Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. P7731-KM MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON ASSISTANCE TO THE UNION OF THE COMOROS UNDER THE ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE J UNE 3, 2010 Department: AFTP2 and PRMED Country Management Unit: AFCE2 Region: Africa This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CF (pegged to EUR at 489.9) USD1.00 = 343.75 (as of December 31, 2009) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR January 1 ­ December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank IsDB Islamic Development Bank AfDF African Development Fund ISN Interim Strategy Note (World Bank) AMF Arab Monetary Fund LIC Low-income country BADEA Arab Bank for Economic Development in MAMWE Comoros Water and Electricity Africa Company BCC Central Bank of Comoros MDG Millennium Development Goals CF Comorian franc MDRI Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative COTECNA Pre-shipment inspection company PV Present value DRA Debt Relief Analysis ODA Official Development Assistance DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis OPEC Organization of the Petroleum EC European Commission Exporting Countries ECF Extended Credit Facility (formerly PRGF, OFID OPEC Fund for International IMF) Development EIB European Investment Bank PCCF Post-Conflict Country Facility EPCA Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance PEM Public Expenditure Management ESF-RAC Exogenous Shocks Facility-Rapid Access PFM Public Financial Management Component PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth EU European Union Facility FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper GFS Government Finance Statistics REER Real effective exchange rate HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country SCRP Stratégie de Croissance pour la I-CSN Interim Country Strategy Note (AfDB) Réduction de la Pauvreté IDA International Development Association SIGFIP Integrated Public Finance Management IFAD International Fund for Agricultural System Development SCH Société Comorienne des IMF International Monetary Fund Hydrocarbures Vice President : Obiageli K. Ezekwesili (AFRVP) Vice President : Otaviano Canuto (PRMVP) Country Director : Johannes Zutt (AFCE2) Director : Sudarshan Gooptu (PRMED, acting) Director : Sudhir Shetty (AFTPM) Sector Manager : Kathie Krumm (AFTP2) Task Team Leaders : Aurelien Kruse (AFTP2), Ralph van Doorn (PRMED) MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON ASSISTANCE TO THE UNION OF THE COMOROS UNDER THE ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 II. PROPOSED IDA DEBT RELIEF ..................................................................................... 1 III. IDA ASSISTANCE STRATEGY ....................................................................................... 3 IV. COMPLETION POINT TRIGGERS................................................................................ 4 V. RECOMMENDATION ...................................................................................................... 4 ANNEX 1. COMOROS: IDA CREDITS SUBJ ECT TO DEBT SERVICE REDUCTION UNDER THE ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE ..... 5 ANNEX 2. COMOROS: SCHEDULE OF DEBT SERVICE REDUCTION UNDER THE ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE ............................. 6 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1. COMOROS: POTENTIAL COSTS OF THE HIPC INITIATIVE BY CREDITOR GROUP ...................................................................................................................... 2 FIGURE 2. COMOROS: PROJECTED DEBT SERVICE TO THE WORLD BANK GROUP BEFORE AND AFTER HIPC AND MDRI .................................................................. 3 MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON ASSISTANCE TO THE UNION OF THE COMOROS UNDER THE ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE I. INTRODUCTION 1. I submit for your approval the following Memorandum and Recommendation on the assistance to be provided to the Union of the Comoros (hereafter Comoros) under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative with respect to debt owed by Comoros to the International Development Association (IDA). This report and recommendation address: (a) the issue of assistance to be provided during the interim period between the decision point and the completion point with respect to debt owed to IDA; (b) the issue of relief to be provided with respect to debt owed to IDA at the completion point; and (c) the triggers that Comoros must satisfy to reach the completion point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. 2. This document complements the attached joint IDA-IMF paper entitled "Union of the Comoros: Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Decision Point Document". The decision point document presents an assessment of Comoros's qualification for assistance under the enhanced HIPC Initiative as well as the corresponding amount of debt relief, and sets forth the triggers for reaching the completion point that have been agreed between the authorities and the staffs of IDA and the IMF. The document is scheduled for discussion at the IMF Board on June 21, 2010 and at the IDA Board on June 29, 2010. 3. The macro framework underlying the Debt Relief Analysis (DRA) has been updated using data obtained by the IMF during the first ECF review mission in April 2010. The DRA was prepared jointly by IDA and IMF staffs, in close coordination with the authorities and presents the envisaged debt relief from multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors under the HIPC Initiative. In response to the suggestions made by some Directors on the Boards of the IMF and IDA for strengthening the completion point triggers, some of the PFM actions have been clarified, while the social sector triggers have been made more substantive and better aligned to key MDGs. II. PROPOSED IDA DEBT RELIEF 4. The Executive Directors made a preliminary determination on April 8, 2010, that Comoros was eligible and could shortly qualify for assistance under the HIPC initiative provided Comoros: (i) had a satisfactory track record of policy implementation under its ECF- supported program; (ii) had in place a poverty reduction strategy; and (iii) had agreed on appropriate completion point triggers. Staff assess that all these conditions have been met. 5. The DRA set out in the decision point document confirms that Comoros has a PV of debt- to-exports ratio at end-December 2009 of 343 percent when assuming full application of traditional debt relief mechanisms. Comoros thus qualifies for Enhanced HIPC initiative debt relief under the exports window. To bring Comoros's PV of debt-to-exports ratio to the 150 percent HIPC Initiative threshold, the total assistance under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative would 2 amount to US$145 million in PV terms. This corresponds to a common reduction factor of 56 percent. 6. Under the proportional burden-sharing approach, the multilateral creditors' share of assistance would amount to US$111 million in PV terms. Of this amount, IDA's contribution amounts to US$45.1 million. Figure 1. Comoros: Potential Costs of the HIPC Initiative by Creditor Group Total Estimated HIPC Enhanced Assistance: US$144.8 million, Paris Club end-2009 NPV terms Commercial 6% 1% World Bank Other Official 31% Bilateral 16% Other Multilateral 19% AfDB Group IMF 24% 3% Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates. 7. It is proposed that the US$45.1 million in PV terms of HIPC Initiative debt relief from IDA be delivered on IDA credits disbursed and outstanding as of December 31, 2009. We seek the Executive Directors' approval for the delivery of such debt relief as proposed below: · Interim HIPC debt relief would start after approval of Comoros's decision point document by the Executive Directors of IDA and the IMF. During the interim period, starting July 2010, debt relief would be provided through a nominal reduction of the debt service on IDA credits of up to a maximum of 65 percent and continue, subject to the limitation of one third of NPV of assistance during the interim period, until the country has reached the completion point. 1,2 · At completion point, the remaining share of HIPC Initiative debt relief from the World Bank would be provided through a 65 percent nominal reduction of the debt service on IDA credits. 3 The irrevocable delivery of assistance at completion point will be subject to having Comoros's other creditors having confirmed their agreement to provide debt relief under the Initiative, to the satisfaction of IDA. · With this delivery mechanism, Comoros would receive an estimated cumulative debt service reduction from IDA of US$66.1 million in nominal terms. 4 This reduction would be applied to the debt service falling due to IDA on disbursed and outstanding IDA credits as of December 31, 2009, as specified in Annexes 1 and 2, until the full amount of assistance is delivered. 1 Staff projects that the one-third limit would be reached by May 2016. 2 There is no arrears clearance operation from IDA. 3 The working assumption in the DRA is that Comoros reaches completion point in December 2012. 4 This amount could change depending on the timing of the completion point. 3 8. Upon reaching the completion point, IDA will provide debt relief to Comoros under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Should Comoros reach its HIPC completion point in December 2012, as assumed in the DRA, the cumulative debt service reduction from IDA in the context of MDRI is estimated at US$50.0 million in nominal terms. Figure 2. Comoros: Projected Debt Service to the World Bank Group Before and After HIPC and MDRI 6 5 4 Before HIPC and MDRI assistance 3 After unconditional HIPC assistance After conditional HIPC and MDRI assistance 2 1 - 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 2042 2044 Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates. 9. IDA and IMF staffs have initiated consultations with Comoros's creditors regarding the delivery of HIPC Initiative debt relief. Most multilateral creditors, IDA, IMF, AfDF, EIB, IFAD, BADEA and IsDB, representing 98 percent of the NPV of debt owed to multilateral creditors, have indicated their willingness to provide HIPC Initiative debt relief to Comoros. AMF and OFID have not yet committed, but communication is ongoing. 5 III. IDA ASSISTANCE STRATEGY 10. An Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for the period FY10-12 to be discussed by the IDA Board on June 1, 2010, sets out the Bank's support to the government's reform program and Comoros's first Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP) from September 2009. The ISN has two main objectives: (i) to reduce social vulnerability; and (ii) to build state capacity and accountability. Another key objective is to help Comoros to achieve the HIPC completion point in 2012. Bank support is aligned with the achievement of HIPC triggers, especially support to public finance management, economic governance and the achievement of social sector outcomes. The ISN foresees the use of investment lending and development policy operations (DPO), trust-funded activities, and the undertaking of analytical and advisory activities (AAA). During FY09, the Bank approved US$1 million additional financing from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund to add a cash-for-work component to support households affected by the food price crisis to the ongoing Service Support Project (SSP; currently the only active Bank project in Comoros). For FY10, the Bank plans a US$3 million Economic Governance Reform Support Grant DPO and a US$5.31 million Emergency Crises Response Project. Earlier in FY10, the Bank also mobilized a US$2.6 million Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) project that supplements activities under the SSP. Another JSDF project for about 5 As of June 4, 2010. 4 US$3 million to support coastal resource management is currently under preparation. For FY11, the Bank plans a US$2 million Economic Governance Technical Assistance Project and envisages a second DPO for FY12. Planned AAA includes preparation of HIPC documents, a political economy study, financial sector assessment and a development policy review. IV. COMPLETION POINT TRIGGERS 11. The delivery of HIPC assistance at completion point would be contingent upon the fulfillment of actions specified in the accompanying decision point document. To reach the completion point, the government will need to: (a) execute to a satisfying extent Comoros's Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP) for at least one year, as confirmed by an Annual Progress Report (APR) examined in a joint memorandum prepared by IMF and IDA staffs; 6 (b) maintain the stability of the macroeconomic framework, as attested by satisfactory implementation of reforms supported by the IMF under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF); and (c) implement key public finance, governance, debt management and social sector measures specified in Box 3 of the attached decision point document. V. RECOMMENDATION 12. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the recommendations presented in the decision point document concerning: · Comoros's qualification for assistance under the Enhanced HIPC Debt Initiative; · The decision point for Comoros; · Overall PV debt relief required to bring Comoros's debt to the PV debt-to-export ratio target of 150 percent as of end-2009; and · The triggers for reaching the floating completion point. 13. I further recommend that the Executive Directors approve the provision of relief on debt owed by Comoros to IDA in the amount and manner proposed in this paper. Robert B. Zoellick President by Graeme Wheeler Managing Director Ngozi N. Okonjo-Iweala Managing Director Washington, D.C. June 3, 2010 6 The evaluation would be made on the basis of a priority action plan to be completed by the authorities before end- December 2010. 5 Annex 1. Comor os: IDA Cr edits Subject to Debt Ser vice Reduction Under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countr ies Initiative Balance at December 31, 2009 Credit Project Name Currency In original currency In USD equivalent 08520 HIGHWAY USD 3,058,406 3,058,406 10350 COCONUT REHAB. & RODENT CONTR. USD 2,738,254 2,738,254 14690 RURAL SERVICES SDR 3,113,825 4,881,512 11880 SECOND HIGHWAY (MAINTENANCE) SDR 4,007,850 6,283,066 29310 PILOT AGRICULTURAL SERVICES SDR 1,152,181 1,806,263 30430 HEALTH SDR 6,648,406 10,422,639 22070 HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE SDR 3,978,533 6,237,107 22700 MACRO-ECONOMIC REFORM SDR 5,403,263 8,470,641 25530 POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES SDR 8,507,991 13,337,893 26320 SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT SDR 3,625,593 5,683,806 35630 EMERGENCY ECON RECOVERY SDR 5,475,000 8,583,103 38680 SERVICES SUPPORT SDR 10,467,667 16,410,056 14080 HEALTH AND POPULATION SDR 2,007,528 3,147,181 30110 SOCIAL FUND SDR 9,043,071 14,176,732 34680 INFRASTRUCTURE WATER ENVIRON. SDR 1,251,679 1,962,245 N0310 THIRD EDUCATION SDR 5,291,372 8,295,231 11950 FIRST EDUCATION SDR 3,653,532 5,727,606 13780 DBC SDR 1,690,590 2,650,321 17510 SECOND EDUCATION SDR 6,254,718 9,805,459 6 Annex 2. Comor os: Schedule of Debt Ser vice Reduction Under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countr ies Initiative Amount to be reduced Calendar Year (in thousands U.S. dollars) TOTAL 66,088 Jul, 1 2010 - Dec, 31 2010 1,230 2011 2,673 2012 2,767 2013 2,751 2014 3,043 2015 3,153 2016 3,133 2017 3,187 2018 3,451 2019 3,490 2020 3,467 2021 3,516 2022 3,541 2023 3,517 2024 3,585 2025 3,652 2026 3,627 2027 3,601 2028 3,576 2029 3,453 2030 1,676 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND UNION OF THE COMOROS Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Decision Point Document Prepared by the Staffs of the International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund Approved by Otaviano Canuto and Obiageli K. Ezekwesili (IDA) and Roger Nord and Thomas Dorsey (IMF) June 3, 2010 Contents Page Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 II. Background And Eligibility for HIPC Initiative Assistance..........................................2 A. Country Background and Political Developments ....................................................2 B. ECF and IDA Status ..................................................................................................2 C. Poverty and Social Issues ..........................................................................................3 D. Recent Economic Developments and Policy Track Record .....................................4 III. Macroeconomic Framework and Outlook and Poverty Reduction Strategy .................6 A. Macroeconomic Outlook...........................................................................................6 B. Poverty Reduction Strategy.......................................................................................7 IV. Debt Relief Analysis and Possible HIPC and MDRI Assistance ..................................9 A. Debt Reconciliation Status ........................................................................................9 B. Structure of External Debt.........................................................................................9 C. Possible Assistance under the HIPC Initiative ........................................................10 D. Possible Assistance under MDRI and Bilateral Debt Relief Beyond HIPC ...........13 E. Impact of Debt Relief and Sensitivity Analysis ......................................................14 V. Decision and Floating Completion Points ...................................................................15 A. Triggers for the Floating Completion Point ............................................................15 B. Monitoring Public Spending Following Provision of HIPC Assistance .................17 VI. Issues for Discussion....................................................................................................19 Tables 1. Progress in Achieving the Millennium Development Goals .........................................4 2. Medium- to Long-Term Macroeconomic Framework, Selected Indicators, 2009­29.......................................................................................................................7 3. Nominal Stocks and Net Present Value of Debt at end-2009 by Creditor Groups ........9 4. HIPC Initiative Assistance Under a Proportional Burden-Sharing Approach .............11 Figures 1a. Composition of Stock of External Debt at End-2009 by Creditor Group....................20 1b. Potential Costs of the HIPC Initiative by Creditor ......................................................20 2. External Debt Sustainability Indicators, 2009­29 .......................................................21 3. Sensitivity Analysis, 2009­29 .....................................................................................22 Boxes 1. External Arrears Clearance ..........................................................................................12 2. Key Macroeconomic Assumptions Underlying the DRA ...........................................15 3. Triggers for the Floating Completion Point .................................................................16 4. Medium-Term Expenditure Priorities ..........................................................................18 Annex Tables A1. Discount and Exchange Rate Assumptions as of end-December 2009 ...........................23 A2. Nominal Stock and Net Present Value of Debt as of December 31, 2009, by Creditor Groups ..............................................................................................................................24 A3. External Debt Service, 2010­29 ......................................................................................25 A4. Net Present Value of External Debt 2009­29 ..................................................................26 A5. External Debt Indicators, 2009­29 ..................................................................................27 A6. Sensitivity Analysis, 2009­29..........................................................................................28 A7. Possible Delivery of World Bank Group's Assistance Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, 2010­44 .................................................................................................29 A8. Possible Delivery of IMF Assistance Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 2010­19.....30 A9. Status of Creditor Participation Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.............................31 A10. Paris Club Creditors' Delivery of Debt Relief Under Bilateral Initiatives......................32 A11. HIPC Initiative: Status of Country Cases Considered Under the Initiative, January 27, 2010 .............................................................................................................33 Annexes Annex1: Debt Management Capacity .....................................................................................34 Annex II: Debt Sustainability Analysis 2010 .........................................................................36 ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank AfDF African Development Fund AMF Arab Monetary Fund BADEA Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa BCC Central Bank of Comoros CF Comorian franc COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COTECNA