Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement A N D Job Outcomes in South Africa Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 1 Cover image (and above): Johannesburg, South Africa Photo credit: Bafedile Mafologele Map credit: Eigo Tateishi / World Bank Graphic design: Alston Taggart and Kevin Sample / Studio Red Design 2  Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement A N D Job Outcomes in South Africa © 2018 The World Bank Group 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: (202) 473-1000 Web site: www.worldbank.org/ All rights reserved. Disclaimer Rights and Permissions This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/ external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect may be a violation of applicable law. The World Bank Group the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. ii  Table of Contents 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 7 7 INTRODUCTION Background, Objectives and Approach 8 Scope and Structure 9 Southern Africa: Why and Why Now? 10 The World Bank, Migration and Displacement 10 A Note on Terminology: Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Development 2 13 14 MIXED MIGRATION AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT INTO AND WITHIN SOUTHERN AFRICA History of Labor Migration in Southern Africa 15 Trends of Migration and Displacement in Southern Africa 18 Displacement from the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa 19 The Crisis in Zimbabwe 21 Migration in South Africa 3 LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 25 25 The International and Continental Governance of Migration and Displacement 26 The Regional Governance of Migration 27 Divergence between Laws, Policies and Practice on Migration and Displacement in South Africa 30 The Role of Local Authorities in the Governance of Migration 33 THE CASE FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MIGRATION AND JOB OUTCOMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 4 35 MIXED MIGRATION, FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND JOBS IN SOUTH AFRICA 36 A Brief Look at Post-Apartheid Immigration History and Trends 37 Estimation Methodology 41 Results 41 Understanding the Results 5 45 CONCLUSION 47 ANNEXURES 47 Annex 1: A Note on Terminology: Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement 49 Annex 2: Methodology, Data and Limitations 53  ist of Interviewees in South Africa Annex 3: L 54 Annex 4: References Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa iii Acknowledgements T HIS P U B L I C A T I O N WA S P R E PA R E D BY A TEAM of colleagues from across the World Bank Group. The team was led by Social Development Africa in close collaboration with the IFC, as well as the Poverty and Macro & Fiscal Global Practices.The team was led by Helidah Refiloe Ogude (Social Development Specialist, GSU20) with the core team including, Joanna P. de Berry (Senior Social Development Specialist, GTFDR), Shoghik Hovhannisyan (Research Officer, CSEIM), Aditya Sarkar (Consultant, GSU20), Christopher Baum (Senior Consultant, GSU07) and Hang Zhou (Consultant). Contributions were also made by the extended team, Marek Hanusch (Senior Economist, GMTA4), Victor Sulla (Senior Economist, GPV07), Robertus Swinkels (Senior Economist, GPV07) and Johannes Herderschee (Senior Economist, GMTA4). Invaluable formal peer-review comments at different stages of its development were received from Manjula Luthria (GSP05), Sam Omollo (IOM, South Africa), Paolo Verme (GTFDR), Varalakshmi Verumu (GSU07), Loren Landau (Wits University) and Mauro Testaverde (GSP02). The publication benefitted from discussions with representatives from multilateral organiza- tions including the ILO, IOM, UNHCR and UNFPA; academic institutions, University of the Witwatersrand, University of Johannesburg, University of Pretoria; South African national, pro- vincial and local government departments such as, the Department of Home Affairs, National Planning Commission, Department of Higher Education and Training, Department of Social Development, Statistics South Africa, City of Johannesburg and Gauteng Provincial govern- ment; NGOs and advocacy groups, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, Lawyers for Human Rights, Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Medicins Sans Frontieres, Church World Services and Jesuit Refugee Services. A full listing of persons consulted can be found in Annex 2. The team thanks Xavier Devictor, Paul Nounba Um, Catherine Tovey, Senait Assefa, Robin Mearns, Sebastien Dessus, and Paolo Belli for their guidance at various stages of the preparation of the study. Financial support was provided by the World Bank Forced Displacement Trust Fund, through the Fragility, Conflict and Violence Cross Cutting Solution Area (CCSA). iv Acknowledgements About the Authors Shoghik Hovhannisyan, an Armenian national, joined the World Bank Group in 2010. She currently works for the Sector Economics and Development Impact Department at the IFC. Shoghik holds a Ph.D. degree in Economics from Boston College and a MA degree in International Development Policy from Duke University. She specializes in migration, growth, informal economy, and other areas of macroeconomics and labor economics. Christopher F. Baum is Professor of Economics and Social Work at Boston College. His recent research has focused on Swedish immigrants' labor market outcomes and advances in computational econometric methods. He is a co-investigator on several research projects in social epidemiology, studying the impact of legislation on women’s cancers, maternal mortality, and firearm suicides. Helidah Refiloe Ogude, a South African-Kenyan national, is a Social Development Specialist at the World Bank. Her work focuses on the development dimensions of migration and forced displacement, social cohesion and violence prevention, and the political economy of reform. She holds a MSc in International Relations from New York University and is a Doctoral Candidate in Public and Urban Policy at The New School. Aditya Sarkar is an independent researcher, and has worked as a consultant with the World Bank, the International Labour Organization, and Open Society Foundations. He is qualified as a lawyer in India and as a solicitor in England and Wales. He holds an MA degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and is a graduate of the National Law School of India University in Bangalore. His current research looks at political mobilization and rights-claiming among refugees and migrant workers in rights constrained systems. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa v Figures, Boxes and Tables Figures Total migrant stock (both sexes) including refugees and asylum seekers, in Southern Figure 1:  Africa, mid-2017 Figure 2: Employment-Population Ratio  hare of Self-employed in Total Employment Figure 3: S Figure 4: Countries Covered by this Study Total migrant stock (both sexes) including refugees and asylum seekers, in Southern Figure 5:  Africa, mid-2017  Figure 6: Comparison of population age structures of migrants (including refugees and asylum seekers) in Southern Africa, 1990 and 2017 Figure 7: Refugees and asylum seekers in Southern Africa, mid-2017 Figure 8: External migrants in South Africa (as per the 2011 census data) Figure 9: Immigrants’ flows by country of origin in 1996, 2001, and 2011 (% in total)  hare of immigrants in total employment by industries and provinces in 1996, Figure 10: S 2001, 2011. Figure 11: Employment-Population Ratio Figure 12: Share of Self-employed in Total Employment Boxes Box 1: Legal Changes in South Africa Box 2: Basotho Female Migrants Box 3: Informal Cross-border Trade: The case of South Africa and Zimbabwe Box 4: Proposed Changes to South African Migration Policy Box 5: ‘Time-theft’ – Lived experiences of asylum-seekers in South Africa Box 6: Johannesburg’s Migrant Help Desk Box 7: Zimbabwe and Mixed Migration in Southern Africa Tables Table 1: Estimated migrant population in Southern Africa, 1990-2015. Table 2: Migrant, refugee and asylum-seeker statistics in South Africa (1990-2017)  ajor countries/territories of origin of asylum seekers and refugees in Southern Table 3: M Africa (end-2016) Table 4: Industry of employment for migrants (QLFS 2014) Table 5: Estimation Results Table 6: Sources of UNDESA’s migrant data in Southern Africa (UNDESA 2017) vi Figures, Boxes and Tables Abbreviations and Acronyms ACMS Africa Centre for Migration and Society AU African Union DHA Department of Home Affairs, Government of South Africa GCRO Gauteng City-Region Observatory HoA Horn of Africa IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre ILO International Labour Organization IOM International Organization for Migration MSF Médecins Sans Frontières OAU Organization of African Unity OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UN-OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs SADC Southern African Development Community SAMP Southern African Migration Project StatsSA Statistics South Africa UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR ROSA United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Office of Southern Africa UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa vii Executive Summary S OUTHERN AFRICA HAS A LONG history of human mobility centered around the migration of labor to farms and mines in the region. Patterns of migration and displacement were trans- formed by the end of Apartheid, changing economic systems, and conflict and political instability, both in the region and elsewhere. Today mobility in the region is (i) motivated by a combination of diverse social, political and economic rea- sons, (ii) shaped by long-standing historical movements and reshaped by newer patterns of urbanization and displace- These complex patterns of migration ment, (iii) organized through various legal and extra-legal and displacement, state responses means, and (iv) governed by fragmented and contradic- to them, and the implications for tory legal frameworks. These complex patterns of labor market outcomes in South migration and displacement, state responses to them, and Africa, as the major destination the implications for labor market outcomes in South country in the region, are the subject Africa, as the major destina- tion country in the region, are matter of this study. the subject matter of this study. Scope This study analyzes the characteristics, causes, and conse- quences of migration and forced displacement in Southern Africa. It includes a brief historical overview, as well as an analysis of current migration trends and their impacts. Further, a brief overview of the policy and legal framework governing migration and displacement across Southern Africa is provided Given South Africa’s position as the major destination for migrants and refugees in the region, the primary focus of this study is an analysis of the links between migration and labor market outcomes in South Africa, namely employment and wages between 1996 and 2011. The evidence provided can serve to inform policy in the region. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 1 Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement practices of migration control persist. As a result, patterns of migration and displacement in the region are characterized by into and within Southern Africa elements of both continuity and change. The discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 laid the foundations for South Africa’s highly centralized mining indus- try, and led to the development of the region’s migrant labor TRENDS OF MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA system. During this period, Southern African economies relied The total migrant population in the Southern African countries on a low-wage, low-skilled, highly-controlled, expendable work- covered in this study (see map below) has increased by about force. Migrant workers, almost all men, were recruited from 68 per cent since 1990. This increase in mobility has not been rural South Africa but also from Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, uniform over time, nor across the region: the largest increases Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania, and usually had to make long in migrant stock have occurred in South Africa, Botswana, and hazardous journeys to their workplaces, where they lived Mozambique and Angola, whereas the number of migrants has and worked in dangerous, over-crowded conditions. decreased in the poorer economies of Malawi, Zambia, and The racist regulatory measures which controlled mobility, and Zimbabwe. South Africa is the single largest country of desti- the extent to which they were enforced in different coun- nation. As of mid-2017, UNDESA estimated that it was host tries, had a profound impact on the patterns and distribu- to about 67 per cent. of the regions total migrant population. tion of poverty and inequality in Southern Africa. They also shaped the region’s economies, urbanization, primary (and SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS gendered) livelihood strategies as well as forms of political OF MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA leadership, organization, and resistance. In South Africa, for The 2011 Census placed the number of international instance, townships were designed to act as labor reservoirs migrants in South Africa at 2,173,409, about 4.2 per cent. for cities and industries centered around urban spaces. This has had direct implications for settlement patterns in South FIGURE 1:  Total migrant population (both sexes) including refugees African townships, the provision of public services and for the and asylum seekers, in Southern Africa, mid-2017 availability and quality of housing in these townships. Total migrant stock (both sexes) including refugees and asylum seekers, mid-2017 Changes in Southern Africa’s political economy led to a major re-structuring of the migrant labor system across the region. As economies shifted to more capital-intensive forms of growth, unskilled migrant labor became increasingly super- fluous to industry and the need for skilled and semi-skilled labor increased. Angola 638,499 Mozambique Zambia Malawi 246,954 The profound economic and political upheaval surrounding 156,982 237,104 the end of Apartheid in South Africa transformed migration and displacement across the region. Alongside the organized Zimbabwe and controlled labor migration system, other forms of mobil- 403,866 Namibia ity emerged and expanded: this included asylum-seekers flee- Botswana 95,067 ing conflict and persecution, seasonal migrants and cross-border 166,430 traders and smugglers. These changes took place within a broader socio-economic and legal context shaped by the rela- Swaziland tionship between Southern Africa’s system of mine-based capital 33,263 accumulation and the migrant workforce on which it relied. Lesotho 6,749 South Africa The content of laws governing migrants and refugees has 4,036,696 changed in many cases since then, and often radically, but their Total Migrant Stock ≤246,954 implementation remains uneven. At the regional level, migra- ≤638,499 tion continues to be governed by unenforceable conventions 0 200 400 800 Km ≤4,036,696 and a patchwork of bilateral agreements and treaties, while World Bank Geospatial Operations Support Team: GOST (2018) Base Map Source; Esri, USGS, NOAA in many national contexts, bureaucratic and administrative Data Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2017). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017). 2 Executive Summary of the country’s total population at that time. The major- ity of migrants (around 75.3 per cent.) originated in other One immigrant worker generates African countries, with significant populations from Europe (8.2 per cent.) and Asia (4.7 per cent.). The vast majority of approximately two jobs for locals. all migrants in South Africa, 68 per cent., originated in other SADC Countries. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement Not all provinces in South Africa attract migrants to the and Job Outcomes in South Africa same extent. Gauteng, in particular, as the primary economic Migrants and refugees in South Africa are often entangled in and financial hub in South Africa, hosted an overwhelming political discourse that blames them for ‘stealing’ local jobs. majority of international migrants with 52 per cent. of the The implications of migration on local jobs, is therefore, total. South Africa is also among the more highly urbanized highly contested. However, empirical evidence may provide countries in Africa, and Gauteng is particularly highly urban- the necessary information policy-makers require to develop ized. As a result, migration and displacement in South Africa policies and interventions that mitigate the costs that may be has important urban dimensions. felt by locals, while enhancing the developmental opportuni- According to the same 2011 Census, 39.8 per cent., of inter- ties for migrants, refugees, locals and the wider economy. national migrants in South Africa were women. Interestingly, It is within this context that this study estimates the impact however, among migrants from SADC, more women than of immigration on labor market outcomes such as employ- men aged 15-24 had migrated to South Africa (reversing his- ment and wages in South Africa between 1996 and 2011, torical trends). Around 23 per cent. of migrants fell below the and posits several possible explanations for what might national poverty income level, and in general, over half of all account for the results. international migrants in 2011 were poor. Around 27 per cent. of all households were headed by women, but almost one- There are only a few papers that have studied the impact of third of these female-headed households fell in the national immigration on labor market outcomes in South Africa. They poverty category. Around 63 per cent. (or three out of five) have generally found no impact on total income but nega- international migrants reported being employed. The major- tive effects on local employment. Compared to earlier papers, ity were employed in the formal sector, while 17.2 per cent. this analysis makes several contributions. First, the analysis reported earning their livelihood in the informal sector. 17 uses industry-province level data, given significant variation per cent. were employed in private households. in the utilization of immigrant labor across industries and Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 3 provinces. Applying data on a more aggregate level such as OLS results may be affected by simultaneity bias, the analysis has provinces instead of smaller geographical units such as districts also produced IV estimates for Equations (1) and (2) (See chap- reduces effects from potential outflows of locals in response ter 5), using the instrument described and its square to permit to immigrants’ inflows. Second, the analysis uses an instru- overidentification of the equation. In both forms of the model, mental variables (IV) approach to address endogeneity issues. the immigrant growth rate for the industry, province and year The instruments are constructed following the methodology has significant and positive effects on total earnings and wage proposed by Card (2001), who uses previous settlements of earnings with values ranging from 0.3 to 1.4. immigrants as an instrument in studying labor market effects of immigration across geographical regions. Third, the analy- UNDERSTANDING THE RESULTS sis includes all immigrants–not only males, as in some stud- This analysis suggests several explanations for the positive ies–given a substantial share of female employment among impact of immigrants on South Africa’s labor market. First, immigrants. In 2011, females accounted for nearly 24 percent given that immigrants and locals are not perfect substitutes, of total employment among immigrants. Next, the estimates specialization in different tasks might lead to overall produc- focus on the relationship between locals and immigrants, and tivity gains. Second, immigrants have nearly twice as high an not on specific groups based on education and experience employment-population ratio compared to locals, possibly within each category. The latter captures only the partial reflecting the demand for the diverse set of skills they bring own-skill effect and ignores cross-skill complementarities and and this can result in large multiplier effects. Finally, immi- externalities. Finally, the study uses wage data from the Post- grants tend to be more risk-taking and entrepreneurial, which Apartheid Labor Market Series (PALMS) harmonized survey, might generate positive externalities in the economy. instead of relying on total income that includes both labor and non-labor earnings as in other studies. For details on the Foreign and local-born workers might specialize in perform- methodological approach, see chapter 4. ing complementary tasks and, hence, the two groups might not compete for similar jobs. As a result, this complemen- RESULTS tarity might increase the productivity of local workers and The estimation results indicate that immigration has a positive hence generate positive externalities for their employment impact on local employment, labor earnings, and wages. The and wages. estimated effects of immigrant growth on local employment are To test this hypothesis the study compares occupations of positive and highly significant in all specifications and are similar immigrants and locals for tertiary and non-tertiary educated in terms of magnitudes. They show that a one percent increase groups. It uses 2011 census data and constructs the Welch in the number of immigrants relative to the previous period (1979) index to test whether immigrants and locals are per- raises local employment by 0.2 percent. In other words, one fect substitutes. This index is similar to a correlation coeffi- immigrant worker generates approximately two jobs for locals. cient, equaling one (1) when the two groups have identical The effects on labor earnings, wages, and self-employment earn- occupational distributions and minus one (-1) when the two ings are insignificant in OLS estimations with an exception of groups are clustered in completely different occupations. We wage earnings when only individual fixed effects are used.As the obtain .35 for the non-tertiary educated group and .14 for the  mployment-Population Ratio FIGURE 2: E  hare of Self-employed in Total Employment FIGURE 3: S IMMIG RANTS NATIVES IMMIGRANTS N AT I V E S 0.80 0.30 