人班向许可证持有人支付可能要求支付的有关费用，程 该费眉不应超过监管委员会为此不时批准的金额。 4. 在按照段落。）（盼的主要求傲的过程中，许可证持有人应考 虑需要（在可行的情况下〉排除与个人事务相关的任何问题，因为公 布此类问题将或者也许会严重且不和地影喝该人的利益。 5. 黠落（ 4 ）所引起的关于公布个人事务问题是否将或者也许会 严重并且不利地影确到该人的利益的任何问题，应该由监管委员会作 出判断。 高压管道的建设 1. 许可证持有人不应不时进有建设高店管道的施工，除非在跑 工开始的前 1 年（或者主管当局所许可的更短的期最内〉，巳经向 ［负责健康及安全的法定抗掏］通告一一 (a）声晓其计划进行该施工： （份在子嚣，〈引来敬要求的情跪下，也造钮摇一一许可在E持有 人地址：在管道建成后，对该管道进行运行管理的舟、公撞址〈如果知 晓的话）；所建议的管道的正常及最大先许运行压力的都节；关于在 管灌选线指导原则中可能不时指定需要说明的第节〈如果在〉；并将 通知副本提交给该管道计划通过的地区的当地兢划部门。 2. 如果在提交较落（ 1 ）项下的通知以后，与该通知有关的施工 在自主管当属给定的日期起三年的期限届满时或者在给予的延提期限 届满时，仍没有充分展开，赔该通知将怯照该段落的要求而停止生 效，程已开始施工的工程〈如果有）除外。 3. 在班建议的管道路线不符合选线指导原则能情况下一一 (a）许可证持有人应为此遥报［负责健康及安全的法定机构 k (b）许可证持有人应就建议的管道路钱咨诲［负责健康及安全的 法定机梅］；并且 (c）如果在按照子段（的的要求通告［负责健康与安金的法定 机构］的当日起，在 3 个月能期酿内（或者经许可证持有人和执行就 掏书商向童的更长期报内〉，执行机构书面通知许可证持有人，不罔 童所建议的管道路钱〈无论有无许可证持有人可接受的修改），赔许 • 120 • 可证持有人应（除非决定不键镇进行所建议的工程〉把段搭“）提 到的通知副本提交给主管当局； (d）如果在上述期限内，〔负责键康与安全的法定机梅〕 (e）同意所建议的管道线路〈无论有无许可证持有人可接受的修 改），或者 (f) 没有将子段（ c）提到的通知发送给许可证持有人，按照段 落（的和段落（幻的要求，许可证持有人可以继续进行所建议的管 道拖工。 4. 已经接到段落（ 1 ）提割的通知副本的当地规划部门，在接到 该通知副本以后的两个月内，出于安全原因〈考虑了管道班线原则以 及风险标准，或者在接少此类标准的情况下，考虑了由〔负责锺康与 安金的法定挠构］提供的建议？或者其结原因，书面通告许可避持有 人，所建议的管道可能会危害她们的发展计划某个方捆的实施。在这 种情况下←一 (a）许可证持有人应由主管当局咨询其建议： (b）如果在主管当局对许可证持有人进行如上通知之日开始的三 个月〈或者许可证持有人与主管当局书嚣翔意的更长期阪〉内，主管 当局书茵通知许可证持有人不同意其建议书（无论者无许可证持有人 可接受的穆改｝，则许可证持有人应〈除非其己决定不再继辑进行所 建议的施工）向±管~周递交段落（ 1 ）挺累j 的通知； (c ）如果在上站期段内当地摆翅j部门一…已经商露了许可证持有 人的建议书〈无论有无许可证持有人可接受的惨改〉，或者没有向许 可证持有人发出子段（日提到j 的通知，期许可证持有人被据段落 (3 ）和段落（ 5) PJIJ,{继镀进行所建议的施工。 5. 如果自收到j段落（ 1 ）提药的通知之吕起的六个丹期段内，按 照在落。） (c）或者何）〈坊，主管当局〈考虑了与安全和风险标 准有关的问嚣，或者在接少此类标准的情况下，考虑了自许可证持有 人所阐述的风险标准或［集资键藏与安全的法定机枪］所做的有关该 建议的陈述）向该许可证持有人发出揭示一一 (a）不应继键管道建设，或者 • 121 . (b）如果许可证持有人希望继续建设管道，题应满足在该指示中 具体指明的要求包括管道选线方面的特别要求。在这种野况下，许可 证持有人应该遵从该指示。 6. 在本条件中←一“选线原则”指的是，在咨询［负责健霹与 安全的法定杭梅〕和在指定或者修改此类原则时持有许可证的人以 后，主管当局班指定的指导原期：“岚险标准”指的是基于标准〈如 果有）的风险，这搓标准己一一 (a）出〔兔责键靡与安全的法定机构］在与采纳时持有许可证的 人楼商之后制定并采纳。 （旨为执行本条件被主管当局指定，或者是这些日制定并采纳的 标准的任何穆订。 • 122 • zltiiililili 国~f牛 3 输气监管方法 -- 输气撞管方法可以广义地分为符合先前报告新考虑原则的三类方 J 法： ·建立输气企业的规黠与程序，这些规剧与程序将支配管输系镜 准人的条款和条件。 ’管输系统管输费的最i定与调节。 ’管道及管道扩容的授权。 本节提出了这些分类并讨论了每一分类中的监管方法。目前，中 国境内的输气系统是由未摆互连通的管道段网络椅成。在这些管网 中，有相对复杂的四 JI! 及东北管道系统，也有从盆地主市场中非的单 一管逞。为了监管，每一管闲（从单一管道乃至最复杂的管网〉均构 成一个独立的输气实体。 监管的韧始重点将主要放在现有的输气揭锦上，而无论是否有第 三方要求准入。即使在客户目前还无法立刻获得替代供气商堆人的管 药，输气与供气业务的分离｛或解捺捆绑）通过展现基础或本的驱动 因素程增进效率的潜力也能产生好处。另外，跑着时间的推移， 3当相 互分离的管揭交互连接在一起时，合适的准入条款布条件的制定将加 速把合适的监管安排应用于中商境内的输气系统。通过增加管网用户 对天然气供应新来静、的灌入，这将茧’快地获得在天然气商品市场提升 竞争力的利益。 制定适宜的准入条款和条件需要成用三褒监管方法。这些方法包 捂： ·确保天然气拱气与输气经营活动相互分离的方法： ·建立辑吨经营业务规则及程序去控制单强管网用户准人的条款 程条件的方法；以及 ·评估以及（如果可以接受）批准输气服务报价的方法 123 供气与输气挺营活动的分离 第一辈监管方法涉及要求有效分离供气与输气楚营活动的原则的 应用。 二三个选择辑略地勾勒了可以选择的混围，以实现不同程皮的分 离： 选择 1 ：分离账户及经营管理，同时通过行磷守期来监管这种分 离。 选择 2：在不向地点分离输气与供气蜂蜜单位。 选择 3 ：撤销输气经营或者供气经营。 这三种选择各不相阿，从最低的分离要求（选择 1 ）到最激进的 撤销〈或出售〉输气旗者供气经膏选择。选择 2 可视为一个括中的办 法，但是，该选择是多个变景之一， ilJ"在选择 1 和选择 3 所定义的两 个极端之前进行定义。这些选择逐个笼统地描述了全世界稽气企业当 被要求提供对其管网准入服务时它引努力适应所带来的变化的经验。 大多数的输气企业最韧都抵制分离其输气与供气业务的监管要求，主 要是为了保护其天然气市场份额〈在欧拚i更为普遍），同时也为了避 免重组其企业的成本以及避免进行新的管理安排（在北美较为普遍）。 结果，他们只做出一点让步，只进行了最小程度的分离。 随着时间的撞移，监管委员会存找蓝有效的分离方法，在许多情 况下寻找有效分离方法的行动是由那搓来白捂运人的抱怨推动的，他 们提怨说：输气企业歧视他｛口商青睐与其有关（或者关联）的供气企 业。最终，许多输气企业发现将其供气业务放在一个完全分离的公却 是有利可图曲。这就提供了战略及管理的焦点并降假了监管委员会与 天然气托运人之间产生争端的凡率。 ~t荣及英国的输气企业都是如 此。 ）I挠应这一潮蔬的举措目前正在澳大利盟和新西兰涌现，这两个自 家的天然气产业改革要晚于北美及英国。西歌（伊J如法国的 Gaz de France 、比刹时的 Distrigaz、荷兰的比.unie、西班牙的 Gas.Natura 以 及德国 R吐ugas）的大部分雄气企业酣开始解决分离事宜，而且在大 多数情况下，都在考虑采踊选择 1 的变化形式。 就中陋的大环境来讲，在过搜期从选择 1 开始并评估其棋足监管 124 • 委员会如托运人的要求的能力是合乎道理的。经常（也是最有效的） 通过行动守则的方式来取得选择 1 的实施。 本示割的目的是为非擂绑输气的提供和监管提供基础。对于每一 家输气企业，监管委员会将列出在每一份文件中都需要解决的问题。 并设想这些文件和程序将通过在监管委员会的指导和监督下结输气企 业及合格的霄’道系统用户的讨论布协商而制定出来。 行动号子则 有动守则是眉来拮珑一家输气企业为实施与拉飞行分离其输气与供 气经营j震动而巳制订好的各种程序的文件。受监管的每一输气实体都 将被要求编写该有动守册。棋据设想，这些行动守期将作为监管委员 会与受监管的输气实体之i悔的咨询过程的一部分再进行编写，同时在 该咨竭过程中也内其他感兴趣方〈例如 i 生产商、符合条件的消费者 以及域市盟气公司）提供参与的就会。 典型的有动守则文件钮捂下列要素： 说明性注释：说明与特定输气实体有关的文件要求。 定义：琦行磷守则中所提及的相关各方及有为进行准确描述。 目栋及原则：本节窍容包括辑气实体向所有符合条件以及有资格 的市请人作出提供元歧挠性准人的承诺。诙承诺的主要特点将椅成摇 导信，患梳管理以及帮息准人能原则。输气实体将从只要求提供输气服 务的申请人处接收商业保宿信息。输气业务部门具有将此信息传递给 其关联供气业务部门的动机。树如，该输气业务部门将在其当前接受 捆绑式服务的客户中，找出是谁打算与其他供气商订立天熬气供应合 阂。这将便其关联供气业务部门可以这些客户为供应自称并诱使他们 继续作为其客户。这就使得该关联供气业务部门与其他供气商相比较 具有不公平的钱势。 执行行动夺划 本节内容混明行动守则的执行，钮括下~j 内容： 输气企业的各填义务。这搓义务包括重组程野、政策、部门结构 以及工作飘责，从南确保符合行动守则之要求。本节也包摇对建立雇 员交流及培训方案的承诺，以确探雇员能够获得信息以及资摞供应以 '125 便遵守。还将建立一个抱越程序。 功能分离的性质。该分项将涉及下列事项： 设施及资摞共事； 保存员长簿及记录： 禁11::从事受限制的经营活动； 提供业务支持服务。 经营行为。本分项涉及运份、 q交费和折扣的应用以及将需要的遥 告以确保提供非歧视性服务。 处理系统紧急情出的程序。本分项捞及违反行动守则的系统应急 反应处理的程序。 维护戴户及记录。该分项静及会计规期及法定要求。 进行符合姓审查的官员的任务。本分璜列出了进行符合性审蜜的 官员的权利、责任和职责，该官员负责监督并强制执行符合运行守膊 的经营有为以及勾勒出外部审计的条款。 行动守则草案见附件 5o 运行守则和输气服务协棋 远行呼蚓 现在可以来接讨阐述“行挠”和提供输气服务的第工和第二套监 管方法。运行守则说明了受监管的输气企业（作为输气服务提供商） 和输气系统用户的职责和义务。输气服务蜘议将按黑运衍守则来定 义，障时将详细说明输吨实体与待合条件的管网用户闻的输气服务合 同。 典型的运行守则将自下列要素掬成： 定义及晓明： 通用管用安全标准以及管阿计划方案； 连髓转运及所有校的转移； 技术规格、压力及质量： 计量及源试。 收结： 人口（输入或者接牧）点要求： • 126 • 出口（分输或者交付〉点要求可用容量及费提供容盘； 气量指定、重章开指定以及时间安排； 气量平衡以及不平衡的解决。 维护： 紧靠事件及输送蠢缩减〈不可抗力）； 开具发票与文件； 税金及应纳费： 争议解决。 自古件 6 是北美一家管道公司的通用条款和条件，与运仔守则相持 合。 输气服务协说 通常而言言，标准输气服务协议由分开的固定输气服务以及耳中断 雄气服务梅戚。典嚣的留定服务提供将怯照运行守则来定义，并将包 捂特定合同条款，比如下列条款： 服务的本质及定义； 接牧点及交付点： 服务收费； 金融保险； 开具发藕及付款； 容量分盟与转让。 陆件 6 中的递用条款和条件中组含吕定及可中断输气服务梅议的 格式（作为醋件）。附录 6 ，远提供了北美及欧洲输气公司肉址，可以 进入这些网址查看准人的条款和条件α 该通用条款奉告条件中的各项条款与上文阐述的举行守翔的主要组 成部分不完全吻合。这有两矜原因。第一个原因是该通用条款军在条件 与一特定管道及一条将美管道有关；第二个膜菌（与此相关）：运行 守则构成部分的囚的是对将需要在中国背景下解决的问题提供总的着 法。 一辈辈重要的西题 在中国背景下，共有六个问题筐得进一步讨论： • 127 . 输气容量的定义及分配： 容量是权的性肆； 网络巍划以及适用管间安全辑推： 天然气质最： 气量平衡及解决办法： 气量减少（缩减〉。 前三三个问题密切相关因此可敢在→起讨论。 输气容最、容量权及安金性 在北荣地眩，输气管道公司传统上…直就是“为理给商建”。这 意味着现有或者新容户订娟的是输气容量，并遥过签署一拾预踹诙容 量的长嘉合同的承诺来支持其踊气的请求。在管道公司同意并且随后 经授权提供非描绑式输气服务（与供气相分离）时，在大多数情况 下，将其合向中的哥最大气量（ MDQ ）转化为颈约容量证明是不商 难的。这事实上产生了…种长期的输气容量的财产权。另外，该财产 权可以合理并准确地被定义及定价，特别是对于长距离输气管道公司 , 韶亩，因为管输费殷切是根据预约容盘以及输送该容量的距离磷定 的。 通过对比，已证明定义及分醒更复杂的欧洲剧家输气管阔的输气 容量要更难。除了英菌的 BG Transco 以及主要的德国辑气公词，大 多数段加输气公司或者完全归自家所有～一『或者正准每逐步上市。所 有的欧拚i输气公司建立并发展其自身的管道网结，以符合建设足够的 供气基础设施的公共服务义务（ PS伪的要求，从而确保安全、可靠 的天然气供应并符合关于天然气渗透的公共政策目标。。结果，欧洲 输气公商报据颈计需求量来建设具有相应输气容量的管谱，雨没有获 得其客户援行长期合同并为该容量仔款的任何承诺。 另外，欧斟已建成的天然气基础设施如果是按照客户的长期合同 承诺而建立的，财其配置银可能不用。一体化的供气与输气系统的发 @ 在许多情况下该 POO 都不太弱确，但可以从规范输气公司建立和运行的法规文件 推断出。 • 128 • 展以及相应日益增加始对外部供气的依赖，已使得对雄气和储气设施 进衍了大量的投资，商这或许只能用一种极端悲班的评价即欺洲面i揣 着供气风险来能明其正确性。 开放式准人的采踊为天然气商络用户提供了该网结所提供的服务’ 增值的机会。同时，天然气网络用户将总是试图以最锚的成本来使其 所获得的服务最大化。这就有可能产生“提浅”或者“高于市场”的 成本。全部的或本回收包摇投资回收、投资回报~及现有输气和销气 设施的捕关运行及维护成本。如果管道网络用户不愿意签署合间并为 从这些设施所获得的服务支付费用，翔实际的科润因牧将无法实现全 部的利润回收。这些收不回来的利润即等同于“掘擒”或者“高于市 场”的成本。在中蜀，情况可能是：在将资产纳人资产基础巳进行远 街设计前，输气〈以及黠气〉公需将不得不接受降部其一些资产账面 价假的规定。 所有这搓因素都使得在联洲关于雄气容量的定义及分自己以及基于 该定义的提供长期输气合问方面只取得了有眠的…一实际上，几乎可 就豆豆畴的…ι进展。结果，一般辑吨合同的期根均为一年，通常与始 自 10 月 1 日的天然气合同年并行。这整合同中的预约睿量与管道两 珞中实际吁用的容暨南者阔的关系即使按最好的懵况估计也是非常脆 弱。管输费按年计，并且不可以任何有意义的方式涉及输气公司能利 润回报要求。 这些因素对中国的影蠕程度尚不萌了，但是，比较清楚的是中国 的输气企立在与欧洲商非北美具有更多的共同点。然而，如第 3 章厨讨 论的内容…样，可以把输气服务协议作为以实际智输容量的睿现定义 和分配为基准的长期合同来开发，为此制定一个强有力的方案飞 在中国，与在欧洲一样，天然气产业正从按照需求预器而非器定 的长期合肉承诺来提供容主意的情形，转变为管道网络用户决定他们需 • 在英固不将管道网络用户（托运人）的预约容盘与英国国家输气系统（ N币）天 然气人口点的实际可用容量相联系部做法警导致托运人的预约容量过寓，从而造成天然气 输入擎的频繁缩减。 BGTrar范∞最近已开始拍卖某人口容量，作为向管遂网络用户分配容 量的最有效方式，这些用户对此给予很高评价。也正在考虑对系统的出口容蠢“合商化”。 • 129 • 要多少容最来运送其天然气。管道揭络用户将总是趋向于少报其容量 需求，从而使其成本最小化。输气公司啦同样有此强烈的动机以确保 管道网络用户尽可能充分地读约可供使用的容量，以便使搁浅或本的 影响蒂固最小化。在有正当理由的情况下，辑气公司将能移声称其有 权收回根据先前的法律及商务安排所灌慎进行的全部技资戚本。熬 丽，当有证据表明有些成本离于市场成本时，监管委员会是不会允许 收障全部投资成本的。 在发生掏演戚本剖题的大多数管辖棋案例中，监管委员会已被迫 达成妥协。这种妥协可以采取很多种形式， f且是一般来说，它具有一 些共性特点。第一个特点就是建立…个包摆在运行守黠中的通用管道 网珞安全栋准，闰时要求新有的管道网络用户遵守该辑准。。这就将 要求管道网络用户如果已经对其预约的容量进行了全部的判斯，其预 约容量水平鼓应离出其将接收的气盘水平。而另一方醋，已预约的容 最水平通常锻于总的可棋气萃，因此会出现一拉阑浅成本。 第工今特点与回收这些搁浅成本有关。通常，监管委员会额由于 允许部分回收这垫搁浅成本，有一提方法可以做茧j这一点。倒如，可 能要求输气公肖立即或者短期内；中销部分搁浅投资。可免许公司继续 按器已确定的折回政策回校其他部分投资的成本，但是，不得囚枚该 部分投资的投资回报。最窟，可能允许该输气公司完全回收投资部 分，组是，只允许获取降截了的投资由报事。 阳在中国，这将需要详额分析每一个已识到的输气实体所提供的 输气服务的可用性以及需求盘。这项任务对于单条管道以及新管道坡 琵应该是相荒草简单直截了当。商蹄子较为复杂的管道系统，可能会消 耗更多的时间及资擦。程是，这一做法摄为重要，菌为成本回i在水平 以及可用容麓水卒的不确定性将使增加容量合国的可能性大大减小。 天然吨震锺 尽管中国的天然气输气系统目前由许多分开的管道及阿络构成， @ 这些规范就定义而玄，各不相同，但在具体实施中通常是吻合的功在大多数情况下， 它们都试图去识别为满足在某一寒冷际需气量所要求的输气容缓水平。 • 130 • 但是，明确制定一份通用的天然气质蠢规格并将其应用于所有的输气 同将是至关重要的。该规格书主要是一种强制性的技术规章，但是， 对于中国境内锚气网络的当前运行以及未来发展而言，它都具有重大 的意义。 对于所有进入输气网络的天然吨都采用一种严格的质量规格.＿：＿＿ 即有效地摇摇采用一种管道商品气的都准←一将碎偎潇蚀性并能够雄 持输气网络的整体性。当建设互连管道时，来居通用的政最规格也将 有助于这些输气网路的互用性。 管道商品气的一传典型主运量魏格的示倒兑附件 4 （第 2 条〉。 气噩平衡与前趣的解决 就花柴长距离管道（如期件 4 所做说明〉丽苔，通常 30 天为… 时段对接收盘及交付最进行平衡，商且在该时段来通过支付辑金结 算。征收罚金以麓腾管道网络m户使两者阔的不平摇最小钱。保持这 些管道尽可能充满天然气具有经济意义，所以，这些管道以较高负荷 远存。然后通过紧邻交付点以及需求中心的错气设施来进行每日以及 李节性需求波动供应调节。结果，在辑气管道的输气囊中相琦较少的 自差异量将是很可能的。从居际上来着，这一点对那些人口密度可能 较低或者人口居住地区较少值人口较为集中的国家境内或阔与国之爵 的长距离管道来说，更是如此。； 相反，在商人口密度国家〈尤其是欧洲国家〉中的输吨管岗，．输 气茸的每日及季节性变化趋向于大得多。此外，这种差异变化与天然 气市场的掺透程度直接相关。居民及商用恨和 C）需求量的比例愈 寓，前需求差异也愈离。陌且，持需求的变先与靠近锦求中，奋的储气 服务的可用性呈梧Jjl_趋势。调节供气量的储气服务的可用’在愈高，输 气网络输气量的每白变功差异愈小。倒如，在英国就需要琦每到 进有平衡调节。意大利和西班牙也正在考虑类似的气景平衡调节。西 比和j时、法盟和荷兰正在寻求建立小时气量平衡制飞 。 这种做法被广泛地认为不现实，一些评论人士把它辛苦成是一种策略，以阻碍实行 对这些管网的准入。 • 131 • 应进行气量平衡的时段是输气陪络技术及运转特点的一个功能。 它也与需要到佳的信息句控制系统的成本有关，以支持与某→气盘平 衡时段在关的气量指定、时间安排及结算安排。 在中国的背景下，这是需要详细研究的问题。应该往意的是，除 月、日气量平衡以外，考虑周平衡也是可能的。平衡时段的选择将确 定费需程序，以确保有效的气量指定、时间安排、平衡及结算。 不平衡罚金应该与辘气企业维持管陪气盘子衡房产生的成本联系 起来。一般来说，这包括在短时间内在取或者处理天然气的成本。很 难设计…种制度去提供有效激励以使这些自管道用户回收的成本最小 化。 在美圃，在现货市场上立时获得天然气正日益减少对不平衡罚金 的要求。输气公司以及管道用户正在利用这撞市场来直接处理气景不 平衡问题。同样，在英国， “每自商品市场”（ 0白。已得到发展， 这就允许 BG Transco 以及管网用户能静在短时间内购买和出售天然 气以维持天然气供求的日平衡。 以上事实强调鼓腾出现一个员活透明的天然气商品市场的会得到 进一步的牧益。 输入输描最差额（ Shrinkage) Shrinkage 被定为一天然气管道的就辑人气量和总提取（输出） 置之间的差额。一般它由丑解释天然气（UAG）一一起因于泄漏及 计量误是一以及黑于应锚杭燃料能自用气掏摸，压缩机燃料用于在 压力降惩驱使天然气温度低于天然气规格要求时进行加热以及进行控 制姓放空。大多数北美管道， UAG 气重镇向于忽略不计，而且对加 热及控制性放空也极少有任何要求。结果，输入输出量差额可等同于 崖描机操料气需求量。输气公司估算压缩就燃料气需求量，并确定每 一管道用户新占份额，然后要求这些用户将该份额气量都到其天然吨 输入盘中。 在英圃，输入输出最荼毒员大约为天然气输入蠢的 1% 。在G Transco 直接购买该气露并在其管辖费中收回该成本。西为英国 NTS 是一个相对较为复杂的管道网结，因此提难；再输入输出量盘棋气整分 • 132 • 配给特定管道翔络用户。另外，所结算的部围包括了整个输气及配气 系统的输入输出囊羞长距离雄气管道相比， UAG 气蠢占输入输出 差额的扮额较高。 鉴于中国境内未连接管道南络的多样性，意i乎有理由建议每一千 输气实体应直接购买输入输出最差额气量（与英国招商），并通过管 输费从管道网结商户收回成本。监管委j运会应该制定并批准一种结算 输入输出叠差额的方法。另外，为输入输出量提额购买的天然气也应 受至u蓝管。 • 133 • 附件 4 通用条款和条件 结息来源 可以在许多网站找至u关于选行耀则的资料或实倒（或通用条款和 条件），其中有些网站湾在下面。本黠件中的通用条款和条件实倒来 自于加拿大能 Alliance 管道公司（兑下文剖蜡 3 ）。之所议选择该公司 的通用条款和条件是由于其罔颂布，并包含了通用条款郭条件中的关 键要求，丽且使用的是清晰简明的语音。 网捕 1 ：加拿大回家能草草委员会（联邦监管委员会〉： 进入＜ www. neb. gc. ca＞：选“English”；圣经“Publications” 〈出 版物，包括年度报告、规章、准赔〉；进入“Ener盯 Overview”〈能摞 穰览）；找到“Natural G邵阳arket Asse阳nents”（天然气市场评估〉： 查“Other Government Agencies, Energy A础。ciations and Related Or- ganizations”（其他政商机梅、能窃、协会和精关组织〉一一加拿大、 阔、墨西哥，包摇进入 FERC （联邦能那管理委员会〉和墨西哥 C闭 的链接。 附站 2: TransCanada Pipιines （丁ransCanada 管道公司…一现有 大型管道）： 进入＜ www.transcanada.com ＞：从主页＜ /fransrr让ssion/in­ dex.htn让＞打开 Transmission Web page （“雄气”现页）；进入 “ Transportation Tariffs" 〈输气运价规则） 愕站。 4: BG Tr；出sea （英属天然气公司 Transco): 进入 WWW.tr甜sco.uk.com ；从主页菜单选择“ Publications”以 获得一份 a summary of Transco ’ s Network Code (Transco 管网规程 概述）。 网站 5: G臼 de France （法器燃气公窝头 进入＜ www. gazdefrance. 创n ＞，选择 Englis且并按路程进入 Pr部 Rel姐ses （错息发布〉。 同站 6: Ruhrg.部〈键因鲁尔公司〉： 进入 www.ruhrgas.de ；然后查里网站 Sa 坷站 7 ：也sunie （荷兰眉家燃气公司）： 进人 www.gas山兹e.nl ；从主页菜单选择“汇:Omm叫ity/Se凹ice” 遁用条款和绪毛件实i如d 目录 第一条：定义和解释 1.1 ..................................’:........ ……................………( 139) 第二条：质露 2.1 .................…...................................…................... (143) 2.2 ................................…..................……..........…．．．．〈支44) 2 .3 .................……....................揭……........... ......... ...... (144) 2.4 …........…………................…….....................…………. (144) .. ~ ........................ (144) 2.5 ................................................ · 2.6 ….................……...............................................……. (145) 2.7 …………................................................…•.• ........……. (145) 第三条：计蠢 3.1 …............................….....................……...….........….. (145) 3.2 ........….........…..........……...........…......................... (145) 3.3 ……........….... ............ ......... •••••• ...... ......... ...... ...... (145) 135 、 3.4 ........….........…….........…....... ,. .……杨....................…. (145) 第四条：计量设各 4 .1 ..............….................................... ...............…瓢..... (146) t 4 .2 .............................………...............................‘……. (146) 斗， 3 ……….........…··“.......... ' ..........……………....................…. (146) 第五条：不可抗力 5.1 ..李................................... "............................…................ (147) 5.2 ……...... •••••• •• .•••••. ...... •• .••• ... ....... ........ ... ..•••• •. ••••••• (147) 5.3 …...................................…….....................………………....... (147) 第六条：接收和交付压力 6.1 ……锺…........... '" .........………..............…. •••••••••.. •••.•• •.. ...••• • (147) 6 .2 ..........................…..............……….....................….......... (148) 第七条：出具账单相支付 7.1 …...........…..........................…….......... "..…李…..........….......... (148) 7.2 …............ "..........………..........…….. ••. •••••• •..... .. .•••• •• ••.. ••• ( 148) 7.3 ........…··*…………..............…….................……..........………. (148) 7.4 …….............……...........…............…...........……..........……. (148) 7.5 …..........…·……………................................…··“………...... (149) 7 .6 .........输……...........…..................................................…………. (149) 7.7 …............................ ~ ...............................……….......... (150) 第八条：服务位先权 8.1 .................………............……................................……. (150) 8.2 ……带.................. "' ...............................….........….......... (150) 第九条：非弃权布将来违约 9.1 …........…...................……............…... ............. ... ...... ( 152) 第十条：要求输气服务 10 .1 ..............………..........…..................................….. (152) 第十一条：气章指定 11.1 ………............................……................ ' ............…. (153) 11.2 ..............………..........….................................... (154) • 136 • 11.3 ........…….............. .....................…....... ..…….........”…. (154) '!' !" 11.4 …...................…...........….................................……….... (155) 11.5 ...............…….........……….................................. (155) 第十二条：时间安排 12.1 ….............…….............…….....................……............……. (155) 12 .2 .................................…. •. .. .... ••. .. •••• •.•.• ••. ...••• .. .• (156) 12.3 .................................................................…·…(157) 第十二条：非授权气量布不平衡气量 13.l ……...….................................................... •••••••• (157) 13.2 ' .................…..........……......... "...................….. ........ (157) 13.3 ......................……….............………………………. (157) 13.4 ………...........…….........................……............…..............…. (158) 13.5 ................................…..........……............… ··γ ……（ 158) 13.6 …............................……~ .........…….......................…. (158) 13. 7 ....................................…................................. (158) 13.8 …...........…..............................…..................................…. (159) 13.9 ………..........……...........……….............…................... (159) 13.10 …...............................……….............………...................…(159) 13.11 ........……..............…............……………. ••••••••.. •••• ••••••• (159) 第十四条：燃料气 14 .1 ........…..........……......................…………..........………( 159) 14.2 ................................…...............................…………. (160) 14 .3 ·•······· ..........................……...............…. ••• ••• •••... .. •••• (160) 14 .4 ............................................……....................…. (160) 第十五条：接收辑先校 15.1 ….................…...................…….. •• .. •••• •... ••••••••• ••• (160) 第十六条：？琵合气的权利 16.1 ……............................…….................................. (161) 第十七条：运行条件改变的i脚 17 .1 ............................................................‘….•••• ... (161) 137 • 第十八条：拥有和控制天然气 18 锺 1 …........….............................….........……‘.........…. (161) 第十九条：托运人担保和赔信 19.1 ……第……..............…..........................……...........…. (161) 19.2 …..........................…….................................".....……. (161) 19. 3 .......................……·……..........................................….. (161) 19.4 ..........................…………·…..........….... •••••• ...... ••• (162) 19.5 ........……·鑫…..................…………........………………. (162) 19 “6 …….........…...…….........“.................................………. (162) 第二十条：财务保证 20 .1 .........................................……..........……………. (162) 第工十…条：可中斯输气服务收入的抵减 21.1 …..............…鑫.................................…......................................…. (164) 第二十二条：运份班期明细表加合国的结合 22.1 …...........…. •• .••••• .••• •• ••• .•• •.. ••••••• ••... •.•• •• •.••••••... ••••• (164) 22.2 …..............…………..............……...........……….............……. (164) 第工十五条：输气服务协议 23.1 ….........……...........................……绷．．．．．．．“….. ••••••• ••• •••• •• • ( 164) 23.2 …............…............……...................................................……. (165) 第二十四条：通知 24.1 ........….........................….............….......................………. (165) 第二十五条：操作者 25.1 …........................…...................................….........…. ......... (165) 第二十六条：责任和赔倍 26.1 ........................................................................ (166) 26.2 ….........……...............................................…. •• ••• •••• ( 166) 第二十七条：其他 27 .1 ........…................................................................………. (166) 附表 A 附件 I 138 • 输气服务接议格式 附件 II 吁中断输气服务梅议格式 通用条款和条件 第…条：定义如解释 1.1 除非在本条款利条件中另有定义，否则下列词语具有下述 含义： “103时”指 1000 立方米天然气。 “可接受气量”的定义见第十一条。 “关联方（关联公苟）”：当用该词表明与某人的关系时，指直接 或间接地通过一个或更多个中间人或其钝人拉制该人或被该人控制或 罔样受制于人的另一个人。如果一家公司直接或间接地受控于另一家 公司或如果它们每…家直接或间接地摄同一个人控制，这家公司应挠 为是另一家公司的关联合碍。 “授权的超限额服务”或“AOS”摆商定输吨搓运人有权分配到 管道一定比销的有时不丢在约的容盘份额，自为依据运价规则晓娼褒器 定输气服务第 2.7 条和第 2.8 条的规定任何分配给固定提运人的 Al­ liance 管道公司的己簇纬容量以及黯盾的该容量分配都指该托运人的 该容量份额。 “营业曰”指必Hance 管道公司在阿尔伯塔省卡尔如里的主要办 公地通常开门营业的日子。 “加拿大接收气汇集点”指紧邻接收气点芋静的认定供每位托运 人使用的…-t-位置，本身即为…提气点，可以计划从该点输气或输入 输出指定气囊，以实现第 11.1 所定义的天然气权益转移。 “直在拿大交付气汇集点 n 指紧邻交付气点下静的认定供每位托运 人使用的一个位置，本身即为一交付气点，可以计划从该点输气或输 入输出指定气盏，以实现第 11.1 既定义的天然气权益转移。 ’ 139 • “中部时钟时闻”或“ ccr＂指采用夏时制时的中部白昼时间朝 英时制取消时的中部标准时间。 “商品费”指在运价规划晓细表面定翰气服务附表 A 中规定的商 品费。 “签约容盘”指某托运人签约的每日气麓，而且极据输滥摄务榜 议的条款该尧运人已同意为该气最支付需求费（预纯容量费）。 “立方米”或“m3 ”指在温度为摄氏 15℃以及Eli力为 101.325 千 棉斯卡（ Pa）时占据…立方米空间的气髦。 “日需求费”指将需求费除以相关月天数得出的商数。 “每在需求费附加费”茹将需求费酣如费除以相关月天数得出的 商数。 “日”指从中部时间 9: 00 开始和结束的连续工十四（ 24 ）个小 时的时间段，或是经运辘商和托运人同意的连续二十四（ 24 ）个小时 的时间段。 制交付点”指 Alliance 管道公司管道系统如柴国 Alli阻ce 管道公剖 管道系统的相互连接点。 “需求费”指在运份规翅明细表固定输气服务附表 A 中规定的需 求费。 “需求费挺减辙”指截据运价旗期明能表睦定输气服务第四条确 定的需求费报减额。 “需求费酣加费”指在远街规则明都表团定输气服务盼表 A 中巍 定的需求赞即如费。 “需求费附如费抵减额”指怯据运货规翅明结表团定输气服务第 四条确定的需求费抵戴额。 “回定输气服务”指根据远椅规那明细表固定输气服务提供的输 气服务。 “自定托运人拇指签署输气服务拚议的托运人，其有权接受商定 赣气服务。 “不可抗力”提任何天灾、战争、民众起义或叛乱、敌对行为、 罢工、停工或其他有盘骚乱、意外事件、战争封锁、暴动、夜病、自 140 • 崩、闪电、地震、爆炸、火灾、暴风、水灾、冲蚀、民众或军队的扣 留与限制、内乱、机械或管绒的断裂或意外事故、到机械或管线的必 要静理或更换、管线的冻结、无法获得材料、供应品、许可成劳动 力、或其他完论是否列举的原自，它们已趟出了任街当事方的控制， 即使其思职尽资也无法阻止或克服α 罢工、停工或其他劳工争端的解 决应完全由西植团支援的一方自行解决。以下事件不应作为不可拉力事 件：（ 1) 托运人的天然气供应不足；（2 ）托运人的天然气市场发育不 完全或无经济效益；（ 3 ）托运人缺乏资金或性）由于上善于天然气接 收点或下游交付点设施的无论任何原因，输气服务藏少或中断；更磷 切地说：“上善于天然气接 q支点”指超出 Alliance 管道公由计量站进口’ 捕的接较点，而“下游交付点”则指溜出 Alliance 管道公商交待点出 口制的交付点。 “燃料需求”其定义克第十四条。 “气棒”或“天然气押指 Ej:f 烧郭其他摄氧化合物或是它们中的两 种或更多种成分的混合物，在任何情况下都能满足运份规则中关于天 然吨的原盘规格要求。 “总热值”指在常温常压下 1 立方米天然气与空气完全燃捷所产 生的以每立方米兆焦（蚓Im:勺表示的总发热量。其中天然气不含水， 每空气及燃烧生戚物的撞在度罔为常温，并且燃烧反应生成的所有水全 部冷凝为液态。 “不平衡”其定义见第十二条。 “吁中断输气收入挺摄额”指棋擂第十二条计算并分配给吕定输 气托运人的吁中船输气收入挺磺额。 “可中断输气服务”指根据运份规蜡唠细表吁中新辑吨服务提供 的输气服务。 “可中断输气服务运价”指可中新辙气服务收费明细表附件 A 中 规定的较费。 “可中酣输气捂运人”指签署可中断输气殷务捧议的花运人，其 寄权接受可中断辑气服务 “王军中黯输气廉务拂议”或“ 1宿A”指依据该协议雄气公司向提 141 运人提供可中断输气服务的胁诀。 “焦耳押或“J”指相当于 1 牛赖的力使辑摔在力的方向上移动 1 米时所做的功。 “最大日输气盘”指在吁中断输气服务她议中明确规定的、输气 公吨同童自托运人接收并根据可中断输气服务枚费明细表进行输送的 最大气囊， 00 （或出托运人和运输 “月押指自一公历月第一天中部时间 9: 公司达成一致的具体时间〉开始至下一公历月第一天中部时间 9: 00 结束的时闻段。 “月度发票金额”指按据适用的收费明缩表要求托运人每月；电边 输公司文何的金额。 “个人H 指一个人、合铁、有限合伙、合营、辛迫如、独资、据 有股本资本的公司或公司集困、非法人协会、托拉菇、托管人、受托 人、管理人或其他法人代表、蓝管委托部门或机梅、政府或政府就掏 以及以任何方式指定或任命的权力部门或实体。 “主接收点”指在托运人输吨服务协议精表 A 中规定的自制定服 务挺运人捕定作为天然气主接收点的接收点。 “主接收点容囊”其定义见器是输气服务收费明细表第 6.1 (a) 款。 “优惠贷款利率”指任何时候由设在阿尔能塔省卡忽加盟的 Nova Scotia 银行主要分行当时指定的年度和~ll挥作为其在加拿大进仔细拿大 元商金贷款的参照利卒，该利事被该银行宜布为其位惠贷款利率。据 此应持的利率在每一夜住惠利率发生变动后将在不通知任拥方的情况 下自动变化。本协议中到期出现的利率应采黑名义和j率法进行讨辞而 且本利应每月合在一起。 4 “接收点”指在酣表 A 中规定的 Alliance 管遭公司管道系统的… 个点，在此接收点托运人可根据一输气摄务协议提交供输送的天然 气。 “次接收点”的定义见匾定输气服务收费葫细表第 2.9 款 “服务梯议”指输吨服务掷议或吁中断输气服务协议，截上下文 142 • 主要求商定。 “托运人弹指苟 Alliance 管道公司亵订输气服务协议（币川的 任何人，或棋据上下文，指与 M主ance 管道公司签署吁中断锚气服务 挣议。四局的人。 “托运人的授权气量”其定义兑以下第十一条。 “托运人的签纬总睿量”指根据托运人作为一方的所有雄气服务 拚议的签约容盘总数。 “托运人的指定气量”其定义兑现下第十…条。 “托运人修改的指定气囊”其定义见以下第十一条二 “运价规期”包括不时会经修订和批准的固定雄气服务收费明细 表、可中断输气服务收费明摇表以及通用条款和条件。 “ Taylor- Aitken Creek 接收点？或“TAC 接收点”指在前表 A 捞起作为丁aylor - Aitken Creek 接收点的接收点。 “赣气”指根据托运人的输气服务楼议在花运人可使用的接收点 为托运人接收天然气，然后输送并在交付点为捂运人交付天然气。 “雄气服务协注”或“’ISA＂指 Alliance 管道公南向托运人提供国 定输气鼓务所截握的协议。 “赣气方”指 Alliance 管道有限合伙公词（译注：在文中简称 Al币 Hance 管道公司）。 “雄气方的签约总容量”指根据 Alliance 管道公司作为一方前所 有输气服务协议的签约容量的总数。 “美国营造公司”指在策国的 Alliance 管道有限含饮公需。 “美国戳蝶料气要求”其定义见第十四条。 “年”指连载 365 天的一时阔戳，但有 2 月 29 日的一年舔外，该 年应为连键 366 天。 第二条：藏量 2.1 除非 Alliance 管道公司另外授挟，杏则在接收点交给 Al翩、 Hance 笆’道公司的天然气盛根据第 2.2 条符合以节规路： e (i ）应具有不低于 36 MJ/m3的总热值； • 143 • ( ii ）在 Alliance 管道公司的管道中处于常温常压条件下，从商 业角皮讲应不含妙、无灰尘、元鼓质物、无在温度超过一 lO'C 相通常 操作压力下可被化的棋氧化合物飞元杂质、无其他可能会从天然气分 离出来的讨厌物质目及将使天然气无法出售的其他固体或被体，它们 会对正常运行的管线、监管任务、天然吨混过的流量计或其他设跑造 成摆害或干拉；天然气中不应含有在街非正常物质，组输送和交付天 然气所必需的含在天然气中的材料和化学物除外，它们不会造成天然 气达不羁规定的质量标准； (iii ）根据标准方法和翻试确定，每立方来天然气中含有的磁住 室主不应超过 23 毫克，总梳不应越过 115 毫克： (iv ）二氧化蝶含量不应越过 2%; ( v ）每立方米天然气中含有的Jj(汽不应超过 65 毫克； (Vi ）温度不应越过 50℃； (Vii ）尽可能不含氧，在任何情况下毓气含盘不应超过 0.4% ；以 及 (Viii) 在任何’！青况下都不应含有将造成在 iE 常操作条件下出现任 何被体的混合成分。 2.2 指定在饺子 AB05 边界湖、 A丑 06 边界潮一IOL 以及 AB 07 边界蛮湖的接收点交接的天熬气进符合在嚣海岸能源有眼公司相 关运价规则中规定的相关质量都准，该E主量标准可能会不时修改。 2.3 如果囱挺运人或代表托运人向 Alliance 管道公司交接的天 然气未能满足第 2.1 和第 2.2 条〈依适用情况定〉中的都准要求， Alliance 管道公需可以拒绝接收该天然气，在此情况下 Alliance 管道 公司将尽快通知托运人允许其立即补救殷莹的任何缺陷。 2.4 放弃： Alliance 管道公商以非歧视的方式保留放弃任向或 所有天然气质量条款的权和，但条件是：经 Alliancε 管道公司确认该 同意的放弃不会以任何方式盘害其管道系统的完整性或违反美国 Al屿 jill ~ liance 管道公司的任何要求。 2.5 如果 Alliance 管道公碍确定在其系统的任街地点提合天然 气气流的总热锺正在接近或预计将要接近提据其系统的设计可接受的 －飞！！ • 144 • 最高水平， Alliance 管道公商将实施第 2.6 条所叙述的天然气容量分 配程序。就正常操作条件下的 Alliance 管道公奇系统中的大口在管道 区段来说， 1昆合天然气气流总热筒的预计摄皮大约为 44.3 MJ/m3a 2.6 在需要时， Alliance 管道公司应接据第 2.5 条采取以下步辘 分配其系统中的天然气容髦。 Alliance 管道公词应伊UJU其系统中受到天然气容盘分配影嘀的部 分，明确那些正在对其实行天然气容量分配程岸的接收点。 Alliance 管道公带应曾先按据第二条其他部分特到是第 2.4 条规 定的授权采取所有任动以消舔或避免巴识射出的部题。 如果有必要， Alliance 管道公司将决定接收点所指定的天然气将 可以接受的！路时性最高总热盘以确保海合天然气气流将不会超过第 2.5 条提定的，总热值i程度。 Alliance 管道公司将通知托运人有关情况以及受影响接收点指定 天然气的 If盘时姓最高总热值。 2.7 不符合临时姓最高总热值的摇定出于不符合控制庚蠢的要 求，因此将予以拒艳。 Alliance 管道公商采取的行动将反映出其有能 力在拒结（如果必要的话）对受影嘀的接投点进行主接收点气盘指定 前就拒绝次接收点的气盘指定，这合作为一种减轻巳识别问题影确的 机制。 Alliance 管道公司将根据需努随时更新临时性最南总热值，以 握最大眼皮捕增如给予如运人的灵活性。 第三条：计量 3.1 用于报告段的的天然气气盘单位为 1000 立方米（ 103m3)o 3.2 自托运人处接收的天然气气盘应摄据如拿大电和气体拴验 法令（ Electricity and Gas Inspection Act）及下述的规定予以确定。 3.3 居于气皇室计算的绝琦大气应力症假定为是根据蔬整计位置 的实际海拔高程邂过计算确定的比茧，离不考虑实际大气压力的变 动。用于计算大气压力的公式应棋据统据加拿大屯和气体撞撞法令及 下述规定所要求的方法。 3.4 对所接收或交付的天然气总热值的确定应按眼加拿大电和 145 • 气体检验法令及下述规定问意的方式进衍，或者如果确定总热怪的方 式在该法令中未巍定，员寻根据行业公认的标准进行，但在任何情况下 采用的方式都要确保所稳定的总热值在接收点接收或交付点交付的天 然气中有代表性。 第四条：计最设备 4.1 磷定气霞、总热值或相对密度的所有仪表和计量设备都应 依据加掌大电和气体检验法令及下述规定获得批准并根据该法令和下 述规定进行安装和雄护。尽管前述有规定，但所有应席于或影响天然 气交待的设备的安装都应按照允许精确确定交付天然气气量和器时标 定计篮精确度的方式进行。在安装、维护和操作压力控器设备时， Alliance 管道公司和托运人都应漾’模小奋，以避免在根据雄气服务搀 议对所交件的天然气气量进行确定时出现不准确的情谎。 4. 2 Alliance 管道公司应每另一次旗在双方同意的更长时间间 隔里标定其计量设备的精确度。无论在任何时间只要托运人提出要 求， Alliance 管道合词都将标充其计最设备的精确度， f盟条件是所骆 求的校验每月不起过一次。如果在进行了既要求的校验后，发现计量 设备纪录准确〈其中包括下文提到的百分之工或更低的不准确度）， 该研要求的校验的费用应由提出校验方文付并承扭；在其他陪况下所 有搜据要求进行的投验的费用由 Alliance 管道公诗承担。如果在测试 之后发现计量提备不准确但并没有超过 2% ，应认定该计量设备的先 前读数在计算交付童时是准确的，但是对该设各班立卖tl进行适当调整 以便准确妃录交付景。如果在前试之后发理计量设备不准确碍且数多重 超过了 2% ，期该计量设备的先前读数班校正为零误差，具体时间最 为已明确知恶或双方同意的时间段；如果该时间段不完全明确或现方 无法达成一致，员自该读数校正的时闰段应是自上一次进行溜试的日 以来已过时间段的后半载。 4.3 在进行与其中→方在计量接收和交件中所使用的设备有关 的安装、读数、清洁、改变、修理、检查、测试、标定或揭整时，弟 一方有枝在场。有关这些计量设备的纪录应伺然是纪录拥有者的财 • 146 • ，｛昆在一方提出要求后，另一方都将向该方提交其纪录和图表以及 与此有关的计算结果供检查和校准之用， f旦绕在收到这些文件后的 30 天内归还。每一方都应把所有摸i试数据、望表以及其他相叙纽录 保商至少 2 年，成保留有管辖权的负责管理机梅可能所要求的更长一 段时间。 第五条：不可抗力 5.1 如果由于不可拉力或超出其合理控制的任何其他事件，剑” lianoε 管道公司或托运人未能履符其在本运椅规则或任铜服务协议下 的任前义务，张据该运价规划成该服务协议的条款，该未展有义务不 !ft视为违约。由于某一不可抗力事件造成的未能震行其在远份规则或 殷务踌议下任何义务的…方班合理地思其所能迅速消除产生不可抗力 的旗匾，但前提是：关于解决罢工、停工或其他行业强乱的期眼应完 全由提出暂停震行其义务的一方自行决定。 5.2 尽管在第 5.1 条的巍定，但上文所指的任何事件都不应： (1 ）免i东任饵一方震行运价规期或服务楼议下的任何义务，除非该方 向另一方合理地郎揭发出有关该事件的通知；（ 2 ）免踪任前一方在一 合理的期限终止后援行远街规则或服务除议下的任何义务，在该期限 内濡过尽职尽资该方本应清除或克服该不可抗力的后果；以及（ 3) 免除任何一方向另一方支付需求费、需求费附加费或其锦费用的义 务，但在固定输气服务收费明细表第四条中明确规定的情况除外。 5.3 根据 5.1 条，如果在任何一方未能履行其在本远贷规则或 任何服务协议下的任挥义务扫视为不是违约的情况下，雇行该义务的 时间应延长，延长的天数应与相关事件存在的天数相等 第六条：接i控制支付压力 6.1 由托运人或代表托运人交付给 Alliance 管道公司的所有天 然气都应以 Alliance 管道公词不时提出的压力在一接软点交付。不应 要求托运人以超市在前表 A 中对诙接收点明确规定的接收压力交付 天然气。 • 147 • 6.2 由 Alliance 管道公司在交付点向美国 Alliance 管道公司的设 施交件的所有天然气都应 ~Alliance 管道公司和柴国 Alliance 管道公 司招互国意的压力进行交付。 第七条：出具账单和支钳 7.1 在每个月九在当天或之前，刽liance 管道公词应通过电子 或其他手段肉托运人发送一给过去一个月托运人对 Allian臼管道公司 的应付金额清单。 Alliance 管道公司遂将通过电子或其他手段向挺运 人发送一给根据第十三条计算的费用清单。如果实际数量还无法及时 算出以制备账单，五军基于结计数盘进行收费，缸 Alliance 管道公剖应 在下…个月的胀单中提供莲子实际数髓与铀计数量向盖异的旗节数。 任伺所要求的发票备份数据都应与该发票就在…题。 7.2 应 Alliance 管道公甫的合理要求，托运人应及时向 Alliance 管道公司提供进有计算如校验气量、展最以及托运人向 Alliance 管道 公诗实际交付天球气的总热值所需耍的任何信息或数据。 7.3 握务胁议或收费明摇表项亨的所有支付都应在该月二十五 日当天或之前不久朝在托运人校到该月应拧金额清单后第五个营业自 向 Alliance 管道公司指定的存款账户以加拿大资金的方式通过电子资 金转账做出。如果在支付到期日蓝天所指定的存款呈长户在正常营业期 闰来打开以接收托运人的付款，托边人应在支付强j期日之后该存敖草草 户在正常营业期间打开的第一天进行支付。如果托运人未能接本条款 7.3 支付在月度清单上列璃的出其应支付的既有或部分金额，由此即 产生的利息应以与白统惠利率再如百分之一的科率相爵的利率每 E 增 加。如果在付款日到期十天眉不支付的情提继续，除了采取其他补救 措监外， Alliance 管道公司可以不经通知暂停为托运人输送和交付天 然气。这种暂停为持运人输送和交付天然气的行为不掏成 Alliance 管 道公司未能震行其本运费规庭或任匍服务褂议项下义务的违约。 7.4 除非在发现一处胀单误差的六十（ 60 ）天内以及自提出跟 单有误差之日远二十吕（24 ）个丹内的任何情况下要求索赔，否则自 接收到另一方声称发现账单瑛握的通知之日起王三十（30 ）天内应对该 148 • 胀单误差进衍调整，具体如"F; 在对托运人多开荒草款并且托运人已支持该账单的情况下，多付的 数额将退还给托运人，其中还告括自多付款之日起到退款之罚止的与 优惠利率相等利率的利息再加百分之一（ 1 %）。如果对托运人的还敖 是通过在另→张 Alliance 管道公司发票上抵攘的方式进行，在该托运 人收到该抵减发票之日起该多付款将视为已邀还。如果 Alliance 管道 公明对托运人少校了款，捂运人将支付该欠收款但无利患，条件是 在五十（ 30 ）天内支持该欠款。对在三十（ 30 ）天内未支付的欠款 额，应自开出账单之日起支付按日增加的与优惠利率相锋利事的和UJ急 再加百分之一（ 1 %）。 7. 5 Alliance 管道公司或托运人均有权在合理的时陪审查另一 方的服簿、记录和自在衰，但限制在为了核实任街景荒岛主的准确桂或核实 对少收教或多收款进行索赔所必要的范围内。 7.6 (a ）假据第 7.3 条， Alliance 管道公司先权暂停对天然气的 进一步变性，条件是如果托运人有城意地： (i）对该跟单的数盘或部分数最提船员提： (ii ）向 Alliance 管道公司提供一份书商通知包括对该 质疑的原因的充分叙述，问时有数份支持性文 件：以及 (iii) EM其承认账单数棋是正确时向 Alliance 管道公商 支付该数棋。 (b ）花运人不能以任何有争议的金额；中报其账单中的需求 费或需求费蹄加费部分。 (c）在有诚意的账单争议中， Alliance 管道公词可以要求， 商捂运人应在接到该要求的十 (10 ）天内提交一份克 分的最约保证，保证向 Alliance 管道公司支付受到或 将受到该争议影响的任何要去单的所有有争议的金额。 如果托运人未能向 Alliance 管道公需提交一份保证支 付的最约保证，或者花运人在有该履给保证的情况下 违约， Alliance 管遵公司有权暂停或终止托运人的输气 149 • 服务她议。 (d）有读嚣的员提单争议应依据 7.6 (a）款在 Alliance 管道 公肖收到托运人的书固通知六十（ 60 ）天内假照阿绍 信塔省持戴令提交持截 7.7 如果托运人没有根据第七条向 Alliance 管道公碍支付金额 到期款， Alliance 管道公奇在不损害其可能有的任何其他权利或黯儒 的精况下，应有权提付戒抵消其欠托运人的到期款项，以冲抵托运人 欠其的任何或所有到期款项，国不论这结教项是与托运人的输气服务 协议或是苟其他楼议有关。 第八条：服务钝先权 8.1 (a）在由于不可拉力的任柯时间、或在根据其独立如i 麟容 锺或运营条件需要时或者在值得或有必要对其管道系 统进行改造、修理或改变远有条件时， Alliance 管道公 司都有权对其管道系统的所有部分或一部分全部或部 分埠缩减或停止输气。在这种需况下， Alliance 管道公 需应向捂运人提交关于合理缩减输气的通知。 (b) Alliance 管道公海拥有绝对的权利在任何时间中睽可 中断雄气服务以便冉托运人提供器定雄气服务。 (c）在根据 8.1 (a ）款缩减输气服务的情况下，应按~下 顺序缩减： (i ）根据第十工条计划的可中断输气服务，将首先按比 例缩减碍中断输气服务； (ii ）接下来将根据托运人据有的 AOS （授权的走蓝眼额 服务）叙利按比例缩诫该服务， AOS 是按据运价 规则明细表盟定输气服务第 2.7 条确定的，在第 十一条规定的指定气量时间之后作出的 AOS 揩定 在及时指定前被全部缩减； (iii) 接下来将提据第十二条对基于商定输气服务的托 运人按比例缩蜡固定输气服务丽不是 AOSo 8.2 如果在某一接收点或接收点的一个局部附属设各依据 8.1 150 • (a）进行缩减输气，输气服务应按山下j服序进行缩减： (a）将首先缩减在这些接较点的可中断辑气服务，应依照 第十二条根据在这些接软点计姐为可中断服务的提运 人提供可中断服务输气蠢与被照第十二条计划的可中 断服务总辑气量之比，按比部分配在这些接软点可供 使靡的可中断输气服务； （始接下来将缩减的是向固定输气托运人提供的朋定输气 服务（钮括授权的超眼额服务气最〉，该（或这提）接 收点不是院定输气托运人的主接收点以及国定输气挺 运人指定的气量大于其主接收点容量。在该（或这些） 接收点可拱这蜡托运人使用的固定服务雏气量将银器 每个托运人在每一接收点超出宝接住点容量的每一计 划气量按比例在这些茹运人间进行分配。如果接收点 为 TAC 接枚点， TAC 接收点不是向固定输气托运人 提供固定输气服务（包括授权的超限额服务气量〉的 主接枚点商旦翻定输气托运人的指定气量大于其主接 收点容最I，这样，该托运人在府有 TAC 接收点的主接 牧点总指定气量链子该托运人在辟有 TAC 接收点的主 接收点总容蠢，四i这 TAC 接软点的固定输气服务应排 除在结诫之井。 (c）接下来将捕诚在 TAC 接投点向固定托运人提供的自定 辑气服务〈包括授权的超限额服务气量），该 TAC 接 收点不是主接校点即旦回定提运人指定的吨量超出这 费托运人在该丁'AC 接收点的主接软点容囊，这样该托 运人在所有 TAC 接枝点的±接收点总指定气量低于该 托运人在所有 TAC 接收点的烹接收点总睿垒。可供使 用的该固定输气服务截据 12.2 (b ）条款将根据在该 接牧点为每一位芫运人计矮的气量按比倒在这些固定 托运人之闯进行分嚣。 (d）在所有接收点为主接技点向周克托运人提供的固定输 151 • 气服务〈包括授校的超段额服务气量）将在最后进有 结躁，可供这费托运人在该接较点使用的该固定输吨 盟务依据 12.2 (a ）条款将摄据在该接收点为每…位 l 扭运人计划的气锺按比摆在这接吕定托运人之间进行 - 分配。 第九条：未放弃幸自将来连的 9 .1 Alliance 管道公司或托运人就弃追究另一方握行服务胁议 任何条款时的任再一次或多次违给行为，不得作为或解释为该方放弃 - 迫究任何类辑或不阔的正在继臻或将来的违纯行为。 第十策：要求输气E曼舞 10.1 要求提供收费明能表固定输气服务和收费明韶表吁中断输 气服务项下的输气服务，应通过向 Alliance 管道公商｛地址如下）书 商提供以下倍患部宿效提出： A丑i础优管道公苟地址如下： Alliance Pipeline Limited P缸tnership Suite 400 605 5th Avenue S. W. Calgary, Alberta Canada TIP 3H5 Attention: Manag役， Tariff Administration (a）托运人的身份： (i）托边人的法定姓名／名称班主要营业地 (ii）托运人的电话号码，盗少包括一个电话号码，→周 7 天 每天 24 小时都可以通过此号码与托运人援校的藤员或 代理进行联系。 (b）要求的眼务特点〈拥定输气或吁中断输气服务）。 (c）要求的固定输气服务签约容盘或可中攒输气服务到最大输送 盒，以 B 千立方米表后（ 1000m3 /d）。 (d）要求的开始服务 5 期。 152 • (e）要求胎摄务期段。 （£）要求的主接收点，选自逼盟条款和条件攒表 A 列出的接收 点：如果能握枚费明结表团定输气服务提出要求，赔需列出 在每一接收点要求的主接收点容量 (g）交易的任何一方（作为挺运人、供应方或是接受最务的个 人〉是否是 Alliance 管道公司的关联方；如果是关联方，盘里 述关联程度。 （坊如果托运人代表第三方要求服务，托运人道提交…椅其与第 三方签署的协议授权托运人代表第三方，以确保卫吁要求的赣 气服务。托运人应提供诙第二三方的姓名、地址、电话号码以 及身份扣（如：地方配气公司租生产者）。 第十…条：指定 11.1 〈时对于嵌照每捞报务搀议每日；要求的输气服务，挠运 人应由 Alliance 管道公萄提供一份气量指定通知， 说萌托运人希望接收、运辅相交付的接收点、交付 点、道理的收费明细表、天然气气量、总热值或总 焦耳数（“托运λ指定”〉以及 Alliance 管道公司合 理确定的其他必要信息。 (b）应 Q,( 书面方式或 Alliance 管道公司辛劳托端人相互间 意的电子方式向 Alliance 管道公商提交指定遵知， Q,(便其搜捕与荣商 Alliance 管道公商制定的时闰表 〈出到elines）收到这整指定通知，该对 i同表反挟了天 然气工业栋准委员会〈“GISB勺的栋准指定周期。 (c）除了酣表 A 列出的接技点外， ff为指定的一部分， 托运人还可以要求自其他托边人的加拿大接牧汇集 点进行气量的转人或转出。托运人也可以指定从托 运人前加靠大交付汇集点转入或转出气量蓝其他托 运人的加拿大交付汇集点。自其他方的加拿大交件 汇集点转入或转出气盖以及商其他方的加拿大接收 • 153 • 汇集点转入或转出气量桂林为“天然气班有权转 移”。 (d）如果通过双方的医配和相肉量指定确认了该天然气 所有权转移，所有剩余的指定、时间安排以及缩减 程序将依据衷方该所有权转移气量的净指定总赣执 行。 11.2 (a）如果 Alliance 管道公司接受了托运人的指定，托运 人的捂定气量（包摇燃斜气要求和策国政燃料气要 求）称为“托运人的授权气盘飞 (b ）如果必liance 管道公词决定它将不接受托运人的指 定〈由于不可抗力、托运人未能遵守托运人摄务胁 议，或与运份规期一敢的任何原因） , Alliance 管道 公词要在托运人己提出要求某在给予己减少气擎的 服务（如果有）的前一天告诉茸运人： Alliance 管道 公司巳准备好依照托运人殷务协议输送和交钳气量 （“巳承诺气蠢”〉。托运人应部 Alliance 管道公司提 交一份经惨改的指定（“托边人修改的指定勺：托运 人修改的指定气量不能大于日承诺气量。 (c）如果托运人不进行重黠指定，将认为托运人的据定 气盘是己承诺气量并成为托运人的授权气量。如果 托运人修改的指定气量提于巳承诺气盏，那么“） 托运人修改的指定气楚、（ 2 ）蝶料要求气麓和（ 3) 美罔段燃科要求气擎的总数即成为托运人的授权气 11.3 Allian四管道公琵应允许托运人在制定输气计划的某天结 束之前的任何时间，依据 Alliance 管道公司的收费晓细我自走输气服 务修改托运人气盘指定，但前提是：（ a）按 Alliance 管道公司的辩酶， 它可以执行此修改器又不会损害它对其他自走托运人提供的服务； (b）该穆改均 Alliance 管道公司的故费晓韶表团走输气服务或 TSA 的 条款和条件极韶持一致；.以及（ c）诙罄改可以及时地与托运人的上 .• 154 • 静运输操作者、连接设施与美国 Alliance 管道公玛的其他操作者进行 确认。对巴指定和巳计捕的交付气量进行更改只能预期做出。尽管有 第 11.2 杂的规定，如果 Alliance 管道公奇先许托运人依据第 11.3 条 修改托运人的气盘指定，那么 (1 ）诙修改的托运人指定气量、。） 燃料要求气量和（到美国段燃料要求气蠢的总数即成为托运人的授 按气量。 11. 4 Alliance 管道公司可以允许（提没有义务去允许）托运人 在制定输气计划的某天结束之前的任何时间，依据 Alliance 管道公司 的收费晓细表可中赔输气服务修改托运人吨盘指定，但前提是：问） 按 Alliance 管道公司的判酣，它吁以执仔i这｛彦改商又不会损害它对其 他商定或可中斯托运人提供的服务；（ b ）诙修改与 Alliance 管道公司 的收费明摇表可中断输气服务或 I白A 的条款租条件仍操持一致；以 及（ c ）诙穆改可以及时地与拉运人的上龄运输操作者、连接设施与 美国 Alliance 管道公司的其他操作者进有确认。对己指定和己计划的 交付气最进行更改只能王震期做出。尽管有第 11.2 条的规定，如果 Al­ liance 管道公司允许托运人依据第 11.4 条修改托运人的气最捕寇，那 么（ 1 ）该修改的托运人指定气量、。）燃科要求气量和（ 3 ）美国段 燃料要求气量的总数即成为托运人的授权气盘a 11.5 所有气量提走按照第十二条须服从 Alliance 管道公司敬出 的调整。 第十二条时胡安排 12.1 Alli臼ce 管道公可应在安排任何可中断输气服务的时间之 前安排所有固定输气服务的时间。输气时间在按以下就先j服序安排： (a ）根据每个托运人的签约容茧，按比例提供商定输气服 务（不包括授权的超限额服务），输气量达到收费明细 表圈定输气服务项下的托运人的答约容量。 (b ）提供收费明细表圈定辑气服务项下的授权的超段穰服 务，接据收费萌娼表固定雄气服务第 2.7 条进抒分配。 AOS under Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service, • 155 allocated in accordance with Article 2. 7 of Toll Schedule Finn Transportation Service. (c) 根据劳有要求可中新雄气服务的托运人的指定，按 比贺！提供牧费明都表可中斯输气服务项下的可中断 输气服务 12.2 在特殊的接故点进行赣气时向安排应根据以下住先顺序： （ ε〉在所有接收点的国2运输气服务｛包括授权的超阪毒案服 务气量）的时闰安排将优先考虑固定托运人，其接收 点为一主接收点，输送气量达到该接收点的托运人主 接收点容锺； (b）在一 TAC 接收点的固定输气服务｛包括授权的超搜额 服务气量）的时间安排将优先考虑脂定捂埠人，诙 TAC 接收点不是主接i段点而且固定托运人指定气量超 过在该 TAC 接收点的固定托送人主接收点容量；在所 有丁AC 接收点的托培人主接收点总指定气最低于所 有丁AC 接收点的托运人主接校点总容量。将辍握每 个托运人在费有 TAC 接收点的未指定主接收点的总 ，在这挫固定托运人问按比树分配该器定输气瑕 务气景。按第 12.2 (b）在丁AC 接收点未分配的容盘 将恢器第 12.2 (c）和第 12.2 （的进行分配； (c）接收点剩余的固定赣气服务气量将在翅定托运人之间 进行分配，该接收点不是主接收点商旦面走托运人捂 定气重大于该接收点的托运人的主接收点容盘。根据 在该接收点托运人的自定输气服务指定气量超过其主 接收点容量的情况，族固定输气服务将在这提固定托 运人之间接比例进行分配； (d）根据在该接收点出吁中断输气托运人指定的可中断赣 气服务气量与在该接收点出所有可中断输气托运人指 定的吁中断输吨服务总吨量之比，可中断输气服务气 量将在可中斯托运人之间按比例分配。 • 156 • 12.3 在 Alliance 管道公司通知捂运人巳接受了其气量指定（无 论是丹、吕或一天内的）后，该气量才将视为已进行了输送时闰安 排。 第十五条：非授权气量和不平衡气量 13.1 托运人应尽合理努力尽量减少每一收费明细表项下己安排 输送气量的差弄。应承认尽管进行了努二号，这盘差拜仍可能会出现。 但是根据第十五条的规定，在某些情况下这些菜异悟出现，是由于托 运人未能合理运行，托运人为此可能会受到罚款αAlliance 管道公明 应有诚意地帮助托运人避免受到这类罚款。在任街情况下支付该类罚 款都不能免除托运人采取所有必需行动的义务以处理尚未解决的气量 不平掬问题。 日 .2 Alliance 管道公商应尽合理努力密忍由于其管道系统实际 能力的暂时摆制历造成的托运人气最差异，适当考；盖其可采用的英捂 住措施如变动管道错吃东平布争取先许采用使用互连设施的运有平苦苦 挣议。在任何情况下 Alliance 管道公司都不会容器对国定托运人可使 用的容蠢具有有害布不公平性影响的托运人气量不平衡。 13.3 托运人应尽所有合理的努力根据尽可能得嚣的倍息在所有 时i海都维持 (a）自每一接收点日安排接收并进入托运人贵族户的气章与 白每一接收点接收并进入托运人黑户的实际气蜜之间 的平衡（“气最接收盖嚣”） (b ）自每一接收点日安排接收井进入托运人虫草户的总能最 与自每一接收点接段并进入托运人虫草户的实际总能量 之间的平衡〈“能量接收差异”〉 (c）接 l没并进人托运人簸户的总气景与在交付点由 Al” liance 管道公司自托运人账户交件的总气景之间的平 衡〈“气量不平衡”）；以及供托运人接收的总气景与 在交付点 Alliance 管道公司为托运人交付的总气量之 间的平衡〈“气羹不平衡”）；以及 . 157 • (d）接收并进入托运人服户的总能量与在交拧点自 Al­ liance 管道公司自托运人账户交付的总第壤之爵的平 衡（“能最不平蟹”〉。 供托运人接收的恙能量与在交甜点 Alliance 管道公司 为托运人交付的总能壁之间的平衡（“能最不平衡”）。 13.4 在第 13.3 条中定义的房有气量不平衡或差异（合称“气 量不平麓”）都应放在托运人接较汇集点的胀户中。 Alliancε 管道公 司应提前给予时间对进入托运人!l!f户的各种不平衡尽可能做出估计以 便及时进行每日气盘指定。 13.5 托运人不应为普遍气量不平衡部受到罚款，条件是在所有 时荫里： (a）根据既能得到的信，鼠，托运人的账户在不时出 Al­ Hance 管道公司规定的可以容忍的水平部由内 (b）托边人采取了所有根据本条款规定历需要的合理的行 功以消除任向气量不平衡，包括遵照执任 Alliance 管 道公司解决普遍气量不平衡问题的所有合理指录，同 时 Alliance 管道公司也要适当考虑在某些情混下确认 合理的有动路线时避免对其他花运人带来潜在的影 响。 13.6 作为指定程序的一个部分， Alliance 管遵公词应向所有托 迫人说明对气盘不平衡当前可也接受的容忍水平。 Alliance 管道公司 应尽所有合理的努力运营其系统以容许每一托举人出嚣的周期性气量 不平衡〈为 Alliance 管道公司授权气量的 4% ），但托运人须遵守第十 三杂的规定。这管如此，提据尽盘增加管输量的需要或为了保护 Al­ liar附管道公司管道设藏的完整性， Alliance 管道公司保爵采取更严 格鸪不平衡容许水平的权辑。 13.7 只有在纪i惹人未能采取立即行动球少在由 Alliance 管道公 司规定的容许水卒范憧内的任饵确定的不平衡气蠢的情况下，白 Al­ lianc巳管道接枚点上番五连系统操作者〈“上潜操作者’〉进行能吕 景分配才会引起气景不平衡罚款。如果托运人不采束该行动》 Al嗣 • 158 • l}ance 管道公司可能会调整新的常用指定气盘在1便使托运人的不平衡 账户维持在规定的容许水平内。 13.8 由上带操作者进行的月终分配语辑应不会寻 i 起不平衡罚 款，提条件是月接分配确认自相应日分配表现出来的气量不平商。为 了确定最终的不平衡气量并实施在关的罚款（如果有的话），月终分 配最幸罚单日分配总量之间的差额应根据上游操作者确认的臼分配量分 摊在该月的每一天。 13.9 由上静操作者通过丹终分配揭辑确认的祟计不平衡气量应 出托运人递过立即实施以下其中…个行动而清除掉： (a）采用天然气所有权转移方式自托运人接收汇集点输入 或输出足够气盘以消除不平衡（但条件是：这样做不 会使另一个托运人产生气量不平衡〉；或 (b ）经 Alliance 管道公玛同意，在不超过 25 天的一段时 间内调整托运人的指定气量（可通过在任街天减少原 累计不平衡气量至少工十五分之一）白消除不平衡气 13.10 如果托运人不以 i注重果取第 13.9 (a ）或（ b ）所描述的 措施， Alliance 管遵公司可以减少托运人的接收或交拧指定气量， lV. 便及时布有条不紊地消除尚未解决的气是不平衡。 13.11 如果根据第十三条｛与此相关部分〉，在上游操作者按比 例将丹终分配蠢分配王三诙丹每一天的基础上，气量不平衡超过了由 剧且扭.ce 管道公苛对每…天规定的容器水平（上限），苟且该数据确 认了在最葡确定不卒衡气盘时所能得弱的数据， f旦托运人并未采取仔 动，为此托运人应被罚款｛“气量不平衡昂款”）。气最不平衡罚款采 用以下方法算出：超击该月每日规定的上限水平的不平衡绝对气量× 10 ×该月日需求费。 第十四条：燃烧气 14.1 除了托运人打算在交待点交付的气之外，花运人还应为 必liance 管道公玛指定、向其提交或促成向其提交摄据在 Alliance 管 159 • 道公玛规定的月度适用燃料比基础上确定的…定气量，该气量相等于 运输入合理确定的管线估计损起和不明原因气以及在该月管道储气 中所需要的运营鼓动气〈合称“燃料气需求”） o Alliance 管道公司将 在每月的 25 日前向托运人通告下个月适用的燃料气需求量，或者在 不发出此项遥知的情况下，托运人将采用上个月的由 Alliance 管道公 甫确定的燃料气需求量。 14.2 作为托运人打算在交付点交付的气中的一部分，提运人应 为·Alliance 管道公吨指定、向其提交或便成向其提交在由美国 Al­ liance 管道公需制定的适用月度4燃料比倒的基石器上确定的一定气楚， 该气鼓相等于 Alliance 管道公司合理确定的管线结计损辑和不晓原因 吨以及在该丹管道储气中所需要的运营波动气（合称耐美回攘攘料气 需求勺。不应要求托运人为运输该美罔段燃料吨向 Alliance 管道公司 8马 付费。 li 14.3 不要求 Alliance 管道公可接受以下’躇况的任部指定气量： ： lfi (a）指定气量中不包括燃料气需求量和美随段路料吨需求蠢，或〈』） ’飞 ： Alliance 管道公司根据自己的独立判断，不满意根据指定吨蠢将实际 61 ii 交付的燃料气需求最和柴菌战燃辛辛气需求盘。如果由于第 14.3 条鸪 ’ 441 原囱 Alliance 管道公司握绝某指定气量， Alli扭ce 管道公司应通告挺 i 运人对其燃料气带求和美国嚣’燃料气需求指定气量进行修改，托运人 、 aa 雇对该指定气鳖进有修改。 ｛ 3 14.4 将在能量热值的基础上对燃料气需求和美国段燃料气需求 最进千计f算，输送气 Q,( GJ （兆焦）／千立方米表示 a 第十五条：接收优先权 15.1 天然气应视为己从托运人的加拿大接收汇集点代表托运人 挂’以下顺序运出： (i ）燃料气需求量； (ii ）荣国最蝶料气需求量； (iii ）达到托运人签的容 的商定输气服务（不包括 AOS); • 160 • (iv) AOS ；以及 (v）可 r:p 新输气康务。 第十六条：混合气的权利 16.1 Alliance 管道公司在所有时间都有权在本管道内将托运人 的天然气与其他天然气提合。在交件点曲 Alliance 管道公司交付的天 然气可以具有在本管道内输送和棍合的天然气的质盘。 第十七条：越行条件改变的道知 17 .1 Alliance 管道公词和托运人在必要时应幸自互通告关于交付 或接收天然气的费事变化的情况、压力或其佳运行条件变化的情况以 及这些王震期变化的原因，以便另一方做好准备在这些变化出现时满足 变化的要求。 第十八条：拥有和控制天结气 ? 18.1 在 Alliance 管道公巧在交付点交件天然气之前， Alliance 管避公湾在视为据有、控告tl其接收的所有天然气井为此负责。 第十九条：在运人姐保租蜡健 19.1 挂运人向 Alliance 管道公司保证：捂运人x>t 由其成代表其 在向 Al豆ance 管道公司提交时提交的一切天然气将据有所有权或有权 提交一切天然气，不存在任何雷置权、抵押权和其他梧反的权利，但 假据雄气服务楼议第五条（抽取和购买被体的选择）以及可中脐输气 服务胁议第五条（抽取和购买被体的选择）所给予的选择不应掏成抵 押权或相反的校利的情器除外。 19.2 托运人在此向 Alliance 管道公司陈述和保证：挂运人拥有 并将保持拥有将天然吨亩产气省份运击、自加拿大出口和策国进口该 天然气的一切授权以及准许托运人输送其天然气既需的其能任何授 权。 19.3 Allian优管道公词保证被据输气服务协议第五条或可中斯 161 • 输气服务悔议第五条（视情况而定）在交持点为挺运人交持天然气 时，该天然气不存在 Alliance 管道公司项下戒由 Alliance 管道公玛引 超的任何留置权和抵押权。 19.4 对于国声称对花运人所提交给到liance 管道公司供输送的 天然气拥有所有权或权益的第三方的不科索赔而发生的一锦索赔、仔 瑜或损害，托运人应黯偿 Alliance 管道公词并使其免受任何损害。 19.S 对于国提费、许可证、费用、矿产使用费或在向另一方交 付该天然气之前适用的收费的任向人的不利索赔商发生的一切诉讼、 行动、债款、翻害、费用、摸失和开支， Alliance 管道公司和托运人 应相互赔偿并使对方免受摸害。 19.6 对托运人向 Alliance 管避公司交付输送天然气前路在销售 和交持谈天然气时征校的一切税费及征税估铃，托运人应赔偿 Al翩 Hance 管道公司并使其免受摸害。 第二十条：财务保证 { 20.1 提运人在任何时候都应遵守以下资信要求： (i）托这人（或扭保托运人在输吨服务协议或可中期输气 梅议项下义务的一关联公司）具有…家公认的资信评 定杭构对其长期位先完扭保债务评定的投资倍用等级。 下表列出了每个资信评定机榕的可接受的最低资信等级： 可接茧的资信评级餐 ｛长踏法先无担保最务｝ 穆边氏债券和股票等级评定 Baa3 或更好 标准普尔 BBB 或更好 问剧。n 债券评级服务公司 应丑院或更好 加拿大债券评级服务公词 政划或更好 保险事务专员全雷协会 NAICl 或 NAIC2 伴或根据 Allian四管道公司确定的公认资信评定机稳始其他将向资馆等级。 接摆上述资信评锻类别起初获得资格的托运人，如果摇摇其资信 162 等级又棒低至投资级别要求以下，将要求该托运人被据驭下另一英到 获得资格。 (ii ）对其长期优先完担保债务不具有上表中列出的资信等 级的托运人，如果 Alliance 管道公词和其贷方确定： 尽管无可接受的资信评级，该托运人（或扭保托运人 在键气服务梅议或可中期输气悔议顶下义务的一关联 公司）钙然是可以接受的，该托运人将接受为具有资 信。可以在挂何时候进行关于接受其为具有资倍的申 除非根据 Alliance 管道公碍和其贷方的想法接受 其为具有资榕的时务标准已有了实质性的相反变化， 否则将不会撤四本类别项下对托运人资倍的接受。 (iii ）在签署并提交输吨服务协议或可中断雄气服务楼议时 或在此之后其己受该惨议的约束时，报提上述（ i ）或 (ii）敖不符合条件的托运人必须采用以下一种方式提 供其债务担保： (a）寄自…信用证或提抨一笔金额等于该信用证的现 金存款，见如下规定；或 (b ）提供 Alliance 管道公司可接受的其辙担棋。 (a）项下的借用证或现金存款应为以下金额：（ i) 对于第辛苦输气服务协议的托运人，担保金额等于 12 个月的估计需求费和需求费前加费〈如滔甩〉；该提 保金额每年进行拥整以反映随后十二个另估计需求费 如需求费前加费住日适用〉的任何变化；（ ii ）对于签 署可中脑输气服务楼议的托运人，该担保金额等于托 运人可中惭输气服务协议中的 5 最大翰气量果以可中 新输气服务收费再乘以 30 ；并不时调整以反映出托运 人到最大输气量如可中断辘气服务故费的变化。 (iv) Alliance 管道公司保留要求任部依照上述 (i ）款没有 获得资格和极据上述（ ii ）款没有接受其具有资信的 托运人提供上述（ iii ）款要求的债务担保的权利。任 163 荷手交照上述（ i）或 (ii ）款递过一家关联公司扭保其 锻务商获得资信资格的捂边人应提供一份来自该关联 公司的无条件不可撤销扭保书（以 Alliance 管道公司 通常使翔的格式〉并应在签署输气服务协议或吁中新 输气服务协议的同时提供该担保书。 第二十…条：可中断输气服务收入的报撬 21.1 每个月 Alliance 管道公司都应计算并自每一固定挺主运人的 月服单中抵攘一份按在于方式确定并分配的一定比例的可中断输气总 较益： (a）可中断输气总收益（摄藏额〉等于（ 1) Alliance 管道公司上 一个月在可中斯输气服务璜下为庆有托边人输送的天然气总量乘以 (2 ）可中断输气服务收费。 (h ）通过扣减己确定可中断输气总收益〈提减穰〉的月份于一个 月托运人本应支付的月跟单，应按比损j分配给每一盟定输吨托运人一 份瑕据签约容量确定的可中新输气总故主主（提减额），该签纯容量是 极据己确定可中新输气总收益（摄减额）的月份第一天的摇纯容撞确 定的’。 第二十二条：运价规Jiltl 萌细挠和合同的第食 22.1 本通用条款和条件与所有收费晓结表和服务合同合为一体 并为它把之一部分。 22.2 本通用条款和条件、收费明细表以及所有服务合商遵守所 有现在和将来有效的法律、法规的各项娱定以及任剖立法挠构或吕篱 或今后对本事项拥有管辖权的合法管理机构的各项法令。 第二十三条：赣吨服务褂议 23.1 托运人应与必liance 管遵公司采用该公词合适的输气服务 协议和可中断输气服务协议格式（附件 I 和附件 II 巳分别列出〉签 署输气服务胁议和吁中断输气服务楼议。 164 • 23.2 托运人句 Alliance 营造公司应在签署可中断输气服务i?iJ. 议 时对诙挠议的期限达成一致。 第工十四条：通知 24.1 除非另有规定，任何一方希望给另一方提出的任前请求、 要求、拣述或提交的账单或任何通知（统称“通知”）都必须为书面 影式并通过专人或速递或传真等有效的联络通信方式送达另一方的收 信人；向下文列巾的地址给另一方发出的上述通知，于下述时！商将视 为送达：专人递送时，于递送之时；~传真发送峙，子正常的营业时 间内；以建递发送时，于发送的第二天（但如果正常的速递服务或传 真服务由于超出各方控制的原阔晤中断，发送通知的一方应利用任向 没有中新的服务或由专人递送该通知）。每一方都应涌告另一方任何 地址改变的情况。 • 操作者：待告知 e Alliance 管道公司： Alliance Pipeline Limited Partnership clo Alliance Pipeline Ltd. S主.e400, 605 … 5 Avenue S.W. Calg班y, AB, Canada TIP. 3H5 Attention: Man啕er, Tariff Administr就ion Fax: (403) 266-4495 (iii ）托运人：见服务胁议中列出的地址。 通过挂号或普通邮件进行击常联珞通信（包括丹报表〉，于发送 之时将视为已正式发迭。 第二十五条：操作者 25 .1 Alliance 管道公司有权指定任何人作为其管道系挠的“操 作者”，进行〈但并不限于）设施的管理、指定气量的接校和安排、 接收和交付的时间安排、服务惨议以及会计的管理。如果 Alliai附管 道公司指定一位操作者，在服务协议、收费萌细表或本通用条款布条 165 • 件中凡提及 Alliance 管道公司（视情况而定〉应看作也包括了代表 Al主ance 管道公司的操作者。 第工十六条：费任和赔偿 26.1 在任剖情况芋，对于任何间接、特殊、后果’住损失、提 费用或开支，包括但不限于利润或收入损失、资本费用、亲交付 气损失或摸害，损失、巳购买或替代气的费用、许可或证书的取消以 及合爵的终止， Alliance 管道公璋对托运人成托运人对 Alliance 管道 公司没有任何违约责任、过失责任、严格赏任或任何其他理由百产生 的征得责任。 26.2 除了在固定输气题务收费明细表第翻条中规定的以外， Alliance 管道公前对由于无论任何原因造成的 Alliance 管道公词未能 根据其与托运人之间的任何服务楼议接受提交或交付天然气，对托这 人没有任何资任，也没有义务去赔德拉运人并使其免受损害。 第工十七条：其他 27 .1 Alliance 管道公前和托运人对其各自财产的安族、维护和 运行承担责任和义务，一方应赔偿另一方由于菇偿方财产和设备的安 装、存在、维护和运仔造成的任何行动或事故部出现的任仰和既有损 失、损害、索赔或行动（包括人员的伤亡〉，并使另一方免除任向资 任和费用的摸害。 附件 5 睿量分配 分配方法 u先到先服务” 在市场发展的罕期阶段，“先到先服务”可能会区别优先到待那 挥其市场占有和知识使其有更强能力一开始即占据排队插到的人。然 • 166 • 丽，在参与者己愈来愈多样化并且已出现具有竞争力的结构以后，没 有理由摆持任何一组参与者能从“先到！先服务”中受益。当然，“先 到先服务”潜在的歧视性影响没有房子诸如“优先取舍权”的旺别性 条款而不注意地扩大化，这一点也接意薯。 “选羹比赛”｛挑选｝法 “选荧比赛”（挑选）法（在可用容最分部是根据采用各种宽容现 挥准确定的情况r ）存在着区别风肆或者说外观区别（以貌取人）曲 风险，因为在设定挥准和实施评价的过程中需要有高度的判断力。这 种方法也很可能是辑费时间、宫镣式、不透明以及易受到政治影嚼的 方法，从而引起不适当的市场扭曲。随着草场的发展，这些缺艳假手 并没有减少。 抽彩法 通过抽影分配剩余容锺叔是非歧视’隘的方法，如果有流动工载市 ilt 场存在，这种方法会导致有效分配。而且很可能会使进这些市场的发 ‘t 展，这完全是因为初期分配中可能出现的无效率。缸是，这种方法具 有潜在的棋点即以武晰的方式分配辑金，并变成人为的J佳人激励措 施。 拍卖式 在一定的条件下，与所讨论舵其锦方法梧比较晦言，拮卖式能够 更好地实现第j余睿量的有效裙始分配。可以预期拍卖中的高出赞会对 应于宽标人的高估俭，因此，竟标成功者通常是给容量校出价最高的 人。 然醋，在拍卖剩下以及没有监管规定酶’请况下，输气企业将自 紧缺的容主意商获取租金，所以，它的可能合对有效扩容起妨碍作用。 更常见的是，即使在扩容现不禁问题的情况下，从拍卖容囊中所获得 的总收入巨大，会为雄气企业产生额外的利润，这一点是非常可能 的。因此，需要一种矫正挠制既可应确保有效扩容又可以防止输气企 业获得超穰利润。一个解决方法就是要求输气企业将招卖容量产生的 超额利润留存放人一个单独的基金。该基金的收益将应用于未来扩容 • 167 • 的成本。。 拍卖及银向一体化企业 ~白银向一体先企业来进行容量拉卖时，这种拍卖活动存在着歧 视的内在可能性α 如果先许输气企业熟位其关联的供气企业参加拉 卖，则一体先企业在竞价过程中将具有内在优势＇ o 由于扭心提交的栋 书是多余的，其他市场参与者将不敢进行报价。币对于读一体化企业 即宫，该报价标书将只是从一个关联公司转茧另一个关联公司的一笔 转拨款项，并没有纯粹的经济影确。高报价的难一风险是存在辛苦放弃 第二高的竞份人可能援出的收入的可能性。如果对容量捂卖的第二高 报告来自于外部企业〈在竟争性市场中可亲期到这一点），一体化企 业的供气余业单位将由于有合格高限而不需要留提交一份过高报铃的 风险从而极大在益。但其他市场参与者面临的局面是：对其高报价的 照撞没有内在的最高睬。 因此，将有必要设计一种容量拍卖方式，；其前止供气企业单位＊＇1 用这一优势。 琼动工辙市场 拍彩法以及先来先服务程摩可能符合才在歧视的自标，但是，且在凭 这两种方法无法确提容量权的有效韧始分配。效率结挥会组成建立一 个容最权的二极市场。潜在的天然气挺运人的容盘权价霞会随着时间 的变化部自然地发生变化。采用流动工银市场，在任何特定时段里将 容盘权估价最高者将购买该睿量权。另外，二级市场的存在通过减少 瘸买容最权风险也能剌激初级市场的活动。市场参与者将知悉，如果 其韭务蘸最无法按预期发展，则他们会很容易地处现掉其容量权。最 后，二级市场也能够促进对等的双边“交换”而无魏买卖~方相互接 触并逐个谈判分割的合国。 医此，有效的容最权二级市场可以对魏余容量权进行拐始分配， @ 如果来自容最拍卖部收入不足以收题固定成本，拍卖也可能会产生“搁毁成本” 的相反影响。在有些情况下这可能是与低初始使用率有关的临时现象。但在另一些情况下 可以有漂白推断，如果没有一矜辅助机制，固定成本路i段将是不可能的。在回收搁置成本 是一个合法吕标的情况下，通过尽蠢减少竞争过程扭曲的透明和非歧视性机制，这个吕标 应该可以实现。其中…个机制将是给容量拍卖增加最低价格。＆ • 168 . 分配从效率角度来看相对不是很紧要的先期合同杖，从西消除捕影法 以及“先来先服务”策略的主要缺路。按照这些政策，容盘权的出售 受限于最高段价，~防止管道拥有者在得超额利润。如果最高照价受 到制约，为此该价格低于市场脱售价，那么需求将超过供给，而该容 蠢权则通过分商己挑制予以分配。因此，这段政策将取决于二级市场来 有效分配容量并为有效的管道扩容提供激勋作用。二级市场中容量的 高价发出容量短缺的倍号，暗示薪的容量将得到较高的使用效事。贤 以，输气企业将报自然地选择在容量缺乏的地方扩容这些管道。商 茧，最高限街去踪了对输气企业的任何潜在激励作琦那通过限制管道 扩容~从事垄断经营，国为在无歧视方式下，任何容量短缺租金都到 不了输气公司手中，西是到了其他市场参与者手中。 向样，自烧输气容量极应该是可交易的，必要的协议ml该商化并 予以捺词，以便使二级市场的流动’段最大化。容量权流动工级市场的 存在是竞争’险天然气市场的一个特点，肉时也将鼓励竟争及交易。 对于容量交易，不应要求进有事先通知或是在得翰气公司的撞 撞。这提要求是进行交易的主要障碍。同时也会产生不必要的程序负 担，使输气公司在得高史上的敏感拮息，而这些倍患可能会被其关联 供气公商所准用。特另号是，一个希望为班前与输气公司的供气单位肇 定合岗的客户提供服务的市场新进入者，应该能够获得必要的容量， 部又不必让该输气公司知悉存在失去一位客户的可能。 磷保二级市场的正确行使其职能也是很重要的。特另号是，初始分 配应该培育工锻市场的苦花费在并避免市场操纵的潜在可能性。通过对 任何单独一方所允许掌握的剩余容盘数蠢规定一个最高眼量可以避免 琦二级市场的操练。应英国许多监管棋局已试菌对工级市场采琦最高 拚格摄制，缸是，这斡做法并不令人满意，因为该做法会产生三级 “灰色市场”，在这种“灰色市场”中使用合间策略来规避最高限骨。 这些策略会造成较高的交易成本并导致市墙的非流动性。在美国已经 采用了并且当前正在考虑使用其他各种不同的方法。 • 169 • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This Report approaches the Transmission Tariff Design in the con- text of the development of China' s gas industry and related policies and regulation proposed in the various reports prepared jointly by the Institute of Economic System Management of the ex - State Council Office for Re- structuring of the Economic Sector (SCORES), the World Bank and the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) • 8 for the of · the Joint Working Group (JWG) . On the one hand, there is the perceived commercial need for an inte- grated structure incorporating exclusive rights to supply, at least for a .pe- riod of time, principally to give investors a degree of control (and the consequent certainties) from the gas field to the plant and city- gates of the final wholesale buyers. On the other hand, the preservation of the policy objectives of: ( 1) separating transmission and storage activities to clearly identify their costs, even when gas and transmission are sold as a "bundled" ser- vice, thereby allowing proper regulation of the natural monopoly elements and preparing the way for unbundling and progressive niarket opening and (2) building- in the principle of no unjust discrimination, so that as competition unfolds new market entrants can count on having equal ac- cess to pipeline services with the· pipeline' s own supply and marketing anns. In regard to the tariffs for use of the pipeline, there are again con- D See Footnote 1 on Page v. . 171 . flicting objectives to be resolved: (1) The charges must be sufficiently high to properly recover effi- ciently- incurred costs, including the costs of the equity invested, but (2) They should also be at a level low enough to both enable gas to be competitively marketed to UGDCs and .large industrial users and to provide producers with a revenue stream that encourages further explo- ration and development. ( 3 ) The structure of tariffs should provide strong. incentives for high utilization that will hold down unit costs of transmission. As a re- sult, this will reduce project risk, enabling the pipeline to be financed with a higher proportion of debt and cutting the amount of equity that in- vestors have at risk and reducing unit tariffs. ( 4) At the same time, the transfer of risk by purchase contracts providing for a high percentage of take or pay should not be such as to impair the financial strength of industrial gas users and UGDCs. In the context of these objectives the purpose of this report is to pre- sent the basis for three eventual deliverables: (1) A Transmission Tariff Oxle that would establish the principles and objectives governing tariff design; (2) A Report detailing the methodology required to apply the prin- ciples and objectives set out in the Tariff Oxle. This could also be de- scribed as a Tariff Design Manual; and 1. Basis of Transmission Tariff Design Many transmission businesses have a tendency to begin with the de- sign of transmission tariffs because tariffs impact on the "bottom line" in terms of revenue and profits. However, transmission tariff design can- not be tackled effectively without clear guidance on the legal and regula- tory framework in which it will be applied. The License based approach to the application of regulation reconi- mended in earlier reports provides an effective and appropriate means of . 172 • establishing the regulatory and· commercial arrangements in China that are specified in the detailed and prescriptive Tariff Code.s or Code.s of Regulation in North America. The sequence of (1) primary legislation establishing a regulatory body and. a licens- ing regime, (2) the definition of license conditions and the issue of licenses and ( 3) the development of commercial arrangements governing t> the separation of the transmission and supply businesses and t> the code of operation or the general tenns and conditions of the transmission service offer progressively cha'nnels the focus of analysis onto the de.sign of trans- mission tariffs. 2. Principles and Objectives The principles and objectives of tariff design should focus on achiev- ing key aspects of economic efficiency while ensuring that the revenue generated is sufficient to recover costs that are prudently and efficiently incurred. Tariffs that achieve these objectives will, by definition, be cost - reflective and non discriminatory. However, the benefits of achieving these objectives completely needs to be weighed against the costs of re- ducing "user-friendly" characteristics such as ease of understanding and application, transparency, predictability' and adaptability. Finally, the design and tariffing of transmissian services should facilitate access to the system and the emergence of competition in supply. 3. Tariff Design Methodology Within the framework of the tariff de.sign methodology various op- tions and techniques may be chosen. However, a consensus is' beginning t6 emerge in relation to the key steps to be followed and the choice'of op- tions that will lead to the rtrost appropriate outcomes. . 173 . (1) Derivation of the Cost Base for an Unbundled Transmission Business The principal components of the cost base comprise: (1) Return on capital employed (on a pre tax basis); (2) Depreciation; and. (3) Operating and Maintenance Expenditure The first two components require an assessment of the initial net as- set value (equivalent to the capital employed) , how this will change over time and the cost of capital. 1) Net Asset Value There are two issues that need to be resolved when .selecting the ap- proach to determining the net asset value for regulatory purposes. The first is setting the initial value and the second is determining how this ini- tial value should be changed over time. In a sense, the second issue is of less concern at this stage. If an initial net asset value is established the application of each option to determine the change over time will generate its own stream of capital charges [ depreciation and return on net asset value (RoNA)] and each stream will have a different profile. If consis- tent estimates of the cost of capital are employed and a common invest- ment recovery period is used, the Present Value of each stream will be i- dentical to the initial net asset value. It is frequently contended that the asset valuation used for regulatory purposes should not deviate from the technique employed by the business for financial reporting. It may be convenient if both methods are the same, but there is no reason why the basis for a separate set of regulatory accounts should be the same as that for financial reporting. Once there is a transparent audit trail between both sets, it should not pose a problem. Even in North America, where both the regulators and the regulated businesses use historic costs, respectively, for regulatory purposes and for financial reporting, the treatment of costs and expenditures varies and, in . 174 • most cases, requires the maintenance of a separate set of regulatory ac- counts. For the WEP setting the initial net asset value should be straighdor- ward as it will be the cost of construction that is transferred from work - in - progress onee the pipeline is commissioned and begins operation. For existing pipeline systems, the task will not be as simple and will require detailed analysis, based on the infonnation and data available, on a case - by- case basis. However, the over-riding objective must be to ensure that the valuation selected generates capital charges that reflect the eco- nomic cost of providing transmission service. It will also be important to ensure that consistency in the treatment of valuation is maintained. When differences in the application of the valuation method arise, they should be transparent and defensible. 2) Deprecia#on In relation to depreciation two questions need answers: Over what . period should the 'initial investment be recovered? And what method should be used to calculate t~e annual depreciation charge? Where there is a very small probability that a pipeline will become e- conomically redundant prior to the expiry of its technical life it is general- ly accepted that the technical lifetime should be used as the appropriate investment recovery period. Various depreeiation methods may be applied each of which will gen- erate different investment recovery profiles. However, the profile of de- preciation should not be considered in isolation. The focus should be on the profile of annual capital charges, which includes depreciation and the return on investment. 3) C-OSt of Capital Most regulatory commissions are required to allow the business'es subject to regulation a "reasonable rate of return" on their assets. For natural gas, a reasonable rate of return can be defined as the risk- adjust- • 175 . ed return that suppliers of funds require the business to provide, given the risks imposed by both the inherent nature of the transmission sector and the regulatory commission process itself. This allowed rate of return is more commonly called the weighted average cmt of capital (WAOC) . It is weighted by the proportions of debt and equity used to finance the invest- ment. The WAOC is generally presented as a real pre-tax rate of return. The Capital Asset Pricing Model ( CAPM) is emerging as the pre- ferred analytic tool to derive an estimate of the WAO:, and a consensus is beginning to emerge with regard to the values of the parameters that, should be used in this model. 4) Operating Expenditures An objective of an¥ regulatory regime is to provide the regulated businesses with incentives to operate efficiently. It will be necessary for transmission businesses to demonstrate that they are operating, and will operate, efficiently. In general, regulators need to examine the variances between the forecast and actual operating arid maintenance expenditure for the regulated business, and develop rules on how these variances should be treated. (2) Deriving the Cost Base A constant real tariff based on the real project rate of return (as~ sumed by PetroChina at 12 % ) is applied in this exercise. This is de- signed to recover the capital and operating expenditures over the 24 -year project evaluation period set by PetroChina. Given the data provided on the debt service requirements, it is assumed that the investors will be content with the residual rate of return and profile of return. Net fixed assets and annual depreciation charges are derived using the Financial Capital Maintenance (FCM) technique• for the asset lifetimes assumed 9 This technique takes account of technologiCal change which reduces the replacement cost of assets • . 