BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS TO REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE IN CENTRAL AFRICA  reaking Down B the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa August 2018 © 2018 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to: World Bank Publications The World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 USA Fax: 202-522-2625 Cover design by: Odilia Renata Hebga Contents Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x 1. Introduction..............................................................................................................................................1 CEMAC and Regional Integration in Central Africa.............................................................................4 2.  Trade integration in CEMAC...............................................................................................................6 2.1  Regional trade in agriculture..............................................................................................................7 2.2  Regional food security situation ........................................................................................................8 2.3  Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC....................................................... 11 3.  Agricultural production in CEMAC has the potential to meet regional staple food demand ............12 3.1  Insufficient commercial organization of producers limits their negotiating power.............................19 3.2  3.3  Poor-quality transport infrastructure is impeding market access both within Cameroon and to CEMAC countries..................................................................................................................21 The high number of intermediaries increases the cost of agricultural trade.....................................25 3.4  Higher-than-expected price volatility leads to unpredictable returns................................................30 3.5  Poor market management and infrastructure hamper commercial links..........................................34 3.6  Some valid trade functions have become de facto tracasseries due to weak execution ................38 3.7  Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC...................................................................................41 4.  Unrecorded and informal trade in agricultural products is widespread............................................41 4.1  Unclear application of trade regulations and customs rules leads to a multitude of formal 4.2  and informal border costs ................................................................................................................44 Abang-Minko–Eboro border crossing (Cameroon–Gabon)...................................................45 4.2.1  Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín border crossing (Cameroon–Equatorial Guinea)...................................53 4.2.2  Garoua-Boulai border crossing (Cameroon–the Central African Republic)...........................54 4.2.3  Kousséri–N’Djamena border crossing (Cameroon–Chad)....................................................61 4.2.4   Traders’ responses to informality and tracasseries lead to a vicious circle 4.3   of further informal practices..............................................................................................................63 Security risks and political crises are altering trade patterns and flows...........................................65 4.4  Women account for most domestic traders along agricultural trade corridors in CEMAC...............67 4.5  Final consumer prices in CEMAC reflect the costly and burdensome trade processes...................68 4.6  Recommendations and Areas for Action............................................................................................75 5.  Bibliography...............................................................................................................................................82 iii iv  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa List of Tables Table E.1  Top five priorities to promote agricultural trade in CEMAC........................................................ xiv Table 1  CEMAC at a glance, 2017...............................................................................................................5 Table 2  The oil sector in the CEMAC region, 2016.......................................................................................5 Table 3  Agricultural exports by destination (percentage)..............................................................................7 Table 4  Key food security and nutrition indicators in CEMAC......................................................................8 Table 5  Checkpoints between Foumbot and Douala (7-ton truck)..............................................................39 Table 6  Checkpoints between Foumbot and Kye-Ossi (12-ton truck)........................................................39 Table 7  Checkpoints between Kye-Ossi and Bata (7-ton truck).................................................................40 Table 8  Checkpoints between Abang Minko and Libreville (20-ton truck)..................................................40 Table 9  Cameroon’s yearly trade with Gabon at Abang-Minko–Eboro border, 2017..................................43 Table 10  Cameroon’s exports to and imports from Chad through the Kousseri market, 2017...................45 Table 11  Border agencies at Abang-Minko–Eboro......................................................................................47 Table 12  Official Gabonese Food Safety Agency (AGASA) fees................................................................50 Table 13  Gabon’s official import/export declaration fines...........................................................................51 Table 14  Actual cost of clearing a truck at Abang-Minko–Eboro border (CFAF unless indicated)..............52 Table 15  Border agencies at Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín.......................................................................................54 Table 16  Border agencies at Garoua-Boulai...............................................................................................56 Table 17  Actual cost of trade for a truck completing a Garoua-Boulai–Bangui return trip (CFAF unless indicated)..............................................................................................................................59 Table 18  Actual cost of trade for a small-scale cross-border trader carrying one cassava bag (about 25 kg)...............................................................................................................................................61 Table 19  Border agencies at Kousseri–N’Djamena....................................................................................63 Table 20  Indicative price formation for selected commodities between Cameroon and Gabon (CFAF per kg)..............................................................................................................................................68 Table 21  Indicative price formation for selected commodities between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (CFAF per kg).........................................................................................................69 Table 22  Top five priorities to promote agricultural trade in CEMAC..........................................................78 List of Figures Figure E.1  Price buildup for selected commodities on the Cameroon to Gabon corridor (percentage of final consumer prices)................................................................................................................................. xii Figure 1  Prevalence of undernourishment (percentage) (three-year average)............................................9 Figure 2  Net food production index (2004–2006 = 100).............................................................................12 Figure 3  Net per capita food production index (2004–2006 = 100)............................................................13 Figure 4  Net production value (constant 2004–2006 US$)........................................................................13 Figure 5  Main agricultural commodities produced in Cameroon (by volume in million tons, 2016 [left] and by value in million constant 2004–2006 US$, 2014 [right]).................................................15 Contents  v Figure 6  Agricultural households by crops produced (percent, 2014)........................................................16 Figure 7  Production of main crops in Cameroon, by region, 2011 (percent)..............................................17 Figure 8  Headcount of main livestock species in Cameroon, by region, 2013 (percent of total)................17 Figure 9  Perceived negotiating power of agricultural producers................................................................20 Figure 10  Perceived ease of market access for agricultural producers......................................................22 Figure 11  Main marketing channels for agricultural trade in CEMAC.........................................................25 Figure 12  Perceived power of negotiation for traders.................................................................................29 Figure 13  Perceived availability and quality of agricultural products for traders.........................................29 Figure 14  Perceived price fairness and predictability for agricultural producers........................................30 Figure 15  Consumer prices’ fluctuations in Bafoussam, western region, Cameroon, January 2012 to September 2017 (CFAF per kg).......................................................................................32 Figure 16  Consumer prices’ fluctuations in Garoua, northern region, Cameroon, January 2012 to September 2017 (CFAF per kg).......................................................................................33 Figure 17  Typology of Cameroon’s agricultural trade with selected CEMAC countries..............................42 Figure 18  Perceptions on price differences in CEMAC countries...............................................................69 Figure 19  Price buildup for tomato on the Foumbot (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices).........................................................................................................70 Figure 20  Price buildup for maize on the Foumbot (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices).........................................................................................................71 Figure 21  Price buildup for plantain on the Foumbot (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices).........................................................................................................71 Figure 22  Price buildup for onion on the Ngaoundere (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices).........................................................................................................72 Figure 23  Price buildup for selected commodities on the Cameroon to Gabon corridor (percentage of final consumer prices).........................................................................................................72 Figure 24  Categorizing interventions to promote agricultural trade in CEMAC..........................................75 List of Images Image E.1  CEMAC zone, including main production areas in Cameroon, selected trade corridors, and border posts covered by this study......................................................................................................xvii Image 1  Cameroon’s regions and main selected agricultural trade flows.................................................. 11 Image 2  Tomatoes being loaded in a pickup in the field, western region, Cameroon.................................22 Image 3  Vegetables being transferred from a car to a truck at Foumbot market, Cameroon.....................24 Image 4  Ad hoc truck waiting areas in the outskirts of Douala...................................................................24 Image 5  Foumbot market in the western region, Cameroon......................................................................34 Image 6  Sandanga market in Douala, Cameroon......................................................................................37 Image 7  Border crossing between Cameroon and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea....................................46 Image 8  Abang-Minko–Eboro border area.................................................................................................46 Image 9  The Abang-Minko–Eboro border crossing (left—Cameroon, right—Gabon)................................47 vi  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Image 10  Kye-Ossi—Ebebyín border area.................................................................................................53 Image 11  Kye-Ossi–Ebebyín border (Cameroon side)...............................................................................53 Image 12  Border crossing between Cameroon and the Central African Republic.....................................55 Image 13  Garoua-Boulai border area.........................................................................................................56 Image 14  Garoua-Boulai border (left—Cameroon side, right—Central African side).................................56 Image 15  The Garoua-Boulai–Bangui journey...........................................................................................60 Image 16  Main border crossings between Cameroon and Chad...............................................................62 Image 17  Tomatoes and plantain being traded at Kousseri........................................................................62 Image 18  Informal practices to deal with rising costs (left—rice bag being overloaded, right—pickup being overloaded).................................................................................................................................................65 Image B.4.1  Port Gabon/Quai Boscam in the Port of Douala....................................................................74 List of Boxes Box 1  The Cereals Office in northern Cameroon........................................................................................19 Box 2  Producers organizations and market links: the case of NOWEFOR ...............................................21 Box 3  Border markets in CEMAC...............................................................................................................26 Box 4  Maritime trade in agricultural products ............................................................................................74 Acknowledgments T his report has been prepared by a team co-led by Joanne Gaskell and John Keyser and consist- ing of Gabriel Boc, Chloe Cangiano, Carmine Soprano, Robert Nkendah, Diego Arias Carballo, and Bodomalala Rabarijohn. Valuable research assistance in the field was provided by Mbouassie Adjac, Jean Marie Assiga, Said Mariam Ben, Ousseni Ayiagnigni Fifen, Arsene Mendomo, Xounkifirou Mongbet, Moussa Njoupouognigi, and Fifen Zounkaraneni. The team acknowledges the excellent guidance and support received from Elisabeth Huybens (Country Director), Dina Umali Deininger (Practice Manager), Issa Diaw (Program Leader), Mazen Bouri (Program Leader), and Alberta Mascaretti (Chief Africa Service, FAO/TCIA) throughout the process. Helpful com- ments on technical aspects related to gender from Kilara Suit are gratefully acknowledged. The team would also like to thank the peer reviewers, Norbert Fiess, Paul Brenton, and Myriam Chaudron, for their very valuable insights. The work was made possible through a collaboration between the World Bank and the Investment Center Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO/TCIA) as part of the FAO/ World Bank Cooperative Program. Publication and dissemination of the report benefitted from the support of the Umbrella Facility for Trade Trust Fund with contributions from the Governments of the United Kingdom (DFID), Sweden (Sida), Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Switzerland (SECO). For further information, please contact Joanne Gaskell (jgaskell@worldbank.org) or John Keyser (jkeyser@ worldbank.org. vii Acronyms and Abbreviations AGASA Gabonese Food Safety Agency (Agence Gabonaise de Sécurité Alimentaire) BARC Central Africa Republic Bureau of Road Chartering (Bureau d’Affrètement Routier Centrafricain) BGFT Cameroon Land Freight Management Office (Bureau de Gestion du Fret Terrestre) CEM Country Economic Memorandum CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community (Communauté économique et monétaire d’Afrique centrale) CFAF Central African CFA Franc CGC Gabonese Council of Loaders (Conseil Gabonais de Chargeurs) CGE Computable General Equilibrium CIG Common Initiative Group DGCC Gabonese Directorate General for Competition and General Consumption (Direction Générale de la Concurrence et de la Consommation Générale) DGRE Cameroon Directorate General of External Research (Direction Générale de la Recherche Extérieure) (Cameroon Intelligence Agency/Secret Service) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations GDP Gross Domestic Product Ha Hectares HDI Human Development Index ICT Information and Communication Technology IDK I Don’t Know (perceptions survey) JBC Joint Border Committee LVO International Vehicle Letter for Road Transportation of Goods (Lettre de voiture internationale) MINADER Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Cameroon (Ministère de l’agriculture et du développement rural du Cameroun) MINEPIA Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries, and Animal Industries of Cameroon (Ministère de l’élevage, de la pêche et des industries animales) PIDMA Agriculture Investment and Market Development Project (Projet d’Investissement et de Développement des Marchés Agricoles) PO Producer Organization PRODEL Livestock Development Project (Projet de Développement de l’Élevage) ROW Rest of the World viii Acronyms and Abbreviations  ix SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary UDE Equatorial African Customs Union (Union Douanière Equatorial) UDEAC Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale) UEAC Economic Union of Central Africa (Union Économique de l’Afrique Centrale) UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine) UMAC Monetary Union of Central Africa (Union Monétaire de l’Afrique Central) UNDP United Nations Development Programme WFP World Food Programme Executive Summary T his study supports Central African and exports of CEMAC countries. Crude petro- Economic and Monetary Community leum accounts for 86 percent of CEMAC’s exports; (Communauté économique et monétaire the Republic of Congo depends on oil for 61 per- d’Afrique centrale, CEMAC) countries in their cent of gross domestic product (GDP), Gabon for efforts to diversify their economies through half, Chad for 40 percent, and Cameroon for nearly increased agricultural trade. The report’s contri- 10 percent. As such, the region has been strongly bution can be summarized in four points: (a) there affected by the fall in oil prices, and CEMAC coun- is substantial potential for regional trade to drive tries are now exploring options for diversification agricultural development and poverty reduction and reduced food import dependency. Agricultural through increased farm revenues and lower food value added as a share of GDP varies widely in prices and, at the same time, to reduce food import CEMAC countries, from 2.6 percent in Equatorial bills and improve the balance of payments; (b) the Guinea to 50 percent in Chad. Agriculture, how- potential is not being achieved primarily because ever, does employ a large share of the population in of weak links between farmers and markets, poor most CEMAC countries, and the region exports a market-related infrastructure, and high trade costs wide variety of agricultural products. due to corruption along regional trade corridors; (c) coordinated action to increase the capacity of While the monetary component of regional inte- producer associations, invest in market facilities gration has been operational for many years, and warehouses, improve the effectiveness of legit- provisions related to the free movement of goods, imate checkpoints, and remove harassment along people, and services remain problematic. The trade corridors would have substantial economic transit regime represents one of the major compli- impacts that would benefit producers and consum- cations for trade integration in CEMAC. Two mem- ers on both sides of the border; and (d) addressing bers (the Central African Republic and Chad) are these constraints will require cross-sectoral collab- landlocked and significantly dependent on transit oration and strong political leadership to overcome from the port of Douala in Cameroon, while the the inevitable political economy resistance from other members’ national systems are not harmo- those who currently extract rents from the system at nized to provide a redistribution of import levies the expense of the poor. when goods are introduced in the community. Upon gaining their independence, the nations Provisions for intra-community trade in agri- of Central Africa embarked on a journey of cultural are unclear, and provisions for free economic integration that led to the signing of movement of people (that is, cross-border agri- the CEMAC Treaty in 1994. Today the members culture traders) are uneven. As the report details, of CEMAC are Cameroon, the Central African border crossing processes vary significantly from Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial one border post to another in terms of procedures Guinea, and Gabon, representing a market of 48.5 and costs. Despite CEMAC countries agreeing to million people. eliminate all tariffs on intra-regional trade, duties are still charged at some borders and, even where Despite CEMAC’s natural potential, the agri- tariffs have been eliminated, there are many nontar- culture sector remains largely underdeveloped; iff costs, often levied by customs authorities them- oil and minerals tend to dominate the economies selves, which play a similar trade-limiting role as x Executive Summary  xi a tariff. Moreover, intra-community trade is nega- and selling agriculture commodities in the CEMAC tively affected by the insufficient application of the region. The report draws conclusions based on four agreed principle on the free movement of people in trade corridors: Camer­ oon–Gabon, Cameroon–­ CEMAC, which is fully effective only in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon–the Central African the Republic of Congo, the Central African Repub- Republic, and Cameroon–Chad. lic, and Chad. Elsewhere, cross-border agriculture traders and others are subject to visa requirements, The study concludes that there is substantial document checks, and other controls that stifle potential for regional trade to drive agricultural competition and raise the cost of agriculture trade. development and poverty reduction through increased farm revenues and lower food prices Therefore, despite the political drive for regional and, at the same time, to reduce food import bills integration, intra-regional trade remains low. For and improve the balance of payments. Spread CEMAC member states, exports within CEMAC over more than 3 million km2, the CEMAC region account for only 2.1 percent of total exports, and is endowed with a diverse climate and substantial imports for only 3.9 percent of total imports, land resources that make it particularly suited to according to official statistics. In the agriculture the development of agropastoral activities. Never- sector, more than 95 percent of recorded agricul- theless, about 45 percent of the population in the tural exports went to third countries in 2015 and CEMAC zone suffers from undernourishment, and more than 75 percent of recorded imports came of these, 10 percent suffer from an extreme food from outside CEMAC. These data, however, need deficit. Boosting regional trade in agricultural com- to be interpreted cautiously, given that regional modities would promote economic diversification, agricultural trade takes place mostly through infor- improve food security, and create jobs for vulner- mal channels and is not systematically recorded in able populations in CEMAC. Many agricultural statistical systems. products that could be produced within CEMAC are imported from the rest of the world. According The analysis uses a “corridor approach” to to formal sector data (UN Comtrade 2017), rice, understand current conditions at selected bor- palm oil, and poultry are among the leading agri- der crossings and in nearby assembly mar- culture imports accounting for several hundred mil- kets that shape CEMAC’s competitiveness in lion dollars of trade annually. There is also known food production and ability of Central African to be substantial amount of unrecorded cross-border farmers to compete in their own regional mar- trade of fresh vegetables and food staples including ket. The analysis focuses on staple commodities trade between CEMAC countries and non-CEMAC that are most relevant to poor producers and poor neighbors with good potential for expansion (Amin consumers and looks in detail at the performance and Hoppe 2013; Nkendah 2013; World Bank 2013; of agriculture trade corridors to identify factors WTO 2013). Allowing informal traders to flourish that either take away from the profits available and gradually integrate into the formal economy to be paid to farmers and/or raise the prices paid would boost trade and the private sector base for by consumers. On the qualitative side, the report future growth and development. Reducing trade describes what happens at the border and types of costs would also promote lower consumer food constraints faced by large and small traders, men prices, improving access to food and food security. and women, who operate in the formal and infor- mal economy. On the quantitative side, the report The potential of intra-regional agricultural breaks down differences in commodity prices in trade in CEMAC is not being achieved primar- buying and selling markets that are due to costs of ily because of weak links between farmers and licenses and trade permits, marketing fees, and offi- markets, poor market-related infrastructure, cial and unofficial charges associated with buying and high trade costs due to corruption along xii  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Figure E.1  Price buildup for selected commodities on the Cameroon to Gabon corridor (percentage of final consumer prices) Transport, 16% Production costs, 18% Producer’s margin, 3% Intermediaries Intermediaries at final destination, along the, 23% corridor, 16% Petty harassment Market fees, 3% (tracasseries), 14% Border crossing, 7% Production Transport Intermediation Border Source: Estimated from data collected for this report. key corridors. The study finds that intermediation a major problem in Cameroon, at the border and costs along the trade corridor, at the destination, in the neighboring CEMAC countries. Actual trad- and including market access costs, are the most ing costs at the surveyed locations are consistently important cost driver, accounting for 42 percent of higher than official listed tariffs. The culture of the final consumer price (see Figure E.1). Trans- petty harassment is so recognized, generalized, and port costs and petty harassment account for about institutionalized that market actors internalize these a third of the final price, while production costs are payments in the transport costs. There is an urgent only 20 percent. Border crossing costs on their own need to make legitimate functions (such as vehicle make up roughly 7 percent of the consumer price, weight limits and sanitary and phytosanitary [SPS] and the producer’s margin is just 3 percent. Inter- measures) more effective and efficient while elimi- mediation costs are high, in part because producer nating tracasseries. organizations (POs) are generally established to facilitate production only, with very few organized Coordinated action to increase the capacity of for group sales or other commercial links, particu- producer associations, invest in market facili- larly with foreign value chain actors. Consequently, ties and warehouses, and remove harassment producers have little negotiating power while sell- along corridors would have substantial eco- ing their ­ production—a fact confirmed both by nomic impacts that would benefit producers and the survey and field observations. Infrastructure is consumers on both sides of the border. Along another challenge. Short-­ distance transport costs, transport corridors, solutions to eliminate petty from the field to the nearest market, represent harassment could reduce food prices by as much between 15 percent and 25 percent of the total pro- as 14 percent and—­ according to a computable gen- duction cost, depending on load size and perishabil- eral equilibrium (CGE) model prepared as part of ity. Both short- and long-distance transport result the CEMAC Country Economic M ­ emorandum— in important losses due to the poor condition of the increase exports by 23 percent. The report’s find- roads. Finally, all participants along the trade corri- ings about marginal cost accumulations along dors identified petty harassments (tracasseries) as selected trade corridors and perceived opportunities Executive Summary  xiii to reduce these costs suggest five priority areas for 2. Insufficient commercial organization of pro- intervention. The top two recommendations target ducers limits their negotiating power. market intermediation costs. Investment in devel- 3. Poor-quality transport infrastructure is oping regional agricultural trade needs to start from impeding market access both within Camer- improving the market access of ­ producers—both oon and to CEMAC countries. commercial and physical access. The third priority 4. The high number of intermediaries increases area targets reducing pervasive petty harassments the transaction costs for agricultural trade. (tracasseries). The fourth priority area is to reduce 5. Higher than expected price volatility leads to other transport costs, and the fifth is to improve unpredictable returns. border conditions. Although border costs appear 6. Poor market management and infrastructure to account for only 7 percent of the final consumer hamper commercial links. price, border posts serve multiple corridors and can 7. Throughout the CEMAC region, valid trade be choke points for agricultural trade when prod- functions are currently not exercised and as ucts cannot get through at all. Details of the priority such have, de facto, become tracasseries. actions are set out in Table E.1. Trading agriculture commodities in CEMAC Addressing these constraints will require strong political leadership to overcome the inevitable 8. Unrecorded and informal trade in agricultural political economy resistance from those who products is widespread. extract rents from the current system at the 9. Unclear application of trade regulations and expense of the poor. Enacting the recommenda- customs rules leads to a multitude of formal tions in this report requires engaging with multiple and informal border costs. stakeholders and identifying champions for each 10. Traders’ responses to informality and tracas- priority area. In general, there is significant national series lead to a vicious circle of further infor- opportunity to facilitate regional trade because most mal practices. agricultural trade costs accumulate before prod- 11. Security risks and political crises are altering ucts reach the border. While regional cooperation is trade patterns and flows. needed in strategic areas, most of the opportunities 12. Women account for most domestic traders to improve agricultural trade within CEMAC rest in along agricultural trade corridors in CEMAC. the hands of national or subnational actors. 