0.25 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.00 1996 2001 2011 1996 2001 2011 4 Executive Summary tertiary educated group.This shows that immigrants and locals therefore these results may differ in the current context. It are not perfect substitutes and the complementarity of tasks is also well documented that even in the best circumstances, they perform might generate efficiency gains in the economy. migration and displacement may have significant short-term costs for receiving communities. Finally, two stylized facts emerge from the comparison of the employment-population ratio and share of self-employed in total employment between locals and immigrants. First, Conclusion although the employment-population ratios for locals and Labor Market Outcomes: An Opportunity immigrants were similar in 1996, this drastically changed by for Policy Dialogue and Further Research 2011 (Figures 2 and 3). In particular, the share of employed The results and substantiations provided here, are significant immigrants in total increased from 36 to 61 per cent. com- for policy makers and development actors in South Africa pared to only 35 per cent. for locals. and the wider region, and as such, their implications should This sharp increase in the employment-population ratio for be seriously considered. They provide a basis for substantive immigrants was probably due to changes in immigration pol- policy dialogue on how to enhance the development impacts icies post-Apartheid. Higher employment rates among immi- of migration, especially for local job and wage outcomes and grants and hence higher labor earnings compared to locals the South African economy. Critically, although such quanti- might generate large multiplier effects in the economy. tative analysis is instructive, perceptions and subjective evalu- ations of well-being of both locals and migrants, matters. As Finally, we must also note the prevalence of self-employment such, any interventions in response to these results, should among immigrants: self-employment accounted for 25 per- account for perceptions and lived experiences. Equally, the cent of total jobs for immigrants, compared to 16 percent for political will to advance policies based on empirical evidence, locals. Migrants are more likely to appear in entrepreneurial is a necessity for the achievement of any sustainable and posi- roles than locals, suggesting that their actions are likely to pro- tive economic outcomes for locals and migrants, alike. mote economic growth by enhancing, for instance, the supply of small retail establishments. If those businesses are success- Crucially, these results also provide an important foundation ful, they also will provide multiplier effects which may spread upon which further large-scale research can be developed. beyond the immediate family. Such research can potentially complicate and enable a richer understanding for how migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers An important note of caution is that these results are retro- engage with the South African economy and the economic spective in nature given the data limitations mentioned, and relationships they share with locals. This research, may for instance, consider how circular migration, informality, undoc- umented movements and gendered dimensions have implica- tions for economic relationships. The results and substantiations provided here are significant for policy makers and development actors in South Africa and the wider region, and as such, their implications should be seriously considered. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 5 6 Executive Summary 1 Introduction Background, Objectives and Approach S OUTHERN AFRICA HAS A LONG history of human mobility. The movement of people, and efforts to control mobility, have substantially shaped the region’s societies and economies. Contemporary migration patterns in Southern Africa are complex, and are motivated by a combination of diverse social, political and eco- nomic reasons. They have been shaped by long-standing histor- ical movements and reshaped by newer patterns of urbanization and displacement. Today, As people move for ever more cross-border movements take place through various legal diverse reasons, migration has and extra-legal means and are governed by fragmented become a central component of and contradictory legal frameworks. livelihood and protection strategies In recent years, a com- bination of poverty and for many. Governments, however, inequality (and in the case of Zimbabwe, political instabil- have struggled to respond to the ity and attendant economic turmoil), has driven migra- governance challenges presented by tion and displacement to wealthier countries within Southern Africa. Migration these complex movements. from other parts of Africa has consisted largely of people fleeing protracted con- flict, repression, and economic insecurity in the Great Lakes Region and in the Horn of Africa (HoA). Southern Africa also hosts migrants and refugees from West Africa and as far afield as South and East Asia (see Crush et al, 2017). As people move for ever more diverse reasons, migration has become a central component of livelihood and protection strategies for many. Governments, however, have struggled to respond to the gov- ernance challenges presented by these complex movements. Some have strengthened borders and tightened legal regimes, or are in the process of doing so. The broader question addressed by this study is not unique to Southern Africa, and in this sense, this study is relevant Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 7 for many other contexts. Refugees, asylum-seekers and other Africa, which will be the case in this study too. Mauritius, migrants are major subjects of political debate in many coun- Madagascar and Seychelles are not covered in this study. tries. The implications of migration and forced displacement for local jobs is widely contested. Concurrently, nation-states, South Africa is the largest economy in Southern Africa, and regional actors and others have increasingly begun to rec- the only middle-income country in sub-Saharan Africa with ognize the inevitability and potential benefits of migration an economy based on industry, services and manual work. As (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2013, p.1). This duality points a result, it remains an extremely important destination for to the fact that migration and displacement are connected migrants from all over Africa, and increasingly, it appears, from to broader, deeply political questions of social transformation, parts of Asia. At the same time, it has a history of xenopho- global inequality and societal development (Castles 2003, bic attacks against ‘foreign nationals’ and other locally defined p.22; Bakewell 2008a;Van Hear 2011, p.4). ‘outsiders’ based on the unsubstantiated notion that migrants and refugees are major sources of criminality, disease and are Therefore, fully grasping the governance of mobility and its the cause of local unemployment (Kihato forthcoming). effects on, for instance, host country labor market outcomes, requires inquiry beyond the legal regulation of mobility. That This study has a particular focus on the impact of international is, it requires an understanding of how mobility is governed in migration on jobs in South Africa.The availability of labor related practice. For example, actual practices of bureaucratic detention, micro-data in South Africa, allows for nuanced empirical exam- deportation and asylum adjudication must be analyzed in addi- ination of the links between migration and domestic labor market tion to the existing asylum policy regime. Further, the often outcomes, such as jobs and wages. This empirical work can serve informal, opaque, and complex local power structures which to inform evidence-based policymaking across the region. regulate access to services for migrants and refugees must be accounted for, notwithstanding the laws and policies on these STRUCTURE topics. Critically, it also involves an examination of how migra- This paper is divided into 3 substantive sections. The first 1.  tion/displacement intersects with several other policy sectors, section analyzes the characteristics, causes, and conse- which may not, on surface, appear to be directly related to quences of migration and forced displacement in Southern mobility, but nevertheless affect how both migrants and hosts Africa. It includes a brief historical overview, as well as an engage with the economy and society. This includes access to analysis of current migration trends and their impacts. labor markets, education, housing and health services, etc. The remainder of this introductory section outlines the scope FIGURE 4: Countries Covered by this Study and structure of this study, sets out the World Bank’s role and interest in understanding migration and displacement in Southern Africa and briefly explains the meaning of some terminology used throughout the study. Scope and Structure Angola Mozambique SCOPE Zambia Malawi Geographically, this study primarily covers South Africa. However, within the chapters that provide context on Zimbabwe Namibia the causes, extent and characteristics of movements into Botswana and within Southern Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Angola and Swaziland Zambia, which are all members of the Southern African Lesotho South Africa Development Community (SADC), are discussed to a limited extent. Of the other member states of SADC, the World Bank usually considers Tanzania as falling within East Africa and the 0 250 500 1,000 Km Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as part of Central World Bank Geospatial Operations Support Team: GOST (2018) Base Map Source; Esri, USGS, NOAA 8 Introduction 2.  The second section provides a brief overview of the Changes made to South African policy and legal framework governing migration and dis- placement across Southern Africa. refugee laws, which include new Given South Africa’s position as the largest destination 3.  for migrants and refugees in the region, the third section restrictions on asylum-seekers, are and primary focus of this study, seeks to foreground evi- dence-based analysis that can provide policy guidance for likely to have significant impacts on governments in the region, as well as work to dispel myths that may otherwise be used to mobilize ill-formed prac- mobility in the region tices and policies. As such, through quantitative analysis, Chapter 4 estimates the impact of immigration on South region’s political economy, major political changes and policy African labor market outcomes, such as employment and amendments, which have all had important implications for wages, between 1996 and 2011. regional mobility. The methodology for the study, [including additional details Since 1990, the overall estimated number of migrants in of the methodology used to assess the impact of international Southern Africa – that is, the number of foreign people in the migration on jobs in South Africa] and the list of interviewees study countries – has increased by about 68 per cent.1 This met in South Africa, are included as Annexures]. increase in mobility has not been uniform across the region: the largest increases in the numbers of migrants and refugees Southern Africa: Why and Why Now? have been in South Africa, Botswana and Angola, whereas they There have been major changes in the patterns of displacement have decreased in the poorer economies of Malawi, Zambia, and migration in Southern Africa since the 1990’s. Some of and Zimbabwe. In fact, South Africa has become the single these were addressed in a World Bank 2011 Study, even though most important migration destination in the region, hosting it had a different thematic and geographic focus. Nevertheless, 67 per cent. of all migrants in the region in 2017. In mid-2017, there remains urgent need for a comprehensive updated anal- ysis of mixed migration and forced displacement trends in the This includes refugees and asylum seekers. See Annexure 1 (Methodology, Data 1 region, most notably because of recent transformations in the and Limitations) of this report for a discussion on the data. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 9 it also hosted 215,860 asylum-seekers, and 92,296 refugees or America advancing more restrictive postures. The European persons in refugee-like situations (UNHCR, 2018).2 All of this Union (EU), in particular, is playing an increasingly active has taken place against the backdrop of increased pan-African role in the governance of African migration, through ‘regional mobility. Across Africa, the migrant stock increased by an esti- consultative processes’ such as the Rabat and Khartoum mated 57 per cent. between 1990 and mid-2017 (UNDESA, Processes (Frouws 2015, p.31-32). 2017). As evidenced by these numbers, migration has become a central component of people’s livelihoods and protection The World Bank, strategies, both in the region, and across the continent. Migration and Displacement Southern Africa has a history of highly organized and insti- The World Bank is a relatively recent entrant to the group tutionalized labor migration. This system was developed to of multilateral organizations which work on forced displace- supply the labor needs of the large commercial farms and ment, although it has long been active in working on issues of mines of the region (Segatti 2016). With the end of the twen- labor migration and employment.4 Its work in mixed migra- tieth century, and with the decline of mining and manufac- tion and forced displacement has been driven by a demand turing in the region, this system collapsed. Today’s migration from client countries for financing support, policy advice and patterns are individualized, ad hoc and often irregular (Kihato research. Consequently, it has an interest in developing strong, forthcoming, p.6). In addition to international (cross-border) empirically grounded analytical research, which can form the migration and displacement, there is substantial rural-to-urban basis for evidence-based policy recommendations, focused on migration within countries. Further, in an already highly-ur- developmental impacts and poverty reduction. banized region, these population movements have had espe- cially significant impacts on towns and cities, and have added to existing pressures on urban housing, health and education. A Note on Terminology: Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Development Recently, there have also been important policy and political How we understand migration and displacement is a func- shifts in the region. Several countries in the region (including tion of the categories that we use to study and analyze these South Africa) have made changes to existing laws, or have phenomena. In this section, therefore, we briefly explain some announced that they are in the process of formulating new of the terms used throughout this study (further detail on migration policies. Changes made to South African refugee terminology can be found in Annex 1). The use and scope laws, in particular, which include new restrictions on asy- of these terms have been the subject of extensive debates in lum-seekers, are likely to have significant impacts on mobil- academic and policy literature; our intention in this study is ity in the region. South Africa also continues to experience not to engage these broader debates. However, we think it sustained ‘xenophobic’ violence - as recently as April 20183, critical to point out how these terms (and the phenomena in fact. At times, this violence is widespread and significant. they describe) have practical implications in the context of Further compounding issues, South Africa struggles with high Southern African migration. levels of unemployment, inequality, and poverty, which influ- ences debates on migration and social cohesion more broadly. At its broadest, ‘migration’ can be understood as: ‘The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international In Zimbabwe, long the country of origin of numerous asy- border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encom- lum-seekers in neighboring countries, Robert Mugabe was passing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, succeeded in late 2017 after 37 years in power by President composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, dis- Emmerson Mnangagwa (International Crisis Group 2017a). placed persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other The implications of this change for regional mobility and dis- purposes, including family reunification.” (IOM 2011, p. 62). It placement are yet to be fully understood. includes both voluntary migration and forced displacement. Finally, this study comes at a time when global migration ‘Forced displacement’ or ‘forced migration’, on the other hand, policy is changing rapidly – with both Europe and North can be understood as the ‘involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict, civil unrest, or natural This is a substantial downward revision from the numbers (above 1 million 2 asylum seekers) due to methodological changes in 2015 and 2016. Recent violence resulted in a Nigerian man, Clement Nwaogu, being doused with 3 See for instance, recent research on labor mobility in the ASEAN region 4 petrol by protestors and burnt alive. He later died in hospital from his injuries. (Testaverde, Moroz, Hollweg and Schmillen 2017) 10 Introduction or man-made catastrophes’ (IOM 2011, p. 39). This term includes ‘refugees’, those who are displaced by large devel- Mixed migratory flows are used to opment projects (for instance, dams), environmental catastro- phes (such as floods) or man-made calamities such as famine describe the intermingled movement of (United Nations and World Bank 2018). It also includes inter- nally-displaced persons, who are forced to move within their refugees and asylum-seekers, as well own countries and do not cross international borders. Jeff Crisp, (then the head of UNHCR’s Policy Development and as those who fall outside established Evaluation Service) noted in 2008 - not only does migra- tion often have ‘mixed’ motivations, ‘[r]efugees and migrants increasingly move alongside each other, often in an irregular protection categories but who may be in manner, making use of the same routes and means of trans- port and engaging the services of the same human smugglers’ need of interventions, such as vulnerable making them harder to distinguish from each other (Crisp 2008, p. 4-5).5 The expression ‘mixed migration’ emerged in migrants, and economic migrants this context, to recognize the complexity of motivations and movements of contemporary migration and displacement. status, as well as the return and readmission of asylum-seekers Mixed migratory flows are used to describe the intermingled whose claims to refugee status were initially rejected. movement of refugees and asylum-seekers, as well as those who fall outside established protection categories but who In countries marked by widespread inequality and poverty, may be in need of interventions, such as vulnerable migrants, where nationals and migrants and refugees compete for ‘scarce and economic migrants (World Bank 2016, p.4). resources, services and opportunities’, the role of migration in hindering or advancing national development agendas also The reality of mixed migratory flows has had significant prac- remains a major point of debate.7 The relationship between tical implications in Southern Africa and particularly in South migration, displacement and development is, of course, a com- Africa. Countries in the region, which have generally restric- plex one, and remains understudied, especially in the context of tive immigration regimes,6 have tightened asylum procedures movement between developing countries. Migration can have and developed restrictive migration policies, arguing that economic benefits for countries of origin (sending communi- economic and voluntary migrants are “abusing” their asylum ties) and destination (hosts), as well as migrants themselves (see systems (Long and Crisp 2011; Betts 2013). In South Africa, World Bank 2016; World Bank 2017b, p.57-73). The extent and which has had one of the most liberal asylum regimes in the nature of these benefits, however, are highly dependent on con- African continent (at least on paper), researchers have sug- text.8 Even in the best circumstances, migration and displacement gested that increases in mixed migration have been accompa- may have significant short-term costs for host communities. nied by stronger immigration enforcement, restrictive asylum These costs may be economic, social and institutional, and often determination practices and allegations of procedural irreg- manifest themselves in strains on local service delivery (World ularities in detention and deportation of migrants (Fassin, Bank 2017b, p. 69). Further, it is usually the poorest in those Wilhelm-Solomon, and Segatti 2017; Amit 2012; Amit 2015; communities who bear these costs, even when there are aggre- Vigneswaran 2011). Significantly, the use of the term ‘mixed gate benefits at the national level in the medium or long-term migration’ is pervasive in South Africa. It is used by govern- (Landau 2017). Where these costs are not addressed, and even mental departments, opposition political parties, civil society if they are only perceived, migrants and refugees can become actors, and humanitarian organizations, usually referencing its the fulcrum of political contestation, as is the case in Southern allegedly negative impacts. Mixed flows have therefore become Africa (Misago 2012).This study considers and remains sensitive mired in several other policy discussions, most notably, around to these economic and political costs and incentives. irregular movements, border controls, applications for refugee The following section analyses contemporary trends in migra- 5 T  here are much broader ethical debates around whether refugees and migrants tion and forced displacement into and within Southern Africa can and ought to be distinguished from each other, and the impact of this framed within their historical context. categorisation, but those are beyond the scope of this study – see, for instance, Zetter 1991, Malkki 1995a, Turton 2003a, Feller 2005, DeWind 2007, Hathaway 2007, Landau 2007, Zetter 2007, Bakewell 2008b, Chimni 2009. 7 See Department of Home Affairs, Republic of South Africa 2017 6 Particularly, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia (see Crush and Frayne 2007). 