Pre-shipment inspection company DPO Development Policy Operation (World Bank) DRA Debt Relief Analysis DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis EC European Commission ECF Extended Credit Facility (formerly PRGF, IMF) EIB European Investment Bank EPCA Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance ESF-RAC Exogenous Shocks Facility-Rapid Access Component EU European Union FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program GFS Government Finance Statistics HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country I-CSN Interim Country Strategy Note (AfDB) IDA International Development Association IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IMF International Monetary Fund IsDB Islamic Development Bank ISN Interim Strategy Note (World Bank) LDC Least Developed Countries LIC Low-income country MAMWE Comoros Water and Electricity Company MDG Millennium Development Goals MDRI Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative NPV Net present value ODA Official Development Assistance OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OFID OPEC Fund for International Development PCCF Post-Conflict Country Facility PEM Public Expenditure Management PFM Public Financial Management PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility PRGSP Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper REER Real effective exchange rate SIGFIP Integrated Public Finance Management System SCH National Hydrocarbon Company i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY · In the last two years, the Union of the Comoros (hereafter "Comoros") has made measured progress on political and economic reforms. Relations with key development partners, including the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank (AfDB); as well as Paris Club creditors, have been regularized. While economic activity remains subdued, growth is trending up. On the political front, the country's multi-layer electoral cycle is being streamlined; and the political landscape consolidated notwithstanding tensions following a failed attempt by the ruling coalition to extend President Sambi's term beyond its limit of May 2010. · The Debt Relief Analysis (DRA) confirms that Comoros would qualify for debt relief under the export window of the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Comoros' public and publicly-guaranteed external debt in nominal terms was estimated at US$287 million (including arrears) as of end-December 2009. After applying traditional debt relief mechanisms, the country's NPV of debt-to-export ratio at end-2009 is estimated at 343 percent, which is above the HIPC Initiative threshold of 150 percent. · Comoros has also fulfilled the other requirements to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. In particular, the country: (i) adopted a full PRSP in September 2009; and (ii) has established a satisfactory track record of policy performance under IMF- and IDA-supported programs. In addition, understandings have been reached between IMF and IDA staffs and the Comoros authorities on appropriate completion point triggers. These were broadly supported by the Executive Directors of the IMF and IDA during their discussions in March and April 2010 on the preliminary HIPC document. Reducing Comoros' NPV of debt-to-export ratio to 150 percent requires total HIPC debt relief of US$145 million in NPV terms, implying a common reduction factor of 56 percent. A sensitivity analysis of Comoros' external debt after full delivery of HIPC Initiative assistance shows that under worsening economic conditions, Comoros' debt ratios could increase above HIPC initiative thresholds. Therefore, in addition to comprehensive debt relief, maintaining sustainable levels of indebtedness would require steady implementation of growth-enhancing economic policies and prudent debt management. · Upon reaching the HIPC completion point, Comoros will also qualify for relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which is estimated to reduce debt service on debt to IDA and the AfDF by approximately US$52.2 million (in NPV terms). There will be no IMF MDRI debt relief as Comoros had no outstanding debt to the Fund at end 2004. I. INTRODUCTION 1. This paper, prepared jointly by the staffs of the IMF and IDA, presents an assessment of the eligibility of the Union of the Comoros (hereafter "Comoros") for assistance under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 1 The assessment is based on a joint HIPC debt relief analysis (DRA) 2 conducted by staffs of International Development Association (IDA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Comorian authorities, following data reconciliation missions to Moroni in January and April 2010. It builds on the preliminary HIPC document for Comoros discussed by the Executive Boards of the IMF and IDA on March 29 and April 8, 2010, respectively. The Directors agreed that Comoros is eligible for assistance under the HIPC Initiative and that the country could reach its decision point provided that it continued satisfactory performance under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and agreed on appropriate completion point triggers. Regarding the latter, Directors broadly supported the triggers outlined in the preliminary document. The main changes and additions to the preliminary HIPC document are: (i) an update on recent political and economic developments; (ii) an update of the macroeconomic framework; (iii) more specific definition of some of the floating completion point triggers in the public finance, health and education sectors; and (iv) annexes containing a Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) under the Debt Sustainability Framework for Low Income Countries and an assessment of debt management capacity. 2. The analysis reveals an NPV of debt-to-exports ratio of 343 percent at end- December 2009 after traditional debt relief mechanisms are applied, significantly above the HIPC Initiative threshold. Possible HIPC debt relief at end-December 2009 is estimated at US$145 million in NPV terms, with a common reduction factor of 56 percent. Assuming that the country meets its completion point triggers, including continued satisfactory performance under its donor-supported reform agenda, at the completion point Comoros would also qualify for debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), in an amount estimated at about US$52.2 million in NPV terms. Debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI would help accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 3. This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background information on Comoros' eligibility under the HIPC Initiative, including the country's recent progress in the political and economic areas. Section III discusses the country's medium- to long-term macroeconomic framework and its poverty reduction strategy. Section IV summarizes the DRA and presents the magnitude of HIPC and MDRI assistance likely to accrue to the country, including through arrears clearance. Section V outlines reforms that will serve as completion point triggers. Section VI presents issues for discussion by Executive Directors. 1 "Enhanced HIPC Initiative" is hereafter referred to as "HIPC Initiative." 2 Also known as HIPC-DSA (Debt Sustainability Analysis). 2 II. BACKGROUND AND ELIGIBILITY FOR HIPC INITIATIVE ASSISTANCE A. Country Background and Political Developments 4. Comoros is emerging from a long period of political instability punctuated by violent transfers of presidential powers since independence in 1975. Progress in nation building and political reconciliation has been slow. In 2001, a new constitution created the Union of the Comoros, providing for each of the three islands to have its own president and parliament. This was followed by the landmark first election of a Union president in May 2006. However, a crisis emerged in June 2007 when alleged irregularities in the election of Anjouan island president, Colonel Bacar, prompted the Union government, backed by the African Union (AU) and the Arab League, to reject the results. Colonel Bacar refused to heed international calls for new elections. As a result, Union-island cooperation disintegrated, preventing IMF Board consideration of a PRGF-supported program that had been negotiated in late 2007. This adversely affected economic management, donor support, and growth. 5. In the last two years, pro-Union authorities have been elected in the hitherto separatist island of Anjouan, and amendments to the constitution have enhanced central government authority over budget and economic management. Also, in an unexpectedly bold sign of strengthening of the judiciary, on May 8, 2010, the Constitutional Court rebuked President Sambi's attempt to extend his term beyond the initial limit of May 2010. In the same ruling, the court called for the holding of nation-wide presidential and local elections by November 2011; and agreed to an interim presidential mandate by the incumbent. Consistent with the court's ruling, President Sambi named an interim cabinet on May 26, 2010. It is hoped these developments would ease political tensions that have been rising in recent months. B. ECF and IDA Status 6. As they gradually overcome a long period of political instability, the Comorian authorities have put in place an ambitious medium-term economic reform program to rekindle growth and better combat poverty. In this context, they benefited from IMF support under Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility-Rapid Access Component (ESF-RAC) in 2008, and are currently supported by the Fund under the ECF. The ECF-supported program draws on Comoros' PRSP and aims to achieve fiscal consolidation and restore external viability; promote financial sector soundness; strengthen institutions of governance; and improve the investment climate. 7. IDA's new Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for FY 2010­12 aims to help Comoros reach the enhanced HIPC completion point by 2012. 3 Approved by the Board of IDA in 3 Comoros is currently an IDA-only country with nominal per capita GNI of about US$ 750 in 2009 (using the World Bank's Atlas methodology). The country is PRGT-eligible and is on the list of ring-fenced countries grandfathered by the IMF Board in October 2006 (Decision No. 13797 (06/88). 3 June 2010, the interim strategy aims to: (i) reduce social vulnerability; and (ii) build state capacity and accountability. IDA is providing a mix of knowledge products and financing instruments to support these objectives. The main instrument for the first objective is the Services Support Project (SSP), which includes a cash-for-work component financed by the Food Price Crisis Support Fund. An Emergency Global Crisis Response Project is planned for FY10 to provide support to the most vulnerable groups affected by the global economic crisis. Key interventions in support of the second objective include a planned FY10 Governance Reform Support DPO, eventually followed by a second DPO in FY12, and an Economic Governance Support TA project. In FY 2010, IDA also plans to undertake a series of public expenditure notes; as well as an analytical work program on the political economy of reforms in key sectors, to inform the institution's overall engagement in the country. 8. Other donors and creditors are gradually resuming support to Comoros, including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU), and development partners of the Arab League and Gulf region. In July 2009 the Board of the AfDB approved a new Interim Country Strategy Paper (I-CSP) for 2009­10 following clearance of most of the arrears under the Post-Conflict Country Facility (PCCF) between 2007 and 2009 and the lifting of related sanctions. Under the I-CSP the AfDB assists the country in: (i) improving economic management through support for institutional capacity building; and (ii) creating a better environment through improved water supply and sanitation. In early 2010, the EU extended a US$11 million budget grant under the V-Flex Facility to help cushion the effects of exogenous shocks from the global economic crisis; EU budget support for 2010 is projected at USD$9 million. In addition to France and China, several Arab League countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, are providing much needed budgetary and project assistance. In May 2010, the Qatari authorities disbursed a grant of EUR 20 million to clear domestic arrears. C. Poverty and Social Issues 9. With weak economic performance and persistent political instability in recent years, poverty is widespread and the social situation Key Poverty & Social Indicators­2008 remains dire. The last household survey, fielded in 2004, Poverty (% below poverty line) 44.80 indicated that 37 percent of households (44.8 percent of Young adult literacy rate (%) 71 individuals) live below the poverty line. The incidence of Female literacy rate (%) 87 poverty varies across islands and is generally higher in Gross primary enrollment 86 rural areas. Comparison of 1995 and 2004 survey data Female primary enrollment (%) 73 shows that the overall situation seems to have improved Under-five mortality (per 1,000) 71 Life expectancy at birth (years) 69 (from 47 to 37 percent of households), albeit inequalities in Child malnutrition (%) 23.1 per capita expenditures also increased substantially, HIV prevalence (%) 0.8 probably due to variances in inflows of remittances which Note: Percent of total population, unless disproportionately benefited the better-off island of otherwise indicated Source: World Bank, Comoros PRSP 2009 Ngazidja. In the absence of more recent survey data, the 4 authorities assume the incidence of poverty to have increased since 2004, given Comoros' recent overall weak economic performance. 10. Nevertheless, some progress was made towards achieving several Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through 2007. Comoros is on track to achieve 4 of 12 MDGs, and substantial progress has been made on five others (Table 1). Table 1. Comoros: Progress in Achieving the Millennium Development Goals MDG Indicators 1990­96* 2004­07** Target 2015 Status Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Proportion of population below poverty line (%) 54.7 44.8 27 Progress Malnutrition prevalence for children under 5 (%) 13.9 24.9 7 Off track Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Net primary enrollment rate (%) 63.2 85 100 On track Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Ratio of female to male primary enrollment (%) 85 96 100 On track Levels of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%) 3.1 13.7 50 Progress Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%) - 2.3 50 Off track Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 86.3 59 28.7 Progress Mortality for children under 5 (per 1,000 births) 130 74 43.3 On track Goal 5: Improve maternal health Maternal mortality (per 100,000 births) 517 381 129 Progress Proportion of births assisted by qualified health workers (%) 52 62 100 Progress Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases Prevalence of HIV in % of population (15-49 years old) - 0.12 <.025 On track Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Access to an improved water source (% of population) 92 85 100 Off track * Indicates data available for the date in time period closest to 1990 (MDG benchmark date). ** Indicates data available for latest date in time period. Source: Comoros PRGSP, 2009 D. Recent Economic Developments and Policy Track Record 11. Economic conditions in Comoros have yet to recover from the effects of persistent political instability and the recent global crises. Real GDP growth was a mere 1 percent in 2008, picking up to 1.8 percent in 2009, driven by donor-funded public works, remittances-based private sector construction, and expansion of the financial sector. With the easing of pressures on food and fuel prices since 2008, inflation is broadly under control and relatively softer energy prices have contributed to a narrowing of the external current account deficit to an estimated 7.9 percent of GDP in 2009 (11.1 percent in 2008). 12. Comoros' overall reform performance in the last two years constitutes encouraging first steps, against a backdrop of a difficult international context, and considering the severe capacity constraints and other institutional weaknesses it faces. 5 13. Macroeconomic policies under the 2008/09 EPCA- and ECF-supported programs have been broadly satisfactory albeit with some fiscal slippage. a. Despite weakening somewhat in recent months, revenue collection has been generally consistent with expectations, the result of initial efforts, including enhanced computerization, to improve customs and tax administration. b. On the spending side, critical initiatives to improve expenditure management, especially the introduction of a new budgetary and treasury committee, have begun restoring order in spending operations, although severe difficulties persist in bringing the wage bill under control. c. At end-March 2009, the EPCA target for the primary domestic budget balance (0.6 percent of GDP) was met; and the ceiling on net domestic credit to the government was observed with a substantial margin (0.5 percent of GDP). 14. Available data indicate that thirteen of sixteen quantitative performance criteria and benchmarks through end-March 2010 under the ECF were met. In particular, at end-December 2009, revenue mobilization was slightly better than programmed, and the target on net domestic credit to the government was met. However, the domestic primary budget deficit (benchmark) was exceeded by 1.0 percentage point of GDP. This reflects spending overruns on wages and on domestically-funded capital outlays, as the government effected a CF 1.7 billion (0.9 percent of GDP) capital transfer to Comoros Telecoms to help the stated-owned company meet its share of the cost of a regional under-ocean optic fiber communication cable project. In the first quarter of 2010, weakened focus on tax and customs administration resulted in the revenue target being missed by a small margin; but the target on the domestic primary fiscal deficit was met, as the authorities cut spending on goods and services and domestically funded investment. 15. Performance in the structural area under the two programs has also been broadly satisfactory. All but one of the structural indicators under the EPCA instrument were met; and under the ECF most structural benchmarks through end-March 2010 have been observed, albeit with delays in some cases. The government notably: a. appointed a permanent secretary for the reform-monitoring committee; b. reestablished the revenue sharing mechanism and completed comprehensive reform strategies for strengthening revenue mobilization and improving expenditure management; c. prepared consolidated quarterly fiscal accounts, timely communicated to Fund staff; d. maintained an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism; e. completed an audit of domestic arrears (with technical support from the EU), and a related arrears clearance strategy; 6 f. completed and submitted to Parliament in April 2010 new personnel frameworks for government ministries that are compatible with medium-term budget viability (an end-March 2010 structural benchmark); g. conclusively tested computerization of civil service wage management, setting the stage for routine operation in the coming months (an end-March 2010 structural benchmark); and h. adopted an IFC-approved reform strategy for the state-owned telecommunications company; and while pursuing consultations with the IFC on reform options for the hydro-carbon importing company, the authorities are taking steps to begin addressing management inefficiencies in the companyincluding the appointment of a new Board of Directors. III. MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK AND OUTLOOK AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY A. Macroeconomic Outlook 16. The government's medium-term reform program, anchored in the PRSP, aims to invigorate economic growth and improve living conditions within a stable macroeconomic environment. Beyond subsistence agriculture, economic recovery is to be driven by accelerated (donor-funded) public works and increased FDI in tourism--as suspended projects are resumed. The reform agenda is focused on improving the business environment and governance to encourage investment, and expanding infrastructure to underpin private sector activity, in particular tourism, as well as support agricultural productivity and diversification. Other positive factors include the gradual improvement in world economic conditions. Following a rebound in 2009 on the back of falling import prices, the terms of trade are expected to modestly improve in the medium-term despite some firming of import prices as the global economy recovers. Growth-supporting import growth would remain relatively strong, spurred by remittances and higher FDI (Box 2). 17. Macroeconomic stability is to be supported by a prudent fiscal policy stance. Fiscal consolidation, combined with comprehensive debt relief and higher foreign aid, would create fiscal space for increased pro-growth and pro-poor spending, while preserving debt sustainability and avoiding accumulation of new arrears. Programmed fiscal adjustment is to be achieved through gradually raising revenue from just under 14 percent of GDP in 2009 to 15 percent of GDP by 2013, and keeping expenditures in check. The wage bill is projected to modestly decline in relation to GDP, after an uncontrolled expansion in the last decade. Additional spending in priority areas (health, education, infrastructure, and restructuring of state-owned banks and enterprises) will mostly be secured through domestic spending reallocations and efforts to raise external assistance to regional standards as well as by ensuring early achievement of HIPC and MDRI debt relief. 