13. Final consumer prices in CEMAC reflect the costly and burdensome trade processes. The report is structured around a set of “key mes- sages” that elaborate the main points described earlier. Those messages are as follows: Producing and sourcing agriculture commodi- ties in CEMAC 1. Agricultural production has the potential to meet the staple food demand in the CEMAC area. xiv  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Table E.1  Top five priorities to promote agricultural trade in CEMAC TIME TYPE OF PAYOFF COST SCALE FRAME SUPPORT Priorities and measures Low/ Short/ Low/ Policy focus/ National/ Medium/ Medium/ Moderate/ Investment Regional High Long High focus Priority 1: Reduce intermediation costs by linking farmers to markets (a) Strengthen market links between rural produc- ers and urban consumers by • Working with POs to aggregate production and High Medium Moderate National Investment organize constant grouped sales • Supporting cross-border productive alliances or High Medium/ Moderate Regional Investment other direct commercial links between CEMAC Long regional traders and POs (b) Increase access to motorized transport in rural areas by • Introduction of leasing arrangements and other Medium Short Moderate National Investment new financing mechanisms for transport service providers Priority 2: Improve the efficiency of agricultural markets (a) Physical investments in market infrastructure including • Market stalls, secure storage, cold storage, load- High Short/ Moderate National Investment ing docks, lighting, sanitation, and rest areas at Medium strategic points on regional trade corridors (b) Promote competitiveness through inclusive market management and oversight by • Involving trader associations and other private Medium Medium Low National Mixed users in development and management of public market spaces • Initiating dialogue on and promotion of a service Medium Medium Low National/ Mixed charter for market management Regional (c) Increased access to market and trade informa- tion to promote competitiveness by • Training and awareness raising for sellers on mar- Low/ Short/ Low National Investment ket and price dynamics to improve interpretation Medium Medium and decision-making capabilities • Introducing market information systems that Medium Short/ Moderate National Investment reduce dependence on informal networks for price Medium discovery • Developing regional market information system to Medium Medium/ Moderate Regional Investment aggregate national systems, using information and Long communication technology (ICT) where possible (continued) Executive Summary  xv TIME TYPE OF PAYOFF COST SCALE FRAME SUPPORT Priorities and measures Low/ Short/ Low/ Policy focus/ National/ Medium/ Medium/ Moderate/ Investment Regional High Long High focus Priority 3: Professionalize behavior along the trade corridor (a) Build capacity of regulatory agencies to perform legitimate trade through • Functional review of key responsibilities and Medium Short Low National Investment introduction of performance-based management systems • Developing and implementing a training program Medium Medium Moderate National/ Investment for checkpoint officers around a code of conduct Regional for professional behavior • Reducing (rationalizing) the number of check- High Medium Moderate National Policy points along trade corridors • Upgrading legitimate checkpoints by building High Medium Moderate National Investment capacity to implement functions (such as SPS monitoring) and improving oversight using cam- eras or other modalities (b) Enlist corridor users to report abuse and cor- ruption, by • Raising awareness of corridor users about legiti- Medium Short Low National/ Investment mate checkpoints, fees, and functions Regional • Reinforcing and/or introducing anticorruption Medium Short Low National/ Investment hotlines (numero vert) by consistently addressing Regional reports and rewarding good outcomes Priority 4: Strengthening regional transport links (a) Improve road maintenance and infrastructure by • Developing regional connectivity strategy for link- Medium Short Low Regional Investment ing agriculture producers with demand centers • Introducing performance-based management of High Short/ Low National Investment weighbridges and other strategies for reliable and Medium transparent enforcement of vehicle weight limits • Investing in road rehabilitation, construction, and High Short/ Moderate/ National Investment maintenance planning Medium High • Attracting investment in private truck parks Medium Short Low National Investment (secure parking place, showers, and so on) (b) Break up cartels and improve competitiveness of domestic and regional agriculture trans- port by • Developing a specific time-bound action plan for Medium Short Low National/ Investment sector reform based on dialogue between trans- Regional port operators and regional policy makers • Establishing a dedicated task force to implement Medium/ Medium/ Moderate National/ Mixed the action plan and track progress toward agreed High Long Regional performance indicators (c) Improve port access for regional traders by • Dredging of Quai Boscam and removal of ship- Medium Short/ Moderate/ National Investment wrecks blocking jetties Medium High • Upgrading of other ports used by regional vessels Medium Short/ Moderate/ National Investment as needed Medium High (continued) xvi  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Table E.1  Continued TIME TYPE OF PAYOFF COST SCALE FRAME SUPPORT Priorities and measures Low/ Short/ Low/ Policy focus/ National/ Medium/ Medium/ Moderate/ Investment Regional High Long High focus Priority 5: Improve border operations (a) Physical investments in border infrastructure such as • Lighting, paving, upgrading buildings, and digitiz- Medium Short Moderate/ National Investment ing records systems High (b) Establish joint border committees including • National committees with a lead agency, such as Medium Short Low National Policy customs, to improve coordination at each border post • International committees to coordinate functions Medium Medium Low Regional Policy and regularize procedures between countries at shared border posts (c) Professionalize behavior of border officials and border users by • Introducing performance-based management sys- Medium Short Low National Mixed tems around a service charter for border agencies • Training of border officials and border users in High Short Low National Mixed basic rights and obligations, including the benefits of regulatory compliance • Introducing toll-free hotlines for reporting corrup- Medium Medium Low National Investment tion and abuse (d) Awareness raising of official regulations, fee structures, and border crossing requirements for border users through • Developing training materials and training pro- Medium/ Short Low National/ Investment grams for border officials and border users High Regional • Producing publicity materials and user-friendly Medium/ Short Low National/ Mixed pamphlets with information on trade procedures High Regional and posting of all official charges in a conspicuous spot at every border post • Publicity campaign on the need for and benefits of Medium/ Short Low/ National/ Investment regulatory compliance High Moderate Regional (e) Rationalize trade requirements by • Adopting risk-based approaches to border inspec- High Short Low National Policy tion and compliance • Reviewing SPS declaration requirements based Medium/ Medium Moderate National/ Mixed on risk High Regional • Eliminating mandatory border inspections and Medium/ Medium Low National Mixed product certification requirements (including SPS High certification) where import declaration conditions do not exist (f) Foster dialogue through the CEMAC Commis- High Ongoing Low Regional Policy sion on the economic costs of unpredictable border closures. Review security controls with an eye to increasing trade opportunities Executive Summary  xvii Image E.1  CEMAC zone, including main production areas in Cameroon, selected trade corridors, and border posts covered by this study Source: Map data © 2018 Google, ORION-ME. 1. Introduction Despite the region’s vast potential for agricul- This study supports CEMAC countries in their ture production and trade, the agriculture sector efforts to diversify their economies through in the Central African Economic and Mone- increased agricultural trade. The report aims to tary Community (Communauté économique et answer three broad questions as follows: (a) what monétaire d’Afrique centrale, CEMAC) remains is the potential for increased regional agriculture largely underdeveloped. Crude petroleum accounts trade; (b) what is holding back this potential; and for 86 percent of CEMAC’s exports, making the (c) what kind of investments and policy reforms economies in CEMAC vulnerable to commodity could help CEMAC countries realize this potential. cycles and falling oil prices to the point where the The study focuses on regionally traded food staples region now faces a major fiscal crisis. Across the such as maize, livestock, tomatoes, and plantain that region, agricultural imports represent close to one- are relevant to poor producers and poor consumers, fifth of the total import bill with Cameroon and the so that the recommendations would be most rele- Republic of Congo each importing over US$1 bil- vant to poverty reduction and income growth for lion worth of agricultural products in 2015. Impor- the bottom 40 percent. tantly for the people of CEMAC, the pattern of petroleum-­ dependent development has led to very Findings focus on the costs and constraints asso- unequal growth with high poverty rates in all coun- ciated with large- and small-scale agriculture tries, particularly in rural areas. Undernourishment trade, including procedures faced at the border affects a substantial proportion of the CEMAC pop- and in nearby assembly markets. Previous studies, ulation, which is made worse by political fragility such as those by Amin and Hoppe (2013), Nkendah and violence in several countries of the region. (2013), and World Bank (2013), indicate that most regional agriculture trade in CEMAC takes place Price volatility due to high trade costs and through informal channels and is not recorded in trade obstacles impedes the agri-food sector in official trade statistics. Relatively little, however, CEMAC. World Bank research on regional trade is known about how these systems operate in the in Africa shows that African countries are globally CEMAC region and specific challenges large and handicapped by disproportionately high trade costs, small traders face in accessing neighboring country arising from poor connectivity, abundance of for- markets in this part of Africa. mal and informal barriers, and transport markets where competition is limited and productivity is This analysis uses a “corridor approach” to very low. These barriers affect small farmers and understand current conditions at selected bor- agriculture traders particularly hard whereby sud- der crossings and in nearby assembly markets den policy changes and regulations that are difficult that are important to regional agriculture trade to follow limit the movement of goods from surplus in CEMAC. The study focuses on understanding to deficit areas and impose unnecessary costs that trade conditions for staple commodities that are result in lower prices for farmers and higher prices most relevant to poor producers and poor consum- for consumers. For farmers and traders dealing in ers by following commodities through six points perishable goods, the costs can be particularly high. on the supply chain: farm, immediate market, 1 2  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa collection market, urban market, border market, Cameroon and the border areas of the neighbor- and foreign market. By looking in detail at the ing countries. The first mission focused on data performance of agriculture trade corridors in this collection at the most important border crossing way, it is possible to identify factors that either take points between Cameroon and Gabon, Equatorial away from the profits available to be paid to farm- Guinea, and the Central African Republic. The sec- ers and/or raise the prices paid by consumers. On ond mission started in the production areas in Cam- the qualitative side, the report describes what hap- eroon’s western region and continued to the northern pens at the border and types of constraints faced regions, tracing the main blocks of ­Cameroon–Chad by large and small traders, men and women, who trade corridors. Further information was collected operate in the formal and informal economy. On in Yaoundé and Douala from public authorities and the quantitative side, the study breaks down dif- private actors involved in agricultural trade. ferences in commodity prices in buying and sell- ing markets that are due to costs of licenses and To collect primary data on the experience of trade permits, marketing fees, and other official traders and transporters engaged in agricultural and unofficial charges associated with buying and trade in CEMAC, the study commissioned a data selling agriculture commodities in the CEMAC collection exercise in which university students area. The report draws conclusions based on four joined truck rides from Cameroon to the neigh- trade corridors: Cameroon–Gabon, Cameroon– boring CEMAC countries (Gabon and Equato- Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon–the Central African rial Guinea). The purpose of the trips was to record Republic, and Cameroon–Chad. the number of checkpoints, their delays, and costs (formal and informal), as well as the border crossing Cameroon is by far the largest producer and procedures. The students travelled on medium and exporter of agricultural products at present. large trucks with mixed agricultural goods, collect- With the notable exception of Chad, other CEMAC ing information on both legs of the journey (though countries export virtually no agricultural products most often the trucks returned empty). A total of to Cameroon while importing significant quan- 10 trips were conducted in late 2017 and early 2018 tities from Cameroon. Therefore, the approach of and included the following routes: Foumbot-Douala, the report has been to focus on agricultural trade Foumbot-Kye-Ossi/Abang-Minko, Kye-Ossi-Bata, corridors originating in Cameroon, which is not to and Abang-Minko-Libreville. Selected insights are disregard the other CEMAC countries that have the presented throughout the report. potential to benefit from increased trade integra- tion. It is noteworthy to entertain the idea that in To complement the field data collection efforts, corridors studied by this report, were the flows to be the present report also commissioned a perception reversed, the magnitude of the trade costs would be survey of the different actors engaged in agricul- similar, as well as the nature of burdensome proce- tural trade in CEMAC: producers, traders, and dures. Therefore, the present analysis (particularly border users at Cameroon–Equatorial Guinea, in terms of border crossing, transport, and petty Cameroon–Gabon, and Cameroon–the Central harassment) can be extrapolated with a good degree African Republic main crossing points. The focus of confidence to a future increase in CEMAC to of the survey was on broad perceptions on agricul- Cameroon trade flows. tural marketing processes, with answer options on a scale of 1 to 5 from strongly agree to strongly A significant part of the qualitative and quan- disagree (plus “I don’t know” and “not applicable” titative information is derived from direct options) and one open-ended question for each field observations during two field missions in tier on ideas for improving the commercialization Introduction  3 of agricultural products. The overall sample size The report is organized around 13 findings that of 463 randomly selected respondents allowed for cover production, sourcing, and trade. The final all modules (except for the Cameroon–Equatorial section lists recommendations and areas for poten- Guinea pair, where the closed border made it diffi- tial investment and policy reform that can help the cult to identify respondents) to indicate interesting region achieve its trade integration ambitions in the perceptions that matched well the findings from the service of food security, agricultural development, field visits and truck rides. Selected insights are and economic diversification. presented throughout the report. CEMAC and Regional 2.  Integration in Central Africa Upon gaining their independence from France, In 2008 CEMAC was reformed to move from the nations of Central Africa embarked on a interstate cooperation to supranationalism. journey of economic integration that culminated While the revised treaty maintained the institutions with the signing of the CEMAC Treaty in 1994. in place, it furthered the power of the institutions This process began in 1959, when four members of and converted the secretariat into a commission, the former Federation of French Equatorial Africa echoing a similar move by the West African Eco- (Federation de l’Afrique Equatoriale Française), nomic and Monetary Union (Union économique the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of et monétaire ouest-africaine, UEMOA) in 2006. It Congo, and Gabon, signed a convention establish- further established a Community Parliament and ing the Equatorial African Customs Union (Union Community Court of Justice for CEMAC. Douanière Equatorial, UDE). In 1964, the customs union was expanded when Cameroon and the UDE Today the members of CEMAC comprise Cam- joined the Customs and Economic Union of Cen- eroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the tral Africa (Communauté économique et monétaire Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and de l’Afrique centrale, UDEAC), eventually joined Gabon, representing a market of 48.5 million by Equatorial Guinea in 1983. Economic crises in people (Table 1). The region represents more than the 1980s created momentum for furthering eco- 3 million km2 and is rich in natural resources. The nomic integration, leading to the establishment of abundance of water and grazing land makes the CEMAC in 1994, which called for the creation of a region particularly suitable for agropastoral activ- common market and monetary union. However, it ities. Nevertheless, the region’s potential has mate- is only in 1999 that CEMAC became effective and rialized in uneven rates of growth in recent years. replaced the UDEAC. The availability of hydrocarbon resources has con- tributed to uneven levels of development within the The new treaty established two unions, the bloc. Although all CEMAC countries apart from Economic Union of Central Africa (Union the Central Africa Republic and Chad are classified Économique de l’Afrique Centrale, UEAC) and as middle income, gross domestic product (GDP) the Monetary Union of Central Africa (Union per capita figures mask a high degree of income Monétaire de l’Afrique Central, UMAC), to ful- inequality with poverty still being a widespread fil the objectives of CEMAC. Together, these two problem in rural and urban areas. unions aim to (a) set up a multilateral device for monitoring economic and financial policies in their Despite CEMAC’s agricultural potential, oil member states; (b) manage the common currency; remains the main source of revenue for most (c) create a safe environment for economic activity; of its member states. Besides Cameroon, all the (d) harmonize the regulations of sectoral policies; economies in the region are highly dependent on and (e) create a common market for goods, ser- oil, which accounts for 18 percent of CEMAC’s vices, capital, and people. 4 CEMAC and Regional Integration in Central Africa  5 Table 1  CEMAC at a glance, 2017 GDP per capita 2017 GDP Average GDP GDP (US$ billion, Population Country (US$, current growth growth current prices) (millions) prices) (% change) 2012–2016 (%) Cameroon 30.7 24.3 1,263 4.0 5.3 Central African Republic 2.0 5.0 400 4.7 −4.4 Chad 9.7 12.2 799 0.6 3.4 Congo, Rep. 7.8 4.3 1,794 −3.6 2.7 Equatorial Guinea 10.1 0.8 11,948 −7.4 −3.1 Gabon 14.5 1.9 7,584 1.0 4.2 CEMAC 74.7 48.5 1,539 2.2 3.4 Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017. GDP and 66 percent of its export revenues (see Chad (50 percent) and the Central African Repub- Table 2). lic (43 percent). In the other countries, the shares of agriculture in GDP are below 20 percent, with The region has been strongly affected by the fall Cameroon at 17 percent (2016 data, World Bank in oil prices. Growth in the region fell from 1.6 per- World Development Indicators). cent in 2015 to 0.2 percent in 2016, before rebound- ing to 2.2 percent in 2017. Still, these growth figures Agriculture employs a large share of the pop- hide strong disparities in the region: in 2017, Equa- ulation in most CEMAC countries. More than torial Guinea and the Republic of Congo faced half of the population is employed in agriculture in recessions, while the Central African Republic and Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and Chad Cameroon experienced strong economic growth of (62 percent, 72 percent, and 77 percent, respec- 4.7 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively. In addi- tively), and 41 percent of people work in agriculture tion, the low oil prices affect the trade balance of in the Republic of Congo. Agriculture represents a the community, with a deficit of 15 percent in both smaller share of employment in Equatorial Guinea 2015 and 2016 (Banque de France 2016). (19 percent of employment) and Gabon (16 percent of employment) (2017 data, World Bank World Agricultural value added as a share of GDP var- Development Indicators). ies widely in the region, from a mere 2.6 percent of GDP value added in Equatorial Guinea to The region exports a wide variety of agricul- 50 percent in Chad. Only two countries derive a sig- tural products, with cash crops exported outside nificant share of their value added from agriculture, CEMAC playing an important role. Cameroon is Table 2  The oil sector in the CEMAC region, 2016 Production Country Growth of production Oil sector, % of GDP Oil sector, % of exports (million tons) Cameroon 4.7 −4.3 4.0 28.0 Chad 6.5 −10.8 10.7 88.1 Congo, Rep. 11.4 −1.8 36.5 79.9 Equatorial Guinea 10.2 −18.6 44.7 97.2 Gabon 11.5 −3.5 25.2 58.7 Total 44.3 –7.7* 18.0* 66.2* Source: Banque de France 2016. *Denotes regional average. 6  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa a strong exporter of cocoa, fruits (pineapples and a Common External Tariff (with five rates: 0 per- guavas), and chicken. The Central African Republic cent, 5 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 per- mostly exports vegetables to non-CEMAC coun- cent) has been adopted, but the member countries tries in Africa. The Republic of Congo exports tea often adopt unilateral exceptions and suspension and coffee (although with a large yearly fluctuation measures. in coffee exports) (UN Comtrade). The transit regime complicates trade integration Trade in agriculture in the region is governed by policies in CEMAC. Two members (the Central the instruments establishing the UEAC, which African Republic and Chad) are landlocked and provide for a common market for agricultural significantly dependent on transit from the port products through several measures: of Douala in Cameroon, while the other members’ national systems are not harmonized to provide • The removal of domestic customs duty and non- a redistribution of import levies when goods are tariff barriers introduced in the community. The importance of • The establishment of a common policy toward customs levies to national budgets is significant in third-party countries each of the CEMAC countries, creating pressure to • The establishment of competition policies, nota- tax at each border until a compensatory or revenue bly regarding state aid distribution system is effectively in place. Efforts • The implementation of the principle of the free to streamline community transit and compensatory movement of people, services, and capital mechanisms have been tried on paper; the systems • The harmonization and recognition of technical that work in practice have often been introduced standards and certification procedures and implemented bilaterally (for example, between Cameroon and the Central African Republic on 2.1 Trade integration checkpoints along priority corridors). in CEMAC Thus, the provisions for intra-community trade While the monetary component of regional (mostly in agricultural products) are unclear integration has succeeded in stabilizing infla- and the application of the free circulation prin- tion and exchange rates, the free movement of ciples is uneven. As the rest of the report details, goods, people, and services remains problematic border crossing processes for intra-community in CEMAC (WTO 2013). It was initially planned agricultural goods vary significantly from one bor- that the free trade area envisaged in the 1994 treaty der post to another, both in terms of procedures and would materialize by 1998, with the introduction costs. Even if tariff measures have been difficult to of zero-rated preferential tariff on intra-community pinpoint in the available legislation and throughout trade. In practice, the free movement of goods is the sample of border posts included in this anal- still not applied universally and uniformly, partic- ysis, there are many nontariff costs, often levied ularly as “libre pratique” (the free circulation once by customs authorities themselves, which play a officially introduced into the community) provi- similar trade-limiting role as a tariff. In addition, sions are not implemented by the member states. intra-community trade is also negatively affected Goods imported from noncommunity countries and by the insufficient application of the free move- cleared by a CEMAC member country are taxed ment of persons in CEMAC, which has so far been again when they are introduced into other CEMAC fully effective only in Cameroon, the Republic of countries. For the moment, there are no provisions Congo, the Central African Republic, and Chad. in the CEMAC Treaty to avoid double taxation of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea are limiting access trade, a seeming step back from the UDEAC provi- to CEMAC citizens on grounds of security issues sions. In relation to noncommunity trading partners, (the most recent example being the closure of the CEMAC and Regional Integration in Central Africa  7 Cameroon–Equatorial Guinea border in January– CEMAC demand for agricultural products is February 2018, following a failed coup d’état in increasingly being met from outside the region the latter country). Still, some limited duration and (Table 3). In all the member states of the commu- distance access for foreign traders is available at the nity, more than 95 percent of agricultural exports border crossing points visited in the southern part went to the third countries (rest of the world [ROW]) of Cameroon. in 2015 and more than 75 percent of agricultural imports came from the ROW. According to offi- cial statistics, agricultural exports remained rather 2.2 Regional trade constant between 2004 and 2015, ranging between in agriculture US$1,395 million in 2006 and US$2,324 million in 2009, before decreasing to US$2,047 million in Despite the political drive for regional inte- 2015, while imports increased by 174 percent from gration, intra-regional trade remains low. For 2004 (US$1,471 million) to 2015 (US$4,033 mil- CEMAC member states, exports within CEMAC lion). This suggests that the increase in demand account for only 2.1 percent of total exports, and for agricultural products was met mostly by the imports for only 3.9 percent of total imports, accord- ROW. Indeed, agricultural imports from the ROW ing to official statistics. This compares to 15 per- increased by 179 percent between 2004 and 2015, cent of exports and 11.5 percent of imports in 2010 compared to an increase of imports from CEMAC for the UEMOA trade community. Explanations for countries of only 41 percent. this low regional trade integration include the pre- ponderance of oil in the region’s export basket, the According to formal trade data, Cameroon is weakness of manufacturing sectors in these coun- the leading exporter of agricultural goods within tries, and the more informal nature of intra-­regional CEMAC (US$13 million in 2015). The main exports trade, which means that inter-CEMAC trade is less according to these data are milled rice, soups and likely to be recorded in official statistics. broths, mineral water, and other preparations. The Table 3  Agricultural exports by destination (percentage) % Agricultural Exports Country Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 CAF CEMAC 0.2 n/a n/a 4.6 3.0 6.2 2.4 3.8 n/a 0.1 n/a 1.7 CAF ROW 99.8 100.0 100.0 95.4 97.0 93.8 97.6 96.2 100.0 99.9 100.0 98.3 CMR CEMAC 1.9 2.8 1.9 3.2 3.3 1.8 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.7 CMR ROW 98.1 97.2 98.1 96.8 96.7 98.2 99.0 99.3 99.3 99.5 99.2 99.3 COG CEMAC 16.7 28.4 28.0 14.2 28.3 22.0 0.7 1.0 n/a 0.2 2.9 3.9 COG ROW 83.3 71.6 72.0 85.8 71.7 78.0 99.3 99.0 100.0 99.8 97.1 96.1 GAB CEMAC 8.6 8.8 12.4 39.5 64.7 79.4 90.5 69.2 68.8 58.1 9.6 4.4 GAB ROW 91.4 91.2 87.6 60.5 35.3 20.6 9.5 30.8 31.2 41.9 90.4 95.6 GNQ CEMAC 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 8.3 9.9 0.3 GNQ ROW 99.3 100.0 99.9 99.2 99.1 99.3 99.9 100.0 100.0 91.7 90.1 99.7 TCD CEMAC 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.9 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.4 TCD ROW 98.7 100.0 99.9 99.8 99.9 99.9 98.1 98.9 99.3 99.5 100.0 98.6 Source: UN Comtrade. Note: CAF = Central African Republic; CME = Cameroon; COG = Republic of Congo; GAB = Gabon; GNQ = Equatorial Guinea; TCD = Chad; ROW = Rest of World; n/a = no recorded trade; 0.0 = less than 0.1 percent. 8  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Republic of Congo exported US$2 million worth of top 10 recorded food imports for Equatorial Guinea agricultural products to CEMAC in 2015, mostly include chewing gum, sweets, and chocolate, which sugarcane and its derivatives. The other countries of surely reflects the more systematic recording of the CEMAC region, the Central African Republic, imports that arrive from outside the region through Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, exported less major air and sea ports than a local diet based than US$1 million worth of agricultural products to largely on sweets. their CEMAC partners. However, these data need to be interpreted Regional food security 2.3  cautiously, as official statistics do a poor job situation of recording regional trade in agriculture. For various reasons discussed throughout this report, About 45 percent of CEMAC’s population suf- regional agriculture trade takes place mostly fers from undernourishment, and of these, through informal channels and is not systematically 10 percent suffer from an extreme food deficit1 recorded in national data systems. According to one (CEMAC 2009) (see Table 4 and Figure 1). Insuf- study of informal trade (Nkendah 2013), just over ficient trade integration reduces the overall accessi- 155,000 tons of otherwise unrecorded agricultural bility of food in the region, leading to even higher and horticultural commodities were shipped from imports from the ROW. Undernourishment is most Cameroon to its CEMAC neighbors in 2008, with prevalent in the Central African Republic and Chad, an estimated value of almost Central African CFA where 58.6 percent and 32.5 percent of people, Franc (CFAF) 38 billion (around US$85 million respectively, are malnourished, but it is rather low using an average 2008 exchange rate) represent- in Gabon and Cameroon. Child stunting is more ing 0.4 percent of Cameroon’s recorded GDP. The homogenously prevalent across the community, underreporting of agriculture trade is also reflected ranging from 17.5 percent of stunting in Gabon in official data on imported goods. For instance, the to 40.7 percent of stunting in the Central African Table 4  Key food security and nutrition indicators in CEMAC Prevalence of Prevalence Prevalence anemia Prevalence of Prevalence of of severe Prevalence Prevalence Prevalence of of obesity among exclusive undernourishment food of wasting of stunting overweight in in the adult women of breastfeeding in the total insecurity in children in children Country children population reproductive among infants population in the total (< 5 years, (< 5 years, (< 5 years, %) (> 18 years, age (0–5 months, (%) population %) %) %) (15–49 years, %) (%) %) 2004–06 2014–16 2014–16 2016 2005 2016 2005 2016 2005 2014 2005 2016 2005 2015 Equatorial n/a n/a n/a 3.1 35 26.2 8.3 9.7 8.2 13.3 48.0 43.7 n/a 7.4 Guinea Gabon 9.7 7.0 n/a 3.4 n/a 17.5 n/a 7.7 10.5 13.6 57.8 59.1 n/a 6.0 Cameroon 20.2 7.9 27.6 5.2 35.4 31.7 8.7 6.7 5.6 8.6 45.3 41.4 23.5 28.2 Central African 39.9 58.6 n/a 7.1 45.1 40.7 8.5 1.8 2.6 4.1 49.0 46.0 23.1 34.3 Republic Chad 39.2 32.5 n/a 13.0 44.8 39.9 4.4 2.5 3.2 5.5 51.1 47.7 2.0 0.3 Congo, 33.4 28.2 n/a 8.2 31.2 21.2 8.5 5.9 5.4 8.2 57.9 51.9 19.1 32.9 Rep. Source: FAO 2017. Note: n/a = not applicable. Less than 300 calories per person per day. 1 CEMAC and Regional Integration in Central Africa  9 Figure 1  Prevalence of undernourishment (percentage) (three-year average) 60 50 40 Percent 30 20 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 13 4 5 6 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 01 20 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 –2 – 09 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 10 11 12 13 14 20 20 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Rep. Gabon Source: FAOSTAT. Republic. Obesity affects only small proportions of for the population (WFP 2015). The country has the population in CEMAC, with the exceptions of the second to lowest level of human development Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, where the reliance in the world (UNECA 2017), notably because of on imported processed food leads to obesity rates the conflict. Poverty is widespread in the country; higher than 13 percent. it has the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) in the world, and about half of the population are Food insecurity in Cameroon is mostly con- facing food insecurity, 2.5 million people. Central tained to rural areas and, more specifically, African authorities and the United Nations esti- the north of the country (WFP 2017a). Around mate that 70 percent of the population live below 16 percent of households are estimated to be food the poverty line in 2015. Nearly half of the poor insecure (3.9 million people), of which 1 percent live in urban areas, while in rural areas, 7 out of are severely food insecure (around 211,000 peo- about 10 live below the poverty line, especially in ple). Food insecurity is mostly concentrated in rural households headed by small farmers and artisans. areas, with more than 22 percent of rural house- In addition, women are more affected by the phe- holds being food insecure, compared to 10.5 per- nomenon, with approximately 77 percent of them cent of urban households. The regions of the Great experiencing poverty (UNECA 2017). The level North have historically been most exposed to food of violence is still high, and rebel groups control insecurity. At a national level, 30 percent of people parts of the country, which continues to experience spend more than 75 percent of their expenditure on sporadic surges of violence; around 600,000 people food, but this figure is driven upward by the north- were forced to move to other parts of the country to ern regions, where the share of people spending escape conflict. more than 75 percent of their expenditure on food are 54.2 percent for the Far North, 41.8 percent for Chad suffers from widespread poverty and food Adamawa, and 43.5 percent for the North. insecurity (WFP 2017b). Chad is ranked 185 out of 188 countries, according to the 2015 United The Central African Republic is slowly rebuilding Nations Development Programme (UNDP) HDI. its economy and reestablishing stability follow- Many Chadians still face severe deprivation, with ing a conflict that had disastrous consequences most of the Millennium Development Goals not 10  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa met by 2015. Between 2003 and 2011, the national 25 years, the proportion of land used for farming has poverty rate fell from 55 percent to 47 percent. risen only minimally, notably because of the lack However, with this current economic and finan- of infrastructure, while the population has almost cial crisis, poverty could increase. The absolute doubled. As a result, the country is unable to keep number of poor is projected to rise from 4.7 mil- up with the increased demand for food. Poverty is lion to 6.3 million between 2012 and 2019 (World predominantly a rural phenomenon, the depth and Bank 2017a). People depend on farming and live- severity of poverty has increased, and the number stock, but agriculture is challenging as the El Niño of poor grew to 951,000 in 2011 from 795,000 in weather phenomenon is making rainy seasons 2005. In addition, urban poverty remains important, unpredictable. The rural population is vulnerable, especially in Brazzaville. In rural areas, 7 out of 10 with 87 percent of the rural population living below (69.4 percent) people are poor; 57.4 percent of poor the poverty line. In addition, 40 percent of children people live in rural areas. Nationally, despite pop- under five are stunted, according to the FAO (2017), ulation growth between the two years, the number with low height for their age caused by chronic mal- of poor decreased to 1,658,000 in 2011, down from nutrition. The level of maternal health is poor, with 1,801,000 in 2005 (World Bank 2017b). high mortality rates due to inadequate access to health services. This dependence on expensive imported prod- ucts, often in processed forms, has negative An influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees implications on food security and nutritional fleeing conflict in neighboring countries has quality in Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Gabon put additional pressure on Chad’s already lim- is 109 in terms of the HDI out of 188 countries. ited resources. Refugees, displaced people, and Gabon’s performance in terms of human develop- other poor communities in the Lake Chad basin are ment is still far from its economic potential, with a dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival. poverty rate in 2014 estimated at 30 percent of the population (UNDP 2014). In Equatorial Guinea, The Republic of Congo’s Human Development because imported products sold in supermarkets Index (HDI) rating is high by regional stan- are expensive, only 20 percent of the population dards, but it masks unequal wealth distribution can cover 100 percent of their daily nutritional and high poverty rates (UNDP, 2014). Nearly needs in terms of calories and protein. According half the population lives below the poverty line and to the national authorities, in 2006, 76 percent of 14 percent of families are food insecure. In addi- the population were living in poor conditions (less tion, 24 percent of children under five are chron- than CFAF 1,000 per day) (República de Guinea ically malnourished, and malnutrition has remained Ecuatorial and FAO 2012). Both Equatorial the fifth leading cause of premature death for a Guinea and Gabon are dependent on food imports, decade. Food production is based on subsistence enabled by high revenues from oil production, that farming of tubers and cassava, and while they are mostly come from Spain and France, the formal calorific, these crops have limited nutritional value. colonial powers. Consequently, these countries The Republic of Congo’s food supplies are highly are affected by both undernutrition (malnutrition dependent on imports, with more than 75 percent of deficiency) and hyper nutrition (malnutrition by total food requirements being imported. In the past excess). Producing and Sourcing 3.  Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC This section focuses on the production, market- Littoral Administrative Regions), avocado, tomato, ing, and sourcing of agricultural commodities maize, poultry meat, and eggs. The northern part of from Cameroon to the other CEMAC countries. Cameroon (consisting of the North and Far North The focus is mostly up to the border to understand Administrative Regions) is another focus area the production aspects, immediate marketing, and the because of its importance in producing dry cereals, intermediaries along the main channels and corridors groundnuts, and pulses and its geographical position through which agricultural products are sourced from for agricultural trade and livestock transit between Cameroon, as well as the main bottlenecks and costs Chad, the Central African Republic, and Nigeria. that play a role before commodities reach the border. The main messages are developed from the field The main production and marketing insights are observations, the perception survey, and the derived from two geographic regions of Cam- truck rides along the main corridors, as well as eroon (see Image 1). The Western Administrative secondary literature and data. The findings relate Region represents an important and dynamic pro- to CEMAC’s agricultural performance and poten- duction area for commodities traded in the CEMAC tial, the shortcomings of producer organizations area and Nigeria, such as plantain (which is also (POs) in trading, transport issues, the main mar- produced in abundance in Southwest, Central, and keting channels (including actors and institutions), Image 1  Cameroon’s regions and main selected agricultural trade flows Source: Atlas of Cameroon. 11 12  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa price volatility, market management, and petty for population growth. Chad, the Central African harassment (tracasseries) within Cameroon, as well Republic, and the Republic of Congo have also as other factors that affect the prices paid to farmers expanded their production relative to their popu- and the way farmers access different markets. lation, while Gabon and Equatorial Guinea’s agri- cultural growth rates have not sufficiently matched their population increases. Cameroon’s progress is 3.1 Agricultural production largely due to the increase in cereals production in CEMAC has the potential through the expansion of the area under cultivation (more than doubling between 2005 and 2014, while to meet regional staple yields have mostly stagnated). The net per capita food demand production in the other food sectors has improved as well, apart from livestock for which growth has With population growth and rising urbaniza- kept the pace with population increase. tion in most countries, food demand in CEMAC is growing rapidly. Financial constraints imposed Thus, Cameroon’s agroecological endowment, by lower hydrocarbon prices, as described in the gains in productivity, and importance of the agri- previous section, are impeding countries’ ability cultural sector in the overall economy explain its to meet this increasing food demand. The CEMAC current role as the food supplier of the CEMAC countries have made good progress in the recent region, as well as demonstrate the potential for decade in terms of increasing their domestic food further expansion. Cameroon’s importance for production, as exemplified in Figure 2, including food production in CEMAC has also increased in both crops and livestock. terms of value and share in the region. In correla- tion with the production gains, Cameroon has also In per capita terms, historical gains in agri- constantly increased the value of its net food pro- cultural production are insufficient to meet duction, which accounts for almost two-thirds of CEMAC’s demand. As Figure 3 illustrates, over CEMAC’s total, as shown in Figure 4. Apart from the last decade, food production has increased livestock, Cameroon has the highest production significantly in Cameroon, even when accounting Figure 2  Net food production index (2004–2006 = 100) 180 160 158 152 140 120 118 113 100 106 90 80 60 40 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Rep. Equatorial Guinea Gabon Source: FAOSTAT. Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   13 Figure 3  Net per capita food production index (2004–2006 = 100) 140 130 126 120 113 110 100 95 90 90 82 80 73 70 60 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Rep. Equatorial Guinea Gabon Source: FAOSTAT. Figure 4  Net production value (constant 2004–2006 US$) 10 9 3% 3% 5% 5% 2% 8 3% 4% 5% 3% 5% 7 3% 24% 21% 22% 3% 6% 3% 24% 18% 5% 3% 5% 6 4% 5% 18% 11% 5% 20% 11% 10% 20% 12% Billion $ 5 20% 11% 22% 13% 13% 13% 4 13% 13% 3 58% 60% 61% 57% 62% 2 61% 58% 58% 56% 57% 1 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Rep. Equatorial Guinea Gabon Source: FAOSTAT. 14  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa value levels per capita for all the different food sub- livestock in the northern semiarid plain; (b) cocoa sectors, including for cereals, on par with Chad. production combined with cassava, plantain, and cocoyam in the southern part of the rainforest area Cameroon’s agricultural production patterns and the western and coastal lowlands; (c) Arabica are explained by a wide range of agroecological coffee production combined with maize, cocoyam, zones, allowing the cultivation of 14 major crops, plantain, beans, yams, Irish potatoes, and livestock the highest in CEMAC. Cameroon has five major in the western highlands; (d) robusta coffee produc- agroecological zones: the inland equatorial forest, tion combined with cassava, plantain, and cocoyam the maritime equatorial forest, the highland tropical, in the northern part of the rainforest area and the Guinea-savannah, and Sudan-savannah. This subset western and coastal lowlands; and (e) ruminant pro- of zones represents most of the agroecological zones duction combined with maize, cassava, and beans within which small-scale food production is done in the Adamaoua plateau, a central savannah with in Sub-Saharan Africa. In comparison, the climate tree savannah and grassland. conditions in the other CEMAC countries make it difficult to cultivate a wide range of food crops: Most agricultural households are engaged in in the more humid countries in the south (Gabon, the production of staple crops, in line with the Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo), dry decreasing importance of cash crops in Camer- cereals production is limited (the Central African oon. As Figure 6 indicates, close to 40 percent of Republic is in a similar situation), while for Chad in households grow maize, and between a fifth and the north fruit and vegetable production is difficult. a quarter of producers grow groundnuts, bananas, beans, gombo (okra), plantain, cassava, and sweet Cameroon’s agroecological potential reflects potatoes. The most important cash crop cultivated some of the diversity in the CEMAC region, is cacao, grown by 8 percent of households, fol- allowing the country to produce a wide range lowed by cotton (7 percent) and coffee (3 percent). of crop and livestock products (see Figure 5). Rice, one of the most consumed products in North In value terms, cassava, plantains, oil palm fruit, Cameroon, is grown by only 4.4 percent of house- maize, and taro are the most important. In value holds. Interestingly, the vegetable production (such terms, plantains, bananas, cassava, tomatoes, and as tomatoes, onions, and garlic), part of the daily beef account for almost half of total agriculture menu of many households, is concentrated with value. a small number of agricultural households. Apart from chickens, one in four (26.5 percent) agricul- Despite the recent gains, the agricultural sector tural households raises cattle and other livestock. in Cameroon remains characterized predomi- nantly by traditional family farming, 63 percent Production and trade dynamics are also influ- of which are smallholders of less than 2 hect- enced by Cameroon’s ethnic diversity, with about ares (ha). Smallholder family farming households 250 groups widespread beyond national borders (about 2 million) contribute 60 percent of food pro- into other CEMAC countries and Nigeria. These duction, operate in the informal sector, and repre- ethnic groups mainly fall under the Bantu, Semitic, sent 75 percent of the agricultural labor force. While and Nilotic language groups and have traditionally more than half of Cameroonian households practice engaged in agricultural specificities. The Bamileke, agriculture, poor households are more dependent a Bantu community, has a strong focus on agricul- on this activity than nonpoor ones (88 percent com- ture, mainly handled by women. The Beti-Pahuin pared to 42 percent) (INS 2015). The main farming are another Bantu ethnic community, occupying systems are (a) cotton production combined with the southern rainforest regions of Cameroon and groundnuts, millet, sorghum, irrigated rice, and mostly engaged in cocoa farming. The Fulani are Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   15 Figure 5  Main agricultural commodities produced in Cameroon (by volume in million tons, 2016 [left] and by value in million constant 2004–2006 US$, 2014 [right]) Cassava 5.5 Plantains 4.3 Oil palm fruit 2.7 Maize 2.2 Taro (cocoyam) 1.8 Sorghum 1.3 Sugarcane 1.3 Bananas 1.2 Tomatoes 1.2 Vegetables, fresh nes 0.8 Groundnuts, with shell 0.7 Yams 0.6 Sweet potatoes 0.4 Beans, dry 0.4 Potatoes 0.4 Rice, paddy 0.4 Pineapples 0.3 Onions, dry 0.3 Cocoa, beans 0.3 Cucumbers and gherkins 0.3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Millions tons Plantains 801.6 Bananas 484.1 Cassava 431.5 Tomatoes 324.5 Meat indigenous, cattle 302.3 Cocoa, beans 280.3 Taro (cocoyam) 266.1 Groundnuts, with shell 261.1 Beans, dry 208.1 Maize 153.1 Vegetables, fresh nes 147.7 Sorghum 130.7 Yams 118.2 Cotton lint 115.8 Oil, palm fruit 110.1 Meat indigenous, chicken 100.6 Cottonseed 66.8 Rubber, natural 63.8 Milk, whole fresh cow 57.9 Cow peas, dry 57.3 0 200 400 600 800 Millions US$ Source: FAOSTAT. 16  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Figure 6  Agricultural households by crops produced (percent, 2014) 45 40 38 35 30 27 27 25 Percent 25 21 20 20 20 20 15 15 13 12 12 9 8 10 7 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 un ze Ba uts Be na s a e e a s in ot v a rg s C Po hum am es ro m ili C in C oa lm on oc e o um m M ice m go C es ne ee O p le G ns ab er C e C s G t R lic r ro be an So toe u Pl kr Av tre ad g Pu Ch Sw C nta pk Ya /ta C g ar ro ai t p sa oy to o o itr na oc Pa ott To an Pi off ba ar R dn ap O Pl n ub at ni G M a oc ta i a Source: ECAM 4, Institut National de la Statistique (INS), Cameroun 2014. nomadic tribes who are mostly travelling with live- limited as Cameroon has a ratio of 0.1 tractor per stock in the northern part of the country. As further 1,000 ha and access to finance is problematic, since detailed in the report, this ethnic diversity plays a agricultural producers are unable to produce bank- key role in informal trade in the CEMAC region, as able proposals for the already limited number of often small-scale trade is carried out by members of financial products in the sector. the same group from both sides of the border. Cameroon’s agroecological differences across its Agricultural producers in Cameroon continue regions, combined with regional particularities to face the same interlinked issues limiting in agricultural production and marketing, result their production as in most Sub-Saharan coun- in uneven output distribution (as indicated in tries. Both field visits and discussions with public Figure 7 and Figure 8). Three regions particularly authorities indicate that access to inputs is limited, stand out and were included in this analysis as case with the average fertilizer use below 7 kg per ha studies: the western region and the northern part, and fewer than 5 percent of farmers using improved comprising the North and Far North regions. seeds. In addition, seed control and certification services by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural The biophysical conditions make the western Development (MINADER) are weak, and constant region of Cameroon one of the most productive project support to the seed system remains nec- parts of the country and an important sourc- essary. Similarly, the quality of the fertilizers and ing area for agricultural trade in CEMAC. The phytosanitary products available on the market is western region is the country’s smallest in terms fluctuating, often leading to informal and uncer- of area (around 14,000 km2) and the most densely tified imports. Extension service coverage is also populated (128.5 people per km2 against a national insufficient and often unable to advise on new dis- average of 41.6 people per km2) (MINADER 2017). eases (for example, recent occurrences of fall army- The region is characterized by high plateaus sur- worm, as observed during field visits). POs (as rounded by plains and a chain of mountains. The detailed in the next section) have weak institutional climate is humid tropical with bimodal rainy sea- capacity and sustainability, particularly for storage, sons that sometimes overlap. The vegetation is gen- processing, and marketing. Mechanization is very erally dominated by a grassy savannah at the top Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   17 Figure 7  Production of main crops in Cameroon, by region, 2011 (percent) 80 67% 60 58% Percent 40 19% 20 0 ua r st th l th t t h t ra es es es te ut Ea or or ao tto en W w hw So N N th am Li C ut e or m So Ad N tre Ex Maize Cassava Potatoes Beans Tomatoes Plantain Bananas Source: National Institute of Statistics, Cameroon, 2015. Figure 8  Headcount of main livestock species in Cameroon, by region, 2013 (percent of total) 45 40 37% 35 Percent national total 32% 30 25 22% 22% 20 16% 15 14% 10 5 2% 1% 0 ua r st th l th t t h t ra es es es te ut Ea or or ao tto en W w hw So N N th am Li C ut e or m So Ad N tre Ex Cattle Sheep Goat Pigs Source: National Institute of Statistics, Cameroon, 2015. of the hills and forests in the valleys. The natural recent available data indicate (as in Figure 5) that conditions of the mountains (abundance of water, the western region is leading in the production of fertile volcanic soils) as well as the hydromorphic tomatoes, maize, potatoes, and beans, with impor­ soils of the lowlands are well suited to agricultural tant quantities of plantains and bananas as well. production, especially for market gardening. More- over, vegetable production in the shallows allows Part of this performance is explained by the a third harvest during the dry season, intercropped region’s transition from an intensive coffee pro- with maize or beans (Fongang 2009). The most duction area to a complex fragmented territory 18  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa with diverse production. The intensive system account for almost 30 percent of Cameroon’s pop- of coffee production implemented by the settlers ulation and are the poorest and most food insecure around 1940 had remained stable for half a cen- parts of the country (poverty rates being 74.3 per- tury. With the oil crisis of 1973, however, the areas cent in Far North and 67.9 percent in North). The devoted to coffee trees were gradually reduced in climate is Sudano-Sahelian and increasingly arid as favor of other crops and livestock. Few coffee plan- one moves north, with an average annual rainfall of tations remain now, while the production of vegeta- 400–500 mm in Maroua against 800 mm per year bles created a new spatial dynamic with new flows in Garoua, just 170 km to the south. The concentra- of people and goods. The growth of food crops tion of activities during the few months of the rainy has profoundly changed the organization of space season results in significant labor shortages and by increasing the area devoted to vegetable, fruits, is one of the main handicaps of agriculture at this and staple crops that occupy most of the fields latitude. Still, almost all (95 percent) of the millet, ­ (Uwizeyimana 2009). The Foumbot urban center 75 percent of the sorghum, two-thirds of the rice, near Bafoussam is no longer depending on coffee and a quarter of the maize productions are grown in trade and has instead become one of the largest these two northern regions, along with groundnuts, agricultural markets in the country. onions, and cotton. In terms of livestock, the western region spe- Northern Cameroon is also a major livestock cializes in poultry production. While the region’s producing area, along with the significant live- population of cattle, small ruminants, and pigs is stock transit that crosses from Chad into Nige- relatively small compared with the northern and ria and the CEMAC countries. The two northern eastern parts of Cameron, the west is by far the most regions have more than half of the small ruminant important poultry meat and egg producing area. In headcount (sheep and goats) and almost a third of 2013 (most recent available comparable data), the the cattle population. western region produced 56,000 tons of eggs, a staggering 87 percent of the national total, and pro- Nonetheless, the two northern regions are the duction has since continued to increase, reaching most exposed to environmental degradation, 85,000 tons in 2016. Similarly, poultry meat is an droughts, floods, and locust incidents, signifi- important output, accounting for about 20 percent cantly affecting harvests and increasing food of the national production in 2013. In addition to insecurity. Despite the production potential, which eggs and meat, live animals are exported from the is more than sufficient for the local population, the western region to the southern CEMAC countries poverty situation often requires producers to sell and to Nigeria. The recent expansion of the poul- their crops immediately at harvest time, at mini- try sector has nevertheless been slowed down by mum prices, for urgent income needs. The vulner- an avian flu outbreak in recent years, particularly ability to climate-related shocks is exacerbated by in 2017 when a significant portion of farms were frequent and continuous political crises (in the Lake affected, and public authorities had to prohibit the Chad basin, the Central African Republic, and Chad sale and movement of animals and slaughter an to a certain degree). Consequentially, the northern important part of the poultry population. part has been and remains Cameroon’s main food insecure food area, with constant need for the gov- Northern Cameroon is also an important pro- ernment’s (see Box 1) and international partners’ duction area, particularly for livestock and dry support. cereals. The two regions of North and Far North Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   19 Box 1  The Cereals Office in northern Cameroon The Cereals Office (Office céréalier) is a public institution created in 1975 to act as a cereal bank and price stabilization mechanism in the northern part of Cameroon by acquiring, stocking, and reselling the main staple foods consumed in the area. With headquarters in Garoua, northern region, and five centers in the three northern regions (North, Far North, and Adamaoua), the office is under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture. The office’s storage capacity has increased significantly over the recent years, particularly with the support of international partners who invested in its storage infrastructure. Yet, the limited financial resources allow the office to use only a quarter of its 40,000-ton stor- age capacity. The cereals bought are sorghum, millet, maize, and rice, from the farmers in the proximity of the warehouses (located mostly in the cities of Garoua, Maroua, and Ngaoundéré). Since 2013, the office has increased its acquisitions from around 5,300 tons to 12,300 tons in 2017, less than 1 percent of the region’s production. The stocking is done at harvest time at market prices and resold during the lean season at preferential prices (up to 20 percent lower than market prices, but still higher than at harvest time). Selling to the most in need is not usually checked and some of the more vulnerable rural populations have no access to its warehouses. Yet, the reselling is done in small quan- tities to a diverse client base to prevent traders from acquiring a large quantity. The price stabilization part of the office’s mandate has never materialized as the office had limited financial resources since its creation, making it impossible to buy, store, and redistribute sufficient quantities to have an impact on the market. Overall, the office’s financial position is degrading, despite modest gains made from the price difference, because of its high running costs and decreasing support from the government. Source: Field visit and interview, February 2018. 3.2 Insufficient commercial unions, 67 unions of cooperatives, and 11 federa- tions of cooperatives. This distribution between organization of producers CIGs and cooperatives is partly explained by the limits their negotiating more binding requirements for cooperatives set in power the legislation, as well as by the underdeveloped understanding of associative benefits. In general, While the PO landscape in Cameroon is quite most POs are created to access external funding, in developed, very few producers are organized for most cases from projects, and their sustainability is grouped sales and commercial links, particu- limited. New interventions by the government and larly with foreign value chain actors. The most its partners are usually uncoordinated and targeting recent data indicate that in 2012 there were more the creation of further POs and the consolidation than 120,000 grassroots POs: 115,581 Common of some of the existing ones in unions and feder- Initiative Groups (CIGs with 10 members on aver- ations, while efforts at strengthening existing POs age), 3,647 unions of CIGs, 59 federations of CIG are occurring only in more recent projects. unions, 1,853 production cooperatives, 1,575 credit 20  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Field observations indicate very few POs go encountered during field visits constantly identi- beyond grouping interests regarding production fied prices as their main concern, particularly in the to engage in organized commercial activities western region where production has increased faster (see Box 2). While producers often used their POs than the marketing opportunities and the supporting for accessing project and non-project funding, for transport and processing infrastructure. Producers bulk buying inputs and in some instances for engag- also expressed a clear preference for foreign buyers ing technical and advisory services for production, (or their representatives), who usually offer better there are very few instances of grouped sales, com- prices than local value chain actors or intermediaries. mercial links, or processing activities, unless as an immediate outcome of an ongoing project. For the Nonetheless, recent interventions are starting to smaller individual producers in the POs, the imme- support the commercial links between producers diate income needs (as a result of external shocks and other value chain actors, but generally only and reliance on agricultural incomes) make it dif- within Cameroon. For example, the two ongoing ficult to synchronize the sale of agricultural prod- World Bank projects (Agriculture Investment and ucts and organize the larger quantities demanded Market Development Project (Projet d’Investisse- by the buyers. In addition, asynchronous harvests ment et de Développement des Marchés Agricoles for members of a PO (particularly for perishable [PIDMA]) and Livestock Development Project goods such as the tomatoes produced in the western (Projet de Développement de l’Élevage [PRODEL]) region) add to the difficulty of organizing a large have components dedicated to supporting POs to and constant supply. The costs of field access and engage in value chains, including in ‘productive alli- transport and lacking storage facilities are also lead- ances’. Field visits in the western region identified a ing to insufficient grouping of production, as large medium-scale maize producer, part of a cooperative buyers prefer dealing with larger producers instead supported by PIDMA, who explained the successful of having their trucks visiting multiple fields. link between their PO and a large poultry producer, which is buying all their production in a predictable As a result, producers have limited negotiating manner with a premium over market prices. In the power while selling their production—a fact con- northern regions, producers also mentioned PIDMA firmed both by the survey and field observations. support to organizing cooperatives to have their own Almost three-quarters of the producers surveyed storage units and group their sales. Nevertheless, perceive that they do not have the power to negoti- while recognizing the market opportunities in the ate prices (Figure 9), in sharp contrast with the per- larger CEMAC area, POs and their members are not ceived negotiating power of intermediary traders, yet exploring commercial links directly with large who report sufficient leeway both when buying and buyers from the neighboring countries, nor are they selling (90 percent of respondents). The producers yet supported by public initiatives. Figure 9  Perceived negotiating power of agricultural producers Farmers: When selling crops or livestock, I have the power to negotiate the price I want. (N =76) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Perceptions survey, January–February 2018. Note: N = Number of respondents. Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   21 Box 2  Producers organizations and market links: the case of NOWEFOR NOWEFOR is a federation of 12 CIGs founded in 1995 in four provinces (Mezam, Momo, Bui, and Donga-Mantung) of North-West region of Cameroon. Its 2,500 members are orga- nized into unions based on their primary agricultural production activity: maize, rice, cassava, yam, potatoes, tomatoes, ginger, palm oil, poultry, and pork. Its core technical team includes a salaried coordinator, three thematic employees (production, marketing, and microfinance), 36 sales representatives, and 25 technical animators. Its sources of funding come from external grants, membership fees, interest payments, and sales levies. Initially, the poultry producers used to sell at the Bamenda market, but they had little negoti- ating power. NOWEFOR contacted the restaurants in the city to arrange regular supply, and the producers are now collaborating with seven restaurants, each buying 50 chickens per week. While prices are not higher than at the market, the producers are benefitting from a constant outlet for their production, resulting in faster sales and limited animal losses. For the tomato producers, at the end of 2005, NOWEFOR reached an agreement with a supermarket chain in Douala for regular weekly delivery for an initial six months. Between December 2005 and September 2006, a total of 25.2 tons of tomatoes were delivered to the buyer. To meet the demand for quality products, NOWEFOR had to organize technical training for its members (for example, on integrated pest management). The contractual arrangement lasted only a year: according to NOWEFOR, the main reasons for termination were the long delay in payment by the buyer (on average three months after delivery) and the difficulties in ensuring the balance between the quantity and quality requirements of the buyer. Source: Fongang 2012. 