8 See de Haas 2012, for a general discussion Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 11 12 Introduction 2 Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement into and within Southern Africa O FFICIAL N E G OT I AT I O N S TO end Apartheid in South Africa began in 1990, and white minority rule formally ended in 1994. The profound economic and political upheaval of this period transformed migration and displace- ment across the region. Alongside the organized and controlled labor migration system, other forms of mobility emerged and expanded: this included asylum-seekers fleeing conflict and persecution, seasonal migrants and cross-border traders and smugglers. Existing patterns of regional mobility were over- laid with new forms of movement as people moved for more diverse reasons.These changes At the regional level, migration took place within a broader socio-economic and legal continues to be governed by context shaped by the rela- tionship between Southern unenforceable conventions and a Africa’s system of mine-based capital accumulation, and the patchwork of bilateral agreements migrant workforce on which it relied. The content of laws governing migrants and ref- and treaties, while in many national ugees has changed in many cases since then, and often contexts, bureaucratic and radically, but their implemen- tation remains uneven. At administrative practices of migration the regional level, migration continues to be governed by control persist. unenforceable conventions and a patchwork of bilateral agreements and treaties, while in many national contexts, bureaucratic and administrative practices of migration control persist. As a result, the story of migration and displacement in the region today has elements of both continuity and change. This section analyses contemporary trends in migration and forced displacement in Southern Africa and does so by placing them within their historical context. It has three objectives - to describe the history of migration and displacement into and within Southern Africa, the changes that have taken place in regional mobility and displacement patterns, and finally, the characteristics of contemporary migration and displacement in the sub-continent with a special focus on South Africa. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 13 History of Labor Migration by forcible land grabs, and by the enactment of a series of highly restrictive laws which progressively deprived African in Southern Africa peasantry of land and restricted their ability to earn a live- The discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 laid lihood from farming (Ferguson 1994, p.177; Wolpe 1972).10 the foundations for South Africa’s highly centralized mining A system of pass laws imposed controls on their ability to industry. Over the next century, extractive industries were migrate to the newly urbanizing spaces (such as Johannesburg) to become the core of the South African economy (Fine to seek employment.Together, these measures left black South and Rustomjee 1996, p.71).9 Their growth, combined with Africans little choice but to enter the migrant labor system the expansion of commercial agriculture, directly led to the which served the mines and commercial farms. Conflict development of Southern Africa’s highly controlled labor between the mines and farms over access to cheap labor were migration system, which remained in place until the 1990’s frequent, and played out in competition between recruiters (Marais 2011, p.8-10; Jeeves and Crush 1997). and recruitment agencies, as well as different factions of state In its early years, the growth of the mining industry was bureaucracy (Crush 1993). accompanied by the inflow of foreign, mainly British cap- In short, the economy of South Africa during this period ital to the sector and by the migration of European skilled was based on the exploitation of a low-wage, low-skilled, and semi-skilled workers to South Africa. However, both the highly-controlled, expendable work-force. Migrant workers, mining sector and commercial agriculture required a steady almost all men, were recruited from rural South Africa but supply of cheap and unskilled labor to ensure profitability and also from Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia growth; a purely ‘voluntary’ workforce proved insufficient for and Tanzania, and usually had to make long and hazardous the needs of these industries (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987, p. journeys to their workplaces, where they lived and worked 196).Various coercive legal and political measures were there- in dangerous, over-crowded conditions (Jeeves and Crush fore taken to force black South Africans into the labor ‘market’. 1995). They were also expected to supplement their wages Initially, workers from rural Southern Africa were forced into from labor by subsistence agriculture, either in the ‘native low-wage jobs in the mines and farms to settle hut and poll tax reserves’ or ‘Bantustans’ or the foreign countries where they liabilities. Rural agricultural production was also undermined were required to maintain their permanent residences (Wolpe 1972, p.427; Moodie and Ndatshe 1994, p.18).11 The costs of family maintenance, retirement, education, other social ser- Fine and Rustomjee coined the evocative phrase ‘mining-energy-complex’ to 9 describe the direct and indirect dependence of South Africa’s entire economy on vices were not accounted for in the wages paid to these work- the mining and energy sectors (and associated manufacturing) (1996, p.71-75) ers, which allowed for wages to be maintained at artificially low levels (Arrigi, Aschoff and Scully 2010, p. 412). Similar systems were implemented, albeit with important differences, to serve the coal mines of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) as well as agriculture in these areas (Burawoy 1976, p.1079). South Africa’s institutionalized labor migration regime dwarfed all other cross border movements in the region, however, and effectively turned parts of Southern Africa into labor reserves for the South African economy. Changes in South Africa’s political economy led to a major re-structuring of the migrant labor system. Concerted anti-Apartheid resistance grew, and was accompanied by increasing unemployment, as the economy shifted to more The 1913 Land Act barred ‘Africans’ from acquiring land outside ‘native 10  reserves’, which comprised 7.3% of South African land area. The 1936 Natives and Land Trust Act doubled the land area set aside for the Native Reserves, which had been found to be insufficient to provide even minimum subsistence requirements for the populations residing in them. 11 As classified by UNHCR. 14 capital-intensive forms of growth. Unskilled migrant labor FIGURE 5: Total migrant stock (both sexes) including refugees  became increasingly superfluous to industry and the need for and asylum seekers, in Southern Africa, mid-2017 skilled and semi-skilled labor increased. Further, increasing Total migrant stock (both sexes) including refugees and asylum seekers, mid-2017 mechanization of agriculture on commercial farms and eco- logical degradation in the homelands led to growing migration to cities, despite the Apartheid state’s efforts at influx control (Marais 2011, p.32). In these cities, work remained scarce, wages were low, and the state continually harassed residents. Angola Widespread and well organized anti-Apartheid movements, 638,499 Mozambique global and domestic financial crises (exacerbated by South Zambia Malawi 246,954 Africa’s involvement in regional conflicts in Namibia and 156,982 237,104 Angola), and international sanctions finally led to talks which dismantled the apartheid regime. Elections took place in 1994, Zimbabwe and South Africa’s new constitution was adopted in 1996. 403,866 Namibia Botswana 95,067 166,430 Trends of Migration and Displacement in Southern Africa Swaziland Table 1 plots changes in the estimated migrant and refugee 33,263 numbers in the study countries between 1990 – 2017, using Lesotho data from UNDESA.12 Annexure 3 replicates this chart for South Africa 6,749 each of the study countries. 4,036,696 Total Migrant Stock ≤246,954 For a discussion of the methodology used by UNDESA to estimate these figures, 12  ≤638,499 and for a more general discussion on the shortcomings of migration data, please ≤4,036,696 0 200 400 800 Km see the section of the report on Methodology. World Bank Geospatial Operations Support Team: GOST (2018) Base Map Source; Esri, USGS, NOAA Data Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2017). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017). TABLE 1: Estimated migrant population in Southern Africa, 1990-2015  C AT EGORY 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 Total estimated migrant stock (including 3,581,782 2,316,839 2,427,952 2,572,688 3,413,504 5,775,998 6,021,610 refugees and asylum seekers)a Total estimated male migrant stock 1,966,456 1,313,698 1,357,349 1,428,265 1,905,600 3,120,649 3,258,213 Total estimated female migrant stock 1,615,326 1,003,141 1,070,603 1,144,423 1,507,904 2,655,349 2,763,397 Refugees and asylum seekers (both sexes) b 1,343,324 248,213 296,044 219,105 146,162 1,377,937 454,646 Total population (in thousands) c 95,886 108,429 120,924 134,272 149,710 168,741 176,842 International migrants as a proportion of total 3.74 2.14 2.01 1.92 2.28 3.42 3.41 population (in per cent.) Refugees and asylum seekers as a proportion 37.50 10.71 12.19 8.52 4.28 23.86 7.55 of International migrants (in per cent.) Refugees and asylum seekers as a proportion 1.40 0.23 0.24 0.16 0.10 0.82 0.26 of total population (in per cent.) Source: UNDESA 2017 aUNDESA calculates the migrant stock by extrapolating from national census data up to mid-2017. The data on the number of refugees and asylum seekers is drawn from end-2016 figures as reported by UNHCR. See UNDESA 2017. bThe major spike (and subsequent decline) between 2010-2017 is largely attributable to a huge number of asylum applications made in South Africa. UNHCR explains the changes in estimated numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa between 2015 and 2016 as follows: “An adjustment to 2015 and 2016 end of year figures, in particular for the number of asylum applications pending on appeal and review, has resulted in a substantially lower figure for numbers of asylum seekers reported in South Africa.” (UNHCR Popstats). In mid-2017, UNHCR reported that the total number of refugees and asylum seekers in the region was 489,266. c This has been rounded up or down to the nearest thousand. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 15 TABLE 2: Migrant, refugee and asylum-seeker statistics in South Africa (1990-2017)  C AT EGORY 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 Total estimated migrant stock (including 1,163,883 1,003,807 1,001,825 1,210,936 2,096,886 3,816,696 4,036,696 refugees and asylum seekers)d Total estimated male migrant stock 717,227 611,083 600,032 712,219 1,216,129 2,122,100 2,244,421 Total estimated female migrant stock 446,656 392,724 401,793 498,717 880,757 1,694,596 1,792,275 Refugees and asylum seekers (both sexes) e 90,000 101,408 15,063 29,714 57,899 1,217,709 309,342 Total population (in thousands) f 37,561 42,088 45,728 48,821 51,585 55,291 56,717 International migrants as a proportion of total 3.10 2.39 2.19 2.48 4.06 6.90 7.12 population (in per cent.) Refugees and asylum seekers as a proportion 7.73 10.10 1.50 2.45 2.76 31.90 7.66 of International migrants (in per cent.) Refugees and asylum seekers as a proportion 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.06 0.11 2.20 0.55 of total population (in per cent.) Source: UNDESA 2017 dUNDESA calculates the migrant population by extrapolating from national census data up to mid-2017. The data on the number of refugees and asylum seekers is drawn from end-2016 figures as reported by UNHCR. See UNDESA 2017. eIn mid-2017, UNHCR reported that the total number of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa was 308,156 (see “Mid-Year Trends 2017”, UNHCR Popstats). UNHCR explains the changes in estimated numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa between 2015 and 2017 as follows: “An adjustment to 2015 and 2016 end of year figures, in particular for the number of asylum applications pending on appeal and review, has resulted in a substantially lower figure for numbers of asylum seekers reported in South Africa.” f This has been rounded up or down to the nearest thousand. The total numbers of migrants and refugees (including asylum Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), which has histori- seekers) in Southern Africa has increased by about 68 per cally been the labor recruitment agency for the mining sector, cent since 1990. This increase in mobility has not been uni- reported that the number of mineworkers fell from 477,000 form over time, nor across the region: the largest increases to 215,000 between 1980-2010, and the proportion of for- have occurred in South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and eign mineworkers fell from about 60 per cent. in 2003 to 23 Angola, whereas the numbers have decreased in the poorer per cent. in 2013. This has affected the flow of remittances to economies of Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. South Africa the historic areas of origin for mineworkers and also resulted is the single largest country of destination. As of mid-2017, in the participation of former mineworkers in dangerous UNDESA estimated that it was host to about 67 per cent. but lucrative illicit mining in abandoned mines (see Crush, of the migrants and refugees in the region. Table 2 plots the Dodson, Williams, and Tevera 2017, p. 10). number of refugees and asylum seekers in Southern Africa over time, as well as the total number of migrants, including DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MIGRANTS refugees and asylum seekers (disaggregated by gender). It also IN SOUTHERN AFRICA plots the numbers of migrants and refugees in South Africa to Since 1990, the proportion of migrants13 aged 15-49 in show how, in recent years, migration and displacement num- Southern Africa has increased sharply (see Figure 6). Across bers in the region have overwhelmingly been driven by move- the region, UNDESA data also suggests that the gendered ment to South Africa. To a smaller extent, the more recent make-up of migrants has remained relatively constant, although increases are also a result of Angola’s 2014 General Population some scholars have argued that there has been a change in the and Housing Census, which was its first for 40 years (UNFPA types of migration, that is, independent women’s migration 2016) and which reported far higher numbers of international has increased (Crush, Dodson, Williams and Tevera 2017).14 In migrants than had been expected. 1990, around 45% of the total migrant population is estimated to have been made up of female migrants.This increased mar- DECLINE OF MINE-BASED MIGRATION ginally, to 45.89 per cent., in 2017. It is worth noting that contract migration to the mines of As noted above, UNDESA’s data includes refugees and asylum seekers in the 13  Southern Africa has decreased sharply in recent years. The total migrant population. See section 3.7 for a brief discussion on the female composition of migration flows. 14  16 Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement into and within Southern Africa BOX 1: Legal Changes in South Africa  The experience of migration is, of course, highly gendered. This manifests itself not only in terms of the vulnerabilities The increase in migrants and refugees moving to South Africa was experienced by those who migrate, but also their reasons influenced to a significant extent by legal and policy changes enacted for moving, the different infrastructure that male and female after the end of Apartheid. Existing, and highly restrictive immigra- migrants and refugees draw upon while moving (for instance, tion policies, including the evocatively named 1991 Aliens Control how they access money to pay for travel), the remittances they Act, continued to act as the cornerstone of South African immigra- send, and their experience of being migrants, refugees or asy- tion policy through the 1990’s. These were ultimately replaced by the lum-seekers in foreign countries.While a few studies have spe- Immigration Act of 2002, which was adopted in 2004 after a great cifically focused on the experience of women in South Africa, deal of internal debate. this remains a major research gap in the region more generally. Segatti (2011) suggests that the process of legal reform was fraught with political contestation. On one hand, activist networks argued REFUGEES AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS for more open and liberal immigration regimes, pointing to ‘a moral IN SOUTHERN AFRICA debt owed by South Africa to the rest of the continent’. The immi- In mid-2017, UNHCR estimated the total number of refu- gration regime that finally emerged, she notes, ensured minimal gees and asylum-seekers in the region at 489,266. The major conformity with the rights guaranteed in the constitution of 1996, countries of origin for refugees and asylum-seekers in the pursued a dual system of limited permanent high-skilled migration region are listed below. In addition to the major movements alongside temporary lower-skilled migration (with limited avenues from the HoA, the Great Lakes Region and Zimbabwe, asy- for legal migration) and retained power within central government, and concentrated it within the Department of Home Affairs, reiter- lum-seekers also originate in Western Africa, and the sub-conti- ating ‘control and sovereignty as core values guiding immigration nent also hosts a small but significant number of asylum-seekers policy in South Africa’ (p.45). from South Asian countries. Needless to say, these numbers are only part of the story. They do not include a large number of Immediate progress was made, however, in reforming, or more asylum-seekers who may have abandoned their applications, nor accurately, formulating refugee legislation. South Africa published do they account for circular migrants, or those who choose to a Green Paper on International Migration in 1997, and the extremely stay undocumented, either because they wish to remain invisible progressive Refugee Act was adopted in 1998 (however it came to the authorities, or due to fear of xenophobic violence, etc. into force in 2000). This allowed asylum-seekers to work and study while their applications were pending. In recent years, however, this In the region, South Africa is the single most important coun- legislation has been amended to become more restrictive. Further, try of destination for asylum-seekers and refugees, followed by as is discussed later in this study, lack of bureaucratic capacity has Angola, Zambia and Malawi. meant that many of the rights nominally guaranteed by the legisla- tion remain unavailable to asylum-seekers and refugees in practice The sub-sections which follow outline trends in displacement (Segatti 2011a; Kihato (forthcoming); Crush, Dodson, Williams and from the major regions of origin - the Great Lakes and the Horn Tevera 2017). of Africa, and then go on to discuss the crisis in Zimbabwe.  omparison of population age structures of migrants (including refugees and asylum seekers) in Southern Africa, 1990 and 2017 FIGURE 6: C 1990 2017 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+ Age Source: UNDESA 2017 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 17 TABLE 3: Major countries/territories of origin of asylum seekers and refugees in Southern Africa (end-2016)  M A J OR COUNTRIES OF NUMBER IN END-20 1 6 M AJ OR C O U N T R I E S O F N U M BE R I N E N D - 2 0 1 6 O R I GIN OF ASYLUM SEEKERS O R I GI N OF R E F U G E E S Various/Unknown 142,380 DRC 76,273 Zimbabwe 41,357 Somalia 32,163 DRC 25,029 Ethiopia 17,919 Burundi 10,829 Burundi 10,313 Guinea 9,150 Rwanda 7,180 Somalia 6,851 Congo 5,420 Côte d'Ivoire 5,975 Zimbabwe 5,351 Mozambique 5,608 Eritrea 2,063 Mauritania 5,403 Namibia 924 Rwanda 4,736 Uganda 703 Source: UNHCR Popstats FIGURE 7: Refugees and asylum seekers in Southern Africa, mid-2017 Displacement from the Great Lakes Total refugee stock (both sexes) including asylum seekers, mid-2017 and the Horn of Africa Between the 1960’s and the 1990’s, a series of anti-colonial inde- pendence wars and struggles against white-minority regimes took place in the region. These led to waves of forced displace- ment, most notably from Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. In recent years, however, trends in mobility have changed, and Angola have come to be dominated by migration and displacement 78,424 Malawi from the Great Lakes regions, the HoA and Zimbabwe. 31,970 Zambia 33,380 Mozambique 21,111 MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT FROM THE GREAT LAKES Zimbabwe 8,864 The countries of the Great Lakes region include Burundi, Namibia 3,832 Botswana Rwanda, the DRC, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Among 2,235 these, conflict in Burundi, DRC, and to a lesser extent, Rwanda, have led to large numbers of people fleeing across Swaziland international borders for protection (World Bank and 1,232 UNHCR 2015a). In 2013, in fact, 98 per cent. of all regis- Lesotho tered refugees in the region came from those three countries 62 South Africa (p.19). Waves of displacement began as early as the 1950’s, and 308,156 continue till the present day. Total Refugee Stock ≤21,111 ≤78,424 Protracted crisis in the DRC began as early as 1992, and 0 200 400 800 Km ≤308,156 cyclical patterns of violence have continued since, involving World Bank Geospatial Operations Support Team: GOST (2018) Base Map Source; Esri, USGS, NOAA neighbouring countries in several instances. Persistent insecu- Data Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Database - "Mid-Year Trends 2017" rity, economic deprivation and to some extent even famine15 have meant that DRC now hosts one of the largest IDP populations in the world, while large numbers of Congolese By some estimates 290,500 people died of hunger and acute malnutrition in the 15  second Congo War (1998-2002) – see de Waal 2018. This war involved armed forces from 9 African countries and a multiplying array of national armed groups. 