7 18. Monetary and exchange rate developments will continue to be governed by the exchange rate peg under the Franc Zone arrangement. This will continue to be the country's main anchor of price stability. 19. The main risks to the medium-term outlook are political tensions between the Union and Island authorities, a slower-than-expected pace of reform implementation, and uncertainties in the pace of the global economic recovery. To mitigate these risks, the authorities need to closely adhere to their reform agenda so as to improve economic competitiveness, strengthen public finance management, preserve donor support, and enhance investor confidence. Program implementation would also benefit from more expeditious national political reconciliation. Table 2. Comoros: Medium- to Long-Term Macroeconomic Framework, Selected Indicators, 2009­29 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009-2029 Prel. (avg) (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated) National income and prices Real GDP 1.8 2.1 2.5 3.5 3.7 GDP deflator 4.6 3.8 3.3 3.0 3.2 Consumer price index (annual averages) 4.8 2.6 2.9 2.8 3.0 Consumer price index (end period) 2.1 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.9 Money and credit Domestic credit 35.2 7.2 9.1 9.6 11.6 Broad money 13.5 7.5 6.5 6.5 7.4 External sector Export volume 81.3 18.1 1.7 2.3 2.3 Import volume 11.7 -0.8 -7.1 3.1 3.1 Terms of trade 39.4 -13.0 -3.7 1.2 3.6 (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) Government budget Domestic Revenue 13.9 14.3 14.2 14.5 15.9 Total grants 9.7 13.7 7.1 7.1 7.6 Total expenditure 23.0 23.2 23.1 22.7 23.4 Domestic primary balance -2.6 -1.5 -1.2 -0.5 0.4 Overall balance (cash basis) 0.8 -2.7 -2.2 -1.6 -0.4 External sector Exports of goods and services 14.7 15.0 14.9 14.7 14.4 Imports of goods and services 48.2 50.5 47.2 46.1 40.1 Current account balance -7.9 -8.9 -12.5 -11.8 -8.5 Excl. official and private transfers -33.6 -35.9 -32.6 -31.5 -25.6 1 NPV In percent of GDP 46.0 41.7 40.1 38.3 27.3 NPV of external debt (end-year) in percent of exports of goods & services 1 328 307 286 274 201 Sources: Comorian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 1 Corresponds to the case before traditional debt relief (Table A5) B. Poverty Reduction Strategy 20. On September 10, 2009, the government of Comoros officially adopted the country's first full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper, PRGSP). The document builds on the strategy laid out in the interim PRSP, 8 which was presented to the Boards of IDA and the IMF in May 2006. For a fragile state, where a rapid succession of political upheavals has hampered policy formulation and implementation over so many years, completing a full PRSP is in and of itself a noteworthy achievement. Moreover, since the early 2000s, the PRSP framework has been instrumental in anchoring the national reconciliation process and guiding the authorities in the gradual formulation of a development vision for the country. 21. Both the I-PRSP and the full PRSP are the result of a thorough and inclusive participatory process. The process was managed by a steering committee and brought together numerous stakeholders--representatives of civil society, traditional and religious leaders, NGOs and development partners--through sectoral working groups (chaired by the relevant Secretary General in each ministry) and a series of participatory workshops held at regular intervals. An important feature of the PRSP preparation process was the involvement of island authorities through local branches of the National Planning Commission, maintained even during separatist crises. 22. The PRGSP sets an ambitious policy agenda focused on: (i) stabilizing the economy and laying the foundations for sustained and equitable growth by strengthening public finance and improving infrastructure provision; (ii) strengthening key sectors of the economy with the highest growth and poverty reduction potential: tourism, agriculture and fishing; (iii) Improving governance and social cohesion; (iv) improving human development outcomes, particularly in healthcare and education, through better social service delivery; and (v) promoting environmental sustainability and civilian security. Achieving these objectives will be challenging given the paucity of resources available from domestic or external sources as well as important capacity constraints and aid absorption bottlenecks. However, at a "Conference for development and investment" hosted by the Government of Qatar on March 9­10, 2010 bilateral partner countries pledged substantial financial assistance in support of Comoros' development efforts. Effective mobilization could contribute to significantly alleviating the first constraint. 23. The monitoring and evaluation of the PRGSP are carried by four oversight organizations, a number of sectoral technical groups (GTS), and island-level monitoring committees (COPSED). Related activities are under the primary responsibility of the Technical Steering Committee (PRGS-TSC) operating from the National Planning Commission, and working with the Technical Secretariat for PRGS Monitoring and Evaluation and the Ministry of Finance's Economic and Financial Reform Monitoring Committee (CREF). 9 IV. DEBT RELIEF ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE HIPC AND MDRI ASSISTANCE 4 A. Debt Reconciliation Status 24. The DRA below draws on data provided by the authorities and creditors for public and publicly-guaranteed external debt disbursed and outstanding as of end-2009. The reconciliation process was completed jointly by the IMF, IDA and the authorities in January and April 2010. All multilateral and 98.3 percent of bilateral and commercial debt were reconciled. 5 B. Structure of External Debt 25. At end-2009, Comoros' public and publicly guaranteed external debt was estimated at US$286.8 million (including arrears) in nominal terms. This corresponds to US$213.1 million in NPV terms. Multilateral creditors accounted for slightly over three- fourths of the total debt stock in nominal terms, with liabilities to IDA alone constituting 42.0 percent of total external debt. Other multilaterals with substantial claims on Comoros are the AfDF (13.3 percent of total external debt), BADEA (9.6 percent), IMF (3.5 percent), IsDB (3.3 percent) and IFAD (2.8 percent). OFID, EIB and AMF held claims amounting to a combined share of 2 percent of total debt. The Paris Club creditors, with France as the major Table 3. Comoros: Nominal Stocks and Net Present Value of Debt at end-2009 by Creditor Groups Legal Situation Base Situation for Nominal Debt Stock 1/ Arrears Stock NPV of Debt 1/ of HIPC Debt Relief 1/ 2/ US$ million Percent US$ million Percent US$ million Percent US$ million Percent of total of total of total of total Total 286.8 100.0 54.0 100.0 213.1 100.0 257.4 100.0 - - - - - - - Multilateral 219.6 76.6 35.8 66.4 163.3 76.6 197.6 76.8 World Bank 120.4 42.0 - - 80.1 37.6 80.1 31.1 AfDB Group 38.1 13.3 3.4 6.3 3/ 27.8 13.0 61.5 4/ 23.9 IMF 10.1 3.5 - - 7.6 3.6 7.6 5/ 2.9 BADEA 27.6 9.6 27.6 51.1 27.6 12.9 27.6 10.7 Others 6/ 23.5 8.2 4.8 9.0 20.2 9.5 20.9 8.1 Bilateral 60.6 21.1 13.7 25.3 43.3 20.3 57.6 22.4 Paris Club: 17.8 6.2 7/ 12.1 22.5 7/ 17.5 8.2 7/ 15.3 6.0 Other Official Bilateral: 42.9 14.9 1.5 2.8 25.8 12.1 42.3 8/ 16.4 Commercial 6.6 2.3 4.5 8.3 6.5 3.0 2.2 0.8 Sources: Comorian authorities; and Fund and World Bank staff estimates. 1/ Includes arrears. 2/ Base situation for the calculation of HIPC debt relief; assumes a stock-of-debt operation on Naples terms at end-December 2009; and comparable action by other official bilateral creditors on eligible debt (pre-cutoff and non-ODA). 3/ Technical arrears, to be cleared at Decision Point by the European Commission. 4/ The relief resulting from the 2007-09 arrears clearance mechanism were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009. 5/ NPV of debt service is calculated with fixed interest rates at end-2009 in line with treatment of other creditors. In Table A8 (HIPC delivery table), the IMF calculates debt service projections based on its own interest rate projections, which leads to a small difference in the NPV calculation according to the HIPC method and its own method. 6/ Other multilaterals include IsDB, IFAD, OFID, EIB and AMF. The Comoros has no arrears with the IsDB. The relief resulting from debt rescheduling and an interest penalty waiver (AMF) and the moratorium on debt service payments and arrears (IsDB) were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009. 7/ Does not include the implementation of the November 2009 Paris Club agreement. 8/ The relief resulting from the 2007 rescheduling agreements were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009. 4 The DRA presented in the paper is based on the HIPC Initiative's methodology. 5 The un-reconciled 1.7 percent of bilateral and commercial debt is due to Banque Postale, representing 0.4 percent of the total debt. 10 creditor, accounted for 26.5 percent of nominal bilateral and commercial claims at end-2009 (6.2 percent of Comoros' total external debt before the November 2009 Paris Club restructuring agreement). Non-Paris Club official creditors are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Mauritius, and United Arab Emirates, accounting for an estimated 15.0 percent of total external debt. Three commercial creditors (Banque Postale, Cotecna, and Hopitaux de Paris) held 2.3 percent of Comoros' total external debt outstanding at end-2009. 26. As of end-2009, about one fifth of Comoros' external debt was in arrears, but these have been deferred pending agreement on restructuring discussions with creditors. 6 The stock of external arrears stood at US$54.0 million, of which US$35.8 million was owed to multilateral creditors, US$13.7 million to bilateral claimants, and US$ 4.5 million to commercial creditors. Arrears to BADEA made up the largest share of arrears to multilateral creditors at end-2009. The bulk of arrears to the AfDB Group were cleared between December 2007 and April 2009 under the Post-Conflict Country Facility (PCCF); 7 a residual amount of US$3.4 million is to be cleared by the EC under the FSF when Comoros reaches the HIPC decision point, together with an amount of US$1.9 million owed to the EIB. The IsDB has agreed to a moratorium on debt service and payment of arrears until December 2010, and the AMF has rescheduled its loan on concessional terms. Comoros has contacted the remaining multilateral creditors to start negotiations to clear arrears in the context of a comprehensive resolution of the country's debt situation under the HIPC Initiative process. Arrears to Paris Club members stood at US$12.1 million at end- October 2009; they will be cleared through bilateral arrangements, consistent with the general rescheduling agreement of November 2009. Other bilateral and commercial creditors have either agreed to defer arrears pending a treatment in the context of the HIPC Initiative process or are holding discussions with the authorities on their restructuring. C. Possible Assistance under the HIPC Initiative 27. Comoros qualifies for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative's "export window" based on end-2009 data. After full application of traditional debt relief mechanisms, the country's NPV of debt is estimated at US$257.4 million at end-2009, equivalent to 343.0 percent of exports of goods and services. 8 6 In line with the method agreed with multilateral development banks, any concessional rescheduling of arrears done by multilateral creditors in the context of the HIPC Initiative would be counted as part of their contribution to debt relief under the HIPC Initiative (see the attachment to "HIPC Debt Initiative: The Chairman's Summary of the Multilateral Development Banks' Meeting", March 6, 1998, IDA/SecM98-90). 7 This has been renamed into Fragile States Facility (FSF) with the same terms and conditions. 8 Remittances are not included in the HIPC DRA. 11 1, 2 Table 4. Comoros: HIPC Initiative Assistance Under a Proportional Burden-Sharing Approach (In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) Debt Outstanding Debt Outstanding Reduction of the (NPV terms) (NPV terms) NPV of Debt due end-2009 (A) Post-HIPC (B) to HIPC (A-B) /3 Total 257 113 144.8 (as percent of export) 343 150 193.0 of which: Multilateral 3/ 198 86 111 Bilateral 58 25 32 Commercial 2 1 1 Memorandum Items: Common reduction factor (percent) 4/ 56 Exports 5/ 75 Sources: Comorian authorities; and IMF and World Bank staff estimates and projections. 1/ The proportional burden sharing approach is described in "HIPC Initiative--Estimated Costs and Burden Sharing Approaches" (EBS/97/127, 7/7/97 and IDA/SEC M 97-306, 7/7/97). 2/ Includes a hypothetical stock-of-debt operation on Naples terms (end-December 2007) and comparable treatment by other official bilateral creditors. 3/ The relief resulting from arrears clearance (AfDB), moratorium on debt service and arrears (IsDB) and debt rescheduling and interest penalty waiver (AMF) were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009 in order to credit these institutions for the debt relief already granted through these operations. 4/ Each creditor's NPV reduction in percent of its exposure at the reference date, end-December 2009, calculated as (A-B)/A. 5/ Based on a three-year average of exports on the previous year (e.g., export average over 2007-2009 for NPV of debt-to-exports ratio in 2009). 28. The amount of debt relief needed to bring Comoros' NPV of debt-to-exports ratio down to the HIPC threshold of 150 percent is estimated at US$144.8 million in end-2009 NPV terms. This implies a common reduction factor of 56 percent. Based on proportional burden sharing, multilateral creditors' assistance would amount to US$111.2 million, and bilateral and commercial creditors' assistance to US$33.6 million (in NPV terms). The country has already been granted some HIPC Initiative debt relief through earlier arrears clearance operations (Box 1). As of June 4, 2010, most multilateral creditors, IDA, IMF, AfDF, EIB, IFAD, BADEA and IsDB, representing 98 percent of the NPV of debt owed to multilateral creditors, have indicated their willingness to provide HIPC Initiative debt relief to Comoros. AMF and OFID have not yet committed, but communication is ongoing. 29. The illustrative scenarios below on the delivery of HIPC Initiative debt relief are based on the assumption that Comoros reaches its HIPC decision point in mid-2010 and its completion point by end-2012. · IDA assistance would amount to US$45 million in NPV terms. After the approval of the decision point, IDA will provide interim relief in the form of a reduction in debt service up to a maximum of 65 percent from July 2010 to June 2030. The details of IDA's anticipated assistance are provided in Table A7. · IMF assistance would total US$4.27 million in NPV terms. There would be no immediate HIPC interim assistance from the IMF following the approval of the decision 12 point by the IDA and IMF Boards. There will be no PRGT principal repayment obligations until 2014, and the PRGT interest obligations have been waived by the IMF to all low-income member countries through 2011. Possible HIPC interim assistance could be considered after 2011 (Table A8). · AfDB Group's assistance would amount to US$34.6 million in NPV terms, which is almost covered by the December 2007 to April 2009 arrears clearance operations under the PCCF. 9 Furthermore, the remaining technical arrears will be cleared at decision point. Box 1. External Arrears Clearance Comoros has made substantial progress in reaching understandings with key creditors on arrears. Nearly one-fifth of the country's official external debt (US$54 million) was in arrears at end-2009; Comoros has no arrears to IDA and the IMF. Most of the arrears have been or are expected to be cleared through concessional arrears clearance operations and Comoros has either reached or is negotiating understandings with creditors to that effect on terms at least comparable to those granted by Paris Club creditors where applicable. Consistent with the HIPC Initiative methodology, the grant element embedded in the arrears clearance is counted toward the creditor's contribution to debt reduction under the HIPC Initiative. Nearly all of the arrears to the AfDB Group were cleared between December 2007 and April 2009 under the Post-Conflict Country Facility. 69 percent of the cost was financed from the PCCF, 1 percent by Comoros, and 30 percent by bilateral donors. All donors have delivered their contribution except the European Commission (EC), which will finance the clearance of the remaining arrears at decision point. The authorities have made progress in discussions on the clearance of arrears with other multilateral creditors. The arrears to the EIB will be cleared at the decision point, and at the completion point the remaining outstanding loan will be cancelled under the LDC initiative, provided that Comoros is still classified as an LDC. The AMF cleared arrears in March 2008. The authorities have also contacted the IsDB, OFID and BADEA to renegotiate the clearance of arrears; all three have responded favorably to the request. Moreover, the IsDB has already provided a moratorium on arrears and debt service payments until December 2010. The government is expected to clear arrears to these creditors in the context of the HIPC Initiative on terms consistent with Comoros's limited repayment capacity. Comoros has been accorded an exceptional debt restructuring treatment by the Paris Club. In the context of the ECF-supported in September 2009, Paris Club creditors agreed to provide an exceptional debt treatment to Comoros, beyond the standard Naples terms. Arrears on short-term debt--a senior category of debt normally not treated by the Club, but which constitutes the bulk of Comoros' debt to the Club--were deferred and are to be repaid over eight years. Overall, the agreement treats debts amounting to US$13 million and reduces by about 80 percent the payments due by Comoros over the program period (2009­12).The agreement includes a clause further reducing debt service payments due if Comoros reaches the HIPC decision point. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, two of Comoros' main non-Paris Club creditors partly delivered their shares of relief through rescheduling agreements in 2007. 9 The PCCF provides partial funding for arrears clearance operation to countries which: (i) demonstrate respect for the AfDB Group's preferred creditor status; and (ii) are eligible for HIPC debt relief, but not yet reached the decision point under the Initiative. 13 · Other multilateral creditors' assistance would amount to US$27.3 million in NPV terms. Some creditors have rescheduled loans or canceled some arrears in 2008 and 2009, which will be credited to their HIPC relief effort, but the bulk is expected to be delivered through cancellation or concessional rescheduling of arrears and/or debt service reduction, to commence at decision or completion points (Table A9). · The Paris Club creditors are assumed to provide their share of HIPC debt relief through a Cologne flow operation (i.e., a 90 percent NPV reduction) after Comoros reaches its decision point, with the remaining HIPC assistance delivered through a stock of debt operation at the completion point. · Regarding the non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors and commercial creditors, Comoros has concluded rescheduling agreements with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on terms at least as favorable as those agreed to with the Paris Club creditors. Debt rescheduling on terms comparable to those granted by Paris Club creditors is assumed for the other creditors. D. Possible Assistance under MDRI and Bilateral Debt Relief Beyond HIPC 30. Upon reaching the completion point, Comoros would benefit from bilateral debt relief beyond HIPC from the Paris Club. The additional relief from the Paris Club would cancel the remaining debt, further reducing the PV of debt after completion point by about US$2 million. 31. In addition, Comoros would qualify for MDRI debt relief from IDA and the AfDF. The country has no debt eligible for MDRI relief from the IMF. The MDRI debt relief provided by IDA and the AfDB Group would cover all outstanding debt disbursed prior to end-December 2003 and end-December 2004, respectively, and still outstanding at the two institutions' implementation dates. 10 32. Preliminary estimates indicate that MDRI debt relief could amount to US$52.2 million in NPV terms, assuming that Comoros reaches the completion point in December 2012. Of this amount, US$29.8 million would be provided by IDA and US$22.4 million by the AfDB Group. 33. Finally, the EIB will cancel all remaining outstanding debt under the LDC initiative, provided that Comoros is still classified as an LDC. This would amount to $0.36 million in PV terms. 10 IDA MDRI debt relief would be on debt outstanding as of the end of the quarter in which the completion point will be reached; MDRI from AfDF will be delivered at the completion point. 