176 • by PetroChina. This generates a specific profile for capital charges. This provides an initial, if not entirely adequate, basis to consider the application of regulatory control of tariffs. The CPI X incentive form of tariff control is advanced as the most appropriate mechanism. The simple initial tariff mechanism proposed assumes that X is equal to zero and it is possible that a regulator would be content with this ap- proach until such time as the level of capacity utilization associated with the initial investment was achieved. Thereafter, or, if the circumstances require it, prior to this, the regulator will be in a position to determine positive values for X. (3) Classification and Allocation of Costs The total cost base is composed of costs that are classified to be ei- ther fixed or variable. Generally for transmission systems fixed costs tend to be in excess of 90% of total costs. Classification is the first step in matching the structure of tariffs with the structure of costs. Costs are allocated to categories of shippers according to capacity uti- lization by such categories, based on economic and equity criteria. This is a critical step in the determination of the final tariff paid by shippers with varying load factor characteristics. The proportion of fixed and variable ' costs which are allocated to the capacity and commodity charge is a func- tion of the tariff design. The economically efficient Straight Fixed Variable ( SFV) approach allocates all fixed costs to a capacity charge. This approach charges low load factor users throughout a year for the full cost of the capacity they use on only one or two days. The development of capacity release or ca- pacity trading mechanisms would compensate the low load factor shippers for the off peak use of their firm capacity. In the absence of such mech- anisms it is possible to allocate a portion of fixed costs to commo9ity. This moves the typical SFV capacity/conunodity split from 90: 10 to- wards a 70: 30 or a 65: 35 ratio. During a transition period it may be . 177 . appropriate to set the ratio initially at 65: 35 and move it progressively over time to a ratio that corresponds to SFV. The classification and allocation of costs to capacity and commodity components provides the basis for designing a two part tariff - a charge for the transmissi!Jn capacity reserved and a charge for the use during the year of this capacity. For the existing transmission systems in China, the development of these mechanisms will take some time, but it is prudent to attempt to en- visage the future conunercial and regulatory arrangements when designing the initial level and structure of transmission tariffs. For illustration pur- poses the SFV approach is applied. (4) Tariff Design A principal determinant of tariff design is the extent to which they are distance related. At one end of a continuum are postalized (or ' postage stamp') tariffs which do not vary with distance; at the other end are ' point - to point' tariffs that attempt to capture the full cost im- pact of distance from each input to each off - take point. The term "zonal tariffs" is used to describe a system where tariffs differ for transactions that cross specific geographic zones, but are uni- form to all transactions within a zone. It involves grouping adjacent input and off- take points into zones. In a sense this is a hybrid of distance - related tariffs between zones and postage stamp within zones. From the economic perspective, it is unlikely that a "pure" path - based system, where tariffs depend on the exact combination of entry and exit points, has any significant advantage over a zonal system that is based on a num- ber of zones that is sufficient to capture the key cost determinants. Any reduction in cost reflectivity is more than compensated for by a degree of flexibility in input and off- take points, by the potential to facilitate the emergence of hubs and a liquid secondary market in transmission capacity and by increased simplicity and predictability . . 178 . It is rerommended that zonal tariffs prop::sed for amsideration by Orinese authorities for existing long distance systems in China. The zonal tariffs provide an effective me.ans of charging for transmission on the system and, eventually, of supporting the emergence of these hubs. . 179 . 1 THE BASIS OF TRANSMISSION TARIFF DESIGN This chapter disrusses the issues and options that will need to be considered in the development of a Tariff Code and a Tariff Manual. It begins by defining the scope of the Tariff Code and clarifying some termi- nology on gas pricing and tariffs as well as reviewing the current approach to the design of transmission tariffs (Sections 1 . 1 and 1. 2) . Since an over riding objective of this study is to develop a transmission tariff methodology in the context of a clear separation of policy and regulation, Section 1. 3 presents the key elements of the proposed legal and regulato- ry framework that is recommended in earlier reports. 8 To facilitate the policy decision to pursue market opening and to comply with the associat- ed legal and regulatory framework, the gas industry will need to be re- structured. The implications of such a restructuring and the re organi- zation that the businesses can pursue in advance of the implementation of this framework are addressed in Section 1. 4. Section 1. 5 follows on from this by examining in more detail the definition of transmission services and Section 1. 6 concludes. 1.1 Scope of the Tariff Code It is possible to define the function and scope of a Tariff Code in a number of ways. This arises from the fact that a "tariff" in its broadest sense may be used to describe the terms and conditions of a service offer as well as its price. This is particularly the case in North America. In the 8 See Footnote 1 on Preface. • 180 • US regulated "prices" for transmission services are commonly called "rates"; in Canada they are frequently described as "tolls." 1.1.1 A North American Style Tariff Code PetroChina has advanced Part 284 of the Code of Federal Regula- tions issued by the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as a template for a Tariff Code for WEP. These regulations govern "Cer- tain Sales and Transportation of Natural Gas under the Natural Gas Poli- cy Act of 1978 and Related Authorities." A copy of these regulations is presented in Appendix 1. These regulations set out in considerable detail the rights and obliga- tions of transmission businesses that are subject to federal regulation in relation to the provision and pricing of tran"!mission and storage services. The regulations extend to prescribe the nature of the business rules that govern the day- to day operation of transmission systems. 1.1. 2 Rules - based and Licenses - based Regulatory Approaches The research and analysis conducted by concerned authorities with the support of the World Bank and PPIAFO the Joint Working Group has come to the conclusion that such a detailed and prescriptive approach is not appropriate for the regulation of the downstream gas industry in Chi- na. This conclusion is based on an understanding of the current stage of development in China of both the gas industry and the legal and regulato- ry framework and of the challenges the industry faces. The Code of Fed- eral Regulations has been developed over a considerable period of time and it is almost certain that the current version would be very different if the policy and regulatory authorities in the US knew 25 years ago what they know now. The conclusion is also based on the existence of an alternative regulatory approach that is being applied successfully in countries whose 0 See Footnote 1 on Preface. . 181 . circumstances have more in common with those in China than those in North America. For ease of discussion, the North American approach is described as "Rules based" ; the alternative as "License - based. " The application of both approaches will achieve the key policy objective of a competitive wholesale gas market; and both approaches share numerous features. The differerice.s arise in the types of instruments used and the manner in which they are applied. The key features of the License based approach are presented in Section 1. 3 below. 1.1. 3 Recommended Use of License - based Approach It is proposed to use licenses to set out the rights and obligations of gas market participants (including those of gas shippers who will have ac- cess to transmission systems) . They will set out the manner in which regulation will be applied and the types of commercial arrangements and business rules that market participants will need to develop and adhere to. O An important distinguishing feature of this approach is that the market participants will develop the commercial arrangements in a consul- tative manner in accordance with the conditions of their licenses and sub- ject to regulatory oversight. This will provide more commercial discretion than is typically al- lowed under the more prescriptive Rules- based approach. This addition- al commercial discretion is necessary while both the gas market and the regulatory arrangements are being developed in China. In addition, fol- lowing the decision to establish a gas regulator, the development of a comprehensive, detailed and prescriptive set of regulations will take time. Furthermore, while the regulatory arrangements are being developed, it makes sense for the businesses that will be regulated to begin the develop- 0 Licenses will also include conditions to deal with matters addressed in other parts of the Code of Federal Regulation. . 182 . ment of appropriate business rules and commercial arrangements. 1.1.4 Implications for the Scope of the Tariff Code The application of the License based approach provides instruments and techniques to deal with all the matters addressed in Part 284 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The key instruments and techniques will be discussed further in Section 1.3. This implies that the Tariff Code may be defined quite narrowly in terms of the principles and objectives of the methodology that will be applied to derive regulated "prices" for trans- mission services. 1. 2 Prices and Tariffs for Gas Supply, Distribution and Tran smission It is useful at this stage to clarify the terminology used in relation to gas prices and tariffs. This helps to identify the "prices" that are subject to regulatory control, those that are competitively determined and those that can be determined through competition but remain (at least for ape- riod of time) subject to regulatory oversight. It also provides the opportu- nity to review the current approach to transmission tariffs. 1.2.1 Prices and Tariffs No consensus exists on the precise definition of the tenns "tariff" and "price" in the context of gas price formation. For the purposes of the subsequent discussion in this report it is proposed to use the term "price" when that price is determined by the interaction of demand and supply. This may range from bilateral negotiations between a single buyer and single seller through to the interaction of many buyers and sellers in a clearly defined market with standardized products and services. The term "tariff" is used when competition does not exist and there is no, or limited, potential to develop competitive market conditions. This occurs for activities that have natural monopoly characteristics and • 183 • where it would be economically wasteful to attempt to introduce competi- tion. This is why tariffs are designed for monopoly activities such as gas transmission and distribution. The objective is to design "tariffs" that would be as close as possible to the "prices" that would emerge in a mar- ket context. Regulatory control of these tariffs is required because the business conducting the monopoly activity has no incentive to design tariffs and to produce the quantity and quality of products or services that would repli- cate the outcome of competition: In fact, a monopolist will almost always seek to set a tariff higher (and a quantity and quality lower) than would emerge in a competitive market. In this way the monopolist will be able to maximize its profit. Since a monopolist can set either the price or the quantity (but never both simultaneously), regulatory control of the tariff should automatically set the quantity. However, the monopolist will have an incentive to lower the quality of service for a given quantity and the regulator should have the power to enforce minimum standards of quality of service. In this sense "tariffs" may be described as "regulated prices." Ini- tially, during the transition from vertically integrated natural and admin- istered monopolies, the only ''price" that will be considered is the price of bulk supplies of gas. And the manner in which this "price" is arrived at may he subject to regulatory oversight, if there is evidence of the exercise of supplier market power. All other "prices" will be regulated and may, therefore, be described as " tariffs. " These include transmission tariffs which ~e the focus of this study and the prices charged to customers of UGOCs for a bundled distribution and supply service. Although the scope of the analysis presented in this report ends at the city gate of the UGOCs., it is necessary to insert some comments on: • The efficient development of the UGOCs; • 184 • • the pricing of the bundled pipeline and commodity service pro- vided by the UGDCs; and • the pricing of an unbundled pipeline service as markets are opened further. 1. 2. 2 Distribution Tariffs It has long been accepted that competition between distribution com- panies (involving the duplication of p8rt, or all, of the pipeline system) in a specific geographical area is economically wasteful. As a result, dis- tribution networks have natural monopoly characteristics and it makes sense for one business to provide service and set tariffs. In addition, the ability to categorize constimers in relation to specific features of their con- sumption patterns or requirements facilitates the setting of tariffs and avoids the transaction costs associated with individually negotiated con- tracts. Furthermore, setting a tariff structure reduces the incidence of unjustifiable discrimination between consumers. As in many other jurisdictions throughout the world, it is envisaged that, in China, UGDCs will have an exclusive right to provide a bundled gas commodity and distribution (pipeline) service to low volume residen- tial, commercial and institutional consumers within a geographically- de- fined area. This right, sometimes called a "franchise," may be granted by a national, provincial or municipal government authority. These con- sumers will pay a single tariff for this bundled service, but it will be sub- ject to regulatory control. Regulation is required to deal with both the natural monopoly characteristics of the distribution system and the exclu- sive right to supply within a defined area. It is also envisaged that the UGDCs will be required to separate the costs of their distribution and gas supply activities to allow more effective regulation and to provide their consumers with a tariff for each service. Over time it is proposed that larger volume industrial consumers served by the UGDCs should be granted access to competing suppliers of . 185 . gas. This will allow a phased and orderly increase in the size of the com- petitive gas market. It will also minimize any anomalies that may arise in access to competing suppliers. For example, most large volilme con- sumers are supplied directly from the transmission systems and in most circumstances will be granted access to competing suppliers. However, some larger vohµne consumers will be supplied by UGDCs .. It would be very difficult to justify preventing these consumers from gaining access.to competing suppliers while similar or stn?lier volume cqnsumers are al- lowed access by virtue of their locations close to transmission systems. This provides a further reason for the separate costing of, and tariff.de- sign for, tqe 9istribution service, since these consumers will coz:itra~ di- rectly for their .gas supplies and seek a distribution (pi~ ,only) service from )he UGDCs. It is envisaged that, eventually, all consumers will b~ granted access to competing suppliers, as is the case in the.Britain, increasingly the case in the US, Canada and Australia and being envisaged for.many European countries by 2007. But this should only be contemplated when the wholesale (or bulk supply) gas market is functioning effectively and the costs and benefits of extending ac.cess to all consumers ha".e been assessed thoroughly. In the context of this report it is important to note that, the design of distribution system tariffs is not as urgent a task as the design Df trans- mission tariffs. However, despite the current focus on the design of transmission tariffs, much of the discussion of the principles and tech- niques is equally valid for the design of distrib.ution tariffs. 1. 2. 3 Transmission Tariffs : Requirement for Reform and Transition Having clarified some important distinctions between gas prices and tariffs, it is now possible to examine:·. • the curient provision of transmission services in China; • . the pricing of gas transmission and bulk supplies of gas; and . 186 • • the nature of reform that will be required to ensure an efficient and effective opening of the market . Integration of Services Currently in China the dominant onshore oil and gas companies, · PetroChina and Sinopec, provide what may be described as a bundled in- tegrated bulk supply service. It is a "bulk supply" service as large vol- umes of gas are delivered to UGDCs and large volume consumers connect- ed to the transmission systems. It is a "bundled" service in that the sup- ply of gas is combined (or bundled) with the transmission service. This bundling is only one aspect of the "integrated" nature of the service. The transmission activity is both vertically and horiwntally integrated. The · vertical integration comprises the sequential activities of gathering, pu- rificationO and transmission that are carried out by one enterprise. The horiwntal integration is characterized by the performance of transmis~ sicn , the operation of storage facilities and the continuous balancing of gas supply and demand within the design and safety parameters for the transmission system. In addition, the transmission system is expanded or reinforced in an- ticipation of increased demand for gas and, as a result, increased demand for transmission capacity. This increased demand may not emerge and the transmission enterprise runs the risk of failing to recover an adequate return on and of this investment. There is no effective mechanism to en- sure that the transmission capacity will be utilized or that the costs of pro- 0 It is understood that purification is not always provided. Some transmission systems flow untreated gas to final consumers who are compelled to install small - scale gas treatment facilities. Although these consumers will avoid a purification fee imposed by the transmission company, they will end up paying more. The cost to them of installing and operating their own treatment facilities will be greater than any fee that would be levied to recover the costs of providing a treatment (or purification) service at the inlets to the transmission system. In addition, the flowing of untreated gas will corrode and damage the transmission system. This will increase future costs by reducing the quality and reliability of transmission service, by increasing maintenance expenditure and by bringing forward replacement expenditure. . 187 . viding it will be recovered. This also removes the incentive to incur capi- tal and operating expenditures to maintain the physical integrity of the transmission system and to ensure the quality of the service being provid- ed. If the transmission company has no asstirance that investments al- ready made will be recovered, there will be no incentive to incur further expenditure to maintain the system. Finally, the industry is characterized by non interconnected trans- mission systems that vary in complexity from single lines to extensive provincial or inter- provincial systems. WEP will constitute a major in- crease in transmission capacity, though it will operate primarily as a non - interconnected system. The complexity of a transmission system is re- lated to the number of gas input and off - take points and the extent to which gas is delivered by displacement rather than in point - to - point flows that are easy to track. Despite the scale of investment and the long distances between input and off- take points, WEP, at least in its early stages of development, will not be a complex transmission system. Guidance Prices and Administered Fees The current approach to setting tariffs and prices, respectively, for transmission services and the bulk supply of gas does exhibit some aspects of unbundling and cost base separation. The Pricing Bureau of the SD- pcO sets administered fees for the purification of gas and the transmission of gas from the well head to the city - gates of UGDCs and the plant - gates of large volume consumers connected to the transmission system. The price of gas is negotiated within bounds around a "guidance" well head price also set by the Pricing Bureau. The principal problem with this approach is that it is not possible to establish to what extent these 0 The SDPC has been renamed the State Development and Reform Commisfilon (SDRC) since the State Council Office for Reform and Economic Restructuring (SCORES) and some de- partments of the State Economic and Trade Commisfilon (SI!,'TC) were merged into it. However in the report we will continue to use SDPC. . 188 . guidance prices and administered fees reflect the economic value and costs of the gas and services being supplied. When the price of gas deviates from the economic value and the administered fees deviate from the .eco- nomic costs the inevitable result is inefficiencies in production, invest- ment and consumption. The Requirement for Transition Inefficiencies of this nature are of great concern to economists. In terms of economic theory they result in misallocation of resources. In practical terms, they pose major problems for all market participants. For example, when the costs of transmission and distribution are added to the well head "guidance" price, it will generate a set of prices to final consumers. However, the resulting prices may be above or below the consumers' willingness to pay in relation to the prices of competing fuels. If the prices are above the willingness to pay level , gas market penetra- tion will be very limited and the strategic, economic and environmental benefits of gas will not be achieved. Economically recoverable reserves of gas will be locked in, under - exploited, or exploited inefficiently. On the other hand, if prices are below this level, there will be wasteful and · inefficient consumption and wasteful and inefficient investment attempt~ ing to satisfy this uneconomic additional demand. The additional and wasteful investment will occur in production, transmission and distribu- tion. Both sets of circumstances are seriously damaging and should be avoided. Under this approach it is oruy by chance that the optimal levels of production, investment and consumption will be achieved. In addition, there is no internal mechanism in place to ensure that, when deviations from the optimal levels occur, steps will be taken by market participants to achieve a viable and efficient equilibrium. As a result, it is necessary to develop and· apply techniques that will establish accurate costs and values at each stage in the gas supply chain. . 189 • A separate report on Gas Price Formation examines various mecha- nisms that may be employed to establish the value of gas and its price at each stage of the gas supply chain. This is required to initiate the transi- tion from the current administered prices to wholesale competition. De- riving from the application of well - developed theory and extensive inter- national practice there is a broad consensus on the identification of the e- conomic costs incurred in transmission and on how these costs may be converted into tariffs to support the transition to wholesale competition. These techniques can only be applied successfully when they are ac- companied by • A legal and regulatory package of incentives, controls and di- rectives; • Internal re - organization of the existing gas businesses; and • a revised definition of the services provided. The next three sections discuss these matters in turn. 1. 3 The Proposed Legal and Regulatory Framework This framework comprises a hierarchy of legal, regulatory and com- mercial instruments that are employed by the institutions either created or empowered by gas legislation. This is illustrated in the following figure. 1. 3 .1 Roles within the Hierarchy The government is responsible for drafting, ensuring the enactment of and implementing gas legislation that, together with the policy state- ment, is the main vehicle for restructuring. This legislation will establish the regulatory commission, which is the operational instrument for re- structuring and regulating the industry. The government body allocated policy responsibility for downstream gas (the "competent authority") , in consultation with the regulatory commission, will issue the first drafts of licenses that enterprises in the downstream gas business will have to ob- • 190 . A Hierarchy of Legal, Regulatory &. Commercial Instruments Licenses Commercial and Regulatory Arrangements icense Enterprises Fig .1.1 A Hierarchy of Legal, Regulatory & Commercial Instruments tain. These licenses will contain standard conditions regarding the rights and obligations of regulated enterprises. The regulatory commission will have the freedom to modifr these conditions in response tq license appli- cations by the regulated enterprises. This freedom will be circumscribed by the application of the process and procedures set down in the gas legis- lation. To comply with the specific license conditions each regulated busi- ness will need to design specific commercial arrangements that will be subject to varying combinations of regulatory oversight and control. Ex- amples of these commercial arrangements for a transmission enterprise are a Code of Conduct (to ensure that pipeline and gas supply activities are separated effectively) , a Code of Operations (the business rules governing access to and use of pipeline systems) and the schedule of pipeline services and the tariffs for these services. The next two sections describe the essential elements of legislation and discuss the licensing system. . 191 . 1. 3. 2 Essential Elements of Legislation International experience demonstrates that the following elements are required to implement this restructuring: • A ·statement of purpose; • The identification of a competent authority for energy policy within the GOC (Government of China) ; • The establishment of a regulatory commission; • The creation of a regime defined by licenses for transmission, storage, distribution and the shipping of gas on pipeline sys- tems; • The empowering of the competent authority to !> provide public policy guidance to the regulatory commis- sion; !> issue standard conditions of licenses; !> define the categories of gas consumers who will be eligible to contract directly for supply (eligible consumers); and !> change this definition from time to time; • The granting of regulatory powers to the commission to: !> grant, modify or revoke licenses; !> investigate compliance by licensed entities; !> conduct hearings; and !> monitor the operation of the gas market and to intervene in gas supply contract negotiations when evidence of the ex- ercise of market power exists. 1. 3. 3 The Licensing Regime The licensing regime is the key instrument for achieving a structure for the downstream gas industry that will permit the development of a functioning gas market. . 192 . License Definitions and Restrictions on Licenses The gas legislation will require that transmission, storage and distri- bution enterprises and gas shippers each hold a license. This is necessary to bring about and then: maintain a "non- integrated structure" in an in- dustry presently characterized by vertical integration from gas supply (production) through gathering, purification and long distance transmis- sion. A licensed transmission enterprise will provide the service of trans- porting gas for gas shippers. It will not be permitted to buy, sell or trade gas and, therefore, cannot be a gas shipperO. Distribution enterprises will continue to provide a bundled distribu- tion and supply service to, at least, some consumers (non - eligible con- sumers) within their areas of operation and will provide an unbundled distribution service to eligible consumers (and their suppliers) . This im- plies that the holder of a distribution enterprise license may also hold a gas shipper' s license to ship the supplies of gas being delivered to its bundled service consumers. If a distribution enterprise decides to supply eligible consumers within its area of operations it will need to establish a ,Separate gas supply business which would be required to apply for its own gas shipper' s license. A gas shipper is anyone who buys, sells or trades gas and needs to have gas conveyed from one location to another to complete the transac- tion. The concepts of "gas shipping" and a "gas shipper" follow directly from the separation of transmission and distribution (natural monopolies) from wholesale and retail supply (administrative monopolies) . A li- censed gas shipper will not be permitted to own or operate atransmission 0 ·It will be allowed t.o buy gas for its own use and ro deal with shrinkage and t.o buy or sell gas for system balancing purposes, but that is the extent of its participation in gas trading. . 193 . system on which its gas is shipped•. Licensing of Transmission Enterprises There is no requirement for licenses for the same activity to have i- dentical conditions. It is possible to include additional conditions, remove conditions or alter conditions in response to specific circumstances. How- ever, it makes sense to begin with a basic set of conditions that would typically be found in the license for a specific activity. For convenience this basic set of conditions is frequently described as the standard condi- tions of a license. The standard conditions of a transmission license may be grouped in- to four categories. These categories include specific conditions. • General and Administrative f> Definitions; f> Maintenance and provision of records; f> Provision of information to the regulatory commission; t> Provision of information to gas shippers; f> Powers of entry; f> Payments by license holder to the regulatory commis- sion; f> Assignment of license. These conditions are similar to those that would be found in the li- cense of any network operator (e.g. , gas, water, telecom. and electrici- I ty) that provides access services. The requirement to maintain records and to provide information are important conditions for regulated busi- nesses as there will always be a considerable imbalance between the infor- mation available to the regulator and that possessed by the regulated busi- 0 Common ownership of separate business units that have different types of licenses is per- mitted, but the regulatory commission must be satisfied about the effectiveness of the separation between the two business units. • 194 . ness. · Because gas pipeline systems do not fail safe operators may be granted powers of entry onto the property of consumers that are connect- ed to their networks if it necessary to maintain the safety and reliability of gas supply. It is in the interests of license - holders and the regulator that there are clear procedures specifying the fees o".'"ed by license holders, how payments are to be made and how the fees will change over time. And the regulator needs to monitor the assignment of licenses to ensure that competition is not being restricted unduly or that market power is not increased. • Transmission Services I> Code of Operations l> Pipeline system security standards l> Standards of perfonnance Each license holder will be required to prepare a Code of Operations that will set out the business rules governing its transmission service of- fer. This may resemble the General Terms and Conditions that typically underpins the contracts for transmission service in the North American context or it may be as lengthy and complex as the Network Code in the lJKD. It will be necessary for the transmission system operator to establish objective system security standards. These are frequently defined in terms of the delivery capability of the system at times of peak gas demand or sustained levels of high demand. It is necessary to define these stan- dards for a number of reasons. They provide a basis for both operations and investment policy. They set criteria against which the perfonnance of the operator may be assessed. And they provide common standards to which all users of the pipeline system must subscribe. In situations where 9 The Network Code Principal Document contains over twenty sections and several hun- dred pages. A summary of the Network Code may be downloaded fromwww.transco.uk. com. . 195 . some shippers are reluctant to. contribute fully to the cost of maintaining these standards (because they may be satisfied with a lower quality of service), it is necessary to impose these standards to ensure that there is no detrimental impact on other users of the system. In some instances the regulator may not be satisfied that the incen- tives and penalties defined in transmission service contracts are sufficient to either encourage or compel the transmission enterprise to achieve high standards of perfomiance. The obvious solution is to ensure that the con- tracts are sufficiently well defined to achieve high standards of perfor-. mance. However, particula,rly during the transition period associated with industry restructuring, it may be necessary for the regulator to de- fine and enforce standards of perfonnance and to penalize failure to achieve them. For example, the regulator may set standards in relation to the time taken by the transmission company to respond to applications for service, to the procedures notifying construction and repair work on its system and to the duration and extent of supply outages associated with such work. • Transmission Tariffs ~ Tariffs for Gas Shippers and restriction of tariffs .~ Obligations as regards tariff methodology ~ Connection charges Both the level and structure of transmission tariffs are subject to reg- ulation. Given the typical annual accounting periods employed the level of tariffs may be expected to change on an annual basis. However, the structure of tariffs may not alter significantly over much longer periods and a broad measure of consensus exis~ regarding tariff structure. One of the main advantages claimed for forms of incentive price control is that, following initial regulatory approval of the tariff methodology submitted by the transmission enterprise, the regulator sets the formal regulatory control in relation to the level of tariffs for a specific period of time. In • 196 . theory this reduces the scope and intensity of regulation. During this pe- riod of time (commonly called the "control period") the transmission en- terprise is obliged to keep its tariffs below the maximmn defined by the regulatory cap .. However, if it is more efficient (i.e., reduces its costs below the level projected by the regulator) it is allowed· to profit from the cost reduction. With this f9rm of regulation the form of price control is specified as a license condition and much of the regulatory effort is expended prior to the end of a control period to determine the price control parameters for the next period and to modify the license condition accordingly. It also makes sense to include a license condition dealing with the transmission enterprise's connection policy. The company may be com- pelled by means of a.Public Service Obligation (PSO) to connect without charge prospective gas consmners situated within a specific distance of a gas pipeline. However, it would be unusual for such a PSO to be imposed on a transmission enterprise; it is quite· common for a distribution enter- prise. In most cases transmission enterprises will seek to· recover the costs of making a connection from a new consmner. However, the true net cost of the connection is related the availability of capacity in the system to .ensure gas delivery at the new connection and to the structure of tar- iffs. If the system has sufficient spare capacity to ensure delivery to the new connection without incurring additional capital or operating expendi- ture upstream of the new connection, costs will only be incurred in the construction of the connection. H, on the other hand, additional capital or operating costs are incurred uJ)stream of the· new connection, the transmission enterprise will seek to recover these costs from the new con- sumer in addition to the actual costs of constructing the connection. The license condition will require the transmission enterprise to es- tablish a policy (or procedures) to deal with connections. This policy will set out the procedures governing . 197 . [> Applications for, and the construction of, new connec- tions; t> How the requirement for additional capital or operating ex- penditure (if any) upstream of the new connection is es- tablished; l> How these costs are recovered; and [> How the additional tariff revenue from the new connection is taken into account in determining the net cost of the connection. • Pipeline System Investment t> · Construction of Pipelines t> Long term development statement In both theory and practice it is difficult to justify an exclusive trans- mission right being granted to a transmission enterprise for a specific geo- graphical area, or for categories of consumers or for a specific period of time or various combinations of all of these. In fact the right to construct and operate transmission pipelines independently of the existing transmis- sion enterprise is feasible from both an economic and an operational per- spective. In addition, it is viewed by both policy makers and regulators as an effective tool to curb the exercise of market power by transmission en- terprises. The threat of "by- pass" the construction of a new pipeline bypassing the existing system - has frequently been employed to compel reluctant transmission enterprises to offer non - discriminatory access ser- vices at cost reflective tariffs. It also provides the basis, in the longer term, to facilitate pipeline to- pipeline competition. An example of the standard conditions of a transmission enterprise's li- cense may be found in Appendix 2. Licensing of Gas Shippers Not all jurisdictions require the licensing of gas shippers, but there are two important reasons for doing so. First, licensing empowers the . 198 . regulatory commission to apply non discriminatory and transparent cri- teria to determine the suitability of all gas market participants (with the exception of gas consumers who do not ship gas) . And secondly, it em- powers the regulatory commission to grant gas shippers rights and to im- pose conditions on them. Gas shippers, for example, may have the right to participate in the development of the terms and conditions of the ser- vices offered by transmission and distribution enterprises. But license ron- ditions will be imJxlsed on gas shippers requiring them, for example, to: • adhere to the terms and conditions of service offers; • provide adequate and timely information regarding their service requirements to the transmission and distribution enterprises to allow them to operate their pipeline systems safely and efficient- ly; and • not cause damage willfully to the facihties operated by these en- terprise8. These conditions are especially important when commercial and con- tractual arrangements are being developed, as they are now in China. It may not prove possible to enforce contractual remedies either effectively or in a timely manner. Empowering the regulator to investigate alleged breaches of license conditions by a shipper and, if the allegations are sub- stantiated, to impose heavy penalties swiftly will ensure that unreliable suppliers are discouraged from entering the market. This will ensure an orderly opening of the market. 1. 3. 4 Requirement for Supporting Policies In addition to the drafting, enactment and implementation of the legislation required to establish this regulatory framework, there is a re- quirement to formulate and implement policies to support the effective functioning of regulation and the development of a competitive gas mar- ket. These include policies to . 199 . • facilitate increased exploration and development of indigenous gas reserves; • allow new producers to enter the business of petroleum explo- ration and development; • ensure non - discriminatory access by new entrant producers and suppliers to upstream gas gathering lines and purification facilities; • remove any hindrances to securing additional external supplies of gas; • ensure that the restructuring and regulation of the electricity in- dustry does not restrict the efficient use of gas in the generation fuel mix; • promote rational and economic pricing of fuels competing with • natural gas; • accelerate the corporatization of UGDCs; and • streamline the laws and regulation$ governing health and safe- ty' technical standards and environmental and planning matters at the UGDC level. 1. 4 Gas Industry Restructuring l The establishment of the legal and regulatory framework outlined above provides the basis for the restructuring of the existing (and emerg- ing) gas industry that is required to facilitate the transition to a competi- tive gas market. However, it will take some time to establish this frame- work, but the requirement to initiate the transition to a competitive gas market cannot be delayed. Delay will hinder the very necessary expansion of gas utilization and runs the risk of reinforcing and perpetuating exist-· ing inefficiencies in both the organization and the conduct of the gas in- dustry. The next two sub sections discuss the nature of industry re- structuring that is required. This re organization may be initiated by . 200 the businesses themselves or the government and its agencies ma.y have sufficient powers to enforce key elements of this restructuring. 1; 4 .1 Separation of Upstream and Downstream The first key organizational (and operational) issue is the require- ment for the separation (at the outlet of the purification plant) of the up- stream production, gas gathering and purification activities from the downstream transmission and distribution activities. The principal responsibility of gas producers is to deliver pipeline quality gas to the iii.lets of the transmission system. The inlet to the transmission system is considered to be at the same location as the outlet of the purification plant. This separation imposes a clear demarcation be- tween raw gas on gas gathering lines and the transmission of pipeline quality gas. It makes se'nse to identify locations at the inlets to the trans- mission system (or at locations further downstream) where gas from a number of reserves and/or producers/suppliers comes together. These will provide locations for trading and the transfer of title. 1. 4. 2 C:Ommercial Arrangements and their Regulation Some of the key organizational issues and commercial arrangements that will need to be resolved and developed, such as codes of operation and transmission tariffs, have already been mentioned in Section 1.2.1 above. These commercial arrangements will be subject, eventually, to regulatory oversight and control. It is nat possible to draw a precise dis- tinction between regulatory oversight and control, but it is necessary to present some explanation of the distinction. All commercial arrangements are initially developed by regulated enterprises and, where appropriate, submitted for regulatory approval. Regulatory oversight ~ exercised in those situations where the regulator is not empowered or does not choose to make direct interventions, but is required to express either its approval or its concern about specific aspects. Regulatory control is exercised • 201 • when, in other situations, the regulator will make specific binding deci- sions regarding the commercial arrangements submitted by the regulated enterprises. This occurs' most frequently in the case of the level of trans- mission tariffs and the nature and quality of services being offered. The principal commercial arrangements that are subject either to regulatory oversight and or to regulatory control have been discussed pre- viously in the Report on Economic Regulation of Downstream Gas in Chi- na•. The relevant sections of the Chapter on Regulatory Techniques are reproduced in Appendix 3. It presents a discussion of the principal com- mercial arrangements that • Ensure an effective separation of transmission and supply activi- ties; [> In the event of separating business units that remain with- in common ownership this separation is frequently per- formed using a Code of Conduct; • Establish the business rules and procedures that govern the tenns and conditions of access for individual system users; and [> This is often described as the Code of Operations (or in the US as the General Terms and Conditions); • Define the transmission service offer; [> This is usually set out in a Transmission Service Agree- ment. A discussion of some issues that arise in the development of these commercial arrangements is also presented in Appendix 3. 1. 5 Definition of Transmission Services Design of adequate transmission tariffs requires a clear definition of 9 China: Economic Regulation of Long Distance Transmission and Urban Gas Distribution, The World Bank, The Institute of Economic System and Management, SCORES and Public- Pri- .vate Infrastructure Advisory Facility, August 2002 . • 202 the services for which the tariffs are being designed. It is possible to enu- merate numerous "principles" that should guide the definition of trans- mission services. However, the principle of non - discrimination, dis- cussed in the next sub- section subsumes all the others and is applied in assessing the implications of the transition from a bundled, integrated transmission, storage and supply service to separate provision of each of these services. 1. 5 .1 The Principle of Non - Discrimination The principle of non - discrimination governs the definition and pric- ing of regulated services. The term "discrimination" has been used so of- ten in a pejorative sense and has become so tarnished by over use that it is rapidly losing its precision and usefulness. The principle of non - dis- crimination has lost none of its crucial importance, but it is necessary to qualify and refine the use of the term. · In relation to regulated services two types of discrimination may be identified. These are permissible and non - permissible discrimination. Non - permissible discrimination is frequently described as undue or un- just discrimination. For obvious reasons, it attracts more attention. Non - permissible discrimination is any action or inaction on the part of a reg- ulated business that denies access to, restricts the use of, or increases the cost of a service to a customer that is available without similar restriction to other customers. It is necessary that any variation in the quantity,' quality or cost of the service is based on objective and demonstrable basis. The definitions of permissible and non permissible discrimination are linked by this requirement. If such a basis may be demonstrated, the dis- crimination may be deemed to be permissible. The principal cause of accusations of discrimination in transmission industries at an early stage of tinbundling is an inadequate (or allegedly inadequate) separation of the transmission business unit and the associat- ed (or affiliated) supply business unit. A previously integrnted transmis- . 203 • sion business will have an incentive to impede the entry of gas shippers who will compete with its associated supply business and, thereby, re- duce its share of the gas market. Conversely, it will seek to treat its asso- ciated supply business more favorably than other shippers. The impedi- ments range from an outright denial of access through the provision of in- adequate or over - priced service to passing confidential information on gas shippers' gas marketing intentions to the supply business. Even when there is an objective and demonstrable basis for the varia- tion in the quantity, quality or cost of the service, shippers will have lit- tle difficulty finding reasons to accuse the transmission business of dis- crimination. In many cases .this has convinced transmission companies to opt for a complete separation of the transmission and supply businesses. This provides an appropriate strategic and management focus for each business and avoids being bogged down in interminable regulatory dis- putes. It has also encouraged transmission businesses to standardize their transmission services and to make them completely transparent. In some countries certain desirable features of the pricing and service regime have been elevated to the level of principles, but, in most cases, these are requirements to prevent the emergence of specific aspects of non permissible discrimination. The requirement to facilitate the intercon- nection and interoperability of transmission systems is an example of one such "principle." Preventing or delaying the interconnection of previously non - interconnected transmission systems is an effective means of deny- ing or delaying shipper access. Similar a failure to agree technical and op- erating standards or the gas specification when transmission systems are interconnected is a means of denying or restricting access. Both are ex- amples of non - permissible discrimination. It is, of course, permissible for a transmission business to discrimi- nate between shippers in terms of the charges levied when it can be shown that there is a difference in the cost of providing the service to . 204 . each shipper. Again, this can be most effectively demonstrated when there is a clear separaticm between'. the transmission and supply businesses . .1. 5. 2 Integrated Transmission and Supply Before considering the definition. of services when transmission and supply are separated (or unbundled) it is worthwhile to review the inte- grated provision of these services. This will help to clarify the implica- tions of unbundling. Figure 1. 2 shows how gas supply sources and demand management would be employed to match the demand load duration curve for an inte- grated transmission and supply business. Pipeline Capacity l .15 29 43 67 . 71 85 99 113 127 141 Uiii Hi9 183 197 211 225 ,239 253 267 2'31 295 309 323 337 ~I 365 Days Fig .1. 2 I.bad Duration Curve for integrated TranSmission and Supply · The demand load duration curve is comprised of both firm demand for gas and demand for gas that is supplied on an interruptible ~is. For system design and operational purposes the demand load duration curve is generally estimated in relation to the probability of extreme demand con.:. ditions. These extreme demand conditions are quantified in terms of the peak day demand and the duration of high demand and are typically relat- • 205 . < I I ed to severe temperature and weather conditions. The pipeline level of ca- I pacity is set in relation to the maximum firm demand (or peak day de- mand) . For some systems where the demand load factor (the average daily demand divided by the peak day demand) is well above 50% the pipeline level of capacity is usually designed at or close to the peak day firm demand for gas. For other systems (as in the example illustrated) where the demand load factor is below or just above 50 % , strategically located LNG tanksO may be used to back - feed the system and substitute for transmission capacity for a limited number of days (say, 5 to 10) . The objective is to maximize the use of the transmission capacity provided. This can be achieved by minimizing the pipeline capacity pro- vided (for example using the technique described above), but it can also be achieved by selling gas on an interruptible basis, as this uses up capaci- ty that becomes available when the level of firm demand drops. However, this is closely integrated with the cost of gas and the cost of storage. The cost of gas provided by producers and suppliers at the in- let to the transmission system will tend to vary directly with the swing on this supply. The swing on supply is the reciprocal of the load factor on demand. It is defined as the Maximum Daily Quantity (JVI.DQ) divided by the average daily quantity (the Annual Contract Quantity (ACQ) di- vided by 365) . The higher is the swing, the greater is the unit cost. Selling gas on an interruptible basis, using storage during times of peak demand and re filling storage from production in the off - peak period will reduce the swing on supply and, thereby, reduce the unit cmt of gas. 0 In Britain, LNG facilities, where gas is liquefied off- peak, stored and sent out at peak, are located at the extremities of the transmission system. Some storage facilities are used for a simi- lar purpose in other countries. The difference hetween these and other storage facilities where ship- pers have discretion over injection and withdrawal is that the TSO must have control over send - out to support the tran.smission system. All other storage facilities will be able to offer an unbun- dled storage service subject only to specific physical and technical constraints on storage capacity, deliverability; injection and withdrawal. • 206 . Storage also provides balancing and. operational margins throughout the year to deal with unanticipated shortfalls in supply or increases in de- mand. Depending on the nature and costs of the storage facilities and the terms of the interruptible supply contracts an integrated transmission and · supply business may decide to employ storage to support interruptible de- mand. In Figure 3. 