3.3 Poor-quality transport car (pickup), or small- and medium-size trucks. Road access to the field is often too difficult for big infrastructure is impeding trucks larger than 10–12 tons, which would repre- market access both within sent the typical load for export and for larger pro- Cameroon and to CEMAC ducers or smaller producers organized for grouped countries sales. In the perception survey, a third of respon- dents complained about the difficulties in bringing Poor-quality transport infrastructure and the their agricultural products to the immediate market associated costs are an important bottleneck for (see Figure 10). producers and traders of agricultural produce. Despite gains in productivity and exports to the The cost of evacuating agricultural commodi- CEMAC region, transport costs have increased in ties from the field to the nearest market often recent years, both for short- and long-distance legs. accounts for most of the production cost. For Farmers typically hire transporters to carry their example, data collected in the production areas goods, as even large producers do not usually own around Bafoussam in the western region indicate their own trucks. Depending on the size of the pro- that short-distance transport costs up to 25 km duction and the marketing mechanism, farmers can from field to immediate market or buyer can range choose transport by motorcycle, small car, larger from US$0.51 per ton per km for a 10-ton truck 22  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Figure 10  Perceived ease of market access for agricultural producers Farmers: It is easy to bring my crops and livestock to the market. (N = 76) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Perceptions survey, January–February 2018. Note: N = Number of respondents. to US$0.63 per ton per km for a 3-ton pickup to Similarly, transporting agricultural products US$0.91 per ton per km for a car transporting a from production area markets to consump- mixed load. This range of short-distance costs is tion centers within Cameroon and in CEMAC four to eight times more expensive/higher than long-­ is costly. Long-distance transport of agricultural distance transport (as detailed below), a difference products is done with larger trucks of 12 tons or in line with evidence from the literature on trans- more, depending on the destination. For the west- port costs in Sub-Saharan Africa (Teravaninthorn ern region agricultural production, the transport and Raballand 2009). Compared with production on the first leg of transboundary corridors or the costs, short-distance transport represents between shortest trips from Foumbot to Yaoundé (270 km) 15 percent and 25 percent of the total, depending and Douala (300 km) usually cost between CFAF on load size and perishable nature. In addition, pro- 150,000 (US$283) and CFAF 250,000 (US$471.7) ducers are also increasingly complaining about the and trips take seven to eight hours. The 260 km insufficient number of available vehicles, which trip from Yaoundé (itself the center of an impor­ has increased costs in recent years. tant agricultural producing region) to the southern Image 2  Tomatoes being loaded in a pickup in the field, western region, Cameroon Source: Photo by team during fieldwork. Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   23 border markets such as Abang Minko costs on from one of the urban markets in Douala indicates average CFAF 210,000 (US$377.40), with a sim- that for the Foumbot-Douala leg only, losses for a ilar duration of seven hours. Within Cameroon on truck of tomatoes would be roughly 8 percent (20 this route, the resulting average cost per ton per km baskets from a total load of 250 baskets). In addi- for long-distance transport is US$0.12, in line with tion, another 20 percent of the load (50 out of 250 other estimates in the literature (for example, along baskets) would be damaged and would sell for a the Douala–N’Djamena corridor, the transport lower price. Similarly, for livestock, transporters cost per ton per km is also estimated at US$0.12, indicated that between one and four animals die while for Douala–Bangui, it is US$0.17 ton per on a regular trip from production area to an urban km [Nathan Associates Inc. 2013]). Interestingly, market. the data from the truck trips indicate that the cost from the ­ Cameroon–Gabon border to Libreville For long-distance traffic, the agricultural cargo (475 km) for a 20-ton truck is roughly CFAF losses are exacerbated by theft. Transporters 697,500 (US$1,316), resulting in a significantly report constant theft issues, particularly in the case lower cost per ton per km of only US$0.08. This of smaller trucks on the Foumbot to Douala, and result is lower than most estimations for transport Yaoundé routes. In areas where poor road conditions costs in West and Central African corridors, but it and congestion slow traffic, thieves climb the trucks can be partly explained by lower fuel prices and and remove bags or baskets to be thrown on the side better infrastructure in Gabon. High long-distance of the road and collected by the rest of the team. transport costs are partly due to infrastructure lim- Usually, truck drivers do not take the risk to stop and itations and partly due to governance challenges, continue the trip, even if losses are often absorbed such as trucking cartels, that limit market entry. from their fees. Data collected during the field visits indicate that 3 out of 10 trucks are subject to theft Both short- and long-distance transport result in on a typical domestic trip from production area to an important losses due to the poor condition of the urban center (a 250 km leg), with losses estimated at infrastructure. Particularly for perishable goods 8–10 baskets for perishable goods such as tomatoes such as tomatoes and other vegetables, poor road or one to two bags for dry goods. Based on the typi- conditions, coupled with overloading of trucks, lead cal volume, theft losses are approximately 1 percent, to important losses or product damage. In addition, a conservative estimate given that transporters also over fragmentation of transport from production to report that products are removed from their cargo consumption increases these risks, as products are at the various checkpoints along the trip and during shifted from various means of transportation and technical stops for urgent truck maintenance. in different configurations. For example, a typi- cal basket of tomatoes or bag of avocadoes would In addition to road toll payments, transporters first be transported from the field to the immediate also pay several types of access fees along the market by motorcycle or small pickup, unloaded, corridors. In the production areas in the western and then loaded into a 12 to 20 ton truck that could region, most local authorities charge access fees possibly stop for unloading in Yaoundé or Douala (droit de circulation) for trucks coming to load agri- before continuing to one of the border markets in cultural products, regardless of whether they pick the south, where the load would be broken down up the goods from the field or from a market. For into smaller loads to be carried in a car by small and example, at the Foumbot market, the fee range is medium Gabonese traders, who would wholesale in as follows: CFAF 550 (US$1.00) for a 7-ton truck, Libreville to retailers who might then repack and CAFAF 1,000 (US$1.90) for a 10-ton truck, CFAF transport the cargo again for final sale. Data on the 1,500 (US$2.80) for a 15-ton truck, CFAF 3,000 losses along the entire chain are not available, given (US$5.70) for a 20-ton truck, and CFAF 5,000 the multitude of actors involved, but information (US$9.40) for a 26-ton truck. 24  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Image 3  Vegetables being transferred from a car to a truck at Foumbot market, Cameroon Source: Photo by team during fieldwork. Besides the quality of the road infrastructure, lack of any sanitary facilities and resting places and transport in Cameroon is also impeded by insuf- often choose gas stations and urban periphery neigh- ficient loading/parking/waiting areas for large borhoods as pit stops, thereby overcrowding these trucks. From smaller, rural markets to Douala and places and increasing the risks of theft and harass- Yaoundé and vice versa, the available facilities to ment. As recently as March 2018, transporter organi- load and park trucks are insufficient, particularly in zations in Cameroon organized a nationwide strike to Douala where the port serves as a gateway for trade in draw the government’s attention to the implications of Central Africa. Transporters often complain about the the closing of the Bépanda truck parking in Douala. Image 4  Ad hoc truck waiting areas in the outskirts of Douala   Source: Photos by team during fieldwork. Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   25 The high number of 3.4  rural market, mostly held weekly, at the intersection intermediaries increases of multiple villages and production basins, usu- ally no further than 25 km from the farm. In these the cost of agricultural immediate markets, the producers can sell their trade goods directly (retail for localized consumption) or sell to an intermediary (buyam sellam), who group The large number of intermediaries along the production for large, mostly Cameroonian buyers main channels are a response to insufficient that pass with their trucks through the small rural commercial links and marketing bottlenecks. As markets. The next level, the collection market (for Figure 11 summarizes, there are six major blocks example, the one in Foumbot), is used for greater in a typical agricultural trade corridor (farm/field, transactions: larger producers sell their goods— immediate market, collection market, urban mar- through intermediaries—to the foreign and Cam- kets, border market, and finally the foreign market) eroonian buyers, who continue from this market and various degrees of intermediation, depend- directly to the border or Yaoundé/Douala. Border ing on available commercial links and informa- markets are often used as an intermediary point to tion, market infrastructure, size of actors, power fragment large consignments of agricultural goods of negotiation, and availability of buyers. At the for medium-size buyers, who cross the border as producing end, farmers sometimes have the option intermediaries between the wholesale and retail of directly selling their output to large urban and phases (for more details, see Box 3). For goods that foreign buyers and local intermediaries (buyam do not pass through border markets, the end point is sellam) or transporting the goods themselves to the wholesale-to-­retail urban markets in the capitals a larger market (urban or border). Otherwise, the and large cities of neighboring CEMAC countries. immediate outlets for agricultural products are the Figure 11  Main marketing channels for agricultural trade in CEMAC Least used Most used Minimum intermediation Medium intermediation High intermediation channel channel channel Producers’ fields and farms Immediate markets Collection markets (Foumbot) Urban markets in Cameroon (Yaoundé/Douala) Border markets Border Foreign CEMAC market = Direction of the interaction = Intermediation point along the marketing channel = Final intermediation from wholesale to retail Source: Elaboration based on field visits. 26  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Box 3  Border markets in CEMAC At the Cameroon–Gabon frontier, Abang-Minko hosts the renowned Marché Mondial, a large market held on the Cameroonian side of the border on Saturdays. The Mondial has historically been an important weekly appointment for regional traders, especially those of Gabonese nationality crossing into Cameroon to buy agricultural commodities. However, interactions with traders and officials at the border revealed that the event has been progres- sively losing part of its importance over the past few years, due to, among other reasons, lower Gabonese demand for Cameroonian goods—this, in turn, would be possibly a result of recent economic downturn in Gabon, where both national GDP and per capita income shrank by over 20 percent between 2014 and 2016. The Mondial hosts a total of about 1,500–2,000 vendors. Market operators are mostly trad- ers of Cameroonian nationality, namely, retailers and wholesalers, who typically purchase goods from the Abang-Minko area or other regions of Cameroon and resell them at the Mondial—only in rare occasions they would be producers too. Some traders, including those operating out of permanent shops, would work at the market on a daily basis, yet others, including many smaller-scale ones, would typically only come on Saturdays. Trucks prepar- ing for market day can be seen starting from Thursday afternoon or Friday morning. Also in southern Cameroon, the Kye-Ossi market, held daily, hosts several retail and whole- sale traders selling a variety of agricultural products. Among others, the most commonly traded items include tomato, onion, potato, beans, ginger, and palm oil. Many originate from other areas of Cameroon, such as Foumbot (tomato, potato), Maroua/Garoua (onion), or Bamenda (potato), and they would be typically transported to Kye-Ossi on Cameroonian trucks between 6 and 12 tons, with loading taking place either on the production site or at larger markets such as Yaoundé. Market vendors are almost exclusively Cameroonians. Wholesalers would typically make their orders from the market via phone, calling Cameroonian intermediaries in source loca- tions such as Foumbot, Maroua/Garoua, or Bamenda, while smaller-scale traders and retail- ers would buy from them on the market site. Payments would typically be made via mobile money by a unique buyer if this is large enough to be able to afford a full truck of goods (or even more than one truck)—instead, smaller traders who are still buying at a wholesale level but cannot pay for an entire load would typically pool their resources and make a joint order. Finally, retailers buying small amounts from wholesalers on-site would generally pay cash. Customers buying at the market would be primarily Gabonese (typically proceeding from Bitam but also from further away locations such as Oyem or Libreville) and Equatorial Guin- eans; albeit Cameroonians coming from villages around Kye-Ossi are also found. In most cases, market operators would be traders rather than producers. The Ambam market is held daily in the city center of Ambam, southern Cameroon. It hosts about 300–350 vendors, all Cameroonians, selling a variety of agricultural goods mostly pur- chased from other (bigger) markets, albeit a few commodities are sourced locally. Vendors are predominantly female, while men are mostly involved in wholesaling, that is, supplying retailers, and operate bars, shops, and other commercial activities in the market area. Most commonly traded items include potatoes, tomatoes, beans, peanuts, and herbs, among oth- ers. Market vendors are almost exclusively Cameroonian traders, who sell goods coming Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   27 primarily from Yaoundé (on a fortnightly or monthly basis) or, to a lesser extent, from the Marché Mondial held weekly in Abang-Minko—on the other hand, tomato and plantain appear to be locally sourced commodities. Vendors at the market include two main categories: retailers operating street stalls (for the most part, they would buy their goods from market wholesalers and sell them to local cus- tomers in small amounts) and wholesalers generally working in concrete rooms with proper roofing of 6–9 m2. They buy their merchandise from Yaoundé or Abang-Minko (although its original provenance would typically be western or northern Cameroon) and have it trans- ported to Ambam, where they would sell it mostly to market vendors (in 100 kg bags) or to local customers (in retail amounts). Orders to suppliers are typically made via phone, and Western Union or mobile money is used for payment purposes—suppliers are responsible for arranging transportation, which normally takes place through big trucks (for example, around 30 tons) that may leave from Yaoundé three to four times per week on average. At the Central African Republic–Cameroon border, Garoua-Boulai hosts a large market fea- turing a broad range of items, including a variety of agricultural products such as onion, gar- lic, tomatoes, and cassava, as well as beverages, clothing, and shoes. Market vendors are almost exclusively Cameroonians, with the exception of small-scale (female) Central African traders selling cassava—of these, some would live across the border in the Central African Republic and make multiple trips to the market every day, while some others have resettled on the Cameroon side following the refugee crisis. Central African traders who come for the day may either cross by foot (if carrying small amounts, for example, 1 cassava bag) or use carts when trading up to 7–10 bags. The provenance of agricultural commodities at the market is varied, with Cameroonian products such as onion from Garoua and Maroua in the north, groundnut from Touboro, and potato from Bamenda. At the intersection of Cameroon, Chad, and the Central African Republic’s frontiers, the Mbaiboum region is a historic meeting point between people from the west (Fulani, Peul), south, and north. The border market of Mbaiboum is in North Cameroon, in the depart- ment of Mayo-Rey, and part of the city of Touboro (35 km away from the city center). Owing to recent public and private investment by Sodecoton, the area benefits from the necessary road and bridge infrastructure, allowing the regional border market to flourish. The market takes place three times per week and attracts trades from the entire region and beyond, including Nigeria and Sudan. The livestock market, taking place once per week, hosts the sale of around 800–900 heads during the dry season and around 2,000 heads during the rainy season. The livestock comes mostly from Cameroon and Chad and the clients are Cameroonians, Sudanese, Nigerians, Central African, and Gabonese. A special market place allows trucks to load large quantities of livestock before leaving for the main consumption centers in the region (Yaoundé, Douala, Bangui, and so on). Recently, security became a major concern and traders are benefitting from military escort from Touboro to the market in the early morning and on the way back at the end of the trading day. Without the escort, the risks of attacks are very high. The taxes at the Mbaiboum market are CFAF 1,500 (US$2.80) per head of livestock originating from Cameroon and CFAF 4,700 (US$8.90) for livestock from outside the country. These fees are distributed between the municipality, the customs, and the Ministry of Livestock. 28  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa At the northern frontier between Cameroon and Chad, right across the Logone River from N’Djamena, Kousséri is the main border market in the Far North region of Cameroon. Tak- ing place every day, the market allows direct exchanges with the Chadian capital on the other side of the border. There are three main types of flows: (a) transit, from Chad to Nige- ria (mainly livestock and sesame) and vice versa (mostly processed product, such as oil); (b) export from Cameroon to Chad (and to a small degree to Nigeria) of maize, sorghum, rice, yams, fruit, onion, sugarcane from northern Cameroon, or plantain and vegetables from central and southern Cameroon; and (c) import from Chad to Cameroon, mostly livestock, sesame, groundnut, and some vegetables. In terms of infrastructure, the commune of Kous- seri has a vaccination park, a slaughterhouse, a cattle market, a sty, rangeland, a forage field, and rearing facilities. The market has around 250 vendors. Source: Field visits and interviews. In Figure 11, the agricultural trade channels with where the producer has insufficient connections at fewest intermediaries are the least used, given the the market and has to use a larger intermediary. difficulties in forming commercial links, transport- ing, and organizing large quantities. Only few and Agricultural trade channels with multiple inter- generally large producers encountered during field mediaries are the most common. The intermediate visits are able to sell their products directly to a foreign example is when producers cannot directly sell to buyer, although the practice is becoming more com- large buyers, mostly because of insufficient quantities mon, particularly with traders or buyers coming from and lack of access. In this case, producers transport Nigeria. As already highlighted, it is difficult for small their goods to an immediate rural market or to a col- producers to organize the large quantities that foreign lection market (such as the one in Foumbot), where buyers are interested in, and direct access of large they sell their goods to intermediaries. Alternatively, trucks to the field is impeded by poor road conditions. some of the intermediaries come directly to the vil- lages and buy from producers. In both instances, the On the other hand, producers have a strong pref- intermediaries are obtaining significant and constant erence for dealing directly with the large buyers, margins, given their negotiation power and knowl- as usually they obtain better prices. Foreign buy- edge of the production areas and potential buyers. ers from Nigeria or Gabon (or their representatives) For example, at the Foumbot market the interme- are perceived as better commercial partners than diaries’ margins range from 16 percent (CFAF 150 the local intermediaries. or US$0.28) for a plantain fruit bunch to 23 percent (CFAF 75 or US$0.14) for a melon to 35 percent Beyond direct commercial links with foreign (CFAF 1,250 or US$2.35) for a basket of tomatoes. buyers, some large producers also transport their goods directly to Yaoundé and Douala or to In general, intermediaries are reluctant to dis- a border market. Using hired transport, these pro- cuss their business model, given that the wider ducers send medium quantities (3–10 tons) directly public is generally aware of the significant mar- to these markets, where they pay for access and gins being charged. The survey results indicate that for intermediaries to sell their products. For exam- in general most traders perceive that they enjoy suf- ple, the market access fee in Douala ranges from ficient power to negotiate prices both when buying CFAF 3,500 (US$6.60) to CFAF 6,500 (US$12.30), (88 percent) and selling (90 percent) agricultural depending on load, while the selling fees range from products (Figure 12). Similar high levels of traders CFAF 100 (US$0.20) per basket sold (tomatoes agree that it is generally easy to find agricultural and other vegetable sold by 20 kg baskets) to up products to trade (80 percent) and their quality is to 25 percent of the value of the load, in instances satisfactory (88 percent) (Figure 13). Following this Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   29 Figure 12  Perceived power of negotiation for traders Traders: When buying agriculture products, I have power to negotiate the price I want. (N = 141) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree I don’t know Traders: When selling agriculture products, I have power to negotiate the price I want. (N = 141) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Perceptions survey, January–February 2018. Note: N = Number of respondents. intermediary point in the production areas, the agri- Most instances of agricultural trade are frag- cultural goods are bought by larger, mostly foreign mented even further, with additional interme- buyers who continue past the border or by Camer- diation costs at each step. Insufficient market oonian traders who continue to one of the border information, asynchronous production and market- markets. These latter markets also have their own ing, and fluctuating domestic and foreign demand intermediaries, whose role is to defragment the lead to further transaction costs. For example, it is larger consignments for trading with the small and quite common for agricultural products to reach medium foreign buyers. a collection market (after being directly sold by Figure 13  Perceived availability and quality of agricultural products for traders Traders: It is easy to find agriculture products for trade. (N = 141) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Traders: I am satisfied with the quality of the agriculture products that I trade. (N = 141) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Perceptions survey, January–February 2018. Note: N = Number of respondents. 30  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa producers or bought at the field by buyam sel- identified price volatility as a major impediment lam’s), from where they are transported to Douala to agricultural production and trade. Particu- and Yaoundé by Cameroonian traders, from where larly for the perishable commodities, but even for they continue to a border market. Once again, sur- some nonperishable ones, prices are perceived to prisingly high and constant margins are charged by fluctuate significantly with only limited correla- intermediaries, resulting in costs three times higher tion to seasonality. Field observations are com- than described earlier. Similarly, as farmers sell their plemented by the survey results (Figure 14) that products in rural markets, intermediaries acting as indicate that 85 percent of farmers believe that the market aggregators transfer the commodities to a prices they receive for their agricultural products collection market, where they collect more prod- are neither fair nor predictable. Several producers ucts, before continuing to an urban market, and sell met on the field described their agricultural activ- to a foreign buyer, directly bound past the border. ity as a ‘lottery’. Price volatility is problematic not only because of the unpredictable returns but also It is worth noting the distinction between intermedi- because producers often do not break even when aries that act as market aggregators (buyam sellam) prices reach minimal levels. For example, calcula- and the ones who execute the wholesale-­ to-retail tions done together with several producers indicated function (detaillants). The latter add another level of how farm gate prices under CFAF 3,000 (US$5.70) cost (15–20 percent) in the markets where they operate for a 20 kg basket of tomatoes are resulting in losses (at all levels), but their function fits well into market for producers. While official statistics are not avail- dynamics. The former are perceived by other market able, the same producers indicated that as recently actors as taking advantage of their cash liquidity and as January 2018 farm gate prices have been below market connections to buy and store agricultural com- the break-even point. The price buildup analysis modities in larger quantities for short periods, until a and the field discussions indicate that halving the large buyer arrives at the market, thus abusing their intermediaries’ (buyam sellam) margins would at a commercial power. In addition, producers and small minimum always result in breaking even. traders complain that buyam sellam monopolize the few existing storage facilities in their respective mar- Unfortunately, there are no regular price col- kets, as well as the limited parking and loading areas. lection mechanisms or market information sys- tems in place to collect information on prices at farm gate or in rural markets to fully verify 3.5 Higher-than-expected these observations. The closest proxy is the data price volatility leads to obtained from the National Institute of Statistics, which collects consumer prices in each of the unpredictable returns regional capitals’ urban markets for a very broad More than price levels, all the producers and a range of agricultural products. Nevertheless, given significant number of other market actors have the proximity of these markets to production areas and the assumed correlation between farm gate and Figure 14  Perceived price fairness and predictability for agricultural producers Traders: The prices I receive for my crops are fair and predictable. (N = 76) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Perceptions survey, January–February 2018. Note: N = Number of respondents. Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   31 consumer prices, the monthly series ranging from On the supply side, one major determinant of 2012 to 2017 can give an indication of trends in price is overproduction at certain times, due price volatility. The price fluctuations of key prod- to producers’ reactions to past price peaks in ucts produced in the areas covered by the markets of a certain month and to relatively high demand Bafoussam (western region) and Garoua (northern in recent years, including from other CEMAC region) are presented in Figure 15 and Figure 16. countries. Tomato is again the most telling exam- ple, as producers and traders met during the field Increasing price volatility is confirmed for cer- visits indicated that the domestic and regional tain crops, particularly in the western region, appetite for it has increased in recent years and while for others the results are inconclusive (as producers have responded accordingly. Similarly, shown in Figure 15). Tomatoes in the Bafoussam the demand for eggs is partly explaining the large market are the prime example, with prices having expansion in commercial poultry farms in the west- increased over the last years despite the growth in ern region. Nevertheless, external shocks (such as production. Price volatility has also increased, par- the avian flu crisis in 2016–2017 or border clo- ticularly since the beginning of 2015; prices in Feb- sures) are having an increasingly disproportionate ruary 2017 were 2.25 times higher than prices four impact on prices. months before in October 2016. Plantain follows a similar trend of increasing prices and increasing The presence of foreign buyers in the market volatility; the peak price of CFAF 322 (US$0.63) also has a significant bearing on price. Producers per kg in August 2017 was 2.3 times higher than met during field visits almost universally praised that six months before in February 2017. It is inter- the presence of foreign buyers and the CEMAC esting to note that both these products are exported plus Nigeria agricultural trade as adding dynamics to neighboring CEMAC countries and to Nigeria. to the market. Nevertheless, the presence of for- Data for other fruits (particularly watermelon) and eign buyers is not constant and not predictable, and vegetables—not included in the figures—indicate while prices increase significantly when Cameroo- similar trends. On the other hand, the price volatil- nian traders compete with external ones, the oppo- ity for maize and avocado claimed by producers is site situation often leads to price crashes. Producers not supported by the consumer price data; avocado have indicated even high daily price fluctuations, maintains its yearly fluctuations due to seasonality, depending on the arrival time of a foreign buyer or while maize prices are slowly decreasing over time its representative to a specific market. with similar price volatility within a season. In the northern region (as shown in Figure 16), the price The lack of a market information system for dis- volatility at the Garoua market is also mixed; for seminating prices, coupled with insufficient price onion, price fluctuations have decreased in intensity awareness, puts producers at an additional dis- over the last years, as a result of increased produc- advantage when it comes to negotiating prices tion (prices are slowly decreasing) and improved for their production. Field visits and discussions storage options. Millet and maize prices had higher with public authorities highlighted the difficulty in fluctuations in 2012 and 2013, followed by a reduc- obtaining any clear information on current prices at tion in volatility in 2014 and 2015, before again different points of the agricultural supply chains and increasingly fluctuating. Groundnut prices had a their evolution. Some larger producers have contacts steady high volatility over the considered period. in the immediate markets and in urban areas and can While these results are mixed, as a note of caution it telephone for price information, but most produc- is worth stressing that some producers have argued ers rely on the information provided by their buyer, that intermediaries force lower prices even in the and no actor has a clear understanding of the final absence of price volatility, given the limited negoti- consumer prices in Douala and Yaoundé and the ating power and insufficient access to information neighboring CEMAC capitals. In addition, the lim- that producers have. ited available price information often turns out to be CFAF per kg. CFAF per kg. CFAF per kg. CFAF per kg. Ja Ja Ja Ja n 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 n- n- n- -1 12 12 12 2 M M M M ay ay ay ay - 12 -1 -1 -1 2 2 2 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 1 2 12 12 12 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n -1 13 13 13 3 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 3 3 3 3 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 13 13 13 13 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n -1 14 14 14 4 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 4 4 4 4 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 14 14 14 14 Source: Data from National Institute of Statistics, Cameroon. January 2012 to September 2017 (CFAF per kg) Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n -1 Tomato Avocado 15 15 15 5 M M M M Maize (grains) Plantain (green) ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 5 5 5 5 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 15 15 15 15 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n -1 16 16 16 6 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 6 6 6 6 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 32  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa 16 16 16 16 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n -1 17 17 17 7 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 7 7 7 7 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 17 17 17 17 Figure 15  Consumer prices’ fluctuations in Bafoussam, western region, Cameroon, CFAF per kg. CFAF per kg. CFAF per kg. CFAF per kg. Ja Ja Ja Ja n 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 n- n- n- 12 12 12 -1 2 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 2 2 2 2 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 12 12 12 12 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n 13 13 13 -1 3 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 3 3 3 3 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 13 13 13 13 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n 1 -1 Source: National Institute of Statistics, Cameroon. 