14 E. Impact of Debt Relief and Sensitivity Analysis 34. Traditional debt relief together with unconditional delivery of HIPC Initiative assistance would drive down Comoros' NPV of debt-to-exports ratio from 343.0 percent as of end-December 2009 to approximately 142.7 percent by 2012 (Table A5). With MDRI and LDC initiative relief added, the NPV would fall further to 86.5 percent of exports of goods and services in 2012, as a result of cancellation of debt to IDA, the AfDF and the EIB. Additional relief from bilateral creditors would lower the NPV of debt to exports to 86.0 percent. 35. The NPV of debt is projected to decline further over the long term. With both HIPC and MDRI debt relief, the NPV of debt would continue to decline to 80.2 percent of exports of goods and services by 2029, reflecting projected growth in exports and the authorities' prudent borrowing policy. Debt service would average about 3.9 percent of revenues or 4.0 percent of exports during 2009­19 and 3.4 percent of revenues and 4.0 percent of exports during 2020­29. 36. In a lower-exports alternative scenario, the debt burden initially exceeds the HIPC Initiative threshold before returning below the benchmark during 2020­29. Under an alternative scenario with permanently lower growth, Comoros' external public debt would remain below the HIPC Initiative threshold through 2029. In the first alternative scenario (Table A6), exports of goods and services are assumed to be lower by about 30 percent in dollar terms by 2027 relative to the baseline. In this case, the NPV of debt would decline over the long term, reaching 68.6 percent of revenues by 2029 (125.9 percent of exports of goods and services, 12.1 percent of GDP). Debt service would average some 5.6 percent of revenues and 6.6 percent of exports of goods and services during 2009­2019. The second scenario assumes a weakening of the average annual growth rate from 3.8 percent to 1.5 percent throughout 2009­29. In this case, the NPV of debt would decline over the long term, reaching 121.8 percent of revenues by 2029 (107.7 percent of exports of goods and services, 18.6 percent of GDP). Debt service would average some 6.4 percent of revenues and 6.1 percent of exports of goods and services during 2009­19. 37. The sensitivity analysis indicates that Comoros' ability to service external debt after HIPC relief is very vulnerable to external and growth shocks. The achievement of a robust external debt position is also heavily influenced by the composition and terms of external assistance; under the DRA the bulk of external assistance is assumed to be grants and the remaining borrowing to be on very concessional terms throughout the projection period. The small export base (including tourism) constrains the amount of debt that Comoros will be able to service in the medium and long term, especially if public expenditure is to give priority to achieving the MDGs. The analysis underscores the importance of a sustained domestic reform effort to support the development of exportable production and services, notably tourism, and to secure external assistance heavily weighted toward grants. 15 Box 2. Key Macroeconomic Assumptions Underlying the DRA Key medium- to long-term macroeconomic assumptions used in the baseline DRA scenario include: Annual real GDP growth: averages 3.8 percent over the projection period (FY 2010­29). CPI inflation: is projected to decline from 7.4 percent in 2008 to about 3 percent over the longer-term horizon. Real exchange rate and terms of trade: After a modest appreciation in 2008­09, the real effective exchange rate is projected to remain broadly stable throughout the latter part of the projection period; the terms of trade would recover from the 2008 deterioration, and moderately improve thereafter. Remittances: on average, remittances are projected to converge to the historical norm of 14.5 percent of GDP during 2013­29, from almost 20 percent of GDP in 2009, following unusually strong growth in 2008. External current account deficit (excluding official grants): is projected to narrow from an annual average of 11 percent of GDP during 2010­16 to about 7 percent of GDP over the reminder of the projection period, with the improvement mostly stemming from moderating food and consumer products imports in the long runreflecting progress in import substitution. Goods exports are projected to grow slower than nominal GDP, on account of stagnating prices. However, the growth rate of nonfactor services exports (tourism) would be stronger than that of nominal GDP. Accordingly, goods and non factor services exports are projected to remain broadly stable in relation to GDP. Government balance: The primary balance (total revenue and grants less noninterest expenditure) is projected to improve from a deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP in 2009, and to move into surplus beginning in 2015, as revenue collection improves and more efforts are made to maintain spending under control. External assistance, scaling up, and concessionality: The framework assumes that up to 2012 external assistance will be mostly in the form of grants, averaging about 7 percent of GDP. Over the long-term (2012­29), further assistance will be available on concessional terms and mostly in grants, including from IDA and AfDB. Loans from sources other than IDA, IMF and AfDB are assumed to be provided under IDA terms (with a grant element of 50 percent) until 2015, after which the grant element is projected to gradually decline to 30 percent. Domestic borrowing: The scenario assumes no new medium- to long-term domestic borrowing beyond central bank's short-term cash advances to the treasury. V. DECISION AND FLOATING COMPLETION POINTS A. Triggers for the Floating Completion Point 38. IMF and IDA staffs have reached understandings with the authorities on completion point triggers, summarized in Box 3. In addition to the standard triggers on PRSP implementation and macroeconomic stability, Comoros' completion point triggers include policy measures aimed at improving public financial management and governance; strengthening the social sectors; supporting growth; and improving debt management. Public financial management and governance triggers would advance ongoing efforts to improve overall budget management, notably by instituting better expenditure control mechanisms Box 3. Triggers for the Floating Completion Point 11 PRSP · Satisfactory implementation for at least one year of the full PRSP, as evidenced by an Annual Progress Report submitted by the government to IDA and the IMF. Macroeconomic stability · Maintenance of macroeconomic stability as evidenced by satisfactory implementation of the ECF- supported program. Public financial management and governance · Regularly produce detailed quarterly budget execution reports for a period of at least 12 months prior to reaching the completion point. · Adopt the terms of reference for a feasibility study for a comprehensive computerized public financial management system, including an estimate of the cost and a timetable for the installation of the proposed system. · Adopt by law a public procurement code consistent with relevant COMESA norms and develop related implementing regulations; and successfully implement the new code prior to the country's attainment of the HIPC Initiative completion point; · Adopt a revised set of organic frameworks (organigram and staffing plans), consistent with the 2009 constitutional amendments, for all ministries. · Government approval and submission to Parliament of a draft law establishing the constitutionally- mandated Chamber of Accounts for external control of budget operations. Structural reform · Officially adopt reform strategies to strengthen management of Comores Télécoms (telecommunications), Société Comorienne des Hydrocarbures (oil import and storage), and MAMWE (electricity); and issue calls for expressions of interest to identify a strategic partner for at least one of the three companies Social sectors Education: Strengthen efforts towards achieving MDG 2; the authorities will: · Construct and equip 210 primary school classrooms following agreed standards (22 on Moheli, 126 on Anjouan, and 62 on Ngazidja). · Construct 100 separated latrines for improved hygiene and promotion of girls' participation. · Provide 300,000 textbooks and 25, 000 school kits (including basic school supplies) for vulnerable children. Health: Strengthen efforts towards achieving MDGs 4 and 6; the authorities will: · Conduct a national measles vaccination campaign for children 9­47 months to achieve 90-percent coverage nationwide (and thus consolidate progress in reducing infant mortality). · Carry out a national survey on risk factors for non communicable diseases to guide the development of a national strategy to reduce the growing burden of noncommunicable diseases. Debt Management · Improve public debt management systems, particularly adopting effective debt management software. · Produce detailed annual reports on external and domestic debt no later than six months after year end, including data on existing stocks, new loans, and debt service due and paid. At least one such report should be available prior to Comoros reaching the HIPC completion point. · Amend the 2003 decree (décret N°03-62/PR) establishing the debt management office to refocus its mandate and activities, consistent with the office's capacity limitations. 11 The first two triggers (PRSP implementation and satisfactory macroeconomic performance) are requirements for reaching the completion point under the IMF PRGT-HIPC Trust Instrument. 17 and procurement practices. 12 They are also intimately linked to the political reconciliation process, as consolidated budgetary reporting, the development of an integrated automated public financial management system and the revision of the personnel frameworks all imply a significant degree of cooperation and trust between the Union and island executives. The triggers relating to the social sectors and to structural reforms are intended to improve key health and education outcomes, and to enhance the competitiveness and growth potential of the economy. 39. IDA and IMF staffs will work together to monitor the completion point triggers, with each institution leading on areas of primary competence, while also incorporating contributions of staff from the other institution. IMF staff will take the lead in monitoring macroeconomic stability. IDA staff will focus on progress in the implementation of the PRSP and on sector-related triggers, including those pertaining to PFM and service delivery, and to tracking of pro-poor expenditures financed with HIPC Initiative assistance. IDA and IMF staffs will jointly monitor structural reforms and progress in improving external debt management. B. Monitoring Public Spending Following Provision of HIPC Assistance 40. The government is committed to ensuring that assistance under the HIPC Initiative is used to enhance poverty related spending. Securing the effective use of debt relief assistance for poverty reduction and, more generally, the capacity to implement and monitor a shift in the composition of expenditure toward poverty-related objectives is a key element of the HIPC Initiative. The authorities will continue their ongoing efforts to strengthen the programming, management and control of public expenditures, and to improve service delivery in key sectors. Within this framework, technical assistance from IDA, IMF, AfDB and other donors is greatly needed; it will be important to establish adequate budget management capacity. 41. While Comoros does not have a budget classification by program or a fully functional budget classification, there are mechanisms in place that can be used to adequately monitor the use of resources made available by the HIPC Initiative. Existing budget and accounting classifications allow for monitoring of budget allocations and expenditures following two dimensions: (i) administrative (ministries and islands authorities) including development projects; and (ii) economic (expenditure types). The budget is also presented in the annexes of the budget law following a functional classification with broad categories (such as education and health), which is prepared using estimates from the administrative classification. Also, in the absence of a program budget, projects can be 12 Not requiring a specific length of track record for public procurement implementation before the HIPC completion point appears justified given Comoros' weak domestic capacity in that area. Even with donor support, government approval of the new code and the strengthening of relevant services would likely take at least two years; the significant investment limits the likelihood that the gains made would not be preserved. 18 individually coded within the administrative classification to allow recording and reporting on project expenditures. 42. The use of resources made available by the HIPC Initiative prior to the completion point will be monitored at the entity (e.g., ministries, public institutions, and executing agencies) and project levels. Entities, which are already coded in the budget classification, will be identified according to their core mandate in relation to poverty reduction. The same process will be followed to identify individual projects in areas which contribute to poverty reduction as defined in the PRSP. A key challenge will be to put in place mechanisms to record expenditures according to their destinations, which could allow for monitoring of both budget allocations and expenditures for entities and projects identified as contributing to poverty reduction. 43. The government intends to use HIPC related savings to fund activities identified in the PRSP. The resources from HIPC Initiative assistance would mostly be allocated to health and education; while other areas, such as major infrastructure programs, would be financed with resources from other external resources (Box 4). The poverty-related programs and projects to be financed with interim assistance support have been included in the FY2010 budget and would need to be included in subsequent budgets. Going ahead, the planned introduction of an effective procurement code will strengthen and modernize the public procurement system, promoting transparency and competition in line with international best practices. Box 4. Medium-Term Expenditure Priorities Education · Increase primary and secondary school completion rates. · Reduce illiteracy prevalence. Health · Increase health personnel and financial means available to major health facilities. · Improve availability of drugs, other materials, and vaccines, with a view to reducing prevalence of major endemic diseases: tuberculosis, malaria as well as improving mother and child health. Agriculture and food security · Expand income generating activities at the community level, including those that increase food production and/or facilitate the supply of food products to markets and the population. · Expand availability of quality services to producers--advice, agricultural education and training, and research and development for improving the supply of agricultural inputs. Infrastructure · Expand supply of, and hence access to, electricity and telephone, through expeditious reform of public utilities. · Expand and improve port and road infrastructure. 19 VI. ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION 44. This paper assesses whether Comoros qualifies for assistance under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Executive Directors' views and guidance are sought on the following issues: · Qualification and decision point: Do Directors agree that Comoros qualifies for assistance under the HIPC Initiative and do they approve the decision point? · Amount and delivery of assistance: In order to reduce the NPV of debt to the threshold of 150 percent of exports of goods and services, the total amount of assistance under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative is estimated at US$144.8 million in NPV terms. Under proportional burden sharing, US$45 million in NPV terms would be provided by IDA; and assistance from the IMF would amount to US$4.27 million in NPV terms. Do Directors agree that IDA should provide interim assistance between the decision and completion points, in line with existing guidelines? · Floating completion point: Do Directors agree that the HIPC floating completion point will be reached when the triggers in Box 3 have been met? Debt relief will be provided unconditionally only when the completion point triggers have been met and satisfactory assurances of other creditors' participation under the enhanced HIPC Initiative for Comoros have been received. 20 Figure 1a. Comoros: Composition of Stock of External Debt at End-2009 by Creditor Group (Nominal stock: $287 million) Nominal stock: US$287 million Paris Club Commercial 6% 2% World Bank Other Official 42% Bilateral 15% IMF Other 4% AfDB Group Multilateral 13% 18% Figure 1b. Comoros: Potential Costs of the HIPC Initiative by Creditor Total Estimated HIPC Enhanced Assistance: US$144.8 million, end-2009 NPV terms Commercial Paris Club 1% Other Official 6% World Bank Bilateral 31% 16% Other Multilateral IMF 3% AfDB Group 19% 24% Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates. 21 Figure 2. Comoros: External Debt Sustainability Indicators, 2009­29 NPV of Debt to Exports (In percent of exports) 400 Bef ore traditional debt relief Unconditional delivery of HIPC 1 2 Af ter conditional HIPC and MDRI assistance 300 200 100 0 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 Debt Service to Exports (In percent of exports) 25 Bef ore traditional debt relief 1 Unconditional delivery of HIPC 20 2 Af ter conditional HIPC and MDRI assistance 15 10 5 0 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates. 1/ Assumes full delivery of estimated HIPC initiative debt relief from July 2010 2/ Assumes HIPC and MDRI delivery at completion point. 22 Figure 3. Comoros: Sensitivity Analysis, 2009­29 After unconditional delivery of enhanced HIPC assistance NPV of Debt to Exports (In percent of Exports) 300 250 200 150 100 Baseline scenario Lower export level 50 Permanently lower growth 0 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 Debt Service to Exports (In percent of Exports) 9 8 7 6 5 4 Baseline scenario Lower export level 3 Permanently lower growth 2 1 0 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates. 23 Table A1. Comoros: Discount and Exchange Rate Assumptions as of end-December 2009 Discount Rate 1/ Exchange Rate 2/ Currency Name (In percent per annum) (Currency per U.S. dollar) Comorian Franc 4.31 0.00 341.50 Swiss Franc 2.85 0.97 1.03 Chinese Yuan 3.91 0.15 6.83 Danish Krone 4.57 0.19 5.19 Euro 4.31 1.44 0.69 Japanese Yen 1.97 0.01 92.06 Norwegian Kroner 4.45 0.17 5.78 Special Drawing Rights 3/ 3.91 1.57 0.64 Swedish Krona 4.44 0.14 7.12 U.S. Dollar 4.09 1.00 1.00 Memorandum item: Paris Club cutoff date June 20, 1999 Sources: OECD; and IMF, International Financial Statistics . 1/ The discount rates used are the average commercial interest reference rates over the six-month period prior to end-December 2009, i.e., the end of the period for which actual debt and export data are available. 2/ The exchange rates are expressed as national currency per U.S. dollar at end-December 2009. 3/ The IsDB, AfDB Group and AMF use the Islamic dinar (ISD), African currency unit (UAC) and Arab accounting dinar (AAD) respectively, which are all linked to the SDR (ISD 1=UAC 1=AAD 1/3=SDR 1) and use the same discount rate as the SDR. 24 Table A2. Comoros: Nominal Stock and Net Present Value of Debt as of December 31, 2009, by Creditor Groups Base Situation for Calculation Legal Situation of HIPC Debt Relief 2/ Nominal Debt Stock 1/ Arrears Stock NPV of Debt 1/ NPV of Debt US$ million Percent US$ million Percent US$ million Percent US$ million Percent of total of total of total of total Total 286.8 100.0 54.0 100.0 213.1 100.0 257.4 100.0 Multilateral 219.6 76.6 35.8 66.4 163.3 76.6 197.6 76.8 World Bank 120.4 42.0 - - 80.1 37.6 80.1 31.1 AfDB Group 38.1 13.3 3.4 6.3 3/ 27.8 13.0 61.5 4/ 23.9 IMF 10.1 3.5 - - 7.6 3.6 7.6 5/ 2.9 BADEA 27.6 9.6 27.6 51.1 27.6 12.9 27.6 10.7 IsDB 9.4 3.3 - - 8.7 4.1 9.1 6/ 3.5 IFAD 8.0 2.8 0.2 0.3 5.6 2.6 5.6 2.2 OFID 3.6 1.3 3.6 6.7 3.6 1.7 3.6 1.4 EIB 1.6 0.6 1.0 1.9 1.4 0.7 1.4 0.5 AMF 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.4 1.2 7/ 0.4 Bilateral and Commercial 67.2 23.4 18.1 33.6 49.8 23.4 59.8 23.2 Bilateral 60.6 21.1 13.7 25.3 43.3 20.3 57.6 22.4 Paris Club: 17.8 6.2 8/ 12.1 22.5 8/ 17.5 8.2 8/ 15.3 6.0 Post-cutoff date 1.7 0.6 - - 1.6 0.8 1.6 0.6 ODA 1.7 0.6 - - 1.6 0.8 1.6 0.6 Non-ODA - - - - - - - - Pre-cutoff date 16.1 5.6 12.1 22.5 15.9 7.5 13.7 5.3 ODA 2.3 0.8 - - 2.1 1.0 1.6 0.6 Non-ODA 13.8 4.8 12.1 22.5 13.9 6.5 12.1 4.7 EEC-IDA Administered Loans 0.4 0.1 - - 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 France 15.9 5.5 10.7 19.8 15.8 7.4 13.7 5.3 Italy 1.4 0.5 1.4 2.7 1.4 0.7 1.4 0.6 Other Official Bilateral: 42.9 14.9 1.5 2.8 25.8 12.1 42.3 16.4 Kuwait 26.4 9.2 - - 14.4 6.7 25.1 9/ 9.8 Mauritius 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.3 Saudi Arabia 14.1 4.9 - - 9.2 4.3 15.3 9/ 6.0 United Arab Emirates 1.3 0.4 1.3 2.4 1.3 0.6 1.0 0.4 Commercial 6.6 2.3 4.5 8.3 6.5 3.0 2.2 0.8 Post-cutoff date 6.6 2.3 4.5 8.3 6.5 3.0 - - Pre-cutoff date - - - - - - - - Banque Postale 1.1 0.4 1.1 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 Cotecna 2.1 0.7 - - 2.0 0.9 0.7 0.3 Hopitaux De Paris 3.3 1.2 3.3 6.1 3.3 1.6 1.1 0.4 Sources: Comorian authorities; and Fund and World Bank staff estimates. 