2 interruptible supplies are terminated before storage is called on. However. if storage is full as the peak demand period ap- proaches and the operator is confident that there is more than enough gas in storage to meet peak demand, it may decide to use gas in storage to continue supply to some or all interruptible consumers. In addition, stor- age capacity in excess of the projected operational requirements may have been constructed for security of supply purposes and this may also be used to support interruptible suppliesO. 1. 5. 3 Reasons for De integrating Activities The brief description in Section 1. 5. 2 relates to a system in which the provision and maintenance of transmission and storaie capacity, the operation of the transmission and storage system and the purchase and supply of gas are completely integrated. From a purely engineering or technical perspective this degree of integration makes good sense. From an economic perspective it is seriously flawed because it does not allow the volumes of gas supplied and consumed to be determined by market forces 8 In many European countries a large amount of storage capacity has been constructed for security of supply purposes. Over time the reliance of Member States of the European Union (EU) on supplies from external suppliers, such as Algeria, Russia, Norway and Libya has been increas- ing and will continue to increase. Titls additional storage capacity is intended to compensate for a supply failure from one (or more) of these sources for a sustained period. However, in many cas- es, gas from this additional storage has been used to support interruptible supplies throughout the year. As a result, supply to large volume consumers who are technically interruptible has been pro- vided effectively on a firm hasis. The large volume consumers enjoy an almost firm supply at prices oompetitive with Heavy Fuel Oil (Hro) . The transmission companies are able to maintain sales volumes, increase the demand load factor and secure a lower unit cost of gas. The price paid by large volume consumers tends to vary around the actual oost of supply as petroleum product prices change, but the prices paid by all other consumers are above the actilal oost of supply. . 207 . that are created by the interaction of multiple suppliers and buyers. As discussed in the report on Gas Price Formation in China, two principal alternative gas price formation mechanisms tend to be employed in integrated, bundled - service gas supply, transmission and marketing systems. The first is market value pricing which sets prices to final con-· sumers as close as possible to their willingness to pay. This generates in- efficiencies and surplus (unearned) profits along the gas supply chain and restricts innovation and choice in the range and quality of service provided to final consumers. The second, which bases final prices on the control of well- head prices with cost plus regulation, causes long run distortions in consumption and investment also restricts innovation and choice. In- ternational experience clearly indicates that the detrimental impacts of these flaws outweigh any economies of scope that arise from the integra- tion of activities. An increasing understanding of these detrimental impacts combined with major developments in computer and information technology that re- duce transaction costs has encouraged policy - makers to restructure the gas industry and, particularly, the transmission businesses to introduce competition progressively. The stage of development of the industry and the progress being made to establish an appropriate permanent l~al and regulatory framework for it may affect the pace at which competition is introduced. In addition, the prudent and pragmatic allocation and man- agement of risk for a large - scale infrastructure project, such as the WEP, may lead investors to seek, and policymakers to concede, a rela- tively high degree of vertical and horiz.ontal integration along the gas sup- ply chain during its implementation and early development stages. The recognition that factors may exist to slow the pace at which competition is introduced does not justify the integration of activities for either new or existing transmission systems. A degree of integration ini- tially may. be viewed as necessary to allow development and expansion of . 208 . the gas industry. However, sustained integration would create "vested interests" that would hamper the emergence of competitive gas conimodi- ty markets and deny the economy the benefits of the optimization that they bring. As recommended in the JWGO reports, ·steps should be taken immediately to identify activities where competition can be introduced and to begin to establish the conditions for its introduction. These steps will need to be accompanied by the establishment of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework. The next sub section considers the various activities carried out by an integrated transmission and supply business and identifies those • where competition can be introduced quite rapidly subject to a measure of regulatory oversight; • which will be subject to regulatory control indefinitely; and • which will be subject to regulatory control initially, but where, over time, competition may be introduced subject to regulatory oversight. 1. 5. 4 De- integrated Activities and Services Five principal activities of integrated transmission and storage busi- ~esses have been identified in the previous discussion: • the provision and maintenance of transmission capacity; · • the provision and maintenance of storage capacity; • the purchase of gas input to the system and the supply of gas at off - takes to ensure an on - going match between. the supply of and demand for gas on the system; combined with • the operation of the transmission system to maintain a balance between the inputs and off - takes of gas on the system while ensuring the maintenance of system security and integrity; and • the operation of storage facilities to support the previous two ac~ 0 See Footnote-1.on Preface. . 209 • tivities. The first key step in the process of de - integration is the separation of the purchase and supply of gas from the provision, maintenance and operation of the transmission and storage facilities. The means of achiev- ing this are discussed above in Section 1. 3. 2. At this stage it is assumed that the other four ac.tivities will remain integrated. As discussed in Section 1. 4. 2, detailed conunercial arrangements will be required to ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the transmission system following this separation and these are typically drawn up in a Code of Operations. Such a Code of Operations will include the following key conunercial features to allow a gas transmission business to offer unbundled transmission and storage services: (a) the Transmission Provider (1P) must be allowed to define and allocate transmission rights to gas shippers ( and ideally, these rights should be transferable, to ensure efficient usage) ; (b) there must be agreement on the security standards to be met by all shippers and on the responsibility of the 1P to achieve any conunon security standards by investing in transportation capacity and/or storage; ( c) gas shippers must give the Transmission System Operator (TSO) due notice of their nominated inputs and off - takes, which must be consistent with their transmission rights, and must abide by the TSO' s scheduling arrangements; ( d) shippers must offer some flexibility in inputs and off - takes (or develop a mechanism in association with the TSO to ensure this flexibili- ty) , so that the TSO can ensure the maintenan~e of sy~tem security and integrity; and (e) the TSO and shippers must draw up and agree a procedure for the settlement of imbalances between scheduled and actual flows of gas, as measured by the TSO. The first two features relate to the provision, maintenance and allo- • 210 • cation of capacity; the next three relate to the utilization of capacity by gas shippers to ensure safe and efficient operation of the transmission sys- tem. These groupings of features distinguish between the functions of a Transmission Provider ( TP) and· a Transmission System Operator (TSO) . Frequently these functions tend to remain integrated until some measure of separation of transmission and storage is achieved with both being subject to regulatory control. Typically, this constitutes the second step in the process of de- integration. Following the initial stage of de - integration and separation of stor- age, storage services could be provided by a monopolistic entity. As a re- sult, they will be subject to the same type of regulatory control as the transmission system. Over time, as the value of the storage services is more clearly defined in relation to alternative means of providing this ser- vice the degree of regulatory control will be reduced. Competing services could comprise new storage facilities, increased swing on gas production or self- interruption by large volume consumers. The third de - integration step involving the separation of the TP and TSO may take some time, but is becoming increasingly common for well - established unbundled transmission businesses. 1n this case the TP will be subject to continuing regulatory control in regard to the defini- tion, allocation and pricing of capacity; but, provided that it has an a- greed and well functioning Code of Operations in place, the TSO will be subject only to regulatory ovfilsight. An example of the General Terms and Conditions for a North Amer- ican pipeline company (equivalent to a Code of Operations) may be found in Appendix 4. 1. 5 . 5 Firm Capacity Rights The principal function of a transmission business (and this applies e- qually to existing businesses and to new projects such as the WEP) is to provide and maintain capacity to transport gas that matches shippers' re- • 211 • ) quirements. Experience in other markets demonstrates that firm capacity rights are a prerequisite to the development of competition. Consumers and suppliers are naturally unwilling to sign contracts without guarantees that the gas contracted will be delivered. Such guarantees are therefore necessary for all third party trades whose time frame extends beyond the very short term. How these capacity rights are defined and allocated a- mong gas shippers will determine the range of services that will be offered and the types of tariffs that will need to be designed. This requires consideration of four issues: • The allocation of existing capacity; • • Access to, and the pricing of, new capacity; The identification and alloca~ion of spare capacity; and • The information disclosure requirements. Each of these issues is considered in turn. Allocation of Existing Capacity For existing transmission systems, various mechanisms can be used to issue rights to available pipeline capacity, including "first come, first served" policies, lotteries and auctions of various types. The attractive- ness of these options from the perspectives of efficiency, non - discrimi- nation and fostering competition depends on prevailing market condi- tions•. These options are considered more fully in Appendix 5 where consideration is also given to the benefits of a liquid sec6ndary market in transmission. ,If capacity is scarce and no competing pipeline exists, then there is a 8 Under certain circumstances the choice of mechanism is of little significance. Specifically, an efficient allocation will generally he achieved if capacity is not scarce. In these circumstances, the objective should be that pricing of capacity is competitive and non - discriminatory: However, given expected growth in natural gas consumption in China, a situation of scarce capacity is likely to he the norm. The existence of effective competition hetween pipelines can also ensure efficient and non - discriminatory allocation, but this is not anticipated to have an impact in China in the foreseeahle future. . 212 . danger that existing allocations may be inefficient and/or discriminatory. The existence of a liquid secondary market in capacity rights, as dis- cussed in Appendix 5, can help to make the final allocation of capacity ef- ficient, but cannot prevent discrimination in the pricing of capacity, or solve problems of market power in the market for capacity. In these cir- cumstances the method used to allocate capacity rights is therefore of the greatest importance. Each of the methods has its own advantages and disadvantages, whose weights vary according to specific market conditions. The method of "first - come, first - served" has disadvantages during the early stages of market development, but these can be addressed by establishing an "open season. " The use of auctions is recommended over lotteries, ,i pro- vided that rigorous safeguards are in place to prevent abuse. Once mar- kets are fully developed, any of these methods can be considered. The transmission business should be entitled to deny access to the system on the basis of lack of capacity. But a transmission business that denies access on the basis of lack of capacity should be required to publish the evidence supporting the existence of congestion and make the neces- sary investments, provided they are economical and/or the shipper is willing to pay for them. If the initial allocation of capacity rights and the associated requirement to provide additional firm capacity prove ineffec- tive in meeting the demand for access, it may be desirable to impose "Use It Or Lose It" ( UIOLI) requirements on existing capacity holders. Moreover, regulatory authorities should examine closely any recent long - term contracts that may have the purpose of preventing the creation of spare capacity. Access to , and Pricing of, New Capacity To ensure an adequate investment lead- time, as the use of the ini- tial capacity approaches the amount available, plans will be made to ex- pand the capacity of the system. At this stage, new gas shippers should . 213 . be permitted to reserve a share of this new capacity on a firm basis under exactly the same conditions as the existing shippers. This may not prove to be straightforward. It is, generally expected that the incremental cost of this additional capacity will be lower (on a per unit basis) than the cost of the initial ca- pacity• . As a result, it can be argued that the tariffs for capacity rights to this additional capacity should be lower than those for the initial capac- ity rights. This is described as "increment8.l pricing" of new capacity. However, in most cases the lower incremental cost of the new capac- ity is a result of the economies of scale derived from the expansion of the initial eapacity. The lower incremental cost would not arise if the initial investment had not been made. It would be inequitable if the holders of the initial capacity were prevented from gaining some benefit from the expansion of the capacity they were funding. In addition, the new capac- ity may have a higher use value by virtue of being part of larger system (with a single system operator) and the holders of the initial capacity de- serve compensation for allowing the capacity they hold to be used to en- hance the value of the new capacity. It is difficult to quantify and allocate the costs and benefits of the new capacity between existing and new hold- ers of capacity rights. As a result, it makes sense to re balance the transmission tariffs to the advantage of the system users who paid for the initial investment. This results in an average tariff that is lower than the initial tariff, but higher than the tariff derived from the incremental cost. This is described as "rolled - in" pricing. When a market - based system of allocating newly created capacity rights and a liquid secondary market in capacity rights are established, it 0 This is not always the case. Economies of scale will allow the transmission business to add capacity at a lower unit cost and may allow it to do so for a considerable period of time. But eventually these economies of scale will be exhausted and incremental costs will increase to, or above, the initial level in real terms (adjusted for the impact of technical progress that occurred in the interim) . 214 . is possible to use "incremental" pricing of new capacity. Until such ar- rangements are well established, "rolled in" pricing is the only viable optionO. ldentificatron and Allocation of Spare Capacity The principle of non - discrimination and the ensuing obligations that will be imposed on the transmission business with regard to the allo- cation of existing and new firm capacity requires transmission businesses to provide access whenever capacity is available. This requirement must therefore encompass an obligation to release spare firm capacity whenever it becomes available. The allocation of spare capacity is of the utmost importance. Spare capacity includes capacity that becomes available as contracts expire, or as consumers switch away from the incumbent supplier. Under no circum- stances should existing capacity holders enjoy preferential treatment, such as automatic renewal rights or a "right of first refusal" to renew contracts. The principal requirement is that, when a customer of the supply business related to the transmission business chooses to switch supplier, the transmission business provides the required capacity. The customer's total consumption of gas is not expected to increase. All else being equal, "spare" capacity is created by the decision to switch away from the in- cumbent supply business. It is to be expected that this situation will oc- cur frequently in the early years of market opening. Exceptions to this re- quirement should be allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, and requiring detailed supporting evidence by the transmission business. An essential component of this obligation relates to the publication of information on the extent of current and future allocations of firm capaci- 0 The cost of connections to the transmission system is separate and dealt with later in this report. • 215 . ty rights on each system. Information Disclosure Requirements The first requirement is that the transmission business should dis- close detailed data describing historical and current utilization of transmis- sion capacity in aggregate tenns. Historical utilization provides a bench- mark for estimating current and future utilization, and hence for forecast- ing the availability of spare capacity. Such benchmarks help third parties and regulators notice any attempt to exaggerate expected utilization. Transmission husinesses should be required to provide objective justifica- tion if forecast utilization differs significantly from historical patterns. Where this may involve commercially sensitive information, it should be revealed only to the regulator or dispute settlement authority, but in oth- er cases, or where the authorities do not accept that it is commercially sensitive, it should be made available publicly. Information on specific current or future use of capacity may be com- mercially sensitive in two respects. The first example is of a situation where a new entrant supplier is negotiating with a customer of the incum- bent supplier and requests firm capacity from the associated transmission business. If this information is passed to the supply business there will be an incentive to indulge in predatory pricing to discourage the customer from switching to the new supplier. The most effective means of dealing with this is to enforce a full legal separation of the transmission and sup- ply businesses. However, short of this separation, the use of a vigorously enforced Code of Conduct may be sufficient to avoid the abuse of commer- cially sensitive information. The second example is where a manufacturer that intends to increase the size of its operations at a particular plant, and therefore requests his supplier to reserve increased future capacity, may not wish to give its competitors advance warning of its expansion plans. The transmission business should therefore provide only data indicating a time period and . 216 . ) the amount of firm capacity currently allocated for that time period. The identity of the capacity holders need not be disclosed. Current practice in the United Kingdom provides an example of good practice in this area. The transmission business, Transco, makes publicly available detailed information concerning capacity availability, including an annual "Ten Year Statement" giving its forecasts of capacity expan- sion over the next decade. It also provides third parties with a computer program that enables them to model capacity and forecast constraints. 1. 5. 6 Interruptible or "On - Demand" Service Utilization of booked firm capacity varies significantly over time, re- flecting fluctuations in the demand and supply of gas. Some of these fluc- tuations are difficult to predict, and consequently, a significant part of reserved firm capacity may be unused at any particular moment. The ex- istence of unused capacity in significant but unpredictable quantities makes it efficient to offer short term interruptible ("on - demand") ser- vice in addition to firm capacity rights. Experience shows that such ser- vices are attractive to gas shippers, and leads to increased capacity utiliza- tion and market liquidity. Benefits of Interruptible Service Short term interruptible service promotes competition in several ways. First, it facilitates the development of a spot market in natural gas. Without interruptible service, market participants would be obliged to acquire firm capacity rights for spot transactions. Until capacity mar- kets are well developed, it can be difficult to acquire capacity quickly on a short - run basis. Short term interruptible service can therefore be es- sential for spot market development, as appears to have been the case in other gas markets. Second, the availability of capacity on short notice reduces potential incentives to· hoard spare capacity for anti - competitive purposes. In the absence of a short term interruptible service, hoarding capacity can pre- . 217 . \ vent other parties from obtaining access. Interruptible service allows par- ticipants to use the system even if capacity is hoarded, motivating.the re- lease of spare capacity on secondary markets and fostering the develop- ment of liquidity. Third, as mentioned above, the provision of interruptible service can mitigate the impact of disputes over the measurement of available firm ca- pacity. For example, a dispute may arise when a pipeline refuses acce5s on the grounds that all current capacity is needed to meet the peak de- mand of existing customers. The party seeking access may deny this, and resolving the issue is complex: the two sides will put forward different estimates of available capacity, based on different assumptions as to likely peak demand. They may also have different views as to what probability of curtailment is acceptable. The incumbent may seek to "gold - plate," insisting that it cannot provide firm access to an entrant unless it can be 100% certain that this will not entail curtailment; while the entrant may suggest that some small but non - zero risk is acceptable. The availability of interruptible service can minimize such disputes. If the party seeking access is persuaded that there is sufficient spare capacity in 'the pipeline, then it will be content to purchase interruptible rather than firm capacity because it may not anticipate significant interruptions. This form of dispute avoidance can be promoted by ensuring that the grounds for interruption are transparent, objective and easily verifiable by all parties. It may also be desirable to ensure that parties for whom inter- ruption is a greater concern should be able to obtain priority over parties who are less concerned, by providing a number of intem.iptible services with different probabilities of interruption. Purchasers of the higher probability service would pay less, but would be chosen for interruption ahead of purchasers of the lower probability service. Such arrangements exist in mature gas and electricity markets. . 218 . , I Interruptible Service in Practice Because of the value created by interruptible and other short tenn services, it is envisaged that they would be readily provided by holders of firm capacity in a competitive market. Consequently, in fully mature gas markets, where firm capacity rights are widely available and traded on a liquid secondary market, it is not necessary to mandate the provision of interruptible service. Third parties who purchase firm capacity, have nat- ural incentives to offer short - term services that are close substitutes for interruptible service. Consequently, where there is a liquid secondary market in capacity rights, competition with such third parties means that the transmission business has no reason to withhold interruptible service, and has a natural incentive to offer it at market rates. However, to achieve the gas sector policy objectives in China, trans- mission businesses should be required to provide interruptible service in the transition to fully competitive markets. Until a liquid secondary mar- ket in capacity exists, pipelines may have incentives to refuse interrupt- ible service. The obligation to make available short term interruptible service during this transitional phase follows also from the requirement to provide non,- discriminatory service. Short- term interruptible service is usually implicitly available to the supply business affiliated to the transmission business. In the case of WEP this is the Marketing and Sales Joint Ven- ture (JV) . If the N participants have an unpredicted need for capacity on a short tenn basis, it is clear that the transmission business will pro- vide it if available, subject to its other commitments. Where this is the case, and until a liquid secondary market ensures that equivalent services are available to other parties, the principle of non discrimination re- quires that the transmission business provide the same interruptible ser- vice to others. However, this requirement to offer interruptible !!ansmission service . 219 • should only be imposed when sufficient firm capacity is reserved to ensure recovery of the cost of providing firm transmission service. Allocation and Pricing of Interruptible Service Since interruptible service can be provided competitively by holders of capacity rights in mature gas markets, there is no need to regulate its price. However, in the transition phase a transmission business could earn monopoly profits from unregulated tariffs for interruptible service. The tariff therefore should be fixed or capped by the regulatory authori- ty. The optimal price for interruptible service lies somewhere between the cost of its provision, which is equal to the variable cost imposed, and the price of firm capacity. In principle the exact optimal price can be de- termined by applying the economic principles of "Ramsey pricing. "0 However, in practice this is ruled out by informational requirements. In- stead, it is logical to allow the pipeline freedom to set the price, subject · to two conditions: a tariff cap, and a revenue sharing mechanism that al- locates the vast majority of the net revenue from selling interruptible ser- vice to the holders of firm capacity. In the United States, pipeline opera- tors are generally required to credit 90 % of revenues from interruptible service to holders of firm capacity. The tariff cap acts as a safeguard against abusive pricing•. Since in- terruptible customers do not place expansion demands on the pipeline, in- terruptible capacity should be priced at a discount to firm capacity. The revenue crediting mechanism avoids over- collection by the pipeline, and channels the interruptible service profits to the firm capacity holders, 0 "Ramsey pricing" is a method of determining prices in situations where marginal cost pricing is impractical due to the need to recover fixed costs (or more generally, to raise flUlds above marginal cost, e.g., in the theory of optimal taxation, where it was first applied) . Under Ram- sey pricing, fixed costs are recovered with minimal economic distortion, by setting price - cost mark- ups that are highest on those products or services for which demand is the most inelastic. , f) The tariff cap should be viewed as a transitional measure until a liquid secondary market in transmission capacity is well established . . 220 . · while leaving the transmission business some financial incentive to provide interruptible service. Financial incentives seem necessary because the in- fonnational asymmetry makes it difficult to determine whether or not a transmission business is actually making available all unutilized capacity. The revenue crediting mechanism has the added attraction of providing firm capacity holders with an incentive to ensure that the transmission business provides interruptible service. The revenue crediting mechanism also prevents discrimination in the pricing of interruptible service. If the transmission business charges a tar- iff higher than variable cost to all shippers, including its related supply business . The cost of the ~rvice is the tariff paid for all shippers but that tariff represents merely a transfer for the related supply business. Such transfer payments frequently arise between related undertakings, and ac- countants may allocate fixed overhead and capital costs to such transac- tions, but from an economic perspective the only cost to the consolidated company of using the spare capacity is the short - run variable cost. In this situation the cost of using interruptible service is clearly lower for the company that owns the pipeline and its related undertakings than for third parties, and this results in discrimination against other shippers. However, the revenue crediting mechanism ensures that the price charged by the transmission business to its related supply business repre- sents more than just a transfer. The revenue crediting mechanism can al- locate the majority of the fixed cost recovery to firm capacity holders on a non-discriminatory basis. An effective short - term interruptible service requires that informa- tion on available capacity be made publicly available on a regular basis. The same points made above in relation to firm capacity rights apply here. When incumbents possess the information, which is likely to be the more usual case, the obligation to disclose follows from the principle of non - discrimination. It is also consistent with the provision of informa- . 221 • tion to justify denials of access, and with provisions to provide sufficient information to transmission and distribution businesses for the secure and efficient use of transmission systems. Again, it is crucial that disclosure should take place in such a way as to avoid revealing commercially sensi- tive information, and this can be achieved by restricting the information to aggregate figures describing available capacity. · In conclusion, the development of an interruptible transmission ser- vice is. an important element of market opening and the introduction of gas to- gas competition. Even if the potential or requirement for inter- ruptible transmission service does not arise immediately, it is necessary to ensure that commercial or contractual arrangements are not established to stymie the offer of this service. Once sufficient firm capacity is reserved to ensure reasonable cost re- covery (and new suppliers enter the market) the potential to offer an in- terruptible service will arise. Given the superior quality of information possessed by the operator of the transmission system it may make 'sense (as outlined above) for the transmission business to offer this service. However, shippers may be prepared to develop an informal Over the Counter (OTC) market among themselves subject to scheduling con- straints imposed by the system operator. The information and publication requirements will vary with the nature of the service that will emerge. 1. 6 Conclusions on the Basis of Tariff Design The License - based approach to the application of regulation pro- vides an effective and appropriate means of establishing the regulatory and commercial arrangements in China that are specified in the detailed and prescriptive Tariff Codes or Codes of Regulation in North America. The sequence of • primary legislation establishing a regulatory body and a licens- ing regime, . 222 • • the definition of license conditions and the issue of licenses and • the development of commercial arrangements governing [> the separation of the transmission and supply businesses and [> the code of operation or the general terms and conditions of the transmission service offer progressively channels the focus of analysis onto the design of trans- mission tariffs.· Transmission tariff design cannot be tackled effectively without clear guidance on the legal and regulatory framework in which it will be ap- plied. The proposed methodology and approach and the illustrative design of the transmission tariffs in this report are suitable within the legal and regulatory framework and the accompanying regulatory and commercial arrangements presented in earlier JWG' s· reports8 and summarized in this chapter. This entails that the Tariff Code will focus on the principles and objectives of tariff design and the next chapter discusses these mat- ters. 0 See Footnote 1 on Preface. . . 223 • 2 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING THE TARIFF CODE The Tariff Code as defined in this report will set out the principles, objectives and desirable attributes of the methodology that will be em- ployed to design transmission and storage tariffs for the WEP. Attention will also be paid to how this Code may be extended to deal with existing transmission systems. This chapter presents a set of principles, objectives and desirable features that should be included in any Tariff Code of this nature. 2 .1 Principles of Tariff Design In line with the discussion in Section 1. 5 above, the over - riding principle is that of non - discrimination. This implies that two shippers requiring precisely the same service should expect to pay the same tariff. If the transmission business imposes a different tariff on each shipper, this is prima facie evidence of non - permissible (or undue) discrimina- tion. Non permissible discrimination is most effectively avoided by en- suring that tariffs are cost reflective. In other word, the application of the principle of non - discrimination requires that the tariffs reflect ,the costs incurred by the transmission business in providing the services re- quired by shippers. This principle (and the associated cost reflectiyity re- quirement) provides the basis for elaborating the objectives of tariff de- sign. 2. 2 Tariff Design Objectives Typically, gas transmission is a natural monopoly. It is therefore . 224 . regulated in the public interest to prevent abuse of the dominant position in the market of pipeline's owners• .Regulation is intended to substitute for the market competition to achieve the following: • First, the level of output is efficient and this is generally achieved when the value to the consumer of the last unit con- sumed equals the price and when the cost of the last unit pro- duced equals its marginal cost. Total surplus is therefore maxi- mized. This is referred to as "allocative efficiency." • Second, the output produced is rationally used if it is allocated among only those consumers whose willingness to pay is more than the price. This phenomenon is known as "rationing effi- ciency." • Third, aggregate production costs are minimized: each produc- er minimizes the cost of producing its output and the number of producers adjusts so that each unit of output is produced at min- imum average cost. This is called " cost or productive efficiency. " 2. 2 .1 Allocative Efficiency A failure to achieve allocative efficiency is typically associated with monopoly and the exercise of market power. The monopolist can raise price above marginal cost and the willingness to pay of the consumer also exceeds marginal cost. This reduces.the total surplus, but the monopolist is better off because its share of the total surplus rises. In pipeline tariff design, the challenge is to regulate prices to ap- proximate long run marginal cost (LRMC) . North American regulatory experience indicates that when pipeline tariffs are at LRMC, the return 9 This issue has been extensively discussed and recommendations put forward in the first chapter of the JWG' s Report: China Economic Regulation of Long Distance Gas Transmission and Urban Gas Distribution. The World Bank/IESM/SCORESIPPIAF. August 2002. • 225 • on investment may be at above- market levels. However, there are some North American studies that tend to confirm that in pipeline transporta- tion long run marginal costs and long run average costs are similar9 . To achieve allocative efficiency, tariffs for parti(:ular types of service and for different locations should to the greatest extent possible be cost - based. 2. 2. 2 Rationing Efficiency This concerns the distribution of a fixed level of output available from the pipeline in the short run among consumers of pipeline services. Rationing efficiency occurs when the level of output is allocated among consumers such that the value to consumers is maximized. The problem for tariff design is to reconcile the fact that different users of the pipeline will attach different .values to its transportation ser- vices with the fundamental public interest principle of pipeline regulation to charge all persons equally for obtaining transportation under the same circumstances. To achieve fairness and avoid undue discrimination,. gas transmission companies should be unbundled contract carriers, providing service to users who contract to purchase capacity on a term basis, in order to effi- ciently match capacity to demand, that is, to achieve allocative efficien- cy•. 2.2.3 Productive Efficiency Productive or cost efficiency requires the production of a given level of output (in the case of the WEP ~ the transmission of some 20 bcm of gas annually) uses the minimum amount of resources possible. It also re- quires that the factors of production (labor and capital) are used in the most efficient proportions to achieve that level of production. If either of 0 See Footnote 1 on Preface. 8 The report cited in Footnote 25 diSCUS'les the subject in further details. . 226 • these conditions is not met, then the output will not have been produced at minimum cost and there will be cost inefficiency. The broad problem for tariff design is that the traditional (North American) methods of "rate of return" regulation provide little or no in- a centive for productive efficiency. It is based on cost plus approach. As a result, there is much potential for cost inefficiencies in the construction and operation of regulated monopoly pipelines. Inefficiencies usually re- sult from overstatement in assets (termed "gold plating") and acquisition of inputs (labor, purchased goods and services) for the pipeline's opera- tion at higher prices. To achieve productive efficiency, the tariff setting mechanism should be "perfonnance based regulation" and not "rate of return" regulation•. 2. 2. 4 Efficiency in Product Selection If products are differentiated, this type of efficiency is important and deserves mention. Gas transmission services are differentiated on the ba- sis of reliability, destination and, often, by season. Firm and interrupt- ible services are clearly different types of service having different values to their users. This type of efficiency requires that the types of service available match the types of service demanded. It may not be achieved if all firm service shippers are provided with the same level of reliability of service. There may exist shippers who would be better off with either a higher or a lower level of reliability than that provided to all shippers under a stan- dard form of transportation service. The solution to this problem is to tailor the services that best meet the needs of the users. This will require time, better knowledge of the demand and adequate consultation. 9 This issue is discussed in details in the report cited in Footnote 25 discusses the subject in details. • 227 • 2. 2. 5 Revenue Sufficiency It is important that regulated transmission companies be allowed to charge tariffs that in relation to forecasted volumes, will generate suffi- cient gross revenues to recover all reasonable costs, including a fair return on investment. Those recoverable costs of course include the return of in- vested capital in the form of depreciation provisions, the cost of borrowed funds, operating and maintenance costs and the return on capital. In traditional North American regulation, a "fair return" is taken to mean a return comparable to that earned in sectors of the economy where markets are competitive and where risks are similar to those in the pipeline business. In both the "rate of return" model and in the "incen- tive regulation" model, the tariff calculation starts with an assessment of the initial revenue requirement of the regulated entity. To achieve this, transmission companies should prepare their rev- enue recovery requirements for an initial year and derive tariffs on that basis. In addition they should prepare capital and operating expenditure forecasts for the initial anfl succeeding years. These prescriptions are usu- ally recommended in order to ensure revenue sufficiency•. In order to encourage efficient production (section 2. 2. 3) beyond that initial year, the JWG proposal was that the regulatory commission should make an estimate of the rate of technical progress in the gas trans- mission industry in China for the number of years over which tariffs are determined. This will generate a decline in real tariffs (benefiting net- work users), but provide the transmission entities with an incentive to · achieve efficiency improvements more rapidly than the commission' s de- termination of the rate of technical progress, as this will increase their profits. 0 This issue is discussed in detail in the report cited in Footnote 27. • 228 . 2. 3 Desirable Features If the design of tariffs c0mplies fully with these objectives, they will, by definition, be cost reflective and non discriminatory. Howev- er, it may not make sense to expend the effort required to ;;ichieve these objectives completely. As a result, tariff . . methodologies design .' are also e- valuated in terms of some additional criteria. Thes~ criteria may be de- scribed as desirable, but not absolutely essential, features. Most listings of thesefeatures would specify that tariffs should be: • Objectively derived and ·~asy to understand and apply;· • Transparent; .• Predictable; and. • Adaptable. 2. 4 Conclusion · fo·developing the Tariff Code, the principles and objectives of tariff design should focus on achieving· key aspects of economic efficiency while eilsuririg that the revenue generated is sufficient to recover costs that are prudently and efficiently incurred .. Tariffs that achieve· these objectives .Will, by definition, be cost - reflective and non - discriminatory. Howev- er,· the ·benefits of· achieving these objectives completely needs to be weighed against the costs of reducing "user - friendly" characteristics such as ease of understanding and application, transparency, predictabili- ty and adaptability. This approach is strongly recommended and followed in ·this report. ·. . 229 . 3 DEVELOPING THE TARIFF MANUAL 3 .1 Overview of Methodology The primary goals of the tariff design model are to: 1. allow the transmission company to recover operating costs and earn an adequate and reliable return on the capital invested; and 2. reflect the cost structure of the service provided. To achieve these goals three top level must be performed. These tasks may be summarized as follows: c • Regulatory Asset Valuation. All networks, whether electricity, water gas or rail, comprise large - scale, long - lived, · dedicat- ed, irreversible investments. These investments generate annu- al capital costs (return on investment and depreciation) that ac- count for a high proportion of the annual cost incurred by. the transmission business. Appropriate valuation of these invest- meµts is a key element in ~tablishing the cost base and the derivation of tariffs. This valuation will. be subject to regula- tion, but the initial requirement to establish an estimate of the asset valuation will be the responsibility of the transmission · business. • Derivation of Cost Base. The principal components of the cost base comprise: • Return on capital employed (on a pre-tax basis); • Depreciation; and • Operating and Maintenance Expenditure These components generate the revenue recovery requirement and, . 230 . when related to forecast throughputs, set the level of tariffs. This is il- lustrated in the Fig~e 3 .1. Regulatory Asset Value x Depreciation Policy Parameters = Operating & Maintenance Costs Annual Revenue Forecast Average Requirement Vollllle Tariff Fig. 3 .1 Deriving the Level of Tariffs • Classification, Allocation and Tariff Design. These tasks deal with the structure of tariffs and are required to: I> Classify the cost base into fixed and variable costs, I> Allocate these classified costs between capacity and com- modity charges, and I> Distribute these classified costs to measurements of the uti- lization of the transmission to derive transmission tariffs. These three top- level tasks - asset valuation, cost base derivation and tariff design - may be broken into a number of steps which are de- scribed below. It is important that the transmission provider conducts this exercise on the basis that its methodology will be subject to a mixture of policy and regulatory scrutiny prior to the establishment of a formal regulatory framework. 3.2 Asset Valuation Determining the value of transmission system assets for the purposes . 231 . of tariff design ·and regulation has proved to be controversial in most countries. In many instances this has occurred beca~se the separation of the integrated transmission and supply business has accompanied or fol- lowed th~ listing of the integrated business. In principle, it should be straightforward to set the value in the accounts or in a legal instrument. In practice, it is felt that investors participating in the listing place a higher value on an integrated monopoly business than o~ separated trans- mission and supply businesses subject, respectively, to regulation and competition. As a result, policy makers believe that they face a dilemma. On one hand, they wish to maximize the proceeds from the listing: on the other, they wish to introduce competition and modern regUlation; and they identify a conflict between these objectives. If the business is listed on a monopoly integrated basis, they are reluctant to enforce the separa- tion required for competition and regulatory purposes, as they fear that the listed value of the business will suffer. The perceived risk is that in- vestors may be deterred from continuing their investment participation or from participating in future listings. Quite frequently~ policy makers (and legislators) have transferred the issue to regulators who have em- ployed various techniques to address it. This tends to create unnecessary regulatory uncertainty about • the extent of unbundling required, • the initial valuation of the transmission system assets, and ii the nature of the assurance on the recovery of, and return on, this, and subsequent, investment. Unbundling of transmission and gas supply is essential to avoid con- flicts of interest, where these conflicts reduce efficiency in the gas supply chain. Efficiency gains from competition in the bulk supply of gas and from the provision of transmission only services have been demonstrated in several countries. But they need, in all cases, to be compared against . 232 . the loss of economies of scope due to unbundling and any increase in transactions costs. Unbundling may also be viewed as an infringement of the property rights of the original investors over their transmission sys- tems, in which they invested for their own exclusive use. The principal problem is that the efficiency gains may take some time to materialize, while the costs associated with restructuring will be experienced almost immediately. It is this disjunction in the realization of benefits and costs and unease about the infringement of property rights that frequently dis- courages policy - makers from establishing the extent of unbundling that is required and the initial asset valuation of the unbundled transmission business. The optimal solution is for the previously integrated transmission and supply businesses to recognize that it is ultimately in the interests of both businesses to effect a complete separation. 0 This will permit the strategic and management focus for each business to operate efficiently and profitably. Regulators may encourage an early recognition of the ben- efits of a complete separation by devising specific incentives and controls. However, regulators should not be empowered to impose major ex- pense on transmission systems (or other existing market participants) to facilitate consumers to switch suppliers. This is sometimes described as "introducing competition for the sake of competition."@ These extreme' cases should not cloud the fact that existence of high- er than justified profits in the gas supply chain frequently provid~ a mo- 0 In 1997 British Gas decided voluntarily to establish the partially unbundled British Gas Trading business unit as a separate public lhnited company (pie), Centrica, with its own Stock Exchange listing. The remainde"r of the business, which included the pipeline business, Transco, was also established as a separate pie. There are numerous examples of shnilar voluntary separa- tions of pipeline and affiliated trading businesses in North America. @ This can be taken to extremes. The incumbent supplier can be compelled to maintain prices to final consumers higher than they would otherwise be so as to provide a margin for new en- trants, but which results in lower final prices than those offered by the incumbent. See for exam- ple, Alfred E. Kahn "Bribing Customers to Leave and Calling it ' Competition'," The Electricity Journal, May, 1999, pages 88 - 90. • 233 . tive for regulatory intervention. This intervention is justifiable, if thee- limination of these higher than justifi~d profits is translated into genuine efficiency gains. But it should be noted that high profits may provide an efficient incentive to entry. •While an industry is being restructured the location and extent of higher than justified profits in the gas supply chain will move and change between the monopoly and competitive segments of the industry. Regulators should, especially during the transition, focus on efficient incentives to new entry. In China, the issue of 8.sset valuation is likely to prove more difficult to resolve for existing transmission systems than for the WEP, although establishing the extent of the separation of transmission and supply may require the same degree of attention. The initial requirement to establish an opening asset valuation for the WEP will fall on the JV group and this will be subject to subsequent review and, possibly, modification by the policy and regulatory authorities. Two broad approaches to asset valua- tion are used. The first is based on the original asset aa:iuisition ca:its; the sec- ond is based on various measures of the current oc&s of these assets. 