18 Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement into and within Southern Africa refugees and asylum-seekers have sought protection in neigh- these countries were traveling along the Great Lakes and bouring countries. Among the countries in Southern Africa, through the Southern African countries to get to South Africa Angola and Zambia, and of course, South Africa are primary each year (Horwood 2009). A 2017 study by RMMS (Frouws countries of destination. Researchers have alleged that states and Horwood 2017) updated this estimate to suggest that no in the region have sometimes engaged in ad-hoc deportations more than 13,000-14,050 are doing so now, although higher of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from their territo- numbers may be leaving the Horn using the southern route. ries: between 2003-2009, for instance Angola is said to have RMMS attributes the fall in numbers to the attractiveness of deported between 300,000 – 400,000 Congolese from its other destinations (such as Europe), low rates of recognition Lunda Norte region (Betts 2013, p. 90). of asylum applications in South Africa, and finally, intolerance towards foreigners and xenophobic violence in South Africa. Elections have been postponed in the DRC since the end of Most of those moving along the southern route intend for 2016, and may finally be held in December 2018, with major South Africa to be their final destination, even though some changes in electoral laws and voting technology (International may travel onwards to Europe, North America or Australia. Crisis Group 2018). If political contestation around the elec- Continued political instability and droughts in Somalia, famine tions turns violent, this may have implications for displace- and conflict in South Sudan, and political reform in Ethiopia, ment within and from the country. combined with a lack of economic opportunities may con- Burundi too, has been both a country of origin and refuge. tinue to drive mixed migratory flows along the Southern In the 1970’s civil war broke out (along ethnic lines), and Route, though the impact of South Africa’s restrictive new resulted in the mass displacement of Burundians to Tanzania legislation on such movement remains to be seen. Between (Malkki 1995b). Periodic conflict, since then, has meant that June-December 2017, for instance, IOM interviewed 174,654 neighbouring countries host large numbers of Burundian migrants leaving the Horn of Africa. Of those, only .004% refugees and asylum seekers (World Bank and UNHCR (or 7 people) reported South Africa as their intended destina- 2015a). In 2015, President Nkurunziza’s decision to run for tion (IOM 2018). This may have been a result of where these a third term and subsequent re-election transformed existing migrants were interviewed (Yemen, Somalia and Djibouti, unrest into a low-intensity conflict. The economy and public none of which are on the Southern route) or a reflection of finances deteriorated, as did the everyday living conditions lower interest in moving to South Africa. for Burundians. Over 400,000 Burundians have since fled the country (International Crisis Group 2017b).16 The Crisis in Zimbabwe Zimbabwe’s liberation war ended in 1980, and resulted in While the largest movement of Rwandans took place during mass emigration of white Zimbabweans to South Africa and the genocide in 1994, and many have since returned to elsewhere. A large number of Zimbabweans also fled to South Rwanda from neighboring countries (and indeed, elsewhere), Africa and Botswana as the new government sought to con- some Rwandan asylum-seekers and refugees remain in the solidate its power in Matebeleland through force (Mlambo camps and towns of Southern Africa. 2010). In the late 1990’s a series of policy decisions taken by then President Mugabe, including the payment of pensions THE ‘SOUTHERN ROUTE’ FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA to 50,000 war veterans, confiscation of 15,000 white-owned Protracted political instability and persistent conflict has led to farms with limited compensation (termed as ‘fast-track land large volumes of displacement within and from the Horn of reform’), and involvement in conflict in the DRC resulted Africa. Much of the displacement is confined to neighbour- in economic collapse and massive outward migration (Fassin, ing countries, but some mixed migration continues to take Wilhelm-Solomon, and Segatti 2017, p.162).17 place along the ‘southern route’ to South Africa (Frouws and Horwood 2017). The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) for the On the topic of land reform in Zimbabwe, see Kariuki 2004; Nmoma 2008. ZA- 17  HoA notes that the vast majority of those moving along this NU-PF’s efforts to reform massive racial inequities in colonial land distribution route are Ethiopians and Somalis. In 2009, an IOM report were initially restricted by its commitments to market-based measures under estimated that between 17,000-20,000 ‘mixed’ migrants from the Lancaster House Agreement (which governed Zimbabwe’s political transition at independence). This provided for land redistribution strictly on a “willing seller, willing buyer basis.” In 1997, the British government abruptly reneged UNHCR estimated that 420,689 had fled Burundi between April 2015 and April 16  on its commitment to provide financial support to this land reform process. See 2017 (UNHCR 2017). also Grebe 2010. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 19 ‘Fast-track’ land reform caused a few thousand white owners 2013, p. 54). While no accurate statistics are available, Betts and their families to move off the farms but more signifi- (2013), has suggested that between 1-1.5 million Zimbabwean cantly, also led to a much larger movement of agricultural migrants crossed into South Africa between 2000-2012 (see workers whose livelihoods were disrupted or destroyed (Potts also Crisp and Kiragu 2010; Polzer 2008). The particular cir- 2010, p. 80). In 2005, the government embarked on a massive cumstances of their migration/displacement mean that they campaign against informal housing and employment in the fall into a ‘protection gap’ – for the most part, not accorded towns, calling it Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order/ formal refugee status or the attendant rights which accom- Clear Out the Trash). By some estimates between 650,000- pany formal legal status, despite fleeing a humanitarian crisis, 700,000 people lost their livelihoods, or homes, or both (Potts and subject to police action, detention and deportation. 2010, p.100). This led to massive internal movement within Polzer (2008) and Betts and Kaytaz (2009), have argued that the cities themselves, as dislocated people sought replace- the South African government’s ad hoc response to complex, ment accommodation, and produced significant short-term mixed flows of Zimbabweans to South Africa were ineffective out-migration from the towns by people who could find no both in protecting South African national interests, as well as other urban livelihood or accommodation. for meeting the needs of some extremely vulnerable migrants. After the contested elections of 2005, and 2008, violence In late-2017, former president Robert Mugabe was succeeded broke out between supporters of Zimbabwe African National by President Emmerson Mnangagwa after 37 years in power Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF, the governing party) and (International Crisis Group 2017a).While this may have impli- the primary opposition party, the late Morgan Tsvangirai’s cations for mobility in the region (with some pointing to the Movement for Democratic Change.18 This took place against possibility of return of Zimbabwean diaspora), most subject the backdrop of wide-spread economic deprivation. Between matter experts interviewed for the study believed that the fun- 1998 and 2004, the economy lost 400,000 jobs and agricul- damental drivers of Zimbabwean outward migration have not tural production declined sharply. Food insecurity, political changed, and that practically, little has likely changed for the violence and persecution of the opposition were exacerbated average Zimbabwean migrant. Further, they substantiated this by hyperinflation, an international sanctions regime, and a by noting the prevalence of trans-local livelihood strategies in cholera outbreak. In this context, perhaps up to one quarter the region, which change very slowly. From a South African of the population left the country, with most moving to the policy perspective, it may result in the termination of tem- neighboring countries of South Africa and Botswana (Betts porary policy dispensations which have allowed a segment of Zimbabweans to live and work in South Africa legally. In prac- 18  For a more comprehensive analysis of Zimbabwean politics at this time, see tice, it may result in even higher rejection rates of Zimbabwean Southall 2013. 20 asylum requests. But ultimately, the recent political changes SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF MIGRANTS may not affect mobility patterns in any significant way. The 2011 Census placed the number of international migrants in South Africa at 2,173,409, or about 4.2 per cent, The next sub-section analyzes contemporary characteristics of the country’s total population at that time.20 The major- of migration and displacement in South Africa. ity of migrants (around 75.3 per cent.) originated in other African countries, with significant populations from Europe Migration in South Africa (8.2 per cent.) and Asia (4.7 per cent.). The vast majority of Capturing data on international migration is extremely diffi- all migrants in South Africa, 68 per cent., originated in other cult, especially for developing countries (and arguably also for SADC Countries, and a large proportion of all migrants (11 developed ones). Despite StatsSA’s sophistication, it continues per cent.) chose not to disclose their country of origin. In to grapple with some of these challenges. South Africa con- 2011, 672,308 migrants were from Zimbabwe, and accounted ducted censuses in 1996, 2001, and 2011, and these remain the for 30.9 per cent. of the total migrant population, and 45.5 per most comprehensive source of data on international migra- cent. of all migrants from SADC. 393,231 migrants reported tion in South Africa. StatsSA also conducts a number of other being from Mozambique, and accounted for18.09 per cent. of surveys such as the Community Survey (last conducted in the total migrant population, and comprised 26.6 per cent. of 2007 and 2016). These do not, unfortunately provide suffi- migrants from SADC countries. A breakdown of international cient basis for measuring and analyzing migration because of migrants by origin, as reported in the 1996, 2001, and 2011 much smaller sample sizes, and sample design issues. Neither Censuses is provided in Chapter 4. the surveys conducted by StatsSA, nor the Census actually Unsurprisingly, not all provinces in South Africa attract asks respondents about their legal status. As a result, the infor- migrants to the same extent. At the time of the 2011 Census, mation is not disaggregated by respondents’ status as migrant, Gauteng and the Western Cape had the greatest proportion of refugee or asylum-seeker. In addition, administrative data is their populations born outside the province. Gauteng, in par- collected by the DHA on both the volume and characteris- ticular, as the primary economic and financial hub in South tics of documented migrants and asylum-seekers. This section Africa, hosted an overwhelming majority of international draws on a combination of these data, but relies primarily on migrants with 52 per cent. of the total, followed by Western data from the 2011 census (See StatsSA 2015).19 Figure 8 plots Cape with 12 per cent. and KwaZulu Natal (8 per cent.). the distribution of external migrants in South Africa. Free State, Eastern Cape and the primarily Afrikaans speaking Northern Cape had the lowest percentages of international migrants. It is worth noting that migration and displacement Unless acknowledged otherwise, data in this section is extracted from the 19  2011 Census. in South Africa has important urban dimensions, since South Africa is among the more highly urbanized countries in Africa, and within it migrants and refugees overwhelmingly FIGURE 8: External migrants in South Africa  move to the urban and per-urban spaces in Gauteng, because (as per the 2011 census data) of its economic dynamism (UNDESA 2015). According to the same 2011 Census, 39.8 per cent., of inter- Botswana Limpopo Mozambique national migrants in South Africa were women. Interestingly, (Northern Province) 163,183 however, among migrants from SADC, more women than Namibia Mpumalanga men aged 15-24 had migrated to South Africa (reversing his- Gauteng 151,901 North West 1,132,509 Swaziland torical trends). Around 23 per cent. of migrants fell below the 151,816 national poverty income level, and in general, over half of all Free State 68,216 KwaZulu-Natal international migrants in 2011 were poor. Around 27 per cent. 168,343 Northern Cape 19,543 Lesotho of all households were headed by women, but almost one- South Africa third of these female-headed households fell in the national Eastern Cape 74,888 The 2016 Community Survey found, surprisingly, that the number of migrants in 20  Western Cape Number of Migrants 258,473 ≤ 74, 888 South Africa appeared to have decreased to 1.6 million. Given methodological ≤ 1 63, 1 83 ≤ 1 , 1 32, 509 concerns, StatsSA believe this significantly underreports the number of migrants 0 100 200 400 Km in South Africa, and should not be relied upon in the absence of additional World Bank Geospatial Operations Support Team: GOST (2018) Data Source: Community Survey 2016, Statistical release P0301 / Statistics South Africa. Base Map Source: Esri, USGS, NOAA material (StatsSA 2016). Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 21 poverty category. Around 63 per cent. (or three out of five) GENDER AND MIGRATION international migrants reported being employed. The major- A note on gender and migration in South Africa is appropri- ity were employed in the formal sector, while 17.2 per cent. ate here. Historically, female migration in Southern Africa (and reported earning their livelihood in the informal sector. 17 South Africa) was driven by the opportunities for informal per cent. were employed in private households. sector trading and by the need to procure goods and services (Dodson 1998). Migration policies too, were largely focused on These statistics were buttressed by data collected from a migration male migration – and as a result, did not adequately address the module included as part of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey changing gender trends in migration (Dodson 2001). As Kihato (QLFS) in the third quarter of 2012. The results from the QLFS has argued (2007, p. 100), female migrants move to, and stay in pointed to several important trends.21 First, that people born out- South Africa (and in particular, Johannesburg) after having faced side the country were more likely than locally-born workers to significant legal and material obstacles. Many struggle to earn a be employed in construction and trade, and also more likely to be decent wage. As a result, explanations for female migration need working in agriculture or private households (where they would be working as domestic workers, gardeners and child-care workers (Budlender 2014, p.27). While trade is the most common occu- BOX 2:  Basotho Female Migrants pation for those who are self-employed, agriculture and domestic work are known to be generally low-paying occupations, with For most of the 20th Century, single and young Basotho men went poor working conditions (Kiwanuka, Jinnah and Hartman- to work in the gold mines of South Africa and were instrumental Pickerill 2014). Second, and affirming the findings from the 2011 in providing household income to those who remained in Lesotho. Census, foreign born workers were also much more likely than However, since the 1990s - following the collapse of Apartheid and South Africans to be working in the informal sector. As a con- the concomitant decline in opportunities for male migrants in South sequence, they have poor access to social protection mechanisms African mines - patterns and demographics of migration changed; such as pension or retirement funds, medical insurance or coverage including increased female migration to South Africa and growing and paid annual leave. It is also worth noting that the QLFS found internal female migration within Lesotho. that the unemployment rates of migrants were lower than the Today, Basotho women migrate to South Africa for several reasons rate for South African workers, although the difference between including – poverty and unemployment, marital status, support for migrant and South African women was marginal.Table 8 provides their children’s education and support for HIV/AIDS-related orphans. a detailed breakdown of industry by proportion of migrants (and The changing nature of patriarchy in the country and its effects on refugees/asylum seekers) employed. marital status is also key to female migrations trends. Crush et al. (2010) note that female migration and female household headship 21  Results drawn from the QLFS Migration Module draw heavily on Budlender’s are closely linked. In a survey they conducted, they found that the (2014) analysis. absence of a male household head, either due to separation, divorce or widowhood, appears to compel some female out-migration and within Lesotho. The vast majority of Basotho female migrants in TABLE 4:  Industry of employment for migrants (QLFS 2014) South Africa are employed as domestic workers, while others are involved in the informal sector, the commercial farm industry, I N D USTRY NUMBER OF MIGRAN T S self-employment, professional and skilled work. EMPLOYED (AS PER C E NT. ) Lesotho has the highest ratio of migrants living in South Africa Agriculture 6 compared to the rest of the world, and among SADC countries, Mining 3 Lesotho has the highest dependence on remittances. In 2015, remit- Manufacture 10 tance inflows made up 16.05 percent of GDP and nearly 97 percent Utilities 0 of remittance inflows to Lesotho originated in South Africa. Basotho Construction 12 female migrants are instrumental in remitting funds to Lesotho. However, because a significant number of the migrants are seasonal Trade 30 and working under precarious conditions for low wages, they often Transport 4 don’t have access to banking services and mostly rely on informal Financial 10 channels for remitting income and goods to Lesotho. Services 12 (Crush et al., 2010; World Bank 2017a; Nalane et al., 2012; Botea Private Households 11 et al., 2018) Other 0 22 Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement into and within Southern Africa to go beyond purely economic rationales - though those are Interestingly, the findings suggested that those migrating to important – and also take into account the changing structures cities from urban spaces from rural areas were among the most of patriarchy in the region, as well as the struggles of women vulnerable, regardless of whether they had crossed an interna- to assert their own agency within these broader structures. tional border. Social networks were the most significant factor Through their mobility, Kihato argues, ‘women are reposition- in explaining the ‘success’ of some migrants and refugees in ing themselves, both in the family and in their communities, accessing food, shelter, and jobs. Needless to say, these out- in ways that challenge traditional notions of their subordinate comes were also highly gendered: men were more likely to socio-economic status’ (Kihato 2007, p. 100). It is also worth face physical attack, robbery and arrest, whereas women faced noting that the relationship between gender and migration in greater challenges in accessing work, housing or other services. Southern Africa remains a major research gap (although there are exceptions).22 In recent years, research on gender in migra- As most migrants and refugees in South Africa choose to tion has disproportionately focused on women’s vulnerability to reside in urban areas, the hardships they face alongside local trafficking, or their exposure to gender-based violence (and to residents include high rates of unemployment, poor service a small extent remittances). More can and needs to be done on delivery, poverty, overcrowding, high crime rates, and drug this, especially focusing on the way migrant women in Southern and alcohol abuse. Africa access services, and the livelihood choices that they make. One of the most important challenges for migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers relates to documentation, as illustrated in REFUGEES AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA the UNHCR data. Even when refugees and asylum-seekers It is difficult to compare the socio-economic conditions of do possess the requisite permits and documents, few service migrants and refugees in South Africa. This is because census providers accept these as valid forms of identity. This point data does not distinguish between people born outside South was reiterated in almost all interviews that we conducted in Africa based on their migration status. However, the UNHCR South Africa. As a result, asylum-seekers are unable to open recently conducted a livelihoods survey among 1,000 refugee bank accounts, go to state hospitals, rent housing and have and asylum-seeker households. Among those surveyed, 53 per limited access to education too. In many instances, and as per- cent. were asylum-seekers, whereas 43 per cent. had received haps demonstrated by the abandonment of 92 per cent. of all refugee status. The majority of those surveyed were from the asylum applications, many have become ‘irregular’ after several DRC, Burundi and Somalia, and the largest number had only years in South Africa. completed secondary schooling. South Africa’s strong national legal framework for protection When asked what would be of most help to them, in order to of asylum seekers has been unevenly implemented. In real- become self-reliant, a large number of respondents mentioned ity, migration is governed through a combination of law and access to capital to be able to start businesses, assistance with informal political structures. rent-payment, and school fees. Significant numbers also pointed to the difficulties that they faced in integrating into South African society, as well as obstacles in obtaining relevant documentation. A separate survey covering migrants and hosts in Johannesburg The survey also found little empirical and Maputo (among others), found that legal status as a refu- gee or asylum seeker was not a key determinant of protection difference in the socio-economic outcomes. In the case of police harassment, informal employ- ment and violence, foreigners were more vulnerable, irrespec- circumstances of those who had been tive of their immigration status. The survey also found little empirical difference in the socio-economic circumstances displaced by violence, compared to of those who had been displaced by violence, compared to those who reported having left their country of origin for those who reported having left their economic reasons. country of origin for economic reasons. Gender plays a role in structuring kinship, and in shaping the relationship 22  between migrants, asylum seekers and formal and informal authorities. See Krystalli, Hawkins and Wilson 2018. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 23 24 Mixed Migration and Forced Displacement into and within Southern Africa 3  aws and Policies Governing L Migration and Displacement in Southern Africa I N SOUTHERN AFRICA, LEGAL CHANGES have influenced, and in turn, been motivated by pat- terns of migration and displacement. As a result, the relationship between law and mobility is a complex one. Historically, and as discussed above, laws were used to restrict and control migration. Legal changes which accompa- nied the end of Apartheid Many of the regional economic reconfigured these controls, and transformed patterns of communities (REC’s) in Africa have movement. Today, laws and policies are being formu- taken important steps towards lated and amended across the region in response to facilitating greater labor mobility the perceived socio-eco- nomic and security chal- lenges posed by migration within their territories. SADC, and displacement. unfortunately, lags behind both The legal regime in the region is deeply fragmented, Economic Community of West African with co-existing, and some- times contradictory instru- States (ECOWAS) and the East African ments governing the same phenomena. National laws Community(EAC) in this regard. are usually restrictive, com- pared to aspirational and liberal regimes on labor mobility contained in international, continental, and regional legal instruments. The International and Continental Governance of Migration and Displacement The primary international legal instrument on forced dis- placement is the Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Both have been signed and ratified by all the countries in Southern Africa, although most have also made reservations to the text of the treaty. Most states in the region maintain an encamp- ment policy and restrict the freedom of movement of refu- gees and asylum-seekers. South Africa is a notable exception, and does not maintain an encampment policy, though it has Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 25 amended its refugee legislation recently, which will make Programme’ (JLMP) which aims to strengthen ‘the effective it more difficult for asylum-seekers to work and study.23 All governance of labour migration’ and promote ‘decent work’ the study countries, barring Namibia, have also signed and against the background of ‘regional integration and inclusive ratified the OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects development in Africa’ (Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2016, p.14- of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969 (hereafter the OAU 16; ILO 2015). Refugee Convention).24 In contrast to the international instruments related to refu- The Regional Governance of Migration gees, Southern African countries have a poor record of signing Many of the regional economic communities (REC’s) in and ratifying international conventions related to the rights Africa have taken important steps towards facilitating greater of migrant workers. The most important of these are the labor mobility within their territories. SADC, unfortunately, International Convention on the Protection of Rights of All lags behind both Economic Community of West African Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICPRMW) States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community(EAC) 1990 (A/RES/45/158), ILO Convention (C097) concern- in this regard. Regional efforts to forge a common approach ing Migration for Employment (Revised 1949), and finally, towards migration have resulted in several non-binding legal the ILO’s Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) and policy instruments, and states have been unwilling to ratify Convention No. 143 of 1975. These conventions suffer from and implement anything that might impinge on their sover- extremely low rates of ratification, generally. Scholars argue eignty in any way (Crush, Dodson, Williams and Tevera 2017, that this is largely due to states’ antipathy towards binding p. 25). SADC member states prefer to deal with each other international legal instruments in the field of migration gov- through a series of bilateral treaties and memoranda of under- ernance (Pécoud 2009; Kalm 2010). For instance, among the standing. In effect, this creates a system of overlapping agree- study countries, only Lesotho and Mozambique have signed ments with South Africa in the center, rather than a coherent and ratified the ICPRMW, and only Malawi has signed and regional system of migration governance (Fioramonti and ratified ILO Convention C097. Nshimbi 2016, p.29; Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2014). A number of legal instruments at the level of the African Union Article 5(2) of the SADC Treaty states that members of SADC also exhort states to take steps to adopt employment policies should aim to develop policies which progressively eliminate which will promote free movement of workers. Prominent among these are the Treaty establishing the African Economic BOX 3:  nformal Cross-border Trade: I Community 1991 (also referred to, as the Abuja Treaty)25, as The case of South Africa and Zimbabwe well as the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, and the African Common Position on Migration and Development. Informal cross-border trade has long been a feature of mobility in These, and the other AU declarations and policy instruments Southern Africa. It has especially been used by border communities which affect migration, are not binding on states.They merely to secure food and job security. Today, it accounts for 30-40% of provide guidelines for how states could use migration for intraregional trade. Notably, trade at the Zimbabwe-South Africa national and regional development (Fioramonti and Nshimbi border is significant, with woman dominating trade activities – up 2016, p.15). These policy instruments have been supple- to 68% - by some accounts. mented by initiatives such as the ‘Joint Labour Migration The lives of informal trades are highly mobile and circular. Some 23  Refugees Amendment Act, 2017. Assented to on 14 December 2017. research found that Zimbabwean traders travel relatively frequently http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/raa201711o2017g41343231.pdf. to South Africa, with 67% making at least one trip a month and 82% Accessed 16 April 2018. travelling more than four times a year. Despite research showing 24  The 1969 OAU Convention includes three interesting variations, compared that informal cross-border traders make significant contributions to the 1951 Refugee Convention. (1) It expands the definition of refugee to to country economies, government policy in the region towards include those fleeing their country of nationality or residence ‘owing to external informal traders has been largely invisible. Efforts by the Zimba- aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality’ (Art. I); bwean and South African government are however underway to (2) exhorts states to provide asylum, by using ‘best endeavours’, and subject to create a one-stop Beitbridge border post – the busiest border-post national legislation (Art. II); and (3) prohibits ‘subversive activities’ by refugees on the continent; this may ease movements and economic activities (Art. III). See Okoth-Obbo 2001 and Wood 2012. for informal traders. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 1991. https://au.int/sites/ 25  default/files/treaties/7775-treaty-0016_-_treaty_establishing_the_african_eco- (Peberdy et al, 2015, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2017) nomic_community_e.pdf. Accessed 7 May 2018. 26 Laws and Policies Governing Migration and Displacement in Southern Africa obstacles to the free movement of labor, and people (more generally).26 This was sought to be given effect by two major ...The existence of laws has not protocols: the 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons27, and then, the 2005 Draft Protocol on the always guaranteed protection Facilitation of Movement of Persons.28 Neither of these had, at the time of writing, come into effect, for lack of ratification. for vulnerable migrants in practice. Various other SADC instruments also contain non-binding provisions affecting migration, including, the SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour,29 the 2008 SADC Code on This is not to suggest, of course, that SADC is not active as Social Security,30 and the SADC Regional Labour Migration a forum in formulating migration policies. New initiatives Policy Framework.31 These are supplemented by the forum by the IOM, ILO, UNODC and UNHCR, at the level of on Migration Dialogue in Southern Africa (MIDSA), which SADC, are seeking to improve the policy environment for is an informal, non-binding, inter-state forum for dialogue on labor migration across the sub-region, while improving migration (Crush, Dodson, Williams and Tevera 2017, p. 32). informed decision-making around and responses to mixed The use of bilateral instruments began in the 1960’s and the migration flows, and protecting vulnerable migrants. These 1970’s as South Africa began to conclude treaties with its neigh- initiatives envisage creation of a regional ‘labor migration bors (and sources of migrant labor) to regulate and control the observatory’, facilitation of labor migration by standardizing supply of migrant mineworkers to the South African mines. the way countries evaluate workers’ qualifications, increase in For instance, the 1973 Agreement between South Africa and the portability of social protections such as pensions across Lesotho32 was initially used by the The Employment Bureau of regional borders, and development of a comprehensive policy Africa (TEBA) and various smaller companies recruiting exclu- framework on mixed migration in the region. sively for the gold and coal mines. In the mid 2000’s it began This focus on establishing and improving migration policy to be used by farmers to recruit labour legally from Lesotho, confronts several major challenges. The first is that the exis- through the use of agents (Bamu 2014, p.16; Ulicki and Crush tence of laws has not always guaranteed protection for vulner- 2007). Many of these agreements are now defunct, but have able migrants in practice. Second, the ability and willingness never been formally repealed (Crush, Dodson, Williams and of states to enforce policies remains uneven. Finally, many of Tevera 2017, p.28). After the end of Apartheid, Memoranda of the recent policy changes in the region have actually been Understanding and Joint Permanent Commissions have prolif- aimed at tightening laws governing migration and displace- erated alongside formal agreements.33 ment and imposing stricter border controls. While the exact impact of these changes remains unclear, it is possible that See: Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Com- 26  these laws will only succeed in driving cross-border move- munity, last amended 21 October 2015, http://www.sadc.int/documents-publi- cations/sadc-treaty/. Accessed 8 May 2018. ment underground, rather than stopping irregular movement 27 See Oucho and Crush 2001. across borders (Kihato forthcoming). See ‘Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005),’ 28  http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/800. Accessed 8 May 2018. Divergence between Laws, See Protocol on Employment and Labour, http://www.sadc.int/ 29  files/5714/6193/6406/Protocol_on_Employment_and_Labour_-_En- Policies and Practice on Migration glish_-_2014.pdf. Accessed 8 May 2018. and Displacement in South Africa See Code on Social Security in the SADC, http://www.sadc.int/ 30  As with the actual trends of migration and displacement, files/2513/5843/3198/Code_on_Social_Security_in_SADC.pdf. Accessed 8 May 2018. In general, Codes are not binding, only Protocols are. See “SADC there are elements of continuity and change tying together Protocols,” http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sa-protocols/. Accessed policies governing migration in South Africa. Between 1910- 8 May 2018. 1991, the governance of migration in South Africa took place The text of the framework can be obtained from Landau and Vanyora 2015. 31  through what was known as the ‘two-gate’ policy (Segatti Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 32  2011b). This privileged the entry of people correspond- Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho relating to the Establishment of an Office for a Lesotho government Labour Representative in the Republic of South ing to the minority government’s notions of ‘attractiveness’ Africa, Lesotho Citizens in the Republic of South Africa and the Movement of which were predicated on social, racial and religious preju- such persons across the international border’ (24 August 1973: Republic of dices, whereas the back gate kept out (or tried to keep out) South Africa Treaty Series No. 1/1973). unwanted migrants, while allowing in carefully controlled 33 See Bamu 2014 for an exhaustive analysis of these. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 27 numbers of labour migrants. These policies were closely con- BOX 4: Proposed changes to South African Migration Policy  nected to the Apartheid system, and its homelands policy, and were maintained through an elaborate system of laws, policies In March 2017, the Department of Home Affairs published a ‘White and opaque administrative practices. Paper on International Migration in South Africa’, which was intended to provide a ‘comprehensive review of the policy frame- The 1991 Aliens Control Act, one of the last legislations passed work [on migration and displacement] which can inform systematic by the Apartheid regime, formed the basis of South Africa’s review of the legislation’ to overcome issues of ‘irregular migra- immigration policy through the 1990’s and was only replaced tion… unacceptable levels of corruption, human rights abuse and by the current Immigration Act in 2002. Refugee movements in national security risks’. the region, primarily from Angola, Mozambique and from the Broadly, it recommends the following: (a) strengthening border Great Lakes regions were dealt with in an ad hoc way, through management techniques (by collecting data more stringently), the signing of specific agreements between the Apartheid gov- (b) establishing a border management authoritya, (c) restricting ernment and UNHCR, since no formal asylum-system existed the conditions in which citizenship can be obtained by a migrant before the passing of the Refugee Act in 1998. As a result, or refugee (by delinking residency and citizenship, removing the debates around migration in post-Apartheid South Africa had a category of permanent resident and replacing it with a ‘long-term highly coercive legal instrument focused on migration control, residency’ and finally only allowing refugees to apply for long term and policing as their point of departure (Segatti 2011b, p.39). residence after 10 years of continuous residence in South Africa), Further, the reform of immigration policy sought to accommo- and (d) moving to a points-based system of migration to privilege date a diverse group of interests. These can be broadly divided higher skilled migrants. Among the measures it proposes is a special into the following overlapping strands: first, a withdrawal of the permitting regime for international students studying in specific ‘critical’ fields to apply for permanent residency. state from migration matters, and subcontracting of the admin- istrative process of control to employers, with a particular focus In general, the approach to international migration articulated in the on providing incentives for highly skilled migrants; a second White Paper is predicated on the assumption that there are a large approach which favoured balanced migration control, taking number of irregular migrants from Zimbabwe and Lesotho staying in into account democratic commitments and state capacity, and South Africa, and that there is a need to prioritise the needs of poor finally, a security and sovereignty centred agenda. The regime South Africans whose lives are being negatively (allegedly) affected which emerged finally, embodied elements of each of these by these migrants (p.64). three approaches (ibid, p.46). The White paper proposes to change the asylum process by (a) estab- These legislative changes took place after the establishment lishing ‘Asylum Seeker Processing Centres’ (p.70), (b) removing the automatic right to work and study for asylum seekers, (c) exploring of the new South African constitution in 1996, an extremely options for resettlement of refugees to other countries, and (d) crim- progressive document. It guarantees to all persons the right inalising the non-compliance with deportation orders. to life, and the right to live with dignity, protection of the (Department of Home Affairs, Republic of South Africa 2017) due process of the law as well as the right to have access to healthcare services, sufficient food and water, and social secu-  he proposed Border Management Authority Bill was passed by the South a T rity as well as social assistance (though distinctions are drawn African Parliament in June 2017, and at the time of writing, was under consideration by the National Council of Provinces. A full text of the Bill between asylum-seekers and refugees as to the enjoyment of is available at https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/ these rights). The Refugee Act of 1998 also created one of the bill/615716_1.pdf. Accessed 18 April 2017. most progressive asylum regimes in Africa, if not the world. Further, other departments amended their legislations to bring those into conformity with constitutional protections: identified above have played out in amendments to immigra- for instance, the Department of Social Development amended tion legislation, the initiation of, and opposition to, restrictive the Social Development Act in 2008, thus providing refugees, policing of migration, and finally in uneven implementation but not asylum seekers, access to social grants on an equal basis of the asylum system. with citizens. Much of this conflict has played out in successive waves of The final immigration system that emerged was a liberal one litigation in South Africa’s court systems, and civil society insofar as higher skilled migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers organizations in South Africa (such as Lawyers for Human were concerned, but a restrictive one when it came to low- Rights (LHR), Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) skilled migration. Conflict between the three sets of interests and Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 28 Laws and Policies Governing Migration and Displacement in Southern Africa (CORMSA), among others) continue to play a major role in publicly scrutinising migration policy. 34 Researchers argue, Researchers argue, however, that however, that notwithstanding the changes in laws, polic- ing and administrative practices aimed at coercive migra- notwithstanding the changes in tion control persist, and can be observed most easily in the administration of asylum, as well as the detention and depor- laws, policing and administrative tation of undocumented migrants (Segatti 2011b; Sutton and Vigneswaran 2011; Hoag 2014;Vigneswaran, Araia, Hoag and practices aimed at coercive Tshabalala 2010). migration control persist, and can ASYLUM IN SOUTH AFRICA The difficulties faced by asylum-seekers in navigating the be observed most easily in the asylum system has long been documented by scholars work- ing on South Africa. This point was reiterated by almost all administration of asylum, as well respondents during our field trip to South Africa. In fact, the asylum system displays a series of highly contradictory as the detention and deportation of impulses. It acknowledges the right to protection, but asy- lum-seekers remain vulnerable to coercive policing tech- niques. Asylum-seekers and refugees find it difficult to access undocumented migrants. the socio-economic rights and services guaranteed to them by the constitution and law. Finally, the DHA remains signifi- cantly understaffed and under-resourced, especially in relation their applications, facing the prospect of traveling long dis- to the magnitude of its tasks (Fassin, Wilhelm-Solomon, and tances at great cost and queuing for long periods. One survey Segatti 2017, p. 163). found that around 23 per cent. of all applicants had to visit a RRO 6 times before being allowed inside (Vigneswaran, Three sets of bureaucracies are involved in the asylum process. Araia, Hoag and Tshabalala 2010, p. 474). In these over- First, at the ports of entry, border officers issue a ‘Section 23 whelmed offices, an alternate economy of bribes has devel- permit’ with a validity of 5 days, allowing for the submission oped, which can allow for the circumventing of lines, and of their claim to a Refugee Reception Office. 