1/ Includes arrears. 2/ Includes a hypothetical stock-of-debt operation on Naples terms at end-2009 and at least comparable action by other official bilateral and commercial creditors on eligible debt (pre-cutoff and non-ODA). 3/ Technical arrears, to be cleared at Decision Point by the European Commission. 4/ The relief resulting from the 2007-09 arrears clearance mechanism were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009. 5/ NPV of debt service is calculated with fixed interest rates at end-2009 in line with treatment of other creditors. In Table A8 (HIPC delivery table), the IMF calcula service projections based on its own interest rate projections, which leads to a small difference in the NPV calculation according to the HIPC method and its own method. 6/ The relief resulting from the October 2009 moratorium on debt service payments and arrears were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009. 7/ The relief resulting from the March 2008 rescheduling and interest penalty waiver were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009. 8/ Does not include the implementation of the November 2009 Paris Club agreement. 9/ The relief resulting from the 2007 rescheduling agreements were added back to the NPV of debt stock as of end-2009. 25 Table A3. Comoros: External Debt Service, 2010­29 (In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) Averages 2010 - 2020 - 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2019 2024 2029 2019 2029 Before traditional debt relief and multilateral arrears clearance Total 17.2 9.0 8.9 8.1 9.1 14.1 14.9 18.5 11.5 15.4 Existing debt 2/ 17.1 8.7 8.6 7.7 8.7 9.5 9.5 9.2 10.0 9.1 Multilateral 13.7 6.4 6.8 6.5 7.5 8.8 7.5 7.0 8.6 7.4 World Bank 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.4 5.5 5.3 4.6 5.5 IMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 AfDB Group 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.5 Others 8.4 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.4 0.4 Official bilateral 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.2 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.2 1.2 1.7 Paris Club 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 Non Paris Club 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 2.0 2.2 0.6 1.7 Commercial 1.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 New debt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 4.5 5.4 9.3 1.5 6.3 Debt service to exports ratio 19.5 9.7 9.1 7.8 8.3 9.2 6.8 5.9 10.1 6.8 Debt service to revenue ratio 20.4 10.1 9.2 7.7 7.9 8.1 5.8 4.9 9.7 5.8 After traditional debt relief 3/ 4/ Total 51.1 8.2 8.9 8.7 9.8 14.7 14.7 19.3 15.3 15.8 Existing debt 2/ 51.0 8.0 8.6 8.3 9.3 10.2 9.3 10.0 13.8 9.5 Multilateral 49.5 6.4 6.8 6.5 7.5 8.8 7.5 7.0 12.2 7.4 World Bank 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.4 5.5 5.3 4.6 5.5 IMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 AfDB Group 4.9 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 2.0 1.5 Others 40.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 4.6 0.4 Official bilateral 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.6 2.8 1.5 1.9 Paris Club 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.6 0.8 1.2 Non Paris Club 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.8 Commercial 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 New debt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 4.5 5.4 9.3 1.5 6.3 Debt service to exports ratio 57.9 8.9 9.1 8.4 8.9 9.6 6.7 6.2 14.2 7.0 Debt service to revenue ratio 60.5 9.3 9.2 8.2 8.5 8.5 5.7 5.1 14.0 5.9 After HIPC assistance 5/ Total 6.0 4.4 4.7 4.8 5.6 10.7 11.4 16.8 7.0 12.5 Existing debt 2/ 5.9 4.2 4.4 4.4 5.1 6.1 6.1 7.5 5.5 6.2 Multilateral 4.9 3.3 3.6 3.2 3.6 5.3 4.4 5.6 4.3 4.8 World Bank 2.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 IMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 AfDB Group 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.5 Others 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 2.5 0.4 1.3 Official bilateral 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.3 Paris Club 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 Non Paris Club 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.7 0.4 1.3 Commercial 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 New debt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 4.5 5.4 9.3 1.5 6.3 Debt service to exports ratio after HIPC assistance 6.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.1 7.0 5.2 5.4 5.9 5.4 Debt service to revenue ratio after HIPC assistance 7.1 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.5 5.6 4.6 Reduction in debt service as a result of HIPC Initiative assistance 6/ 45.1 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.2 4.1 3.2 2.5 8.3 3.3 After HIPC and MDRI assistance 7/ Total 6.0 4.4 4.7 1.7 2.1 7.7 8.1 13.9 4.8 9.2 Existing debt 2/ 5.9 4.2 4.4 1.3 1.7 3.2 2.8 4.5 3.3 2.9 Multilateral 4.9 3.3 3.6 0.1 0.1 2.4 1.1 2.7 2.1 1.5 World Bank 2.6 1.4 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 IMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 AfDB Group 1.5 1.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 Others 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 2.5 0.4 1.3 Official bilateral 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.3 Paris Club 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 Non Paris Club 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.7 0.4 1.3 Commercial 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 New debt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 4.5 5.4 9.3 1.5 6.3 Debt service to exports ratio after HIPC and MDRI assistance 6.8 4.8 4.8 1.6 1.9 5.0 3.7 4.4 4.1 4.0 Debt service to revenue ratio after HIPC and MDRI assistance 7.1 5.0 4.8 1.6 1.8 4.4 3.2 3.7 3.9 3.4 Reduction in debt service as a result of MDRI assistance 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 3.5 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.2 3.3 After conditional additional bilateral and multilateral relief beyond enhanced HIPC and MDRI assistance 7/ 8/ Total 6.0 4.4 4.6 1.5 2.0 7.7 8.1 13.9 4.7 9.2 Existing debt 2/ 5.9 4.2 4.3 1.2 1.5 3.2 2.8 4.5 3.2 2.9 Multilateral 4.9 3.3 3.6 0.1 0.1 2.4 1.1 2.7 2.1 1.5 World Bank 2.6 1.4 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 IMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 AfDB Group 1.5 1.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 Others 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 2.5 0.4 1.3 Official bilateral 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.7 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.3 Paris Club 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 Non Paris Club 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.7 0.4 1.3 Commercial 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 New debt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 4.5 5.4 9.3 1.5 6.3 Debt service to exports ratio after HIPC, additional bilateral relief and MDRI a 6.8 4.8 4.7 1.5 1.8 5.0 3.7 4.4 4.0 4.0 Debt service to revenue ratio after HIPC, additional bilateral relief and MDRI 7.1 5.0 4.7 1.4 1.7 4.4 3.2 3.7 3.9 3.4 Reduction in debt service as a result of Additional bilateral assistance beyond HIPC 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 Memorandum items: Exports of goods and nonfactor services 9/ 88.3 92.5 97.5 103.1 109.9 152.9 219.4 313.1 116.1 231.6 Government revenues 10/ 84.4 88.4 96.5 105.7 115.4 173.1 256.6 376.6 123.5 272.8 Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates and projections. 1/ All debt indicators refer to public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt and are defined after res cheduling, unles s otherwis e indicated. Fis cal year ends in Decem ber. 2/ Includes only principal and interes t due on debt outs tanding as of the reference date (12/31/2009) and does not include projected penalty interes t on arrears . 3/ Includes the im pact of hypothetical arrears clearance operation by AfDB Group, BADEA, IFAD, OFID, EIB and AMF. 4/ As s um es a hypothetical s tock of debt operation on Naples term s and com parable treatm ent from other bilateral creditors . 5/ Bilateral and com m ercial creditors are as s um ed to provide a Cologne flow res cheduling on eligible debt during the interim period and a Cologne s tock of debt operation at the com pletion point (end Decem ber 2012). Multilateral creditors are as s um ed to provide HIPC debt relief as of the decis ion point, except for Is DB, IFAD, BADEA, OFID, which are as s um ed to provide relief at the com pletion point. 6/ The reduction is m eas ured as the difference between the projected debt s ervice after full us e of traditional debt relief and debt s ervice after the application of HIPC relief. 7/ MDRI as s is tance applies to IDA and ADF (Com oros has no MDRI-eligible debt to the IMF) and s tarts after the as s um ed com pletion point (Decem ber 2012). This s cenario als o includes debt cancellation at com pletion point by the EIB under the LDC Initiative, as s um ing Com oros is s till clas s ified as an LDC. As s um es that MDRI has no im pact on Com oros 's new borrowing over the projection period. 8/ Paris Club creditors deliver, under bilateral initiatives , additional debt relief beyond the HIPC Initiative at the com petion point detailed on Table A9. 9/ As defined in IMF, Balance of Paym ents Manual, 5th edition, 1993. Refers to current year exports . 10/ Revenues are defined as central governm ent revenues , excluding grants . 26 Table A4. Comoros: Net Present Value of External Debt 2009­29 (In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) Averages 2009 - 2020 - 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2019 2024 2029 2019 2029 I. Before traditional debt-relief 1/ NPV of total debt 247.4 246.1 250.2 254.6 259.4 263.4 272.5 295.6 332.8 260.8 301.1 NPV of outstanding debt 247.4 236.6 233.6 230.7 228.6 225.4 200.6 177.4 145.0 223.3 173.1 Official bilateral and commercial 49.8 47.7 46.6 45.9 45.8 45.7 46.8 46.1 40.4 46.6 44.9 Paris Club 17.5 16.8 15.9 14.8 14.3 13.7 12.3 12.2 12.1 14.2 12.2 Other official bilateral 25.8 25.8 26.2 26.6 27.1 27.5 30.0 29.4 23.8 27.6 28.3 Commercial 6.5 5.1 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.5 Multilateral 197.6 188.9 187.1 184.8 182.8 179.6 153.9 131.4 104.6 176.7 128.1 World Bank 80.1 79.5 78.5 77.3 76.1 74.5 63.0 47.1 27.3 73.3 44.6 AfDB Group 61.5 60.9 60.4 59.5 58.7 57.9 53.3 48.1 42.4 57.7 47.4 IMF 7.6 7.9 8.2 8.5 8.8 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 Other multilateral 48.4 40.6 40.0 39.4 39.1 38.8 37.5 36.2 34.9 39.7 36.0 Multilateral debt in arrears 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 35.8 NPV of new borrowing 0.0 9.5 16.6 23.9 30.8 38.1 71.8 118.1 187.8 37.5 128.1 II. After traditional debt relief 1/ NPV of total debt 257.4 169.6 174.9 179.9 184.6 188.7 197.3 221.3 259.3 193.4 226.8 NPV of outstanding debt 257.4 160.1 158.3 156.0 153.8 150.6 125.5 103.2 71.6 155.9 98.8 Official bilateral and commercial 59.8 41.3 41.4 41.3 41.2 41.1 41.8 41.9 37.1 43.0 40.8 Paris Club 15.3 15.4 15.2 14.9 14.6 14.3 13.4 11.4 6.7 14.4 10.6 Other official bilateral 42.3 23.8 24.0 24.3 24.5 24.7 26.3 28.8 29.5 26.5 28.6 Commercial 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.7 0.9 2.1 1.6 Multilateral 197.6 118.8 116.9 114.7 112.6 109.5 83.7 61.2 34.5 112.9 58.0 World Bank 80.1 79.5 78.5 77.3 76.1 74.5 63.0 47.1 27.3 73.3 44.6 AfDB Group 61.5 23.8 23.3 22.4 21.6 20.8 16.2 11.0 5.3 24.0 10.3 IMF 7.6 7.6 7.9 8.2 8.5 8.8 1.3 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 Other multilateral 48.4 7.9 7.3 6.7 6.3 5.4 3.2 3.1 1.8 9.0 3.0 NPV of new borrowing 0.0 9.5 16.6 23.9 30.8 38.1 71.8 118.1 187.8 37.5 128.1 III. After conditional delivery of enhanced HIPC assistance 3/ NPV of total debt 196.8 199.6 208.9 132.4 139.6 146.1 169.5 206.7 258.4 166.2 213.9 NPV of outstanding debt 196.8 190.1 192.3 108.4 108.8 108.0 97.6 88.6 70.6 128.6 85.8 Official bilateral and commercial 49.8 42.2 41.9 25.7 26.1 25.6 23.9 23.1 18.6 30.2 22.2 Paris Club 17.5 15.1 14.1 4.5 4.2 3.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 Other official bilateral 25.8 25.2 26.3 20.1 20.7 21.0 22.6 22.2 18.1 22.6 21.4 Commercial 6.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.5 1.7 0.8 Multilateral 147.0 147.9 150.4 82.7 82.8 82.4 73.7 65.5 52.0 98.4 63.6 World Bank 74.0 74.4 75.8 35.4 35.3 35.1 33.0 29.8 25.7 45.4 29.3 AfDB Group 24.4 23.8 23.3 22.4 21.6 20.8 16.2 11.0 5.3 20.6 10.3 IMF 7.6 7.9 8.2 4.1 4.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 Other multilateral 41.0 41.8 43.1 20.8 21.6 22.4 24.5 24.7 21.0 28.3 24.0 NPV of new borrowing 0.0 9.5 16.6 23.9 30.8 38.1 71.8 118.1 187.8 37.5 128.1 IV. After unconditional delivery of enhanced HIPC assistance 4/ NPV of total debt 112.6 118.6 125.6 132.4 139.6 146.1 169.5 206.7 258.4 143.6 213.9 NPV of outstanding debt 112.6 109.0 109.1 108.4 108.8 108.0 97.6 88.6 70.6 106.1 85.8 Official bilateral and commercial 26.1 25.9 26.0 25.7 26.1 25.6 23.9 23.1 18.6 25.1 22.2 Paris Club 6.7 5.8 5.2 4.5 4.2 3.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 Other official bilateral 18.5 19.1 19.8 20.1 20.7 21.0 22.6 22.2 18.1 20.8 21.4 Commercial 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.8 Multilateral 86.4 83.1 83.0 82.7 82.8 82.4 73.7 65.5 52.0 80.9 63.6 World Bank 35.0 35.5 35.5 35.4 35.3 35.1 33.0 29.8 25.7 34.7 29.3 AfDB Group 26.9 23.8 23.3 22.4 21.6 20.8 16.2 11.0 5.3 20.8 10.3 IMF 3.3 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 Other multilateral 21.2 19.9 20.3 20.8 21.6 22.4 24.5 24.7 21.0 22.5 24.0 NPV of new borrowing 0.0 9.5 16.6 23.9 30.8 38.1 71.8 118.1 187.8 37.5 128.1 V. After conditional delivery of enhanced HIPC and MDRI assistance 3/ 5/ 6/ NPV of total debt 196.8 199.6 208.9 80.3 88.6 96.6 126.4 172.5 234.1 131.9 180.8 NPV of outstanding debt 196.8 190.1 192.3 56.3 57.8 58.5 54.5 54.4 46.3 94.3 52.8 Official bilateral and commercial 49.8 42.2 41.9 25.7 26.1 25.6 23.9 23.1 18.6 30.2 22.2 Paris Club 17.5 15.1 14.1 4.5 4.2 3.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 Other official bilateral 25.8 25.2 26.3 20.1 20.7 21.0 22.6 22.2 18.1 22.6 21.4 Commercial 6.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.5 1.7 0.8 Multilateral 147.0 147.9 150.4 30.6 31.8 32.9 30.6 31.3 27.8 64.1 30.5 World Bank 74.0 74.4 75.8 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.4 6.8 6.9 24.8 6.7 AfDB Group 24.4 23.8 23.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0 IMF 7.6 7.9 8.2 4.6 4.7 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 Other multilateral 41.0 41.8 43.1 20.4 21.2 22.1 24.2 24.5 20.9 28.1 23.8 NPV of new borrowing 0.0 9.5 16.6 23.9 30.8 38.1 71.8 118.1 187.8 37.5 128.1 VI. After conditional additional bilateral and multilateral relief beyond enhanced HIPC and MDRI assistance 3/ 5/ 6/ 7/ NPV of total debt 196.8 199.6 208.9 79.8 88.3 96.4 126.4 172.5 234.1 131.8 180.8 NPV of outstanding debt 196.8 190.1 192.3 55.9 57.5 58.3 54.5 54.4 46.3 94.2 52.8 Official bilateral and commercial 49.8 42.2 41.9 25.2 25.7 25.4 23.9 23.1 18.6 30.1 22.2 Paris Club 17.5 15.1 14.1 4.0 3.9 3.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 Other official bilateral 25.8 25.2 26.3 20.1 20.7 21.0 22.6 22.2 18.1 22.6 21.4 Commercial 6.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.5 1.7 0.8 Multilateral 147.0 147.9 150.4 30.6 31.8 32.9 30.6 31.3 27.8 64.1 30.5 World Bank 74.0 74.4 75.8 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.4 6.8 6.9 24.8 6.7 AfDB Group 24.4 23.8 23.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0 IMF 7.6 7.9 8.2 4.6 4.7 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 Other multilateral 41.0 41.8 43.1 20.4 21.2 22.1 24.2 24.5 20.9 28.1 23.8 NPV of new borrowing 0.0 9.5 16.6 23.9 30.8 38.1 71.8 118.1 187.8 37.5 128.1 Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates and projections. 1/ Includes the impact of arrears clearance operations by the AfDB Group in 2007 (actual) and BADEA, IFAD, AMF, OFID and EIB (hypothetical) as well as loan rescheduling agreements with the IsDB (2009) and AMF (2008). Also includes the relief resulting from the 2007 rescheduling agreements added back to the 2009 NPV of debt stock (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). 2/ In terms of simple historical three-year average of exports of goods and nonfactor services. 3/ Assumes interim relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative from July 2010 to December 2012. 4/ Assumes full delivery of estimated HIPC initiative debt relief from July 2010 5/ MDRI assistance applies to the World Bank and the AfDB Group, and starts after the assumed completion point (December 2012). This scenario also includes debt cancellation at completion point by the EIB under the LDC Initiative, assuming Comoros is still classified as an LDC. 6/ For the AfDB Group, the actual NPV of debt after unconditional delivery of HIPC assistance is smaller than the number shown in this table, which is the NPV of debt required to bring the total NPV of debt down to 150 percent of exports (similarly for the EIB), because the amount of arrears clearance pledged by the AfDB Group and the EIB will reduce their debt by more than the common reduction factor. 7/ Paris Club creditors deliver, under bilateral initiatives, additional debt relief beyond the HIPC Initiative at the competion point detailed on Table A9. 1 Table A5. Comoros: External Debt Indicators, 2009­29 Averages 2009 - 2020 - 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2019 2029 (In percent, unless otherwise indicated) I. Before traditional debt-relief NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 46.2 41.8 40.2 38.4 36.5 34.5 32.5 30.5 28.6 26.9 25.2 23.8 22.6 21.5 20.4 19.4 18.6 17.8 17.0 16.2 15.5 34.7 19.3 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 2/ 3/ 329.7 308.0 286.3 274.6 265.5 254.6 242.3 228.7 215.5 203.2 191.0 179.9 169.8 160.8 152.6 144.7 137.9 131.4 125.5 119.6 114.0 254.5 143.6 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 4/ 331.9 291.5 283.2 263.9 245.4 228.3 211.3 196.0 181.3 169.2 157.4 147.1 137.6 129.6 122.1 115.2 109.3 103.4 98.1 93.1 88.4 232.7 114.4 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 19.5 9.7 9.1 7.8 8.3 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.9 9.2 8.1 7.8 7.1 7.1 6.8 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.1 5.9 10.1 6.8 Debt service-to-revenue ratio 4/ ... 20.4 10.1 9.2 7.7 7.9 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.8 8.1 7.1 6.7 6.1 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.9 9.7 5.8 II. After traditional debt relief and multilateral arrears clearance 5/ 6/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 48.1 28.8 28.1 27.1 26.0 24.7 23.4 22.0 20.6 19.4 18.3 17.3 16.5 15.7 15.1 14.6 14.0 13.6 13.1 12.6 12.1 26.0 14.5 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 2/ 3/ 343.0 212.2 200.1 194.0 189.0 182.3 174.3 164.9 155.5 146.9 138.3 130.7 123.8 117.9 113.1 108.4 104.3 100.3 96.5 92.7 88.9 191.0 107.7 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 4/ 345.3 200.8 197.9 186.5 174.7 163.5 152.0 141.3 130.8 122.3 114.0 106.9 100.4 95.1 90.5 86.2 82.7 78.9 75.5 72.1 68.9 175.4 85.7 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 57.9 8.9 9.1 8.4 8.9 9.7 9.8 9.9 10.3 9.6 8.6 8.2 7.5 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.2 14.2 7.0 Debt service-to-revenue ratio 4/ ... 60.5 9.3 9.2 8.2 8.5 9.0 8.9 8.9 9.1 8.5 7.5 7.1 6.5 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.1 14.0 5.9 III. After conditional delivery of enhanced HIPC assistance 7/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 36.8 33.9 33.5 20.0 19.6 19.1 18.6 17.9 17.1 16.4 15.7 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.1 12.7 12.4 12.1 22.6 13.5 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 2/ 3/ 262.2 249.8 239.0 142.7 142.9 141.2 138.4 134.0 128.5 123.9 118.8 114.3 110.2 106.9 104.1 101.2 98.9 96.7 94.2 91.4 88.5 165.6 100.6 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio (existing debt only) 262.2 237.8 220.1 116.9 111.4 104.3 96.6 89.3 81.8 74.9 68.5 62.9 57.7 52.8 48.0 43.4 39.2 35.3 31.4 27.7 24.2 133.1 42.2 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 4/ 264.0 236.4 236.4 137.2 132.1 126.6 120.7 114.8 108.1 103.1 97.9 93.4 89.3 86.2 83.3 80.6 78.4 76.1 73.6 71.2 68.6 152.5 80.1 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 6.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.5 6.0 6.9 7.2 7.0 6.3 6.0 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.9 5.4 Debt service-to-revenue ratio 4/ ... 7.1 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 6.2 6.4 6.2 5.5 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.6 4.6 IV. After unconditional delivery of enhanced HIPC assistance 8/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 21.0 20.1 20.2 20.0 19.6 19.1 18.6 17.9 17.1 16.4 15.7 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.1 12.7 12.4 12.1 18.7 13.5 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 2/ 3/ 150.0 148.4 143.8 142.7 142.9 141.2 138.4 134.0 128.5 123.9 118.8 114.3 110.2 106.9 104.1 101.2 98.9 96.7 94.2 91.4 88.5 137.5 100.6 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio (existing debt only) 150.0 136.4 124.8 116.9 111.4 104.3 96.6 89.3 81.8 74.9 68.5 62.9 57.7 52.8 48.0 43.4 39.2 35.3 31.4 27.7 24.2 105.0 42.2 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 4/ 151.0 140.4 142.2 137.2 132.1 126.6 120.7 114.8 108.1 103.1 97.9 93.4 89.3 86.2 83.3 80.6 78.4 76.1 73.6 71.2 68.6 124.9 80.1 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 6.