3. 2 .1 Historic Cost Valuation In general practice, the "original cost" (or net investment) standard for capital valuation measures the asset base by summing the original ac- quisition cost of all capital assets, minus the provision fo~ accumulated de- preciation. Because the value of assets defined in this manner is equal to their relatively unambiguous "book value" (or the value as measured in the balance sheet of the company in question), original cost is viewed as a non contentious capital cost valuation from whi~ to determine tariffs. The original cost standard (also called Historical Cost Accounting) • In the China's power sector, the "new plant/new policy" allowed high returns and pro- vided incentives for new generators to enter the markets in the mid-1980s and 1990s. This allevi- ated power shortages. This policy has been changed in 2002 by the introduction of competition at the generation level. . 234 . for- measuring the value of the capital stock makes no attempt to deter- mine the "optimality" of the assets or their current economic value. It recognizes; instead, that there are certain expenses associated with the capital stock (depreciation; if only in an accounting sense) and that' the undepreciated capital stock balance represents an outstanding liability of the company, owed to the providers of. capital, 0 on which a return is due. Thus both depreciation (the return of capital) and the return on capital form the basis of the capital cost component of tariffs. 3. 2. 2 Current Cost Valuations Current· cost valuations fall into three' categories that are distin- guished by the weightings assigned to a combination of economic, ac- eounting and regulatory objectives. · • Reproduction (or Replacement) Cost is the rost of rebuilding (or replacing) existing pl~t with new plant that is substantial- ly identical; • Optimized Replacement Cost is the cost of replacing the present output of services using a plant of mod~m configuration; • Cost based on Financial Capital Maintenance ( FCM) . FCM means that the financial or monetary amount of net assets at the erid of a financial period is maintained if it is equal to, or ex- ceeds, net assets at the beginning of the period, excluding any distributioris to, or contributions from, the owners. This gen- erally implies that the amount of net assets should be inflation -proofed. Reproduction (or Replacement) Cost This cost is estimated by establishing the current replacement cost of . . 0 Of course, if loog tenn debt is fully repaid and the business relies completely on share- holders funds (unlikely for low risk capital intensive businesses) there will be no outstanding liabili- ty to providers of debt fmance. · • 235 • each asset in the register of assets. This is a time and resource - consum- ing exer~ise. In practice it tends to be carried out periodically, say, once every five years. In the intervening years specific price indices are applied to the various cost components (steel, materials and equipment, .labor and project management, way- leaves, etc.) to generate estimates.of the replacement costs. This exercise provides an estimate of the gross current cost replacement value of the assets and similar adjustments are made to the accumulated depreciation to generate an estimate of ~he net. current cost replacement value. This approach to asset valuation is often de- scribed as Operational Capability Maintenance ( OCM) . It revalues the assets on a replacement, ~·as new" basis and allocates replacement and re- f~bishment exp~nditure to maintain this "as new" operational capability. From an accounting, perspective proponents of original cost s~dard view current cost replacement valuation as expensive in relation to the benefits it may generate in terms of presenti~g a ;,true and fair" value for the system. In addition, the estimates are inherently subjeetive and it is difficult to establish a basis for revaluation that will remain. unchanged over time. The economic case for replacement cost i~ that it is a better reflection Of the current cost of provi~ng transmission service. This case contends that the original cost rate base may be very much lower than its replace- ment cost, and, therefore, that payment of this lower cost to use existing assets would not covc:r the. curr~t costs of efficient production. This could lead to economic inefficiencies of two types: • wasteful consumption arising from the failure of consumers to pay the curn::ni costs of consumption; and. • disproportionate new investment in the service res;_ating from this upward pressure on consumption Optimized Replacement Cost The objective of this exercise is to generate an estimate of the Mod- . 236 • em Equivalent Asset (MEA) value of the transmission system. Given that transmission systems expand over time in response to varying pat- terns of gas supply and demand, it is extremely ulllikely that the configu- ration of the system will end up as it would if future patterns of supply and demand were known with certainty while it was being developed. In addition, on - going technical progress will exert downward pr~ure on real cost over time. From an economic and regulatory perspective, the optimized replace- ment cost provides an estimate of the "contestable" value of the transmis- sion system. This means that the value of the asset base should be equal to the investment that would be incurred by a hypothetical new entrant who would be required to produce the same level and mix of output as the incumbent. From the accounting and, to an extent, from the economic perspec- tive proponents of the original cost standard contend that, in addition to the problems with replacement cost valuation, optimized replacement cost frequently will require very detailed engineering analysis of the cost of re - configuring the transmission company' s pipeline system. In addition, it will result in a significant supplementary risk to investors. Cost based on FCM The FCM approach focuses on the market capitalization of the busi- ness if it i~ listed. The price that shareholders are prepared to pay for shares in the business times the number of issued shares plus the amount of funding that lenders are prepared to advance is equal to the market val- ue of the business. This is treated as a reasonable initial estimate of the net asset value. The initial net asset value is revalued over time using a general inflation index. A general inflation index, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) , is chosen as it is the deflator most commonly used by investors to determine the real value of their investments. Another advantage of this approach when it is compared to the re- • 237 • placement cost is that it reveals the "holding losses" that arise from tech- nical progress. When technical progress occurs it reduces the real cost of replacement and this is reflected in the revaluation of shareholders, funds under the replacement cost (or optimized replacement cost) approach. The extent of these "holding losses" is revealed when the net asset valua- tion under FCM is compared to the replacement cost valuation. From a regulatory perspective, ex.posing the shareholders to these losses reduees the incentive on the regulated company to reduce unit costs. Using FCM to value the asset base gives the regulated company the option of protect- ing its shareholders from the foll impact of these holding losses; Although this approach is theoretically appealing (and is employed by the gas and electricity regulatory body, Ofgem, in the UK and other regulators), it is not without its problems. If the business is not listed, one of the previous methods will need to be applied to generate the initial value of the assets. If the business is listed but as an integrated part of a much larger gas or gas and oil business (as PetroChina' s transmission ac- tivities are), it may be difficult to assign an appropriate portion of the to- tal market capitalization to the transmission business. It is also difficult to decide when (and at what share price) the market capitalization should be quantified to generate the initial asset value for regulatory purposes. 3. 2. 3 Selection of Valuation Option There are two issues that need. to be resolved when selecting the ap- proach to determining the net asset· value for regulatory purposes. The first is setting the initial value and the second is determining how this ini- tial value should be changed over time. In a sense, the second issue is of less concern at this stage. If an initial net asset value is established the ·application 'of each option to determine the change over time will generate its own stream of capital charges (depreciation and return on net asset value (RoNA)) and each stream will have a different profile. If consis- tent estimates of the cost of capital are employed and a common invest- • 238 • ment recovery period is used, the Present Value of each stream will be i- dentical to the initial net asset value. The change in value and the profile of capital charges are discussed further below in relation to depreciation and the cost of capital. It is frequently contended that the asset valuation used for regulatory purposes should not deviate from the technique employed by the business · for financial reporting. It may be convenient if both methods are the same, but there is no reason why the basis for a separate set of regulatory . accounts should be the same as that for financial reporting. Once there is a transparent audit trail 1?etween both sets, it should not pose a problem. Even in North America, where both the regulators and the regulated businesses use historic costs, respectively, for regulatory purposeS and for financial reporting, the treatment of costs and expenditures varies and, in most cases, requires the maintenance of a separate set of regulatory ac- counts. For the WEP setting the initial net asset value should be straightfor- ward as it will be the cost of construction that is transferred from work- in - progress once the pipeline is commissioned and begins operation. For existing pipeline systems, the task will not be as simple and will require detailed analysis, based on the information and data available, on a case - by - case basis. However, the over - riding objective must be to ensure that the valuation selected generates capital charges that reflect the eco- nomic cost of providing transmission service. It will also be important to ensure that consistency in the treatment of valuation is maintained •. When differences in the application of the valuation method arise, they should be transparent and defensible. 3 . 3 Derivation of the Co.st Base 3 . 3 .1 Depreciation Policy Depreciation is variously treated as the charge against profit that re- • 239 . covers the cost of investment over time, as a measure of the wear and tear of a capital asset and as a means of accumulating funds internally to refur- bish or replace assets. It should be viewed only in terms of investment re- covery. The wear and tear of a capital asset is ·a technical and engineering matter and is only related to the decision to invest or to continue investing by the expected technical lifetime. The decision to refurbish or r.eplace assets should ultimately be made by the owners of the business. In relation to depreciation two quest.ions need answers: Over what period should the initial investment be recovered? And what method should be used to calculate the annual depreciation charge? Depreciation Period For specific assets the technical or physical asset life sets the upper bound on the investment recovery period. The economic life may be .·shorter as this is the period over which the services provided by the asset will continue to generate the full economic value. However, different in- vestors and providers of finance will have their own views on what the in- . vestment recovery period should be. For example, banks will seek to minimize their exposure by recovering their fi'mds as quickly as possible. Shareholders may be prepared to postpone investment recovery provided they can manage the risk of under-recovery and be rewarded appropria- tely for the risk they cannot transfer to others. Since the WEP will be the spine of a transmissiOn that has sigllifi- cant potential for development, there is strong ease for setting the invest- ment recovery period in relation to its technical lifetime. This may be or the order of 40 years or more, depending on the design tests that are con- ducted. Of course, the different types of assets that comprise a pipeline system will have different technical lifetimes. For example, plant with moving parts, such as compressors, will have shorter lifetimes than pipelines. Each asset will be depreciated at its own rate and the average depreciation period may be calculated ex post. . 240 . Depreciation Method Straight - line depreciation has emerged as the most common method for depreciating long life assets, regardless of whether original or current cost valuation standards are used. Once the depreciation period for an as- set has been decided, the annual depreciation charge is equal to the initial value divided by the depreciation period. When a current cost valuation method is used, the initial asset value, the annual depreciation charge and the accumulated depreciation are revalued continuously using the chosen price indices. At the end of the period, the total accumulated deprecia- tion will equal the inflated (or re valued) initial asset value. The calculation of depreciation allowances for taxation purposes may differ from the application of this method. This will impact the prepara- tion of accounts for financial reporting purposes, but it does not prevent the application of straight - line depreciation in the regulatory accounts. It does, however, require a specific calculation to estimate the actual marginal tax rate for the regulated business when an estimate is made of the pre - tax cost of capital. The principal alternative to straight line depreciation is " economic depreciation." The objective of this method is to reproduce the price pat- tern that would prevail in equilibrium in a competitive market, i.e., prices would stay constant in real terms. The depreciation allowed under the "economic depreciation" methodology is derived implicitly. A con- stant real stream of capital charges that will recover the investment and generate the required return on investment is first derived. The annual return on investment is then subtracted from the desired total annual cap- ital charges to derive the annual depreciation charge. Economic depreciation has a number of advantages that include the following: • If the methodology is designed to track inflation in pipeline con- struction costs over time, then it has the merit of producing . 241 . charges that should not vary significantly between old and new pipelines; and • It can be designed to produce stable charges even as throughput changes over time. For ex~ple, if low volume is anticipated in the first few years of a pipeline' s life, th~ the economic de- preciation method can be designed to ensure that those volumes do not pay higher tariffs. Rather, the method can ensure that charges per unit volume remain steady in inflation - adjusted terms over time, by postponing a portion of capital recovery un- til higher volumes materialize. Prices in competitive markets behave similarly. However, the profile of depreciation should not be considered in iso- lation. The focus should be on the profile of annual Ca.pital charges which includes depreciation and the return on investment. This leads to consid- eration· of the cost of capital which provides the basis for determit)i~ the appropriate return on investment. 3. 3. 2 Cost of Capital Most regulatory commissions are required to allow the businesses subject to regulation a ~·reasonable rate of return" on their assets. For natural gas, a reasonable rate of return can be defined as the risk adjust- ed return that suppliers of funds require the business to provide, given the risks imposed by both the· inherent nature of the transmission sector and the regulatory commission process itself. This allowed rate of return is more commonly called the cost of capital. Generally speaking, the riskier the business, the higher the cost of capital, because suppliers of funds will require a higher return to compen- sate them for bearing greater risk. Maintaining an expected allowed re- turn on capital in line with the cost of capital is the primary determinant of the business' financial viability. Since most businesses are {inanced with a combination of debt and . 242 • equity, the relevant measure of the cost of capital is the weighted average of the cost of debt and. the cost of equity, where the weights reflect the business' s level of gearing. The Cost of Debt The cost of debt to a regulated business can generally be thought of as the sum of the following: • The real pretax return required by investors in risk free invest- ments, such as government bonds plus • A margin over the risk free rate at which debt can be obtained by the business in question, which will reflect the credit rating of the business. The main contentious issue here is the maturity of the risk-free as- set. On one hand, it is possible to contend that the maturity should re- flect the useful life of the assets in the business, which in transmission could be of the order of 40 years or more. It can be argued that it is ap- propriate to match the cost of investing in the asset with its productive life to determine an appropriate revenue stream that will service this cost in a manner consistent with the revenue generated by the asset. On the other hand, it is equally pqssible to argue that it should be short (typically 3- 5 years) so as to be consistent with the likely length of period between re - determinations of the control of the level of tariff by the regulator. The Cost of Equity A number of alternative approaches to estimating the pretax cost of equity, more or less in order of increasing sophistication, can be used: B Comparative returns in "equal risk" industries, nationally or in- ternationally. One difficulty in using comparative returns is al- lowing for differences in the cost of capital as a result of differ- ent risk factors, such as regulatory commission environments. Longer term trends in the returns to industry generally, at • 243 • the national or international level, may be useful as an indica- tion of the magnitude of the real cost of capital, even if the ad- justment for the specific industry risk factors is more judgmen- tal. • The Dividend Growth Model (DGM) based on expectations for future dividends. The method is popular among regulatory commissions in the United States, but it suffers from the lack of a dividend payment history in recently listed finns. It is also ruled out where subsidiaries of the parent company are also cus- tomers of the regulated business. • The Capital Asset Pricing Model ( CAPM) calculates the re- quired rate of return, given the opportunity cost of investing in the equity market, the volatility of the market itself, and the systematic risk of holding equity in the particular company. This is the current "conventional wisdom" approach to estimat- ing the cost of capital in Australia and the United Kingdom, where regulatory commissions have tended to favor the CAPM methodology, at least as a conceptual framework. Even if the methodology can be agreed in principle, approaches to estimat- ing key parameters can be contentious. The relationship be- tween past evidence and the future is debatable: the cost of capital is the expected return required to attract capital in fu- ture. Historic values of key parameters may not reflect future values if the nature of risks is changing. Aspects of risk, such as regulatory commission risk, can also be hard to incorporate in CAPM framework for the cost of capital, except in a tauto- logical manner. Although determining the cost of equity is quantitatively one of the most significant decisions affecting transmission tariffs in the longer term, it is also one of the most difficult areas for objective quantification. . 244 • ·Taxation The post- taf{ weighted average cost of capital (WACL) is the re- turn necessary for investors to have sufficient incentive to invest in the business. To finance the post- tax WACL and tax liabilities, a business rpust ,earn a pretax rate of return. The difference between the two, is the tax wedge. The size of the tax weP,ge is a function of the rules governing the taxation of business profits and the specific tax posi~ion of each bU&i- ness. It is a relatiyely simple matter to. e8timate the tax wedge from a de- scription of the tax system in, the law (the statutory tax wedge) . A bµsiness' actual tax payments liabilities (the effective tax wedge), how~ ever, will reflect a number of other factors: such as the availability of capital allowances. , Regulators tend to favor an estimation of actual tax payments based o,n financial modeling of the expected cash flows of the business and this may be most appropriate, appi;oach for the WEP. Gearing The ratio of debt to equity will determine the weights attributed to the return on equity and the cost of debt when deriving the WACL. Reg- ulators focus on the return to allow on the assets in the regulatory asset base, rather than the returns to individual stakeholders in that business. As a result, they have a limited role to play in deciding the allqcation of the allowed return between equity holders and debt holders or the struc- ture of the business' balance sheet. Nevertheless, regulators must aim to allow· the regulated business only the required cost of finance. If the structure of financing is non - op- timal, so that the cost of capital is raised, the extra cost might be disre- garded. Consequently, regulators seek to estimate the cost of capital on the assumption of an efficient or "optimal" level of gearing. Regulated businesses have an incentive to .reduce the debt - to - equity ratio prior t~/ the regulator' s determination of the WACL. This gives them the oppor- • 245 • tunity to raise the ratio subsequently and increase the return to sharehold- ers. -Regulators can counter this by requiring the regulated business to · maintain a specific investment grade credit - rating. 3. 3. 3 Operating Expenditures An objective of any regulatory ·reginie is to provide the regulated businesses with incentives to operate efficiently. It will be necessary for the WEP and allow transmission businesses to demonstrate that they are operating, and will operate, efficiently. In general, regulators need to examine the variances between the forecast and actual operating and maintenance expenditure for the regulated business, and develop rules on how these variances should be treated. These variances could result from the following: • Price effeets, which may be caused by unanticipated move- ments in the price index used in forecasting investment or effi- ciency gains (that is, the business purchasing more cheaply than the price index would imply) . • Volume differences, to the extent that, say, demand has not ·grown as anticipated, such that investment has been higher or lower than forecast. • Failure to meet agreed quality standards, which may invoke penalties. For example, actual investment may be lower than foretast, but at the expense of a deterioration in the quality of service. • Efficiency gains, which may be rewarded, from a lower volume of investment to achieve the same quality and output as fore- cast. The analysis of cost relationships, however, in particular the rela- · tionship between operating and maintenance expenditure and quality, is a difficult and relatively novel area of regulatory practice. Few regulators have attempted to distinguish between the different causes of variances of • 246 • actual from forecast operating expenditure. Regulators have instead either set operating expenditure allowances at actual levels when making a de- termination (thereby eliminating the variances at a stroke), or they have phased out the whole variance over a period. In deciding how far to pursue this analysis, moot regulators tend to weigh up the possible benefits, and the probability that useful results will be gained, against the likely costs. One approach is to base the allowance for operating costs on a level of efficient costs, rather than on the busi- nesses' actual or forecast level of costs (which may include inefficient ex- penditure) ; This raises the question of what level of operating costs could an efficient business achieve. There are at least two ways in which this could be resolved. The first is to make comparisons with similar regulated businesses in similar countries and to set a target path for the business that envisages it moving toward that target at a demanding, but achievable, rate. Using benchmarking to set allowable revenues would give the business a power- ful incentive to become efficient, but determining benchmarks of the type required for setting the operating cost element of transmission and distri- bution businesses is not without its problems. In many countries, there are a number of gas transmission entities against which to compare a par- ticular operator. If that is not the case, international comparisons may need to be developed. This may not be straightforward, however, be- cause it will be difficult to make appropriate allowances in any such exer- cise for all the factors affecting the level of the business' s controllable op- erating costs. These factors include population density, size of network, age of network, weather, nature of terrain, and differences in quality of service. In addition, benchmarking compels the regulated business to operate along an efficient cost frontier which may be based on questionable and subjective assessments of comparators' costs. Regulated businesses will . 247 . have an incentive to improve efficiency if they can retain any efficiency gains in excess of those detennined by the regulator. The total efficiency gains are shared between the transmission business and its customers. If the regulator sets these efficiency gains at its view of the maximum effi- ciency gains that can be achieved,. the incentive property is lost and effi- cient businesses may not be able to recover their costs. An alternative to benchmarking that is considered by some regulators is to project future operating costs using objective and stable measures of efficiency trends, such as industry or economy wide measures of an- nual gains in labor and capital productivity, as a means of setting the fu- ture trend of the businesses' operating costs. This has the potential ad- vantage of being less contentious than attempting to use suitably adjusted information on comparators' efficiency levels. It would be inappropriate, however, for businesses that are currently performing particularly badly, since the target path for operating costs would by definition include exist- ing (large) inefficiencies. 3.4 Projecting the Cost Base (or Revenue Requirement) The gas transniission businesses in China will need to develop cost base projections for a number of years. This will allow for a degree of sta- bility in the tariffs and assurance of cost recovery. It is to be expected that there will be some form of regulatory intervention in the future in- vestments and operating expenditures that will be allowed. One of the principal factors impacting on the projection of the cost base will be the profile of annual capital charges allowed by the regulator. Figure 3. 2 pre- sents selected profiles in nominal or Money of - the - Day tenns for an asset whose cost is recovered over 40 years. Four profiles are presented: • Constant Real - based on an "economic depreciation" profile; • Current Cost based on Financial Capital Maintenance; . 248 • 0 s 20. 001-----------------:-~~~~~ 'C ~· - ,.... ' i 15. 001---------------:-::::;o......- - - - - - - - - - 1 .m u ~ io. oo~:!:~~~i!~i~;;;:;~:=~~~=~=:~~ s '~ j 5.00~------------------....:::C-.'----,":C:.:......ti 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 910111213'141516111819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940 Years . Note:Ree.1 WACC=7%: lnfle.tion=3%;Technical Progress=l. 5\\\ Fig. 3. 2 Selected Profiles of Annual Capital Charges • Current Cost - based on Operating Capability Maintenance; and • Historic Cost. These profiles are presented for a single asset where there is agree- ment on the initial vB.luation. For the purposes of comparison it is as- sumed that the real pre - tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital is 7% and that general inflation (measured, for example by percentage changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)) is 3 % a year. The Historic Cost profile starts at the highest level of all the profiles compared and falls lin- early; the Current Cost FCM profile remains relatively stable. It increas- es initially and then slowly declines, averaging a little over 10% of the initial investment. The Constant Real profile starts at the lowest level and increases continuously in step with the assumed inflation rate. All three. of these profiles, when discounted by the nominal pre tax . 249 . WACC, generate identical Present Values (PVs) . The Current Cost OCM profile progresses over time below the Current Cost FCM profile with an ever -:- widening gap. This profile assumes technical progress at the rate of 1. 5 % a year and this is factored into the revaluation of the as- set. The result shows the "holding losses" that will be incurred by in- vestors as the gap between the FCM and OCM profiles. As a result, the profile does not recover these holding losses and its PV is below that of the .other three profiles. When these profiles are derived for a number of assets commissioned at different points in time, the aggregated profiles will not demonstrate the stark differences seen in Fig. 5 . 2 and, on occasion, the aggregated profiles will be quite dose. The idea of aggregated profiles is a reasonable representation of a transmission business where investments are made se- quentially to maintain and expand the provision of transmission services. This implies that, in a similar manner to the choice of the method for the initial asset valuation, the selection of the appropriate profile for capital charges will require detailed analysis of the data and information avail- able. For the purposes of this analysis, it is proposed to apply a constant real tariff based on the real project rate of return (assumed by PetroChi- na) . This is designed to recover the capital and operating expenditures over the 24 year project evaluation period set by PetroChina. Given the data provided on the debt service requirements, it is assumed that the in- vestors will be content with the residual rate of return and profile of re- turn. O Net fixed assets and annual depreciation charges are derived using FCM for the asset lifetimes assumed by PetroChina. This generates a specific .profile for capital charges. 0 The potential inadequacy of this approach is recognized and its use at this stage is justified by the lack of key data and parameters. In using this methodology, limited access to transmission providers in China need to take into account investors' justified requirements. • 250 . This provides an initial, if not entirely-adequate, basis to consider the application of regulatory control of tariffs even if the CPI X incen- tive form of tariff control is recommended.- The simple initial tariff mech- anism proposed assumes that X is equal to zero and it is ·possible that a regulator would be content with this app:roach until such time as the level of capacity utilization associated with the initial investment was achieved. °Thereafter, or, if the circumstances require it, prior to this', the regulator will be in a position to determine positive value.5 for X. 3. 4 .1 Connections Costs Connection charg~ are levied on n~w co~umers and provide ~ ad- ditional source of revenue to transmission businesses. This needs to be taken into account when deriving .th~ ~~venue recovery requirement. While connection to the transmission system is a monopoly activity, it will be subject to regulation@ and the costs recovered through connection charges must be netted off the asset base for the purposes of setting gas transmission tariffs. An important issue is determining which costs are to ·be r~vered through the connection charges: • charging on a ' shallow' basis recovers just the direct and local costs (the costs of the service pipe, meter etc.) of connecting a new consumer • charging on a ' deep' basis would also recover the additionaI costs imposed elsewhere on the system in term5 of system rein- forcement etc. Transmission businesses tend to.prefer deep charglng (or the option of imposing a deep charge) since it reduceS their risk by ensuring that the 0 This approach is heitlg considered by the CRE, the energy regulator in Mexico. G .However connections can be a competitive activity and when this is established regulation may not be required. . 251 . actual costs incurred can be recovered. It can additionally be used as a barrier to new access that will result in a reduced market share for its· as- sociated supply business. However, except for very large consumers, the costs associated with identifying the additio~al investment requirements imposed on the system as a whole by a new connection, and the negligi- ble impact of most small consumers, means that the use of deep charging is not cost effective. The identification of applicable costs is also diffi- cult since the deeper into the network, the more likely the costs are to be joint and common costs between many consumers. With deep charging there is a lack of transparency and risk of unfair cost allocation. For these reasons, it is proposed to use shallow charging and to recover any system reinforcement c0sts from all users of the transmission system. O This ap- proach is applied in all countries which require the provision of an unbtin- dled transmission service. 3. 4. 2 Total Cost Base It is important to note that separate cost bases will need to be devel- oped for transmission and storage, even if the activities are integrated. 3 . 5 Classification and Allocation of C.OSts Establishing the cost base sets the level of tariffs. Determining the structure of tariffs begins with two related steps- classifying and allocat- ing the cost base. 3. 5 .1 Cost Classification The total cost base for each function is composed of costs that are de- termined to be either fixed or variable. Fixed costs are defined as costs and expenses that remain constant regardless of volume or throughput. Fixed costs remain essentially constant over the relatively short term. 0 This approach may need to be reviewed in relation to very large users such as power sta- tions. • 252 • These costs include labor expenses, overheads and capital - related costs such as plant investment, depreciation, accruals, return on investment and associated income taxes. These latter three elements (depreciation, return and corporate taxes) make up the preponderance of fixed costs. These costs are typically referred to as "capacity related" costs because of their obvious direct relation with a transmission company' s capacity to provide service. Variable costs change essentially in direct proportion to facilities use or capacity utilization. These costs are basically related to compression or compressor station activity. Classification is the source of good tariff design. Separating costs in the process of classification allows the design of tariffs that are both more economically, efficient and safer financially than tariffs that contain no such distinction. Prices with more than one component - particularly with an "up front" component - are common in competitive markets as a way of better matching the cost of providing certain services with the price. Classification is a formal way of doing the same thing with trans- mission tariffs - matching the structure of tariffs with the structure of costs. 3. 5. 2 Allocating Costs The next step involves the allocation of fixed and variable costs to the capacity and commodity charges. Costs are allocated to categories of shippers according to capacity uti- lization by such categories, based on economic and equity criteria. This is a critical step in the determination of the final tariff paid by shippers with varying load factor characteristics. The proportion of fixed and variable costs which are allocated to the capacity and commodity charge is a func- tion of the tariff design. Allocation is the process whereby an attempt is made to match the characteristics of shipper use of the transportation systems with the types of costs that must be incurred to serve them. Allocation directs costs to· • 253 . l users who should pay them. It is, in other words, the central core of the I effort to present shippers with the cost consequences of their capacity uti- l lization decisions. I 3 . 5. 3 Equitability v. Efficiency in Classification and Allocation The classification and allocation of costs has been the subject of on- l going controversy and modification in North America for alm6st 50 years from the early 1940s to the 1990s. The cost of service basis of tariff de- sign and regulation ensured that this remained a focus of concern for gas market participants and regulators both when transmission and supply were bundled and later, in the mid 1980s, when transmission and s~pply were beginning to be unbundled. The debate has often been couched in terms of equitability versus ef- ficiency. To illustrate this terminOlogy two of the important concerns of gas market participants are presented in Figure 3 . 3 . lv;ar_i_a_bl_e,_l_-1----'F'-"i=x.;:,.;ed"--_ _ _ __,I Classification.__ Allocation I Commodity Capacity I L-----~-+--------'------' Cost responsibility of olw ~~t--~~~--1--~~~~~~~~ load factor users Increasing Decreasing :Company's Revenue Risk Decreasing Increasing Fig. 3. 3 Classification & Allocation of Coots The first horizontal bar presents a typical classification of costS for a transmission system. In general,, the variable portlon of total costs is of the order of 5 10 % . On some systems it may be even lower. The sec- ond horizontal bar presen~ the a.llocation of these costs between oonimod- • 254 • ity and capacity costs. This is the essence of a two - part tariff where commodity costs are recovered in a usag~ (or volumetric or energy) tariff expressed, for example, in RMB/cubic meter or in RMB/GigaJoule. Ca- pacity costs a're recovered in a reservation (or capacity or demand) tariff expr€ssed in RMB/peak day (or peak hour) cubic meter/month or RMB/ peak day (or peak hour) GigaJoule/month. The vertical line indicates the allocation between commodity and ca- pacity costs. Its initial position shows that, in addition to the variable costs,· a portion of fixed costs is being allocated to the commodizy costs. The vertical line may be moved to the left or to the right. If it is moved completely to the right, the result will be a one - part usage tariff. This, . in general, is the current approach in China where prices and fees are ex-' pressed in RMB.Icubic meter. This is at the "equitability" extreme where there is no difference in the amount·paid per ciibic meter by gas shippers regardless of the tinting of gas deliveries at the off - takes of the transmis- sion system or the costs incurred to ensilre delivery at that time. The "efficiency" ,extreme occurs when the vertical· line is moved to the left until the capacity/commodity allocation coincides with the fixed/ variable classification. This generates the Straight Fixed Variable ( SFV) approach to tariff design. This approach was mandated in Order 636 of 1992 by the US FERC ( except in circumstances where it could be demonstrated.that its application distorted tariffs) • The term SFV de- scribes the method precisely .. Fixed costs are allocated "straight" to ca- pacity; variable costs are allocated "straight" to commodity. The efficiency argument is that transmission capacity is provided to meet peak demand. Low load factor shippers (such as UGDCs or their suppliers) ,contribute proportionately more to this peak.demand than oth- er shippers such as large volume industrial consumers and power genera- tors (or their suppliers) . Fixed casts are incurred to provide ( and to maintain the provision of) transmission capacity. Consequently, low load • 255 • I factor shippers should contribute proportionately more to the recovery .of these fixed costs than other (higher load factor) shippers. The SFV method seeks to allocate the fixed and variable costs to ensure that the cost responsibility of shippers is proportional to the costs they cause the transmission company to incur in providing them service. This is efficient in that discourages wasteful consumption by low load factor consumers and the resulting increased demand for transmission capacity. It also pro- motes allocative efficiency in that UGDCs who offer an almost guarantee of supply to their customers should value transmission capacity at times of peak demand more highly than other shippers. This is also illustrated in Figure 3. 3. When the vertical line is moved to the left the cost responsibility of low load factor shippers in- creases. When it is moved to the right it decreases and higher load factor shippers subsidize the low load factor shippers. The transmission compa- ny is also exposed to greater revenue risk when the vertical line is moved to the right . The lower the proportion of costs that is recovered in a fixed capacity or reservation charge the greater is the company' s exposure to variations is volume. This issue varies in importance with the form of tar- iff or regulatory control applied by the reglllator and this is discussed fur- ther in the next chapter. 3. 5. 4 Resolving the Equitability v. Efficiency Debate Two approaches have been applied to resolve this debate. The first emerged during the transition to market opening in the developed market economies; the second has emerged during the process of consolidating market opening. Transition to Market Opening Any resolution of the "equitability v. efficiency" debate during the transition tended to be reduce te a consideration of the cost responsibility that should be allocated to low lead factor shippers. Allocating the cost responsibility using the SFV method meets efficiency criteria, but it is· . 256 . not completely equitable. If fixed costs are allocated to capacity and these fixed costs are related to the peak availability of transmission capacity, low load factor shippers will contribute to fixed cost recovery broadly in proportion to the share of available transmission capacity they use at peak. However, the transmission company will have the opportunity to use this capacity off - peak (when the low factor shippers do not require it) to enhance or extend its transmission service to other shippers or to offer an interruptible transmission service. See Section 1. 5. 4 above. In the ab8ence of a formal capacity release or similar arrangement that would compensate the low load factor shippers for the off - peak use of their firm capacity it is possible to allocate a portion of fixed costs to commodity. This moves the typical SFV capacity I commodity split from 90: 10 towards a 70: 30 or a 65: 35 ratio. 0 There is a strong case in favor of not applying SFV immediately and, thereby, including some measure of compensation for low load factor shippers. However, it is not easy to identify the appropriate split. During the transition period it may . be appropriate to set the ratio initially at 65: 35 and move it progressive- ly over time to a ratio that corresponds to SFV. Consolidation of Market Opening Once firm transmission capacity rights have been allocated to ship- pers and these rights can be traded in a liquid secondary market, the eq- uitability v. efficiency debate evaporates. Low load factor shippers can trade their firm rights in the secondary market and receive an appropriate market based compensation for the use of these rights. In addition, 0 The cost allocation debate has also taken place in Britain and the rest of Europe, but not with the same degree of intensity. British Gas' Transportation & Storage business unit (BGT&S) ignored classification and opted for a compromise 50 : 50 capacityI commodity split in the early 1990s. For transmission this is being progressively moved through 65: 35 to an eventual 90: 10 ratio. Ireland has opted for a 90: 10 ratio, while Franre, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Nether- lands and Germany have decided to recover all costs (both fixed and variable) in a 100% capaeity eharge. . 257 . I j t !i shippers, over time, will attempt to diversify their portfolios of cus- tomers to achieve the demand load factor they wish to manage. This .im- plies that the SFV method can be applied as any concerns about the use of firm capaci~y reserved by low load factor shippers in off - peak periods ..~I not ari~. The use of the SFV method provides the basis for a further develop- ment of the. role of the transmission business. Section 1. 5 above outlined a further .unbundling of the transmission business into a Transmission Provider.(TP) and a Transmission System Operator (TSO) . The TP would provide and maintain transmission capacity and recover the regu- lated fixed costs of these activities in 100% capacity tariffs. The TSO would operate the transmission system and recover the variable costs of opera~ion under incentive based regulation. For the existing transmission systems in China, these developments :'ill take ~me time, but it is prudent to attempt to envisage ,the future commercial and regulatory arrangements whep. designing the initial level and structure of transmission tariffs •. 3. 6 Tariff Design The classification and allocation of costs to capacity and commodity components provides the basis for designing a two ~ part tariff - a charge for the transmission capacity reserved and a charge for the use during the year of this capacity. Numerous tariff design options may be considered but fo~ specific systems are commonly used: • Postage - stamp; • Path - based; • Zonal; and · • Entry- Exit. Each of these systems is considered in relation to the transmission • 258 • pricing in China. Some comments are made about their applicability to existing transmission systems. 3. 6 .1 Postage Stamp Under a pure postage - stamp system all transactions would be levied the same transmission tariff, regardless of the points of input and off - take. The postage stamp charge is designed to recover the average costs of using the transmission system. For natural gas transmission, a com- mon variant on the "pure" postage-stamp system would involve a fixed capacity charge that is independent of the points of input and off take, plus acommodity 'charge that covers the variable costs of transmission. The commodity charge, by definition, is not independent of the points of input and off take. For complex, meshed systems where the distance traveled by gas is either not significant or difficult to establish with any degree of certainty, the postage stamp approach may be appropriate. However, for long - line systems such as WEP, where distance traveled is reasonably expected to be a significant determinant of cost, it is diffi- cult to argue convincingly in favor of a postage - stamp system. 3.6.2 Path Based By "path based" is meant a system that involves different tariffs for different contract paths. This approach generates a matrix of different tariffs depending on both the input and off - take points of the gas, as shown in Figure 3. 4. One obvious example of a path - based system is the use of distance based tariffs. This approach is illustrated in Figs. 3 . 5 , 3 . 6 and 3 . 7 . For a transmission system with multiple input and off- take points, it is assumed that a proportion (up to 100%) of the allo~ted capacity costs may be recovered in distance - related capacity tariffs. Since capaci- ty may be related gas flows at peak, a peak volume flow matrix is con- structed (Figure 3. 5) . . 259 . I ) Inputs ( X106 m3) Ii I2 I., ,....... Tu Tm s 01 T1., ~ .... x 02 T21 T22 T2a ._,, Ill f service and receives a lower priority than such other classes of service.· (b) The provisions regarding non discriminatory access, reason- able operational conditions, an.cl limitations contained in § 284. 7 (b), (c), and (£) apply to pipelines providing interruptible service· under this section. (c) Reservation fee. No reservation fee may be imposed for inter- ruptible seririce. A pipeline's ~te for any transportation service provided under this section may not.include any minimum bill provision, minimum take provisipn, or any other provision that has the effect of guaranteeing revenue. [Order:436, 50 FR 42494, Oct. 18, 1985] EDITORIAL NOTE: For FEDERAL REGISTER citations affect- • 272 • ing ·§ 284.9, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and on GPO Access. § 284.10 Rates. (a) Applicability. Any rate charged for transportation service under subparts B and G of this part must be established under a rate schedule that is filed with the Commission prior to commencement of such service and that conforms to the requirements of this section. (b) Rate objeetive8. Maximum rates for both peak and off- peak periods must be designed to achieve the following three objectives: (1) Rates for service during peak periods should ration·capacity; (2) Rates for firm service during off - peak periods and for inter- ruptible service during all periods should maximize throughput; and (3)'The pipeline's revenue requirement allocated to firm and inter- ruptible services should be attained by providing the projected units of service in peak and off - peak periods at the maximum rate for each ser- vice. (c) Rate design - ( 1) Volumetric rates. Except as provided in § 284. 7 ( e), any rate filed for service sub- ject to this section must be a one - part rate that re-:- covers the costs allo- cated to the service to the extent that the projected units of that service ate actually purchased and may not include a demand charge,· a millimum bill or minimum take .provision or any other provision that has the effect of guaranteeing revenue. Such rate must separately identify cost compo- nents attributable to transportation, storage, and gathering costs. (2) Based on projected units of service. Any rate filed for service subject to this section must be designed to re cover costs on the basis of projected units of service. The· fixed costs allocated to capacity reservations, as determined in accordance with § 284. 7 ( e); should be used along with the projected: nominations accept- . 273 . ed by the pipeline to compute the unit reservation fee. The remaining fixed costs 'and all variable costs should be used to determine the volumet- ric rate con:iputed on the basis of projected volumes to be transported. The units projected for the service in rates filed under this section may be ' . changed only in a subsequent rate filing under sectibn 4 of the Natural Gas Act. (3) Differentiation due to time and distance. Any rate filed for service subject to this section must reasonably re- flect any material variation in the cost of providing the service due to: (i) Whether the service is provided during a peak or an off- peak period; and: (ii) The distance over which the transportation·is provided. ( 4) Uist basis for rates. ( i) Any maximum rate filed under this sec- tion must be designed to recover on a unit basis, solely those.costs which are properly_ allocated to the service to which the rate applies. (ii) Any minimum rate filed under this section must be based on the average variable costs which are properly allocated to the service to which the rate applies. ( 5) Ra:te flexibility. (i) Any rate schedule filed under this section must state a maximum rate and a rr;llnimum rate. (ii) (A) Except as provided in paragraph (d) · (5). (ii) (B) of this section the pipeline may charge an individual customer any rate that is · neither greater than the maximum rate nor less than the minimum rate on file for that 8ervice. (B) If ,a pipeline does not hold a blanket certificate.under Subpart G of this part,: it may not charge, in a transaction involving its marketing affiliate, a rate that is lower than the highest rate it charges in any trans- action not involving its marketing affiliate. (iii) The pipeline may not file a revised or new rate designed to re- • 274 • cover costs not recovered under rates previously in effect. [Order 436, 50 FR 42493, Oct. 18, 1985, as amended at 50 FR 52274, Dec. 23, 1985;~ 53 FR 22163, June 14, 1988; Order 522, 55 FR 12169, Apr. 2, 1990; Order 581, 60 FR 53072, Oct. 11, 1995. Redesignated and amended by Order 637, 65 FR 10220, Feb. 25 , 2000] § 284.11 Environmental compliance. (a) Any activity involving the construction of, or the abandonment with removal of, facilities that is authorized pursuant to § 284. 