53360 JUSTICE Briefing Note POOR for the February 2010 Volume 4 | Issue 2 Expanding State, Expectant Citizens: Local Perspectives on Government Responsibility in Timor-Leste n David Butterworth* Introduction onistic body, as it once was under Indonesian and Portuguese administrations. It is now in partnership with the people, and “Timorese were willing to When the prime minister requests they—in view of this new affinity—have much greater expec- die to gain independence… further sacrifice to strengthen the tations as to what the state should provide for their welfare. today, as a fragile State, “fragile” state, one might ask how much more determined and At present, Timor-Leste’s citizens see the state as being “in we need to again embrace tolerant of hardship are the peo- their debt”, and expect it to repay the suffering endured during this great sense of purpose ple of Timor-Leste willing to be? their fight for independence. State initiatives proving long-term and determination” (Kay Even as the government has been commitment to settling this debt (though they might involve Rala Xanana Gusmao, only small, incremental advances) are regarded positively, as working with international agen- 17 August 2009). cies towards a more concerted are programs which make use of local resources and labor. effort of “participatory intervention” (Chopra & Hohe 2004), Such initiatives fit with customary patterns of exchange, and those farmers and families now urgently needing state support contribute to strengthening state legitimacy at local levels. are also those for whom the sacrifice would be most acute. With this potentially destabilizing situation in mind, in this briefing Trajectories of the Emerging State note we investigate local engagements between citizens and their state, and sketch out the values, hopes and expectations Timor-Leste’s continuing transformation into an independent that underlie these encounters and shape rural communities’ and democratic state gives cause for optimism: an increasingly definition of state responsibility.1 well-defined regulatory system and non-oil economic growth of 12.8% in 2008 and an estimated 7.4% in 2009 (IMF 2009) Based on a review of anthropological and political stud- have contributed to obviating post-conflict state fragility. The ies literature, as well as original field research on the imple- growing maturity of the state and mounting indications of mentation of two public service delivery programs (Local prosperity, however, do not mask a constellation of problems Development Programme and TIM Works),2 we put forward surrounding citizen-state relations—all having the potential to an argument in two parts. First, we outline current trends of fracture hard-won stability. state-building in Timor-Leste, showing that while contempo- rary relationships between citizens and the state are fragment- ed, an ambitious reform agenda culminating in decentraliza- * I would like to thank Pamela Dale, Rod Nixon, Lene Ostergaard, Geraldo Moniz da Silva and Matt Stephens for their support during research and generous comments tion aspires to increase local participation in state decision on drafts of this note. I thank also AusAID, our local research partners Luta Hamu- making. Second, with a view to informing the reform agenda tuk, staff of the Local Development Programme and TIM Works, and the people of Aileu and Lautem for their cooperation and warm hospitality. The author can be with voices from rural households and village halls, we bring contacted at david.butterworth@anu.edu.au. into focus historical connections between the peoples of east 1 This Briefing Note complements a series of publications, including Articulations of Local Governance in Timor-Leste: Lessons for Decentralization and (Re)Defin- Timor and the various iterations of the state to which they ing Local Governance through Development Initiatives: Contributions for the Youth have been subject. Development Program, from J4P Timor-Leste’s “State Building at the Local Level” project. These reports will be released in March 2010 and will be available at www. Independent Timor-Leste represents a radical shift in the worldbank.org/justiceforthepoor. 2 Field research was undertaken in 2009 and was carried out in 10 suco (villages) in construction of citizen-state relations in the region, and we sug- the districts of Aileu and Lautem. In-depth interviews were conducted with over 150 gest that communities are now invoking local idioms of gover- research participants from a cross-section of society involved in the implementation of the LDP and TIM Works programs. For more information on LDP, please visit nance, grounded in social obligation and reciprocal exchange, www.estatal.gov.tl. Information on the TIM Works program can be found at www.ilo. to define their state. The state is no longer an external or antag- org/jakarta/info/public/fs/lang--en/docName--WCMS_116128/index.htm. the world bank “Widespread, and in Contested claims over the grams, and through them the state, stack up in terms of the ex- some areas deepening, “real” champions of indepen- pectations of local populations. How do these