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.5 6.0 6.9 7.2 7.0 6.3 6.0 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.9 5.4 27 Debt service-to-revenue ratio 4/ ... 7.1 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 6.2 6.4 6.2 5.5 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.6 4.6 V. After conditional delivery of enhanced HIPC and MDRI assistance 9/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 36.8 33.9 33.5 12.1 12.5 12.6 12.8 12.7 12.3 12.0 11.7 11.6 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.2 11.1 10.9 18.4 11.3 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 2/ 3/ 262.2 249.8 239.0 86.5 90.7 93.3 95.5 95.4 92.6 90.6 88.6 87.2 86.1 85.5 85.1 84.5 84.2 83.9 83.0 81.8 80.2 134.9 84.1 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio (existing debt only) 262.2 237.8 220.1 60.7 59.2 56.5 53.7 50.7 45.9 41.6 38.2 35.8 33.5 31.4 29.0 26.6 24.5 22.5 20.2 18.0 15.9 102.4 25.7 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 4/ 264.0 236.4 236.4 83.2 83.9 83.7 83.3 81.8 77.9 75.4 73.0 71.3 69.8 68.9 68.0 67.2 66.7 66.0 64.9 63.7 62.2 125.4 66.9 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 6.8 4.8 4.8 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.8 5.4 5.6 5.0 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.0 Debt service-to-revenue ratio 4/ ... 7.1 5.0 4.8 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.6 4.8 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.4 VI. After conditional additional bilateral and multilateral relief beyond enhanced HIPC and MDRI assistance 9/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 36.8 33.9 33.5 12.0 12.4 12.6 12.8 12.7 12.3 12.0 11.7 11.6 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.2 11.1 10.9 18.4 11.3 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 2/ 3/ 262.2 249.8 239.0 86.0 90.4 93.1 95.4 95.4 92.6 90.6 88.6 87.2 86.1 85.5 85.1 84.5 84.2 83.9 83.0 81.8 80.2 134.8 84.1 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio (existing debt only) 262.2 237.8 220.1 60.2 58.9 56.3 53.6 50.7 45.9 41.6 38.2 35.8 33.5 31.4 29.0 26.6 24.5 22.5 20.2 18.0 15.9 102.3 25.7 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 4/ 264.0 236.4 236.4 82.7 83.6 83.5 83.2 81.8 77.9 75.4 73.0 71.3 69.8 68.9 68.0 67.2 66.7 66.0 64.9 63.7 62.2 125.3 66.9 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 6.8 4.8 4.7 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.8 5.4 5.6 5.0 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.0 4.0 Debt service-to-revenue ratio 4/ ... 7.1 5.0 4.7 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.5 4.8 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.4 Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates and projections. 1/ All debt indicators refer to public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt at end-December 2009. 2/ Exports are defined as in IMF, Balance of Payments Manual, 5th edition, 1993. 3/ Based on a three-year average of exports on the previous year (e.g., export average over 2007-2009 for NPV of debt-to-exports ratio in 2009). 4/ Revenue is defined as central government revenue, excluding grants. 5/ Shows the external debt situation after the full use of traditional debt-relief mechanisms, and assuming at least comparable treatment from official bilateral creditors. 6/ Includes the impact of arrears clearance operations by the AfDB Group in 2007 (actual) and BADEA, IFAD, OFID and EIB (hypothetical) as well as loan rescheduling agreements with the IsDB (2009) and AMF (2008). Also includes the relief resulting from the 2007 rescheduling agreements added back to the 2009 NPV of debt stock (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). 7/ Assumes interim relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative from July 2010 to December 2012 and full delivery of assistance in December 2012. 8/ Assumes full delivery of estimated HIPC initiative debt relief as of July 2010. 9/ MDRI assistance applies to IDA and ADF (Comoros has no MDRI-eligible debt to the IMF) and starts after the assumed completion point (December 2012). This scenario also includes debt cancellation at completion point by the EIB under the LDC Initiative, assuming Comoros is still classified as an LDC. Assumes that MDRI has no impact on Comoros's new borrowing over the projection period. 1 Table A6. Comoros: Sensitivity Analysis, 2009­29 After unconditional delivery of enhanced HIPC assistance Averages 2009 - 2020 - 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2019 2029 (In percent, unless otherwise indicated) I. Baseline scenario 2/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 21.0 20.1 20.2 20.0 19.6 19.1 18.6 17.9 17.1 16.4 15.7 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.1 12.7 12.4 12.1 18.7 13.5 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 3/ 4/ 150.0 148.4 143.8 142.7 142.9 141.2 138.4 134.0 128.5 123.9 118.8 114.3 110.2 106.9 104.1 101.2 98.9 96.7 94.2 91.4 88.5 137.5 100.6 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 5/ 151.0 140.4 142.2 137.2 132.1 126.6 120.7 114.8 108.1 103.1 97.9 93.4 89.3 86.2 83.3 80.6 78.4 76.1 73.6 71.2 68.6 125 80 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 6.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.5 6.0 6.9 7.2 7.0 6.3 6.0 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.9 5.4 Debt service-to-revenue ratio ... 7.1 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 6.2 6.4 6.2 5.5 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.6 4.6 II. Sensitivity analysis I. Lower export level scenario 6/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 21.0 20.1 20.2 20.0 19.6 19.1 18.6 17.9 17.1 16.4 15.7 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.1 12.7 12.4 12.1 18.7 13.5 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 3/ 4/ 150.0 152.3 151.6 154.8 156.0 155.2 153.8 150.5 146.1 142.7 139.1 136.4 134.2 132.8 131.6 130.7 130.2 129.9 128.8 127.5 125.9 150.2 130.8 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 5/ 151.0 140.4 142.2 137.2 132.1 126.6 120.7 114.8 108.1 103.1 97.9 93.4 89.3 86.2 83.3 80.6 78.4 76.1 73.6 71.2 68.6 124.9 80.1 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 7.4 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.6 6.2 6.8 8.0 8.4 8.3 7.7 7.5 6.9 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.7 7.4 7.5 7.8 6.6 7.2 Debt service-to-revenue ratio ... 7.1 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 6.2 6.4 6.2 5.5 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.6 4.6 28 II. Permanently lower growth 7/ NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 21.0 20.3 20.5 20.7 20.9 20.8 20.7 20.5 20.0 19.7 19.3 19.1 18.9 18.9 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.9 18.8 18.7 18.6 20.4 18.8 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 3/ 4/ 150.0 148.3 143.9 143.3 144.3 143.6 142.1 138.8 134.4 131.0 127.3 124.3 121.8 120.0 118.2 116.6 115.3 114.1 112.2 110.1 107.7 140.6 116.0 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio 5/ 151.0 141.0 143.8 143.1 143.4 142.0 140.1 137.6 134.0 132.3 129.6 127.7 126.0 125.3 124.6 124.1 124.9 124.7 124.0 123.1 121.8 140 125 Debt service-to-exports ratio ... 6.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.2 5.7 6.2 7.3 7.7 7.5 7.0 6.7 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.9 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.1 6.4 Debt service-to-revenue ratio ... 7.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 5.4 5.9 6.5 7.7 8.2 8.1 7.6 7.4 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.8 7.5 7.7 8.0 6.4 7.2 Sources: Comorian authorities and staff estimates and projections. 1/ All debt indicators refer to public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt and are defined after HIPC debt relief assumed delivered unconditionally as of July 2010. 2/ The macroeconomic projections for the baseline scenario are described in Section III. 3/ As defined in IMF, Balance of Payments Manual , 5th edition, 1993. 4/ Based on a three-year average of exports on the previous year (e.g., export average over 2007-2009 for NPV of debt-to-exports ratio in 2009). 5/ Revenue is defined as central government revenue, excluding grants. 6/ Assumes a lower export level of 30 percent. 7/ Assumes a lower growth of 1.5 percent. 1 Table A7. Comoros: Possible Delivery of World Bank Group's Assistance under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, 2010­44 (In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) Cumulative 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2023 2033 2043 2044 2012-23 2010-44 I. Relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative Debt service before HIPC assistance 1/ 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.3 5.4 3.8 0.6 0.3 59.9 133.7 of which principal 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.9 3.6 0.6 0.3 51.7 120.4 of which interest 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 8.2 13.3 Debt service after HIPC assistance 1/ 2.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 3.8 0.6 0.3 20.9 67.6 of which principal 1.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 3.6 0.6 0.3 18.0 62.0 of which interest 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.9 5.6 Savings on debt service to IDA 2/ 1.2 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 66.1 of which principal 0.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.7 58.4 of which interest 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 7.7 II. Relief under the MDRI 3/ Projected stock of IDA credits outstanding at implementation date 4/ 110.9 Remaining IDA credits after MDRI 15.8 29 Debt stock reduction on eligible credits 3/ 5/ 95.0 Due to HIPC relief 6/ 48.3 Due to MDRI 46.7 Debt service due after HIPC relief and the MDRI 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.8 12.1 Memorandum item: Debt service to IDA covered by HIPC assistance (in percent) 7/ 32.5 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 - - - 65.1 49.4 Debt service to IDA covered by HIPC assistance and MDRI (in percent) 8/ 98.7 97.8 96.9 96.8 96.9 97.0 97.1 81.7 - - 97.0 90.9 IDA debt service relief under the MDRI (in SDR) 9/ - - - 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.0 - - 11.7 32.8 Source: IDA staff estimates. 1/ Principal and interest due to IDA correspond to prorated projections on disbursed and outstanding debt as of end-December 2009, converted to U.S. dollar. 2/ Enhanced HIPC assistance from June 2010 to December 2012. 3/ Stock of debt and debt service denominated in SDRs are converted into U.S. dollar by applying the end-2009 exchange rate. 4/ Stock of debt outstanding on January 1, 2013. 5/ Debt disbursed as of December 31, 2003 and still outstanding at the December 31, 2012. 6/ HIPC relief is assumed to proportionally reduce repayments of principal and charges on IDA credits disbursed as of end-December 2003 and still outstanding as of December 31, 2012. 7/ Based on debt disbursed and outstanding as of end-2009. 8/ Based on debt disbursed and outstanding as of end-2003. 9/ For SDR denominated credits, debt relief under the MDRI is estimated as debt service on SDR denominated credits minus USD-based HIPC debt relief on these credits. HIPC debt relief is converted into SDR equivalent amounts, from July 2009 onwards, by applying the IDA15 foreign exchange reference rate of 1.524480 U.S. dollars per SDR. For USD denominated credits, debt relief under the MDRI is estimated as debt service on USD denominated credits minus USD-based HIPC debt relief on these credits. The resulting MDRI debt relief amounts are converted into SDR equivalent amounts by applying the IDA15 foreign exchange reference rate. 30 1 Table A8. Comoros: Possible Delivery of IMF Assistance Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 2010­19 (in millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Jul-Dec (Based on the US$/SDR exchange rate as of December 31, 2009) I. Pre-MDRI Debt relief (under the HIPC Initiative only) 2/ HIPC-eligible debt service due on IMF obligations 3/ - - 0.03 0.03 0.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 Principal - - - - 0.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 Interest 4/ - - 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.002 HIPC assistance--deposits into member's Umbrella Account Interim assistance 5/ - - 0.03 Completion point disbursement 6/ 4.5 Completion point assistance 4.2 Completion point interest 0.27 IMF assistance--drawdown schedule from member's Umbrella Account - - 0.03 - 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.4 IMF assistance without interest - - 0.03 - 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.3 Estimated interest earnings 7/ - - - - 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.05 Debt service due on current IMF obligations after IMF assistance - - - 0.03 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 Delivery schedule of IMF assistance (in percent of the total assistance; on a flow basis) - - 0.6 - 5 20 20 23 24 8 Share of debt service due on IMF obligations covered by HIPC assistance (in percent) - - 100 - 63.9 54.9 54.6 54.4 54.6 29.5 Proportion (in percent) of each repayment falling due during the period to be paid by HIPC assistance from the principal deposited in Umbrella Account 5/ - - 100 - 30.4 42.0 42.0 48.3 50.4 25.6 II. Post-MDRI Debt relief (under both MDRI and HIPC Initiatives) 4.5 Projected pre MDRI cutoff date debt at completion point 8/ - Delivery of remaining HIPC assistance for post MDRI cutoff date debt (on stock basis): 4.5 III. Debt service due to the IMF after HIPC and MDRI debt relief - - - 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.2 2.0 2.0 1.3 Principal - - - - - - 0.2 2.0 2.0 1.3 Interest - - - 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.002 Source: Fund staf f estimates and projections. 1/ Total IMF assistance under the enhanced HIPC Initiative is US$4.270 million in NPV terms calculated on the basis of data available at the decision point, excluding interest earned on Comoros' Umbrella account and on committed but undisbursed amounts as described in f ootnote 6. 2/ Estimated hypothetical delivery of HIPC assistance on f low basis in the absence of MDRI decision. 3/ Forthcoming obligations estimated based on schedules in ef f ect as of April 30, 2010. Interest obligations do not include net SDR charges and assessments. 4/ Ef f ective January 7, 2010 interest charges on concessional loans are waived through 12/31/11. The Fund will review interest rates f or all concessional f acilities in late 2011 and every two years thereaf ter. Af ter 2011, projected interest charges are based on 0.25 percent per annum f or the ECF credit outstanding. 5/ As there would be no principal or interest obligations due though 2011, it is projected that a HIPC interim assistance will be deposited into Comoros' Umbrella account in June 2012 to cover 100 percent of eligible PRGT interest due to the Fund in June and December 2012. 6/ The remaining IMF's grant HIPC assistance is assumed to be disbursed into member's account at the completion point in December 2012, which is ref lected in the calculation of interest. 7/ Estimated interest earnings on: (a) amounts held in Comoros' Umbrella Account; and (b) up to the completion point, amounts committed but not yet disbursed. The projected interest earnings are estimated based on assumed interest rates which are gradually rising to 4.5 percent in 2015 and beyond; actual interest earnings may be higher or lower. 8/ Comoros does not have MDRI-eligible credit outstanding to the IMF. 31 Table A9. Comoros: Status of Creditor Participation Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative Debt relief Percentage of Modalities to in NPV terms total assistance deliver debt relief (US$ millions) IDA 45.1 31.1 Interim assistance w ill be delivered through reduction in debt service reduction started from July 2010 on all debt outstanding and disbursed at end-2009. AfDB Group 34.6 23.9 The AfDB Group has provided nearly all its required debt relief via arrears clearance under the Post-Conflict Country Facility betw een 2007 and 2009. Including arrears clearance at the decision point by the European Commission, the AfDB Group have fully delivered its HIPC relief. IMF 4.3 2.9 There w ill be no principal payments until 2014, interest payments are w aived through 2011, and part of HIPC relief is applied to the interest payment in 2012. Thereafter, the IMF w ill give debt relief. Possible HIPC interim assistance could be considered after 2011. BADEA 15.5 10.7 Debt relief assumed to be given after completion point via concessional rescheduling. OFID 2.0 1.4 Debt relief assumed to be given after completion point via concessional rescheduling. EIB 0.8 0.5 Arrears up to the decision point w ill be cancelled by a budget support operation. This w ill already exceed the required relief. The remaining debt w ill be cancelled at the completion point under the LDC initiative, provided Comoros is still classified as an LDC. AMF 0.6 0.4 Debt relief assumed to be given after decision point via concessional rescheduling. IsDB 5.1 3.5 Debt relief assumed to be given after completion point via concessional rescheduling. IFAD 3.2 2.2 Debt relief assumed to be given after completion point via cancellation of debt service. Total multilateral 111.2 76.8 Paris Club Creditors 8.6 6.0 Interim assistance w ill be delivered through a Cologne flow during the interim period. Non-Paris Club Creditors 23.8 16.4 Kuwait 14.1 9.8 Kuw ait has partly delivered its relief through a loan rescheduling in 2007. Mauritius 0.5 0.3 Saudi Arabia 8.6 6.0 Saudi Arabia has partly delivered its relief through a loan rescheduling in 2007. United Arab Emirates 0.5 0.4 Commercial creditors 1.2 0.8 Banque Postale 0.2 0.1 Cotecna 0.4 0.3 Hopitaux De Paris 0.6 0.4 Total bilateral and commerci 33.6 23.2 TOTAL 144.8 100.0 Sources: Comorian authorities; and Bank-Fund staff estimates. 32 Table A10. Paris Club Creditors' Delivery of Debt Relief under Bilateral Initiatives Countries Covered ODA (In percent) Non-ODA (In percent) Provision of Relief Pre-cutoff Post-cutoff Pre-cutoff Post-cutoff Date Debt Date Debt Date Debt Date Debt Decision Point Completion Point (In percent) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Australia HIPCs 100 100 100 100 2/ 2/ 2/ Austria HIPCs 100 - 100 - Case-by-case, flow Stock Belgium HIPCs 100 100 100 - 100 flow Stock Canada HIPCs 3/ - 4/ - 4/ 100 100 100 flow Stock Denmark HIPCs 100 100 5/ 100 100 5/ 100 flow Stock France HIPCs 100 100 100 - 100 flow 6/ Stock Finland HIPCs 100 - 7/ 100 - 7/ - - Germany HIPCs 100 100 100 100 100 flow Stock Ireland - - - - - - - Italy HIPCs 100 100 8/ 100 100 8/ 100 flow Stock Japan HIPCs 100 100 100 - - Stock Netherlands, the HIPCs 100 9/ 100 100 - 90-100 flow 9/ Stock 10/ Norway HIPCs 10/ 10/ 11/ 11/ - - Russia HIPCS - 12/ - 12/ 100 100 - Stock Spain HIPCs 100 Case-by-case 100 Case-by-case - Stock Sweden HIPCs - - 13/ 100 - - Stock Switzerland HIPCs - 14/ - 14/ 90-100 15/ - 90-100 flow Stock United Kingdom HIPCs 100 100 100 100 16/ 100 flow 16/ Stock United States HIPCs 100 100 100 100 17/ 100 flow Stock Source: Paris Club Secretariat. 1/ Columns (1) to (7) describe the additional debt relief provided following a specific methodology under bilateral initiatives and need to be read as a whole for each creditor. In column (1), "HIPCs" stands for eligible countries effectively qualifying for the HIPC process. A "100 percent" mention in the table indicates that the debt relief provided under the enhanced HIPC Initiative framework will be topped up to 100 percent through a bilateral initiative. 2/ Australia: post-cutoff date non-ODA relief to apply to debts incurred before a date to be finalized; timing details for both flow and stock relief are to be finalized. 3/ Canada: including Bangladesh. Canada has granted a moratorium of debt service as of January 2001 on all debt disbursed before end-March 1999 for 13 out of 17 HIPCs with debt service due to Canada. Eligible countries are Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia. 100% cancellation will be granted at completion point. As of July 2004, Canada has provided completion point stock of debt cancellation for Benin, Bolivia, Guyana, Senegal, and Tanzania. 4/ 100 percent of ODA claims have already been cancelled on HIPCs, with the exception of Myanmar's debt to Canada. 5/ Denmark provides 100 percent cancellation of ODA loans and non-ODA credits contracted and disbursed before September 27, 1999. 6/ France: cancellation of 100 percent of debt service on pre-cutoff date commercial claims on the government as they fall due starting at decision point. Once countries have reached completion point, debt relief on ODA claims on the government will go to a special account and will be used for specific development projects. 7/ Finland: no post-Cutoff date claims 8/ Italy: cancellation of 100 percent of all debts (pre- and post-cutoff date, ODA and non-ODA) incurred before June 20, 1999 (the Cologne Summit). At decision point, cancellation of the related amounts falling due in the interim period. At completion point, cancellation of the stock of remaining debt. 9/ The Netherlands: 100 percent ODA (pre- and post-cutoff date debt will be cancelled at decision point); for non-ODA: in some particular cases (Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia), the Netherlands will write off 100 percent of the consolidated amounts on the flow at decision point; all other HIPCs will receive interim relief up to 90 percent reduction of the consolidated amounts. At completion point, all HIPCs will receive 100 per cent cancellation of the remaining stock of the pre-cutoff date debt. 10/ Norway has cancelled all ODA claims. 