4 14 14 4 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 -1 -1 -1 4 4 4 4 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 14 14 14 14 January 2012 to September 2017 (CFAF per kg) Ja Ja Ja Ja Millet Onion n- n- n- n -1 15 15 15 5 Groundnuts Maize (grain) M M M M ay ay ay ay - 15 -1 -1 -1 5 5 5 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 15 15 15 15 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n -1 16 16 16 6 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 - -1 -1 6 16 6 6 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 16 16 16 16 Ja Ja Ja Ja n- n- n- n -1 17 17 17 7 M M M M ay ay ay ay -1 - -1 -1 Figure 16  Consumer prices’ fluctuations in Garoua, northern region, Cameroon, 7 17 7 7 Se Se Se Se p- p- p- p- 17 17 17 17 Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   33 34  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa counterproductive for producers; responding to past northern regions are generally poorly orga- price peaks in a certain month, they end up overpro- nized and have limited market infrastructure. ducing and pushing the prices lower. For example, The main problems are the generalized absence tomato prices reached very low levels in January of market stalls, with traders selling directly from 2018 (and slowly picking up in February during the the ground; the immediate proximity to the major field mission) despite having peaked in January– roads, leading to traffic jams and dust pollution; the February 2017. As main reasons, the producers indi- lack of dedicated or specialized places by crop; the cated the oversupply on the market and the closed lack of or insufficient access to water and sanitary border between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. facilities; the absence of parking and loading spots for trucks; the uncollected garbage and waste; and the unorganized flow of people and goods imped- Poor market management 3.6  ing further access. In addition, very limited gen- and infrastructure hamper eral market (covered areas, loading and unloading spaces) and storage facilities were observed, which commercial links is particularly problematic during the rainy season Given the estimated traded volumes, the mar- when market participants and their goods enjoy no kets in the production areas in the western and cover. As a result, the limited access for trucks and Image 5  Foumbot market in the western region, Cameroon Source: Photos by team during fieldwork. Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   35 the general lack of organization are slowing down experiences significant traffic for local consump- exchanges and encouraging the proliferation of tion and transport to other places in Cameroon and intermediaries with better commercial connections. to Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. Accord- This situation is typical for both immediate rural ing to market officials, about 45–50 trucks (7 tons) markets and for the larger collection markets, such depart per week to Yaoundé and Douala (315–350 as Foumbot. tons per week) and 10–15 trucks (15 tons) to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (150–225 tons per week). A Particularly in the important production basin smaller number of trucks are bound for Kousséri, to around Bafoussam in the western region, the be traded with Chad, but on the other hand, Foumbot market facilities are insufficient for the size and experiences an increase in volumes in July–August type of agricultural trade currently practiced. when Nigerian buyers arrive in large numbers. Yet, The Foumbot market is a major point in linking the the market area is totally unpaved, is situated on the production areas in the western region with the con- side of the major road, and barely has any covered sumption centers in Cameroon and in the neighbor- areas and concrete buildings, and most of the trad- ing CEMAC countries. Taking place three times a ers sell directly on the ground or in small wooden week (Tuesdays, Fridays, and Sundays), the market shacks, as Image 5 highlights. Image 5  Continued Source: Photos by team during fieldwork. 36  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Larger, urban markets are in no better position Except for the Foumbot market, no receipts when it comes to infrastructure and manage- seemed to be issued for the paid fees, which were ment (Image 6). The Sandanga market in Douala, collected on behalf of the local public author- centrally located and only 1 km from the port, runs ity (town hall, municipality, or local chieftain). every day both as a retail market and a connecting In none of the discussions did market managers or point from production areas in Cameroon to foreign representative indicate that the collected fees are markets. Market access for trucks is limited, with used for the cleaning, running, and development space for about six trucks at a time, while others of their markets. Improvements and investments in must wait, further congesting the already heavy infrastructure are usually the result of the central traffic around the market. While water and sani- government’s, nongovernmental organizations’, or tary facilities are generally available, traders con- international partner’s initiatives. In addition, the tinue selling their products on the ground, with few collection of the fees is rarely systematic, partly tables and stalls for the sellers closest to the market because sellers self-declare and underdeclare the entrance. Overall cleanliness of the market is poor, quantities brought to the market and partly because as garbage collection and cleaning happens once collectors misplace some of the money, in the a day, and there are no clearly demarcated places absence of a ticketing or receipt system. For exam- for waste. Market space segmentation by product is ple, at Foumbot, the market collector indicated in place, but overall mobility in the market is very that 500 tickets of CFAF 100 (US$0.20) would be difficult, given the proximity of sellers to the main issued to sellers on a Sunday and 1,000 tickets each access ways. In addition, the market is developed Tuesday and Friday, for a total of 2,000 tickets for on a terrain with two levels, only one currently sellers on a typical week. This estimate is signifi- linked to the road and allowing access of vehicles. cantly lower than the volume of agricultural goods traded at Foumbot (at least 500 tons are depart- Market fee collection does not seem to be system- ing for Yaoundé, Douala, Gabon, and Equatorial atic and the collected funds are not earmarked Guinea) and the number of people observed at the for market maintenance and development. All market during the field visits. markets visited in the production areas, at the urban centers, and at the border had a fee system In the absence of an organized market manage- in place, with representatives of the local authority ment, traders organize themselves into collective or auxiliaries collecting the charges from the mar- interest groups to ensure that basic functions ket users. For example, at the livestock market in such as cleaning and security are set up, at a sep- Bafoussam, fees are collected based on the number arate cost to the market participants. For exam- of animals brought to the market (not necessarily ple, the Sandanga market in Douala has a public all sold): CFAF 100 (US$0.20) per head of cattle, market management team, whose role is unclear small ruminant, or pig and CFAF 50 (US$0.10) for beyond fee collection on behalf of the municipality, poultry. At the Foumbot market and several other and traders’ association, which charges CFAF 100 smaller rural markets in the western region, the (US$0.20) per day per trader, organizes the clean- fees for crops are CFAF 100 (US$0.20) per 100 kg ing of the market every night and regulates relations bag or 20–25 kg basket of vegetables. In the north, between market participants. Other markets use a markets such as the Yagoua cereal market charge similar but less institutionalized system by paying CFAF 200 (US$0.40) per 100 kg bag of cereals. For third parties to clean, guard, and organize the mar- regular traders or retailers (detaillants), monthly ket premises. fee options are available, with examples rang- ing from CFAF 5,000 (US$9.40) to CFAF 10,000 The scarce market infrastructure, especially (US$18.80). storage facilities, seems to be captured by local Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   37 Image 6  Sandanga market in Douala, Cameroon Source: Photos by team during fieldwork. 38  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa elites and intermediaries. In the few instances Other legitimate functions related to national and where project or governmental interventions have regional security, vehicle and driver fitness, and built warehouses for storing goods at the market, market maintenance needed to support regional smaller market participants are complaining about commerce have also been taken over by the culture the lack of access. Instead, these facilities are often of paying small fines and bribes. used by the buyam sellam intermediaries to store the collected goods while waiting for the arrival of Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) certification large buyers. is another example of a legitimate trade func- tion that, as currently practiced, is more about collecting revenue than protecting from genu- Some valid trade functions 3.7  ine food safety or plant and animal health risks. have become de facto Although field investigations found that phytosan- itary police and veterinary officers in Cameroon tracasseries due to weak are more likely to issue official receipts for their execution services than other agencies along the corridor, the practice of charging mandatory inspection fees Petty harassments, known as tracasseries, are serves little purpose since neighboring CEMAC widespread in the CEMAC region and are a sig- countries have not set any SPS declaration condi- nificant driver of regional trade costs. Tracasse- tions. In this regard, it is not clear what the SPS ries are a generalized form of corruption consisting officers are certifying for other than general appear- of many small payments without receipt, or cause, ance. Managing SPS risks effectively requires to public officials, particularly to the police, army/ well-functioning, professional systems and cannot gendarmerie, weighbridge officials, road traffic be achieved simply through the collection of fees or officers, town council officials, and other authori- selling of SPS permits. Presently, due to a lack of ties. Field investigations found a universal percep- test materials, prescribed protocols, and training, all tion along the corridors that regardless of whether SPS inspections are visual only, and low- and high- all the paperwork is in order, payments are still risk commodities are treated alike. required. Without these payments, public agents simply delay the shipment until payment is made. While there are many dimensions to the impact One of the most frequently cited examples, which of tracasseries, the estimates of direct costs along was also a cause of the March 2018 transporter’s the corridor focus on nontechnical checkpoint strike, is that weigh stations are not calibrated, so stops. These costs occur for all actors, from the pro- they produce very different results at each stop, ducers stopped between the village and their imme- thus requiring multiple ‘corrective’ payments with- diate market to the transboundary trader whose out receipt. truck is stopped tens of times before reaching its destination. While each such payment may seem More than just taking money out of people’s small, tracasseries quickly add up. As detailed pockets, tracasseries undermine regional agricul- below, petty harassments increase the cost of trans- ture competitiveness and impose a large cost on porting agriculture commodities between Foumbot the broader economy. By failing to control vehicle and Douala by 25 percent (US$0.03 per ton per weight limits, for example, roads deteriorate more km). In other countries, transporters say the cost quickly leading to higher maintenance costs for is even greater. In Equatorial Guinea, field obser- governments and vehicle owners alike. Many of vations and transporter reports suggest that tra- the drivers interviewed even said that tracasseries casseries add US$0.06 per ton per km (US$15 per encourage overloading since they know they must ton from the Cameroon border to Bata), while in pay a bribe regardless of actual vehicle weight. Producing and Sourcing Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC   39 Gabon the cost is even higher at US$0.30 per ton increase). As Table 6 details, an average 12-ton per km (US$135 per ton from the Cameroon border truck trip from the production area to the border to Libreville). market in Kye-Ossi would be stopped 52 times, with a delay of 130 minutes (against a 10–11 hour trip) Between Foumbot and Douala, petty harassment for a total average cost of CFAF 65,000 (US$123). is increasing transport costs by US$0.03 per ton Of these stops, 44 could qualify as tracasseries, for per km (a 25 percent increase) excluding the a delay of 114 minutes and a cost of CFAF 61,000 value of the driver’s time and opportunity cost (US$115). The results indicate that the longer the of the vehicle standing idle. As Table 5 details, an trip and the larger the truck, the lower the cost per average 7-ton truck trip from the production area to ton per km that petty harassments generate. the market in Douala would be stopped 22 times, with a delay of 47 minutes (against a 6–7 hour trip) Across the border in Equatorial Guinea, petty for a total direct cost of CFAF 44,500 (US$84) on harassment is also common and is increasing average. Sixteen of these stops could qualify as tra- transport costs by US$0.06 per ton per km. As casseries, for a delay of 34 minutes and a cost of Table 7 details, after crossing the border, an average CFAF 41,000 (US$77). 7-ton truck trip to the urban market in Bata would be stopped 32 times, with a delay of 3 hours 55 min- Between Foumbot and Kye-Ossi in southern utes for a total cost of CFAF 124,500 (US$235). Of Cameroon, petty harassment is increasing direct these stops, 28 could qualify as tracasseries, for a costs by US$0.02 per ton per km (a 15 percent delay of 3 hours 20 minutes and a cost of CFAF Table 5  Checkpoints between Foumbot and Douala (7-ton truck) Total average Tracasserie Total delays Average cost cost for the Type of checkpoint Number (yes/no, depending on caused (min.) (CFAF) one-way trip the level for formality) (CFAF) Road toll  5 10 No    500 2,500 Gendarmerie  7 14 Yes  2,000 14,000 Mixed control  7 14 Yes    500 3,500 Trade office  1  3 Yes 13,500 13,500 Phytosanitary police  1  3 Yes 10,000 10,000 Municipality  1  3 No  1,000 1,000 Total 22 47 44,500 Source: Truck rides. Table 6  Checkpoints between Foumbot and Kye-Ossi (12-ton truck) Total average Tracasserie Total delays Average cost cost for the Type of checkpoint Number (yes/no, depending on caused (min.) (CFAF) one-way trip the level for formality) (CFAF) Road toll  8  16 No 500 4,000 Gendarmerie 18  36 Yes 2,000 36,000 Mixed control 20  60 Yes 500 10,000 Road prevention  6  18 Yes 2,500 15,000 Total 52 130 65,000 Source: Truck rides. 40  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa 66,000 (US$125). These higher results are partly Table 8 shows, an average 20-ton truck trip from explained by the additional stop by the paramilitary crossing the border to the urban market in Libre- force present on the routes in Equatorial Guinea, ville can expect to be stopped 44 times, with a following the failed coup d’état. delay of 15 hours 34 minutes for a total cost of CFAF 1,980,000 (US$3,736). Of these stops, In Gabon, petty harassment seems to have 33 could qualify as tracasseries, for a delay of a particularly high impact, as it is increasing 11 hours 7 minutes and a cost of CFAF 1,510,000 transport costs by US$0.30 per ton per km. As (US$2,850). Table 7  Checkpoints between Kye-Ossi and Bata (7-ton truck) Total average Tracasserie Total delays Average cost cost for the Type of checkpoint Number (yes/no, depending on caused (min.) (CFAF) one-way trip the level for formality) (CFAF) Police  7 31 Yes 1,300 9,100 Gendarmerie  7 39 Yes 1,471 10,300 Army  7 60 Yes 5,214 36,500 Paramilitary  7 70 Yes 1,443 10,100 Customs  4 35 No 14,625 58,500 Total 32 3 hours 124,500 55 minutes Source: Truck rides. Table 8  Checkpoints between Abang Minko and Libreville (20-ton truck) Total average Tracasserie Total delays Average cost cost for the Type of checkpoint Number (yes/no, depending on caused (CFAF) one-way trip the level for formality) (CFAF) Police  7 2 hours Yes 47,143 330,000 27 minutes Phytosanitary police  4 1 hour Yes 45,000 180,000 44 minutes Gendarmerie 18 6 hours Yes 45,000 810,000 18 minutes Municipality  4 1 hour Yes 47,500 190,000 10 minutes Customs  4 1 hour No 42,500 170,000 38 minutes Others  7 2 hours No 42,857 300,000 27 minutes Total 44 15 hours 1,980,000 34 minutes Source: Truck rides. 4. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC This section focuses on the formal and informal actors facing trade costs, petty harassment and inef- agricultural trade, border crossing processes ficient processes, and the impact of the regional and costs, and how traders respond to or bypass security situation and political crises on trade pat- formal procedures and informal practices from terns and flows. the public sector. The focus is mostly on the activ- ity at and around Cameroon’s borders with Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, Unrecorded and informal 4.1  and Chad to understand how current practices dif- trade in agricultural fer from the official CEMAC regulations, how offi- cial trade statistics differ from the reality, what the products is widespread real border crossing costs are, and how agricultural Understanding, regulating, and improving agri- commodities reach their final destination (and at cultural trade in the CEMAC area is complicated what prices). by the inaccurate trade statistics that miss the large portion of unrecorded and informal flows. The main agricultural trade insights at CEMAC’s For this report, formal trade refers to flows that frontiers are derived from the Abang-Minko–Eboro pass through an official border post, while infor- border post (Cameroon/Gabon), K ­ ye-Ossi–Meyo mal trade denotes the crossing of a frontier through Kye border post (Cameroon/Gabon), Kye-Ossi– non-designated areas. Recorded trade represents Ebebiyín border post (Cameroon/Equatorial trade that is captured by the official statistics (either Guinea) in the south; Garoua-Boulai border post by the customs authorities or by the ministries of (Cameroon/the Central African Republic) in the trade). Unrecorded trade is not captured in offi- east; and the Kousséri/N’Djamena, Yagoua/Bongor, cial statistics, although in some instances it passes and Figuil border posts ­ (Cameroon/Chad) in the through formal border crossing points (and fortu- north (see Image E.1 for details). It is worth noting nately some of the details are recorded by the phy- that the northern and western parts of Cameroon tosanitary authorities, as described in the following also trade extensively with Nigeria, which, though pages). not a CEMAC member, is an important trading partner (not covered by this analysis). The trade between Cameroon and its CEMAC neighbors can be summarized as follows (see Findings in the previous section were developed Figure 17): from field observations, the perception survey, and the truck rides at these selected border • Between Cameroon and Gabon and Equatorial posts, in addition to official statistics and sec- Guinea, the actual border crossing appeared to ondary literature. The focus areas are the com- take place through the designated crossing point parison between formal and informal, recorded and rather than an unchartered route. This may be unrecorded trade flows, the experience of formally for at least two reasons: first, the trade patterns crossing the border with agricultural products and make it more convenient for trucks and other the associated costs, the behavioral responses of vehicles to opt for formal crossing and second, 41 42  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Figure 17  Typology of Cameroon’s agricultural trade with selected CEMAC countries Recorded trade Cameroon–Central African Republic Informal trade Formal trade Cameroon–Chad Cameroon– Equatorial Guinea Cameroon–Gabon Unrecorded trade some site-specific factors might be involved. At mandatory military convoy for all trucks in Abang-Minko–Eboro and Kye-Ossi–Meyo Kye, transit, thus eliminating any possibility of diver- for instance, the geographic layout of the border, sion from the formal crossing channel. Also, the which includes a vast buffer zone and a natural border layout features only one main paved road demarcation line provided by a river, discour- making it difficult for trucks to use unchartered ages the use of unchartered routes, which would paths. Fragmentation and reconsolidation of involve river-crossing by pirogue. According to truck consignments do not appear very popular border officials, some small-scale traders occa- either. The use of large trucks, large official sionally do venture into informal crossing, which presence at the border, and the Central African includes crossing of the Ntem river by pirogues, Republic’s revenue needs lead to a more com- especially when carrying prohibited or banned plete recording of trade flows. items. However, anecdotal evidence gathered • Between Cameroon and Chad, the length of the during fieldwork suggests that such (informal) border and the geography of the region (clear trade represents only a small fraction of overall landscapes with minimal vegetation and the eas- trade flows passing through the border posts. ily passable Logone River) make it easy to cross Yet, regardless of the use of the formal crossing the border through non-designated areas, partic- points, the official trade data are not matching ularly in the dry season when even medium-size some of the realities on the ground, indicating a trucks can cross through the bush. Field observa- large quantity of unrecorded trade, as described tions and discussions with officials indicated that in detail later in this section. informal crossing is widespread in the northern • Between Cameroon and the Central African region. The insufficient capacity of border con- Republic, at Garoua-Boulai, growing insecurity trol and patrol along its entire length reduces the and instability in the Central African Repub- risks of illicit border crossing for individuals, lic have recently led to the introduction of a who even if caught can escape with an informal Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  43 payment. Even at Kousseri, Figuil, and Yagoua and beans, among others. Beyond Cameroonian border posts, the nature of small consignments exports, a few imports from Gabon into Cameroon passing the border results in under- and nonre- are recorded, such as garlic (locally produced) and cording of trade flows. The official statistics are spaghetti (from third countries)—frozen chicken is at odds with the data collected in the field. also imported, although usually in an illicit man- ner, passing through informal routes as the item is According to official data,2 Gabon’s main currently banned in Cameroon. Table 9 provides imports from CEMAC are palm oil (US$3.3 mil- an overview of agricultural goods most commonly lion); soups, broths, and preparations (US$3.1 traded at the border. million); chocolate (US$2.8 million); milk and cream in solid forms (US$2.4 million); and chew- Trade flows at Kye-Ossi–Meyo Kye are similarly ing gum (US$1 million). The reality, as recorded at unidirectional such as at Abang-Minko. Trade the main borders posts between the two countries, is mostly features agricultural exports from Cameroon indicating significant unreported trade. For exam- to Gabon, including plantain, tomato, onion, maize, ple, just the estimated value of plantain imported potatoes, and cassava, among others. Cameroonian in 2017 at the Abang-Minko–Eboro border post is imports are instead only occasional, featuring a US$6.5 million. small amount of smoked fish (tuna, sardines, and so on) and commercially made cooking oil. Traders In more detail, the actual trade at Abang-Minko are predominantly of Gabonese nationality, enter- is predominantly unidirectional and mostly fea- ing Cameroon on small trucks (3.5 tons) or smaller tures agricultural goods crossing southward vehicles. Consignments are typically transported from Cameroon into Gabon. The most com- to Kye-Ossi on Cameroonian trucks, for example, monly traded item appears to be plantain (sourced arriving from production areas such as Foumbot locally or from the Littoral province), followed by (tomatoes) or Garoua/Maroua (onions), and subse- potatoes (from West province), onions (North/Far quently transferred onto Gabonese trucks headed North provinces), tomatoes (West province), to Libreville—the only exception is probably Table 9  Cameroon’s yearly trade with Gabon at Abang-Minko–Eboro border, 2017 Exports Imports Volume Value Volume Value (tons) (US$/CFAF) (tons) (US$/CFAF) Plantain 10,408.00 US$6,513,730 Garlic 38.45 US$67,774 CFAF 3,446,418,519 CFAF 35,859,259 Beans 1,968.33 US$308,077 CFAF 163,003,704 Onions 1,218.83 US$1,230,461 Spaghetti 31.07 US$63,046 CFAF 651,037,566 CFAF 33,357,672 Tomatoes 1,116.96 US$735,591 CFAF 389,201,587 Potatoes 1,082.34 US$474,855 CFAF 251,246,031 Source: Data provided by Cameroon’s Phytosanitary Police. 2015 UN Comtrade data. 2 44  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa plantain, which is produced locally and thus often including rice (from Asia), flour (from Europe), and purchased by Gabonese traders at the Kye-Ossi sugar (from Brazil), along with beverages, biscuits, market. Instead, Gabonese pickups and cars would and other processed items. Information on volumes generally transport smaller loads to be traded at was not available during the field visit. the Bitam market or to be consumed locally. In the case of (occasional) imports from Cameroon into According to official data,5 Chad’s main imports Gabon, it would be Cameroonians crossing at Meyo from CEMAC are sauces and sauce preparations Kye to buy at the market in Bitam. (US$8.1 million); semi-milled or wholly milled rice (US$4.6 million); sweet biscuits (US$2.7 mil- According to official data,3 Equatorial Guinea’s lion); sugar confectionery (US$2.4 million); and main imports from CEMAC are soups, broths, soups, broths, and preparations (US$2.1 million). and preparations (US$2.4 million); chocolate Data on volumes6 (see Table 10) obtained for agri- (US$1 million); beer (US$0.9 million); milk and cultural goods traded at the Kousseri/N’Djamena cream in solid forms (US$0.6 million); and min- border crossing indicate that most common prod- eral water (US$0.4 million). Despite the border ucts are maize, plantain, potato, onion, avocado, being closed during the field visit, indicative data and tomatoes (as exports from Cameroon) and cat- highlight that the main traded agricultural products tle (as imports to Cameroon). are Cameroonian exports of plantain, cassava, and tomato as well as livestock. In addition to long-­ distance trucking from production areas, Yaoundé 4.2 Unclear application and Douala, Equatorial Guineans would also reach of trade regulations the Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín by pickup or small car, leave their vehicle at the border, and cross into Cameroon and customs rules leads by foot to buy at the Kye-Ossi market. to a multitude of formal and informal border costs Official trade data4 for the Central African Republic indicate that the main imports from Border clearance requirements and formali- the other CEMAC countries are frozen sar- ties lack clarity, consistency, and transparency. dines (US$1.9 million); soups, broths, and Tariffs and procedural requirements are typically preparations (US$1.6 million); mineral waters established on paper, yet are not readily available (US$1.5 million); milk and cream in solid forms at the border level for traders and travelers who (US$0.6 million); and chewing gum (US$0.3 mil- wish to consult them—formalities (and related lion). In reality, the trade flows at Garoua-­ Boulai costs) can also vary from one site to another and appear to mostly feature long-distance, heavy frequently involve a margin of discretion related to trucks ­(25–40 tons) transporting a variety of com- the individual judgment (and mood) of the official modities from Cameroon and other third countries on duty. The enforcement of CEMAC provisions to the Central African Republic. These include also appears to be irregular at best, despite users CEMAC-originated items from Cameroon such as (including both border officials and traders) being onion (from Garoua/Maroua), garlic, and ground- often aware of them. The following case studies nuts, as well as goods arriving from third countries show how differences in the degree of enforcement 3 2015 UN Comtrade data. 4 2015 UN Comtrade data. 5 2015 UN Comtrade data. 6 In the absence of reliable price data, these volumes could not be converted into values. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  45 Table 10  Cameroon’s exports to and imports from Chad through the Kousseri market, 2017 Export products Frequency Volumes Annual total Exported products Onion 4 months per year (October–January) 24 trucks per month with 100 bags each 960 tons Plantain All year round 8 trucks (7 tons) per week on average 2,800 tons Avocado 3 months per year (December–February) 7 trucks (7 tons) per week on average 588 tons Potato All year round 5 trucks (7 tons) per week on average 1,750 tons Maize All year round 5–6 large (45 tons) trucks per month 2,970 tons Tomato All year round 3–4 trucks per month 294 tons Imported products 12,600 Peak of 6 weeks during September–December 10 trucks per day, each with 30 animals animals 2–3 days a week (Monday, Wednesday, 41,250 Cattle Rest of the year and Saturday) for a total of 10–15 trucks animals 53,850 Total cattle animals 30,870 Sheep 6 weeks during September–December 7 trucks per day, all days, 100–110 animals animals Source: Data from the Phytosanitary Police, Mora, Far North region. can be observed across countries. Among other fac- 4.2.1 Abang-Minko–Eboro border tors, including some that are site specific, the like- crossing (Cameroon–Gabon) lihood that CEMAC provisions be enforced at the various locations is correlated with trading/security The Abang-Minko–Eboro border, dividing Cam- conditions and governance levels. eroon’s southern region from Gabon, lies on a large, composite area crossed by the Ntem river. Actual trading costs at the surveyed locations are The border is open from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. with the correlated with the limited clarity, consistency, Ntem river providing for a clear, natural demarcation and transparency of border procedures. Real between the two countries. At the actual border point, costs are often not aligned with official tariff lists a large paved area is found where small offices of all and frequently include unofficial cost items such main border agencies are located, staffed with one as mandatory informal payments extorted by cer- to two officials on average—these only are respon- tain authorities, both at border level and along the sible for checking documentation related to border roads leading to main consumption areas. For some formalities on all transiting individuals and vehicles. fees, such as those owed to customs, SPS, and land The area is known as ‘advanced checkpoint’ or poste freight authorities, payments are generally made avancé. Other border formalities are completed in against the issue of an official receipt. Neverthe- areas away from the river crossing line. On the Cam- less, the actual amount paid is not always aligned eroonian side, such a zone is found about 3.5 km with the amount on the receipt, suggesting that from the poste avancé: it hosts the main offices of rent-seeking behavior is present even when official all border agencies, a warehouse facility, and a large procedures are seemingly followed. Finally, actual area where the market is held, with a few small trade costs are often regressive on smaller traders/ shops in addition to stalls used by market vendors. vehicles, as some fees, especially those extorted Similarly, on the Gabon side, most border agencies informally, tend to be imposed at a rate irrespective are deployed on an area located about 1 km from of the consignment size. the poste avancé, where checks are conducted and 46  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa formalities are completed. Passport formalities in According to official statistics of Camer- Gabon are conducted at the departmental office of oon’s immigration authorities, approximately the Police ­ Immigration/­Emigration in Bitam,7 which 2,500 individuals enter from Gabon through is 29 km from the border area. The map (Image 7) and Abang-Minko every month. Of these, about 2,000 Images 8 and 9 offer an overview of the border area. are Gabonese crossing to buy at the Mondiale Image 7  Border crossing between Cameroon and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea Source: Based on information gathered during fieldwork in January 2018. Map data © 2018 Google. Image 8  Abang-Minko–Eboro border area Source: Data and images gathered during fieldwork in January 2018. Map data © 2018 Google. Note: Numbers (Cameroon side) and letters (Gabon side) in the image correspond to the list of border agencies in Table 11. Bitam is the departmental capital of the Ntem department, which is part of the Woleu-Ntem province. The provincial capital of 7 Woleu-Ntem is Oyem. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  47 market on Saturdays. Border crossing takes part of the country) and Gabon. Border officials place mostly via small- to mid-size trucks (3.5 to estimate that an average of 130–150 vehicles cross 8–10 tons on average), both from Cameroon (any at Abang-Minko every month. Image 9  The Abang-Minko–Eboro border crossing (left—Cameroon, right—Gabon) Source: Photos by team during fieldwork. Border formalities Table 11  Border agencies at Abang-Minko–Eboro Border agencies Cameroon Gabon 1.  Customs—main office a.  Immigration/Emigration Police—poste avancé 2.  Phytosanitary Police and Veterinary Service—main office b.  Ministry of Health—poste avancé Cameroon Land Freight Management Office (Bureau de 3.  c. Army—poste avancé Gestion du Fret Terrestre, BGFT)—main office 4.  Immigration/Emigration Police—main office d.  Conseil Departmental—poste avancé 5.  Army (Gendarmerie in French)—poste avancé e Customs—poste avancé 6.  Intelligence Agency—poste avancé Gabonese Food Safety Agency (Agence Gabonaise de f.  Sécurité Alimentaire, AGASA)—poste avancé 7.  Phytosanitary Police—poste avancé g.  Conseil Departmental—poste avancé 8. Customs—poste avancé h.  Ministry of Commerce—poste avancé 9.  Phytosanitary Police—poste avancé Note: Numbers (Cameroon side) and letters (Gabon side) in the table are used to indicate the location of each border agency in Image 8. Cameroonian side The following agencies are found on the Camer- • Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries, and Animal oonian side of the Abang-Minko–Eboro border: Industries (Ministère de l’élevage, de la pêche et des industries animales, MINEPIA) (responsible • Customs for veterinary checks) • Police Immigration/Emigration (specialized • BGFT police branch with responsibility for overseeing • Ministry of Commerce migration fluxes) • Secret Service (known as Direction Générale de • Phytosanitary Police la Recherche Extérieure, DGRE) 48  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Officials from regular police and the Army on weekdays and at any time on w ­ eekends—the (known as Gendarmerie in French) are also pres- fee amounts to CFAF 5,000 (US$9.45) for small ent at the border. Phytosanitary and veterinary vehicles such as pickups and minibuses and inspections are conducted by two separate agencies, CFAF 10,000 (US$18.90) for small-size trucks one reporting to the MINADER (that is, Phytosan- (3–4 tons). On the other hand, customs do not itary Police) and the other reporting to the MINE- appear to be charging import duties, as established PIA (that is, Veterinary Service). However, the two by CEMAC provisions.8 agencies are typically located in the same office, not only at Abang-Minko but also at all other borders vis- Technical review. Customs representatives indi- ited during field work. Border formalities are often cated that, according to a decree issued in January completed by the consignment owner or truck driver. 2018, all consignments of agricultural products In some cases, facilitators/intermediaries may also such as plants, grains, legumes, and fruit, as well be used—these would generally take responsibility as livestock, would now officially require technical for undertaking clearance formalities on behalf of review (visa technique) of the Ministry of Forests the buyer, against the payment of a fee. and Fauna before being allowed for exportation. Since the ministry is not represented at the border Police Immigration/Emigration. Entry into Cam- level, customs would be in principle tasked with eroon is officially visa free (and cost free) for up to enforcing the decree of their behalf—while they 90 days for nationals of CEMAC countries travel- indicated that they are currently not doing so in ling on their passports, as mandated by the principle order not to limit export flows, it is not unrealistic of free movement of people. CEMAC travelers are to presume that the newly approved provision could also allowed into Cameroonian territory on their provide room for abuse and/or offer opportunities national IDs, yet they can only move within a 30 km to extract rents. radius from the border point—that is, for instance, the case of Gabonese traders crossing on Saturdays Phytosanitary controls. Phytosanitary Police are to buy at Abang-Minko’s Marché Mondial. How- responsible for phytosanitary controls on agricultural ever, immigration authorities recognize that, once products. These controls did not appear to be based travelers are admitted on their national IDs (that on any formal SPS declaration conditions, but rather is, without stamps indicating their date of entry) based on each inspector’s interpretation of cleanness as opposed to passports, enforcing the 90-day rule and safety. Inspections are visual only as authorities becomes difficult. lack proper sampling equipment or lab facilities. No risk management approach was apparent; instead, Customs fees. At Abang-Minko, customs officials officials indicated that they aim to check 100 per- explained that the agency normally charges an ‘exit cent of consignments passing through the border. fee’ (droit de sortie) on all Cameroonian exports, In Cameroon, checks are conducted at a warehouse amounting to 2 percent of the consignment value. facility located in the market area before goods are As invoices accompanying consignments may be loaded onto trucks. The process includes the follow- missing and/or inaccurate, the calculation of the ing steps: filling in an application form; having the exit fee can sometimes be based on an estimation goods visually analyzed by a Phytosanitary Police made at a border level, left to the discretion of the official; and paying a fee to obtain a phytosanitary officer on duty. Customs also charge an ‘overtime certificate issued at the border. The actual cost of the fee’ (against the issue of a receipt) on consignments phytosanitary certificate is CFAF 2,000 (US$3.80), cleared outside of the 7:30 a.m.–3:30 p.m. window as indicated on the top-left section of the certificate. 8 At Abang-Minko and elsewhere, Cameroon Customs was arguably the least cooperative border agency with most officials declining to share information on the grounds that a formal approval had not been sent by their headquarters in Yaoundé. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  49 However, officials indicated that the total cost of the Gabonese side procedure ranges from CFAF 3,500 to CFAF 7,000 The following agencies are represented at Eboro (US$6.60 to US$13.20), depending on the ‘amount border: of work’ required of the official and/or on the size of the vehicle/consignment inspected. An official list • Customs of charges was not available at the border level, and, • Police Immigration/Emigration (specialized contrary to the figures reported by officials, traders police branch with responsibility for overseeing and truck drivers claim that fees paid range from migration fluxes) CFAF 5,000 for small vehicles (cars, pickups, mini­ • AGASA vans, and so on) to 10,000 (US$9.45 to US$18.90) • Gabonese Council of Loaders (Conseil Gabo- for any type of truck. Receipts are normally issued nais de Chargeurs, CGC) but usually only for part of the total paid, suggesting • Directorate General for Competition and Gen- the official on duty is pocketing the difference. eral Consumption (Direction Générale de la Concurrence et de la Consummation, DGCC) According to officials, the phytosanitary • Ministry of Commerce requirements described earlier only apply to commercial consignments, not to smaller ones Most border formalities appear to be centralized aimed for personal consumption. Yet, no formal in Bitam, except for customs checks that are still legislation, regulatory text, or other relevant provi- performed at the border level. While it was not sion exempting smaller loads from phytosanitary possible to meet with customs representatives at documentary requirements seems to exist. Also, no Eboro or Bitam, information gathered from border precise threshold appears to be set for commercial users suggests that Gabonese Customs authorities consignments to be distinguished from personal are no longer charging import duties on agricul- ones—officials indicated that they would be able tural consignments entering Gabon, with respect to to tell those apart ‘based on experience’. The issue CEMAC provisions. Customs also conducts visual does not seem to be relevant to Abang-Minko since, phytosanitary inspections on imported consign- as explained, trade appears to mostly feature large ments on behalf of AGASA. consignments transported via trucks. Immigration/Emigration Police. In October BGFT. The Land Freight Management Office is 2017, Gabon officially ratified the CEMAC agree- a government agency reporting to Cameroon’s ment providing for the free movement of persons Ministry of Transport, responsible for traffic and within the region. As a result, at least in principle, freight management at the country’s land borders. all CEMAC citizens travelling on a biometric pass- At Abang-Minko, the BGFT conducts inspections port are now allowed to enter Gabonese territory on vehicles crossing the border and their loads and visa free for stays up to 90 days. However, the real- issues a document called Lettre de voiture interna- ity on the ground appears to be somewhat different. tionale pour le transport routiere de marchandise According to Gabon’s immigration authorities, an (literally translated as ‘International Vehicle Letter average of 15 CEMAC citizens (mostly Cameroo- for Road Transportation of Goods’), usually abbre- nians) enter Gabon visa free every day—this may viated as Lettre de voiture internationale (LVO), be because most of those crossing at Abang-Minko certifying that the vehicle is authorized to transport do not possess a passport and generally travel on merchandise internationally. The cost of issuing an their national IDs. For the latter ones, Gabon’s LVO ranges from CFAF 5,000 (US$9.45) for pick- immigration authorities may ask to leave IDs at the ups and minibuses to, respectively, CFAF 10,000 border and return within one day. Overall, anec- (US$18.90) and CFAF 15,000 (US$28.35) for small dotal evidence collected during fieldwork suggests (3–4 ton) and mid-size (8–10 ton) trucks. 50  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa that the enforcement of the free movement principle (US$18.90) to AGASA to obtain an authorization is often left to the discretion of the individual offi- for their livestock to circulate within Gabon. cer on duty. DGCC. It is mandated with performing quality AGASA. Similar to what is observed on the Camer- checks on items imported into Gabon, both agricul- oonian side of the border, phytosanitary inspections tural and nonagricultural. As in the case of AGASA, at Eboro are conducted visually due to the lack of inspections are conducted visually: importers are laboratory facilities and testing equipment. Checks required to pay a fee of CFAF 5.30 per kg (US$0.01 also did not appear to be based on formal SPS dec- per kg) of load transported (of any kind), amount- larations but rather focused on general appearance. ing to approximately CFAF 16,800 (US$31.75) or Importers are required to present AGASA with the CFAF 48,000 (US$90.72) for, respectively, a 3.5- phytosanitary certificate issued by Cameroon’s ton and a 10-ton truck and are issued a ‘certificate Phytosanitary Police and to pay an inspection fee of authorization for consumption’(autorisation de based on the vehicle size and on the type of mer- mise á la consommation)—the latter is only avail- chandise transported. Table 12 summarizes official able in Bitam. fees based on information provided by AGASA officials in Bitam. Fees are apparently charged only CGC. It is a public entity established under the on commercial consignments, not personal ones— technical supervision of Gabon’s Ministry of Trans- though again this distinction does not seem to rely port, responsible for freight and traffic manage- on official information or classification but is rather ment among other things. Agricultural importers left to the discretion of the officer on duty. entering Gabon are required to pay CFAF 10,000 (US$18.90) for their consignments (irrespectively AGASA is also responsible for animal health of the size), against which an ‘identification note of inspections. Traders importing livestock into multi-modal freight’ (bordereau d’identification de Gabon are required to present a Veterinary Import fret multimodale) is issued—the document is only Certificate and to leave their livestock in a quar- available in Bitam. antine zone at the border while inspections are completed—these can take up to one week at a Ministry of Commerce. All consignments cost of CFAF 3,500 per head (US$6.62) and are ­ entering/exiting Gabon need to be accompanied by typically conducted only visually due to the lack of an import/export declaration. This is issued free of laboratory facilities and testing equipment. Upon charge, yet apparently is only available at the Min- successful completion of the inspection, livestock istry of Commerce in Libreville—traders unable traders are required to pay a flat fee of CFAF 10,000 to produce a declaration at the border are subject Table 12  Official Gabonese Food Safety Agency (AGASA) fees Vehicle Plantain load Non-plantain load size Total fees Fees per ton Total fees Fees per ton (ton) US$ CFAF US$ CFAF US$ CFAF US$ CFAF >1 18.90 10,000 18.90 (1 ton) 10,000 (1 ton)  18.90  10,000 18.90 (1 ton) 10,000 (1 ton) 3.5 37.80 20,000 10.80  5,714  56.70  30,000 16.20  8,571 10 56.70 30,000  5.67  3,000  75.60  40,000  7.56  4,000 >12 75.60 40,000   6.30 (12 ton)   3,333 (12 ton) 189.00–302.40 100,000–160,000 15.75–25.20 (12 ton)   8,333–13,333 (12 ton) Source: Based on data provided by AGASA Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  51 Table 13  Gabon’s official import/export declaration fines Fee (US$/CFAF) Vehicle size (tons) Plantain only Plantain + fresh items Fresh items (no plantain) Fresh items + onion >1 US$18.90 US$18.90 US$18.90 ? (CFAF 10,000) (CFAF 10,000) (CFAF 10,000) 3.5 ? US$28.35 US$47.25 ? (CFAF 15,000) (CFAF 25,000) 10 US$28.35 US$56.70 US$94.50 ? (CFAF 15,000) (CFAF 30,000) (CFAF 50,000) >12 US$37.80 US$75.60 US$170.10 US$198.45 (CFAF 20,000) (CFAF 40,000) (CFAF 90,000) (CFAF 105,000) Source: Based on information provided by Gabon’s Ministry of Commerce. Note: ? = information on official costs not available from responsible agency. to a fine at the border, which varies depending on payments on all vehicles transiting through the the amount and nature of goods transported (see border area, with no receipt issued. Table 13). As usual, fines are in principle, only imposed on commercial loads, yet the distinction As already highlighted in the second part of the between the latter ones and those for personal con- report, payments made along the way contribute sumption is generally left to the discretion of the to increasing the overall cost of trade. Besides official on duty. clearance costs at the border, traders and transport- ers indicated that several informal payments must be Actual trade costs made at checkpoints set up along the road by police (regular branch) and/or the army. Payments typi- Actual trade costs and procedures at Abang- cally range between CFAF 2,000 and CFAF 5,000 Minko may be (significantly) different from offi- (US$3.78 and US$9.45), irrespective of the vehicle cial ones. The previous two subsections provided size or nature of the consignment, with the actual an overview of supposedly official requirements, amount frequently determined by the mood of the procedures, and fees in Cameroon and Gabon officer on duty—for instance, an officer working on based on information shared by border agencies in a Sunday is likely to be in a worse mood and thus to each country. However, interviews conducted with potentially ask for a larger payment. A truck driver traders and transporters at the market revealed that headed to Oyem (100 km from Abang-Minko) indi- actual fees differ quite substantially, as summa- cated that at least eight checkpoints can be found rized in Table 14. For detailed information on each along the road—assuming an average of CFAF official fee level, reference should be made to the 3,500 (US$6.62) per payment, that amounts to an various agency-specific tables presented through- extra cost of CFAF 28,000 (US$52.96) per trip. Sim- out this report. As shown, trade costs are highly ilarly, a truck driving to Libreville can be stopped by regressive whereby small traders using a 1-ton the police and/or the army up to thirty times along minibus pay three times more per ton than larger the way—that amounts to about CFAF 105,000 traders using a 10-ton truck. Receipts are gener- (US$198.60) per ride. Due to the unpredictable and ally issued, albeit sometimes for amounts differ- informal nature of such payments, computing aver- ent from (and generally lower than) those paid ages can be m ­ isleading—yet, it does suggest that to officials. Police (regular branch) and the army bribes may account for an important portion of total are known for systematically extorting informal transport costs. 52  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Table 14  Actual cost of clearing a truck at Abang-Minko–Eboro border (CFAF unless indicated) Minibus (1 ton) Small truck (4 tons) Large truck (10 tons) Responsible Fee name Official Actual Official Actual Official Actual agency Variance Variance Variance cost cost cost cost cost cost Costs to exit Cameroon Entry fee Police* 0 5,000 5,000 0 5,000 5,000 0 5,000 5,000 Paid to enter Army* 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 the market for loading Immigration 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 purposes Town hall ? 2,000 ? ? 2,000 ? ? 2,000 ? Assembly ? 1,000 ? ? 2,000 ? ? 2,000 ? Loading fee Town hall ? 1,000 ? ? 2,000 ? ? 5,000 ? Customs exit Customs 2% 10,000 n/a 2% 15,000 n/a 2% 15,000 n/a fee Phytosanitary Phyto Police 2,000 5,000 3,000 2,000 10,000 8,000 2,000 10,000 8,000 LVO fee BGFT 5,000 5,000 0 10,000 10,000 0 15,000 10,000 (5,000) Exit fee Police* ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 2,000 2,000 Paid at the poste avancé. Information only available Army* ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 2,000 2,000 for large trucks Costs to enter Gabon Overtime fee Customs 5,000 5,000 0 10,000 10,000 0 10,000 10,000 0 Phyto AGASA 10,000 5,000 (5,000) 20,000 25,000 5,000 30,000 50,000 20,000 inspection Identification CGC 10,000 5,000 (5,000) 10,000 10,000 0 10,000 25,000 15,000 note fee Certificate of authorization for con- DGCC ? 5,000 ? 16,800 25,000 8,200 48,000 48,000 0 sumption (issue fee) Town hall ? 2,500 ? ? 5,000 ? ? 10,000 ? Unspecified Assembly ? 5,000 ? ? 5,000 ? ? 15,000 ? fees Army* 0 5,000 5,000 0 5,000 5,000 0 5,000 5,000 Police* 0 5,000 5,000 0 5,000 5,000 0 10,000 10,000 Total costs at border Total per vehicle (CFAF) 32,000 70,500 12,000 68,800 140,000 40,200 115,000 230,000 66,000 Cost per ton (CFAF) 32,000 70,500 12,000 17,200 35,000 10,050 11,500 23,000 6,600 Total per vehicle (US$) 60.49 133.27 22.68 130.06 264.65 75.99 217.39 434.78 124.76 Cost per ton (US$) 60.49 133.27 22.68 32.51 66.16 19.00 21.74 43.48 12.48 Source: Based on data collected during fieldwork in January 2018. Note: n/a = not applicable. * = Informal fee without receipt (official cost shown as zero). ? = information on official costs not available from responsible authority. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  53 Image 10  Kye-Ossi—Ebebyín border area Source: Based on information gathered during fieldwork in February 2018. Map data © 2018 Google. Note: Numbers (Cameroon side) and letters (Eq. Guinea side) in the image correspond to the list of border agencies in Table 15. 4.2.2 Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín border officers deployed, and the entire area is marked by an crossing (Cameroon– overall atmosphere of tension: no crossing could be Equatorial Guinea) observed, albeit Equatoguinean authorities indicated that a few individuals and trucks were occasionally Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín presents a very different layout let into Equatorial Guinea. As a result, only limited compared to Abang-Minko–Eboro and Kye-Ossi– information could be collected through short, infor- Meyo Kye. The border lies on a small, paved-ground mal conversations held in proximity of the border zone with no natural demarcation line between Camer- with officials and traders from Cameroon. oon and Equatorial Guinea. The area on the Cameroo- Image 11  Kye-Ossi–Ebebyín border nian side, located in proximity of the Kye-Ossi market, (Cameroon side) includes a roundabout from which a road heading to Meyo Kye also departs—on the Equatoguin­ ean side; however, a road departing from the border point heads to Ebebiyín (about 27 km away). Images 10 and 11 provide an overview of the border area.9 The border was closed during the field visits and since late December 2017. The area was appar- ently closed following a failed coup attempt that took place in Equatorial Guinea on December 24, 2017—trade between the two countries has since almost completely stopped. The border is currently militarized with Equatoguinean soldiers and police Source: Photo by team during fieldwork. 9 Based on Google Maps data, it appears that the Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín border is located at a point along the Cameroon–Gabon border line and not the Cameroon–Equatorial Guinea border line. While no official explanation for this could be obtained during fieldwork, one possible justification could be that, since the only main road that apparently connects Cameroon with Equatorial Guinea (known as N2) passes through Gabon first, the three countries might have negotiated some sort of arrangement whereby the Cameroon–Equatorial Guinea crossing point lies on the N2 along what is, in fact, the Cameroon–Gabon border line. 54  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Border Formalities the official in charge, while the border itself used Table 15  Border agencies would be occasionally closed with no notice or jus- at Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín tification, even before the December 24 closure. Border agencies Cameroon Equatorial 4.2.3 Garoua-Boulai border Guinea crossing (Cameroon– the Central African Republic) 1. Town hall a. Police 2. Ministry of Commerce b. Customs 3. Phytosanitary Police and Veterinary Service Garoua-Boulai is one of the two main borders 4. BGFT of Cameroon’s eastern region, Kentzou being 5. Customs the other one. Located along the main corri- 6. Immigration/Emigration Police dor that runs from the port of Douala to Bangui Note: Numbers (Cameroon side) and letters (Eq. Guinea (via Yaoundé), the town has traditionally played side) in the table are used to indicate the location of an important role as a gateway for trade between each border agency in Image 10. Cameroon and the Central African Republic. As a result, border activity in the area has historically Cameroonian side been quite intense—however, trade flows appear On the Cameroonian side, small offices of all to have recently slowed down due to the deterio- main border agencies are found including Cus- ration of security conditions on the Central Afri- toms, Immigration/Emigration Police, BGFT, can side. Since 2013/14, insecurity and violence in Phytosanitary Police, Ministry of Commerce, and the Central African Republic have also generated a representation of the town hall. On the Equato- a major influx of refugees, many of whom even- rial Guinea side, however, only two big offices could tually settled in Cameroon’s eastern region—as a be observed for police and customs, albeit no visits result, two major refugee camps are now found in were permitted on that side of the border. Equatogu- the Garoua-Boulai area, one of which (Gado) cur- inean authorities declined to provide information on rently hosts about 25,000 residents.10 the number of agencies represented. The border area has no natural demarcation Border activity appears to be closely linked line and mainly consists of a paved road mea- to market dynamics in Kye-Ossi. According suring approximately 200 meters, currently to Cameroon’s Immigration/Emigration Police, shared by trucks, cars, carts, and pedestrians. ‘thousands’ cross at Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín on the On the Cameroonian side, juxtaposed to a portion busiest market days, which are apparently Mon- of the Garoua-Boulai market, a large area is also days, Wednesdays, and Saturdays. During the rest found where the loading and unloading of trucks of week, an average of 100 crossings is observed. take place. A few unchartered roads are known to Equatorial Guineans can enter Cameroon visa free run parallel to the formal border crossing; how- on their national IDs and move freely within the ever, traders, who for the most part would be country for up to 90 days. The same should apply small-scale ones travelling by foot, would gen- to Cameroonians crossing into Equatorial Guinea, erally deem them as insecure and/or patrolled by as the latter officially adopted the CEMAC princi- officials extorting bribes and would hence appar- ple of free movement of people in October 2017; ently use them only occasionally. Images 12 and however, conversations held with Cameroonian 13 provide an overview of the Garoua-Boulai bor- traders indicated that the actual enforcement of the der area. principle varies and is often left to the discretion of 10 https://www.voanews.com/a/many-more-refugees-flee-central-african-republic-violence-to-cameroon/4060632.html. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  55 Image 12  Border crossing between Cameroon and the Central African Republic Source: Map data © 2018 Google. Compared to the past, trade volumes passing may have changed the nature of trade in the area, through Garoua-Boulai have decreased follow- as local sources indicated that Garoua-Boulai has ing the 2013/14 crisis in the Central African historically been an important gateway to the Cen- Republic. Increased insecurity on the Central Afri- tral African Republic on the Douala–Bangui cor- can side of the border, massive refugee influxes into ridor and has traditionally featured long-distance, Cameroon, and occasional raids by Central Afri- heavy trucks. The convoy may have contributed to can militias have negatively affected overall trade enhancing overall security and thus reviving trade volumes. However, the situation seems to have flows, which apparently had slowed down due to improved recently owing to the introduction of mil- frequent militia attacks against trucks in Central itary convoys. All vehicles headed to the Central African territory, along the way to Bangui. Appar- African Republic are now required to join a con- ently, such attacks have ceased since convoys were voy, organized by the Central African army jointly introduced. On non-convoy days, the border is typ- with the association of transporters, and typically ically used by some small-scale traders crossing by departing to Bangui twice a week on Tuesdays and foot to buy and sell at the market and a moderate Saturdays. Trucks returning empty from the Cen- number of cars and pickups. It also appears that tral African Republic travel in a weekly convoy Central Africans living on the Central African side arriving at Garoua-Boulai on Thursdays. Convoys of the border rely almost exclusively on hospitals, typically comprise an average of 80–100 trucks, schools, and similar public services on the Cam- most of which are heavy ones, each paying CFAF eroonian side of Garoua-Boulai. Thus, the border 25,000 (US$47.30) to the Central African trans- remains open on non-convoy days to cater to such porters’ association as ‘convoy right fee’.11 It is not traffic. clear to what extent the introduction of convoys A convoy generally includes both long-distance trucks coming from Douala and trucks completing Garoua-Boulai–Bangui trips 11 only—the latter typically takes 2.5 days with two overnight stops. While official information on when convoys were introduced could not be gathered, it would appear that the measure has been in place since 2016 at least, and possibly earlier. 56  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Image 13  Garoua-Boulai border area Source: Based on data and images gathered during fieldwork in February 2018. Map data © 2018 Google. Note: Numbers (Cameroon side) and letters (CAR side) in the image correspond to the list of border agencies in Table 16. Image 14  Garoua-Boulai border (left—Cameroon side, right—Central African side) Source: Photos by team during fieldwork. Border formalities Table 16  Border agencies at Garoua-Boulai Border agencies Cameroon Central African Republic 1. Immigration/Emigration Police a. Police 2. Ministry of Health b. Army 3. Ministry of Commerce c. Single Window Phytosanitary Police and Veterinary 4.  Central Africa Republic Bureau of Road Chartering (Bureau d’Affrètement d.  Service Routier Centrafricain, BARC) 5. Army (Gendarmerie in French) 6. BGFT 7. Customs Note: Numbers (Cameroon side) and letters (CAR side) in the table are used to indicate the location of each border agency in Image 13. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  57 Cameroonian side Phytosanitary Police. All products exiting Camer- oon are required to be accompanied by a phytosani- The following agencies are found on the Camer- tary certificate. Trucks arriving from Douala would oonian side of the Garoua-Boulai border: have normally obtained the certificate at the port; instead, all other vehicles can have it issued at the • Customs border for a standard fee of CFAF 2,000 (US$3.78), • Police Immigration/Emigration irrespective of the nature and the amount of the • Phytosanitary Police consignment transported. The fee is in line with • MINEPIA (responsible for veterinary checks) what is being charged for certificate printing at • BGFT other borders visited during the mission; however, • Ministry of Commerce additional fees are also charged for a total ranging • Ministry of Health between CFAF 5,000 (US$9.45) and CFAF 20,000 • Intelligence Agency (DGRE) (US$37.80) depending on the size of the vehicle and on the nature of the consignment inspected. Officials from Cameroon’s regular police and Small-scale cross-border traders at Garoua-Boulai the army are also present. Thus, agencies at are apparently exempted from such requirement, Garoua-Boulai are almost the same as those seen albeit the decision seems to be ultimately left to the at borders visited in the southern region, the only discretion of the official on duty. Due to the lack of notable exceptions being the Ministry of Health and lab facilities and testing equipment, all phytosani- the Ministry of Commerce (the latter is not found tary inspections are conducted only visually. at Abang-Minko but is present at Kye-Ossi–Meyo Kye). In addition, a small desk of BARC is pres- BGFT. As at border points in the southern region, ent, along with a single window facility reporting to the BGFT is responsible for performing checks on Central African customs. The border is open from vehicles in transit, for collecting freight declara- 6 a.m. through 6 p.m. tions, and for issuing the LVO.12 The latter is avail- able at a fee of CFAF 751 per ton (US$1.42) plus Police Immigration/Emigration. On average, CFAF 4,500 (US$8.51) for commissions, of which approximately 1,000 individuals per month are esti- CFAF 2,000 (US$3.78) is for ‘information commis- mated to enter Cameroon through Garoua-Boulai, sion’ and CFAF 2,500 (US$4.73) for ‘road assis- over 90 percent of whom are of Central African tance commission’. Small-scale traders crossing by nationality. These individuals include both vehicle foot are exempted from BGFT formalities. drivers and small-scale traders travelling by foot. The latter are said to be well known to Cameroo- BARC. The BGFT office in Garoua-Boulai hosts a nian authorities and thus are not expected to pro- small desk of the Central African Republic BARC, duce a passport or even a national ID. Truck drivers, a public agency reporting to the Ministry of Trans- on the other hand, can enter Cameroon visa free on port in Bangui that is tasked with conducting checks their passports and are allowed in the country for up on all long-distance vehicles in transit toward the to 90 days. It appears that most drivers do not in fact Central African Republic. BARC issues a separate own a passport and thus travel on a laissez-passer LVO different from the one issued by the Camer- issued by Immigration authorities at the cost of oon BGFT. Small-scale traders are exempted from CFAF 5,000 (US$9.45). BARC formalities. 12 Fees charged by the BGFT appeared to be more of a plain (unnecessary) tax rather than the cost of an actual service rendered to traders (for example, insurance). 