35 Researchers facilitation of steps such as photocopying, taking of pictures, note that border officials may choose not to issue these etc (Fassin, Wilhelm-Solomon, and Segatti 2017, p. 169). We Section 23 permits on the grounds that the person claiming understand that, in response, the DHA has taken some steps asylum may have travelled through safe third countries before to re-organize the RRO’s. arriving at the South African border, or because they assess claims to be unfounded (as appears to have become systematic Some of the respondents we interviewed during our research practice in case of Zimbabweans after 2011). Those who are visit to South Africa pointed out that in practice, most refugee rejected may be summarily deported (Amit 2012; 2015). reception offices no longer accept new asylum-seekers, and instead simply renew existing asylum documents. Further, Asylum-seekers encounter a second level of bureaucracy at the they and civil society representatives, suggested that some refugee reception offices (RRO’s), where claimants exchange RRO’s now have rejection rates approaching 100 per cent. the ‘Section 23 permit’ for a ‘Section 22 permit’ with a valid- Further, several of the existing RRO’s have been closed, nota- ity of 6 months, which then have to be renewed. Researchers bly the one in Cape Town, and remain closed although courts have alleged that this stage of the application process is both have ordered them re-opened. The DHA, for its part, notes burdensome, deeply complicated, and marked by pervasive that there is no direct migration to Cape Town, and while the corruption (see Amit 2015). Many asylum-seekers abandon existing residents will be dealt with where they are, it is not likely to that newcomers will be received in Cape Town.  ee for instance, Lawyers for Human Rights’ ‘Refugee and Migrant Rights 34 S Programme’. http://www.lhr.org.za/programme/refugee-and-migrant-rights-pro- The final level of bureaucracy is encountered by rejected gramme-rmrp. asylum-seekers, who choose to maintain an appeal. The  ee the Refugees Amendment Act 2017, which reduced this period from 14 35 S appeals process is notoriously slow, in large part because to 5 days. Respondents noted that subsidiary legislation to implement these amendments have yet to be formulated. of the workload and backlog of the adjudicators. Recent Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 29 legislative changes by the DHA have been intended to bolster BOX 5: Time-theft’ – ‘ investigation of departmental corruption, and streamline the Lived experiences of asylum-seekers in South Africa asylum appeals process, though the effects of these changes are still not known. It is also worth noting that there have Asylum-seekers evocatively argued that the broader system been multiple ad hoc measures to relieve the stress on the governing migrants and refugees in South Africa was ‘stealing their asylum system – for instance, in 2010, South Africa approved a time’. Many asylum-seekers, they argued, have been waiting for as long as ten years for the determination of their claims. In the legalization amnesty for Zimbabwean migrants already in the meantime, they have been unable to access education, or when they country. They could apply for rights of domicile, study, work have been able to do so, have found it difficult to obtain opportuni- and entrepreneurship on 4-year permits under the Zimbabwe ties in the South African labor market. Many end-up working as car Documentation Project (DZP). 242,731 DZP permits were washers, security personnel at various establishments, and in some issued and expired in 2014, to be replaced by the Zimbabwe cases, they are reduced to begging. Special Dispensation Permit, which was in turn, replaced by the Zimbabwean Special Exemption Permit (Thebe 2017). Similar measures were put in place for the Basotho between Informal migrants who do not go through the asylum pro- 2016 and 2017. cess remain subject to frequent and very coercive practices of While South Africa has deported significant numbers in past policing (Sutton and Vigneswaran 2011; Landau et al forth- years, according to DHA’s administrative records, these num- coming). A large number of migrants cross the border illegally bers have declined significantly – from 103,529 in 2012 to despite the possibility of legal crossing, and these policing 23,454 in 2016. Since 2013, the top three nationalities of practices impose major limitations on their mobility. those deported are Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho (in In circumstances where laws are weakly enforced, and charac- that order). Many of those deported may have been deported terised by pervasive anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiment, multiple times in a single year (Department of Home Affairs, what are the possibilities of alternate forms of governance? Republic of South Africa 2017). Some have argued that effectively assisting migrants and ref- Documentation is not a guarantor of protection outcomes in ugees in diverse environments requires an examination of the South Africa, nor do they accurately predict the likelihood role that local authorities could play in the governance of of asylum-seekers or refugees being able to access services, migration (Landau, Kihato, Sarkar and Sanyal 2017a). This is education and jobs. A combination of technical reasons (dif- particularly true, they argue, in urban spaces. ferences in the format of national and asylum-seeker identity documents, no standardized methods for evaluation of quali- The Role of Local Authorities fications) and exclusionary attitudes result in the exclusion of in the Governance of Migration migrants and refugees. Across the world, and in Southern Africa, migration and dis- placement is an increasingly urban phenomenon (World Bank 2017a). While the majority of analyses focus on national and regional impacts of migration, the consequences of migra- Some have argued that effectively tion are often felt most acutely at the municipal or provin- cial level (Landau, Segatti and Misago 2011). It is also these local authorities which are at the forefront of delivering ser- assisting migrants and refugees vices to migrants and refugees. This is not to suggest that local authorities are automatically predisposed towards protecting in diverse environments requires migrants and refugees; they may in fact be extremely hos- tile to outsiders. A recent study in Ekurhuleni (South Africa) an examination of the role that found that local residents and officials blamed migrants for most of the problems faced by the community, including local authorities could play in the ‘undermining the local labor market by providing cheap com- petition, providing ‘illegitimate’ competition by invading and governance of migration closing local business spaces or undermining existing local businesses, overburdening public resources through resources 30 Laws and Policies Governing Migration and Displacement in Southern Africa BOX 6: Johannesburg’s Migrant Help Desk Some laudable steps have been taken to support migrants at a local StatsSA and the Department of level – notable among this is the creation of a Migration Help Desk in the City of Johannesburg in 2007, primarily established to counter Social Development have created xenophobia and to help integrate cross-border migrants. The Help Desk aims to provide services such as counselling, information, an ‘Urbanization and Migration economic opportunities, and legal advice to internal, cross-border migrants and refugees. Importantly, the Help Desk provids informa- tion to all migrants, legal or illegal and seeks information about their Forum’ which will, among other immigration status (Kihato forthcoming). things, aim to improve data The City of Johannesburg continues to run awareness campaigns on xenophobia, and to conduct dialogues with both migrants and collection and data use in migration locals, though they have faced significant challenges in ensuring constructive dialogue between these two groups. In their work, they collaborate closely with civil society actors, as well as government in South Africa departments including the Department of Labour, Department of Home Affairs, Department of Justice, among others. Over time, it appears that fewer migrants are seeking help from the Migrant Help Desk, primarily fearing arrest and deportation. Equally, Close attention must also be paid to the collection and use of the operation of various programs at the city, provincial and national data. Policy-makers may not have the capacity (or incentives) level are not always well coordinated. to use available data effectively (Landau and Duponchel 2011). As the research team inferred from its meetings in South Africa, different levels of government, and different departments and ministries have diverse motivations for wanting better data on outflow and less investment in local economic development, migration.These range from service delivery (such as access to and being responsible for a broad range of social maladies education), assessing the protection needs of unaccompanied including crime, conflict, violence, fraud and corruption, drug minors, to eviction from occupied buildings, and deportation and substance abuse, disease, moral degeneration and lack of (Fassin, Wilhelm-Solomon, and Segatti 2017). Some depart- social cohesion’ (Misago 2016, p. 15). ments (especially at the municipal level) noted that they do Changing these narratives requires a deep contextual analysis not have the capacity to use the data for policy-making, nor of the role of local government. In South Africa, for instance, sufficient access to the policy-making process itself. although the Constitution includes provisions allowing Laudably, StatsSA and the Department of Social Development municipalities to govern the local government affairs of its have created an ‘Urbanization and Migration Forum’ which own community, subject to national and provincial legislation, will, among other things, aim to improve data collection most municipalities believed migration to be a subject to be and data use in migration in South Africa and has already regulated at the national level (Landau, Segatti and Misago engaged the City of Johannesburg and the Gauteng Provincial 2013). Similarly, the particular bureaucratic incentives which Government in its meetings. motivate local authorities need to be accounted for. For instance, the role played by the National Treasury in South Africa in promoting of local revenue raising, was found to have influenced planning by municipal authorities, including for mobility (ibid, p.119). Improving protection outcomes will therefore require engagement of local authorities in multiple policy fields, and creation of pragmatic incentives for them to work with migrants and refugees (Kihato and Landau 2017). Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 31 32 Laws and Policies Governing Migration and Displacement in Southern Africa The Case for Empirical Evidence: Migration and Job Outcomes in South Africa A S NOTED IN THE INTRODUCTION, this study recognizes that migration and dis- placement are connected to broader, deeply political questions of social transformation and economic inequity. As such, analysis on a topic as politi- cally contentious as migration and displacement can at times become embroiled in public perceptions and unsubstantiated political assertions, which can serve to override empirically based information. For this reason, it is ever more important to foreground evidence-based analysis that can provide policy guidance. The analysis provided in the following section has been con- ducted in this vein. It provides an empirical analysis on a con- tested and significant issue in South Africa, the relationship between migration, displacement and local South African jobs. Although critical analysis on its own cannot lead to sound and well-evidence policies, which also rely on political will and available resources, it can however work to dispel myths that may otherwise be used to Although critical analysis on its own mobilize ill-formed prac- tices and policies. Instead, this kind of analysis can cannot lead to sound and well- redirect attention towards people, places and processes evidence policies, which also rely on that warrant attention and that may otherwise be mis- political will and available resources, understood or neglected (Landau & Achiume, 2017). it can however work to dispel myths that may otherwise be used to mobilize ill-formed practices and policies. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 33 34 The Case for Empirical Evidence: Migration and Job Outcomes in South Africa 4  ixed Migration, Forced M Displacement and Jobs in South Africa T H E T R I P L E T H R E A T, A S I T I S referred to in South African policy circles, remains a key policy priority for the govern- ment; namely, inequality, poverty and joblessness. The latter – unemployment – was 26.7% in the fourth quarter of 2017 (QLFS, 2017) and at such high rates, the issue is a crit- ical development issue in contemporary South Africa. Significantly, within the context of high levels of internal migra- tion, where local migrants are themselves in search of better livelihoods in urban contexts, access international migrants, asy- lum-seekers and refugees have to the South African labor market is a contentious issue (Fauvelle- Social cohesion in South Africa, Aymar, 2014). Notably, social cohesion in South Africa, and and as is the case in other parts as is the case in other parts of the world, is often entangled in of the world, is often entangled political discourse that blames migrants and refugees for ‘stealing’ local jobs in a context in political discourse that blames where resources are already limited (Afrobarometer, 2017). migrants and refugees for ‘stealing’ The implications of migration local jobs in a context where on local jobs, is therefore, highly contested. However, empirical resources are already limited. evidence may provide the nec- essary information policy-mak- ers require to develop policies and interventions that mitigate the costs that may be felt my locals, while enhancing the develop- mental opportunities for migrants, refugees, locals and the wider economy. It is within this context that the following chapter 1) estimates the impact of immigration on the labor market out- comes such as employment and wages in South Africa between 1996 and 2011, 2) provides an overview of the results and 3) posits several possible explanations for what might account for the results.The chapter also includes a) an overview of the estimation methodology and justification for its use, b) an overview of the results of previous studies focused on the impact of immigration on labor market outcomes in South Africa, and c) contributions the analysis makes to existing literature. Further details on data description and methodology, are provided in Annexures. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 35 A Brief Look at Post-Apartheid Immigration History and Trends South Africa’s long history of migration and the contempo- Policies instituted during this period affected immigration to rary regional and South African immigration regime are well the country. Near the end of the apartheid regime, the de documented in previous chapters. It is however worth provid- Klerk administration adopted the 1991 Aliens Control Act to ing a cursory overview of several Apartheid and post-Apart- manage international migration, which lasted until 2002 with heid historical migratory and policy trends that are especially a few modifications. After a 10-year consultative process, the relevant for the period this analysis covers (1996-2011). government of South Africa passed a new Immigration Act in 2002 followed by the Amendment Act of 2005. This leg- South Africa has long been a major immigration hub in the islation had elements of continuity with the previous immi- region hosting migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers from vari- gration regime, but two major changes were introduced: it ous African countries as well as people from outside of the con- ensured minimum constitutional conformity of immigra- tinent (See Figure 1 for migrant by country of origin in 1996, tion legislation with South Africa’s progressive Constitution 2001 and 2011). After 1990, international immigration in South of 1996, while retaining a dual system of limited permanent Africa increased rapidly and underwent a major transforma- high-skilled immigration and temporary lower-skilled migra- tion, shifting from collective mining labor agreements to largely tion implemented through corporate permits (Segatti 2011b, informal and individual immigration (World Bank, 2011). In the p. 34-35). A new and extremely progressive refugee legislation 1990s, South Africa hosted refugees, although fewer than many was enacted in 1998: this allowed asylum seekers the right to other African countries system. There were two major inflows work and study while their applications were being adjudi- of immigrants to South Africa: the Mozambican refugees cated, and granted refugees and asylum seekers freedom of from 1984 and Zimbabweans in 2000s. Mozambican refugees movement (unlike most other countries in Southern Africa). were officially granted that status after an agreement between the UNHCR and the South African government from 1993. The following section describes the estimation methodology Despite this protection, many Mozambicans were deported that will be used within the context of established method- from the country as ‘illegal immigrants’ and only a few were ologies. It also provides an overview of the results of previous able to stay and legalize their status. Despite the emergence of studies focused on the impact of immigration on labor market South Africa as a major immigration hub, immigrants’ share in outcomes in South Africa and the contributions this analysis the population has not significantly increased over 1996-2011, makes to existing literature. rising from 3.3% to nearly 4.0% percent over the period. 36 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Jobs in South Africa FIGURE 9: Immigrants’ flows by country of origin in 1996, 2001, and 2011 (% in total)  1996 2001 2011 Mozambique 21.8 Mozambique 26.3 Zimbabwe 31.1 England 12.7 Zimbabwe 12.9 Mozambique 17.9 Lesotho 12.1 UK 12.6 Lesotho 7.5 Lesotho 11.3 Malawi 4.0 Zimbabwe 8.7 Namibia 4.4 UK 3.8 Namibia 3.4 Swazilan 3.2 Namibia 1.9 Swazilan 2.7 Malawi 2.6 Swaziland 1.7 Germany 2.0 Germany 2.4 India 1.5 Netherlands 1.7 Zambia 2.3 Zambia 1.4 Zambia 1.6 Portugal 1.9 Ethiopia 1.3 Portugal 1.5 Botswana 1.8 Nigeria 1.3 Botswana 1.3 India 1.7 Congo 1.2 India 1.2 Angola 1.2 Somalia 1.1 Malawi 1.2 Italy 1.0 DRC 1.1 Netherlands- Italy 0.9 0.8 Germany 1.0 Antilles Angola 0.7 Netherlands 0.8 Bangladesh 0.9 Mauritius 0.5 Congo 0.7 Pakistan 0.8 DRC 0.5 US 0.7 Portugal 0.8 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 Nigeria 0.7 China 0.7 Kenya 0.7 Botswana 0.6 China 0.5 0.00 20.00 40.00 Ireland 0.5 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 Estimation Methodology The empirical literature on immigration has generally focused on its impact on the labor market outcomes of the local pop- ulation. A vast variety of empirical papers can be divided a modest impact of immigration on the variables of interest. into two main streams: those employing the spatial correla- More recent papers in that stream including Basso and Peri tion approach and those using national-level data categorized (2015) generally find a positive impact of immigration on by education and experience. The first group of papers uses labor market outcomes of locals. geographical areas to study effects of immigration at a sub- national level by using data on the geographic distribution In the second stream of research, the skill-cell method stud- of immigrants. LaLonde and Topel (1991), Altonji and Card ies the immigration impact on labor market outcomes using (1991), Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), and others find only national level data, thus avoiding the bias in estimates caused by local labor market adjustments likely to appear in the Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 37 spatial correlation approach. If there is a significant inflow data helps overcome endogeneity issues, as there will be no of immigrants to one region, locals will respond by moving outflow of locals in response to immigration inflows in the to other regions, thus diffusing the impact of immigration skill-cell. Workers’ education and experience levels can be beyond the local labor markets. These methods generally considered as predetermined characteristics for both locals group labor inputs into skill-cells based on education and and immigrants, unaffected by current labor demand. experience, assuming there is no mobility across these groups. Borjas’ (2003) seminal paper utilized national level data, dis- There are only a few papers that have studied the impact of aggregated into skill-cells by education and experience, and immigration on labor market outcomes in South Africa. They found a significant negative effect of immigration on locals’ have generally found no impact on total income but nega- wages and employment. In his approach, using national level tive effects on native employment. Among them Faccini et FIGURE 10:  Share of immigrants in total employment by industries and provinces in 1996, 2001, 2011. BY PROVINCES BY INDUSTRIES 1996 2001 2011 1996 2001 2011 Western cape Agriculture Eastern cape Mining Norhern cape Manufacturing Free state Utilities Kwazulu-Natal Construction North west Trade Gautang Transport and Communication Financial and Mpumalanga Business Services Community, Limpopo Social and Personal Services 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 38 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Jobs in South Africa al. (2011) analyze the relationship between migrants’ share in The dependent variable is constructed from , the level of local total employment and locals’ employment, using district and employment, labor income, wage earnings or non-wage labor skill-level data based on education and experience. Broussard earnings in industry , province , and year . The key indepen- (2017) finds a negative impact of immigration on black locals’ dent variable is the growth rate of immigrants in industry , employment-population ratio and income in South Africa province , and year , where is the number of immigrants. and using data disaggregated by district councils and metropolitan are respectively industry and province fixed effects while is areas and two types of skills: secondary or higher education a zero-mean random shock. In the second equation, indus- and less than secondary education. Finally, Fauvelle-Aymar try-province fixed effects are also included. (2015) uses skill-level data based on education and experience and finds that an increase in immigrants’ share of the labor Estimation of this reduced-form structure with ordinary least force reduces the employment-population ratio, while there is squares (OLS) is prone to simultaneity and omitted variable no impact on the employment rate. bias that might generate biased estimates of the impact of immigrants on the variables of interest. To solve for these This chapter estimates the impact of immigration on