11/ Due to the current World Bank/IMF methodology for recalculating debt reduction needs at HIPC completion point, Norway has postponed the decisions on whether or not to grant 100% debt reduction until after HIPCs' completion point. 12/ Russia has no ODA claims 13/ Sweden has no ODA claims. 14/ Switzerland has cancelled all ODA claims. 15/ In some particular cases (Central African Republic, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Togo), Switzerland will write off 100 percent of the remaining debt stock at completion point; all other HIPCs will receive debt relief according to Paris Club terms. 16/ United Kingdom: "beyond 100 percent" full write-off of all debts of HIPCs as of their decision points, and reimbursement at decision point of any debt service paid before the decision point. 17/ United States: 100 percent post-cutoff date non-ODA treated on debt assumed prior to June 20, 1999 (the Cologne Summit). 33 Table A11. HIPC Initiative: Status of Country Cases Considered Under the Initiative, January 27, 2010 Target Estimated Total NPV of Debt-to- Assistance Levels 1/ Percentage Nominal Debt Decision Completion Gov. (In millions of U.S. dollars, present value) Reduction Service Relief Country Point Point Exports revenue Bilateral and Multilateral in NPV of (In millions of (in percent) Total commercial Total IMF World Bank Debt 2/ U.S. dollars) Completion point reached under enhanced framework (26) Afghanistan Jul. 07 Jan. 10 150 582 446 136 - 76 51 1,280 Benin Jul. 00 Mar. 03 150 265 77 189 24 84 31 460 Bolivia 1,302 425 876 84 194 2,060 original framework Sep. 97 Sep. 98 225 448 157 291 29 54 14 760 enhanced framework Feb. 00 Jun. 01 150 854 268 585 55 140 30 1,300 Burkina Faso 553 83 469 57 231 930 original framework Sep. 97 Jul. 00 205 229 32 196 22 91 27 400 enhanced framework Jul. 00 Apr. 02 150 195 35 161 22 79 30 300 topping-up ... Apr. 02 150 129 16 112 14 61 24 230 Burundi Aug. 05 Jan. 09 150 833 127 706 28 425 92 1,366 Cameroon Oct. 00 Apr. 06 150 1,267 879 322 37 176 27 4,917 Central African Rep. Sept. 07 Jun. 09 150 578 186 362 27 207 68 804 Congo Rep. of Mar. 06 Jan. 10 250 1,575 1,462 113 8 47 31 1,738 Ethiopia 1,982 637 1,315 60 832 3,275 enhanced framework Nov. 01 Apr. 04 150 1,275 482 763 34 463 47 1,941 topping-up Apr. 04 150 707 155 552 26 369 31 1,334 Gambia, The Dec. 00 Dec. 07 150 67 17 49 2 22 27 112 Ghana Feb. 02 Jul. 04 144 250 2,186 1,084 1,102 112 781 56 3,500 Guyana 591 223 367 75 68 1,354 original framework Dec. 97 May 99 107 280 256 91 165 35 27 24 634 enhanced framework Nov. 00 Dec. 03 150 250 335 132 202 40 41 40 719 Haiti Nov. 06 Jun. 09 150 140 20 120 3 53 15 213 Honduras Jul. 00 Mar. 05 110 250 556 215 340 30 98 18 1,000 Madagascar Dec. 00 Oct. 04 150 836 474 362 19 252 40 1,900 Malawi 1,057 171 886 45 622 1,628 enhanced framework Dec. 00 Aug. 06 150 646 164 482 30 333 44 1,025 topping-up ... Aug. 06 150 411 7 404 15 289 35 603 Mali 539 169 370 59 185 895 original framework Sep. 98 Sep. 00 200 121 37 84 14 43 9 220 enhanced framework Sep. 00 Mar. 03 150 417 132 285 45 143 29 675 Mauritania Feb. 00 Jun. 02 137 250 622 261 361 47 100 50 1,100 Mozambique 2,023 1,270 753 143 443 4,300 original framework Apr. 98 Jun. 99 200 1,717 1,076 641 125 381 63 3,700 enhanced framework Apr. 00 Sep. 01 150 306 194 112 18 62 27 600 Nicaragua Dec. 00 Jan. 04 150 3,308 2,175 1,134 82 191 73 4,500 Niger 663 235 428 42 240 1,190 enhanced framework Dec. 00 Apr. 04 150 521 211 309 28 170 53 944 topping-up ... Apr. 04 150 143 23 119 14 70 25 246 Rwanda 696 65 631 63 383 1,316 enhanced framework Dec. 00 Apr. 05 150 452 56 397 44 228 71 839 topping-up ... Apr. 05 150 243 9 235 20 154 53 477 São Tomé and Príncipe 124 31 93 1 47 128 263 enhanced framework Dec. 00 Mar. 07 150 99 29 70 - 24 83 215 topping-up ... Mar. 07 150 25 2 23 1 23 45 49 Senegal Jun. 00 Apr. 04 133 250 488 212 276 45 124 19 850 Sierra Leone Mar. 02 Dec. 06 150 675 335 340 125 123 81 994 Tanzania Apr. 00 Nov. 01 150 2,026 1,006 1,020 120 695 54 3,000 Uganda 1,003 183 820 160 517 1,950 original framework Apr. 97 Apr. 98 202 347 73 274 69 160 20 650 enhanced framework Feb. 00 May 00 150 656 110 546 91 357 37 1,300 Zambia Dec. 00 Apr. 05 150 2,499 1,168 1,331 602 493 63 3,900 Decision point reached under enhanced framework (9) Chad May. 01 Floating 150 170 35 134 18 68 30 260 Cote d'Ivoire Mar. 09 Floating 250 3,005 2,311 694 38 402 24 3,129 Congo, Democratic Rep. of Jul. 03 Floating 150 6,311 3,837 2,474 472 831 80 10,389 Guinea Dec. 00 Floating 150 545 215 328 31 152 32 800 Guinea-Bissau Dec. 00 Floating 150 416 212 204 12 93 85 790 Liberia Mar. 08 Floating 150 2,846 1,420 1,426 732 375 91 4,008 Togo Nov. 08 Floating 250 270 120 150 0.3 98 19 360 Total assistance provided/committed 42,597 21,786 20,682 3,406 3/ 9,728 70,529 Sources: IMF and World Bank Board decisions, completion point documents, decision point documents, preliminary HIPC documents, and staff calculations. 1/ Assistance levels are at countries' respective decision or completion points, as applicable. 2/ In percent of the net present value of debt at the decision or completion point (as applicable), after the full use of traditional debt-relief mechanisms. 3/ Equivalent to SDR 2181.98 million at an SDR/USD exchange rate of 0.640563, as of January 27, 2195.475 0.644524 34 Annex I. Comoros: Debt Management Capacity Debt management is shared between the debt management office (DMO), 1 and the national debt committee. 2 The DMO, which is part of the Ministry of Finances, will work under the Treasury 3 supervision starting in 2011 according to the new organic law. Its mission is to define the government policy for debt accumulation and servicing. The DMO is responsible for the management of public debt, debt of state-owned enterprises and publicly guaranteed debt, and for preparing analytical reports for the Minister of Finance and the Budget. It is also in charge of making debt service projections, preparing invoices and sending them to the treasury, which authorizes the central bank to transfer amounts of debt service due to creditors. The mission of the national committee is to ensure the coordination of the debt policy and management of public debt with fiscal and monetary policy and to execute the debt management strategy. The minister of finance is the only government member who is allowed to sign new loan agreements, while the national committee only gives advice. Coordination with international institutions on debt issues is shared with another unit, the CREF. 4 This department's mission is to coordinate implementation and monitoring of economic and financial reforms. In particular, it negotiates programs with the IMF, collects and compiles and analyzes economic, financial and fiscal data from the federal and island finance offices, the central bank and other ministries. Meanwhile, the DMO 5 coordinates all activities with respect to debt and debt rescheduling with the IMF, World Bank, Paris Club and bilateral creditors. In theory, the DMO consists of a director, an officer for external debt service, an officer for domestic debt service, a statistician, an information analyst and an accountant. The minimum qualification of the staff is a master's degree. The staff seems reasonably knowledgeable. In practice however, the DMO is understaffed with only two full-time and one part-time staff and no director. Loan disbursement projections are currently generated by the National Planning Commission,6 but the DMO expects to be able to generate these projections in the future, when the debt management software, CS-DRMS2000+, is installed in early 2011with 1 Established by decree (décret N°03-62/PR) in 2003 as the Direction Nationale de la Dette (DND). 2 Established by decree (Décret N°08-27/PR), consisting of the minister of finance, minister of external affairs, planning minister, director general of the budget, director of the DMO, and others. 3 Direction Générale du Trésor. 4 Established by decree (décret N°07-018/PR) in 2007, Cellule des Réformes Économiques et Financières. 5 Art 9, Arrêté N° 03-005/MFBECEIP/CAB. 6 Commissariat Général au Plan. 35 assistance by the AfDB. Until then, data on the debt stock and debt projections will continue to be kept in an Excel spreadsheet file. The DMO is a member of a debt management capacity building project by the BCEAO/BEAC, 7 which receives assistance from Pôle Dette 8 in the areas of building a strategy for debt reduction, a financial strategy, financial programming, and putting in place a legal framework in line with international standards. Currently however, Comoros does not have a formal debt strategy; instead the country seems to give priority to payments to the largest multilateral creditors, while endeavoring to secure agreements to prevent accumulation of arrears to the smaller creditors. The DMO uses Debt-Pro for analyzing debt and for creating debt sustainability and debt relief simulations. The DMO has no regular official publications, but it publishes a table with debt service of the current year and the debt stock of the previous year, and frequently informs the Vice- President and Finance Minister of developments in the debt stock. The department sporadically publishes articles on debt in the written press. It communicates with creditors primarily via internet. Unfortunately, due to the lack of debt management capacity in terms of staffing, training, and software, the DMO has not been proactive so far in debt management. Its analytical capacity would need to be reinforced especially when beginning the HIPC Initiative process. The DMO could improve its debt management capacity by making more use of debt management database software; and the government is planning to install such software with associated training with the support of the AfDB. It could also increase the number of staff, provide more training for them, and produce more frequent publications on the country's debt outlook. 7 The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). 8 Pôle-Dette is the regional debt management training unit for Central Africa and Western Africa, which runs the debt management capacity building project created by the training centers of the BCEAO and the BEAC. 36 Annex II. Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis 2010 1 Comoros is in debt distress. The debt sustainability analysis (DSA) shows that Comoros is in debt distress and would remain so under the baseline scenario for most of the projection period. 2 In the alternative scenario, which for illustrative purposes assumes a hypothetical access to HIPC decision point in mid-2010 and HIPC completion point and MDRI debt relief within the next two years, debt would become manageable. A. Introduction 1. This DSA is based on the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) for Low-Income Countries. The DSA presents the projected path of Comoros' external and public sector debt burden indicators, and assesses the country's future sustainability of debt. Methodologically, the DSA differs from the HIPC Debt Relief Analysis (DRA) in the decision point document in that it compares the evolution over the projection period of debt-burden indicators against policy-dependent indicative thresholds. In contrast, under the HIPC DRA, the historical debt burden indicators are compared to uniform thresholds in order to evaluate eligibility and calculate the amount of debt relief that the country qualifies for under the HIPC initiative. Moreover, the DSA uses uniform discount rate and exchange rate projections; and same-year exports to calculate debt ratios, whereas the HIPC DRA uses currency-specific discount rates, base year exchange rates, and three-year average exports. 2. The last fully elaborated DSA for Comoros, which was prepared in 2008, and the 2009 update assessed the country as being in debt distress. At that time Comoros was accumulating arrears to external creditors and the relevant debt indicators in NPV terms breached the indicative thresholds. Compared to the 2009 assessment 3, the DSA results presented below show more favorable dynamics of debt indicators in the medium term, reflecting improved macroeconomic performance, as well as arrears clearance operations, 1 This DSA has been prepared jointly by the World Bank and Fund staffs using the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) for Low Income Countries approved by the Executive Boards of the IMF and IDA. The fiscal year cover s the period from January to December. 2 See "Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries: Proposal for an Operational Framework and Policy Implications" (http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sustain/2004/020304.htm and IDA/SECM2004/0035, 2/3/04), "Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries: Further Considerations on an Operational Framework and Policy Implications" (http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sustain/2004/091004.htm and IDA/SECM2004/0629, 9/10/04), and "Staff Guidance Note on the Application of the Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries" (http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4419). Comoros is classified as a "weak performer" based on the quality of its policies and institutions as measured by the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) average score for the period 2006-2008. The corresponding indicative thresholds are 30 percent for the NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio, 100 percent for the NPV of debt-to-exports ratio, 200 percent for the NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio, 15 percent for the debt service- to-exports ratio, and 25 percent for the debt service-to-revenue ratio. 3 EBS/09/132, Supplement 1 (August 31, 2009). 37 HIPC initiative interim debt relief, debt relief granted under the November 2009 Paris Club agreement, and the assumption of relief on comparable terms by other creditors. B. Baseline Scenario 3. The baseline macroeconomic assumptions for the present DSA are consistent with the long-term macroeconomic projections underlying the ECF arrangement and the HIPC DRA. Sustained by a gradual improvement in the external environment, steady inflows of remittances and FDI, notably in tourism, as well as enhanced financial intermediation, economic activity is expected to rebound in the medium term. The upward revision from the previous growth projections for the period 2010-12 reflects mostly a better growth outcome for 2009 when credit to the private sector expanded significantly following the entry of two new banks and aggressive bank lending. The better-than-initially anticipated growth performance in 2009 was also driven by a surge in construction activity. GDP growth is assumed to accelerate further to around 4 percent in the long run as the prospects for improving terms of trade trigger additional investment in the agricultural sector, which together with improvements in economic infrastructure would enhance competitiveness and facilitate exports. 4. After accelerating to above 7 percent in 2008, inflation fell to 2.1 percent in 2009 (y-o-y) contained by easing food and energy costs. Pressures on domestic prices are expected to remain subdued in the coming years. A long-term projection of 3 percent annual change in the CPI is compatible with the fixed exchange rate regime under the Franc Zone arrangement, which provides an important anchor of price stability. 5. A key assumption underlying the DSA is a steady strengthening of the fiscal policy position consistent with the ECF-supported program. Under the latter, the domestic primary deficit is projected at 1.5 percent of GDP in 2010 (2.6 percent of GDP in 2009). Fiscal consolidation is expected to continue in the medium term, allowing the achievement of a positive primary fiscal balance by 2015. 6. The current account deficit is projected to deteriorate slightly in 2010-11, driven by strong growth-supporting imports. Over the long run, the current account (including official grants), would gradually converge to about -4.6 percent of GDP by 2030 (-7.9 percent of GDP in 2009) as food and consumer goods imports slacken. As a share of GDP, goods imports are projected to revert to long-run historical averages (20-25 percent of GDP) reflecting the impact of terms of trade improvements and import substitution in agriculture and manufacturing. Exports of goods are projected to grow in volume terms in line with real GDP; they would however decline in relation to nominal GDP as a result of stagnating prices. The growth rate of nonfactor services exports (tourism) would slightly exceed that of nominal GDP. Remittances, which constitute a major source of external financing, are projected to remain robust, although increasing at more moderate rates. The improved outlook for FDI compared to prospects under the previous macroeconomic 38 framework mostly reflects the resumption of projects in tourism and other pledges made at the March 2010 Arab League conference on development and investment in Comoros. Official capital transfers (investment grants) will continue to be an important source of external financing for Comoros. 7. The baseline scenario for the DSA takes account of recent arrears clearance operations, 4 and debt relief granted under the November 2009 Paris Club agreement together with assumed relief on comparable terms by other official bilateral and commercial creditors, as well as delivery of interim of IMF and IDA HIPC assistance starting in mid-2010 up to end-2012. 5 Consistent with the DSF guidelines, the baseline does not include the delivery of HIPC, MDRI and bilateral or multilateral beyond-HIPC assistance. The evolution of Comoros debt indicators which incorporate the full impact of the HIPC Initiative and MDRI debt relief is presented as an alternative scenario. C. Debt Sustainability Analysis External debt sustainability 8. Under the baseline scenario, the NPV of debt-to-exports ratio breaches the indicative threshold during the projections period (Table 1a, Figure 1). While remittances are a significant source of external financing for Comoros, including them in the DSA would not alter the assessment that Comoros is in debt distress because of the existing external arrears and protracted breaches of the debt ratio thresholds. However, once the arrears are cleared, remittances would likely play an important role in determining the country's debt rating.. The ratios of NPV of debt-to-GDP and to- revenue remain close to or slightly above the respective thresholds in the medium term and steadily decline thereafter. Overall, there is an improvement in the projected paths of the debt burden indicators from the previous DSA, especially in initial years. The improvement largely derives from the new debt service schedule consistent with the assumptions of the baseline scenario, and to a smaller extent from changes in the underlying macroeconomic framework. The debt service ratios are below the indicative thresholds and remain so throughout the projections horizon. The differences in the baseline debt indicators presented in the HIPC DRA and the LIC DSA can be explained both by differences in the methodology and in the underlying assumptions about debt service. In particular, HIPC DRA and LIC DSA use different denominators (three-year historical moving average versus current year) and discount rates, and recent arrears clearance and rescheduling operations are added back into the base of the HIPC DRA 4 The bulk of arrears to the AfDF were cleared between December 2007 and April 2009 and Comoros has engaged in negotiations with the remaining creditors to clear arrears as part of the HIPC Initiative process. 5 Paris Club debt relief is assumed to be topped up to standard Cologne terms at the decision point. For those multilateral creditors for which debt service is not being paid and have not previously rescheduled, it is assumed that outstanding arrears and current debt service falling due is deferred to end-2012. After 2012, it is assumed that Comoros will resume paying debt service falling due, while the stock of existing arrears is considered to be deferred/under discussion pending resolution and is left outstanding. 39 debt stock. Also, the LIC DSA takes into account the Paris Club debt relief granted in November, which went beyond the traditional terms used in the HIPC DRA. Overall, about 80 percent of the difference in the NPV of debt-to-exports ratios is due to the debt numerator and the remaining 20 percent is attributable to the different export values in the denominator. The drop in the debt ratios in 2010 in the LIC DSA reflects attainment of the decision point and the assumption that debt relief on terms comparable to the Paris Club treatment is granted by non-Paris Club official creditors and commercial creditors. 