3 ( c) and subpart B or C of this part is subject to the terms and conditions of § 157. 206 (b) of this chapter. (b) Advance notification - (1) General rule. Except as provided in paragraph (b) (2) of this section, at least 30 days prior to commencing construction a company must file notification with the Commission of any activity de scribed in paragraph (a) of this section. (2) Exception. The advance notification described in paragraph (b) --· ( 1) of this section is not required if the cost of the project does not exceed the cost limit specified in Column 1 of Table I of § 157. 208 ( d) of this chapter. ( c) Contents of advance notification . . · The advance notification described in paragraph (b) (1) of this sec- tion must include the following information: (1) A brief description of the facilities to be constructed or aban- doned with removal of facilities (including pipeline size and length, compression horse - power, design capacity, and cost of construction) ; (2) Evidence of having complied with each provision of § 157 .206 (b) of this chapter; (3) Current U.S. Geological Survey 7 .5-rninute series topograph- • 275 • ical maps showing the location of the facilities; and ( 4) A description of the procedures to be used for erosion control , re vegetation and maintenance, and stream and wetland crossings. (d) Reporting requirements. On or before May 1 of each year, a company niust file (on electronic media pursuant to § 385 .2011 of this chapter, a~mpanied by 7 paper copies) an annual re - port that lists for the previous calendar year each activity that is de - scribed in paragraph (a) of this·~tion, and which was completed during the previous calen- dar year and exempt from the advance notification requirement pursuant to paragraph (b) (2) of this section. For each such activity, the compa- ny must indude all of the in - formation described in paragraph (c) of this section'. [Order 544, 57 FR 46495, Oct. 9, 1992, as amended by Order 581, 60 FR 53072; Oct. 11, 1995; Order 603- A, 64 FR 54537, Oct. 7' 1999] § 284 .12 Standards for pipeline bnsi - ness operations and com- munications. (a) Eiectronic Bulletin Boards. An interstate pipeline that is re- - quired by this- chapter or by its tariff to display information on an Elec- tronic Bull~tin Board must provide for the following features on its board: · (1) Downloading by users; (2) Dhlly back- up of information displayed on the board,, which must be available for user review for at least three years; (3) Ptirging of ·information on completed transactions from current files; ( 4) Di~play of most recent entries ahead of information posted earli- er; and (5) On line help, a: search function that permits users to locate all information.concerning a specific transaction, and a·menu that permits users to separately access the notices of available capacity, the marketing • 276 . affiliate discount infonnation, the marketirig affiliate capacity allocation log, and the standards of conduct information. (6) A pipeline's obligation to provide infonnation pursuant to this paragraph will terminate when all relevant information is provided pur- suant to paragraph (c) (3) (i) of this section. (b) Incorp0ration by reference of GISB standards; (1) An interstate pipeline that transports gas under subparts B or G of this part must com- ply with the following business practice and electronic communication stand8:fds promulgated by the Gas Industry Standards Board, which are incorporated herein by reference: · · · (i) Nominations Related Standards ( Version 1. 4, August 31, 1999); ·: · (ii) ·Flowing Gas Related. Standards ( Version 1. 4, August 31, 1999) with the exception of Standards 2. 3. 29 and 2. 3. 30; · ··(iii) Invoicing Related Standards (Version 1.4, August 31, 1999); (iv) Electronic ·Delivery Mechanism Related Standards (Version 1. 4, November 15, 1999) with the exception· of Standard 4. 3 .4; and · · ·(v) Ca.pa.City Release Related Standards (Version 1.4, August 31, 1999)' . . .(2) This illeorporation ·by reference was a:ppmved by· the Director of the Federal Register in· accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies of these standards may be obtained from the Gas Industry Standards Board, 1100 Louisiana, Suite 3625, Houston, TX 77002. Copies may be inspected at the Federal.Energy Reguiatory Commission, Public· Reference and• Files Maintenance Branch, ·888 First Street, NE. , Washington, DC 20426 and· at the Office of the Fedei;al Register, 800 North Capitol St. , NW. , Suite 700, Washington; DC. (c) Business practices and electronic communicatiqn requirements. An inter- state. pipeline that transports gas under subparts B or G of this part must comply with •the following requirements. The· regulations in • 277 • this paragraph adopt the abbreviations and definitions contained in the Gas Industry Standards Board standards incorporat~ by reference in paragraph ( b) ( 1) of this section. ( 1) N~minations. (i) ln~ra - day nominations. (A) A pipeline must give scheduling pribrity to an intra -day nomi- nation submitted by a firm shipper over nominated and scheduled volumes for interruptible shippers. When an interruptible shipper' s scheduled volumes are to be reduced as a result of an intra - day nomination by a firm shipper, the interruptible shipper must be provided with advance notice of such reduction and must be notified whether penalties will apply on the day ~ts volumes are reduced. (B) Ail intra - day nomination submitted on the day prior to gas flow will take.effect at the start of the gas day at 9 a.m. ccr. (ii) Capacity release nominations. Pipelines must permit shippers · acquiring released .1 capacity to submit a nomination at the earliest available nomination opportunity after the acquisition of capacity. If the pipeline requires the replacement shipper to enter into a contract, the contract must be issued within one hour after the pipeline has been notified of the release, but the requirement for contracting must not inhibit the ability of the replacement shipper to submit a nomination at the earliest available nomination .opportunity . . (2) Flowing gas. (i) Operational balancing agreements. A pipeline must enter into Operational Balancing Agreements at all points of interconnection between its system and the system of another interstate or intrastate pipeline. (ii) Netting and trading of imbalances. A pipeline must establish provisions permitting shippers and their a~ · gents to offset imbalances accruing on different contracts held by the . 278 • shipper with the pipeline and to trade imbalances with other shippers where such imbalances have similar operational impact on the pipeline' s . system. (iii) Imbalance management. A.pipeline with imbalance penalty provisions in its tariff must provide, .to the extent operationally practica- ble, parking and lending or other services that facilitate the ability of its shippers to manage transportation imbalances. A pipeline also must pro- ·vide its shippers the opportunity to obtain similar imbalance management services from other providers and shall provide those shippers using other providers access to transportation and other pipeline services without un- due discrimination or preference. · (iv) Operational flow orders. A pipelinemuSt take all reasonable ac- tions to minimize the issuance and adverse impacts of operational flow orders ( OFOs) or other measures taken to re- spond to adverse operational events on its sys - tern. A pipeline must set forth in its tariff clear standards for when sµch measures will ~n and end and must provide timely information that will enable shippers to min- imize the adverse impacts of these measures. ( v) Penalties. A pipeline may include in its tariff transportation penalties only to the extent necessary , to prevent the impairment of reli- able service. Pipelines may not retain net penalty revenues, but must credit them to shippers in a manner to be prescribed in the pipeline~ s tar- iff. A pipeline with penalty provisions in its tariff must provide to ship- pers, on a timely basis, as much information as possible about the imbal- ance and overrun status of each shipper and the imbalance of the pipeline' s system. (3) .Communication protocols. (i) (A) All electronic infoJ:mation provided and electronic transac- tions con~ ducted by a pipeline ·must be provided on the public Internet. A pipeline must provide, upow request, ·private network connections us- • 279 . ing internet tools; internet directory services, and internet communic,a- ·tion PI?toc6ls and must provide these networks with non - discriminatory access to all electronic information. A pipeline may charge a reasonable fee.to recover the costs of providing such an interconnection •. (B) A pipeline must implement this requirement no.later than June 1, 2000: (ii) A pipeline must comply with the following requirements:for documents ·constituting public information .posted on the pipeline web site: (A) The documents must be accessible to the public over the public Internet using commercially available web browsers, without imposition of a password or other access requirement; (B) Users must be able to search an entire document online for·se,- lected words, and must be able to copy selected portions ·of. the docu- ments; and (C) Documents on the web site should .be :directly downloadable without the need for users to first view the documents on the ,web site. (iii)· If a pipeline uses a numeric or other designation to represent in- formation, an electronic .cross - reference table between the numeric or other desi~ation and the information represented must be available to users, at a cost not to exceed reasonable shipping and handling. (iv) A pipeline must provide the same content for all information re- gardless of the electronic format in which it is· provided. ( v) A pipeline must maintain, for a period of three years, all infor- mation displayed and transactions conducted electronically under this sec- tion and be able to recover and regenerate all such electronic information and documents. The pipeline must make this archived information avail- able in electronic form for a reasonable fee. (:vi) A pipeline must post notices of operational flow orders, critical periods, an~Lother critical notices on its Internet web site and must notify • 280 • affected parties of such notices in either of the following ways to he cho- sen by the affected party: Internet E - Mail or direct notification to the party' s Internet URL address. [Order 587, 61 FR 39068, July 26, 1996, as amended by Order 587 B, 62 FR 5525, Feb. 6, 1997; Order 587 - C, 62 FR10690, Mar. 10, 1997; Order 587 - G, 63 FR 20095, Apr. 23, 1998; Order 587-a, 63 FR 39514, July 23, 1998; Order 587-:- I, 63 FR 53576, Oct. 6, 1998; Order 587-K, 64 FR 17278, Apr. 9, 1999. Redeiig- nated and amended by Order 637, 65FR 10220, F,eb. 25, 2000; Order 637 A, 65 FR 35765, June 5, 2000; .Order 587-M, 65 FR 77290, Dec. 11, 2000] § 284.13 Reporting requirements for interstate pipelines. An interstate pipeline that provides transportation service under sub- parts B or G of this. part must comply with the following reporting re- quirements. (a) Cross references. The pipeline must comply with the require- ments in Part 161, Part 250, and Part 260 9f this chapter, where appli- cable. ( b) Reports on firm and interruptible services. An interstate pipeline must post the following information on.its Internet web site, and provide the infqnnation in downloadable file formats, in conformity with § 284.12 of this part, and must maintain access to that information for a.period not less than 90 days from the date of posting. · (1) For pipeline firm service and for release transactions under § 284. 8, the pipeline must post with respect to each contract, or revision of a contract for service, the following information no later than the first nomination under a transaction: (i) The full legal name of the shipper, and identification number, of the shipper receiving service under the con - tract, and the full legal name, and identification number, of the releasing shipper if.a capacity re- • 281 • leare is involved or an indication that the pipeline is the 5eller of trans- portation capacity; (ii) The contract number for the shipper receiving service under the oort tract, and, in addition, for released transactions, the contract number of the releasing shipper's contract; · (iii) The rate charged under each contract; . (iv) 1be ., maximum -tate, and for capacity release transactions not subject to a maximum rate, the ri:iaxiinum rate that would be applicable to a comparable sale of pipeline services; { v) The duration of the oontract; (vi) 'f:he receipt and delivery points and zones or segments oovered by the con#"act, iricluding the industry· common rode for each point, ione, or segment; (vii} The eontract quantity or the volumetric quantity under a volu- metric release; ·. · · (viii) Special tenns and· conditions applicable to a capacity release transactioh~ including all aspectS in which the contract deviates from the pipeline' s tariff, and special details pertaining to a pipeline transporta- tion contract, including whether the oon tract is a negotiated rate con- tract,· oondi.tions applicable to a discounted transportation contract, and :all aspects ih which the contract deviates from the pipeline• s tariff. · (ix)- Whether there is an affiliate relationship between the pipeline and the shi~per or between' the releasing and replacement shipper. · (2) For pipeline interruptible service, the pipeline must post on a ,, later than the first nomination for ·service under an inter- daily ba8is no ruptible agr~ent, the following information: (i) The full legal name, and identification number, of the shipper receiving service; · (ii) The rate charged; (iii) The maximum rate; . 282 " • (iv) The receipt and delivery points covered betWeen which the shipper is entitled to transport gas at the rate charged, including the in- dustry common code for each point, zone, or segment; ( v) .The quantity of· gas the shipper is entitled to tr~port; (vi) Special details pertaining to the agreement, including conditions applicable to a discounted transportation contract and all aspects in which the agreement deviates from the pipeline's tariff. (vii) Whether the shipper is affiliated with the pipeline. ( c) Index of customers. ( 1) On the first business day of each calen- dar quarter' an interstate pipeline must file with the Commission an in- dex of all its firm transportation and storage customer8 under contract as of the first day of the calendar quarter that complies with the require- ments set forth by the Commission. The Con::imission will establish the requirements and fortriat for such filing. The index of customers must al- so posted on the pipeline' s Internet web, in accordance with standards adopted in ,§ 284 .12 of this part, and made available from the Internet web site in a downloadable format complying with the specifications es- tablished by the Commission. The information posted on the pipeline' s Internet web site must be made available until the next quarterly iridex is Posted. (2) For each shipper receiving firm transportation or storage ser- vice, the index must include the following information: (i) The full legal name, and identification number, of the shipper; (ii) The applicable rate schedule number under which the service is being provided; (iii) The contract. number; (iv) The effective· and expiration dates of the contract; · ( v) For tran8portation service, the· maximum daily contract quantity (specify unit of measurement), and for storage service, the maximum storage quantity (specify unit of measurement); • 283 • (vi) The receipt and delivery points and the zones or segments cov- ered by the contract in .which the capacity is held, including the industry common code for each point, zone, or segment; (vii) An indication as to whether the contract includes negotiated rates; (viii) The name of any agent or asset manager managing a shipper' s transportation service; and (ix) Any affiliate relationship between the pipeline and a shipper or between the pipeline and a shipper's asset manager or agent. (3) The reqllirements of this section do not apply to contracts which relate solely to the release of capacity under § 284. 8, unless the release is permanent. ( 4) Pipelines that are not required to comply with the index of cus- tomers posting and filing requirements of this section must comply with the index of customer requirements applicable to transportation and sales under Part 157 as set forth under § 154.111 (b) and (c) of this chap- ter. ( 5) The requirements for the electronic index can be obtained from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Division of Information Ser- vices, Public Reference and Files Maintenance Branch, Washington, DC 20426. ( d) Available capacity. ( 1) An inter - state pipeline must provide on its Internet web site and in downloadable file formats, in conformity with § 284 . 12 of this part, equal and timely access to information rele- vant to the availability of all transportation services whenever capacity is scheduled, including, but not limited to, the availability of capacity at receipt points, on the mainline, at delivery points, and in storage fields, whether the capacity is available directly from the pipeline or through ca- pacity release, the total design capacity of each point or segment on the system, the amount scheduled at each point or segment whenever capaci- • 284 • ty is scheduled, and all: planned·and.aetual ~ice outages or reductions in service capacity·.: . · · · (2) An interstate,pipeline must make an annual filing by March 1 of each year.showing the estimated peak day capacity of the pipeline's sys-, tern, and.the estimated;storage capacity and maximum daily delivery ca- pability of storage facilities under reasonably representative operating as:- sumptions and the respective assignments of that capacity to the vadous firm services provided by the pipeline. (e) Semi~annual storage report. Within 30 days of the end of each complete storage injection and withdrawal ~n, .the interstate pipeline must file with the Comffiission a report of storage activity. The report must be signed under oath by a senior official; •cons~st of an original and five conformed copies, and c;ontain a suinmary of storage injection and withdrawal activities to include the following: (1) The identity of each customer injecting gas into storage and/or with - drawing gas from storage, identifying ·any affiliation with the in- terstate pipe- line; (2) The rate. schedule under which the storage injection or with- drawal service was performed; (3) The·maXimum storage quantity and maximum daily withdrawal quaritity applicable to each storage customer; (4) For each storage customer, the volume of gas (h:.1 dekathenns) injected into and/or withdrawn from_ storage during the period; and ( 5) The unit charge and total revenues received during the injec- tion/withdrawal period from each storage customer, noting. the extent of any discounts.permitted during the period. · (£) Notice of bypass. An interstate pipeline that provides trans- portation (except ,storage) to a customer that is located in. the service area of a localdistribution company and will not be delivering. the customer' s gas to that local distribution company, must file with the Commission, • 285 . within thir;ty days after commencing such transportation, a statement that the inter8tate pipeline has notified the local distribution company and the local distribution company's appropriate regulatory agency in Writing of the proposed transportation prior to commencement. [Order 637, 65 FR 10221, Feb. 25, 2000, as amended by Order. 637 A, 65 FR 35765, June 5, 2000] § 284.14 [Reserved] . Subpart B- ·Certain Transportation i by Interstate Pipelines · · § 284:.101 Applicability. This subpart implements section 311 (a) (1) of the NGPA and ap- plies to the transportation of natural gas by any interstate pipeline on be- half of: (a) ~Y intrastate pipeline; or · ( b) Any local· distribution company. § 284.102 Transportation by interstate pipelines. (a) Subject to paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, other provi- sions of this ;subpart, and the conditions of subpart A of this part, any in- terstate pip~line is authorized without .prior Commission approval, to transport natural gas on behalf of: (1) Any intrastate pipeline; or ( 2) Any local distribution company. (b) Any rates charged for transportation under this subpart may not exceed the just and reasonable rates established under subpart A of this part. ( c) An· interstate pipeline that engages in transportation arrange- ments under•'.this subpart must file reports in accordance With § 284 .13 and § 284 .106 of this chapter. • 286 • (d) Transportation of natural gas is not on behalf of an intrastate pipeline or local distribution company or authorized under this section un- less: (1) The intrastate pipeline or local distribution company has physi- cal custody of and transports the natural gas at some point; or. (2) The intrastate pipeline or local distribution. company holds title· to the natural gas at some point, which may occur prior to, during, or after the time that the gas is being transported by the interstate pipeline, for a purpose related to its status and functions as an intrastate pipeline or its status and functions as a local distribution company; or (3) The gas is delivered at some point to a customer that either is lo- cated in a local distribution company' s service area or is physically able to receive direct deliveries of gas from an intra - state pipeline, and that lo- cal distribution company or intrastate pipeline certifies that it is on its be- half that the interstate ·pipeline is providing transportation service. ( e) An interstate pipeline must obtain from its shippers certifications including sufficient information to verify that their service8 qualify under · this section. Prior to commencing transportation service described in paragraph (d). (3) of this section, an interstate pipeline must receive the certification required from a local distribution company or an intrastate pipeline pursuant to paragraph (d) (3) of this section. [Order 436, 50 FR 4~495, Oct. 18, 1985, as amended by Order 526, 55 FR 33011, Aug. 13, 1990; Order 537, 56 FR 50245, Oct. 4, 1991; Order 581,. 60 FR 53072, Oct. 11, 1995; Order 637, 65 FR 10222, Feb. 25, 2000] § § 284 .103 - 284 .106 [Reserved] • 287 • Subpart C- Certain Transportation· by. Intrastate Pipelines § 284 .121 Applicability. This silbpart implements section 311 (a) (2) of the NGPA and ap- plies to the. transportation of natural gas by any intrastate pipeline on be~ half of: ' (a) Any interstate pipeline, or ( b ) f,\ny ·local distribution company served by any interstate pipeline. § 284.. 122 Transportation by intrastate pipelines. (a) Subject to paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, other provi- sions of this subpart, ,and the applicable conqitions of Subpart A of this part' any intra - state pipeline may' without. prior Commission approval, transport natural gas on behalf of: (1) Any interstate pipeline; or .·; : (2) Any local distribution company served by an interstate pipeline. ( b) No rate charged for· transportation authorized under. this subpart may exceedf a fair and equitable rate under· § 284 .123. ( c) ·Any in- trastate pipeline engagedin transportation arrangements authorized .under this seetion must· file reports as required by § 284 .126 . (d') Transportation of natural gas is not on behalf of an interstate pipeline .or 19cal distribution company served by an interstate pipeline or authorized under this section unless: (1) The interstate pipeline or local distribution ci:Jrripany has 'physi- cal custody of and transports the natural gas at some point; or (2) Th~ interstate pipeline or local distribution company holds title to the natural gas at some point, which may occur prior to, during, or after the time that the gas is being transported by the intrastate pipeline, • 288 • for a purpose related to its status and functions as an interstate pipeline or its status and functions as a local distribution company. [Order 436, 50 FR 42495, Oct. 18, 1985, as amended by Order 537, 56 FR 50245, Oct. 4, 1991; Order 537 A, 57 FR 46501, Oct. 9, 1992; Order 581, 60 FR 53073, Oct. 11, 1995] § 284.123 Rates and charges. (a) General rule. Rates. and charges for tra.nSportation of natural gas authorized under § 284 .122 (a) shall be fair and equitable as deter- mined in accordanee with paragraph (b) of this section. (b) Election of.rates. (1) Subject to the conditions in § § 284. 7 and 284 .. 9 of this chapter, an intrastate pipeline may elect to: (i) Base its rates upon' the methodology used: (A) · In designing rates to recover the cost of gathering, · treatment, processing, transportation, delivery or similar service· ( incltiding storage service) included in one of its then effective firm sales rate schedules for city- gate service on file with the appropriate state regulatory agency; or (B) In determining the allowance permitted by the appropriate sta:te regulatory agency to be included iri a natural gas distributor~ s rates for city- gate natural gas service; or (ii) To use the rates contained in one of its then effective transporta- tfon rate schedu1es for intrastate service ·on file with the appropriate state regulatory agency which the intrastate pipeline determines covers service ciJmparable to servite under this subpart. · (2) · (i) If an intrastate pipeline does not choose to make any elec- tion under paragraph (b) (1) bf this section, it shall apply for Commis~ sion approval, by order, of the proposed rates and charges by filing with the Commission the propased rates and charges, and in - formation showing the pro~ed rates and charges are fair and equitable.' Each peti- tion for approval filed under this paragraph must be accompanied by the fee set forth in § 381. 403 or by a petitiort for waiver ptirsuant to § . 289 • ~84.106 of this chapter. Upon filing the petition for approval, the in- trastate pipeline may commence the transportation service and charge and collect the proposed rate, subject to refund. (ii) 150 days after the date on which the Commission received an application filed pursuant to para- graph (b) (2) (i) of this section, the rate proposed in the application will be deemed to be fair and equitable and not in excess of an amount :.Vhich interstate pipelines would be permitted to charge for providing similar transportation service, unless within the 150 day period, the Commission either extends the time for action, or institutes a proceeding in which all interested parties will be afforded an opportunity for written comments and for the oral presentation of views, data and arguments. In such proceeding, the Commission either will approve the rate or disap- prove the rate and order refund, with interest, of any amount which has been determined to be in excess of those shown to be fair and equitable or in excess of the rates and charges which interstate pipelines would be per- mitted to charge for providing similar transportation serviee. . . (iii) A Commission order approving or disapproving a transportation rate under this paragraph supersedes a rate determined in accordance with paragraph (b) (1) of this section. ( c) Treatment of revenues. The Commission presumes that all rev- enues received by an intrastate pipeline in con nection with t~porta­ tion authorized under § 284 .122 (a) and computed in accordance with paragraph (b) (1) of this section have been or will be taken into account by the appropriate state regulatory agency for purposes of establishing transportation charges by the intrastate pipeline for service to intra state customers. ( d) Presumptions. If the intrastate pipeline is charging a rate com- puted pursuant to § 284.123 (b) (1), the rate charged is presumed to be: (1) Fajr and equitable; and • 290 . (2) Not in excess of the rates and charges which interstate pipelines would be pennitted to charge for providing similar transportation service. (e) Filing requirements. Within 30 days of commencement of new service, any intrastate pipeline that engages in transportation arrange- ments under this subpart must file with the Com mission a statement that describes how the pipeline will engage in these transportation ar- rangements, including operating conditions, such as, quality standards and financial viability of the shipper. The statement must also include the rate election made by the intrastate pipeline pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section. If the pipeline changes its operations or rate election under this subpart, it must amend the statement and file such amendments not later than 30 days after commencement of the change in operations or the change in rate election. [ 44 FR 52184, Sept. 7, 1979, as amended at 44 FR 66791, Nov. 21, 1979; Order 394, 49 FR 35364, Sept. 7, 1984; Order 436, 50 FR 42496, Oct. 18, 1985; 50 FR 52276, Dec. 23, 1985; Order 581, 60 FR 53073, Oct. 11, 1995] § 284.124 Terms and conditions. Contracts for the transportation of natural gas authorized under this sub- part shall provide that the transportation arrangement is subject to the provisions of this subpart . § 284.125 [Reserved] § 284 .126 Reporting requirements. (a) Notice of bypass. An intrastate pipeline that provides trans- portation (except storage) under § 284 .122 to a customer that is located in the service area of a local distribution company and will not be deliver- ing the customer' s gas to that local distribution company, must file with the Commission within thir.ty days after commencing such transporta- tion, a statement that the interstate pipeline has notified the local distri- bution and the local distribution company' s appropriate state regulatory . 291 . agericy in writing of the proposed transportation prior to commencement. (b) Annual report. Not later than March 31 of each year, each in- trastate pipeline mi.1st file an annual report with the Cornmissiori and the appropriate· state regulatory agency that contains, for each transportation service ( exeept storage) provided during the preceding calendar year un- der § 284' 122, the following information: (1) The name of the shipper receiving the transportation service; (2) The type of service performed (i.e., firm or interruptible); (3) T9tal volumes transported for the shipper. If it is firm service, the report should separately state reservation and usage quantities; and ( 4) Total revenues received for the shipper. If it is firm service, the report should separately state reservation and usage revenues. (c) Seini- annual storage report. Within 30 days of the end of each complete storage injection and withdrawal season, the intrastate pipeline shall file with the Commission a report of storage activity provided under the authority of § 284 .122. The report must be signed under oath by a senior offici~, consist of an original and five confirmed copies, ~d con- tain a sumrilary of storage injection and withdrawal activities to include the following: ( 1) T4e identity of each customer injecting gas into storage and/or with-drawing gas from storage; (2) The docket where the storage injection or withdrawal rates were approved; (3) The maximum storage quantity and maximum daily withdrawal quantity applicable to each storage customer; ( 4) For each storage customer, the volume of gas (in dekatherms) injected into and/or withdrawn from storage during the period; (5) The unit charge and total revenues received during the injec- tion/withdrawal period from each storage customer; and • 292 • (6). The.related docket numbers in which the intrastate.pipeline re- ported storage related injection/withdrawal transportation services. ·( d) Notification of termination. Not later than thirty days aftet the tennination of any transportation arrangement (except storage) autho- rized under: § 284 .122, the intrastate·. pipeline must file. with the Com- mission and vrith the appropriate state regulatory agency a statement, consisting of an original and five conformed copies to the Com - mission, including 'the following information: ( 1) The docket number assigned to the transaction and the date the transaction was terminated; (2) The total volumes transported under the arrangement; ( 3) The total revenues received; and ( 4) A statement certifying that the service was provided under the terms and conditions previously reported in that docket. [Order 436, 50 FR 42496, Oct. 18, 1985, as amended at 50 FR 52276, Dec. 23, 1985; Order 636, 57FR13317, Apr. 16, 1992; Or- der 581, 60 FR 53073, Oct. 11, 1995] Subpart D Certain Sales by Intrastate Pipelines SOURCE: 44 FR 12409, Mar. 7, 1979, unless otherwise noted. Redesignated at 44 FR 52184, Sept. 7, 1979. § 284 .141 Applicability. This subpart implements section 311 (b) of the NGPA and applies to certain sales of natural gas by intrastate pipelines to: (a) Interstate pipelines; and (b) Local distribution companies served by interstate pipelines. § 284.142 Sales by intrastate pipelines. Any intrastate pipeline may, without prior Commission approval, .• 293· • sell natural gas to any interstate pipeline or any local distribution company served by an interstate pipeline. The rates charged by an intrastate pipeline purauant to this subpart may not exceed the price for gas as nego- tiated in the; contract, plus a fair and equitable transportation rate as de- termined in accordance with § 284 .123. [Order 581, 60 FR 53073, Oct. 11, 1995] § § 284.143 284.148 [Reserved] • 294 • ' Subparts E - F [Reserved] SubpartG Blanket Certificates· Authorizing Certain Transportation by Interstate Pipelines on Be- half of Others and Services by Local Distribution Companies § 284. 221 General rule; transportation by interstate pipelines on behalf of others. (a) ,Blanket certificate. Any interstate pipeline may apply under this section fbr a single blanket certificate: authorizing the transportation of natural gas on behalf of others in accordance with this subpart. A certifi- cate of public convenience and necessity under this section is granted pur~ suant to section 7 of the Natural Gas· Act. (b) Application procedure. (1) An application for a blanket certifi- cate under this section must be filed electronically. The format for the electronic application filing can be obtained at the Federal Energy Regula- tory Commission, Division of Information Services, Public Reference and Files Maintenance Branch, Washington, DC 20426, and must include: (i) The name of the interstate pipe-line; and , (ii) A statement by the interstate pipeline that it will comply with the conditions in paragraph ( c) .of this section. (2) Upon receipt of an application under this section, the Commis- sion will conduct a hearing pursuant to section 7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act and § 157 .11 of this chapter and, if required by the public conve- nience and necessity, will issue to the interstate pipe - line a blanket cer- tificate authorizing such pipeline company to transport natural gas, as provided under this sub- part. · ( c) General conditions. Any blanket certificate under this subpart is • 295 • subject to the conditions of subpart A of this part. (d) Pre grant of abandonment. ( 1) Except as provided in para- graph (d) (2) of this section, abandonment of transportation services is authorized pursuant to section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act upon the ex- piration of the contractual term or upon termination of each individual transportation arrangement authorized under a certificate granted under this section.~. (2) Paragraph.( d) (l) ·of this section does not apply if. the individu- al transportation arrailgement is for firm transportation under a contract with a term' of one year or more, and the firm shipper: · : (i) Exerc;ises any contractual right to continue such service; or (ii) Gives notice that it wants to eontinue its transportation arrange- ment and will match the longest term and highest rate for .its firm ser- vice; up to the applicable maximum rate under § 284 .10, offered to the pipeline during the period established in .the pipeline' s tariff for receiving such offers by any other person desiring firm capacity, and· executes a contract matching the terms of any such offer • .To be eligible to exercise this right o{first refusal, the firm shipper's contract must be for service for twelve oonsecutive months or more at the applicable maximum rate for that service,, except that a con - tract for more than one year, for a ser- vice which is not available for 12 consecutive months, would be subject to the right of first refosal. (e) Availability of regular certificates. This subpart· does not preclude an: i!l;terstate pipeline from applying for an individual certifieate .of public convenience and necessity for any particular· transportation sec.vice. (£) c~ references. (1) Any local distribution company. served by an inter - sta'.te ,pipeline may apply for a blanket certificate to perform cer- tain services und~ §' 284 . 224 of this chapter, (2) Any interstate pipeline may apply under subpart P.of part 157 of • 296 . this chapter for a blanket certificate to construct or acquire and operate certain natural gas facilitiffi that are n~cessary. to provide transportation under § 284 ..223. ( 3) Section 157 . 208 of this chapter provides automatic authorization I for the construction; acquisition, operation, replacement, and. misceHa- I neous rearrangement of certain. eligible facilities, as defined in § 157. 202 of this chapter, subject to limits specified in § 157. 208 ( d) of I this chapter: and § 284 .11. ( 4) Authorization for delivery points is subject to .th.e automatic au- thorization under § 157 . 211 (a) (1 ) and the prior notice procedures under § 157. 211 (a) (2) and § 157. 205. (g) Flexible ~eipt point authority (1) An interstate pipeline au- thorized to transport . gas under a certificate g!anted under this section may, at the re - quest of the shipper and without prior notice: (i) Reduce or discontinue receipts of natµral gas at a particular re- ceipt point from a supplier; and (ii) Commence or increase re~eipts at a particular receipt point from that supplier or any other supplier. (2) The total natural gas volµmes received by the interstate pipeline followi:ng any such reassignment under this paragraph must not exceed the total volume of natural gas that the interstate pipeline may transport on behalf of the shipper under a certificate granted under this section. (3) The receipt points to which natural gas volumes may be reas- signe9 under· this paragraph include eligible facilities under § 157. 208 which are authorized to be constructed and operated pursuant to a certifi- cate issued under subpart F of part 157 of this chapter. (h) Flexible delivery point authority --:-· ( 1) An interstate pipeline . authorized to transport gas under a certificate issued purs4ant to this sec- tion may at the re- quest of the shipper and without prior notice: (i) :Reduce or discontinue deliveries of n~tural gas to .a particular de- • 297 • livery point; and (ii) Commence or increase deliveries at a particular delivery point. (2) The total natural gas volumes delivered by the interstate pipeline following any such reassignment must not exceed the total amount of nat- ural gas that the interstate pipeline is authorized under a certificate issued pursuant to. this section to transport on behalf of the shipper. (3) The delivery points to which natural gas volumes may be reas- signed under this paragraph include facilities authorized to be constructed and operated only tinder § 157. 211 and the prior notice conditions of § 157 .205 of; this chapter. [Order 436, 50 FR 42496, Oct. 18, 1985, as amended by Order 433-A, 51 FR 43607, Dec. 3, 1986; Order 636, 57 FR 13317, Apr. 16, 1992; Order 636 A, 57 FR 36217, Aug. 12_, 1992; Order 581, 60 FR 53073, Oct. 11,. 1995; order 603, 64 FR 26610, May 14, 1999; Order637, 65FR10222, Feb. 25, 2000; Or- der 637 A? 65 FR 35765, June·5, 2000] § 284.222 [Reserved] § 284. 223 Transportation by interstate pipelines on behalf of shippers. Subject to the provisions of this sub- part and the conditions of Sub- partA of this part, any interstate pipeline issued a certificate under § 284.221 is authorized, without prior notice ta or approval by the ·Com- mission, to transport natural gas for any duration for any shipper for any end use by that shipper or any other person. [Order _436, 50 FR 42497, Oct. 18, 1985; 50 FR 45908, Nov. 5, 1985, as amended at 50 FR 52276, Dec. 23 , 1985; Order 537, 56 FR 50245, Oct., 4, 1991; Order 581,-60 FR53074, Oct. 11, 1995; Order 637, 65FR10222, Feb. ZS, 2000] § 284. 224 Certain transportation and sales by local distribution companies. (a) Applicability. This section applies to local distribution compa- • 298 . nies served by interstate pipelines, including persons· who are not subjtrl to the jurisdiction of the O:lmrriission, by reason of section 1 .( c) of the Natural Gas Act. ( b) Blanket certificate - . ( 1) Any local distribution company· served by an interstate pipeline or any Hinshaw pipeline may apply for a blanket certificate under this section. . • (2) Upon application for·a certificate under this Section; a hearing will be conducted tinder section 7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act,·§ 157.11 of this chapter, and subpart H of part 385 ofthis ·chapter. · (3) The O:lrnmission will grant a blanket certificate to such local distribution eompany or' Hinshaw pipeline :under this section; if required by the present or future public convenience and necessity. Such certificate will authorize the local distribution company to· eng~e in the sale or transportation of natural gas that is subject to the COrnmission' s jurisdic- tion under the Natural Gas Act, ·tb the same extent that and in the same manner that intrastate pipelines are authorized to ~age iri such activities by subparts C and D of this part, 'except as otherwise proVided in para- graph (e) (2) of this section. ( c) Application procedure. Applications fot blanket certificates rriust be accompanied by the fee prescribed in· § 381.207 of this chapter or·a petition for waiver pursuant to § 381.106 of this chapter, all:d ·shall state: (1) The exact legal name of applicant;: its ]JrinCipal place of busi- ness; ·whether an individual, ·partnership, corporation oi'otherWise; the state under the laws of which it·. is ·organiZed or authoriZed; the agency having jurisdiction over rates and tariffs; and the name; title, and mail- ing address of the person or persons to·whom comlnunications concerning the application are to be ad -dressed; (2) The volumes of natural gas which: (i) Were received during the most recent 12- month period by the . 299 • applicant ~thin or at the boundary of a state, and (ii) Were exempt from the Natural Gas Act jurisdiction of the Com- mission by reason of section 1 (c) of the Natural Gas Act, if any; (3) T:he total volume of natural gas received by the applicant from all sot.trces,during the same time period; ( 4) Citation to all currently valid declarations of exemption issued by the Commission under section 1 (c) of the Natural Gas Act if any; A (5) statement that the applicant will comply with the conditions in paragraph (e) of ·this section; (6) A form of notice suitable for publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER, as contemplated by § 157. 9 of this chapter, which will briefly summarize the facts contained in the application in such way as to acquaint the public with its scope·and purpose; and (7) A. statement of the methodology to be used in calculating rates for services to be rendered, setting forth any elections under § 284 .123 .or paragraph (e) (2) of this section and a sample calculation employing the methodology using current data. If a rate election i~ made under para- graph (e) (2) of this section, this statement shall contain the following items (reflecting the 12 month period used to justify costs in the most recently approved rate case conducted by an appropriate state regulatory agency): (i) Total operating revenues, (ii) P~chase gas costs, . (iii) I;>istribution costs (which include that portion of the common costs allocated to the distribution function) , . (iv) The volume throughput of the system categorized by ~es, transportat~on and exchange service, and ( v) A study which determines transportation costs on a unit revenue basis in accordance with paragraph (e) (2) of this section, .including any supporting work papers. • 300 • (d) Effect of certificate. (l) Any certificate granted under this sec- tion will authorize the certificate holder to engage in transactions of the type authorized by subparts C·and D of.this part. · ( 2) Acceptance of a certificate or con ~ duct :Of an activity authorized there under will: (i) Not. impair the continued validity of any exclusion under section l ( c) oLthe' Natural Gas Act which may be applica~le Jo the certificate holder, and . (ii) Not subject the certificate holder to the Natural Gas .Act juris- diction to the Commission except to the extent necessary to ·enforce the terms and conditions of the certificate. (e) General .conditions. ( l ) Except as provided in paragraph ( e) (2) of this section, any transaction authorized under a blanket eeriificate is subject to the same rates and charges, terms ·and conditions, and .re- porting requirements .that apply to a transaction authorized for an in- trastate pipeline under sub parts C and D of this'parL (2) Rate election. If th:e Certificate holder does not have any exist- ing rates on. file with the appropriate state regulatory agency for city - gate service, the certificate holder may make the rate election specified in § 284.123. (b) (l) only if: (i) The certificate holder's existing rates are approved by an appro- priate state regulatory agency, · (ii) The rates and charges for any transportation are computed by using the portion of the certificate holder weighted average annual unit revenue (per MMBtu) generated by existing rates :which is attributable to the cost of gathering, treatment, processing,· transportation, delivery or similar service (including· storage service) , and . (iii) The Commission has approved the method for computing rates and charges specified in paragraph (e) (2). (ii} of this section. ( 3) Volumetric test. The volumes of natural gas sold or assigned . 301 • under the: blanket certificate may not exceed the volumes obtained from sources other than interstate supplies. ( 4) Filings. Any filings made with the Commission that report indi- vidual traµsactions shall reference the docket ni.Jmber of the proceeding in which th~ blanket certificate was granted. (5) Tariff filings. The· tariff "filing requirements of part 154 of this chapter shall not apply to transactions authorized by the blanket certifi- cate. (f) · Pregrant of abandonment. Abandonment of transportation ser- vices or sales, pursuant to section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, is au- thorized upon the expiration of the contractual term of each individual ar- rangement, authorized by a blanket Certificate under this section. ( g) :Hinshaw pipeline without· blanket certificate. A Hinshaw pipeline that does not obtain a blanket certificate under. this section· is not authorized to sell or transport· natural gas as an intrastate pipeline under subparts C and D of this part. (h) Defiriitions. ·For the purposes of this section: (1) A Hinshaw pipeline means any person engaged in the trans- portation of natural gas which is not subject to the jurisdiction ·of the Commission under the Natural Gas Act solely by reason of section 1 ( c) of the Natliral Gas Act. (2) Interstate supplies means any natural gas obtained, either di- rectly or in,- directly, from: · (i) The system supplies of an,inter- state pipeline, or (ii) Natural gas reserves which were committed or dedicated to in- terstate commerce on November 8, 1978. · [45 FR 1875, Jan. 9, 1980, as amended by Order 319, 48 FR 34891, Aug. 1, 1983; 48 FR35635, Aug. 5, 1983; Order 433, 50 FR 40346, Oct. 3, 1985 • Redesignated and amended by Order 436, 50 FR 42497, 42498, Oct. 18; 1985; Order 478, 52 FR 28467, July 30, . 302 • 1987; Order 581, 60 FR 53074, Oct. 11, 1995] § 284. 225 - 284. 226 [Reserved] § 284.227 Certain transportation by intrastate pipelines. (a) Blanket certificate. A blanket certificate, shall issue under this section to any intrastate pipeline that receives natural gas produced in· ad- jacent Federal waters or onshore or offshore in an adjacent state, provided that: ( l) The gas must be. received by the intrastate pipeline from a: gath- erer or other intrastate pipeline; (2) The intrastate pipeline delivers the gas in the intrastate pipeline' s state of operation to an end user or an -:other intrastate pipeli~e; and· (3) The gas ultimately used by an end user in the same state. (b) Effective date. If an intrastate pipeline is ·providing a trans- portation service described in ·paragraph (a) of this section as of February 1, 1992, and the service is not a qualifying service under § 284 .122 of subpart C of this part, a blanket certificate shall issue under paragraph (a) of this section and become effective as of February 1, 1992. If an in- trastate pipeline is not providing a transportation service described in paragraph (a) of this section as of February 1, 1992 the blanket certifi- cate shall issue and become effective on the date that the intrastate pipeline commences such a service that is not a qualifying service under .§ 284 .122 of sub - part C of this part. ( c) Acceptance of certificate. An intra state pipeline shall be deemed to have accepted a blanket certificate under this. section if it con- tinues after February.!; 1992, a service described in paragraph (a) .of this section that is not a qualifying service under .§ 284 .122 of subpart C or commences such a service after November 4, 1991 .. (d) Terms and conditions. An intra state pi'()eline' s blanket cer-. tificate transportation authority under this section is subject to its compli- ance with all terms and conditions of sub part C of this part, except • 303 • that service under this section does not have to be on behalf of art inter- state pipeline or local distribution. company served by an interstate pipeline. '; (e) Pregrant of abandonment. Abandonment of transportation ser- vices, pursu~t to section 7 ( b) of the Natural Gas Act, is authorized upou- the expiration of the contractual term .of each individual arrange- ment authorized by a blanket certificate under this section. (f) Effect of certificate. Acceptance of a certificate issued under this section or eonduct of activity authorized under this section will not subject the certificate holder to: the Natural Gas Act jurisdiction of the Commis- sion except to the extent necessary to enforce the terms and conditions of the certificate. [Order 537, 56 FR 50246, Oct. 4, 1991, as amended. by-Order 544, 57 FR 46501, Oct. 9, 1992; Order'581, 60 FR 53074, Oct. 11, 1995] Subpart H- Assignment of Capacity on Interstate Pipelines SOURCE: Order636, 57FR13318, Apr. 16, 1992,,unlessother" wise noted. § 284. 