58  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Ministry of Health. Health officials are mainly Beloko, a small town located some 10 km away responsible for checking that long-distance travel- from the border where offices of border agencies ers in transit possess a yellow fever certificate— are located. Among others, those agencies include small-scale cross-border traders crossing for the day Customs, BARC, Phytosanitary Police, Veterinary are however apparently exempted from this, albeit Service, Ministry of Water and Forestry, Ministry the decision is presumably left to the discretion of of Transport, and Ministry of Commerce, as well as the official on duty. Inspections are conducted at an Internal Revenue Service commonly known as no cost, yet travelers unable to produce a certificate impôts. While it was unfortunately not possible to are charged a fee of CFAF 4,500 (US$8.51), which enter the Central African Republic and meet with includes the actual vaccination cost and the cost of border officials due to security concerns, infor- issuing a certificate. mation gathered from traders suggests that border agencies charge various formal and informal fees Central African Customs Single Window. A sin- as summarized in Table 17. These payments include gle window office is found on the Cameroonian import duties that are charged in an apparent con- side of the border. Established in 2016, it reports travention of CEMAC free trade provisions. Duties to the Central African Republic customs, is staffed also appear to be subject to duplication, as the Cen- with Central African customs officials, and mainly tral African Republic customs charge them not only serves as a final checkpoint for trucks in transit at the border level (actual import duties, paid in toward Bangui. Its customers are mostly drivers Beloko) but also upon arrival in Bangui (so-called arriving from Douala, transporting manufactured récuperation). Additionally, Central African phy- or processed items—they typically complete clear- tosanitary authorities do not recognize SPS certifi- ance formalities at the Port of Douala and then pre­ cates issued by their Cameroonian counterparts and sent the single window officer with documentation, require traders to have a new one issued against the including a titre de transit, an export declaration, payment of a fee. and an invoice, along with proof of payment of cus- toms duties for goods originated outside CEMAC. Actual trade costs If all documents are in order, trucks are allowed to proceed into the Central African Republic, else they Actual trade costs reported by traders and are required to complete formalities while their load transporters may differ quite substantially from is stored at a warehouse facility located on the Cen- those provided by border agencies as suppos- tral African Republic side of the border. No fee is edly official ones. Table 17 provides an overview charged for the services rendered by the single win- of total costs incurred by a truck completing a dow. Vehicles carrying agricultural goods would be Garoua-Boulai–Bangui return trip. The table also typically not expected to stop at the window.13 compares actual trade costs as reported by traders with official fees based on information provided by border authorities. Such comparison, however, is Central African Republic side only available for Cameroon as security conditions On the Central African Republic side of the bor- prevented the team from crossing into the Central der, all clearance formalities are conducted at African Republic and gathering information from 13 One possible explanation could be that the single window appeared to be primarily concerned with preclearance of long- distance trucks coming from Douala and headed straight to Bangui, that is, the ones that typically transport manufactured and processed items originating in third countries and travelling in containers. However, agricultural commodities would generally originate from various regions of Cameroon, be transported to and cleared at Garoua-Boulai, and then loaded onto trucks leaving for Bangui. Thus, it is possible that agricultural trucks complete clearance formalities at the border (through intermediaries) rather than using preclearance through the single window. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  59 Table 17  Actual cost of trade for a truck completing a Garoua-Boulai–Bangui return trip (CFAF unless indicated) Large truck (25 tons) Very large truck (40 tons) Fee name Responsibile agency Official Actual Official Actual Variance Variance cost cost cost cost Costs to exit Cameroon Parking fee Town hall ? 1,500 ? ? 2,000 ? Laissez-passer Immigration Police 5,000 5,000 0 5,000 5,000 0 Army 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Exit fees* Police (regular) 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Customs fees Customs ? 50,000 ? ? 10,000 ? Phytosanitary certificate Phyto police 2,000 5,000 3,000 2,000 20,000 18,000 LVO issue fee BGFT 23,250 23,250 0 34,500 34,500 0 Export declaration fee Min. of Commerce ? 10,000 ? ? 15,000 ? Costs to enter CAR–Garoua-Boulai border post Police (regular) 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Entry fee* Army 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Town hall ? 1,000 ? ? 1,000 ? LVO issue fee BARC ? 5,000 ? ? 10,000 ? Weighbridge fee Min. of Public Works ? 15,000 ? ? 20,000 ? Military convoy fee BARC ? 25,000 ? ? 25,000 ? Beloko checkpoint (8 km from Garoua-Boulai border) Police (regular) 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Unspecified fees* Army 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Stamping of customs receipt Min. of Water and Forest ? 20,000 ? ? 25,000 ? Weighbridge* Min. of Public Works 0 75,000 75,000 0 150,000 150,000 Import duties Customs 0 1,000,000 1,000,000 0 1,500,000 1,500,000 Revenue tax Internal Revenue ? 50,000 ? ? 50,000 ? Phytosanitary certificate Phyto police ? 5,000 ? ? 5,000 ? Import declaration fee Min. of Commerce ? 25,000 ? ? 50,000 ? Stops en route Weighbridge fee (Baboua)* Min. of Public Works 0 40,000 40,000 0 50,000 50,000 Weighbridge fee (Bouar)* Min. of Public Works 0 40,000 40,000 0 50,000 50,000 Parking (Bouar)—overnight Security guards ? 1,000 ? ? 1,000 ? Parking (Bossembélé)—overnight Security guards ? 1,000 ? ? 1,000 ? Arrive Bangui Police 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Unspecified fees* Army 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Customs recovery fee* Customs 0 500,000 500,000 0 750,000 750,000 Toll fee BARC ? 5,000 ? ? 5,000 ? Stamping fee* Phyto police 0 2,500 2,500 0 5,000 5,000 Escort fee Customs ? 10,000 ? ? 10,000 ? Exit Bangui Military convoy fee BARC ? 25,000 ? ? 25,000 ? Police 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Unspecified fees* Army 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Re-enter Cameroon Army 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Entry fees* Police 0 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 Unspecified fee BGFT ? 5,000 ? ? 10,000 ? Total journey Total per vehicle (CFAF) 30,250 1,969,250 1,684,500 41,500 2,853,500 2,547,000 Cost per ton (CFAF) 1,210 78,770 67,380 1,038 71,338 63,675 Total per vehicle (US$) 57.18 3,722.59 3,184.31 78.45 5,394.14 4,814.74 Cost per ton (US$) 2.29 148.90 127.37 1.96 134.85 120.37 Source: Based on information collected during fieldwork in February 2018. Note: * = Informal fee without receipt (official cost shown as zero). ? = information on official costs not available from responsible authority. 60  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa authorities there. Image 15 shows the various stops trucks transiting at Garoua-Boulai are mostly large made during a Garoua-Boulai–Bangui trip. ones that allow for economies of scale. As demonstrated, costs along the route are It is also notable that Central African weigh- very expensive. At an estimated CFAF 78,770 bridge fees account for an estimated 8.6 percent (US$148.90) per ton on a 25-ton truck and CFAF and 9.5 percent of the total costs paid by 25- and 71,338 (US$134.85) per ton on a 40-ton truck, the 40-ton trucks on the entire route, respectively amounts collected by border officials and other (that is, CFAF 170,000 or US$320 for a 25-ton agencies along the route add significantly to the truck and CFAF 270,000 or US$510 for a 40-ton cost of landing staple foods in Bangui. As a share truck). Drivers say that weighbridge officials jus- of the maize price paid to growers at the farm gate, tify these high charges as fines for vehicle over- for instance (that is, around CFAF 145,000 or loading but claim they do not receive receipts for US$274 per ton), the cost of crossing the border the amounts paid and that all trucks are systemati- at Garoua-Boulai and traversing the road to Ban- cally deemed overweight regardless of the load size. gui adds almost 49–54 percent to the commodity’s Such practices, therefore, not only deny the Central landed shipment value. African government revenue that it needs for road maintenance but also encourage overloading since Table 17 shows costs are highly regressive on drivers know they will be made to pay regardless of smaller vehicles in that the amounts paid to var- vehicle weight. ious authorities do not vary significantly accord- ing to vehicle size. Thus, the cost of transporting Clearance formalities and costs appear to be less 1 ton of goods to Bangui on a 25-ton truck is institutionalized for small-scale traders. As shown approximately 9.4 percent higher than when using in Table 18, a small-scale cross-border trader crossing a 40-ton vehicle. This at least partly explains why by foot from the Central African Republic (generally Image 15  The Garoua-Boulai–Bangui journey Source: Based on information gathered during fieldwork in February 2018. Map data © 2018 Google. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  61 Table 18  Actual cost of trade for a small-scale cross-border trader carrying one cassava bag (about 25 kg) Amount paid Responsible agency CFAF US$ Exit from Central African Republic Phytosanitary Police 100 0.19 Entry into Cameroon Town hall 300 0.57 Phytosanitary Police 100 0.19 Market manager 400 0.76 Army 500 0.95 Total 1,400 2.66 Estimated trade costs per tona 51.07 96.52 Trade costs as % of bag valueb 35.47% Source: Based on information gathered during fieldwork. Note: a. Computed based on the following equivalence US ton 1 = kg 907.185. b. Computed based on a purchase price of US$0.30 per bag, implying a bag value of US$7.5. to sell cassava at the Garoua-Boulai market) would on each of their respective sides. Most goods for be charged a variety of small fees that do not neces- agricultural trade are sourced from the Kousseri sarily have a proper name or official justification and market, where Cameroonian trucks usually stop that are charged informally without issue of receipt. and Chadians buy and transport across agricultural Also, it seems that most documentary requirements commodities. Alongside these small traders, several applying to larger traders are waived on smaller con- larger trucks coming from Douala cross the border signments, albeit not necessarily in a systematic way and overall Kousseri–N’Djamena, together with and/or as result of a formal exemption granted by the Touboro/­Mbaiboum, is the more formal border cross- competent border agency. Overall trade costs remain ing between Cameroon and Chad. Unfortunately, the high: the total of fees paid to transport a 25 kg bag security situation did not allow the same in-depth of cassava across the border correspond up to over visits and data collection as at the other frontiers. 35 percent of the bag value. Visits to the secondary border crossing of Figuil and Yagoua-Bongor highlighted a lax and infor- Kousséri–N’Djamena border 4.2.4  mal border crossing regime. For example, inter- crossing (Cameroon–Chad) views with various public and private actors at these The Kousséri–N’Djamena border crossing is still border posts revealed that tariff levels are applied the most important post between Cameroon and differently depending on border post and officials, Chad and the final point of the 1,650 km corri- on truck size and load, on timing, and so on. Often, dor starting in Douala.14 The border is formed by guidance notes from the customs authority are hav- the Logone River and the two parts are linked by ing a wide margin of interpretation, leaving a lot a bridge. The border authorities have their offices of room for informal payments. Border users who 14 See the section on the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin for more details. 62  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Image 16  Main border crossings between Cameroon and Chad Source: Map data © 2018 Google. try to comply with the requirements and demand and additional payments, particularly as check- a receipt for payments are usually delayed signifi- points are not concentrated in one single point. For cantly by border authorities. In addition, the roles of example, at the Figuil border crossing point, the the public authorities at the border are not defined 12 inspections stretch along several kilometers on clearly enough, generating duplications of controls both sides. Image 17  Tomatoes and plantain being traded at Kousseri Source: Photos by team during fieldwork. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  63 Border formalities Table 19  Border agencies at Kousseri–N’Djamena Border agencies Cameroon Chad Departmental Delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture Police (immigration service) Customs Office (management) Customs Authority Customs Post (at the Ngueli bridge) Army (Direction Surveillance Territoire) Phytosanitary Police Phytosanitary control Veterinary Control Other secondary technical agencies Police (immigration service) Gendarmerie Rapid Response Force (Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide) Ministry of Trade On the Cameroonian side, the same agencies as Traders’ responses 4.3  at the border posts are present, with the addi- tion of the rapid response force (Bataillon d’In- to informality and tervention Rapide), given the Boko Haram–induced tracasseries lead to a security situation and a duplication of the presence vicious circle of further of the customs (one large office in Kousseri and a informal practices smaller post at the bridge crossing). The reticence of the Chadian side to discuss border agencies did Traders and border users have responded cre- not allow a full counting of the agencies present at atively to the increasing number of and value of the border, but discussions with other actors indi- informal payments, as well as to the legal, formal cate that the immigration and regular police, the requirements. As formal and informal payments customs, a separate army branch responsible for are often determined by the size of consignment, border control (Direction Surveillance Territoire), which in turn is estimated by the number of bags, the phytosanitary authorities, and other secondary traders are overloading bags. Moreover, the type of technical agencies are present. See Table 19. commodities being carried is often disguised, with higher taxed commodities hidden at the center and Similarly, given the generally tense climate at surrounded by lower value commodities. Addition- Kouserri, a full data collection and analysis on ally, because smaller consignments in cars or on border crossing costs was not possible. Indica- motorcycles are rarely checked and are taxed— tive information suggests that customs levies are formally and informally—proportionally less, it is charged (but it is not clear whether as tariffs or common to ‘decompose’ a large truck’s load into other types of taxes) and that tracasseries by the small batches of two to three bags per motorcycle, police and the army are common at a standard cost which then crosses the border with less hassle, only of CFAF 5,500 (US$10) per truck. to ‘recompose’ the cargo into a different truck on the other side. 64  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa One type of response to formally crossing a use intermediaries to fragment (a couple of kilome- border is higher risk taking. Particularly in the ters before the first border checkpoint, sometimes at northern part of Cameroon, traders often engage the nearest market) the cargo of a truck into smaller in risky behavior to avoid dealing with authorities. quantities of one to two bags that are then trans- For instance, livestock traders often choose to cross ported across the border by car or motorcycle (and the Logone River with their animals swimming, sometimes even by bike or cart). In general, trucks while they lead the herd from a pirogue, to avoid pass through all the border checkpoints with pay- crossing bridges manned by public authorities or ments required at each stage, while a motorcycle use the equally supervised ferries. In the dry sea- is stopped at less than half of checkpoints (particu- son, the losses due to drowning are minimal, but larly, the phytosanitary police and ministry of trade traders continue this practice in the rainy season seem to be unconcerned with small transports). On as well, when livestock prices peak. On land, when the other side of the border, a partner truck is wait- crossing through unmarked, undesignated terri- ing for the arrival of the small consignments to con- tories, traders often encounter local thieves, have solidate the load. This practice is widespread at the their vehicles damaged, but generally successfully Kousseri–N’Djamena border crossing, where virtu- escape the mobile brigades of the police and cus- ally all trucks stop and unload on the Cameroonian toms authorities. side at the border. From there, a thriving business (apparently conducted by Chadian war veterans, Ethnic ties can play a key role in informal trade, who enjoy a tax-free status) transports small quan- creating unequal access to markets. As described tities across the bridge into N’Djamena for delivery earlier in the report, the ethnic distribution in the to traders or directly to the market. region overlooks the national border, and popula- tions close to the border use this fact to their advan- When formal channels are used, the usual tage. Informal cross-border networks, particularly strategy is to overcharge a truck by either over- in the northern part of Cameroon, take advantage loading individual bags or by exceeding the max- of shared ethnolinguistic ties and operate as mar- imum weight allowed (or both). The practice of ket intermediaries. Often a group of villages or a overloading a bag—as witnessed firsthand at the larger family resides on both sides of the border and Yagoua market (see Image 18)—is an example uses their family ties to transport small batches of of how traders start with the individual unit—the agricultural goods (one to two bags of cereals on bag—to manipulate the many payments that are lev- a motorcycle, a couple more in a small car) across ied per bag. Overloading ‘specialists’ at the cereal the frontier. When caught or questioned, they often market charge of CFAF 1,000 (US$1.90) per bag to declare that the goods have been bought at the mar- compress 200 kg of grains into a 100 kg bag. Fol- ket and are intended for domestic consumption at lowing this, sometimes transporters are disguising the destination. Then, once a sufficient quantity their loads by having lighter goods on the outside is gathered, a truck comes and picks up the cargo. of the truck and heavier (bags of cereals, for exam- In this setup, wholesalers rarely deal with border ple) ones hidden inside. This tactic is particularly authorities and little trade is recorded, checked, and useful in the less trafficked, more rural areas, where taxed at the official border posts. weighing stations are missing along the main roads and at the border posts. Similarly, in the cases where Linked to the two coping strategies above, frag- different agricultural commodities are charged dis- mentation and consolidation of consignments of tinct fees by public authorities, more valuable items agricultural goods are a widespread practice. are hidden inside and the overall cargo composition Again, particularly in northern Cameroon, but to is misdeclared. some degree at other border points, it is common to Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  65 Image 18  Informal practices to deal with rising costs (left—rice bag being overloaded, right—pickup being overloaded) Security risks and political 4.4  prices. Finally, the closure of the Cameroon–­ crises are altering trade Equatorial Guinea border resulted in the rechannel- ing of trade through unofficial rural routes. patterns and flows Adding to the high trade costs and cumber- Since May 2014, Cameroon has officially par- some procedures, poor security and frequent ticipated in the offensive against Boko Haram, political crises are affecting agricultural trade and this involvement has deeply affected the by increasing losses, risks taken by traders, security situation in its northern regions.15 While and informality. In the northern parts of Cam- the conflict has slowly decreased in intensity since eroon (and to some degree in the Adamaoua 2014–2015, continued violence and suicide attacks region), the Boko Haram–induced security situ- took place in 2017, and the threat level remains high ation has reduced trade flows between Cameroon in the Far North, North, and Adamaoua regions. and Nigeria, as well as decreasing livestock transit On Cameroonian territory and at the border, Boko from Chad into Nigeria. In addition, the Douala– Haram succeeded in disrupting both productive N’Djamena corridor has also been disrupted activities and trade. The group engaged in financ- because of the risk of attacks on the last segment ing its activities by providing loans to traders, and (Mora–Kousseri). The traffic has been redirected expecting a percentage of their profits in return. to cross through Touboro into southern Chad and In markets near the borders—Amchidé, Fotokol, continue through Moundou up to N’Djamena. The Makary, Hile Alifa, and Kousseri—Boko Haram number of cross-­border livestock theft incidents in has extorted money from traders whom it has not Cameroon has also increased on both the Nigerian helped with financing. In the Mayo Sava and Mayo and Chadian sides, limiting the usual cross-border Tsanaga departments, hundreds of kidnappings transactions and momentarily fluctuating livestock have been reported, as the group took the people for International Crisis Group. (2017). Cameroon’s Far North: Reconstruction amid Ongoing Conflict. Crisis Group Africa Briefing 15 N°133. Nairobi/Brussels, October 25, 2017. 66  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa forced agricultural labor, later selling the harvest in segment of the Douala–N’Djamena corridor, which Cameroonian and Nigerian markets. In the lake area was closed for several months in 2014. On other (Kofia, Hile Alifa, Darak), Boko Haram threated critical routes in the region, such as Amchidé- farmers to extort a contribution of 10 percent of their Mora, Maroua-Kousseri, and Fotokol-Kousseri, harvests (the Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga districts traffic was only possible under military escort until have also been subject to this extortion). As some of 2016. According to data from Camrail, the freight the border regions are inaccessible, cereal produc- of commodities produced in northern Cameroon tion (millet and maize)  has been prohibited by the (onions, millet, sorghum, maize, peanuts, and live army, even in certain non-border areas, for security pigs) has dropped by half since 2014. As a result, reasons, leading to a significant decrease in regional a significant part of the Douala–N’Djamena traffic agricultural production and displaced farmers. has shifted to the border crossing at Touboro, reduc- ing the distance travelled in Cameroon in favor of Livestock trade and transit are equally affected, entering southern Chad. as traders or livestock breeders travelling to Nigeria have had to pay for safe passage. Sales of Nevertheless, the security situation is deteriorat- stolen livestock on the markets in Nigeria and Cam- ing in Chad as well, and the crisis in the Central eroon are another revenue source for Boko Haram. African Republic continues. Particularly impor­ Estimates indicate that since 2013, the group has tant are the increasing recent incidents of livestock stolen at least 17,000 heads of cattle and thousands theft and associated violence, which is displacing of sheep and goats in Cameroon, worth around many livestock farmers. For example, the kidnap- US$6 million. In addition, data collected from the ping of Mbororo children, part of an ethnic group customs authority in Yagoua, an important livestock specialized in livestock rearing, has increased in crossing point from Chad to Cameroon and Nige- frequency since 2007 (Kossoumna Liba’a, Dugué, ria, clearly indicate the reduction in transit flows. and Torquebiau 2011). Children are used as bar- For example, the transit of cattle to Nigeria, passing gaining chips to force livestock sales. The perpe- through Yagoua, decreased from 53,662 animals in trators are Nigerians and Cameroonians but mostly 2015 to around 33,000 animals in 2016 and 2017 Chadians and Central Africans. Because of the (a reduction of 39 percent). The transit of sheep increasing risks, livestock producers adjusted their also reduced from 2,482 animals in 2015 to 1,373 trading practices: while they previously exhibited in 2016, before rebounding slightly to 1,944. In their livestock proudly, now they are forced to split comparison, cattle imports from Chad to Cameroon large herds into subunits of 20 to 30 heads to limit through the same border crossing have stagnated at the risk of theft and to reduce the visibility of their around 6,000 animals. capital. In turn, the costs of guarding livestock have increased, and many urban cattle owners stopped Trade in northern Cameroon and the Lake contracting the Mbororo to take care of their ani- Chad basin has reduced significantly, and the mals because of the risks involved. local trading networks have had to find alter- native income sources or redirect their activities More recently, economic activity and trade to other parts of Cameroon. Traders with larger with Nigeria are also affected by the crisis in operations have moved to N’Djamena, Bertoua, the English-speaking part of Cameroon. Two Douala, or Yaoundé, while the smaller scale traders regions (North-West and South-West) form the have been the hardest hit. Merchants now have to English-speaking part of the country, accounting engage in significant detours of more than 100 km for 4 percent of the national area and 20 percent on worse roads and often by motorcycle and bicy- of the total population (International Crisis Group cle to reach their Nigerian destinations. Transport 2017). The regions’ economy is based on the oil within Cameroon has also been affected by the con- sector (9 percent of GDP), timber (4.5 percent), flict, in particular the important Maroua-Kousseri intensive agriculture, including large plantations Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  67 owned by the Cameroon Development Corpo- generally cultivate smaller plots, and have lower ration, and other smaller plantations that supply access to inputs and advisory services. Moreover, Douala and the CEMAC countries. The crisis women contribute disproportionately more to agri- affects both domestic trade and trade with Nige- cultural work, despite men taking over the heavier ria: the Nigerian traders must pass through those work (clearing and plowing). Also, few POs are regions to reach the production basins in the west- led by women, one of the notable exceptions being ern region and beyond, while domestic traders are CROPSEC, an agropastoral association active in often put off by the increased police and military the North and Far North regions, that counts more presence in the two regions, as well as the general than 3,000 women members (representing 59 per- climate of instability (for example, Internet con- cent of members) (Fongang 2012). nectivity is frequently cut). For the moment, no studies or estimates are available on the impact of Women play an important role in trade at all the crisis, but anecdotal evidence during the field surveyed locations but mainly as traders within mission indicates that if the crisis escalates, Cam- their own countries, while men predominate in eroon’s economy (20 percent of GDP is generated cross-border trade. The fieldwork and the survey by the Anglophone regions) as a whole will be sig- confirmed that most retailers and intermediaries nificantly affected. (buyam sellam) in immediate rural markets and collection markets, as well as a large number in Border closures, such as the recent one between urban markets, are women. Generally, women are Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, are another involved in short-distance trade (for example, Cen- example of how political crises affect agricul- tral African small-scale cross-border traders cross- tural trade. The border post at Kye-Ossi–Ebebiyín, ing by foot are predominantly female). In general, an important crossing point and source of foodstuffs they appear to dominate among small-scale retail for Guinea, was closed in late December 2017, and vendors and customers at the market, albeit their the traffic was redirected to the close-by village of participation in wholesale trading is not infrequent Olamze, where large trucks were fragmented into either, as observed at Abang-Minko or Kye-Ossi small batches that were transported by ‘pushers’ markets. In some cases, women also feature among along clandestine tracks through forest across the more established traders buying larger amounts of border. Indicative information obtained during agricultural goods (for example, through pickups, these trips (the students crossed as well through minibuses, or small trucks). The drivers of those this channel) shows that an additional cost of CFAF vehicles, on the other hand, would generally be 20,000 (US$18) was necessary to cross the border men. Finally, Garoua-Boulai presents a peculiar through the thick of the forest. flow of small-scale cross-border trade in cassava featuring predominantly Central African women. These women generally cross the border in the Women account for most 4.5  Central African Republic and may complete multi- domestic traders along ple trips in a day to buy and sell at the local market on the Cameroonian side. In some areas, the low agricultural trade corridors participation of women could be explained by their in CEMAC central role in the family and especially the weight of Islam in North Cameroon, where Islamic culture Women agricultural producers and traders are does not accept exhibition of women from the Peul disproportionately affected by trade barriers. In ethnic group in public places. line with findings in the literature on gender in agri- culture in Sub-Saharan Africa (for example, Mukasa Compared with other border locations in Africa, and Salami 2016), field observation confirmed that women at the visited sites did not report major female producers have difficulty in accessing land, 68  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa constraints related to abuse, including sexual full price formation analysis across the large harassment and physical violence. Instead, they number of traded agricultural products. Nev- would generally complain about the ‘financial’ ertheless, the collected data from field visits and harassment by authorities both at the border and at truck rides, along with some of the official statis- the market, referring to the fact that their generally tics from Cameroon, allow an indicative analysis of limited volume of business can be inadequate to meet price evolution at the major points along the corri- the costs associated with border crossing or market dors to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, as well as a vending. Similarly, women would often list access price buildup analysis along the Cameroon–Gabon to finance as their top priority to expand their trad- corridor for tomato, plantain, maize, and onion. ing activity, followed by access to skills, machinery, distribution, and marketing. Gender-specific infra- Consumer prices in Libreville are significantly structural deficiencies could be observed at the var- higher than in Cameroon, and compared with ious locations visited during the mission, including farm gate prices, they are four to six times higher. the complete lack of toilets and childcare facilities. As Table 20 indicates, the difference is smallest for In general, moving from small-scale to larger-scale maize but still 3.8 times the farm gate prices and trade usually depends on factors such as access to highest for plantain (5.8 higher). No clear pattern credit, education level, and entrepreneurial attitude. emerges regarding trends in the main steps of price For women, personal variables such as marital status formation, except that differences between the farm and number of children, as well as sociocultural vari- gate and immediate market represent between a ables such as discrimination and decision-making fifth and a quarter of the total (in line with previous power and control over resources within the house- observations in the report about the difficulties and hold, can affect their ability to trade at a large scale. cost to evacuate and market one’s production). The results are similar for consumer prices in Final consumer prices 4.6  Bata, Equatorial Guinea’s largest mainland city. in CEMAC reflect the costly Yet, costs in Malabo, the country’s capital and larg- est city, are probably even higher given the addi- and burdensome trade tional boat trip. As Table 21 indicates, the smallest processes difference between farm gate and consumer prices is for maize (three times higher), while the largest The fragmented nature of agricultural trade and is for plantain (7.5 times higher). the lack of systematic consumer price data in the CEMAC capitals make it difficult to develop a Table 20  Indicative price formation for selected commodities between Cameroon and Gabon (CFAF per kg) Cameroon and Gabon Tomato Plantain Maize Onion Farm gate 175 120 145 150 Foumbot/Garoua 275 150 190 350 Yaoundé 475 290 275 400 Abang-Minko 700 400 310 480 Bitam 750 470 320 495 Libreville 825 700 550 635 Consumption/farm gate price ratio 4.7 5.8 3.8 4.2 Source: Calculations based on field visits, truck ride trips, and official data. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  69 Table 21  Indicative price formation for selected commodities between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (CFAF per kg) Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea Tomato Plantain Maize Onion Farm gate 175 120 145 150 Foumbot/Garoua 275 150 190 350 Yaoundé 475 290 275 400 Kye-Ossi 500 410 340 460 Ebebiyin 925 740 395 545 Bata 1,075 900 440 605 Consumption/farm gate price ratio 6.1 7.5 3.0 4.0 Source: Calculations based on field visits, truck ride trips, and official data. Overall, the report has identified a multitude of consumer prices while squeezing the margins of domestic, border, and foreign factors that con- producers. The survey results confirm that the large tribute to increased costs of trading agricultural price differences between the countries are widely products, which in turn result in higher final recognized by border users, as detailed in Figure 18. Figure 18  Perceptions on price differences in CEMAC countries Border users: There are large differences in prices of agriculture commodities between Cameroon and Equatorial Gulnea. (N = 24) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Border users: There are large differences in prices of agriculture commodities between Cameroon and Gabon. (N = 106) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree Border users: There are large differences in prices of agriculture commodities between Cameroon and the Central African Republic. (N = 115) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Percent of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree I don’t know Source: Perceptions survey, January–February 2018. Note: N = Number of respondents. 70  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa A more detailed price buildup analysis has been The price buildup analysis for tomato along the prepared using the various information collected Foumbot (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) cor- throughout the fieldwork for four important agri- ridor indicates that production costs (including cultural commodities traded within CEMAC: the producer’s margin) account for only 20 per- tomato, maize, plantain, and onion. The avail- cent of the final consumer price (Figure 19). On ability of information allowed the full analysis to the other hand, the costs of intermediation along be conducted only for the Cameroon to Gabon cor- the corridor (22 percent) and at the final destination ridor (from western or northern production areas to (21 percent) are significant cost drivers. The cost Libreville). The analysis focused on the more typi- of petty harassments (12 percent) is an important cal marketing mechanism (as described previously addition to price formation and is about 75 percent in the report) in which the producer takes his/her of the total transport cost from the farm to table commodities to a collection market, where through (16 percent). Border crossing costs account for intermediaries the goods reach a large trader who in about 6 percent. turn transports the goods to a border market (in this case Abang-Minko), from where the goods cross The price buildup for maize from Cameroon to the border and continue to Libreville. The cost of Gabon is also dominated by the costs of inter- petty harassments, the losses along the way, and mediation along the corridor (22 percent) and the intermediaries’ margins (wholesale and retail) at the final destination (21 percent) (Figure 20). at the destination market have been also been con- Production costs account for less than a fifth of the sidered. While the trucks carry mixed goods, the total, while the producer’s margin is a mere 3 per- analysis focused on a single commodity at a time, cent. Transport costs account for 16 percent and the given the unavailable information on the actual mix associated tracasseries for 12 percent. of products. Figure 19  Price buildup for tomato on the Foumbot (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices) 9% 100 12% 90 11% 1% 80 70 5% 6% 60 11% Percent 50 1% 1% 6% 40 11% 30 3% 1% 5% 20 5% 13% 10 0 e r n t n s ko s) s ko g lle s) s n n bo bo ee ee ee as gi gi in gi gi rie ie vi in in ar ar ss ar ar um La tf tf tf le er re M M se m m m lm ro ke ke ke ss ib - g- nd o ng as c –F ’s ’s le –L ar ar ar ca an ai la er ry er ac ba sa et M M M ro rm tra Ab + ia rd uc (tr le R –A bo ed fa s t( Bo n– ho od t t ot tE pu en en t rm gi W or Pr b In m m or ar m te sp ss ss sp ou m In an ra ra an tF ’s Tr ry ha ha Tr or ia sp tty tty ed an Pe Pe rm Tr te In Source: Estimated from data collected for this report. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  71 Figure 20  Price buildup for maize on the Foumbot (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices) 9% 100 12% 90 14% 1% 80 70 6% 60 7% Percent 7% 50 2% 0% 7% 40 7% 30 3% 0% 9% 2% 20 12% 10 0 e r n t n s ko s) s ko g lle s) s n n bo bo e ee ee as gi gi in gi gi rie ie vi in in fe ar ar ss ar ar m La tf tf le er re -M M se t m ou m m lm ro ke ke ke ss ib g- nd ng as c –F ’s ’s le –L ar ar ar ca an ai la er ry er ac ba sa et M M M ro m tra Ab + ia rd uc (tr le R A ar bo ed s t( Bo t– n– ho od tf ut t tE en en bo m gi p W or Pr In r sm m or ar m te sp ss sp u m In an s Fo ra ra an ’s Tr ry ha ha t Tr or ia sp ty tty ed t an Pe Pe rm Tr te In Source: Estimated from data collected for this report. Similarly, the price buildup for plantain from (Figure 21). The other building blocks maintain Foumbot to Libreville demonstrates that inter- similar proportions, with production costs (includ- mediation costs (along the corridor 14 percent ing the producer’s gains) accounting for 18 percent, and at the final destination 27 percent) explain transport costs for 15 percent, petty harassment for a significant proportion of the final prices 15 percent, and border crossing for 7 percent. Figure 21  Price buildup for plantain on the Foumbot (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices) 13% 100 90 14% 80 1% 13% 70 6% 60 7% Percent 50 7% 40 7% 2% 1% 7% 30 2% 1% 20 6% 2% 10% 10 0 se r n t n s ko s) s ko g lle s) s n n bo bo ee ee ee gi gi in gi gi rie ie vi in in a ar ar ss ar ar m La tf tf tf le er re M M se m ou m m lm ro ke ke ke ss ib - g- nd ng as c –F ’s ’s le –L ar ar ar ca an ai la er ry er ac ba sa et M M M ro m tra Ab + ia rd uc (tr le R –A ar bo ed ts t( Bo n– ho od tf t ot tE pu en en rm gi W or Pr b In m m or ar m te sp ss ss sp ou m In an ra ra an tF ’s Tr ry ha ha Tr or ia sp tty tty ed an Pe Pe rm Tr te In Source: Estimated from data collected for this report. 72  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Figure 22  Price buildup for onion on the Ngaoundere (Cameroon) to Libreville (Gabon) corridor (percentage of final consumer prices) 9% 100 12% 90 12% 1% 80 70 6% 6% 60 7% Percent 50 3% 1% 11% 40 7% 30 3% 1% 3% 20 7% 11% 10 0 e r n t n s ko s) s ko g lle s) s n n bo bo e ee ee as gi gi in gi gi rie ie vi in in fe ar ar ss ar ar m La tf tf le er re -M M se t m ou m m lm ro ke ke ke ss ib g- nd ng as c –F ’s ’s le –L ar ar ar ca an ai la er ry er ac ba sa et M M M ro m tra Ab + ia rd uc (tr le R A ar bo ed s t( Bo t– n– ho od tf ut t tE en en bo m gi p W or Pr In r sm m or ar m te sp ss sp u m In an s Fo ra ra an ’s Tr ry ha ha t Tr or ia sp ty tty ed t an Pe Pe rm Tr te In Source: Estimated from data collected for this report. The price for onion, produced more in the Given the similar patterns of price formation northern regions of Cameroon, follows a similar for these four selected commodities, the overall buildup pattern as the other three commodities price buildup analysis indicates that interme- (Figure 22). The longer distance of the overall cor- diation costs (along the corridor, at the final ridor results in higher costs of transport (20 percent) destination, and including market access costs) and associated tracasseries (15 percent). Intermedi- are the most important cost driver, accounting ation costs along the corridor again account for over for 42 percent of the total (Figure 23). Transport 40 percent of the final prices, while border crossing costs and petty harassment account for about a explains 6 percent of the cost. third of the total, while production costs are almost Figure 23  Price buildup for selected commodities on the Cameroon to Gabon corridor (percentage of final consumer prices) Transport, 16% Production costs, 18% Producer’s margin, 3% Intermediaries Intermediaries at final destination, along the, 23% corridor, 16% Petty harassment Market fees, 3% (tracasseries), 14% Border crossing, 7% Production Transport Intermediation Border Source: Estimated from data collected for this report. Trading Agricultural Commodities in CEMAC  73 20 percent. Border crossing costs on their own are CGE model developed by the World Bank, elimi- roughly 7 percent, while the producer’s margin is nating the cost of petty harassments in Cameroon only 3 percent. would increase Cameroon’s exports to CEMAC countries by about 23 percent. A CEMAC-wide It is surprising that the overland transport removal of tracasseries costs would increase of agricultural goods is gaining in popularity intra-regional exports by about 25 percent by 2030 despite the large number of obstacles and costs. (Djiofack 2018). While these modeling results are Gabon and especially Equatorial Guinea could be only indicative, they confirm the fact that trading better served through maritime routes from Douala costs undermine export competitiveness, and their and other smaller ports in Cameroon, both in terms removal can have multiplier effects for the econ- of official and unofficial costs. Nevertheless, the omy. Lowering trade frictions would facilitate not sea route seems to be slowly disappearing (see only food exports, but also imports of agricultural Box 4). inputs such as seed and fertilizer. Lower prices for farm inputs would promote agricultural intensifica- The implications of these trading costs, from a tion and, combined with increased access to export macroeconomic point of view, are potentially markets for food, would spur the region toward eco- large. According to ENVISAGE, a dynamic global nomic diversification. 74  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Box 4  Maritime trade in agricultural products Many older studies describe the maritime route for trading agricultural commodities between Cameroon’s Port of Douala and Gabon’s Libreville and Port-Gentil and Equatorial Guinea’s Malabo and Bata. Estimated volumes in this literature indicate that this channel was widely used and that large volumes were traded by sea with these neighboring CEMAC countries. Nevertheless, visits and interviews for this study (February 2018) found that very few trad- ers use this sea channel anymore and that maritime trade has slowed almost to a halt. Port Gabon/Quai Boscam, part of the Port of Douala, used to be the main loading place for agricultural products bound for CEMAC countries and Nigeria, but recent infrastructure and access problems have redirected traders to using trucks overland. According to the few authorities still present at the site, trade volumes began steadily decreasing in 2014 due to sand accumulations and remaining shipwrecks in the quay and its immediate proximity. Capacity went down from 20–30 boats along the quay in two or three parallel lines to just 3–5 boats at present with ships having to undergo complicated ‘parking’ moves to be able to load. As a result, very few traders use the quay. At the time of the visit, one boat bound for Libreville had been waiting for six weeks for sufficient cargo to justify the trip, compared with the almost daily departures in the past. The obvious solution (removal of sand and wrecks) has been present to the management of the Port of Douala, but no progress has been made to date. Image B.4.1  Port Gabon/Quai Boscam in the Port of Douala Source: Imagery © 2018 DigitalGlobe, map data © 2018 Google. Recommendations and Areas 5.  for Action As the report has highlighted, the factors restrict- the length of a selected trade corridor is likely to be ing agricultural trade in the CEMAC area are more effective than targeting a single problem for multiple, interrelated, and costly. These bottle- many trade corridors. necks can be national or regional (international) in nature, reflecting gaps in policy or investment. Some Investment opportunities to reduce the costs of level solutions could be scaled up to the level national-­ regional agricultural trade start with producers. of CEMAC through well-designed interventions. The Helping producers organize to achieve commercial recommendations in this section fall into four catego- links with large buyers will allow them to graduate ries according to the targeted scale (national versus from farmers to agropreneurs. Physical access to mar- regional) and the likely instrument (policy reform kets, through road maintenance and motorized trans- versus investment). These four categories are num- port, is also critical. Promising investments to support bered according to the quadrants in Figure 24. Rec- producers include the following in which the numbers ommendations can be further classified according to in parentheses refer to quadrants in Figure 24. the stage along the trade corridor (farm, market, bor- der, and so on) where they are targeted. • Increase in the capacity of POs to aggregate pro- duction and organize constant grouped sales (1); Figure 24  Categorizing interventions to • Support for the establishment of stronger mar- promote agricultural trade in CEMAC ket links between rural producers and end con- Investment sumers possibly through productive alliances (following the model used in the World Bank-­ 1 2 financed PIDMA and PRODEL) and/or other approaches (1); National Regional • Rural road rehabilitation, construction, and maintenance planning to improve physical access 4 3 from the field to the immediate market (1);  • Innovative financing mechanisms to increase the availability of motorized transport (1); and Policy • Support for cross-border productive alliances or other forms of commercial links between net- The research emphasis in this study on ‘corri- works of large traders from the CEMAC region dor approaches’ also applies to investments and and POs or networks (2). policy reforms. Efforts to improve regional agri- cultural trade are likely to be most successful when Reducing trade inefficiencies at the market they consider the full path of goods from the farm level requires infrastructure investments, policy/­ to the end consumer. Unblocking one constraint, governance reforms, and better information such as an individual farmers’ access to immediate systems. The analysis has highlighted that public markets, would have a negligible impact on regional access to markets is often hindered and that, despite trade if downstream blockages remain unaddressed. the almost universal collection of market fees by As a general approach, improving conditions along public authorities, little maintenance or long-term 75 76  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa development work is being done. In addition, reg- these agencies to perform legitimate trade func- ular price collection and dissemination through a tions, and developing a training program for trade information system could add transparency officers found at checkpoints around a code of to transactions, reduce the margins of intermedi- conduct for professional behavior (1), (4); aries, and mitigate price volatility. Recommended • Reducing the number of checkpoints along the market-level interventions include: ­ corridors and, in the process, upgrading the remaining ones with cameras or other modalities • Construction of market infrastructure such as that add a sense of oversight (1); covered spaces, market stalls, warehouse facili- • Reinforcing an anti-corruption hotline (numero ties, water points, and sanitary facilities (1); vert) and consistently addressing reports (1); and • Support for inclusive management and oversight • Incentivizing traders to adhere to existing regu- structures. The existing trader associations could lations, that is, not overcharging vehicles, ensur- be a good starting point for involving the private ing necessary paperwork is in order, refusing to sector in the management and development of turn a fine into a bribe. This could be achieved such public spaces (3); through the creating of a “traders” charter’ • A sustainable trade information system to reduce detailing the rights and obligations of trade cor- dependence on informal networks for gathering ridor users (3), (4). information and making business decisions and to enable transparent price discovery (1) (2); At the border, there are opportunities to facilitate • Training and awareness raising for producers/ agricultural trade by improving management, col- sellers on market and price dynamics, so that lecting better information, and investing in infra- producers can more accurately interpret price structure. The current artificial proliferation of data (1); border agencies significantly increases the delays, • A regional market information system to aggre- costs, and corruption without adding much value to gate national systems (2), (4); and the trading process. There is scope to consolidate • Support for wholesale market development, fol- agencies (some agencies could in theory form joint lowing lessons learned from China and India on units or be present only on the more concerned side the importance of enabling competition and pro- of the border) and enhance interagency coordina- viding unrestricted entry for licensed traders (1). tion. During fieldwork, officials appeared to know each other at the various sites and to communicate Solutions to eliminate petty harassment along in a friendly manner through informal phone calls, transport corridors could reduce food prices by as but there were no established, institutionalized coor- much as 14 percent. Actors surveyed for this study dination mechanisms/platforms through which they universally recognized that tracasseries are general- could meet regularly (for example, once a quarter), ized and costly. Eliminating such a generalized prac- have rotating chairmanship arrangements, discuss tice would not be easy, but possible actions include: and solve common issues, and so on.16 Similarly, there did not seem to exist any internal hierarchy • Awareness raising about what are legitimate among the various agencies, which could enhance checkpoints/fees/functions and what are not (1); interagency coordination on each side of the bor- • Engaging agencies found at checkpoints in a dia- der.17 Suggested policies and investments to reduce logue on the cost of tracasseries to their nation, agricultural trading costs at the border include: supporting capacity improvements needed for 16 Interesting experiences on interagency coordination through Joint Border Committees (JBCs) are available from various East African Community borders. 17 In Zambia, the new border management bill designates the Zambia Revenue Authority as a lead agency at all borders in the country. Recommendations and Areas for Action  77 • Establishing national border committees with a no declaration requirements and little purpose lead agency, such as customs, to improve coordi- in certifying that a product is free from pests or nation (3); disease when both countries have the same pest • Streamlining border agencies by using single or disease. Further research on SPS measures window systems. Multiple layers of police, that reflect genuine plant and animal health and gendarmerie, and other army units could be food safety risks would help generate value from consolidated; similarly, technical agencies such current SPS stops (4); and as Phytosanitary Police and veterinary control • At the CEMAC level, establishing a trade regime could also be consolidated (3); for agricultural products that all governments • Establishing joint, international border commit- can adhere to. The primary political economy tees to coordinate functions and regularize pro- obstacle is revenue generation or redistribution cedures across countries (4); from border activities. Advisory and policy • Investing in infrastructure and facilities such as support could help the countries find alternative lighting (for security), paving, upgrading build- solutions, learning from the experience of other ings, and digitizing records systems (1); trade blocs, on how to decrease their dependency • Revisiting existing performance-based manage- on border taxes (4). ment systems to ensure adequate salaries and timely payments for border agencies staff and Moving from coordination to cooperation, man- upgrading training for border agencies staff (1); aging political crises at a high level between and CEMAC governments could minimize border • Disseminating regulations, fee structures, and closures. As the often-repeated example of Equa- border crossing requirements for border torial Guinea indicates, a closed border between users (1).  Cameroon and a net food importer immediately affects both producer prices and the food availabil- At a general policy level, regional agricultural ity in the other country. trade in CEMAC suffers from a lack of standard practices and a lack of harmonization between • The CEMAC Commission, together with the national policies and CEMAC policies. Within respective governments, reviews security consid- Cameroon, there is no single set of regulations gov- erations to ensure they are not disproportionate erning agricultural trade with the CEMAC neigh- and that trade—even with additional controls— bors. This study found that official regulations can continue unhindered (4). often clashed with the border practices, which in turn varied widely by region. Recommendations to This report’s findings about marginal cost accu- address this finding include: mulations along the selected trade corridors provide a mechanism to rank interventions. Top • Providing advisory and policy support for priorities for intervention are areas that account national governments, particularly the Customs for a significant portion of trading costs and where Authority and the Ministry of Trade, to establish there is a high potential to reduce these costs. a single and coherent set of regulations and to Table 22 lists the top five recommended priorities develop capacity and oversight necessary to con- for action to improve agricultural trade in CEMAC. sistently apply these (3); Market intermediation costs, which represent the • Reducing border taxes that act as nontariff bar- bulk (42 percent) of trade costs in CEMAC, are the riers, even if export tariffs are or will soon be focus of the top two recommendations. Reducing removed (3); pervasive petty harassments (tracasseries) is the • Establishing a regional dialogue on SPS decla- third priority, reducing other transport costs is the ration requirements. There is little/no purpose in fourth priority, and improving conditions at the bor- charging for certification when the importer has der (which accounts for 7 percent of final consumer 78  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa prices) is the fifth priority. Although border costs agriculture trade. Removing price wedges offers appear relatively modest in the total price composi- major opportunities to improve farmer incomes and tion, border posts serve multiple corridors and can reduce urban food prices, but demand and supply be choke points for agricultural trade when products elasticities would affect which actors in the system cannot get through at all. It is also worth noting that are able to capture any rents that ultimately result there is significant national opportunity to facili- from policy changes or investments. The inci- tate regional trade because most agricultural trade dence of these gains from increased trade is a key costs accumulate before products reach the border. political economy question and an important area Indeed, most of the opportunities to improve agri- for future research. A second research question cultural trade within CEMAC rest in the hands of relates to the SPS risks posed by agricultural trade. national or subnational actors. While the benefits of increased agricultural trade for economic diversification and food security are Successful implementation of these recommen- undeniable, there is an associated risk of contam- dations will require strong political leadership ination. Understanding the current scope of ani- to overcome political economy resistance from mal and plant diseases in CEMAC is necessary to those who extract rents from the current system identify appropriate, targeted risk-based mitigation at the expense of the poor. Complicating the task, measures. Finally, as noted at the outset, this study improved corridor performance requires engaging focused on trade corridors that originate in Camer- with multiple stakeholders and government minis- oon. A useful area for additional research would be tries at the local, national, and regional levels. The to look at corridors beginning in other countries, to identification of public and private sector champions confirm whether the structure of trading costs and for the necessary reforms and investments in each the primary barriers to agricultural trade are indeed priority area will therefore be critical to success. similar. Agricultural trade corridors originating outside of Cameroon will be especially important The findings in this report suggest several ave- as these other CEMAC countries develop agricul- nues for future research. A first question is who tural exports to diversify their economies. will benefit from efforts to reduce the costs of Table 22  Top five priorities to promote agricultural trade in CEMAC TIME TYPE OF PAYOFF COST SCALE FRAME SUPPORT Priorities and measures Low/ Short/ Low/ Policy focus/ National/ Medium/ Medium/ Moderate/ Investment Regional High Long High focus Priority 1: Reduce intermediation costs by linking farmers to markets (a) Strengthen market links between rural produc- ers and urban consumers by • Working with POs to aggregate production and High Medium Moderate National Investment organize constant grouped sales • Supporting cross-border productive alliances or High Medium/ Moderate Regional Investment other direct commercial links between CEMAC Long regional traders and POs (b) Increase access to motorized transport in rural areas by • Introduction of leasing arrangements and other Medium Short Moderate National Investment new financing mechanisms for transport service providers (continued) Recommendations and Areas for Action  79 TIME TYPE OF PAYOFF COST SCALE FRAME SUPPORT Priorities and measures Low/ Short/ Low/ Policy focus/ National/ Medium/ Medium/ Moderate/ Investment Regional High Long High focus Priority 2: Improve the efficiency of agricultural markets (a) Physical investments in market infrastructure including • Market stalls, secure storage, cold storage, load- High Short/ Moderate National Investment ing docks, lighting, sanitation, and rest area at Medium strategic points on regional trade corridors (b) Promote competitiveness through inclusive market management and oversight by • Involving trader associations and other private Medium Medium Low National Mixed users in development and management of public market spaces • Initiating dialogue on and promotion of a service Medium Medium Low National/ Mixed charter for market management Regional (c) Increased access to market and trade informa- tion to promote competitiveness by • Training and awareness raising for sellers on mar- Low/ Short/ Low National Investment ket and price dynamics to improve interpretation Medium Medium and decision-making capabilities • Introducing market information systems that Medium Short/ Moderate National Investment reduce dependence on informal networks for price Medium discovery • Developing regional market information system to Medium Medium/ Moderate Regional Investment aggregate national systems, using information and Long communication technology (ICT) where possible Priority 3: Professionalize behavior along the trade corridor (a) Build capacity of regulatory agencies to perform legitimate trade through • Functional review of key responsibilities and Medium Short Low National Investment introduction of performance-based management systems • Developing and implementing a training program Medium Medium Moderate National/ Investment for checkpoint officers around a code of conduct Regional for professional behavior • Reducing (rationalizing) the number of check- High Medium Moderate National Policy points along trade corridors • Upgrading legitimate checkpoints by building High Medium Moderate National Investment capacity to implement functions (such as SPS monitoring) and improving oversight using cam- eras or other modalities (b) Enlist corridor users to report abuse and cor- ruption, by • Raising awareness of corridor users about legiti- Medium Short Low National/ Investment mate checkpoints, fees, and functions Regional • Reinforcing and/or introducing anticorruption Medium Short Low National/ Investment hotlines (numero vert) by consistently addressing Regional reports and rewarding good outcomes (continued) 80  Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa Table 22  Continued TIME TYPE OF PAYOFF COST SCALE FRAME SUPPORT Priorities and measures Low/ Short/ Low/ Policy focus/ National/ Medium/ Medium/ Moderate/ Investment Regional High Long High focus Priority 4: Strengthening regional transport links (a) Improve road maintenance and infrastructure by • Developing regional connectivity strategy for link- Medium Short Low Regional Investment ing agriculture producers with demand centers • Introducing performance-based management of High Short/ Low National Investment weighbridges and other strategies for reliable and Medium transparent enforcement of vehicle weight limits • Investing in road rehabilitation, construction, and High Short/ Moderate/ National Investment maintenance planning Medium High • Attracting investment in private truck parks Medium Short Low National Investment (secure parking place, showers, and so on) (b) Break up cartels and improve competitiveness of domestic and regional agriculture transport by • Developing a specific time-bound action plan for Medium Short Low National/ Investment sector reform based on dialogue between trans- Regional port operators and regional policy makers • Establishing a dedicated task force to implement Medium/ Medium/ Moderate National/ Mixed the action plan and track progress toward agreed High Long Regional performance indicators (c) Improve port access for regional traders by • Dredging of Quai Boscam and removal of ship- Medium Short/ Moderate/ National Investment wrecks blocking jetties Medium High • Upgrading of other ports used by regional vessels Medium Short/ Moderate/ National Investment as needed Medium High (continued) Recommendations and Areas for Action  81 TIME TYPE OF PAYOFF COST SCALE FRAME SUPPORT Priorities and measures Low/ Short/ Low/ Policy focus/ National/ Medium/ Medium/ Moderate/ Investment Regional High Long High focus Priority 5: Improve border operations (a) Physical investments in border infrastructure such as • Lighting, paving, upgrading buildings, and digitiz- Medium Short Moderate/ National Investment ing records systems High (b) Establish joint border committees including • National committees with a lead agency, such as Medium Short Low National Policy customs, to improve coordination at each border post • International committees to coordinate functions Medium Medium Low Regional Policy and regularize procedures across countries at shared border posts (c) Professionalize behavior of border officials and border users by • Introducing performance-based management sys- Medium Short Low National Mixed tems around a service charter for border agencies • Training of border officials and border users in High Short Low National Mixed basic rights and obligations, including the benefits of regulatory compliance • Introducing toll-free hotlines for reporting corrup- Medium Medium Low National Investment tion and abuse (d) Awareness raising of official regulations, fee structures, and border crossing requirements for border users through • Developing training materials and training pro- Medium/ Short Low National/ Investment grams for border officials and border users High Regional • Producing publicity materials and user-friendly Medium/ Short Low National/ Mixed pamphlets with information on trade procedures High Regional and posting of all official charges in a conspicuous spot at every border post • Publicity campaign on the need for and benefits of Medium/ Short Low/ National/ Investment regulatory compliance High Moderate Regional (e) Rationalize trade requirements by • Adopting risk-based approaches to border inspec- High Short Low National Policy tion and compliance • Reviewing SPS declaration requirements based Medium/ Medium Moderate National/ Mixed on risk High Regional • Eliminating mandatory border inspections and Medium/ Medium Low National Mixed product certification requirements (including SPS High certification) where import declaration conditions do not exist (f) Foster dialogue through the CEMAC Commis- High Ongoing Low Regional Policy sion on the economic costs of unpredictable border closures. 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