labor problems, the analysis follows the methodology adopted by market outcomes such as employment and wages in South Card (2001) which uses previous settlements of immigrants Africa. Compared to earlier papers, it makes several contribu- as an instrument in studying labor market effects of immigra- tions. First, the analysis uses industry-province level data, given tion across geographical regions. Immigrants’ networks play a significant variation in the utilization of immigrant labor key role in their location and industry choices, as information across industries and provinces (Figure 2). Applying data on a acquisition from individuals from the same countries of origin more aggregate level such as provinces instead of smaller geo- substantially reduces migration costs and drives migrants to graphical units such as districts reduces effects from potential the places and industries with higher concentrations of immi- outflows of locals in response to immigrants’ inflows. Second, grants. This network-driven immigration is exogenous to the anlysis uses an instrumental variables (IV) approach to address local labor market developments and can be used as an instru- endogeneity issues.The instruments are constructed following ment to study the labor market effects of immigration. the methodology proposed by Card (2001), who uses pre- vious settlements of immigrants as an instrument in study- To construct the instrument, this approach classifies immi- ing labor market effects of immigration across geographical grants in South Africa into five groups according to their regions. Third, the analysis includes all immigrants–not only birthplace, or nationalities of origin based on Census data: males, as in some studies–given a substantial share of female (1) Lesotho, (2) Malawi, (3) Mozambique, (4) Zimbabwe, employment among immigrants. In 2011, females accounted and (5) rest of the world. For each nationality of origin the for nearly 24 percent of total employment among immigrants. total number of immigrants in each industry and province in Next, our estimates focus on the relationship between locals 1996, , is constructed.Then, the national growth rates for each and immigrants, and not on specific groups based on educa- nationality of origin in South Africa are computed for the tion and experience within each category. The latter captures following census years 2001 and 2011 relative to 1996: only the partial own-skill effect and ignores cross-skill com- plementarities and externalities. Finally, the study uses wage Popn,t – Popn,1996 Gn,t–1996 = data from the Post-Apartheid Labor Market Series (PALMS) Popn,1996 harmonized survey, instead of relying on total income that includes both labor and non-labor earnings as in other studies. Next, these growth rates are applied to the number of immi- The main empirical strategy is to estimate the immigration grants from each nationality of origin in each industry and impact on the labor market outcomes such as local employ- province in 1996 in order to impute the number of immi- ment and wages in South Africa using reduced-form equations: grants by the nationalities of origin in the subsequent years across industries and provinces. Therefore, the imputed Tbijt TNijtF number of immigrants from the nationality of origin n, for = hb F + ci + zj + eijt (1) time t, industry i and province j would be: bijt–1 Nijt–1 Popn,i,j,t = Popn,i,j,1996 x [ 1 + Gn,t–1996 ] Tbijt TNijt F = hb F + ci + zj + mi,j + eijt (2) bijt–1 Nijt–1 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 39 The imputed total number of immigrants in each industry They show that a one percent and province is obtained by summing over the nationalities of origin: increase in the number of Pop} } F,i,j,t = R Pop n,i,j,t immigrants relative to the previous n Finally, the instrument for the growth rate of immigrants for period raises local employment each industry and province is constructed: by 0.2 percent. In other words, T} F Nijt } TPop = F,i,j,t } TNijt–1 F } TPopF,i,j,t–1 one immigrant worker generates This instrument imputes network-driven immigration that approximately two jobs for locals. should be exogenous to industry and location-specific devel- opments. The literature generally applies longer lags when evaluating immigrants’ prior settlement patterns. However, in the case of South Africa, the paper uses 1996 data to construct TABLE 5: Estimation Results  R E G RESSIONS/ LOCAL EMPLOYMENT E A R N I NGS WAGE E A R N I NGS SELF-EMPLOYMENT D E P ENDENT E A R N I NGS VA R IABLES OLS with individual 0.219*** 0.138 0.096** -1.291 fixed effects (0.036) (0.102) (0.039) (1.515) RMS Error 0.170 1.404 0.243 33.26 Observations 162 162 162 128 OLS with all 0.218*** 0.05 0.083 1.741 fixed effects (0.051) (0.154) (0.056) (3.344) RMS Error 0.197 1.508 0.299 31.10 Observations 162 162 162 128 IV with individual 0.281*** 1.149* 0.386** 1.452 fixed effects (0.096) (0.672) (0.169) (7.041) RMS Error 0.163 1.423 0.274 30.86 J p-value 0.369 0.305 0.176 0.242 C p-value 0.447 0.049 0.027 0.592 Observations 162 162 162 128 IV with all fixed effects 0.225*** 1.371*** 0.341** 2.132 (0.09) (0.518) (0.142) (1.656) RMS Error 0.139 1.226 0.242 21.47 J p-value 0.295 0.145 0.206 0.540 C p-value 0.880 0.041 0.014 0.594 Observations 162 162 162 128 Note: Each cell shows the coefficient on the variable “immigration growth” from a different regression. The units of observations are province-industry level data. All variables are converted into five-year changes to equalize the time intervals between various census years. Regressions are weighted by the total number of employment in the previous period. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered by industry and province. (*, **,***) indicate respectively significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels. 40 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Jobs in South Africa the instrument, as previous Census data are not representative rejects its null hypothesis that OLS yields consistent estimates, of the country and exclude certain regions and population suggesting that IV methods are required to produce consistent segments. While this instrument is widely used in the liter- estimates. In both forms of the model, the immigrant growth ature, its limitations are also acknowledged. The validity of rate for the industry, province and year has significant and pos- this instrument depends on the assumptions that immigrants itive effects on total earnings and wage earnings with values did not initially settle in the region and find employment in ranging from 0.3 to 1.4. The coefficient on local employment industries that would have the highest growth potential in in Table 5 is very similar in magnitude to that of Table 2, as later years. the C test for that model does not reject the OLS estimates. The immigration impact on self-employment remains insig- The following section provides an overview of the results. nificant but becomes positive in all IV estimates. Results Understanding the Results The estimation results indicate that immigration has a positive This study suggests several explanations for the positive impact on native employment, labor earnings, and wages. Results impact of immigrants on South Africa’s labor market. First, from Equations (1) and (2) using OLS and IV approaches are pre- given that immigrants and locals are not perfect substitutes, sented in Table 1. The estimated effects of immigrant growth on native employment are positive and highly significant in all speci- fications and are similar in terms of magnitudes. They show that a one percent increase in the number of immigrants relative to the We obtain .35 for the non-tertiary previous period raises local employment by 0.2 percent. In other words, one immigrant worker generates approximately two jobs for educated group and .14 for the tertiary locals. The effects on labor earnings, wages, and self-employment earnings are insignificant in OLS estimations with an exception of educated group. This shows that wage earnings when only individual fixed effects are used. As the OLS results may be affected by simultaneity bias, we immigrants and locals are not perfect also produced IV estimates for Equations (1) and (2), using the instrument described above and its square to permit overiden- substitutes and the complementarity tification of the equation. The J p-value refers to the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions, which is generally sat- of tasks they perform might generate isfactory. The C p-value reports the Hayashi (2000) GMM distance test for endogeneity, which is asymptotically equiv- efficiency gains in the economy. alent to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test comparing OLS and IV methods. For both earnings and wage earnings, the C test  mployment-Population Ratio FIGURE 11: E  hare of Self-employed in Total Employment FIGURE 12: S IMMIG RANTS NATIVES IMMIGRANTS N AT I V E S 0.80 0.30 0.25 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.00 1996 2001 2011 1996 2001 2011 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 41 specialization in different tasks might lead to overall produc- tivity gains. Second, immigrants have nearly twice as high an employment-population ratio compared to locals, possibly Short-term costs can however be reflecting the demand for the diverse set of skills they bring and this can result in large multiplier effects. Finally, immi- mitigated and addressed, while grants tend to be more risk-loving and entrepreneurial, which might generate positive externalities in the economy. long-term benefits maximized The positive effects of immigrants on locals’ labor market out- through preemptive and sustained comes might be explained by various task specialization between immigrants and locals. Foreign and local-born workers might specialize in performing complementary tasks and, hence, two interventions that are based on groups might not compete for similar jobs. As a result, this com- plementarity might increase the productivity of native workers empirical evidence. and hence generate positive externalities for their employment and wages. To test this hypothesis the study compares occu- pations of immigrants and locals for tertiary and non-tertiary educated groups. It uses 2011 census data and constructs the Welch (1979) index to test whether immigrants and locals are perfect substitutes, where and give the fraction of immigrants (i) or locals (n) employed in occupation c, and gives the fraction of the entire workforce employed in that occupation. – – – Rc( Qic – Qc)( Qnc – Qc)/ Qc Gin = – – – – Rc[( Qic – Qc) 2/ Qc][( Qnc – Qc) 2/ Qc] This index is similar to a correlation coefficient, equaling one (1) when the two groups have identical occupational distribu- tions and minus one (-1) when the two groups are clustered in completely different occupations. We obtain .35 for the non-tertiary educated group and .14 for the tertiary educated group. This shows that immigrants and locals are not perfect substitutes and the complementarity of tasks they perform might generate efficiency gains in the economy. Finally, two stylized facts emerge from the comparison of the employment-population ratio and share of self-employed in total employment between locals and immigrants. First, although the employment-population ratios for locals and immigrants were similar in 1996, this drastically changed by 2011 (Figures 11 and 12). In particular, the share of employed immigrants in total increased from 36 to 61 percent com- pared to only 35 percent for locals. This sharp increase in the employment-population ratio for immigrants was probably due to changes in immigration policies discussed above and in chapter 3. Higher employment rates among immigrants and hence higher labor earnings compared to locals might gen- erate large multiplier effects in the economy. Finally, we must 42 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Jobs in South Africa also note the prevalence of self-employment among immi- An important note of caution is that these results are retrospec- grants: self-employment accounted for 25 percent of total jobs tive in nature given the data limitations mentioned, and there- for immigrants, compared to 16 percent for locals. Migrants fore these results may differ in the current context. Notably are more likely to appear in entrepreneurial roles than locals, too, the South African economy has witnessed economic suggesting that their actions are likely to promote economic decline in the years following the period covered in this analy- growth by enhancing, for instance, the supply of small retail sis, that may have affected the impact of immigration on labor establishments. If those businesses are successful, they also will market outcomes today. It is also well documented that even provide multiplier effects which may spread beyond the imme- in the best circumstances, migration and displacement may diate family. have significant short-term costs for receiving communities. These costs may not necessarily manifest economically, but in social and institutional ways. Short-term costs can however be mitigated and addressed, while long-term benefits maximized through preemptive and sustained interventions that are based on empirical evidence (World Bank 2017b). Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 43 44 Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Jobs in South Africa 5 Conclusion T HE R E L AT I O N S H I P BETWEEN migration, displacement and development is, of course, a complex one, and remains under- studied, especially in the context of movement between developing countries. Our emphasis in this study has been on the relationships between displacement/migration, poverty, and livelihoods, as well as the implications mobility has for labor market outcomes in the major destination coun- try of the region, South Africa. As evidenced by the statistics and analysis, migration is a cen- tral component of people’s livelihoods and protection strate- gies, both in the region, and Any interventions in response to these across the continent. Further, Southern Africa is the most results should account for perceptions heavily urbanized sub-re- gion in Africa. These popu- and lived experiences. lation movements have had especially significant impacts on the regions towns and cities – both in positive social, cul- tural and economic ways, but they have also added to existing pressures on urban housing, health and education. Significantly, our analysis finds that a one percent increase in the number of immigrants relative to the previous period raises local employment by 0.2 percent or that one immi- grant worker generates approximately two jobs for locals. The results and substantiations provided here, are significant for policy makers and development actors in South Africa and the wider region, and as such should be seriously considered. They provide a basis for substantive policy dialogue on how to enhance the development impacts of migration, especially for local job and wage outcomes and the South African economy. Critically, although such quantitative analysis is instructive, perceptions and subjective evaluations of well-being of both locals and migrants, matters. As such, any interventions in response these results, should account for perceptions and lived experiences. Equally, the political will to advance poli- cies based on empirical evidence is a necessity for the achieve- ment of any sustainable and positive economic outcomes for local and migrants, alike. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 45 Crucially, these results also provide an important foundation The political will to advance policies upon which further large-scale research can be developed. Such research can potentially complicate and enable a richer understanding for how migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers based on empirical evidence is a engage with the South African economy and the economic relationships they share with locals. This research, may for necessity for the achievement of any instance, consider how circular migration, informality, undoc- umented movements and gendered dimensions have implica- sustainable and positive economic tions for economic relationships. outcomes for local and migrants, alike 46 Conclusion Annexures  Note on Terminology: Mixed Annex 1: A Migration and Forced Displacement As Van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa (2009, p.1) have pointed are in a country that is a party to the Refugee Convention out: ‘In the analysis of migration a basic distinction is often or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and made between those who choose to move and those who are irrespective of whether they have been recognized by the host forced to – that is, between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migrants. country as a refugee under either of these instruments (IOM This distinction is maintained in the policy world, where the 2011; Frouws 2015, p.13). In practice, persons seeking safety governance of international migration is shaped by the con- from persecution need to apply for refugee status in a country ceptual distinction between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migra- other than their own, under the relevant national and interna- tion as mutually exclusive categories.’ This is reflected in the tional legal instruments. While they await a decision, they are bifurcated global governance architecture for migrants on the usually described as ‘asylum-seekers’. one hand, and refugees on the other. For instance, UNHCR’s mandate is limited to refugees and other populations of con- This study uses the expression ‘migrants and refugees’ to cern (UNHCR Division of International Protection, 2013). describe mixed migration flows (see Frouws 2015, p.13). The The ILO has the responsibility for migrant workers (ILO distinctions between these categories are not always clear-cut 2006), and the IOM, which initially emerged as a logistical (Turton 2003a;Van Hear 2011;World Bank 2016, p.3). Scholars agency to aid refugees and displaced persons in the wake of and policymakers have long acknowledged that migration is the Second World War, has a general focus on the promotion driven by a combination of factors; most migrants and refu- of ‘humane and orderly migration’ through migration man- gees make their decisions to migrate in response to ‘a complex agement (IOM 2017; Elie 2010). set of external constraints and predisposing events’ (Turton 2003b, p.9). These constraints and events vary in their signif- The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 icance and impact, but there are elements of compulsion and (henceforth, the Refugee Convention) defines ‘refugees’ as choice in the decision-making of most migrants. For instance, those persons who seek protection in a second country, being for migrants ‘who are classed as ‘voluntary’, especially towards unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection the lower levels of the socio-economic scale – such as labor of their country of nationality ‘owing to well-founded fear migrants from lower income backgrounds – there may be of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, only limited choices available. Conversely, those classed as ref- membership of a particular social group or political opin- ugees or asylum-seekers – that is ‘forced migrants’ – may look ion’.36 In other words, they are persons who qualify for the to expand their life opportunities, especially once they have protection of the UNHCR, regardless of whether or not they reached a place of relative safety; in a way they may transmute from refugees to economic or betterment migrants… those 36 S  ee Article 1(A), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, http:// who flee a country where conflict, persecution, discrimina- www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. It is worth noting that, in addition to the tion and human rights abuses are rife, for example, may also be grounds mentioned in the Refugee Convention, the 1969 Organization of trying to escape dire economic circumstances – which them- African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled selves feed into such conflict, persecution, discrimination and to leave his or her country “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the human rights abuse.’ (Van Hear, Brubaker, and Bessa 2009, p.1) whole of his country or origin or nationality.” Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Large numbers of people also leave their country of origin Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country for reasons that do not fall within the definition of ‘refugee’ “because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by general- ized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” See IOM 2011, p.80. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 47 within the Refugee Convention, nor can these people be BOX 7: Zimbabwe and Mixed Migration in Southern Africa accurately described as voluntary economic migrants (Betts and Kaytaz 2009, p.1). The movement of many Zimbabweans A series of policy decisions including ‘fast-track’ land reform, into neighboring countries, scholars have argued, falls into economic deprivation, a cholera outbreak, and political violence this category (See Betts and Kaytaz 2009; Betts 2013). around contested elections led to massive internal migration within Zimbabwe, as well as outward migration into neighboring countries. By some estimates, between 1-1.5 million crossed into South Africa between 2000-2010 fleeing a humanitarian and live- lihoods crises, and some argue, famine conditions (Betts 2013; Howard-Hassmann 2005). This movement was referred to as mixed migration or economic migration in South Africa, and for the most part, Zimbabweans were not accorded refugee status, or given the accompanying legal rights, although many continued to live in South Africa as asylum-seekers. Today, many continue to live in precarious socio-economic condi- tions, and remain subject to various forms of police action, detention and deportation (Polzer 2008). 48 Annexures  ethodology, Data and Limitations Annex 2: M METHODOLOGY This study was undertaken by a cross-sectoral team of World Mozambique, this information was drawn mostly from sec- Bank Group staff and consultants, and was funded through ondary sources. a World Bank Trust Fund37 and implemented by the World In addition to the desk research and quantitative data analy- Bank Group. The research process consisted of a literature sis, members of the team conducted field research in South review, analysis of the existing sources of quantitative data, Africa, in February-March 2018. Discussions were held with econometric analysis, and field research in South Africa. a wide range of stakeholders, such as national, provincial and The literature review for the study took place in two parts. local government officials, representatives of nongovernmen- For all the sections other than Chapter 4 the literature search tal organizations (NGOs) (both advocacy NGOs and project focused on identifying empirically grounded, social science implementers), representatives from multilateral organizations, literature (both qualitative and quantitative) on the causes such as the UNHCR and IOM, and academics and other of, trends in, and impacts of migration and displacement in researchers. Some of these organizations work directly with Southern Africa. The search process itself consisted of two refugees and migrants as service providers or advocates. A stages: a database driven search, and a ‘snowball’ search which full list of organizations and persons interviewed is set out augmented the database search and also formed the basis of in Annexure 2. The team met with some South Africa-based our study of the ‘grey’ literature, such as working papers, con- refugees and asylum-seekers during its meetings with NGO’s, cept notes, donor reports, policy documents and briefings.38 but regrettably due to time and budgetary constraints, it did Only studies published in English were selected (this was an not conduct formal interviews with refugees and migrants. unavoidable limitation given resource constraints), and greater It is worth noting that research on refugees and migrants in emphasis was placed on studies that contained or referenced Southern Africa remains challenging, and raises major meth- local level empirical data. odological and ethical concerns (Jacobsen and Furst Nichols Quantitative data on forced displacement and migration 2011; Jacobsen and Landau 2003a; 2003b). Conducting inter- (which forms the basis for the descriptive statistics set out views without systematic sampling techniques could lead to in chapter 2 of this report) was collected from UNHCR’s skewed data and results.39 Researchers also run the risk of Population Statistics database and UNDESA’s International revealing sensitive or damaging information about the sub- Migrant Stock database, as well as other international and jects of their study. Both these concerns came up on several national databases and reports. The limitations of data in the occasions during the field visit. Methodologically, of course, field of migration and displacement are well known (see Crisp research on forced displacement usually takes the policy cat- 1999; Landau and Achiume 2017) but some of the specific egories of ‘refugee’, ‘asylum-seeker’, ‘voluntary migrant’ etc., limitations of data in Southern Africa and concerns around its as its point of departure. This can (but need not) result in use are discussed below. causal links being drawn between the category of analysis, and revealed vulnerabilities. For instance, intimate partner violence For chapter 3 which is focused on the laws and policies gov- faced by female asylum-seekers in inner city Johannesburg erning migration and displacement in Southern Africa, the may be causally linked to the status of these women as asy- researchers prepared a grid of relevant laws and policies.These lum-seekers, instead of being connected to class or patriarchy were organized according to whether they were international more generally (Kihato 2011; 2013).40 In this vein, the team’s legal instruments, regional treaties or national laws or policies. research approach was attentive to the following idea: a care- A special effort was made to try and examine laws which ful parsing of how different facets of a refugee’s or migrant’s were not directly related to mobility, but which have impli- identity intersect in a given social context, is necessary for a cations for migrants’ and refugees’ abilities to access services, nuanced understanding of migration and displacement, and as for instance, health, education and housing. For Angola and a precondition for effective policymaking. The Forced Displacement Trust Fund was awarded by the Fragility, Conflict and 37  Violence Cross Cutting Solution Area (CCSA) This was one of the reasons why the researchers chose not to conduct formal 39  interviews with refugees and migrants. For a discussion on literature reviews of ‘grey literature’ in international devel- 38  opment, see see Hagen-Zanker and Mallett 2013. See Krystalli, Hawkins, and Wilson (2018) for a discussion on gender and forced 40  migration, albeit in a different geographical context. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 49 MIGRATION, DISPLACEMENT AND LOCAL JOBS DATA LIMITATIONS AND DATA USE Chapter 4 on Migration and Jobs in South Africa included IN SOUTHERN AFRICA an extensive review of the academic literature on the labor Existing data on migration and displacement in Southern market impact of migrants in destination countries as well Africa is of uneven quality, and is far from comprehensive as specific papers focusing on South Africa’s immigration. when it comes to capturing the dynamics of movement. Studies on immigration mostly rely on empirical estimations Where data does exist, it is often outdated.This is true even in as opposed to general equilibrium models. This review helped South Africa, which has the best data collection capacity (and identify the key econometric approaches used to estimate the systems) in the region (Budlender 2013). In other countries, impact of immigrants and select the relevant methodology national census data, and other surveys are of variable quality for South Africa. In addition, most studies on immigration (Kihato forthcoming). The growth of undocumented migra- focus on the North-South labor mobility and only a few tion in the region has made it even more difficult for official papers analyze South-South migration as in the case of South statistics to capture the full extent of migration and displace- Africa. The review of the latter helped identify the existing ment. In such conditions, only rough estimates and projections gaps and propose potential areas for improvement. Finally, are possible. In general, however, data collection on migration the team also researched the immigration history of South and displacement reflects the bifurcation between ‘voluntary Africa since the 1990s to better understand the validity of the migration’ and ‘forced displacement’. estimation methodology that relies on an instrumental variable The process of compiling data for large databases such as those approach and past allocations of immigrants across provinces maintained by UNDESA (the International Migrant Stock and industries. database), and UNHCR (Population Statistics) is complicated The team then surveyed the existing micro-data in South and challenging in almost all circumstances, and largely reliant Africa that could be used to provide estimates on the impact on national authorities. In Southern Africa, the specific chal- of immigration on the labor market outcomes such as employ- lenges are methodological and political, and sometimes a direct ment and wages. The following data sources were used for result of migrants’ and refugees’ desire to remain ‘invisible’. this analysis: ten percent samples of the South Africa Census UNDESA estimates the international migrant stock (at mid- data for 1996, 2001 and 2011 and the Post-Apartheid Labor year) for each country based on data obtained primarily from Market Series (PALMS). The South African Census data population censuses, other population registers and nationally provide information on the number of immigrant and local representative surveys. In its databases, international migrants workers, their education level, industry, age, and residence. are generally equated with the foreign-born population. PALMS includes data on labor, wage, and self-employment However, where national authorities do not collect data on earnings; it is annual cross-sectional data for labor market place of birth, international migrants are equated with for- and household indicators in South Africa between 1994 and eign citizens. This latter approach has important shortcom- 2017, based on microdata from 61 household and labor force ings: in countries where citizenship is conferred mainly on surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa. The team put the basis of jus sanguinis (that is, on the basis of citizenship of a lot of effort to carefully merge these several datasets and an individual’s parents), people who were born in the coun- define variables of interest. Applying data on labor earnings try of residence may be included in the number of interna- from PALMS instead of using data on total income from the tional migrants even though they may have never lived abroad Census is one of the key contributions of this section to the (UNDESA 2017).41 literature as it provides more precise measurement of labor income. Table 6 shows the sources used to compute the total migrant stock for each of the countries considered by this study. ‘B’ indi- Finally, during the course of the study, the team has shared cates that estimates were derived from data on the foreign-born preliminary results with several World Bank economists across population; ‘C’ indicates that estimates were derived from data Global Practices, as well as colleagues working on South Africa on foreign citizens, and ‘R’ indicates that the number of ref- and Zimbabwe through several internal consultative techni- ugees or persons in refugee-like situations as reported by the cal reviews. These discussions helped the team strengthen the interpretation of the findings and develop plausible explana- This also has an implication on the estimated age distribution of the internation- 41  tions to substantiate the results. al migrant stock. In countries where citizenship is conferred on the basis of jus soli (that is, on the basis of place of birth) children born to international migrants are granted citizenship on birth and excluded from migrant stock. In other cases, children born to international migrants are considered foreign citizens. 50 Annexures TABLE 6:  ources of UNDESA’s migrant data in Southern Africa S publicly available.43 Where national governments provide the (UNDESA 2017) data, different countries may use different definitions and methodologies to count refugees and asylum-seekers.This can lead to radically different estimates over time. For instance, in C O U NTRY TYPE OF DATA South Africa, UNHCR recorded 1,079,482 asylum-seekers in Angola BR mid-2016, but revised this number to 215,860 in mid-2017 Botswana C (UNHCR 2018). This was because the South African DHA’s Lesotho CR information systems had continued to count asylum appli- Malawi BR cations which were no longer active (for an array of reasons Mozambique BR discussed in greater detail in Section 3).44 Namibia B When refugees and migrants live among the local population South Africa BR in low income urban areas, as in the case in South Africa, Swaziland BR some may choose to avoid contact with national authori- Zambia BR ties, UNHCR and other aid agencies – preferring to remain Zimbabwe BR ‘invisible’. Others may not know about organizations which are able to assist them, or may be afraid to come forward if Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees they are undocumented, fearing detention and deportation (UNHCR) were added to the estimates (UNDESA 2017).42  (Jacobsen and Furst Nichols 2011, p.7). In Zambia, as Bakewell has noted in his study of ‘self-settled’ Angolan refugees, staying The coverage of refugees in population censuses is uneven. outside camps without making themselves known to author- In countries such as South Africa, where refugees and asy- ities unlocked greater opportunities for refugees to earn live- lum-seekers have been allowed to integrate, they are normally lihoods, and integrate into local societies (Bakewell 2000; covered by the population census as any other international Bakewell 2014). migrant. However, in all other countries in the region, ref- ugees lack freedom of movement and are required to reside Registration allows refugees and asylum-seekers to obtain in camps or other designated areas (although enforcement legal status, and remains essential to access formal employment varies). In these cases, population censuses may ignore or par- and specific targeted assistance (Jacobsen 2014). In practice, tially count refugees. Furthermore, when refugee flows occur however, (and as the researchers were told multiple times in rapidly in situations of conflict, it is uncommon for a popu- South Africa) documentation does not provide effective pro- lation census to take place soon after and to reflect the newly tection in contexts characterised by harsh and often arbitrary arrived refugee population. Among countries in the region, policing, corruption, bureaucratic discretion, and anti-mi- only Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho have con- grant sentiment (see Landau 2014).45 Where refugees and asy- ducted very recent population and housing censuses. lum-seekers have to seek employment in the informal sector, or live in areas far from the writ of the state, legal-status is For data on forced displacement, this study relies on data of limited value (Bakewell 2014). Needless to say, this com- collected by UNHCR and the Geneva-based Internal plicates the process of data collection. It also raises an ethical Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). The UNHCR question – that is, how to balance the need for data to ensure collects yearly data on the extent of forced displacement, effective service delivery while giving effect to the agency of including figures on refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs (though the displaced.46 only those assisted by the UNHCR itself), returnees, reset- tlement applications, as well as basic demographic data on Better data on migration and displacement has long been gender, age, and location. This data is collected primarily sought by policymakers and by national governments. by direct registration, but also from national governments, Accurate data allows for better assessment of the needs of dis- NGO’s, UN-OCHA reports, UNHCR field offices, and placed and mobile populations, and facilitates better delivery other ad-hoc surveys and censuses, and some of it is made See World Bank and UNHCR 2015a, p.80 43  The specifics of the South African asylum system are discussed in Chapter 3. 44  42  Also see UNDESA 2017 for a detailed discussion on the methodology used by 45 For an analysis of deportation practices in Botswana see Galvin 2015. UNDESA to extrapolate or estimate the migrant stock growth rates for each Zetter (1995) has argued that it was international humanitarian aid which led to 46  country. the adoption of an encampment policy in Malawi. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 51 of services. On the other hand, the collection of data on surveys (in-between censuses), and the Quarterly Labor migration and displacement remains deeply political, and Force Survey; the Department of Home Affairs – which increased data collection efforts do not always lead to poli- collects and publishes data on asylum-seekers, deporta- cies which protect the rights of refugees and asylum-seek- tions, and different categories of visas and permits issued; ers (Crisp 1999; Crisp 2018). For instance, states increasingly the Department of Labour – which conducts establish- view migration and displacement through the lens of national ment surveys and plays a role in work-permit applications; security. While this is certainly their national prerogative, it is and finally, the data collected by different provincial and clear that better data may be used to control movement or municipal governments.49 restrict asylum (Crisp 2018).47 Further, national policy-mak- ers may not have the capacity (or incentives) to use available Non-governmental administrative sources: This b.  data effectively (Landau and Duponchel 2011). As the research includes the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) which team inferred from its meetings in South Africa, different continues to be the recruitment agency for the formal levels of government, and different departments and ministries migrant labor system prevalent in the mining sector. have diverse motivations for wanting better data on migration. Academic and policy sources: The Southern African c.  Some departments (especially at the municipal level) noted Migration Project (SAMP) and the Africa Centre for Migration that they do not have the capacity to use the data for pol- and Society (ACMS) are foremost among these and have con- icy-making, nor sufficient access to the policy-making pro- ducted several surveys on migration in the region. cess itself. These range from service delivery (such as access to education), assessing the protection needs of unaccompanied Despite these sources, researchers have noted that only minors, to eviction from occupied buildings, and deportation ‘approximate trends’ can be identified (Budlender 2013, (Fassin, Wilhelm-Solomon, and Segatti 2017). Consequently, p.83) and by and large, data remains inadequate and lim- organizations and researchers working on migration and dis- ited (Fauvelle-Aymar 2014). Some laudable recent initiatives placement ought to go beyond calls for more and better data, aim to improve data collection: StatsSA and the Department and consider the actual uses of data. of Social Development have created an ‘Urbanization and Migration Forum’ which will, among other things, aim to Finally, a note on data sources in South Africa. Data on migra- improve data collection on migration in South Africa.Various tion and displacement in South Africa comes from three multilateral organizations – namely ILO, IOM, UNHCR and sources (see Budlender 2013; 2014)48: UNODC are also looking to strengthen data collection sys- a. Governmental sources: This includes Statistics South tems on labor migration at the SADC level. Africa (StatsSA), which conducts the census, community See for instance the data collected by the Gauteng City – Region Observatory 49  (GCRO) for Gauteng which is the South African the province with the highest There are a host of other issues around data collection including whether better 47  proportion of migrants in its population. The GCRO was established in 2008 as a data is the best use of constrained resources, and data security and privacy of partnership between the University of Johannesburg (UJ), the University of the asylum-seekers and refugees. Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (Wits) and the Gauteng Provincial Government Budlender (2013) contains a detailed analysis of existing datasets on migration 48  (Peberdy 2013). in South Africa. 52 Annexures  ist of Interviewees in South Africa Annex 3: L O R G ANIZATION I NT E R V I E WE E ( S ) Church World Service • Ngoto Libula Phily (Refugee)  aul Kakera Mwanza •P (Asylum Seeker) • Pauline Nfirata (Asylum Seeker) • Roy (Refugee) • Thabile Maphosa • Kathyn Gerber • Jean Guy Kwuimi • Alphonse Jesuit Refugee Services • Tim Smith Médecins Sans Frontières • Garret Barnwell • Liesbeth Schockaert City of Johannesburg • Robinson Sathekge Gauteng Provincial Government • Nalini Naicker Southern African Litigation Centre • Kaajal Ramjathan Keogh ACMS • Jean Pierre Misago • Loren Landau University of Johannesburg • Caroline Wanjiku Kihato UNFPA • Celine Mazars StatsSA • Diego Iturralde Department of Social Development, South Africa • Jacques van Zuydam University of Pretoria • Christopher Nshimbi UNHCR • Matlotleng Matlou • Madalena Hogg  ecilie Becker-Christensen Saenz Guerrero •C Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa • Thifulufheli Sinthumule Lawyers for Human Rights • Kayan Leung • Jacob van Garderen Department of Higher Education and Training, South Africa • Diana Parker National Planning Commission, South Africa • Elias Masilela IOM • Richard Ots ILO • Redha Ameur Department of Home Affairs, South Africa • Mandla Madumisa Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Job Outcomes in South Africa 53 Annex 4: References BIBLIOGRAPHY Ackermann, Marilize. 2017. 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Geneva and Washington, DC: UNHCR and World Bank Group. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/down- load/52535. 60 Annexures Photo Credits Cover, c2, i Johannesburg, South Africa by Bafedile Mafologele. 1 Johannesburg Pary Railway Station by Kounosu. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- Share Alike 3.0 unported, 2.5 generic, 2.0 generic and 1.0 generic license. 3 “Woman hawker selling peanuts at a roadside stall” by Rich Townsend. 5 “Migrant family pack their belongings as they prepare to flee the Jeppestown suburb after being threat- ened by locals” by Ihsaan Haffejee and Al Jazeera. 6 Hillbrow Tower - Johannesburg, South Africa by demerzel21. 9 South Africa - Johannesburg by tuxone. 12 Slum by Steven dosRemedios. Licensed under CC BY-ND 2.0. 14 Carpentry Workshop, South Africa by monkeybusiness. 20 “A local teacher from a nursery school in Johannesburg got her class of kids to paint signs calling for the unification and end to xenophobic violence” by Ihsaan Haffejee and Al Jazeera. 24 Downtown Johannesburg by Jorge Láscar. Licensed by CC BY 2.0. 32 Zimbabwe in South Africa by Raymond June. Licensed by CC BY-ND 2.0. 35 Market by Steven dosRemedios. Licensed under CC BY-ND 2.0. 36 Barber Shop Saloon, Joe Slavo Park, Cape Town, South Africa by Vgrigas. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 unported license. 43 Shipping container store, Joe Slavo Park, Cape Town, South Africa by Vgrigas. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 unported license. 44 View of Joburg inner city from Gandhi Square, Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa by South African Tourism. Licensed under CC by 2.0. 46 Storeftont by Martyn Smith. Licensed by CC BY-ND 2.0. 48 Braamfontein Railway Yards, Johannesburg by demerzel21. 61 Imizamu Yethu Township Houtbay near Cape Town by tuxone. Mixed Migration, Forced Displacement and Labor Outcomes in South Africa “One immigrant worker generates approximately two jobs for South Africans” — World Bank, 2018 For additional information, please contact: Helidah R.A. Ogude Social Development | Africa Region hogude@worldbank.org 4 Annexures