241 Applicability. This subp~ applies to any inter state pipeline that offers trans- portation service under subpart B or G of this part. § 284.242 Assignment of f"mn capacity on upstream pipelines. An interstate pipeline that offers transportation.service on a firm ba- sis under subpart B or G of this part must offer without undue discrimina- tion to assign to its firm shippers its firm transportation capacity, includ- ing contract storage, on all upstream pipelines, whether the firm capacity is authorized under part 284 or part 157. An upstream pipeline is autho- • 304 • rized and required to permit a downstream pipeline to assign its firm ca- pacity to the down stream pipeline• s firm shippers. [Order 636. 57 FR 13318, Apr. 16, 1992, as amended by Order 636-A, 57 FR 36217, Aug, 12, 1992] • 305 • APPENDIX 2: SOME EXAMPLES OF LICENSE CONDITIONS The outline of conditions set out below outlines some examples of Standard Conditions for a Transmission Enterprise' s License (that is, the licensing of entities responsible for the transmission of gas) . These conditions ':"ould be similar for a Storage or Distributions Enterprise's li- cense. The: wording presented is adapted from the conditions developed in the UK. The Standard License Conditions published in the UK may be found on Ofgem' s web-site at www.ofgem.gov.uk. Conditions governing Access ,to Transmission Systems Separate Accounts for Transmission Business I 1. The license - holder shall keep proper accounting and other records and they shall be in such a form that the revenues and cos~, assets and liabilities of, or reasonably attributable to, its pipeline services business are separately identifiable from those of any other business of the license - holder. 2. Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph ( 1) , the licensee ·' shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, prepare in respect of its transportation business on a consistent basis from its accounting reco~ds - (a) ,in respect of the initial period and of each succeeding finan- cial year of the licensee, accounting statements comprising (b) profit and loss account ,(i) a statement of asset:S and liabilities with the details rea- sonably necessary to reconcile the net assets shown in • 306 • that statement at the beginning and end of the period to · which it relates; and (ii) a cash flow statement for that period with a reconcilia- tion to the accounting statements specified in sub - paragraphs (i) and (ii) , and in respect of the first 6 months of each financial year of the licensee commenc- ing on or after the first day of the initial period, an in- terim profit and loss account 3. The accounting statements prepared under paragraph (2) (a) shall (a) set out and fairly present the costs (including depreciation), revenues, assets employed and liabilities of, or as may be ·reasonably attributable to, the pipeline services business and . show separately and in appropriate detail the amount of any revenue, cost, asset or liability which has been either - (i) charged from or to any other business of the license - holder; or (ii) determined by apportionment between the transporta- tion business of the licensee and any other business of the licensee, together with a description of the basis of the charge or apportionment; (b) so far as is reasonably practicable (if the licensee is a compa- ny required ·to prepare annual accounts) ( i ) have the same content in respect of the business to which they relate as the annual accounts of the licensee prepared in accordance with the [SPECIFY THE REL- EVANT LAW IN GIINA GOVERNING FINAN- CIAL ACCOUNTS OR THE RELEVANT INTER- NATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS THAT ARE GENERALLY.APPLIED] • 307 • · 4. Except in so far as the Regulatory Commission accepts otherwise, the licensee shall not change any basis of charge or apportionment used in the accounting . statements in respect of its transmission . business for any financial year of the licensee subsequent to the initial period from the basis used in the accounting statements in respect of that business for the initial period or, as the case may be, · the preceding financial year. 5. The licensee shall procure, in respect of each set of accounting statements prepared under paragraph (2) (a), a report by an ap- propriate auditor which is addressed to the Gas Regulatory Com- mission and states whether in his opinion that set of ·accounting statements " (a) adequately shows the financial affrurs of the transporta- tion business of the licensee and is in compliance with this condition, and (b) represents a true and fair view of the revenues, costs, assets and liabilities of, or reasonably attributable to, that business. 6. The' licensee shall furnish the Regulatory Commission with a copy of ~ch set of accounting statements and the auditors, report re- lating thereto required by paragraphs (2) (a) and (5) and of each interim profit and loss account required by paragraph ( 2) (b) as soon as is reasonably practicable and in any event not later thari (a) .in the case of each set of accounting statements and the audi- .tor' s report relating thereto, 6 months after the end of the periOd in respect of which the statements are prepared, or (b) :in respect of each interim profit and loss account, 2 months .after the end of the period in respect of which it is prepared. 7. The licensee shall publish each accounting statement required by · . 308 . paragraph (2) (a) in such a manner as, in the reasbnable opin- ion·of the licensee, ·will secure adequate publicity for it and so publish it not later than - ·(a) The time of publication of the annual accounts of the licensee for the financial year of the licensee: to which the statements relate, or (b)' 6 months (or such longer period as the Regulatory Commis- sion may accept ) after the end · of that financial year, whichever is-the earlier: Provided that this paragraph shall not require the publication of the amonnt or basis of any charge or apportionment to be ·shown separately under paragraph (3) (a), where publi~­ tion would or might seriously and prejudicially affect the in- . ··terests of the· licensee · 8 ~ Any question arising under the proviso to· paragraph ( 7) as to whether such publication as is there mentioned would or might seriously and prejudicially affect the interests of the licerisee shall be determined by the Regulatory Commission · 9. In this condition "appropriate auditor", means, in the case of a -licensee which is a company within the meaning of [SPECIFY REFERENCE TO RELEVANT COMPANY LAW IN CHI- NA], a person appointed as auditor; "financial year" has the same meaning· as in the [SPECIFY REFERENCE TO RELE- . VANT COMPANY LAW ·IN CHINA] , except that where that ·Law is not applicable it means a year ending with [DATE] or such other date~ may be specified by the-licensee in a notice giv- en to the Regulatory Commission; "the initial period" means the period beginning on the appointed day or (if later) the comirig in- to force of the license and ending immediately before the begin- .. ning of the succeeding financial year of the licensee; references to • 309 • cost.s or liabilities of, or reasonably attributable to, a business shall be, construed as excluding taxation, capital liabilities not re- lated solely to that business and interest thereon; and references ·to a· profit and loss account or cash flow statement. shall be con- strued accordingly. Conduct of transportation business 1. The licensee shall conduct its transportation business in the man- ner . best calculated to secure that neither - (a) The licensee or any such person as is mentioned in paragraph ; (7), nor ( b} Any gas shipper or gas supplier, obtains any ullfair commer- • cial advantage including, in particular, any such advantage from a preferential or discriminatory arrangement, being, in the case of such an advantage accruing to the licensee, one in connection with a business other than its transportation busi- ~ ness. 2. Subject to paragraph (3), the licensee shall use its best endeavors to secure that - . (a). No information relating to, or derived from, its transporta- : tion business is disclosed for the benefit of any trading busi- " :iless conducted by the licensee or any such person as is men- ; tiorted in paragraph ( 7) , and (b) No information derived from its transportation business is used for the purposes of any trading business conducted by · the licensee• or (so far as the licensee has powers in that be- half) of a trading business conducted by .any such person as · is mentioned iri paragraph ( 7) . _3. Par~graph (2) shall not apply in so far as - (a) The Regulatory.Commission so consents; (b} A gas shipper or gas supplier has, for the purposes hereof, • 310 • consented ~n writing to the use .or disclosure of information relating fu that shipper or supplier; (c) It is necessary or expedient that the information be used or disclosed to enable such a ·person as is mentioned in para- graph (7) to enter into transportation arrangements with the licensee or to. give effect to such arrangements; ( d) The information has been published. or is required to be dis- -closed as mentioned in paragraph (2) (a) in pursuance of any other condition of this license, or (e) The information (otherwise than in consequence of a contra- vention .of any condition of this license)· is in the public do- , main. 4. In this condition ·~trading .business" means activities connected with the acquisition and. disposal of ·gas in China or connected with arranging with a gas transmission enterprise for gas to be in- troduced into, conveyed by means of or taken out of a pipe- line system operated by that enterprise, other than (a) such aetivities relating. to gas intended for consumption out- side China as are designated for the purposes of this condition by the Regulatory Gommission, or (b) in the case of the licensee, such activities in connection with . either the efficient operation of its pipe - line system or the .replacement of gas lost· from that system Code of Operations 1. The licensee shall establish-transportation arrangements in respect of matters other than those to·which standard conditions 3 and 4 relate which are calculated to facilitate the achievement of the fol- lowing objectives - (a) the efficient and economic operation by the licensee of its pipe - line system; . 311 . (b) ·so far as is ·consistent with sub- paragraph (a), the efficient ·discharge of its obligations under this license; ( c) ' so Jar as is consistent with sub - paragraphs ( a) and ( b) , · the securing of effective competition between relevant ship- :pers and between relevant suppliers, ( d) hereinafter referred to as "the relevant objectives." 2. The' licensee shall - · (a) prepare a document (in this license referred to as the "Code of Operations") setting out (together with the terms of any other arrangements which the licensee considers it appropri- ate to ~t out in the document) the tenns of the arrangements pwde in pursuance of paragraph ( 1) save in so f~ as they re~ late to matters regulated by standard condition 5 or .6 or are contained in such an agreement, or an agreement of such a ,class or description, as may be designated. by the: Regulatory Commission for the purposes of .this condition, and (b) furnish the Regulatory Commission with a copy thereof. 3. Ex~pt in a case in which the Regulatory Con:\.mission accepts otherwise, the licensee shall only enter into transportation ar: rangements which .are in, conformity with any relevant provisions of the code of operations. 4. Wh~re a provision of the code of operations requires that, in cir- cumstances specified in the provision, a detennination by the li- censee in pursuance of that provision in a particular case should be such as is calculated to facilitate the achievement of the relevant objectives, any question arising thereunder as to whether the li- censee has complied with that requirement shall be determined by the Regulatory Commission. 5. The: licensee shall establish and operate such procedures as are mentioned in paragraph ( 6) for the modification of the code of • 312 ~. operations so a8 to better facilitate the achievement of the rele- vant objectives. 6. The procedures referred to in paragraph (5) shall be such as pro- vide for - (a) the reviewjng of the code of operations; (b) the making of proposals for its modification either by the li- censee or .by a, relevant shipper; ( c) the giving of adequate publicity to any sµch proposal includ- ,ing, in particular, drawing it to the attention of all relevant shippers and sending a copy of the proposal to any gas ship- per or other person who asks for one; ( d) the seeking of the views of the Regulatory Commission on · any matter connected with any such proposal; ( e) the consideration of any representations relating, to such a proposal made (and not withdrawn) by a relevant shipper or by any gas shipper or other person likely to be materially af- ., fected were the proposal to be. implemented, and (f) where the Regulatory Commission accepts that. the code of operations may require modification as a matter of urgency, the exclusion, acceleration or other variation, subject to his approval, of ·any particular procedural steps which would otherwise be applicable. ,7. The licen~ shall - (a) prepare a document ( "the modification rules") setting out the procedures established in pursuance of paragraph ( 5) , and shall furnish the Regulatory Commission with a copy thereof; ( b) not make any change in the modification rules except - ( i) after consulting all relevant shippers and considering any representations made by such a shipper; . 313 . (ii) after furnishing the Regulatory Commission with a re- port on such consultation and its consideration of any such 'representations, and (Hi) with the consent of the Regulatory Commission, and ( c ): furnish the Regulatory Commission With a copy of any . '. change which is made. 8. Th~ licensee shall not make any modification to the code of opera- tions except ~ (a) !to comply with paragraph (10) (b) or (11)' or · (b), with the consent of the Regulatory Commission, and shall furnish the Regulatory Commission With a copy of any modi- .fication made. 9. Where the·.[ STATUTORY BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR .·HE,ALTH AND SAFETY] has given a notice to the licensee in -pursuance of this paragraph· referring to a niatter relating to the protection of the public from dangers arising from the con- veyance of gas through its pipe - line system and a modification to the code of operations could, consistently with the relevant ' objectives, appropriately de.al with the matter, the licensee shall propose such a modification: in accordance with the modification rules, and any requirement that a modification be such as to bet- ter facilitate the achievement of the relevant objectives shall be treated as met if the modification is consistent with those objec- tive8. 10. Where a proposal is made in aceordance with thb modification rul~ to modify the code of operations; the licensee shall - (a)' as soon as is reasonably practicable, give ootice to the Regu- ' latory Commission (i) giving particulars of 'the proposal; (ii) where the proposal is made by a ·relevant shipper, . 314 . drawing attention to any alternative proposal to modify the code of operations in respect of the same matter which has been made by the licensee;. (iii) giving particulars of any representations by a gas ship- per or other person with respect to those proposals; (iv) stating whether, in its opinion, any proposed modifi- cation should or should not be made; ( v) stating the factors which, in its opinion, justify the making or not making of a proposed modification, and (vi) giving such further information as may be required to be given to the Regulatory Commission by the modifi- cation rules, and (b) comply with any direction given by the Regulatory Com- mission to make a modification to the code of operations in accordance with a proposal described in a notice given to the Regulatory Commission under sub - paragraph ( a) which, in the opinion of the Regulatory Commission, will, as compared to the existing provisions of the code of opera- tions or any alternative proposal, better facilitate, as men- tioned in paragraph ( 5) , the achievement of the relevant objectives. 11. The licensee shall - (a) prepare and publish a summary of the code of operations and of the modification rules as modified or changed from time to time in such form and manner as the Regulatory Com- mission may from time to time direct, and ( b) send a copy of the code of operations as modified from time to time, or of the modification rules as so changed, to any person who asks for one and makes such payment to the li- censee in respect of the cost thereof as it may require not • 315 • exceeding such amount as the Regulatory Commission may from time to time approve for. the purposes hereof. 12. Any question arising under the modification rules as to (a) whether a gas shipper or other persqn is likely to be materi- .: ally affected by a proposal to modify the code of operations .were it to be implemented, or ( b) whether representations relating to such a proposal and made in pursuance of the rules have been properly consid- ered by the licensee, shall be determined by the Regulatory Commission. Conditions governing Tariffs Tariffs ,for Gas Shippers 1. The. licensee shall furnish the Regulatory Commission with a stat~ent of (a) the charges to be made in pursuance of transportation ar- rangements with specified descriptions of gas shippers in dif- :·ferent specified cases or descriptions of cases, and (b) ''.the methods by which, and the principles on which, those 'charges are determined in .accordance with the methodology referred to in paragraph (5) or, as the case may be, in para- graph ( 6) , and, without prejudice to paragraph (2) , if any change is made in the charges to be so made' or in the meth- . ods by which, or the principles on which, those charges are to be so determined, the li~see shall, before the change :takes effect or, if that is not reasonably practicable, as soon as is reasonably practicable thereafter, furnish the Regulato- :ry Commission with a rev;ision of the statement or., if he so accepts, with amendments to its previous statement, which .reflect the change. 2. The licensee • 316 • (a) shall give the Regulatory wmmission notice of any proposals which it is. consideririg to change the charges mentioned in paragraph ( 1) , together with a reasonable estimate of the . effect of the proposals (if implemented) on those charges, and shall use all reasonable endeavours to do so at least 150 days· before the proposed date of their implementation, and (b) where it has decided to implement any proposals to change the charges mentioned in paragraph ( 1)., give him notice of its decision and. the date on which the proposals will be im- plemented which shall not,. unless he otherwise consents, be less .than a month after that on which the notice required by · '·· this sub- paragraph was given to him. 3 . The lieensee shall . (a) publish any statement, or revision or amendment of a state- ment, furnished, or notice given, under paragraph. (1) or (2) in such manner as will, in its reasonable opinion, secure . adequate publicity for it, and (b) send a c:Opy of any such statement, revision, amendment or notice so published to any person who asks for one. 4. Except in a case in which the Regulatory wmmission accepts ' otherwise, the 'liceqsee shall only enter into transportation ar- rangements which secure that the charges in .pursuance thereof will be in conformity with the statement last published under . paragraph ( 3) either (a) before it enters into the arrangements, or (b) before t~e charges in question from time to time fall to be made, and, for the purposes of this paragraph, the reference to the statement last published under paragraph (3) shall be construed, where that statement is subject to amendments so published before the relevant time, as a ·reference to that • 317 . statement as so amended. 5. Subject to paragraph ( 6) , the licensee shall - (a)1 establish a methodology showing the methods by which, and ~ the principles on which (except in a case in which the Regu- ~· latory Commission accepts otherwise) such charges as are : mentioned in paragraph ( 1) (a) are to be determined, and (b): conform to the methodology sd established as from· time to i. time modified in accordance with standard condition 4 . .6. If, before the appointed day, .the holder of this license had estab- . lished a .methodology showing the methods by which and the · principles on which, charges corresponding to ones mentioned in paragraph (1) (a) were to be determined ang that methodology had been approved by the Regulatory Commission ( "the old methodology") then, so long as it continues to apply that methodology (subject to any necessary m~fications) - (a) paragrap~ (5) shall not apply, and (b) ·in any case to which the old methodology (subject to any .·such modifications) is applicable, the licensee shall conform ,.to , that methodology, . as from time to time modified in accor- ·:dance ·with standard condition 4. 7 . In any case in which the licensee is willing to enter into storage arrangements in respect of such facilities as are mentioned in paragraph ( 10) - (a) :if the charges in pursuance of those arrangements are not governed by the methodology established under paragraph {5) or, as the case may be, by the old methodology, the li- .censee shall avoid any undue preferenee or undue discrimina- tion in the terms on which it enters into such arrangements, · and (b) if either those charges or any charges made in pursuance of • 318 •. transportation .arrangements other- than storage·· arrange-, ments are not governed as aforesaid> the licensee shan ensure . so far as is reasonably practicable, that no unjustified cross - subsidy is involved between the tenns on which it enters into the storage arrangements and those on which it enters into other transportation arrangements. 8. Any que5tion which arises under paragraph ( 7) a8 to whether a cross - subsidy is unjustified, shall be determined by the Regula· tory Commission. 9. Refeiences in paragraphs ·( 1) to ( 5) to charges do not include references to - (a) charges related to the acquisition or disposal of gas for pur- poses connected with the balancing of the licensee' s pipe - line system, or (b) to the extent (if any) t6 which the Regtilatory Commission .has accepted that they should, as respects certain matters, be so determin,ed, to charges determined ·by reference to pro- visions in that behalf set out in the code of operations, and, subject as aforesaid,. references in this condition and:in stan- dard condition 4 to charges - include references to the means whereby charges·may be ascertained, and exclude ref- erences to supplemental charges within ·the meaning of stan- .dard condition 6 Tariff Methodology Obligations 1. Except in so far as the Regulatory Commission consents to the li- censee not doing so, the licensee shall, subject to·paragraphs (2) and ( 3 ) , from time· to 'tinie make such modifications of the methodology established in pursuance of paragraph ( 5) of stan- dard condition 3 or, as the case may be, the old methodology mentioned in paragraph ( 6) · the~f ( "the methodology") as may • 319 •· be-iequisite for the purpose of achieving the relevant objectives. 2. ·Except in 'so far as the Regulatory G:>mmission otherwise ap- proyes, the licensee shall not make a modification of the method-· ology unless it has (a) ·consulted the relevant shippers on the proposed modification and allowed them a period of not less than 28 days within which to make written representations, and (b) · furnished the Regulatory Commission with a report setting out - · .· ( i) the terms originally proposed for the modification, · (ii) the representations (if any) made by relevant shippers,' and·· (iii) any change in the tenns of the modification intended in consequence of such representations, and unless 28 days have elapsed since the said report was ·furnished without the Regulatory Commission having given the licensee a direction requiring ·that the modification be not made. · 3. Subj¢ct to paragraph ( 4) , the licensee shall in each calendar year furnish the Regulatory Commission with a report on the applica- tion of the methOdology during the 12 nionths preceding lst Octo- ber in that year including a statement as to - (a) the extent to which, in the licensee's opinion, the relevant objectives have been achieved during the period to which. it ~elates; (b) ~hether those objectives could more cl0sely ·be achieved by modification of the. methodology, and ' (c) if so, the modifications which should be made for that pur- pPse. 4. As respects the calendar year in which ~his license came into force • 320 • (a) if it came into force on or after lst October in that year, para- graph (3) shall not apply, or ( b) if it came into force before that date, paragraph ( 3) shall have effect as if for the reference to the 12 months preceding that date there were substituted a reference to the period preceding that date beginning with the date on whi~h the li- cense came into force. 5. In paragra'phs (1) and (3) "the relevant objectives" means, sub- ject to paragraph (6) , the following objectives (a)· that compliance with the methodology results in charges . · which reflect the costs incurred by the licensee in its trans- portation business; (b) that, so far as is consistent with sub- paragraph (a), the . methodology properly takes account of developments in the transportation business; (c) ·that, so far as is so consistent, compliance with the method- ology facilitates effective competition between gas shippers and between gas suppliers. 6. Where - (a) 'the methodology results in charges which, or the revenue de- rived from which, are, in the main, not controlled or limited in pursuance of any condition of this license other than stan- dard condition 3, and (b) the Regulatory Commission has not accepted that, for a specified period, this paragraph should not apply or has so accepted subject to conditions whfoh are not satisfied, "the relevant .objectives" shall include the following objective, namely, that the methodology ., results in charges which, taking one charge with another and one year with another, • 321 • I permit the licensee to make a reasonable profit, and no more, from its transportation business so, however, that, for the purposes of this paragraph, there shall be disregard- ed (i) costs incurred for the purposes of that business in con- nection with the construction of pipe lines for the ben- efit of an area for the time being designated for the pur- poses of standard condition 6; (ii) revenue derived from that business by way of charges (~thin the meaning of standard condition 5) to which any provisions of that condition have effect and which are in respect of premises within an area for the time being so designated; (iii) revenue derived from that business by way of supple- mental charges (within the meaning of standard condi- tion 6), and (iv) any payments made by the licensee in connection with the proposed development of an area for the time being not so designated to a person who has an interest in land in that area, other than by way of reasonable consideration for an interest in land or for goods or services with which the licensee is provided, and, for the· purposes of this paragraph, "costs" and "revenue" mean costs and revenue determined on an accruals ha- SlS. 7. The licensee shall comply with any direction given from time to time by the Regulatory OJmmission requiring the licensee - (a) subject to paragraphs (8) and (9) to publish such informa- tion as may be speci!ied or described in the direction - as to any of the costs incurred by the licensee in its transportation • 322 . business, or relating to the methodology as modified from time to time in accordance with paragraph ( 1) , and (b) to do so in such form and manner and with such frequency as . may be so specified. 8. The licensee shall not be required by paragraph ( 7) to publish any information or any document - (a) which it could not be compelled to give in evidence or pro- duce in civil proceedings before the court, or (b) so far as it comprises information relating to costs incurred in connection with the construction of pipe - lines for the bene- fit of an area for the time being designated for the purposes o.f standard condition 6 or so incurred in preparation for the area becoming so designated. 9. In publishing any information in pursuance of paragraph (7) (the licensee shall have regard to the need for excluding, so far as is practicable, any matter which relates to the affairs of any .person where the publication of that matter would or might seriously and prejudicially affect his interests. 10. Any question arising under paragraph ( 9) , as to whether the publication of some matter which relate to the affairs of a person would or might seriously and prejudicially affect his interests, shall be determined by the Regulatory Commis8ion. Restriction of prices for transportation services · 1. The Licensee shall ill setting ·its prices for the use made of its Transportation System having effect on or after [start date of Tariff Year] take 8.11 reasonable steps to secure that in each For- mula Year commencing on or after [start date of Formula Year] its Average Transportation Price per energy unit shall not exceed the Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy unit [or per GigaJoule] calculated in acmrdance with the following formula - . 323 . CPI-X Mt= (1 +. lOO )Kt provided that in respect of the Formula Year commencing on [start date of Formula Year], Mt-l shall have the value of [ ] RMB where Mt Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy unit in Formula Year t Kt= the correction factor per energy unit (whether of a positive or negative value) to be made in relation to Formula Year t which is derived from the following formula: K = ( Tt-1 Qt-1Mt-1)(l _L_) t Qt + 100 where Mt-1 =Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy unit in Formula Year t 1 Qt=Deemed Transportation Quantity in Formula Year t Qt-1 =Deemed Transportation Quantity in Formula Year t 1 T t- l =Transportation Revenue for Formula Year t -1 In the formulae in this C.Ondition - CPit=the percentage change (whether of a positive or negative val- ue) in the C.Onsumer Price Index between that published or determined with respect to [month name] in Formula Year t and that published or determined with respect to the immedi- ately preceding [month name]; It the percentage interest rate in Formula Year t which is equal to, where Kt (taking no account of It for this purpose) has a posi- tive value, the average Specified Rate plus three or, where Kt (taking no account of It for this purpose) has a negative value, the average Specified Rate; . 324 . 2. In this Condition: "Average Transportation Price per energy unit" means in respect of any Formula Year the Transportation Revenue for that Formu- la.Year divided by the Deemed Transportation Quantity for that Formula Year; . "Retail Prlce Index" means the Index of Consumer Prices pub- lished by the [APPROPRIATE BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PUBLICATION OF NATIONAL STATISTICS] each month in respect of all items or - · (a) if the Index for the month of [month name] in any year shall not have been published on or before the last day of [month + 3. month] next following, such index for such month or months as the Regulatory Commission may after . consultation with the Licensee determine to be appropriate in the circumstances; or (b) if there is a material change in the basis of the Index, such other index as the Regulatory Commission may after consul- . tation with the Licensee determine to be appropriate in the circumstances; · "Shipper" means any gas shipper who has arranged with the Li- censee for gas to be introduced into' conveyed by means of' or taken: out of the Transportation System; "Specified Rate" m,eans the base rate of [NAME OF ESTABLISHED REGULATED COMMERCIAL BANK] current from time to time dur- ing the period in respect of which the calculation falls to be ~de; '!Supply of Transportation Services" means ·the undertaking and perfor- mance for gain or reward of engagements: (a) in connection with the conveyance of gas through the Trans- portation -System, and (b) for the prevention of the escape of gas which has been taken off • 325 • the Transportation System by the Licensee for other persons except engagements relating to the acquisition or disposal of gas otherwise than for the efficient operation of the Transportation System or for replacing gas lost from that system; "Transportation Quantity" means the aggregate quantity of _gas, in energy units, taken off "Transportation Revenue" means the turnover (measured on an ac- cruals basis) derived from Supply of Transportation Services for Shippers but excluding turnover which (a) relates to the execution of works in connection with the provi- sion of, or the carrying out of modifications to, points at which gas may be introduced into or taken off the Transportation System; (b) relates to the acquisition or disposal of gas for the efficient oper- ation of the Transportation System; (c) derives from the Supply of Transportation Services which other- wise are not ordinarily required by Shippers; (d), to the extent not excluded by sub paragraph (b) above, de- rives from charges made by or payments made to the Licensee pursuant to provisions of the Licensee's Code of Operations; ( e) derives from supplemental charges within the meaning of Stan- dard Condition 6; (£) represents revenue equal to any allowance made or charges (in respect of gas treated as not having been taken out of its pipeline system) required to be foregone for the purpose of paragraphs ( 4) and ( 5) of Standard Condition 24; or (g) derives from charges in respect of the provision of emergency services under contracts entered into pursuant to Special Condition 19; Provided that for the purposes of measuring Transportation Quantity or Large User Quantity in respect of any Formula Year where gas is tak- en off the Transportation System directly into a facility used wholly or • 326 • mainly for the purpose of storage of gas, account shall be taken only of the quantity of gas (which may have a negative value) equal to the differ- ence between (a) the quantity of gas taken off the Transportation System directly into such a facility in that Formula Year; and (b) the quantity of gas introduced into the Transportation System from such a facility in that Formula Year. 3 . Except in so far as the Regulatory Commission consents to the Licensee not doing so the Licensee shall refer for determination by the Regulatory Commission any question whether, for the purpose of the definition of "Transportation Revenue" in para- graph (2) above, the undertaking and performance for gain or reward of an engagement is or is not of a kind ordinarily required by Shippers or the supply of any Transportation Service is or is not ordinarily required by Shippers. 4. If in respect of any Formula Year the Average Transportation Price per energy unit exceeds the Maximum Average Transporta- tion Price per energy unit by more than 4 per cent of the latter, the Licensee shall furnish an explanation to the Regulatory Com- mission and, in the next following Formula Year, the Licensee shall not effect any increase in prices unless either· (a) it has demonstrated to the reasonable satisfaction of the Reg- ulatory Commission that the Average Transportation Price per energy unit would not be likely to exceed the Maximum .. Average Transportation Price per energy unit in that next following Formula Year; or (b) the Regulatory Commission has, on the application of the Licensee, consented to such an increase in prices. 5. If, in respect of any two successive Formula Years, the sum of the amounts by which the Average Transportation Price per ener- • 327 . gy unit has exceeded the Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy unit is more than 5 per cent of the Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy unit for the second of those years, then in the next following Formula Year the Licensee shall, if required by the Regulatory Commission, adjust its prices such that the Average Transportation Price per energy unit would not be likely, in the judgment of the Regulatory Commission, to exceed the Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy u- nit in that next following Formula Year. 6. Where the Licensee publishes any statement or revised or amend- ed statement as to its transportation charges under Standard Con- dition 3, the Licensee shall not later than twenty - eight days · prior to the time of such publication provide the Regulatory Com- mission with - (a) a written forecast of Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy unit, together with its components, in respect of the Formula Year in which the change in such charges is to take effect and also in respect of the next following Formula Year; and (b) a written estimate of the Maximum Average Transportation Price per energy unit, together with its components, in re- , spect of the Formula Year immediately preceding the For- mula Year in which the change in such charges is to take ef- fect unless a statement complying with paragraph 10 below in respect of that first mentioned Formula Year had been furnished to the Regulatory Commission before the publica- tion of. the proposed change in such charges. 7. If, within three months of the commencement of any Formula Year, the Licensee has not published or effected any such change in its charges, the Licensee shall provide the Regulatory Commis- . 328 • sion with a written. forecast of the Maximum Average Trans- portation Price per energy unit, together with its components, in respect of that Formula Year .. 8. Any forecasts as·aforesaid shall be accompanied by such informa- tion as may be necessary to enable the Regulatory Commission to be reasonably satisfied that the forecasts have been properly pre- pared on a consistent basis. 9. Not later than six weeks after the end of a Formula Year, the Li- censee shall send· to the Regulatory Commission a statement as to whether dr not, in its opinion, paragraphs 4 or 5 above applies in respect of that Formula Year and its best estimate of what K is likely to be in the following Formula Year. 10. The Licensee shall send to the Regulatory Commission, not later than three months after the end of each Formula Year, a state- ment showing the Transportation Revenue and the Transporta- tion Quantity in respect of that Formula Year. . 11. The statement referred to in sub- paragraph ( 5) above shall be accompanied .by a report from the Auditor that:, in his opinion, that statement fairly presents Transportation Revenue and the Transportation Quantity in accordance with the requirements of this Condition. Conditions governing Investment Long tenn Development .Statement 1. The licensee shall comply with a direction given by the Regulato- ry Commission to prepare a statement in such form as may be specified in the direction giving, with ·respect to each of the 10 succeeding years begimiing with 1st October, such information by way of forecasts of - (a) the use likely to be made of any individual pipe - line system which includes high pressure pipe lines oPera.ted by the li- • 329 • censee and of any such facilities as are mentioned in para- graph (6), and (b) the likely developments of that system and those facilities which the licensee expects from time to time to be taken into account in detennining ·the charges for making connections to that system and in pursuance of transportation arrange- ments, as will assist a person who contemplates seeking the · connection of a pipe - line of his to the licensee' s pipe.:_ line system; entering into transportation arrangements with the ·licensee, or seeking the connection of the·licensee' s pipe- . line system to premises which would reasonably be expected to be supplied with gas at a rate exceeding [ ] Gigajoules a year, in identifying and evaluating the opportunities for do- ing so. · ' · 2. Except in so far as the Regulatory Commission consents to the li- censee not doing so, the licensee shall on· an annual· basis prepare ' a revision of any statement prepared under paragraph ( l) so as to ensure that, so far as is reasonably practicable, the information in ·the revised statement is up to date .. 3. The 1icensee shall, subject to any requirement to comply with paragraph ( 4) below - (a) furnish the Regulatory Commission with a copy of the state- ment prepared under paragraph ·( 1) and of each re:vision of ·the statement prepared under paragraph (2); · (b) ·in such form and manner as the Regti.l.atory•Commission may direct, · publish such a summary of the statement or, as the · ' .· case may be, of a revision of the statement as will assist a person in deciding whether to ask for a copy of the version mentioned in sub - paragraph ( c) , and ( c) · prepare a version of the statement or revision which ex- • 330 . eludes, so far as is practicable, any such matter as is men- tioned in paragraph ( 4) and send a copy thereof to any per- son who asks for one and makes such payment to the li- censee in respect of the cost thereof as it may require not ex- ceeding such amount as the Regulatory Commission may from time to time approve for the purposes hereof. 4. In complying with the requirements of paragraph ( 3) ( b) , the licensee shall have regard to the need for excluding, so far as is practicable, any matter which relates to the affairs of a person where the publication of that matter would or might seriously and prejudicially affect his interests. 5. Any question arising under paragraph (4) .as to whether the pub- lication of some matter which relates to the affairs of a person would or might seriously and prejudicially affect his interests shall . 'be determined by the Regulatory Commission. Construction of high pressure pipe- lines · l. The licensee shall not at any time execute any works for the con- . struction of a high· pressure pipe -:- line unless, not less than one year (or such shorter period as the Competent Authority inay al- . low) before that time, it has given notice to the [STATU1DRY BODY. RESPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY] - (a) stating that it intends to execute the works; ( b) also containing, so far as they are not required by sub - paragraph (b) the address of the licensee; the address (if known) of the office from which the pipe - line, if con- structed,· would be operated; particulars of both the normal and maximum permissible operating pressure of the proposed pipe - line, and such particulars, if any, as may from time to time· be designated for 'purposes of this paragraph in the ·routing guidelines, and has sent a copy of that notice to any· • 331 • t local planning authority through whose area the pipe - line is intended to run. 2. If after a notice under paragraph ( 1) has been given, the execu- tion of the works to which the notice relates has not substantially begun at the expiration of three years from the date on which it was given or at the expiration of any extension of that period giv- en by the Competent Authority, the notice shall cease to have ef- fect for the purposes of that paragraph except in relation to such works (if any) as have already been executed. 3. Where the proposed routing of the pipe - line is not in accordance with the routing guidelines - (a) the licensee shall so. notify the [STATUTORY BODY RE- SPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY]; (b) the licensee shall consult the [STATUTORY BODY RE- SPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY] on the pro- posed routing; and (c) if, within the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which the [STATUTORY BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY] was notified in pursuance of sub - paragraph (a) (or such longer period as may be agreed in writing between the licensee and the Executive) , the Execu- tive gives written notice to the licensee that it does not agree to the proposed routing (with or without modifications ac- ceptable to the licensee), the licensee shall (unless it decides not i:o proceed with the proposed works) send to the Compe- tent Authority a copy of the notice referred to in paragraph (1); . (d) if within the said period, the [STATUTORY BODY RE- SPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY] - ( e) has agreed to the proposed routing (with or without modifi- • 332 • cations' acceptable to the licensee), or (f) has not given the licensee such a notice as is referred to in sub - paragraph ( c) , the licensee may, subject to para- graphs ( 4) and (5), proceed with the proposed works. 4. Where a local planning authority who have received a copy of the notice referred to in paragraph ( 1) , within 2 months of receiving that copy, for reasons relating to safety (having regard to the routing guidelines and the risk criteria or, in the absence of such criteria, any ad.vice given· by the [ STATU1DRY BODY RE- SPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY]) or otherwise, notify the licensee in writing that the proposed pipe - line would be likely to prejudice implementation of a material aspect of their development plan (a) the licensee shall consult the authority on its proposals; (b) if, within the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which the authority notified the licensee. as aforesaid (or such longer period as may be agreed in writing between the licensee and the authority~ , the authority give written notice to the licensee that they do not agree to its proposals (with or without modifications acceptable to the licensee}, the li- censee shall (unless it decides not to proceed with the pro~ posed works) send to the Competent Authority a copy of the notice referred to· in paragraph ( 1) ; (c) if, within the said period,. the local planning authority - have agreed to the licensee' s proposals . (with or without modifications acceptable to it), or have not given the licensee such a notice as is referred to in sub~ paragraph (b), the Ii- . censee may, subject to paragraphs ( 3 ) and ( 5) , proceed with the proposed works. 5. If, within 6 months beginning with the day on which he received • 333 • a copy of the notice referred to in paragraph ( 1) , in pl.lrsuance of . paragraph (3) (c) or (4) (b), the Competent Authority (hav- ing regard, as respects matters relating to safety, to the risk cri- teria 0r, in the absence of such criteria, any criteria as to risk for- mulated by the licensee and any representations made by the [STATUTORY BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY] in relation to the proposal) gives a direction to the li- cen8ee - (a) that it shall not proceed with the construction of the pipe - · line, or (b)' that, if it wishes to proceed with the construction of the pipe line, it shall satisfy such requirements as are specified in · the direction including, in particular requirements as re- .· spects the routing of the pipe-1ine, the licensee shall com- .· ply with the direction .. 6. In !his condition - the "routing guidelines" means the guidelines designated as such by the Competent Authority after consultation with the [STATUTORY BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY] and the persons who hold licenses at the time of such designation or any revision of such guidelines so designated, and the "risk criteria" means the risk based criteria, if any, which have (a) been formulated and adopted by the [STATUTORY BODY ·RESPONSIBLE FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY] after oon- sllltation with the persons who hold licenses at the time of ,such adoption, and (b) · been designated for the purposes of this condition by the '. Competent Authority, or any revision of such .criteria so for- mulated and adopted and so • 334 APPENDIX 3: TRANSMISSION REGULATORY TECHNIQUES The regulatory techniques for transmission fall into three broad cate- gories that correspond to the principles considered in the previous report: • The establishment of the business rules and procedures that will govern the tenns and conditions of access to the transmission system. • The derivation and regulation of tariffs for the transmission sys- tem. • The authorization of pipelines and pipeline expansions. This section addresses these categories and discusses the regulatory techniques in each of them. Currently the transmission system in China comprises uneonnected networks of pipeline segments. These networks vary from relatively complex ones in Sichuan and in the Northeast to sin- · gle pipelines 'from basins to market centers. Each of these networks .,,.. (from the single pipeline to the most compleX:) constitutes a separate transmission entity for regulatory purposes. The principal initial focus of regulatory effort wilUJe on the existing transmission networks regardless of whether or not there is a demand for access by third parties. Even on networks where there is no immediate potential for the customers gaining access to an alternative supplier of gas, the separation (or-unbundling) of transmission and supply activities generates benefits by revealing the underlying cost drivers and the poten- tial for. increased efficiency. In addition, as the interconnection of the currently isolated networks occurs over time, the development of appro- priate terms and conditions of access will expedite the application of the • 335 • appropriate regulatory arrangements to the transmission systerri in China. This will confer more rapidly the benefits of increased competition in gas commodity markets through the increased access of network users to new sources of gas supply. The e8tablishment of appropriate tenns and conditions of access re- quires the application of three sets of regulatory techniques. These com- prise techruques to • • Ensure the separation of transmission and gas supply activities; Establish the business rules and procedures that govern the forms and conditions of access for individual network users; and • Evaluate· and, if acceptable, approve the transmission service offer Separation of Transmission and Supply Activities . The first set of regulatory techniques relate to the application of the principle that requires an effective separation of transmission and gas sup- ply activities. Three options define a broad range of options that may be chosen to achieve -- , varying degrees of separation: · Option 1: Separation of accounts and management accompanied by a Code of Conduct to police this separation. Option 2: Separate business units for transmission and supply at dif- ferent locations. Option 3: Divestment of either transmission or supply. These three options vary from the minimum separation requirement (Option 1).: to the radical option of divesting (or selling· off) either the - transmission or supply business. Option 2 may be viewed as a "half - way house," but it is one of a number of variants that may be defined between the extreme8 defined by Option 1 and Option 3. These options succes- sively broadly describe the experience of gas transmission businesses • 336 • l throughout the world as they attempt to adapt to the changes involved when they are required to provide access to their pipeline networks. Most transmission businesses initially resisted regulatory demands to separate their transmission and supply mainly to protect their share of the gas market (more common in Europe), but also to avoid the costs of restruc- turing their businesses and the development of new administrative ar- rangements (more common in North America) . As a result, they were prepared to concede only a minimum degree of separation. Over time regulatory commissions sought more effective separation, which was motivated, in many cases, by complaints from shippers that the transmission businesses were discriminating against them and in favor of their own associated (or affiliated) supply businesses. Eventually many transmission businesses saw a benefit in placing their supply activities in a completely separate company. This provided a strategic and managerial focus and reduced the incidence of disputes with both the regulatory com- mission and gas shippers. This is true of gas transinission businesses in both North America and the United Kingdom. Movements in this direc- tion are beginning to emerge in Australia and New Zealand, which began their gas industry reforms later than those in North America and the U- nited Kingdom. Most gas transmission businesses in Western Europe (such as Gaz de France {France), Distrlgaz (Belgium), Gasunie (the Netherlands) , Gas Natural (Spain) and Ruhrgas (Germany)) are only beginning to address this issue of separation and,, in most cases, are con- templating some variant of Option 1. In the Chinese context, it makes sense to begin with Option 1 and, during the transitional phase, to assess its ability to satisfy regulatory commission and shipper requirements. The implementation of Option 1 is frequently (and most effectively) achieved by means of a Code of Con- duct. The purpose of this exercise is to provide the basis for the offer and ~ 337 • regulation of an unbundled transmission service. For each transmission business, the regulatory commission will set out the issues that will need to be addressed in each document. It is envisaged that these documents and procedures will be developed by means of discussion and consultation between the transmission business and the eligible pipeline system users under the guidance and oversight of the regulatory commission. Code of Conduct The Code of Conduct is the document that describes the procedures put in place by a transmission business to implement and enforce the sep- aration of its transmission and supply activities. Each transmission entity that is subject to regulation will be required to prepare such a code. It is envisaged that these codes will be prepared as part of a process of consul- tation between the regulatory commission and the regulated transmission entity with provision for the participation of other interested parties (for example, producers, eligible consumers, and UGDCs) in the consultation process. A typical Code of Conduct document will include the following ele- ments: An Explanatory Note: This will set out the requirement for the doc- ument with reference to the specific transmis..~ion entity. Definitions: This will set out precise descriptions of the relevant par- ties and activities that will be referred to in the code. Objectives and Principles: This section includes the transmission en- tity' s commitment to provide nondiscriminatory access to all eligible and suitably qualified applicants. A key feature of this commitment will COlll- prise the principles governing the management of information flows and the access to information. The transmission entity will receive commer- cially confidential information from applicants for a transmission - only service. The transmission activity has an incentive to pass this informa- tion on to its affiliated supply activity. For example, it will find out • 338 • who, among its customers currently receiving a bundled service, is plan- ning to contract for a gas supply from another supplier. This will allow its affiliated supply activity to target these customers and entice them to, remain as customers. This would provide the affiliated supply activity with an unfair advantage relative to other suppliers. Implementation of Code of Conduct This section addresses the implementation of the Code of Conduct and includes the following: The obligations of the transmission business. These obligations in- clude the reorganization of procedures, policies, departmental structures, and job responsibilities to ensure compliance with the Code of Conduct. This section also includes commitments to establish employee communica- tions and training programs to ensure that employees are informed and re- sourced to comply. A Complaints Procedure will also be established. The nature of the functional separation. This subsection deals with the following: • Sharing of facilities and resources • Keeping of books and records • Prohibitions on engaging in restricted activities • Provision of business support services The conduct of business. This subsection addresses the application of tariffs, charges, and discciunts and the notification that will be required I to ensure nondiscriminatory service. Procedure for dealing with system emergencies. This subsection ad- dresses the procedures for dealing with responses to system emergencies that violated the Code of Conduct. The maintenance of accounts and records. This addresses accounting Code and statutory requirements. The role of the Compliance Officer. This subsection presents the · powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Compliance Officer who is re- . 339 . sponsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Code of Oper- ation, and,'Outlines provisions for external audit. A draft Code of Conduct is presented in Appendix 5. Code of Operations and Transmission Service Agreement Code of Operations The second and third sets of regulatory techniques that set out the "business rules" and the offer of transmission service may now be ad- dressed. The code of operations sets out the duties and obligations of the regulated transmis5ion business (as the transmission service provider) and transmission system users. The transmission service agreement will be defined in terms of the code of operations and will detail the contract for transmissio.n service between the transmission entity and an eligible net- work user.: A typ~cal code of operations would comprise the following elements: • Definitions and interpretation. • Common network security Code and network planning. • Transfer of custody and title. • Specification, pressure and quality. • Measurement and testing. • Shrinkage. • Entry (input or receipt) point requirements. • Exit (off- take or delivery) requirements. • Gtpacity available and offered. • Nominations, re - nominations, and scheduling. • Balancing and settlement of imbalances. • Maintenance. • Emergencies and throughput curtailments (force majeure) • Billing and Payment. • Taxes and duties. • Dispute resolution. . 340 . Appendix 6 contains the General Terms and Conditions for a North American pipeline. This corresponds to a Code of Operations. Transmission Service Agreement Generally a standard transmission service agreement is comprised of separate firm and interruptible services. A typical firm service offer will be defined in terms of the Code of Operations and will include specific contractual tenns such as the following: Nature and definition of service. • Receipt and delivery points. • Charges for service. • Financial assurances. • Invoicing and payment. • Allocation and assignment (release) of capacity. The General Terms and Conditions presented in Appendix 6 contain the form of firm and interruptible transmission service agreements as ap- pendixes. Appendix 6 also contains Web site addresses for the Terms and Conditions of Access being offered by a selection of North American and European gas transmission companies. The Articles in the General Terms and Conditions do not precisely match the key components of a Code of Operations as set out above. There are two reasons for this. First, the General Terms and Conditions relate to a specific pipeline and to a specific pipeline in North America. Second; and· related to this, the components of the Code of Operations are intended to provide an overview of the issues that will need to be ad- dressed in the Chinese context. Some Important Issues Six issues are worthy of further consideration in the Chinese con- text: • The definition and allocation of transmission capacity. • The nature of the right to capacity. • 341 . • Network planning and common network security standard. • Gas quality. • Balancing and settlement. • Shrinkage. The first three issues are closely related and may be discussed to- gether. Transmission capacity, capacity rights, and security In North America transmission pipelines have traditionally been "built to order." This means that existing or new customers placed an or- der for capacity and backed up this request with a commitment to enter into a long - term contract for this capacity. When pipelines agreed, and were subsequeritly mandated, to offer an unbundled transmission service (separate from the supply of gas), in most cases it did not prove difficult to convert the Maximum Daily Quantity (MDQ) in their contracts to a capacity reservation. This, in effect, created a long-·term property right to transmission capacity. In addition, this property right could be reason- ably accurately defined and. priced, particularly on long - di.stance trans- mission pipelines, because transmission charges were primarily deter- mined by the capacity reserved and the distance over which this capacity was reserved. By way of contrast, it has proved ·more difficult to define and allo- cate capacity on the more complex European national transmission net- works. With the exception of BG Transco in the United Kingdom and the major German transmission companies, most European transmission companies are either fully within state ownership or are gradually being listed. All European transmission companies established and developed their networks to comply with a Public Service Obligation (PSO) to con- struct sufficient gas supply infrastructure to ensure secure and reliable supplies of gas and to comply with public policy objectives regarding the . 342 . penetration of natural gas. O As a result, European transmission compa- nies constructed capacity in anticipation of demand and without any long ·:.._term contractual commitment by their customers to pay for this capaci~ ty. In addition, the infrastructure in place in Europe would very likely be configured differently, if it had been constructed in resp6nse to long- term contractual commitments by customers. The development of inte- grated gas supply and transmission systems in step with increasing re- liance on external supplies has involved an amount of investment in-trans- mission 'and storage facilities that may only be justified by an extremely pessimistic assessment of the supply risk to which Europe is expcised. The introduction of open access provides network users'with the op- portunity to place a value on the services provided by the 'network. And network users will invariably attempt to rriaximize their access to service at minimum cost. This has the potential to generate "stranded" or "above market" rosts. Full cost recovery includes the investment recovery, in- vestment return, and associated operating and maintenance costs of the eXisting transmission and stcirage facilities. If network u5ers ate unwilling to contract anp pay for all the services of these facilities' actual revenue recovery will fall short of full revenue recovery. This shortfall is equiva- lent to "stranded" or "above market" costs. It may the case id China th~t the transmission (and distribution) businesses will have to accept a write down in the value of some of their assets before they are included in the asset base for the purposes of tariff design. All these factors have contributed to the limited _:_ indeed, almost negligible progress in Europe toward the definition and allocation of transmission capacity and the offer of longer .,... term transmission con- O In many instances, this PSO was not explicit, but it could be inferred from the legislation governing the establishment and operation of the transmission company. • 343 • tracts based on this definition. As a result, transmission contracts are typically offered for one year, usually in parallel to the gas contract year beginning on October 1. The relationship between the capacity reserved in these contracts and the capacity physically available on the network tends, at best, to be tenuous. The transmission tariffs are on an annual basis and may not be related in any meaningful way to the revenue recov- ery requirement of the transmission company. The extent to which these factors affect China is not clear, but what is clear is that the Chinese transmission business has more in common with that in Europe than in North America. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, a strong case may be made for developing the transmission ser- vice agreement as a longer-, term contract based on an objective definition and allocation of the physical transmission capacityO. In China, as in Europe, the gas industry is moving from a situation where capacity is provided in anticipation of demand without firm long term contractual commitments to a situation where network users decide how much capacity they require to ship their gas. Invariably network users will tend to understate their capacity requirements so as to minimize their costs. The transmission company will have an equally strong incen- tive to ensure that network users reserve as fully as possible the capacity that is available so as to minimize the incidence of stranded costs. With some justification, the transmission company will be able to assert that it is entitled to recover the full costs of investments prudently made under the previous legislative and commercial arrangements. However, regula- tory commissions are reluctant to allow the full recovery of investment 0 In the United Kingdom the failure to relate capacity reservations by network UBerS to the physical capacity available at the entry points on the U.K. National Transmission System (NTS) resulted in overbooking by network UBerS ( shippers) and frequent curtailments of gas inputs. BG Transco has recently begun to auction entry capacity as the most effective means of allocating ca- pacity to the network users who value it most highly. Omsideration is also being given to a "con- tractualization" of system exit capacity. . 344 . costs when there is evidence that some of these costs are above market. In most jurisdictions where the stranded cost issue has arisen, regu- latory commissions have been compelled to arrive at a compromise. This compromise may take many forms, but it generally is oomposed of a number of common features. The first feature is the establishment of a common standard of network security that is included in the Code of Op- erations and with which all network users are required to comply.• This will result in a requirement that network users reserve a higher level of capacity than they would if they had complete discretion as to their capac- ity reservations. On the other hand, the level of capacity reserved is usu- ally less than the total available, so some stranded costs result. The second feature relates to the recovery of these stranded costs. In gener~, regulatory commissions tend to allow recovery of a portion of these stranded costs, which may be achieved in a number of ways. For example, the transmission company may be required to write off a por- tion of the stranded investments either immediately or over a short peri- od. The company may be allowed to continue to recover the cost of a fur- ther portion of investment in accordance with the established depreciation policy, but without recovering a return on this portion of the investment. Finally, the company may be allowed full' recovery of a portion of the in- vestment, but allowed to earn a reduced rate of return. In China, this will require detailed analysis of the availability of, and demand for, transmission in each of the identified transmission enti- ties. This task should be relatively straightforward for single pipelines and for new pipeline projects. It may prove more time and resource con- suming for the more complex systems. The exercise is very important, however, because uncertainty about the level of cost recovery and the lev- 9 These Codes can vary quite considerably in terms of definition, but generally coincide in practice. In most cases, they attempt to identify the level of transmission capacity that is required to meet demand on a particularly cold day. . 345 • el of capacity available will diminish any possibility of developing con- tracts for capacity. Gas Quality Although the gas transmission system in China currently consists.of a number of separate pipelines and networks, it is vitally important that a common gas specification is defined and applied to all networks. This is primarily a mandatory technical regulation, but it has major implications for the current operation and future development of transmission net- works in China. Maintaining a tight specification for all gas entering the networks - in effect, enforcing a standard of. pipeline marketable gas - will reduce corrosion and maintain the integrity of the networks. It will also facilitate the interoperability of these networks when interconnects are construct- ed. An example of a typical specification for pipeline marketable gas may found in Appendix 4 (Article 2) . Balancing and Settlement Typically for long distance pipelines in North America (as illustrat- ed in Appe11dix 4) , receipts and deliveries are balanced over a 30 day period with a eash-out settlement at the end of the period. Penalties are imposed to encourage network users to minimize imbalances. It makes e- conomic sense to keep these lines as full of gas as· pqssible. These pipelines therefore operate at a high load factor. The fluctuations in daily and seasonal demand are then dealt with by supply from storage facilities located close .to delivery points and adjacent to demand centers. AS a re- sult, .relatively little daily variation will be likely in throughput on trans- mission lines. This tends to be true internationally for long - distance pipelines both in and between countries whose population density may be relatively low by international standards or where areas of population den- sity may be few an4 concentrated. . 346 . By way of contrast, transmission networks in countries with. higher population densities (which is particularly true of Europe) tend to experi- ence much greater daily and seasonal variation in throughput. In addi- tion, this variation varies directly with the extent of market penetration. The higher . the proportion of residential and commercial ( R&C) mand, the greater will· be the daily variation. And it varies inversely with the availability of storage services close to demand centers. The greater the availability of storage services to modulate supply, the less will be the daily variation in throughput on the transmission network. For example, daily balancing is required in the United Kingdom. Italy and Spain are considering a similar arrangement. Belgium, France, and the Nether- lands are seeking to establish an hourly balancing regimeo. The period over which balancing should take place is a function .of the technical and operational characteristics of the transmission network. It is also related to the costs of the information and control systems that would need to be put in place to support the nomination, scheduling, and settlement arrangements associated with a specific balancing period. In the Chinese context, this is an issue that will require detailed study. It should be noted that in addition to monthly and daily balanc- ing, considering weekly balancing .is possible. The choice of balancing pe- riod will determine the procedures that will be required to ensure efficient nomination, .scheduling, balancing, and settlement. · Imbalance penalties should be related to the casts incurred by the transmission entity to maintain network balance. Typically this involves the costs of either acquiring or disposing of gas at short notice. It is diffi- cult to devise a regime that provides an effective incentive to minimize these costs, which are recovered ·from· network users. 0 This is widely viewed as unrealistic, and some commentators view it as a tactic to dis- courage applications for access to these networks. · . 347 • Increasingly in the United States, the availability of gas at short no- tice on spot markets is reducing the requirement for imbalance penalties. Transmission companies and network users are using these markets to deal with imbalances directly. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, an On - the- day Commodity Market ( OCM) has been developed, which al- lows BG Transco and network users to buy and sell gas at short notice to maintain a daily balance. This emphasizes an additional benefit of encouraging the emergence of a liquid and transparent gas commodity market. Shrinkage Shrinkage is defined as the difference between the total inputs to a gas network and the total volume taken off. Typically it is comprised of Unaccounted for Gas ( UAG) - arising from leakage and measurement error - and Own Use gas used as compressor fuel, for heating where the drop in pressure drives gas temperature below the gas specification and for controlled venting. On most North American pipelines, the UAG volume tends to be negligible, and there is rarely any requirement for heating and controlled venting. As a result, shrinkage may be equated to the com- pressor fuel requirement. The transmission company estimates the com- pressor fuel requirement and determines the share of this for each net- work user who is then required to add this volume to his gas input. In the United Kingdom shrinkage comprises approximately 1 per- cent of gas inputs. BG Transco purchases this gas directly and recovers the cost in its transmission tariffs. Because the U.K. NTS is a relatively complex network, it is difficult to assign shrinkage volumes to specific network users. In addition, shrinkage is estimated for the entire trans- mission and distribution system, and UAG comprises a higher share of shrinkage than would be the case for long - distance transmission lines. Given the variety of the unconnected networks in China, it appears reasonable to suggest that each transmission entity should purchase . 348 . shrinkage volumes directly ·(as in the United Kingdom) and recover the ·cost from networks users via transmission tariffs. A method to estimate the shrinkage volume should be developed and be approved by the regula- tory commission. In addition, the purchase of gas for shrinkage should be subject to regulatory oversight. . 349 • j APPENDIX 4: GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS Information Sources Information on, or exampl~s of, the Code of Operations (or General Terms and Conditions) may be found on numerous Web sites-some are listed below. The example of General Terms and Conditions presented in this Append,ix is that the Alliance Pipeline Partnership in Canada (see Web site 3 below) . It was chosen because it has just been issued, it contains the.key requirements for a statement of General Terms and Con- ditions and it is presented in clear, concise language. Web site 1: Canadian N~tional Energy Board (federal regulatory commission) : go to < www. neb. gc. ca > ; select "English" ; check "Publications" for Annual Reports, Act, Regulations, Guidelines; go to "Energy Overview" ; review "Natural. Gas Market Assessments" ; check "Other Government Agencies, Energy Associations and Related Organi- zations" Canada, United States, Mexico, including links to FERC and Mexican CRE. Web site 2: TransCanada PipeLines (large existing pipeline): go to . . < www. tra.r,iscanada. com> ; open Transmission Web page from Home Page ; go to "Transportation Tariffs" < business/PDFrariffs/index. html>; choose "Canadian Mainline"; go to "Informatio~al Postings"; review menu items "Queuing Procedure"; ''Tariff Schedules" ( there are nine, try "Ff") ; "General Terms and Conditions" ,"Pro Forma Contracts." Web site 3: Alliance Pipeline (large new Canada U.S. system): go to < www. alliance - pipeline. com > ; review Home Page choices; • 350 ~ check tariffs and tariff conditions, Canada <./Shipp&/fariff/Cariadi- .ari%20Tariff%202000.pdf> or United States: Web site 4: · BG · Transco ( United Kingdom ) : go to < www.transco.uk. com> and select "Publications" from 'the home menu 'foi.; a copy of a summary of Transco' s Network Code . .Web · site · 5: Gaz de France ( France ) : go to < ·v.;ww. gazdefrance. com > , switch to Englis~ and follow path to Press Releases. · ·..Web site 6: Ruhrgas ( Gennany) : go to < www. ruhrgas. de> and -proeeed as for Web site 5. Web site 7: Gasunie (Netherlands):· go. to < www.gasuQie.nl> and· select "Commodity/&rvice" from the home menu. Example of General· Terms and Conditions TABLE OF CONTENTS ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION ·l .1. ..... .... .. ... .................... .. .... ... ...... ... ... ... ... ... . ............ (356) ARTICLE 2: QUALITY 2.1 : ................................ ~................................ ~ ......... _. (362) ' ' 2.2 ................................. : .. ·~······ .... ·~· ...... ; ... ; ......... ~. • .... (363) 2.'3 .............................................................................. (363) Z.4 .................................................................. '. ........... (364) 2.5 ............ ~ ......................... ~·· .. -. ...................................... (364) 2.6: .................................................... ~······················· (364) 2. 7 ......... , ............... ;'.; .................................................. (365) ARTICLE 3: MEASUREMENT 3.1 ............................. , .......................................; ..... ;; {365) 3'.2 ...................................................... '. ........................... (365) 3.3 ............................................................................. (365) 3'.4............................................................................... (365) . 351 • ARTICLE 4: MEASURING EQUIPMENT 4 .1 ........ •, ................... ; .................... ~..... . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 366) 4.2 ........ : ........................•.......................................... (366) 4.3 ············································································ (367) ARTICLE 5: ,. FORCE MAJEURE 5.1 ............................................................................ (367) 5. 2 ......... '., .................................................. ,•............... ( 367) 5 .3 ........ :, .................................................................. (368) ARTICLE 6: RECEIPT AND DELIVERY PRESSURE 6 .1 ........ ·..................... '............................................. ( 368) 6.2 .........:···································· .. ···························· (368) ARTICLE 7: BILLING AND PAYMENT 7.1 ........ ::································; ................................. (368) 7 .2 ......................... , ............................................... .' .. (369) 7 .3 ; ............................................................................. (369) 7.4 ·········•·,····························:···································· (370) 7. 5 •.. .. . .. . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .... . . . .... . . .. . ... . . . . . . . .. ( 370) 7 .6 ........ : ................................................... , .............. (370) 7.7 ········~:····················· .. ·········································· (371) ARTICLE 8: PRIORITY OF SERVICE 8.1 ........................................................................... (371) 8.2 ·········:" 00 (372) •••••••••••••••••••••••••• .. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ARTICLE 9: NONWAIVER AND FUTURE DEFAULT 9.1 ........................................................................... (374) ARTICLE 10: REQUESTS FOR TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 10.l ......................................................... '. ............... (374) ARTICLE 11: ·NOMINATIONS 11.1 ........................................................................ (376) 11.2 ........................................................................ (377) .................................................................. (377) 11.3 ...... , • 352 ;, 11.4 ············.-··································'.························· (378) 11.5 ........................ ; ............................................... (379) ARTICLE 12 :· SCHEDULING 12.l ········································································ (379) 12~2 ..................................................... · ................... (379) 12 . 3 ........... ; ....... ·.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 380) ARTICLE 13: UNAUTHORIZED VOLUMES AND IMBALANCES 13.1 ········································.································ (381) 13 .2 ·································································.······· (381). 13. 3 ................................... ,; ........................... ··.· ... .. . (381) 13.4 ... ; ..................................................................... (382) 13.5 ···········~················· .......................... , ................ '.. (382) 13 . 6 ....................................................... ' .. ·.· . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 382) 13. 7 ·······:································································· (383) 13 . 8 .............. ; ............................ ; .................. '. ........ ; ( 383) 13.9 ········································································· (383) 13.10 ········································································ (384) 13.11 ······························································.··········· (384) ARTICLE 14: FUEL 14.1 ········································································· (384) 14.2 ········································································· (384) 14.3 ········································································ (385) 14.4 ........................................................................ (385) ARTICLE 15: PRIORITY OF RECEIPTS 15 .1 ········································································ (385) ARTICLE 16: RIGHT TO COMMINGLE 16.1 ........................................................................ (386) ARTICLE 17: NOTICES OF CHANGES IN OPERATING CONDI- TIONS 17.1 ··········································: .. ······:········.············ (386) . 353 . ' ARTICLE is: POSSESSION AND CONTROL OF GAS 18.1 ········································································ (386) ARTICLE 19: SHIPPERWARRANTY AND INDEMNITY 19.1 ·····:,··································································· (386) 19.2 ........- ................................................................ (386) 19.3 ..... , ................................................................... (387) 19.4 ......,. .................................. , .............. '. ............... (387) 19.5 ......,: .................................................................. (387) 19. 6 ........................................................................... (387) ARTICLE '.?0: FINANCIAL ASSURANCES 20.1 ..... : ...... ~ ......................................................... '.. (387) ·ARTICLE 21: CREDITING OF REVENUE F:ROM INTERRUPT- IBLE TRANSPORTATION - 21.l ..... , ................................................................... (390) ARTICLE 22: INCORPORATION IN TARIFF SCHEDULES AND CONTRACTS 22.1 ······:·································································· (390) 22.2 ·····•···································································· (391) ARTICLE 23: TRANSPORTATION SERVICE AGREEMENTS 23.l ········································································· (391) 23.2 ........................................................................ (391) ARTICLE 24: NOTICES 24.1 ·····'.································································.···· (391) ' ARTICLE 25: OPERATOR 25.1 ········································································ (392) ARTICLE 26: LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY 26.1 ..... : .................................................................. (392) 26.2 ..... ; .............................. ~ ................................... (393) ARTICLE 27: MISCELLANEOUS 27 .l ..... ; .................................................................. (393) • 354 • SCHEDULE A 33 APPENDIX I Form of Transportation Service Agreement APPENDIX II Form of Interruptible Transportation Service Agreement , • 355 . GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION 1.1 Except where expressly stated otherwise, the following tenns, when used in these General Tenns arid Conditions shall have the follow- ing meaning: "103 and m3 " means 1000. cubic meters of Gas. "Accepted Volume" has the meaning ascribed to it in Article 11 hereof. "Affiliate" when used to indicate a relationship with a specific Per- son, means another Person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries or otherwise, controls, or is controlled by, or is un- der comma~ control with such specific Person. A corporation shall be deemed to ~e an Affiliate of another corporation if one of them is directly or indirectly controlled by the other or if each of them is directly or indi- rectly controlled by the same Person. "Authorized Overrun Service" or "AOS" means the right of Firm Shippers to be allocated a pro rata share of capacity on the pipeline that is not, from time to time, contracted for as Transporter's Contracted Ca- pacity with·any allocation to Firm Shippers to be made pursuant to Arti- ' cle 2. 7 and Article 2. 8 of the Tariff Schedule Firm Transportation Ser- vice and subsequent to such allocation means the Shipper's share of such capacity. "Business Day" means any day on which Transporter's main office in Calgary, Alberta, is customarily open for business. "Canadian Receipt Pool" is a deemed location immediately down- stream of the Receipt Points, maintained for.each Shipper, forming itself a Receipt Point from which volumes may be scheduled for Transportation or nominated to or from for purposes of effecting Title Transfers, as de- fined in Article 11.1. . 356 . ' .} ·"Canadian Delivery Pool" is a deemed location immediately up- stream of the Delivery Point, maintained for each Shipper, forming iUlelf a Delivery Point from which volumes may be scheduled for Transporta- tion or nominated to or from for purposes of effecting Title Transfers, as defined in Article 11.1. "Central Clock Time" or "CCI"' means Central Daylight time when Daylight Savings time is in effect and Central Standard time when Day- light Savings time is not in effect. "Commodity Charge" means the C.Ommodity· Charge set out in "Schedule A" to the Tariff Schedule Firm Transportation Service. "Contracted Capacity" means the daily volume of Gas contracted for by a Shipper and for which the Shipper has agreed to pay the De,nand Charge in accordance with the terms of a Transportation Service Agree- ment. "Cubic Meter" or "m3 " means the volume of Gas occupying one cu- bic meter at a temperature of fifteen degrees Celsius ( 15° C) , and at a, pressure of 101.325 kilopascals absolute. "Daily Demand Charge" means the quotient obtained by dividing the Demand Charge by the number of days in the relevant Month. "Daily Demand Charge Surcharge" means the quotient obtained by dividing the Demand Charge Surcharge by the number of days in the rele- vant Month. "Day" means a period of twenty - four (24) con:,ecutive hours be- ginning and ending at 9: 00 CCT or such other period of twenty - four (24) consecutive hours agreed to by Transporter and Shipper. "Delivery Point" means the point of interconnection between Trans- porter' s pipeline system and the pipeline system of U.S. Pipeline. ''Demand Charge" means the Demand Charge set out in Schedule "A" to the Tariff Schedule Firm Transportation Service. "Demand Charge .Credit" means a Demand Charge Credit deter- • 357 • mined pursuant to Article 4 of the Tariff Schedule Firm Transportation Service. "Demand Charge Surcharge" means the Demand Charge Surcharge set out in Schedule "A" to the Tariff Schedule Firm Transportation Ser- vice. "Demand Charge Surcharge Credit" means a Demand Charge Sur- charge Credit determined pursuant to Article 4 of the Tariff Schedule Firm Transportation Service "Firm Service" means Transportation provided pursuant to Tariff Schedule Firm Transportation Service. "Firm Shipper" means a shipper that enters into a Transportation Service Agreement and is eligible to receive Firm Service. "Force Majeure" means any act of God, war, civil insurrection or disobedience, acts of public enemy, strikes, lockouts or other industrial disturbance5, accidents, wars, blockades, insurrections, riots, epi- demics , landslides, lightning, earthquakes, explosions, fires, storms, floods, w11Shouts, arrests and restraints of governments and people, civil disturbances, breakage or aceidents to machinery or lines of pipe, the ne- cessity for making repairs to or alterations of machinery or lines of pipe, freezing of lines of pipe, inability to obtain materials, supplies, permits or labor, or other cause whether of the kind enumerated or otherwise, which is beyond the control of any applicable party and which by the ex- ercise of due diligence such party is unable to prevent or overcome. The settlement of strikes, lockouts or other labor disputes shall be entirely within the discretion of the party having the difficulty. The following shall not be events of Force Majeure: (i) insufficiency of Shipper' s Gas supplies, (ii) inadequate or uneconomic markets for Shipper' s Gas, (iii) Shipper' s lack of funds, or (iv) curtailment or disruption of service, for any reason whatsoever, on facilities upstream of Receipt Points or down- stream of the Delivery Point; for greater certainty, "upstream of Receipt • 358 • Points" shall mean beyond the. inlet side of Transporter's measurjng sta- tions, and "downstream of the Delivery Point" shall mean beyond the outlet side of Transporter's Delivery Point. . "Fuel Requirement" has the meaning ascribed to it in Artjcle )4 hereof. . "Gas" or ·"Natural Gas" means methane, and such other hydrocar- bon constituents, or a mixture of two or more of them which, in.any case, meets the quality specifications of the Tariff . ."Gross Heating Value" means the total Joules expressed in.mega- joules per cubic meter (Mr /m3 ) produced.by the .complete combustion at constant pressure of one ( 1) cubic meter of Gas with q.ir, with the Gas free of water vapor and the temperature of the Gas, air and products of combustion to be at standard temperature and all water formed by com- bustion reaction. to be condensed to the. liquid state. "Imbalance" has the meaning ascribed to it in Article 13 hereof. "Interruptible Revenue Credit" means an Interruptible Revenue Credit to.be calculated and allocated to Firm Shippers in accordance with Article 21 hereto. "Interruptible Service" means Transportation provided pursuant to Tariff Schedule Interruptible Transportation Service .. "Interruptible Service _Tariff" means the toll set out in Schedule "p/' to the Toll Schedule Interruptible Transportation Service. "Interruptible Shipper" means a Shipper that enters into an Inter- ruptible Transportation Service Agreement and is eligible to receive Inter- ruptible Service. "Interruptible TraDsportation Service Agreement" or "ITSA" means an agreemen~ pursuant to :which Transporter provides Interruptible Ser- vice to a Shipper. . "Joule" or "J" shall mean the work done y.rhen the_ pqint of appli~­ tion of a fore~ of one (1) Newton is displaced a distance of one (1) meter • 359 . in the direction of the force. "Maximum Daily Transportation Quantity" means the maximum volume of Gas as specified in an Interruptible Transportation Service A- greement that Transporter agrees to receive from Shipper for Transporta- tion under Toll Schedule Interruptible Transportation Service. "Month" means a period extending from 9: 00 am CCT on the first Day in a calendar Month and ending at 9: 00 am CCT on the first Day of the next succeeding calendar Month, or at such hour as Shipper and Transporter agree upon. · "Monthly Bill" means the amount that Shipper is required to pay to Transporter for each Month in accordance with the terms of the applica- ble Toll Schedule. "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, syndicate, sole proprietorship, company or corporation with or without share capital, unincorporated association, trust, trustee, executor, administrator or other legal personal representative, regulatory cbmmission body or agency, government or governmental agency, au- thority or entity however designated or constituted. "Primary Receipt Point" means a Receipt Point that is designated by a Firm Shipper as a Primary Receipt Point as set out in Schedule "A" to the Shipper's Transportation Service Agreement. "Priuiary Receipt Point Capacity" has the meaning ascribed to it in Article 6.1 (a) of the Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service and "Primary Receipt Point Capacities" means each of them. "Prime Rate" means, at any time, the per annum rate of interest then designated by the main branch of The Bank of Nova Scotia in Cal- gary, Alberta as its reference rate of interest for Canadian dollar commer- cial loans in Canada and which is announced by such Bank as its Prime Rate. A rate of interest payable pursuant hereto shall change automatical- ly without notice to any party on each occasion upon which the Prime • 360 • Rate is varied. Interest accruirig due hereunder shall be calculated using the nominal rate method ·and shall "be Compounded monthly. "Receipt Point'' mea.nS:a point on Transporter's pipeline system as .set out in Schedule "A" heretQ at which a shipper may in accordance with a Service Agreement tender Gas·for Transportation. "Secondary Receipt Point''· has the meaning ascribed to if in Article 2:9 of the Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service. "Service Agreement" means, as the context requires, a Transporta- tion Service Agreement or an Interi:uptible Transportation Service Agree- ment. · "Shipper" means any Penion who enter8 into a TSA with Trans- porter, or, if the context so requires, a person who enters into an ITSA with Transporter. "Shipper's Authorized VolUme~' has the meaning ascribed to it in Article 11 hereof. "Shipper's Contracted Capacities" means the aggregate of the Con- tracted Capacities under. all Transportation Service Agreements to which Shipper is a party. "Shipper's Nomination" has the meaning ascribed to it in Article 11 hereof. "Shipper's Revised Nomination" has the ~eaning ascribed to it in Article 11 hereof . . "Tariff" includes the Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service, the Toll Schedulelnterruptible Transportation· Service, and the G€neral Tenns and Conditions, as amended and approved from tim'e to tiine. . 361 . GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS . "Taylor - Aitken Creek Receipt Point" .or·,"TAC Receipt Poinf' means a R~eipt Point designated as .. a Taylor.,.,. Aitken Creek Receipt Point on Schedule "A" hereto. "Tran8portation" means the receipt of Gas.for Shipper's account at Receipt Points that are available to Shipper pursuant.to Shipper's Service Agreements and the transport and delivery ~f Gas for Shipper's account at the Delivery Point. ............ ·· _" .1.nt11:1por tat" . A greemen t" ion Service · ·or:·"'ISA" means an agreement . pursuant tci which Transporter provides Firm Service to a Shipper. "Transporter" means Alliance Pipeline Limited Partnership. · , "Transporter' s Contracted Capacities'' means. the aggregate 'of the COntract Capacities under·all Transportation Service Agreements to which Transporter is a party. "U.S. · Pipeline;'. means Alliance Pipeline L. P. · "U.S. Fuel Requirement" has the meaning ascribed to it in Article 14. ,"Year''.· means ·a period of three hundred sixty - five ( 365) consecu- tive days except where the year contains the date 29 February, in which ·ease' .it shall: consist of. thr,ee hundred sixty.:._ six (366) consecutive days. ARTICLE. 2: QUALITY 2 .1 Unless otherwise authorized by Transporter, Gas tendered to Transporte~ at .Receipt Points shall, subject to Article· 2. 2, · eonform to the following specifications: . • · shall have a Gross Heating Value of no less than thirty - six (36) MJ/m3 ; • shall be commercially free at prevailing pressure and tempera- ture in Transporter's pipeline from sand, dust, gums, hydro- carbons liquefiable at temperature in excess of minus ten de- .• 362 • grees Celsius ( - 10° C) and at the prevailing operating pres- . . silre , impurities, other objectionable substances that may be- come separated from the Gas, and other.solids or liquids that will render it unmerchantable or cause injury to or intederence .with proper operation of. the lines, regulatory commissions, meters or other facilities through which it flows; and shall not contain any substance not normally contained in Gas, other than traces of those.materials and chemicals necessary for the transportation and delivery of the Gas and which do not cause it to fail to meet any of the quality specifications herein set forth; • shall contain no more than 23 mj.lligrams of hydrogen sulphide per cubic meter, no more than 115 milligrams of total sulfur per cubic meter of Gas determined by standard methods and testing; . · • .· shall contain no more than two percent (2 % ) by volume of car.,- bon dioxide; • shall contain no more than sixty- five ( 65) milligrams of water vapor per cubic meter of Gas; • shall not exceeq a temperature of fifty degrees Celsius (50°C); • shall be as free of oxygen as practicable and shall in any event contain no more than four tenths of one percent ( 0. 4 % ) by volume of oxygen; and • shall in no event, contain any mix of components that will cause the presence of any liquids in the pipeline under normal operating conditions. 2. 2 Gas tendered at Receipt Points designated as AB 05 Boundary Lake, AB 06 Boundary Lake:- IOL, and AB 07 Boundary Lake South shall confonn to the relevant specifications set out in the relevant tariff of W e8tcoast Eneygy Inc. ·as such tariff may be amended from time to time. 2. 3 In the event gas tendered to Transporter by or on behalf of • 363 . Shipper fails to meet the specifications in Article 2. 1 or Article 2. 2 as ap- plicable, Transporter may refuse to receive the gas, in which case, Transporter will as soon as possible inform the Shipper to allow Shipper to promptly remedy any deficiency in quality. 2. 4 Waiver: Transporter reserves the right· to waive any or all such gas quality provisions, in a not unduly discriminatory manner, if it is determined by Transporter that such waiver can be granted without, in any way, jeopardizing the integrity of its system or violating any require- ment of U.S. Pipeline. 2. 5 In the event that Transporter determines that the projected Gross Heating Value of the commingled gas stream at any location on Transporter's system is approaching or is expected to approach the maxi- mum acceptable level, based on the design of Transporter ' s system, Transporter will implement the energy capacity allocation procedure de- scribed in Article 2. 6. For large diameter pipeline segments of Trans- porter' s system, under normal operating conditions, the anticipated lim- it for the Gross Heating Value of the commingled gas stream is approxi- mately 44. 3 MJ /m3 • 2. 6 Transporter shall take the following steps to allocate energy capacity on Transporter' s system when required pursuant to Article 2. 5. Transporter shall identify the affected part of its system, and specif- ically those Receipt Points for which these energy capacity allocation pro- cedures are being invoked. Transporter will first take all actions authorized under other portions of this Article 2, and specifically Article 2 .4, to eliminate or avoid the i- dentified problem. If necessary, Transporter will determine the temporary maximum Gross Heating Value that will be acceptable for Gas nominated at Receipt Points to eBsure that the commingled gas stream will not exceed the limit determined pursuant to Article 2. 5. . 364 . Transporter will notify Shippers of the situation and the temporary maximum Gross Heating Value for Gas nominated at affected Receipt Points. 2. 7 Nominations not in compliance with the temporary maximum Gross Heating Value will be rejected as not complying with the governing quality requirements. Transporter's actions will reflect Transporter's a- bility to reject Secondary Receipt Point nominations prior to rejecting, if necessary, Primary Receipt Point nominations for the affected Receipt Points, as a mechanism to alleviate the identified circumstance. Trans- porter will update the temporary maximum Gross Heating Value as re- quired, with the objective of maximizing the flexibility afforded to Ship- pers. ARTICLE 3: MEASUREMENT 3 .1 A unit of volume for purposes of reporting shall be one thou- sand (1000) cubic meters (103m3 ) of Gas. 3. 2 The volume of the Gas received from Shipper shall be deter- mined in accordance with the Electricity and Gas Inspection Act ( cana- da) and the Regulations thereunder. 3 .3 The absolute atmospheric pressure used for volume calculations shall be assumed to be a specific pressure determined by calculations based on the actual elevation above sea level at the site of the meter, regardless of variations in actual barometric pressure. The formula used to calculate the atmospheric pressure shall be in accordance with the methodology prescribed pursuant to the Electricity and Gas Inspection Act (Canada) and the Regulations thereunder. 3. 4 The determination of Gross Heating Value of Gas received or delivered shall be performed in a manner approved under the Electricity and Gas Inspection Act (Canada) and the Regulations thereunder or, if a manner for such determination is not set out in that Act, in accordance • 365 . with industry accepted standards, and, in any event, in a manner to en- sure that the Gross Heating Value so determined is representative of the Gas received or delivered at the Receipt or Delivery Point. ARTICLE 4: MEASURING EQUIPMENT 4 .1 All meters and measuring equipment for the determination of volume, Gross Heating Value or relative density shall be approved pur- suant to, and installed and maintained in accordance with, the Electricity and Gas Inspection Act ( Canada) and the Regulations thereunder. Notwithstanding the foregoing, all installation of equipment applying to or effecting deliveries of Gas shall be made in a manner permitting accu- rate determination of the quantity of Gas delivered and ready verification of the accuracy of meru;;urement. Care shall be exercised by Transporter and by Shipper in the installation, maintenance and operation of pressure regulating equipment so as to prevent any inaccuracy in the determi"nation of the volume of Gas delivered under the Service Agreement. 4.2 Transporter shall verify the accuracy of its measuring equip- ment once each month or at such longer intervals as agreed to by the par- ties. Transporter will verify the accuracy of measuring equipment when- ever requested by Shipper, provided requests do not require verification more than once in any month. If upon a requested verification, the mea- suring equipment is found to be registering correctly (which shall include any inaccuracy of two percent ( 2 % ) or less as mentioned below) , the cost of such requested verification shall be charged to and borne by the re- questing party; otherwise the cost of all requested verifications shall be borne by Transporter. If, upon any test, measuring equipment is found to be inaccurate but not by more than two percent (2 % ) , previous read- ings of the equipment shall be considered correct in computing deliveries, but the equipment shall be adjusted properly at once to record accurately. If, upon any tests, any measuring equipment is found to be inaccurate by . 366 . an amount exceeding two percent ( 2 % ) then the previous readings of the equipment shall be corrected to zero error for any. period that is known definitely or can be agreed upon, but if the period is not known definitely or cannot be agreed upon, such corrections shall be for a period covering the last half of the time elapsed since the date of the last test. 4. 