programs change, poverty and the marked dence still linger alongside eth- repulse or respond to local values and practices, and how can failure of independence to nic tensions between the eastern this knowledge be used to improve state stability and legitimacy? improve material life has loro sa’e and western loro monu contributed to a deep affiliations—a mainspring of Toward Connection and Obligation the 2006/7 violence and popula- sense of frustration” tion displacements (Kingsbury Colonization and occupation by Portugal and Indonesia im- (Brown 2009: 142). posed state values that were largely antithetical to the values 2009). The lack of significant material improvement in rural communities and subsequent held legitimate in east Timor’s diverse societies. The new state migration to urban centers contributes to socio-economic reverses this condition: the state, at least in sentiment if not al- vulnerability, especially among the youth and elderly (Brown ways in practice, is now “owned” by the citizens. But with this 2009).3 And while the state has undergone a positive concep- change comes responsibility, and as the state and people have tual reconfiguration from adversary to partner, administrative partnered, so too has the state incurred an obligation to repay woes arising from disjunctures between Dili-based elites and the debt of the people’s suffering for independence. poor rural communities are undermining accountability and efficiency in public service delivery. Failure at this crucial nex- While the longevity of the Portuguese colony has made us between citizen and state is emphasized by anthropologist lasting impressions in the contours of the Timor-Leste pol- David Hicks (2007:13), who characterizes the partnership as ity, the extension of statehood to rural communities arguably no less than “dysfunctional.” reached its zenith during the short but severe Indonesian ad- ministration (1975–1999). But throughout these transforma- The problems are recognized by the government of Timor- tions, the state did not fully penetrate, and could not arrogate, Leste, and the current expansion of rural service delivery and, the ethos of governance held legitimate at local levels. States in particular, proposed decentralization4 is designed to address remained peripheral to customary livelihoods, politics and the ongoing challenges to rural growth and cohesion between cultural values, and were met with insistent hostility and resis- state and populace. A decentralized Timor-Leste would com- tance. Indeed, the failure of such “external” states to peaceably prise 13 municipalities, each with its own local assembly: a negotiate alliances with local communities strengthened cus- legislative body constituted by elected representatives with tomary systems, which—as densely networked economies and powers to approve budgets, adopt by-laws and oversee local cosmologies—became a key source of stability and welfare public service delivery.5 Decentralization is squarely aimed at (McWilliam 2005; Molnar 2006). alleviating the “dysfunction” of community-state relations by promoting “more effective, efficient and equitable public ser- The independent Timor-Leste state, on the other hand, pres- vice delivery” (Government of Timor-Leste 2008). ents a new vision of what a state can be for rural populations in the region, and decentralization could encourage further In preparation for such a significant shift in governance, 3 Findings from the second Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards (TLSLS) show Timor-Leste’s Ministry of State Administration and Territorial a large increase in poverty between 2001 (36%) and 2007 (50%) (World Bank and Management (MSATM) has implemented the Local Develop- Directorate of National Statistics 2009). The distribution of wealth in Timor-Leste is ment Programme (LDP).6 LDP allocates annual block grants also highly unequal: With a gini coefficient of 39.5, Timor-Leste ranked 162nd out of 182 surveyed nations in equality of income distribution in 2009 (UNDP 2009). The for small-scale infrastructure projects, which are designed and substantial growth in non-oil GDP in 2008 and 2009, however, will likely contribute selected through local planning processes in district assemblies7 to stemming further increases in poverty. 4 The Timor-Leste National Parliament approved a Law on Administrative and (which serve as the model for future municipal assemblies) Territorial Divisions for decentralization in June of 2009. Municipal elections are formed by elected suco (village) members and local public ser- planned for mid-2010, pending approval of additional laws on Local Government vants. With less explicit governance aims, but equally commit- and Municipal Elections. 5 Government of Timor-Leste, Ministry of State Administration and Territorial ted to increasing community participation in state initiatives, Management, Draft Law on Local Government. the TIM Works8 program utilizes labor-based rural road works, 6 Started in 2005 and initially supported by the United Nations Capital Develop- ment Fund (UNCDF). The program Block grants are allocated based on population enlisting local community members at a wage of 2 USD per day size, with a current allotment of US$3.50 per village resident, and average project to conduct basic maintenance and reconstruction of rural roads. cost was approximately US$5500 in 2007-8 (LGSP-Timor-Leste 2008). 