9. Bound tests indicate that Comoros' external debt outlook is subject to significant vulnerabilities (Table 1b, Figure 1). Sensitivity analysis based on standardized tests suggests that in case of adverse temporary shocks the external debt indicators for Comoros would deteriorate considerably. In the scenario, which in the first two years assumes one standard deviation below the historical average of non-debt flows (including FDI and current transfers), the NPV of debt-to-exports ratio increases to almost 300 percent and stays significantly above the indicative threshold for the rest of the projections period. This highlights the unsustainable nature of the country's debt situation and its strong dependence on external non-debt financing. Similarly, in the scenario that assumes a one-time 30 percent nominal depreciation of the national currency, the NPV of debt-to GDP and NPV of debt-to- revenue ratios breach the corresponding thresholds for a prolonged period of time. Shocks tend to have a lesser effect on the debt service ratios, in part owing to the high degree of concessionality of new loans. The historical scenario, which assesses the evolution of the debt ratios under the assumption that key variables are at their historical averages, implies a more pronounced improvement in the debt burden indicators in the initial years. 6 This pattern is largely explained by the lower current account deficit in earlier years as compared to the one prevailing in 2009 and in the medium-term balance of payments projections. 10. The alternative country-specific scenario, which assumes additional delivery of debt relief at completion point, indicates a marked improvement in Comoros' external debt outlook. Under this scenario, the NPV of debt-to-exports ratio still exceeds the 100 percent indicative threshold but the debt burden is at a much more manageable level compared to the baseline. The ratios of NPV of debt to GDP and to revenue fall comfortably below the respective thresholds and remain in sustainable ranges. This underscores the importance of debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and MDRI in securing external debt sustainability for Comoros. 6 In the sensitivity analysis calculations, the historical averages have been computed for the recent 7-year period as opposed to the 10-year period set as default in the DSA template. This change has been made to exclude observations, which due to data reporting problems, introduce a considerable upward bias in the historical current account balance. 40 Public Sector Debt Sustainability 11. When domestic public debt is included in the analysis, the debt burden indicators deteriorate only slightly (Table 2a, Figure 2). In the baseline scenario, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the debt-to-revenue ratio steadily decline over time, driven largely by the dynamics of the external public debt. 12. Sensitivity analysis suggests that public debt dynamics are vulnerable to adverse shocks (Table 2b, Figure 2). Lower long-run economic growth would have a noticeable effect on key debt burden ratios. When historical averages are used for GDP growth and the primary budget balance, the debt indicators deteriorate markedly, thereby confirming the need for both stronger growth and steady fiscal consolidation as outlined in the ECF- supported program. D. Conclusion 13. The low-income country debt sustainability analysis shows that Comoros is in debt distress and is likely to remain so under the baseline scenario for a prolonged time period. Full delivery of HIPC debt relief and MDRI will significantly improve the country's external debt situation. These conclusions are consistent with the results from the 2009 DSA update. 14. Alternative scenarios and stress tests highlight the vulnerability of Comoros to negative shocks. Besides comprehensive debt relief, maintaining sustainable levels of indebtedness would require steady implementation of growth-enhancing economic policies, including fiscal prudence, as well as prudent debt management, as evidenced by the results from the public DSA. 41 Figure 1. Comoros: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt under Alternatives Scenarios, 2010-2030 1/ a . Debt Accumula tion 50 b.PV of debt-to GDP ra tio 20 60 45 15 50 40 10 40 35 30 5 30 25 0 20 20 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 15 -5 10 10 -10 0 5 Rate of Debt Accumulation 0 Grant-equivalent financing (% of GDP) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Grant element of new borrowing (% right scale) c.PV of debt-to-exports ra tio 350 d.PV of debt-to-revenue ra tio 350 300 300 250 250 200 200 150 150 100 100 50 50 0 0 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 e.Debt service-to-exports ra tio f.Debt service-to-revenue ra tio 16 30 14 25 12 20 10 15 8 6 10 4 5 2 0 0 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Baseline Historical scenario Most extreme shock 1/ Threshold With HIPC/MDRI Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ T he most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in 2020. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Non-debt flows shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Non-debt flows shock and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock 42 Figure 2.Comoros: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2010-2030 1/ Baseline Fix Primary Balance Most extreme shock Growth Historical scenario 50 PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 250 PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ 200 150 100 50 0 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 14 Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in 2020. 2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants. 43 Table 1a.: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2007-2030 1/ (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) Actual Historical 0 Standard Projections Average 0 Deviation 2010-2015 2016-2030 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 2020 2030 Average External debt (nominal) 1/ 57.6 54.2 51.3 45.0 45.5 45.5 44.8 43.8 42.4 33.2 21.1 o/w public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) 57.6 54.2 51.3 45.0 45.5 45.5 44.8 43.8 42.4 33.2 21.1 Change in external debt -12.2 -3.3 -2.9 -6.4 0.5 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 -1.4 -1.6 -1.0 Identified net debt-creating flows -4.7 3.1 4.8 1.6 7.3 6.2 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.5 Non-interest current account deficit 5.9 10.5 7.5 4.4 3.6 5.2 10.7 10.0 8.8 8.5 8.2 6.3 4.4 5.8 Deficit in balance of goods and services 27.2 34.9 34.0 35.9 32.8 31.9 30.6 29.9 29.2 24.7 18.4 Exports 14.1 13.4 14.2 14.5 14.4 14.2 14.0 13.9 13.8 13.7 14.1 Imports 41.3 48.3 48.2 50.5 47.2 46.1 44.6 43.8 43.0 38.4 32.5 Net current transfers (negative = inflow) -19.9 -23.3 -25.7 -17.3 4.5 -27.0 -20.1 -19.7 -19.2 -18.7 -18.2 -16.0 -12.1 -14.8 o/w official -2.8 -2.8 -5.9 -7.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) -1.4 -1.1 -0.7 -3.7 -2.0 -2.2 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 Net FDI (negative = inflow) -1.7 -0.9 -2.6 -0.7 0.8 -2.9 -2.6 -2.6 -2.5 -2.3 -2.2 -1.1 -0.3 -0.9 Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ -8.9 -6.6 -0.1 -0.7 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.0 -0.6 Contribution from nominal interest rate 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 Contribution from real GDP growth -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3 -0.8 Contribution from price and exchange rate changes -9.0 -6.6 0.4 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Residual (3-4) 3/ -7.5 -6.4 -7.7 -8.0 -6.8 -6.2 -5.6 -5.9 -6.1 -5.8 -4.5 o/w exceptional financing -4.6 -0.2 -3.1 -8.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 PV of external debt 4/ ... ... 36.9 29.5 30.2 30.4 29.9 29.1 28.1 22.0 14.9 In percent of exports ... ... 260.4 202.8 209.8 213.9 213.5 209.5 203.7 160.4 106.0 PV of PPG external debt ... ... 36.9 29.5 30.2 30.4 29.9 29.1 28.1 22.0 14.9 In percent of exports ... ... 260.4 202.8 209.8 213.9 213.5 209.5 203.7 160.4 106.0 In percent of government revenues ... ... 265.2 199.2 207.0 200.8 206.5 193.1 182.0 125.6 75.1 Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 12.0 13.3 10.7 7.5 5.4 7.3 10.4 11.9 12.7 9.4 7.4 PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 12.0 13.3 10.7 7.5 5.4 7.3 10.4 11.9 12.7 9.4 7.4 PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 13.3 13.6 10.9 7.4 5.3 6.8 10.1 11.0 11.4 7.4 5.2 Total gross financing need (Billions of U.S. dollars) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio 18.1 13.9 10.4 11.6 10.2 10.0 9.4 9.5 9.6 7.9 5.3 Key macroeconomic assumptions Real GDP growth (in percent) 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.1 2.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) 14.8 12.9 -0.8 7.5 10.0 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 Effective interest rate (percent) 5/ 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) 20.8 8.3 6.7 10.9 11.9 6.7 3.6 4.8 5.1 5.9 6.0 5.3 7.7 7.5 7.2 Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) 23.4 33.2 0.7 13.9 14.1 9.0 -2.1 3.5 3.3 4.9 4.9 3.9 5.0 5.5 5.1 Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent) ... ... ... ... ... 44.6 43.9 44.3 47.3 47.3 47.1 45.7 41.9 33.1 38.5 Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) 12.7 13.1 13.9 14.8 14.6 15.2 14.5 15.1 15.4 17.5 19.9 18.1 Aid flows (in Billions of US dollars) 7/ 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 o/w Grants 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 o/w Concessional loans 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 8/ ... ... ... 15.0 8.2 8.0 8.7 8.5 8.5 6.6 5.5 6.4 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 8/ ... ... ... 87.2 81.7 81.3 83.5 83.9 85.1 87.1 86.4 86.5 Memorandum items: Nominal GDP (Billions of US dollars) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 2.1 Nominal dollar GDP growth 15.3 14.0 1.0 4.1 4.7 5.9 6.6 6.9 6.9 5.8 7.1 7.1 7.1 PV of PPG external debt (in Billions of US dollars) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) -7.8 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.5 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 0 1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt. 2/ Derived as [r - g - (1+g)]/(1+g++g) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms. 3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes. 4/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value. 5/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock. 6/ Historical averages and standard deviations are derived over the past 7 years. 7/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief. 8/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt). 44 Table 1b.Comoros: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2010-2030 (In percent) Projections 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 2030 PV of debt-to GDP ratio Baseline 29 30 30 30 29 28 22 15 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2010-2030 1/ 29 27 24 22 21 19 11 10 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2010-2030 2 29 31 32 33 33 32 28 23 A3. Alternative Scenario :With HIPC/MDRI 29 30 24 16 17 18 17 15 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 29 31 32 32 31 30 23 16 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 3/ 29 31 32 31 31 30 23 15 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 29 31 31 31 30 29 23 15 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 4/ 29 36 42 41 40 39 31 18 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 29 34 37 37 36 34 27 17 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2011 5/ 29 43 43 42 41 40 31 21 PV of debt-to-exports ratio Baseline 203 210 214 214 209 204 160 106 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2010-2030 1/ 203 185 171 160 148 135 82 68 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2010-2030 2 203 215 226 232 234 234 207 162 A3. Alternative Scenario :With HIPC/MDRI 203 210 168 116 123 129 124 104 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 203 209 213 213 209 203 160 106 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 3/ 203 228 260 259 254 247 196 126 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 203 209 213 213 209 203 160 106 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 4/ 203 251 295 293 287 280 223 129 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 203 237 270 269 263 256 204 122 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2011 5/ 203 209 213 213 209 203 160 106 PV of debt-to-revenue ratio Baseline 199 207 201 206 193 182 126 75 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2010-2030 1/ 199 182 161 155 136 121 64 48 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2010-2030 2 199 212 212 224 216 209 162 114 A3. Alternative Scenario :With HIPC/MDRI 199 207 158 112 114 116 97 74 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 199 211 212 218 204 192 133 79 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 3/ 199 210 211 217 203 191 133 77 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 199 209 206 212 199 187 130 77 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 4/ 199 248 277 284 265 250 175 91 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 199 230 247 253 236 223 155 84 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2011 5/ 199 292 283 292 273 257 178 106 45 Table 1b.Comoros: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2010-2030 (continued) (In percent) Debt service-to-exports ratio Baseline 7 5 7 10 12 13 9 7 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2010-2030 1/ 7 5 6 9 9 10 5 3 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2010-2030 2 7 5 8 11 13 14 10 11 A3. Alternative Scenario :With HIPC/MDRI 7 5 5 2 2 3 5 6 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 7 5 7 10 12 13 9 7 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 3/ 7 6 8 12 14 15 11 9 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 7 5 7 10 12 13 9 7 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 4/ 7 5 8 12 13 14 12 10 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 7 5 8 11 13 14 11 9 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2011 5/ 7 5 7 10 12 13 9 7 Debt service-to-revenue ratio Baseline 7 5 7 10 11 11 7 5 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2010-2030 1/ 7 5 6 8 9 9 4 2 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2010-2030 2 7 5 7 11 12 13 8 8 A3. Alternative Scenario :With HIPC/MDRI 7 5 5 2 2 2 4 4 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 7 5 7 11 12 12 8 6 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 3/ 7 5 7 10 11 12 8 5 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 7 5 7 10 11 12 8 5 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2011-2012 4/ 7 5 7 11 12 12 9 7 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 7 5 7 11 12 12 9 6 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2011 5/ 7 8 10 14 16 16 10 7 Memorandum item: Grant element assumed on residual financing (i.e., financing required above baseline) 6/ 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows. 2/ Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline. 3/ Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly assuming an offsetting adjustment in import levels). 4/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI. 5/ Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent. 6/ Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2. 46 Table 2a.Comoros: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2007-2030 (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) Actual Estimate Projections Standard 2010-15 2016-30 Average 2007 2008 2009 Deviation 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 2020 2030 Average Public sector debt 1/ 60.9 57.3 54.1 47.7 48.2 48.2 47.5 46.4 45.0 36.0 24.1 o/w foreign-currency denominated 57.6 54.2 51.3 45.0 45.5 45.5 44.8 43.8 42.4 33.2 21.1 Change in public sector debt -12.3 -3.6 -3.1 -6.5 0.5 0.0 -0.7 -1.1 -1.4 -1.6 -1.0 Identified debt-creating flows -13.5 1.8 -9.0 -12.9 -1.0 -1.7 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3 -2.5 -2.7 Primary deficit 1.6 2.0 -1.0 1.4 1.3 -5.2 1.5 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -1.2 -0.6 Revenue and grants 20.3 23.5 23.6 28.0 21.3 21.7 21.7 22.1 22.6 23.4 25.0 of which: grants 7.6 10.4 9.7 13.2 6.7 6.5 7.2 7.1 7.2 5.9 5.1 Primary (noninterest) expenditure 21.9 25.5 22.7 22.8 22.8 22.4 22.7 22.8 23.0 23.1 23.7 Automatic debt dynamics -10.5 0.0 -4.9 0.4 -2.1 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 -2.6 -2.2 -1.4 Contribution from interest rate/growth differential -2.3 -2.0 -2.1 -1.7 -1.8 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -1.9 -1.2 of which: contribution from average real interest rate -1.9 -1.4 -1.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 of which: contribution from real GDP growth -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.6 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -1.4 -1.0 Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation -8.3 1.9 -2.8 2.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 ... ... Other identified debt-creating flows -4.6 -0.2 -3.1 -8.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Privatization receipts (negative) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Debt relief (HIPC and other) -4.6 -0.2 -3.1 -8.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Residual, including asset changes 1.1 -5.4 5.8 6.5 1.5 1.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.7 Other S ustainability Indicators PV of public sector debt 3.3 3.1 39.7 32.2 32.9 33.1 32.6 31.7 30.6 24.8 18.0 o/w foreign-currency denominated 0.0 0.0 36.9 29.5 30.2 30.4 29.9 29.1 28.1 22.0 14.9 o/w external ... ... 36.9 29.5 30.2 30.4 29.9 29.1 28.1 22.0 14.9 PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Gross financing need 2/ 5.8 6.2 3.0 -1.9 4.6 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.5 3.5 2.6 PV of public sector debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 16.5 13.0 168.2 114.8 154.4 152.9 150.1 143.1 135.5 105.7 72.0 PV of public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 26.4 23.4 285.2 217.5 225.7 218.6 224.6 210.2 198.6 141.5 90.4 o/w external 3/ ... ... 265.2 199.2 207.0 200.8 206.5 193.1 182.0 125.6 75.1 Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 4/ 8.6 7.9 7.1 4.2 4.0 5.1 7.0 7.8 8.0 5.5 4.2 Debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 4/ 13.8 14.3 12.1 7.9 5.8 7.3 10.5 11.4 11.7 7.4 5.2 Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio 14.0 5.6 2.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.3 -0.3 Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions Real GDP growth (in percent) 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.1 2.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 Average nominal interest rate on forex debt (in percent) 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Real exchange rate depreciation (in p ercent, + indicates depreciation) -12.2 3.4 -5.3 -4.8 10.8 4.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 5.2 5.5 4.6 4.3 2.1 3.8 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent) 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Grant element of new external borrowing (in percent) ... ... ... ... ... 44.6 43.9 44.3 47.3 47.3 47.1 45.7 41.9 33.1 ... Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ Covers general government gross debt. 2/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period. 3/ Revenues excluding grants. 4/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt. 5/ Historical averages and standard deviations are derived over the past 7 years. 47 Table 2b.Comoros: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt 2010-2030 Projections 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 2030 PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Baseline 32 33 33 33 32 31 25 18 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 32 33 34 34 35 35 36 46 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2009 32 30 29 28 26 24 17 13 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 32 33 33 33 32 32 27 26 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2011-2012 32 34 35 35 35 34 30 27 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2011-2012 32 34 35 34 34 32 26 19 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 32 34 35 35 34 34 29 24 B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2011 32 45 44 43 41 39 30 21 B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2011 32 40 40 39 38 37 30 21 PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ Baseline 115 154 153 150 143 136 106 72 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 115 154 156 156 153 149 145 170 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2009 115 141 135 127 117 108 74 52 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 115 155 154 152 146 139 116 103 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2011-2012 115 157 161 160 155 149 128 107 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2011-2012 115 158 162 159 152 144 112 75 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 115 157 162 160 154 147 123 97 B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2011 115 211 204 196 184 171 128 83 B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2011 115 186 183 179 171 162 127 82 Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ Baseline 4 4 5 7 8 8 6 4 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 4 4 5 7 8 8 7 8 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2009 4 4 5 7 8 8 5 3 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 4 4 5 7 8 8 6 5 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2011-2012 4 4 5 7 8 8 6 6 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2011-2012 4 4 5 7 8 8 6 5 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 4 4 5 7 8 8 6 5 B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2011 4 5 7 10 11 11 8 7 B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2011 4 4 6 8 8 8 6 6 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period. 2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.