3 Each party shall have the right to be present at the time of any installing, reading, cleaning, changing, repairing, inspecting, testing, calibrating or adjusting done in connection with the other' s eqillpment used in measuring receipts and deliveries hereunder. The records from such measurement equipment shall remain the property of their owner, but, upon request, eacJ1 will submit to the other its records and charts, together with calculations therefrom, for inspection and verification, sub- ject to return within thirty ( 30) days after receipt thereof. Each party shall preserve for a period of at least two (2) years all test data, charts, and other similar records or such longer period as may be required by a responsible authority having jurisdiction. ARTICLE 5: FORCE MAJEURE 5 .1 If either Transporter or Shipper fails to perform any obliga- tions under the Tariff or any Service Agreement due to an event of Force Majeure or any other event beyond its reasonable control then, subject to the provisions of the Tariff or such Service Agreement, such failure shall be deemed not to be a breach of such obligations. A party that fails to perform any obligation under the Tariff or Service Agreement where such failure is caused by such an event shall promptly remedy the cause thereof so far as it is reasonably able to do so, provided that the terms of the set- tlement of any strike, lockout or other industrial disturbance shall be wholly in the discretion of the party claiming suspension of its obligations hereunder by reason thereof. 5 .2 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5 .1, no event re- . 367 . £erred to therein shall: (i) relieve any party from any obligation or obli- gations pursuant to the Tariff or Service Agreement unless such party . ' ' gives notice with reasonable promptness of such event to the other party, or (ii) relieve any party from any obligation or obligations pursuant to the Tariff or Service Agreement after the expiration of a reasonable period within which, by the use of due diligence, such party could have reme- died or overcome the consequences of such event or (iii) except as ex- pressly provided in Article 4 of the Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service relieve any party from its obligations to make any Demand Charge, Demand Charge Surcharge or other payments to the other. 5. 3 . Where the failure by either party to perform any obligation under the Tariff or Service Agreement is, by virtue of the provisions of Article 5 .1, deemed not to be a breach of such obligation, then the time for the performance of such obligation shall be extended by a number of days equal to the number of days during which the relevant event exist- ed. ARTICLE 6: RECEIPT AND DELIVERY PRESSURE 6 .1 All gas tendered by or on behalf of Shipper to Transporter shall be tendered at a Receipt Point at the pressure requested by Trans- porter from time to time. Shipper shall not be required to tender gas at a receipt pressure in excess of that specified for the specific Receipt Point in Schedule "A" . 6.2 All Gas delivered by Transporter to the facilities of U.S. Pipeline at the Delivery Point shall be delivered at the pressure agreed to by Transporter and U.S. Pipeline. ARTICLE 7: BILLING AND PAYMENT 7 .1 On or before the ninth (9th) day of each Month, Transporter sllifll deliver to Shipper by electronic or other means a statement of the • 368 . amount payable by Shipper to Transporter for the preceding Month. Transporter will also deliver to Shipper by electronic or other means a statement of any charges calculated in accordance with Article 13. If ac- tual quantities are unavailable in time to prepare the billing, such charges shall be based on estimated quantities and Transporter shall provide, in the succeeding Month' s billing, an adjustment based on any differences between actual quantities and estimated quantities. Any required invoice backup data will accompany the invoice. 7.2 At the reasonable request of Transporter, Shipper shall pro- vide to Transporter in a timely manner any information or data required by Transporter to calculate and verify the volume, quality and Gross Heating Value of Shipper's actual deliveries to Transporter. 7. 3 All payments under a Service Agreement or a Toll Schedule shall be made in. Canadian funds to a depository designated by Trans- porter via electronic funds transfer on or before the later of the twenty - fifth (25th) day of the Month and the fifth (5th) Business Day following receipt by Shipper of the monthly statement. If the payment due date falls on a day that the designated depository is not open in the normal course of business to receive Shipper's payment, then Shipper's pay- ment shall be made on the first day after the payment due date that such depository is open in the normal course of business. If Shipper fails to pay in accordance with this Article 7. 3 all or any portion of the amount shown as payable by Shipper on a monthly statement, interest thereon shall accrue daily at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the Prime Rate plus one percent (1 %) . If the failure to pay continues for ten (10) days after payment is due, Transporter, in addition to any other remedy it may have, may suspend further transport·and delivery of Gas for Shipper without further notice. Such suspension of transport and delivery of gas shall not constitute a failure by Transporter to perform any of its obliga- tions under this Tariff or any Service Agreement. . 369 . 7. 4 Provided that a claim is made within sixty ( 60) days of dis- covery of a billing error, and in any event within twenty four ( 24) months from the date on the statement claimed to be in error, a billing error shall be adjusted within thirty ( 30) days from the date of receipt by the other party of a notice claiming discovery of the billing error, as fol- lows: Where· Shipper has been overcharged and has paid the statement, the amount of the overpayment will be refunded to Shipper with interest at a rate equal to the sum of .the Prime Rate and one percentage point ( 1 % ) from the date of the overpayment to the date of the refund. Where the refund is provided to Shipper by way of credit on another Transporter invoice, the overpayment will be deemed to have been refunded on the date the credited invoice is received by the Shipper. Where Shipper has been undercharged by Transporter, Shipper will pay the amount of the undercharge without interest provided the under- charge is paid within thirty (30) days. Interest shall accrue daily on un- dercharge amounts not paid within thirty (30) days at a rate equal to the daily equivalent .of the Prime Rate plus one percent ( 1 % ) from the date of the statement. ·7. 5 Transporter or Shipper shall have the right at reasonable times to examine the books, records and charts of the other party, to the ex- tent necessary to verify the accuracy of any statement or any claim for un- derpayment or overpayment. 7 .6 (a) Transporter shall not be entitled to suspend further-deliv- ery of Gas pursuant to Article 7. 3 if Shipper in good faith: (i) disputes the amount of any such bill or part thereof; (ii) provides Transporter with a written notice including a full description of the reasons for the dispute, to- gether with copies of supporting documents; and • 370 •. (iii) pays to Transporter such amounts as it concedes to be correct. (b) Shipper shall not off set any disputed amounts against the Demand Charge, or Demand Charge Surcharge por- tion of its bill. (c) In the event of a good faith billing dispute, Transporter may demand, and Shipper, within ten (10) days of such demand, shall furnish a good and sufficient surety bond guaranteeing payment to Transporter of all disputed amounts for any bills that are or will be affected by such dispute. If Shipper fails to provide a bond to Transporter guaranteeing payment, or if Shipper defaults in the con- ditions of such bond, then· Transporter shall have the right to suspend or terminate Shipper' s Service Agree- ment. (d) Any good faith billing dispute shall be submitted to arbi- tration pursuant to the Arbitration Act of Albert.a within sbcty ( 60) days of Transporter ' s receipt of Shipper' s written notice under Article 7. 6 (a) . 7. 7 In the event that Shipper daes not pay the full amount due Transporter in accordance with this Article 7, Transporter, without prej- udice to any other rights or remedies it may have, shall have the right to withhold or set off payment or credit of any amounts of monies due or owing by Transporter to Shipper, whether in connection' with Shipper' s Service Agreement or otherwise, against any and all amounts of monies due or owing by Shipper to Transporter. ARTICLE 8: PRIORITY OF SERVICE 8 .1 (a) Transporter shall have the right to curtail or discontinue Transportation, in whole or in part, on all or a portion of its • 371 . 'system at any time for reasons of Force Majeure or when, in Transporter's sole judgment, capacity or operating conditions . so require, or it is desirable or necessary to make modifica- : tions, repairs or operating changes to its system. Transporter shall provide Shipper such notice of curtailment as is reason- rable in the circumstances. i(b) Transporter shall have the unqualified right to interrupt Interruptible Service at any time to provide Firm Service to any Shipper. ~(c) In the event of curtaihnent pursuant to Article 8.1 (a), Transportation shall be curtailed in the following order: (i) Interruptible Service will be curtailed first, pro rata, based ori the Interruptible Service scheduled in accor- dance with Article 12; (ii) AOS will be curtailed next, pro rata, based on Ship- 1 per' s relative rights to AOS as detennined pursuant to Article 2. 7 of the Toll Schedule Firm Transporta- tion Service with nominations for AOS made after the time for nominations set out in Article 11 being curtailed fully before timely nominations; and . (iii) Firm Service other than AOS will be curtailed next, pro rata, based on the Firm Service scheduled for each Shipper in accordance with Article 12. 8.2 In the event of curtailment pursuant to Artide 8.1 (a). at a specific Receipt Point, or a localized subset of Receipt Points, Trans- portation at such Receipt Point (s) shall be curtailed in the following or- der: (a) Interruptible Service at the Receipt Pol.nt (s) will be cur- tailed first and suchlnterruptible Service that is available at the Receipt Point ( s) shall be allocated, pro rata, • 372 • based on the ratio of the Interruptible Service scheduled for the Interruptible Shipper at the Receipt Point ( s) in .aci;:ordance .wj,th Article 12 to the aggregate Interruptible .Servi~ ~heduled at the Receipt Point ( s) in accordance with Article 12; (b) Firm Service (including AOS quantities) to Firm Ship- pers for which the Receipt Point ( s) is not a Primary Receipt Poh:it and Firm Shippers nominating quantities greater than the Shipper'· s Primary Receipt Point Capac- ity at the Receipt Point (s) will be curtailed next. Such Firm Service that is available to such Shippers at the Re- ceipt :Point ( s) shall be allocated among such Shippers, .pro rata, based on and up to each Shipper' s scheduled quantity above Primary Receipt Point Capacity at each Receipt Point. If the Receipt Poim (s) is a TAC Receipt Point, Firm Service (includiug AOS quantities) to Firm Shippers for which the TAC Receipt Point is not a Pri- mary Receipt Point and Firm Shippers nominating vol- mnes above their Primary Receipt Point Capacity at .that TAC Eeceipt Point, to the extent that such Shipper's aggregate Primary Receipt Point nominations .at. all TAC Receipt Points are less than the Shipper's aggregate , Pri- mary Receipt Point Capacity at all TAC Receipt Points, shall be excluded from this curtailment; · (c) Firm Service (including AOS quantities) at TAC Receipt Points to Firm Shippers for which the TAC Receipt Point , is not a Primary Receipt Point and. Firm Shippers nomi- nating volmnes above their Primary Receipt Point Capaci- ty at that TAC Receipt Point, to the extent ~hat such Shipper's aggregate Primary Receipt .Point nofilinations • 373 • . at all TAC Receipt Points are less than the Shipper' sag- gregate Primary Receipt Point Capacify at all TAC Re- ceipt Points, will be curtailed next. Such Firm Service that is available shall be allocated among such Firm Ship- pers, pro rata, based on and up the volume of Gas sched- uled for each shipper pursuant to Article 12.2 (b) at the Receipt Point; and (cl) Firm Service ( i~cluding AOS quantities) at all Receipt • 1 Points to Fimi Shippers to the extent the Receipt Point :· (s) is a Primary Receipt Point will be curtailed last and. such Firm Service that is available to such Shippers at the Receipt Point shall be allocated among such Shippers, pro rata, based on and up to the volume of Gas scheduled for each Shipper pursuant to Article 12".2 (a) at the Re- ceipt Point. ARTICLE 9: NONWAIVER AND FUTURE DEFAULT 9 .1 No waiver by either Transporter or Shipper of any one or more defaults by ihe other in the performance of any provisions of· the Service Agreement shall operate or be construed as a waiver of any continuing or future defa~t or defaults 1 whether of a like or different character. ARTICLE 10: REQUESTS FOR TRANSPORTATION SERVICE ' 10.1 Valid requests for Transportation under Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service and Toll Schedule Interruptible Transportation Service shall· be made b~ providing the following information in writing to Transporter at the following address: Alliance Pipeline Limited Partnership Suite 400 605 5th Avenue S. W. CalgarY' Alberta . 374 . Oinada T.4P 3H5 Attention: Manager, Tariff Administration (a) Identification of Shipper: (i) Shipper's legal name ~d princip;tl place of b~in~: _(ii) Shipper's business address for notices and billing. (iii) ?hipper' s telephone number, including at least one telephone number at which an authorized employee or agent. of Shipper can be. contacteQ on a 24 hour, 7 day a week basis. (b) Character of service requested (firm or Interruptible) · (c} Requested Contracted Capacity for Firm Service or Maxi- mum Daily Transportation Quantity fqr :Interruptible Ser- ,vice, stated in 10? m3 per day. :. , : ..-. (d) Requested date of commencement of ~rvice. (e) Requested term of service . . . (f) Requested Primary Receipt Point ( s), from the Receipt Points listed in Schedule A to· the General Terms and Conditions and requested Primary Receipt Point Capaci- ties at each receipt point if request is, pursuant to toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service. ( g) Whether any party to the transaction is an Affiliate of . Transporter, either as shipper, supplier, or as the person for whom service is provided and, if so, the extent of that affiliation. (h) If Shipper requests service on behalf of a third party, . . Shipper shall submit a copy of an executed agreement be- . tween Shipper and the third party that authorized Ship- p~r to. act on behalf of the third party to secure the .Transportation requested. Shipper shall provide the , name_, address, telephqne number and status (for exam- • 375 • pie, Local Distribution Company arid producer) of the third party. ARTICLE 11: NOMINATIONS 11.1 {a) For service required on any day under each Service A- greement, Shipper shall provide Transporter with a nomina- tion indicating the Receipt Points, Delivery Points, the ap- . plicable Toll Schedule, the. volume of ·Gas, Gross Heating Value or total number of Joules ("Shipper Nomination") that Shipper desires to be received, transported and delivered, and such other information as Transporter reasonably deter- hunes as necessary. (b) Nominations are to be provided to Transporter in writ- ing or by electronic means agreed to between Trans- porter and the Shipper so as to be received by Trans- porter in accordance with the timelines established in conjunction with U.S. Pipeline, which reflect the Gas .Industry Standards Board ( "GISB") standard nomina- . tion cycles. ( c) In addition to the Receipt Points listed in Schedule "A", Shippers may, as part of a Nomination, re- quest transfers to and from the Canadian Receipt Pools of other Shippers. Shippers may also nomi- nate for transfer to or from Shipper' s Canadian De- livery Pool to the Canadian Delivery Pool of other Shippers. Transfers to ·and from the Canadian De- livery Pools of other parties and transfers to and from the Canadian Receipt Pools of other parties are collectively referred to as "Title Transfers." ( d) If such Title Transfers are confirmed through • 376 •. matching and equal norrtlnations by both parties, all remaining nominations, scheduling, and cur- tailment procedures will be implemented based on the parties aggregate Nominations net of such Ti..: tle Transfers. · 11. 2 . (a) If Transporter accepts Shipper' s Nominations, Ship- per' s Nomination including Fuel Requirement and U.S. Fuel Requirement, shall be " Shipper ' s Authorized ·Volume." (b) If Transporter determines that it will not accept Ship- per's Nomination (for reasons of Force Majeure, fail- ure of Shipper to eomply with Shipper's Service Agree- ments, or any reason what:Soever consistent with the Tariff) Transp6rter shall advise Shipper on the day im- mediately preceding the day for which service was re- . quested of the reduced volume (if any) that Transporter is .Prepared to transport and deliver under Shipper' s Service Agreements (the "Accepted Volume") . Ship- per shall provide a revised nomination ( "Shipper' s Re- vised Nomination") to Transporter Shipper' s Revised Nomination shall be no greater than the Accepted Vol~ ume. (c) If Shipper does not renominate, Shipper's Nomination will be assumed to be the Accepted Volume and shall ·become Shipper ' s Authorized Volume. If Shipper' s Revised Nomination is less than the Accepted Volume, then the sum of (1) Shipper's Revised Nomination, (2) Fuel Requirement, and (3) U.S. Fuel Require- ment shall become Shipper's Authorized Volume. 11.3 Transporter shall permit Shipper to revise Shipper's Nomi- • 377 .. nation under Transporter's Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service at any time prior to the end of a Day being scheduled, proyided: (a) such revision may be implemented, in Transporter's reasonable judgment, by Transporter without detriment to Transporter'.s service to any other Firm Shipper; (b) such revision is not inconsistent with any term or con- dition of Transporter' s Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service or TSA; and (c) such revisioI). can be confirmed in wtimely manner with Shipper's upstream transportation operators and other operators of con- necting facilities and U.S. Pipeline. Such change in nominated and scheduled deliveries shall be made prospectively only. Notwithstanding Article 11.2, if Transporter permits Shipper to revise Shipper's Nomi- nation under this Article 11. 3 then the sum .of ( 1) such revised Shipper' s Nomination, (2) Fuel Requirement, and, (3) U.S. Fuel Requirement shall become Shipper's Authorized Volume. 11.4 Transporter may allow, but shall not be obligated to allow, Shipper to revise its nominations under Transporter" s Toll Schedule In- terruptible Transportation Service at any time prior to the end of the Day being scheduled, provided: (a) such revision may be implemented, in Transporter.' s reasonable judgment, by Transporter without detriment to Transporter's service to any other Firm or Interruptible Shipper; (b) such revision is not inconsistent with any term or condition of Trans- porter's Toll Schedule Interruptible Transportation Service and the IT- SA; and ( c) such revision can. be confirmed in a timely manner with Shipper's upstream transportation operators and other operators of con- necting facilities and, U.S. Pipeline. Such change in nominated and scheduled deliveries_.shall be made prospectively only·. Notwithstanding Article 11.2, if Transporter permits Shipper to reyise Shipper's Nomi- nation under· this Article 11. 4 then the sum of ( 1) such revised Shipper' s Nomination, (Z)Fuel.Requi:t:ement, and (3) U.S. Fuel Requirement shalLbecom,e Shipper's Authorized Volume . • 378. • 11.5 All Nominations are subject to adjustment by Transporter in accordance with Article 13 hereof .. ARTICLE 12: SCHEDULING 12 .1 TransJ}orter shall schedule all Firm Service for each Shipper prior to the scheduling of any Interruptible Service. Trans- portation shall be scheduled in accordance with the following . order of declining priority: (a) Firm Service (excluding AOS) up to Shipper's C.On- tracted Capacities under the Toll Schedule Firm Trans- portation Service, pro rata, based on each Shipper' s C.Ontracted Capacities. (b) AOS under Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service, allocated in accordance with Article 2. 7 of Toll Schedule Finn Transportation Service. (c) Interruptible Service under Toll Schedule Interruptible Transportation Service, pro rata, based on the nomina- tions of all shippers seeking Interruptible Service. 12. 2 Scheduling at specific Receipt· Points shall be in accordance with the following order of declining priority: (a) Scheduling of Firm Service (including AOS quantities) at all Receipt Points will accord priority to Firm Ship- pers for which the Receipt Point is a Primary Receipt Point, to the extent of the Shipper's Primary Receipt Point Capacity for such Receipt Point; (b) Scheduling of Finn Service (including AOS quantities) at a TAC Receipt Point will afford priority to Firm Shippers for which the TAC Receipt Point is not a Pri- mary Receipt Point and Firm Shippers nominating vol- umes above their Primary Receipt Point Capacity at that • 379 • TAC Receipt Point, to the extent that such Shipper's aggregate Primary Receipt Point nominations at all TAC Receipt Points are less than the Shipper' s aggregate Primary Receipt Point Capacity at all TAC Receipt Points. Such Firm Service shall be allocated among such Firm Shippers, pro rata, based on and up to each Ship- per' s unnominated aggregate Primary Receipt Point - Capacity for all TAC Receipt Points. Capacity at TAC Receipt Points that is not allocated in accordance with this Article 12 . 2 - ( b) shall be allocated in accordance -, with Articles 12.2 (c) and 12.2 (d); : (c) Remaining Firm Service (including AOS quantities) at Receipt Points shall be allocated among Firm Shippers for which the Receipt Point is not a Primary Receipt Point and Firm Shippers nominating quantities greater than Shipper's Primary Receipt Point Cap~city at the Receipt Point. Such Firm Service shall be allocated a- mong such Firm Shippers, pro rata, based on and up to each such Shipper ' s Firm Service nomination above their Primary Receipt Point Capacity at that Receipt Point; and ' ( d) Interruptible Service shall be allocated among Interrupt- ible Shippers, prdrata, based on the ratio of the volume of Interruptible &rvice nominated at the Receipt Point by the Interruptible Shipper to the aggregate volume of Interruptible Service nominated at the Receipt Point by all Interruptible Shippers. 12. 3 ~- Until Transporter has informed Shipper that Shipper ' s Nomination; whether monthly, daily or intraday, is accepted, such vol~ umes will nqt be deemed scheduled. . 380 • ARTICLE 13: UNAUIHORIZED VOLUMF.S AND IMBALANcEs 13 .1 Shipper shall use reasonable efforts to minimize variances from scheduled quantities under each Toll Schedule. Notwithstanding such efforts, it is acknowledged that such variances are likely to occur. However, under certain circumstances, pursuant to the provisions of this Article, Shipper may be subject to penalties.for failure to operate reason- ably in this regard. Transporter shall, in good faith, assist Shipper in avoiding such penalties. Under no circumstances shall the payment of such penalties relieve Shipper from the obligation to take all required ac- tions to resolve outstanding Imbalances. 13. 2 Transporter shall use all reasonable efforts to tolerate Shipper variances because of temporary limitations of the physi~ capability of Transporter' s system, giving due consideration to flexibility available to Transporter by fluctuating line pack levels and exploitation of permissible use of any operational balancing agreements with interconnecting facili- tiffi. Under no circumstance shall Transporter tolerate Shipper Imbal- ances that have a deleterious and discriminatory effect upon the capacity available to Finn Shippers. 13. 3 ·Shipper shall use all reasonable efforts to at all times maintain balance, based on the best available information, between: (a) volume of gas scheduled for receipt to Shipper's account from each Receipt Point and actual volume received to Shipper's account from each Receipt Point ( "Volume Receipt Variance") ; (b) total energy scheduled for receipt to Shipper' s account from each Receipt Point and actual energy received to Shipper's account from each Receipt Point ( "Energy Receipt Variance") ; (c) aggregate volume received to Shipper's account and ag- • 381 . gregate volume of gasdelivered by Transporter from Shipper' s account at" the Delivery Point ( "Volume Im- balance") ; and (d) aggregate energy received to Shipper's account and ag- gregate energy delivered by Transporter from Shipper's ac~ oount at the Delivery Point ( "Energy Imbalance") . 13 . 4 All imbalances or variances defined in Article 13 . 3 ( collec- tively "Imbalances") shall be held in the Shipper's account in the Ship- per's Receipt Pool. Transporter shall make available in advance of the time for timely nominations each Day the best available estimate of the various Imbalances to Shipper's account. 13. 5 Shipper shall not be subject to any penalty for prevailing Im- balances, provided at all times: (a) Shipper' s account is within acceptable tolerance levels, as specified by Transporter from time to time, based on the best available information; and (b) Shipper takes all reasonable actions to eliminate any Im- balances, as required by the provisions of this Article, including complying with all reasonable directions of Transporter to address prevailing Imbalances, with Transporter giving due consideration to avoiding poten- tial impacts on other Shippers in identifying reasonable courses of action in specific circumstances. 13.6 Transporter shall communicate to all Shippers, as part of the nomination procedures, the current acceptable level of tolerance for Im- balances. Transporter shall use all reasonable efforts to operate its system so as to permit tolerance of periodic Imbalances by each Shipper, subject to compliance with the requirements of this Article 13, up to 4 % of the volume authorized by Transporter. However, Transporter reserves the right to impose more stringent Imbalance tolerance levels, based on the • 382 . . need to maximize throughput or to protect the integrity of Transporter's facilities. 13. 7 Daily allocations by operators of interconnecting systems up- stream of the Alliance Receipt Points ( "Upstream Operators") shall only give rise to Imbalance penalties, if Shipper fails to take immediate action to reduce any identified Imbalances within tolerance levels specified by Transporter at that time. In the event such actions are not taken, Trans- porter may adjust new or standing nominations so as to bring Shipper' s account within specified tolerance levels. 13. 8 Any month - end allocation adjustments by Upstream Opera- tors shall not give rise to Imbalance penalties, except to the extent the month end allocations confirm Imbalances indicated by the correspond- ing daily allocations. For the purpose of establishing final Imbalances and imposing associated penalties, if any, differences between the month - end all~cation and the aggregate of the individual daily allocations shall be prorated across each Day. in the Month based upon the daily allocations confirmed by the Upstream Operators. 13. 9 Any cumulative Imbalance confirmed by month - end alloca- tion adjustments by Upstream Operators, if applicable, shall · be eliminated by Shipper by immediately implementing one bf the following courses of action: (a) Effecting Title Transfer (s) to or from Shipper's Re- ceipt Pool sufficient to eliminate any such Imbalance (provided this does not create an Imbalance for the ac- count of another Shipper) ; or (b) Adjusting Shipper's nomination over a period no greater than 25 Days, as agreed to by Transporter ( accom- plished by reductions of no less than one twenty fifth of the original cumulative Imbalance on any Day) , to e- liminate any such Imbalance. • 383 . 13 .10. In the event Shipper does not take either of the actions in. Article 13.9 (a) and (b) in sufficient quantity, Transporter may de- crease Shipper' s Receipt or delivery nomination to eliminate the out- standing Imbalance in a timely and an orderly fashion. 13 .11 If, based on month - end allocations of Upstream Operators prorated across each Day in the Month in accordance with this Article 13 (where relevant), the Volume Imbalance exceeds the Imbalance toler- ance level specified by Transporter on ?UY Day, and such data confirms the best available data available at the time the Imbalance was originally identified, and Shipper failed to take action, Shipper shall be subject to a charge ("Volume Imbalance Penalty") . The Volume Imbalance Penalty shall be the product obtained by multiplying the absolute amount of the Imbalances in excess of the stated tolerance level on each Day in the Month, by ten times the Daily Demand Charge for the Month. ARTICLE 14: FUEL 14 .1 Shipper shall nominate for and tender or cause to be tendered to Transporter, in addition to the Gas that Shipper desires to be delivered for Shipper's account at the Delivery Point, a volume of Gas determined on the basis of the applicable monthly fuel 'ratio established by Trans- porter, a volume of gas equal to Transporter's reasonable determination of estimated line losses ;md unaccounted for Gas, and the required opera- tional variance in linepack for the month, (collectively the "Fuel Require- ment") . Transporter will advise Shipper of the applicable Fuel Require- ment by no later than the twenty- fifth (25th) day of the Month for the following Month, or, in the absence of such notification, Shipper shall use the last monthly Fuel Requirement established by Transporter. 14. 2 Shipper shall nominate for and tender or cause to be tendered to Transporter as part of the Gas that Shipper desires to be delivered for Shipper's account at the Delivery Point a volume of Gas determined on • 384 • the basis of the applicable monthly fuel ratio established by U.S. Pipeline, a .volume of gas equal to U.S. Pipeline' s reasonable determina- tion of estimated line losses and unaccounted for Gas, and the required operational variance in linepack (collectively the "U.S. Fuel Require- ment") . Shippers shall not be required to pay Transporter any toll for Transportation of the U.S. Fuel Requirement. 14.3 Transporter is not required to accept any nomination; (a) that does not include a nomination for the Fuel Requirement and the U.S. Fuel Requirement, or (b) if Transporter is not satisfied, in its sole discretion, that the Fuel Requirement and U.S. Fuel Requirement will actually be tendered to Transporter in accordance with the nomination. In the event Transporter refuses the nomination for the reasons set out in this Article 14. 3, Transporter shall advise Shipper to revise its nomina- tion for the Fuel Requirement and U.S. Fuel Requirement and Shipper shall revise its Fuel Requirement and U.S. Fuel Requirement nomina- tion. 14.4 The Fuel Requirement and U.S. Fuel Requirement will be calculated on an energy basis and expressed in Gj per 10 3 m 3 of Gas to be transported. ARTICLE 15: PRIORITY OF RECEIPIS 15 .1 Gas shall be deemed to be transported from Shipper's Cana- dian Receipt Pool on Shipper's behalf in the following order: (i) Fuel Requirement; (ii) U.S. Fuel Requirement; (iii) Firm Service (excluding AOS) up to Shipper's Con- tracted Capacities; (iv) AOS; and ( v) Interruptible Service. • 385 • ARTICLE 16: " . TO COMMINGLE RIGHf 16.1 Transporter shaHhave the right at all times to commingle Shipper's Gas with other Gas in the pipeline. Gas delivered by Trans- pdrter at the Delivery Point shall have the quality that results from Gas having been, transported and commingled in the pipeline. " . ARTICLE 17: NOTICES OF CHANGES IN OPERATING CONDIDONS 17 .1 ·Transporter and Shipper shall notify each other from time to time as necessary of expected changes in the rates of delivery or receipt of Gas, or in the pressures or other operating conditions, and the reason for such expected changes, to the end that the other party may be prepared to meet them when they occur. ARTICLE 18: POSSESSION AND CONTROL OF G.As 18 .1 . Transporter shall be deemed to be in possession of; in control of and. resp0nsible for all Gas received by it tintil· the Gas is delivered by it at the Delivery Point. ARTICLE 19: SHIPPER WARRANTY AND INDEMNITY 19 .1 .' Shipper warrants to Transporter that it will at the time of tendering have title to or right to tender all Gas tendered by it or on its behalf to Tf"ansporter for Transportation free and clear of liens and en- cumbrances and adverse claims of every kind, except that the option granted pursuant to Article 5 (Option to Extract and Purchase Liquids) of a TSA or Article 5 (Option to Extract and Purchase Liquids) of an IT- SA shall not constitute an encumbrance or adverse claim hereunder. 19.2 . Shipper represents and warrants to Transporter that it has and will maintain all authorizations for the removal of Gas from the • 386 .. province of production, export of Gas from Canada and import of Gas in- to the United States and any other authorization required to permit its Gas to be transported hereunder. 19 .3 Transporter warrants that, subject to Article 5 of the TSA or Article 5 of the ITSA, as applicable, .at the time of delivery of Gas for Shipper's account at the Delivery Point such Gas will be free and clear of all liens and encumbrances arising under or by virtue of Transporter. 19.4 Shipper shall indemnify Transporter and save it hannless a- gainst all claims, actions or damages arising from any adverse claims by third parties claiming ownership or an interest in the Gas tendered to Transporter for Transportation. 19. 5 Transporter and Shipper shall each indemnify the other and save it hannless from all suits, actions, debts, accounts; damages, costs, losses, and expenses arising out of the adverse claim of any per&>n or per- sons for any taxes, licenses, fees, royalties or charges that are applicable prior to the time of delivery of such Gas to such other party. 19. 6 Shipper shall indemnify Transporter and save it hannless from all taxes and assessments levied and assessed upon the sale and deliv- ery of such Gas prior to and upon delivery of such Gas to Transporter for Transportation. ARTICLE 20: FINANCIAL ASSURANCES 20 .1 Shipper shall at all times comply with one of the following creditworthiness requirements: (i) Shipper (or an Affiliate that guarantees Shipper's obli- gations under the Transportation Service Agreement or Interruptible Transportation Service Agreement) has an investment grade rating for its long - term senior unse- . cured debt from a recognized rating agent. The schedule below sets out the minimum acceptable rating from each of • 387 • the indicated rating agencies: Acceptable Credit Ratings * (Long - term Senior Unsecured Debt) Moody' sBaa 3 or betterStandard & Poor' sBBB or betterDominion Bond Rating ServiceBBB or betterCanadian Bond Rating ServiceBBB or betterNational Association of Insurance CommissionersNAIC 1 or NAIC 2 * Or other equivalent ratings from recognized rating agencies, .as deter- mined by Transporter .A Shipper who qualifies under this category initial- ly but is later downgraded below investment grade will be required to qualify under another category below. (ii) A Shipper whose long term senior unsecured debt does not have an acceptable rating as outlined in the schedule above will be accepted as creditworthy if Transporter and its lenders determine that, notwithstanding the absence of an acceptable rating, the financial position of the Ship- per (or an Affiliate that guarantees the Shipper's obliga- tions under the Transportation Service Agreement or In- terruptible Transportation Service Agreement) is accept- able to Transporter and the lenders. Application for ac- ceptance as creditworthy may be made at any time. Ship- per will not be subject to having its acceptance under this category revoked unless there has been a material adverse change in the financial criteria relied on at the time of ac- ceptance in the sole opinion of Transporter and its lenders. (iii) A Shipper who, at the time of execution and delivery of its Transportation Service Agreement or Interruptible Transportation Service Agreement or at any time there- after while it is bound thereby, is not eligible under ( i) or (ii) above, must provide security for its obligation by • 388 • either: (a) posting a letter of credit or pledging a cash deposit, in an amount equal to the amount of the letter of credit, as set forth below; or (b) by providing oth- er security acceptable to Transporter. A letter of credit or cash deposit under (a) above shall be in the followi~ amounts: (i) with respect to a Shipper under a Transportation SerVice Agreeme~t, an amount equal to 12 months of estimated Demand Charges and Demand Charge Surcharges if applica- ble, such security to be adjusted annually to reflect any change in the estimated Demand Charges and Demand Charge Surcharge if applicable, for the succeeding 12 months; (ii) with respect to a Ship- per· under an Interruptible Transportation Service Agreement, such security shall be equal to the prod- uct obtained by multiplying the Maximum Daily Transportation Quantity in Shipper'· s ·Interruptible Transportation Service Agreement by the Interrupt- ible Service Toll and that product multiplied by thir- ty ( 30) ; and shall. be adjusted from time to time to reflect any changes to Shipper'· s Maximum Daily Transportation Quantity and the· Interruptible Ser- vice Toll. ( iv) Transporter reserves the right to require any Shipper who does not qualify under .Paragraph ( i) above and who has not been accepted pursuant to par~ph (ii) above to provide the security required by paragraph (iii) above. Any Shipper who qualifies under paragraphs (i) or (ii) above by virtue of an Affiliate· guaranteeing the • 389 • obligations of the Shipper shall provide an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee from the Affiliate, in Trans- porter's usual form, and ·shall provide the guarantee · concurrently with the execution of the Transportation Service Agreement or Interruptible Transportation Ser- vice Agreement. ARTicLE 21: CREDITING OF REVENUE FROM IN1ERRUPTIBLE . TRANSPORTATION . 21.1 .For each Month Transporter shall calculate and credit to each , . i Finn Shipper a share of an aggregate Interruptible Revenue •Credit determined and allocated as follows: . (a) The aggregate Interruptible Revenue Credit shall bee- qual to the product obtained by multiplying (1) the total volume of Gas transported by Transporter under Inter- ·1', ruptible Service for all Shippers in the preceding Month I '> by (2) the Interruptible Service Toll. ,(b) Each Finn Shipper shall be allocated, by way of deduc- . ! tion from the Monthly Bill otherwise payable by such Shipper for the Month following the Month for which the aggregate Interruptible Revenue Credit has been de- ,' termined, a pro rata share of the aggregate Interruptible Revenue Credit determined based on Contracted Capaci- ties as at the first day of the Month for which the aggre- . · gate Interruptible Revenue Credit ha8 been determined. ARTicLE 22; INCoRPORATION IN TOLL SCHEDULES ' . AND CONTRACTS. 2i.1 .These·General Terms and Conditions are incorporated in and are part of all Toll Schedules and Service Agreements.· . 390 . I 22.2 These General Terms and Conditions, the Toll Schedules and all. Service Agreements are subject to the provisions of all valid present and future laws, rules, regulations and orders of any legislative body or duly constituted authority now or hereafter having jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. ARTICLE 23: TRANSPORTATION SERVICE AGREEMEN'IS 23 .1 Shipper shall enter into a Transportation Service Agreement or Interruptible, Transportation Service Agreement with Transporter un- der Transporter' s appropriate standard form of Transportation Service Agreement or Interruptible Transportation Service Agreement, a5 pre- sented in Appendix I and Appendix II hereto respectively. 23. 2 The term of an Interruptible Transportation Service Agree- ment shall be agreed upon between Shipper and Transporter at the time of the execution thereof. ARTICLE 24: NOTICF.S . '24 .1 Except as otherwise provided, any request, demand, state- ment, or bill, or any notice (collectively "a notice") that either party de- sires. to give. to the other, must be in writing and shall be validly commu~ nicated by the delivery thereof to its addressee, either personally or by courier or by telecopier, and will be considered duly delivered to the party rowhom it is sent .at the time.of its delivery if personally delivered or if sent by telecopier during normal business hours, or on the day following transmittal thereof if sent by courier (provided that in the event normal coUrier service, or telecopier service shall be interrupted by a cause be- yond the control of the parties hereto, then the ,party sending the notice sliatl utilize any service that has not been so interrupted or shall personally deliver such notice) tothe.othei party attheaddress.setforth below. Each party shall provide notke to the other of any change of address . 391 . ) for the purposes hereof. (i) Operator: To be advised (ii) Transporter: Alliance Pipeline Limited Partnership clo Alliance Pipeline Ltd. Ste 400, 605 - 5 Avenue S. W. Calgary, AB, Canada TIP 3H5 Attention: Manager, Tariff Administration Fax: (403) 266-4495 (iii) Shipper: At the address set out in a Service Agreement. Routine communications, including monthly statements, will be considered duly delivered when mailed by either registered, certified, or ordinary mail .. ARTICLE25: OPERA10R 25 .1 Transporter shall have the right to designate any Person or Persons to function as "Operator" of its pipeline system with respect to, but not limited to, the management of facilities, receipt and disposition of nomin~tions, scheduling of receipts and deliveries, administration of Service Agreements and accounting. If Transporter designates an Opera- tor, references to Transporter in a Service Agreement, Toll Schedule or these General Terms and Conditions shall be read to include Operator act- ing on behalf of Transporter, to the extent applicable. ARTICLE 26: LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY 26 .1 In no event will either Transporter or Shipper be liable to the other for any indirect, special or consequential loss, damage, cost or ex- pense whatsoever based on breach of contract, negligence, strict liability or otherwise including, without limitation, loss of profits or revenues, cost of capital, loss or damages· for. failure to deliver Gas, cost of lost, . 392 . purchased or replacement Gas, cancellation of permits or certificates and the termination of contracts. 26 .2 Except as set out in Article 4 of the Toll Schedule Firm Transportation Service, Transporter shall have no liability to Shipper, nor obligation to indemnify and save harmless Shipper, in respect of Transporter' s failure for any reason whatsoever to accept receipt of, or deliver Gas pursuant to any Service Agreement between Transporter and Shipper. ARTICLE 27: MISCELLANEOUS 27 .1 Transporter and Shipper each assume responsibility and lia- bility for the installation, maintenance and operation of its respective 1properties and shall indemnify and save harmless the other party from all :liability and expense on account of any and all losses, damages, claims or actions, including injury to or death of persons, arising from any act or accident resulting from the installation, presence, maintenance and oper- ation of the property and equipment of the indemnifying party. . 393 • APPENDIX 5: CAPACITY ALLOCATION Allocation Methods "First come, first-served" In the early stages of market development, "first - come, first served" is 'likely to· discriminate in favor of incumbents, whose market presence and knowledge give them superior abilities to occupy the head of the queue initially. However, after the diversity of players has increased and a competitive structure has been realized, there is no reason to expect that any one group of participants would benefit from "first- come, first. - served" . Of course, it .is critical that the potentially discriminatory impact of "first come, first - served". is not extended inadvertently by discriminatory provisions such as "right of first refusal" provisions. "Beauty contest" A "beauty contest" (where the allocation of available capacity is de- termined by the application of various subjective and objective criteria) risks discripiination, or the appearance of discrimination, because of the high degree of discretion involved in setting criteria and evaluating appli-. cations. It is also likely to be time consuming, bureaucratic, non transparent and subject to political influence that could give rise to im- proper market distortions. These flaws would not seem to decrease as markets develop. Lotteries The allocation of spare capacity rights by lottery is non - discrimina- tory, and leads to an efficient allocation provided that liquid secondary markets exist. Moreover, it is likely to promote the development of such markets, precisely because of the likely inefficiency of the initial alloca- • 394 . tion. However; it has the potential disadvantage of distributini?; rents in an arbitrary fashion,' and creates an artificial incentive for entry .. Auctions Under certain circumstances, auctions can better achieve an efficient initial allocation of spare capacity than the other mechanisms discussed. High bids in auctions can be eX:pected to corresp0nd to high valuations by the bidders., so that the winners tend to be those parti~ who value the capacity rights most highly. However, under ah auction system, and in the absence of supple~ mentary regulatory provision, the transmission business would receive the rents arising from scarce capacity, and might therefore have a ·disincen- tive for efficient capacity expansion. More generally, even where capacity expansion is not at issue, it is quite possible for the total reven~e from the auction to be sO great .as to create excess profits for the transmission busi- ness. A corrective mechanism is therefore needed both to ensure efficient expansion and to prevent excess profits. One solution is to require the transmission business to set aside any excess profits arising from the auc~ tion into a separate fund. Proceeds in the fund would be applied to the costs of future capacity expansion. 0. Auctions and vertically- integrated undertakings Auctions have an inherent potential for discrimination when con- ducted by vertically - integrated undertakings. If a transmission business ~it' s associated supply business is allowed to participate in the aucti~n, then the integrated business. will have an inherent advantage in the bid- 0 Auctions may also have the opposite effect of creating "stranded costs," if the revenues arising from the auction are insufficient to allow fixed cost recovezy. In some cases this may be a temporary phenomenon related to low initial utilisation. However, in other cases it may be reason- abl~ to infer that fixed cost recovezy ~11 not be possible without some supplementary mechanism. Where stranded cost recovezy is a legitllna.te goal, it should be achieved through transparent and non - discriminatory mechanisms that minimise distortions to the competitive process. One such mechanism would be the addition of a floor price to the auction • 395 . ding. Oth~r market participants will be· deterred in their bids by the fear of submitti~ an excessive bid. For the integrated business, the bid will constitute ~imply a transfer payment from one affiliate to another, and have none~ economic impact. The only risk of a high bid is the possibili- ty of foregoing the revenues that the second - highest bidder might offer. If the second- highest bid is exogenous to the auction, as one might ex- pect in competitive markets' then the incumbent' s supply business unit will effectively benefit from a cap on its exposure from submitting an ex- cessive bid. Other m~ket participants face no inherent ceiling on their exposure from high bids. It will be necessary to design the auction in such a way so as to pre- vent the supply business unit from exploiting this advantage. I ' . • ' Liquid Secondary Markets Lotteries and first - come, first - served procedures may comply .' - . ' with the goal of non -discrimination, but alone they do not ensure an ef- ficient initial allocation of .capacity rights. The goal of efficiency favors the establishment of a secondary market in capacity rights. The value of capacity rights to pot~ntial gas shippers naturally varies over time. With a liquid seco~dary market, the parties who v~ue capacity rights the most at any particular time period will purchase them. In addition, the existence ' . of a second'.'11Y market can stimulate activity in the primary market by re- ducing the' risk of purchasing capacity rights. Market participants will . . know that. they can easily dispose of capacity rights if their business ' prospects do not develop as hoped. Finally; the secondary market can fa- cilitate the equivalent of bilateral "swaps" without the need for buyers and sellers to contact each other and negotiate separate contracts on a case - by - case basis. An effective seconda.rY market for capacity rights therefore renders the initial allocation of rights to spare capacity and the distribution of pri- or contractual rights relatively unimportant from an efficiency perspec- . 396 . tive, eliminating the key disadvantage of lotteries and "first- come, first served" policies. Under any such policies, capacity rights are sold subject to a price cap that prevents the pipeline owner from earning excess prof- its. If the cap binds, so that the price is below the market clearing price, then demand will exceed supply and the rights are distributed by the allocation mechanism. Such policies therefore rely on secondary mar- kets to allocate capacity efficiently and to provide incentives for efficient pipeline expansion. High prices for capacity in secondary markets signal scarcity, implying that new capacity will enjoy high utilization. Trans- mission businesses will therefore naturally choose to expand those pipes where capacity is most scarce. Moreover the price cap removes .any po- tential incentive of the transmission business to engage in monopolistic behavior by restricting expansion, since any scarcity rents go not to the transmission business but to other market participants in non - discrimi- natory fashion. It follows that firm capacity rights should be tradable, and the nec- essary protocols should be simplified and harmonized. so as to maximize liquidity in secondary markets. The existence of a liquid secondary mar- ket in capacity rights is a feature of competitive natural gas markets, and will foster competition and trade. There should be no requirement to pre notify or obtain approval from the transmission business for capacity trades. Such requirements are a significant disincentive to trade. As well as creating an unnece.'>Sary pro- · · cedural burden, they allow the transmission business to obtain commer- cially sensitive information that may be abused by its associated supply business unit. In particular, an entrant who wishes to serve a c!-1stomer previously contracted to the transmi8Sion business' s supply unit should be able to obtain the necessary capacity without the transmission business learning of the potential loss of a customer. Ensuring the proper functioning of the secondary market is not triv- . 397 . ial. Specifically, the initial allocation should foster liquidity in the sec- ondary market-and avoid the potential for market dominance. Dominance of the secondary market can be avoided by putting a suitable cap on the amount of spare capacity that any single party is allowed to hold. A num- ber of r~ators in the United States have attempted to impose price caps ,in the secondary market, but this is unsatisfactory as it gives rise to a ter- tiary "greY, market" where contractual devices are used to circumvent the price caps:· Such devices impo8e high transactions costs and lead to illiq- uidity in the market. Various other approaches have been used and are currently ~nder consideration in the United States. . 398 • { I ISBN 7-5021-4528-1