7 Early pilots of LDP, including those studied by J4P, made use of sub-district and district-level planning processes. However, in keeping with the current decentraliza- These two programs are significant for their emphasis on tion model, new LDP districts concentrate on district-level planning, in consultation community driven development: providing one of the only chan- with suco and aldeia. 8 nels by which citizens can choose the direction of development In full, TIM Works is the “Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural In- frastructure Development and Employment Generation”, and implemented by the in their communities. Yet program design is still, by nature, a the- Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment (SEFOPE). oretical construct, floating above specificity before thudding into 9 Autochthonous political systems pre-dating and coexisting with colonial rule did not possess the same institutions as Western-based states, though some large and the messy world of political and logistical pragmatics. Lessons powerful kingdoms, like Sonba’i and Wehali, did effect some state-like powers, such are learnt in practice, and so we must consider how these pro- as holding authority to form militias and exact tribute (Boxer 1960; Therik 2004). engagement of citizens in state activities.10 This redefinition, they are not willing to become passive or dependent recipients. however, carries a particular set of values and responsibilities Demand is high among local communities for the extension of to be negotiated which, we suggest, are informed by customary the state footprint through service delivery,11 but in doing so the political systems. In Timor-Leste, transformative events such preservation of long-term reciprocity is also sought. as births change the fabric of political, as well as social, life in a hierarchical system scholars call “precedence” (Vischer The local construction of citizen-state relations stresses 2009). Transformations create asymmetric pairs, whereby each on-going and balanced partnerships with state initiatives. This component is assigned different responsibilities and a comple- view is informed by customary exchange practices which, in mentary relationship is mediated by exchanges of goods and Timor-Leste, can be contracted over individual life-times and services. For example, births differentiate elder and younger beyond. For example, in the lead up to marriage, and then siblings such that the “elder” is customarily attributed sacred continuing throughout the life authority and “younger” is given political power. In the birth of of the couple and often their “There are no poor Timor-Leste, the state is younger than the people, it is a new- children, bride-wealth goods people here, we are just comer who might wield power in the political sphere, but is in and services are customarily not given the means” many ways inferior, and obligated, to the elder, autochthonous, exchanged between the clans (chefe aldeia, male, 44). citizenry who facilitated its arrival. of the couple. While the “wife- taker” group carries the heavi- “According to our The specific dynamics of the relationship between citizen est burden, and must offer ex- Timor traditions…we work and state pivot on sacrifices made by the people to deliver in- pensive gifts such as buffalo, problems out ourselves, dependence. With reference to the Mambai people from Aileu the “wife-giver” group also district, Traube (2007:10) shows that the experiences of the expresses its commitment to the and do not complain to resistance movement “evokes a cultural code of reciprocity in relationship through counter- the government” which those who suffer to bring something forth must be repaid; prestations, such as their offer (chefe suco, male, 56). whoever benefited from or caused their suffering owes them of cloth, betel nut and hospitality on ritual occasions. ‘payment for their fatigue’ or ‘wages’ (seul kolen).” Fox (2009: 125) extends this principle to argue that the rural population as LDP and TIM Works are core instruments in the citizen- a whole “regard themselves as having purchased East Timor’s state partnership, and analysis of their achievements uncovers nationhood with their blood.” The new familial partnership be- aspects of program design that correspond or conflict with citi- tween the state and its citizens emergent in the independence of zen expectations. Undesirable outcomes, such as unbalanced Timor-Leste is given shape by the suffering necessary to attain power relationships between community and public servants or that very goal. From this local perspective, the debt of indepen- community dissatisfaction with the process and quality of sub- dence owed to the people by their new “younger sibling” must project implementation, can in part be explained by conflicting be repaid with stability, welfare and, eventually, prosperity. ideas of what public service delivery should, in fact, be doing. For example, much dissatisfaction among rural communities For example, an initiative carried out hurriedly and on ad with the performance of the new state revolves around infrastruc- hoc bases will likely be construed locally as unreliable, prob- ture. Degrading roads, overcrowded classrooms, and irregular ably corrupt and insufficient to fulfill state obligation. Estab- access to clean water were some of the major complaints heard lishing long-term, on-going exchanges between community by the J4P researchers. In some cases, citizens drew unfavorable and state, in which a reliable commitment is proven through comparisons with the advances in infrastructure made during the time, can reap greater dividends. Even if benefits might at first Indonesian occupation. In this respect, a positive transformation accrue only slowly, incremental advances build trust and con- in community welfare has not mirrored the transformation to in- fidence that “one-off ” programs do not (see Box 1). dependence. Indeed, dissatisfaction is heightened because there The long-term reciprocity hoped for by local communities in is now a closer sentimental connection with the state, forged their partnership with the state presents further possibilities for through violence and suffering, that entails higher expectations. refining state initiatives. While the state is undoubtedly viewed In our interviews with public servants, village elders, and project as a “debtor”, the cultural system underpinning the citizen-state beneficiaries, the majority charged the state with the responsibil- partnership does not preclude—and in fact encourages—recip- ity to make restitution for the peoples’ sacrifice. 10 The idea that decentralization impacts positively upon citizen-state relations and Implications for Public Service Delivery improves state accountability towards the citizenry is, of course, not without conten- tion (see World Bank 2005). Decentralization can arguably also increase the risk of In juxtaposition, these statements from community leaders cap- inefficiencies in spending, corruption, and clientelism. 11 For example, recent surveys show a clear preference for community leaders, ture a tension immanent in the new partnership between citizens rather than the judiciary, to retain responsibility for dispute resolution (2007 Timor- and state: while people expect more assistance from the state, Leste Survey of Living Standards, extended). rocal contributions from the “creditor”. Rural communities cer- Box 2: Cooperation between community and state tainly expect the state to repay their sacrifice in full, but this does not render citizens passive bystanders to state development, and In a small peri-urban aldeia in Lautem district, community action played a crucial role in shaping the implementation of an LDP experiences from LDP and TIM Works highlight this point. In- project. In 2007 a project to upgrade the small access road linking deed, some key challenges faced by the programs are overcom- it with neighboring communities was conceived through consensus decision making by local leaders, in which citizens were consulted ing obstacles hindering the involvement of motivated citizens. and an executive decision made by the hamlet chief (chefe aldeia) Public service delivery programs can draw upon local resources and ritual elders (lia na’in). The leaders also created a design for the project which they believed most suited to local conditions and during sub-project implementation, and this commitment can which would make most use of local resources. However, subse- substantially increase community satisfaction (see Box 2). quent changes in project design at district level were questioned by the local community, and they deemed project implementation by a contractor ineffectual. For example, community members were frus- Conclusion trated that the type of clay used to surface the road was spread too thinly and that the road did not extend to the houses located at the furthest end of the hamlet. To remedy this situation, a cooperative Understanding the values and hopes citizens have for their state work day was held by the hamlet, in which together the community is a fundamental, but often overlooked, aspect of measuring completed the road to the full length. progress in state-building and seeking new paths for change. In this note we have highlighted how customary values of reci- procity are shaping definitions of state responsibility in inde- part of future public service delivery programs will help create pendent Timor-Leste. The new state is a “sibling that came into the prosperity deserved by the people of Timor-Leste. being” through the sacrifice of resistance, and to the people it has thus incurred a debt to provide for their welfare. 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Justice for the Poor Briefing Notes provide up-to-date information on current topics, findings, and concerns of J4P’s multi-country research. The views expressed in the notes are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank.