57986 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review & Lessons Learned THE WORLD BANK Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned July 2010 Table of Contents Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................................vii Acronyms....................................................................................................................................................ix Overview.....................................................................................................................................................xi CHAPTER I: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations............................................................................................................ 1 Background and Issues.............................................................................................................. 1 Some Basic Definitions.............................................................................................................. 1 Overview of Challenges............................................................................................................ 2 Court Management: the "Macro" Approach to Capacity Building.............. 3 Courtroom and Case Management: The "Micro" Approach to Capacity Building.................................................................................................................6 Elements of a Capacity Building Program.................................................................... 8 Conclusions..................................................................................................................................... 18 CHAPTER II: Fragile Situations............................................................................................... 19 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 19 . Characteristics of Fragile or Conflict-Affected States........................................ 20 Strengthening the ROL in Peace and State Building Operations............. 21 Sequencing..................................................................................................................................... 25 Guidelines........................................................................................................................................ 26 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................... 28 CHAPTER III: Access Programs............................................................................................... 31 . Analyzing the Problem........................................................................................................... 32 Traditional Justice....................................................................................................................... 33 ADR....................................................................................................................................................... 34 iii Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Commercial Justice................................................................................................................... 36 Legal Assistance........................................................................................................................... 39 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................... 40 CHAPTER IV: Criminal Justice Reform.............................................................................. 41 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 41 . Bank Activity & Criminal Justice....................................................................................... 41 The criminal justice chain and its variations........................................................... 42 . Objectives of Criminal Justice Reforms....................................................................... 43 Law Reform..................................................................................................................................... 44 Institutional Reform.................................................................................................................. 44 Police................................................................................................................................................... 45 . The Judiciary.................................................................................................................................. 46 Prosecution..................................................................................................................................... 46 Legal Assistance (Public Defender)................................................................................ 47 Prisons................................................................................................................................................ 48 . Civil Society Role......................................................................................................................... 49 Conclusions..................................................................................................................................... 50 CHAPTER V: Corruption in African Justice Systems............................................. 51 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 51 . How Corruption is Organized............................................................................................ 52 The Political Economy of Corruption............................................................................ 58 Methods for Combating Corruption in African Justice Systems............... 61 Category 1: Countries with High Levels of Sporadic, Unorganized TABLE OF CONTENTS Corruption due to Lack of Oversight Mechanisms and General Disorder................................................................................................................ 61 Category 2: Countries with High Levels of Corruption Based on the Government's use of the Courts to Maintain Power....................... 62 Category 3: Countries with Lower Levels of Corruption or a Mixture of Corruption and Inefficiency......................................................... 63 Conclusions..................................................................................................................................... 64 CHAPTER VI: Indicators................................................................................................................ 65 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 65 . iv Table of Contents What is an Indicator?................................................................................................................ 65 Designing Indicators................................................................................................................ 67 Types of Indicators by Use.................................................................................................... 70 Conclusions..................................................................................................................................... 74 Annexes..................................................................................................................................................... 75 Annex I................................................................................................................................................ 76 Annex II: Justice Sector Projects in the Africa Region....................................... 80 Annex III: List of Participants to the Stakeholder Consultations: "Demand Side of Justice Workshops".............................................................. 109 References............................................................................................................................................ 113 List of Tables Table 1: Doing Business 2010 ­ Enforcing Contracts................................................. 37 Table 2: Entry Points for Corruption in the Justice Sector...................................... 53 Table 3: Structural Characteristics of Organizational Corruption...................... 58 Table 4: Political Priorities vis-à-vis Justice Sector Outputs................................... 60 TABLE OF CONTENTS v Acknowledgements This report was prepared by a core Task Team comprised of: Lisa L. Bhansali (Task Team Leader), Linn Hammergren (Senior Rule of Law Consultant), Nancy Chaarani Meza (Public Sector Consultant, AFTPR). Members of the Africa Justice Working Group included: Hisham Abdo Kahin (LEG), Maria González de Asis (WBI), Varun Gauri (DECRG), Greg Ellis (OPCS), Richard E. Messick (PRMPS/INT), Lourdes Pagaran (AFTRL), Gilberto de Barros (AFTFW), Julien Levis (CICAF), Ikechukwu Nweje (AFTPR), George Larbi (AFTPR), Denis Biseko (AFTPR), Sahr Kpundeh (AFTPR); and Helene Grandvoinnet (SDV). Other task team members included: Jo Abuodha (Consultant), Paulina Soto (Consultant), Tazeen Hasan (Consultant), Barry Walsh (Consultant), Mukta Mahajani (Consultant), and Joyce Adams (Consultant). The Team would like to particularly thank Anand Rajaram (Sector Manager, AFTPR), Sudhir Shetty (Director, Africa PREM), Deborah Wetzel (Director, PRMPS) and Christina Biebesheimer (Chief Counsel, LEGJR), who provided overall guidance for this work. The Team is especially grateful to three reviewers: Lubomira Beardsley (Senior Counsel, LEGJR), Richard E. Messick (Senior Operations Specialist, INTOP), and Waleed Haider Malik (Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, AFTPR). Many thanks are also due to Nelia Polines Dinkin and Tess Buktaw (AFTPR), who provided invaluable administrative support to this task. Comments and helpful suggestions were received by: David Bernstein (INTSC), Richard Messick (INTOP), Dominique Bichara (EXTUN), Amitabha Mukherjee (ECSPE), Raj Soopramanien (LEGAF), Heike Gramckow (LEGJR), Klaus Decker (ECAPREM), Wolfgang Koehling (INT), María González de Asis (WBI), Carolina Vaira (WBI), Elizabeth Ninan (AIDS Campaign Team for Africa, AFTHV), Motoky Hayakawa (AFTPR), Andreas Foerster (AFTPR), Erik Caldwell Johnson (OPCFC); Caroline Sage (LEGJR), Vivek Maru (LEGJR), Deval Desai (LEGJR), Valerie Nussenblatt (LEGJR), Roberto Panzardi (AFTPR), Kathrin Plangemann (AFTPR), Milena Sanchez de Boado (LCSPS), Nicolette K. Dewitt (LEGAF), Alexandre Marc (SDV), William Kingsmill (Office of the Vice President, Africa Region), Rebecca Hife (PRMPS), Arjun Suraj Ponnambalam (LCSPT), Bernard Harborne (Lead Conflict Adviser, Africa Region), Solange A. Alliali (LEGLA), Masud Mozammel (EXT), and Jeff Ramin (AFTRL). A number of participants assisted the Team through stakeholder workshops in East and West Africa to discuss substantive issues of reform in the Rule of Law agenda in sub-Saharan Africa (see Annex III for a detailed list of participants). For support during these stakeholder workshops, vii Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned a very special thanks to His Lordship, Chief Justice A. Ramadhani of the United Republic of Tanzania and Her Ladyship Chief Justice Georgina Wood of the Republic of Ghana. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the Trust Fund of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs without which work for this Note, including accompanying stakeholder workshops, empirical caseload data and user studies and the case studies in justice sector development in sub-Saharan Africa, would not have been possible. ACkNOwLEdgEmENTS viii Acronyms AAP Africa Action Plan ABA American Bar Association ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution AfDB African Development Bank AFTQK Operational Quality and Knowledge Services, Africa Region CAR Court Administration Reform Project (Ethiopia) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CEPEJ European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CMC Citizens' Mediation Centers of Lagos State (Nigeria) CONAC National Anti-Corruption Commission (Cameroon) CSO Civil Society Organization DEC Development Economics Vice Presidency DFID UK Department for International Development EC European Commission ECA Europe and Central Asia Region ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FCS Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations FLSTAP Financial and Legal Sector Technical Assistance Project (Kenya) GAC Governance and Anti-Corruption HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICT Information and Communication Technologies IDA International Development Association IDF Institutional Development Fund INT Department of Institutional Integrity ISN Interim Strategy Note KACC Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission LDC Least Developed Country LCR Latin America and Caribbean Region LEG Legal Vice Presidency LEGAF Africa Practice Group, Legal Vice Presidency LEGJR Justice Reform Practice Group, Legal Vice Presidency LEGOP Operations Policy Practice Group, Legal Vice Presidency ix Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned LICUS Low-Income Countries under Stress LIL Learning and Innovation Loan LJR Legal and Judicial Reform LTA Legal Technical Assistance MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation MIS Management Information Systems NCLR National Council of Law Reporting of Kenya NGO Non Governmental Organization NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OHADA Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) OPCS Operations Policy and Country Services OSI Open Society Institute PIU Project Implementation Unit PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Vice Presidency PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSCAP Public Sector Capacity Building Program (Ethiopia) PSD Private Sector Development Department PSR Public Sector Reform ROL Rule of Law ROLI Rule of Law Initiative (ABA) SDV Social Development Department SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence SSA Sub-Saharan Africa SWAP Sector-Wide Approach TTL Task Team Leader UN United Nations UNCAC United Nations Convention Against Corruption USAID United States Agency for International Development USIP United States Institute of Peace WBI World Bank Institute WJP World Justice Program ACrONymS x Overview Since the early 1990s, international development bodies have increasingly provided financial and technical assistance to developing countries to reform their legal frameworks and strengthen the capacity of institutions responsible for rule-based conflict resolution. This goal is generally recognized as promoting the "rule of law" (ROL). ROL reforms are considered to be necessary conditions for the achievement of economic and social development and poverty reduction for a number of reasons. A well-functioning justice sector can resolve conflicts before they escalate; ensure citizen security; attract investors by providing a predictable legal environment; curb corruption by ensuring accountability; and provide access to justice for all people, regardless of their age, gender, ethnicity, religion, or socio-economic status. The benefits of a well-functioning justice system are generally accepted, but agreement about the importance of this goal has not meant that ROL reform has always been as successful as project designers and participants had hoped. As of this writing, the World Bank has no official, general strategy for promoting the ROL, but many, both Bank staff and others, have accumulated a great deal of experience from working on justice sector projects in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This Africa Regional Justice Note (the "Note") draws on that experience to present a review and some guidance specific to the needs for working on ROL reform in SSA. The Note is designed to assist Bank task teams, working together with their country counterparts, who may have varying levels of experience with promoting the ROL; some will be familiar with the African context but not ROL, and for others, vice-versa. This Note may also represent a first introduction to ROL reform; for those who have worked on such projects in the past, it should supplement existing knowledge about this emerging field. Specifically, this Note aims to equip Bank staff to promote, design, conduct, and oversee projects and analytical work related to ROL reform by: · Providing an introduction to the Rule of Law Movement and the purpose of ROL work in the broader context of development; · Placing the Bank's work on the rule of law in Africa in a historical context, both in terms of Africa's recent history and the Bank's evolving priorities; · Presenting "lessons learned" from past and ongoing rule of law reform efforts and providing specific guidance for embarking on new or supervising existing projects, particularly in conflict-affected and fragile situations; and xi Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned · Highlighting rule of law projects that are noteworthy because of a particular focus or approach. Following this Overview, each chapter is briefly described in the Summaries section. The Note has also benefitted from three additional reports designed to assist with ROL project design and implementation: two user studies: Uses and Users of Justice in Africa: The Case of Ethiopia's Federal Courts and Uses and Users of Justice: The Case of Ghana's Specialised Courts and the report entitled In Search of Success: Case Studies in Justice Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, which explores a variety of ROL projects from countries throughout the continent. The rule of Law Rule of law reforms include a wide variety of initiatives aimed at strengthening the State's ability to ensure the just, timely, and fair administration of justice. However, definitions of the "rule of law" often vary, depending on donor philosophies and development objectives. This Note will use the definition set out in the World Development Report (2000), Attacking Poverty.1 The "rule of law" exists where: · The laws of the society are publicly known and understood. · The law is equally applied to all. · Enforcement of the law is through a predictable, transparent, and respectful mechanism. · The State itself is also subject to law. Today's ROL movement The Bank's current ROL work began in the early 1990s, when it was accepted that good governance (including ROL) was a necessary condition for promoting economic development. In the 1992 report Governance and Development, the Bank recognized that: "...good governance is central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to sound economic policies." 2 At the time, the Bank was involved in two major efforts that contributed to this conclusion. After the end of the Cold War, the Bank was helping Eastern European states adopt new laws that would foster private sector development, with a focus on corporate, bankruptcy, and property law reform. In the course of this work, and as a result of internal evaluation, it became clear that law reform by itself without institutional reform and strengthening would have limited, if any, OvErviEw impact. The Bank was also continuing its work in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), primarily 1 World Development Report (2000), pg. 102­03. 2 Governance and Development, World Bank, (1992), p.1. xii Overview Why Do rule of law reform? Promoting the rule of law is never going to be an easy task, but it is one that is absolutely worth doing. While recognizing that the criticisms of and frustrations with justice work are often well-founded, the present Note would stress that these concerns must not be allowed to outweigh the immense importance of the goals being pursued. The World Bank became involved in rule of law reform because it recognizes that doing so promotes economic and social development. However, we recognize that rule of law is one amongst many conditions that supposedly achieve this goal. Rule of law reform should be pursued even when resources are limited because, as noted in the Voices of the Poor report, many ordinary people see safety and security as one of their greatest and most fundamental needs. Just as investment can see better returns in a state where economic transactions are governed and disputes resolved according to the law, individuals are more productive when they do not feel that they, their families and friends, and property are in constant danger and that any wrongful acts committed against them will go unpunished. Many donors see ROL as a way for people to protect their fundamental human rights, without which the cycle of poverty and disempowerment will continue. Ensuring access to justice, and a justice system that operates according to the ROL, means that human rights violations do not go unpunished. in Africa, where managers acknowledged that states were facing a "crisis of governance" following decreasing growth rates in the 1980s.3 A consensus was reached that projects would be sustainable only if states were also working toward good governance, often defined in terms of state adherence to the rule of law. Later on, such Bank documents as the Governance and Anti- Corruption (GAC) Strategy, adopted in 2007, cited the justice sector as one of the core governance "systems" to be addressed by Bank country teams. Indeed, the justice sector is integral to all three cross cutting issues under the GAC; namely, transparency, accountability, and public sector effectiveness. Although the Bank's priorities and work have increased in scope and design over the past 20 years, the origins of its ROL in work in Africa are still reflected in its emphasis on good governance, private sector development and combating corruption. The scope of ROL reform has changed over time. Originally, the Bank preferred a model that heavily focused on helping courts resolve disputes in a timely and predictable way, which often meant providing Legal Technical Assistance (LTA) to assist countries with drafting market-friendly legislation to deal with commercial disputes (Peerenboom 2005). However, recognizing that the justice sector extended beyond the courts to a wide range of interconnected agencies, the Bank broadened its working definition of ROL to include institutions in addition to the courts such as prosecutors, police, ministries of justice, administrative tribunals, non-governmental or civil OvErviEw society organizations (NGOs/CSOs), traditional authorities applying customary law and truth and reconciliation commissions. Collectively, these institutions (while even transitory, as in the case 3 Governance & Development, World Bank (1992). xiii Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned of truth commissions) play a key role in advancing or hindering a country's efforts to promote economic growth and good governance, and reduce poverty and corruption. The goals of the ROL movement have also expanded beyond improving legislation and the courts' ability to resolve commercial disputes. More recent ROL efforts focus on democracy promotion, including conformity with international human rights standards, pro-poor laws and practices, creating a structure for international law enforcement, and equal treatment of public and private actors. This model has become increasingly influential in the design of ROL projects financed by the international donor community and has had a significant effect on the Bank's justice work in Africa and other regions. Methodology This Note was designed to build on the rich experience that the Bank and other stakeholders (state and non-state recipients, other development partners) have gained through their work on rule of law reform in SSA Africa. The process commenced with desk reviews of: (i) past Bank operations that represent the principal approaches that have been used in the Africa region; (ii) selected examples of justice reform in the region, including a review of projects as part of the Bank's framework for implementation of the Africa Action Plan (AAP)4; and (iii) a wide range of studies done by Bank staff and consultants, development partners, and academics on the nature and range of rule of law challenges in the region. Stakeholder workshops were conducted with users and justice sector representatives in East and West Africa, and as part of a program on anti- corruption capacity building in Southern Africa. Field research was used to gather empirical data from caseload surveys in Ghana and Ethiopia and to develop a better picture of the "uses and users" of justice services in those countries (as noted above). This work was coordinated with the Africa Regional Justice Working Group, which was comprised of Bank staff from PREM, LEG, OPCS, PSD, DEC, SDV, WBI, and AFTQK. Input from the Working Group was especially helpful due to the group's diversity of experience and its familiarity with rule of law reform in the region. Some History and Situational Analysis The rule of law in Africa Like all the regions in which the Bank works, Africa has a particular history that gives rise to a unique set of challenges to establishing a well functioning justice system. With few exceptions, the region's countries are all former colonies that secured independence roughly 50 years ago. OvErviEw These colonial histories continue to shape Africa's legal and judicial systems today. In fact, the 4 The Capacity Development Management Action Plan (CDMAP) was adopted by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors in September 2006. xiv Overview development of a common law or civil law system in many of these countries was largely a function of whether the primary colonizer was Great Britain or a continental European nation. Interestingly, colonial powers did not impose national governance structures in African colonies until the late 19th century. In 1884, the Berlin Conference led to a division of the occupied or claimed territories (nearly the entire continent) among the colonizing countries and drew boundaries that would later mark the borders between independent African states. All European colonizers relied on a system of indirect rule and left the management of purely local affairs, including dispute resolution, in the hands of traditional authorities (or those they selected for that role). This meant that for most indigenous citizens, the formal state judicial system (along with many other state organizations) had little relevance. In urban centers, the state system prevailed, though smaller disputes involving only African parties were handled by indigenous systems. Over time, Africans began to train as lawyers either to represent clients or to participate in the lower levels of the state system. Once independence came, the judicial institutions introduced by the colonialists were generally retained. With regard to checks and balances and the oversight role of the judicial branch, "basic principles of democracy were incorporated into early constitutional documents in Africa (e.g., participatory elections, three branches of government) but, for the most part, the resulting governments soon became single-party systems and many experienced dictatorship and authoritarian rule, as has been the case in Chad, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In some cases, the ruling governments were overthrown by military coups, and a significant number of countries of the region remained under military rule for extended periods of time, as in Ghana and Nigeria."5 For the most part, the influence of formal state structures remains limited in sub-Saharan Africa. Relative to population size, African countries tend to have minimal formal justice systems as compared to other countries. Police forces remain small, and the ratio of judges to inhabitants is usually about 1 to 100,000 (as opposed to 8.1 for Latin America and 15.2 for Western Europe6). The number of prosecutors is also low and public defense is often nearly non-existent. While the number of lawyers is gradually increasing as countries develop their own law schools, it is still inadequate to fill state positions and provide services to private clients. Even in what may be considered a "best case" scenario, South Africa only has 17,000 attorneys for a population of 45 million, while Malawi has 77 for a population of 11 million (USAID, 2009a). Despite increasing urbanization, physical access to sector services is very limited, and it has been estimated that in most African countries as much as 85 percent of the population continues to rely on traditional or religious justice systems.7 OvErviEw 5 Africa Regional Rule of Law Status Review, prepared by Management Systems International for USAID (April 2009),p 6. 6 Figures are from CEPEJ (2005) for Western Europe and from CEJA (2005) for Latin America. 7 Piron (2006; 291). xv Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned In addition to the numbers, functions and capacity of personnel comprising justice institutions, the role of certain legal systems should also be considered when embarking on ROL activities. For example, in both common and civil law countries, Administrative Law, provides accountability mechanisms and some possibility for checking executive authority. According to some, it is an area that has been largely ignored by development partners or donor programs in Africa despite a general interest in limiting executive power.8 Civil Law Systems ­ Administrative law is the body of law that governs the activities of administrative agencies of government, including adjudication or enforcement of regulations. Administrative law is considered a branch of public law, dealing specifically with decision- making by government agencies and special boards or commissions that are part of a national regulatory system (e.g. regulations governing international trade, manufacturing, the environment, taxation, broadcasting, immigration, and transport). Many civil law countries have established specialized administrative courts to review decisions made by government entities. Administrative jurisdiction focuses on abuses of power and authority of government institutions and, as enforced by the administrative courts, can strengthen the power of the judiciary to serve as a viable check over executive power.9 Common Law Systems ­ The role of administrative law and procedures is similar in countries with a common law tradition, although implementation varies. As in civil law countries (e.g. Senegal, Mozambique, Mali, DRC), administrative law governs the legal relations between government and its citizens in contexts that directly affect their everyday lives and concerns, (e.g., small business licensing, health and pension benefits, education, social programs, transportation, workplace safety, unemployment benefits, environmental regulations, etc.). In common law countries (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria), the fundamental purpose of administrative law is to ensure that government officials and agencies exercise their powers and authorities lawfully and in accordance with defined rules and procedures. Administrative law is not a discrete substantive area of law, but applies to a range of substantive areas, many of which are the subject of distinct reform efforts not labeled or considered as "administrative." Likewise, in common law countries, administrative laws allow individual citizens, as well as private entities or groups, to contest government decisions or actions. Although some specific administrative courts exist, many such disputes are argued and resolved at the agency or administrative board level. Courts are often accessible only as an appellate venue, and after all administrative remedies have been exhausted.10 Hybrid systems ­ Essentially, all legal regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are hybrids of formal Western and African customary systems. Two principal forms of hybrid systems are found in sub-Saharan OvErviEw 8 Africa Regional Rule of Law Status Review, prepared by Management Systems International for USAID (April 2009),p 11­12. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. xvi Overview Africa: the common law/customary model, or the civil law/customary model (although some countries show features of both common and civil law, as well). In countries of the northern tier of sub-Saharan Africa, however, Islamic law is added to the already diverse mixtures of legal systems. In Sudan and Nigeria, this mixture of European, customary, and Islamic law is referred to as a "hybrid" legal system. Another form of hybrid systems is increasingly seen in countries updating what may be seen as antiquated codes and laws. No longer necessarily tied to the common law or civil law traditions of former colonial leaders, countries throughout the region are adapting models, laws, and language from a diverse mix of legal traditions--selecting those elements most relevant to the specific issues leading to new or modified laws.11 Traditional and customary systems ­ The term "customary law" applies to the body of traditions, mores, social conventions, and rules that through usage over a period of years have become the mainstay of governing traditional African societies. It is as much social convention as legal protocol. Organized along ethnic and geographic lines, customary authorities most frequently deal with resolving everyday disputes and conflicts arising over issues such as inheritance, ownership of movable or immovable property, status of individuals, rules of behavior and even morality. There are various different conflict resolution mechanisms at local levels, ranging from traditional healers, to local chiefs and clan elders, to the more formalized community court system, with elected judges and defined jurisdictions. Customary practices may also incorporate traditional approaches to policing.12 It is noteworthy that although the complexity of the interactions between the civil, common, traditional, and religious legal systems may seem problematic, this complexity can be an asset by providing multiple prospective entry points and potential counterparts for ROL reform projects. Rule of law in the Bank's Africa region As described above, early Bank involvement in the sector was largely focused on law reform, usually as a component of broader development lending or grant operations. Little attention was paid to sector institutions per se, even when they were important to the implementation of new laws. From the mid-1990s, the Bank's work has adopted a broader focus, echoing the transition to a broader conception of ROL, and gradually expanding from a focus on judicial reform to include initiatives that seek to improve access to justice sector services. Funding for this work has taken two forms: either as a component of a multi-sector lending OvErviEw operation (where the focus is usually on promoting reforms that will encourage private sector 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. xvii Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned development or public sector governance) or small, focused grants to support state agencies or civil society organizations, provide targeted assistance to judiciaries (often ICT or training), or build alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This funding structure is somewhat particular to the Africa region: in most other regions, stand-alone justice loans have been pursued to fund ROL activities (e.g. ECA, LCR). However, it should be noted that most funding to Africa, regardless of the type of project, comes from the limited pool of IDA funds. Furthermore, the region has also had important experience with multi-sector, multi-donor SWAPs (sector-wide programs in which multiple donors contribute to a "single basket" of funding for the benefit of several justice sector organizations, both state and non-state). A desk review of illustrative projects financed by the Bank in SSA found that the funding structure of justice sector projects has had important consequences for the "success" of these efforts. The review found that judicial components often got less attention as a part of larger lending operations and, in many cases, programmed activities were never implemented. It also found that many of the loans and grants were extremely complex and involved too many different activities and counterparts. In both cases, projects were hampered by the limited capacity of implementing offices as well as the difficulty of coordinating between so many Senegal Economic Governance Project Until recently, the AFR region had not approved a stand-alone justice sector loan, and justice activities have been included as a component in other types of lending, usually public or private sector operations. However, on April 8, 2010, the Senegal Economic Governance Project was approved by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. The project seeks to promote the rule of law through increased contract enforcement and institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Justice. As the Project Appraisal Document noted, in Senegal "supporting justice reform and improving access to justice" is one of the four components, which focuses on improving institutional capacity for the effective implementation of the Justice Sector Program of the country. Senegal's justice sector faces severe resource constraints (material, financial, and human) and the project will analyze data on the justice sector's performance and perform periodic and timely monitoring that could result in adopting corrective measures when required. The World Bank is using this project to help the authorities implement justice sector reform through a programmatic approach based on the Justice Sector Reform Program. To that end, the new project will be implemented using existing country systems. As a result, no dedicated Project Implementation Unit or project specific Steering Committee will be set up. Instead, the Project will strengthen the capacity of CEDAF (Cellule d'Execution Administrative et Financière), the Unit responsible for the implementation of the Justice Sector Reform Program, and the Justice Sector Project Evaluation and Coordination Committee, established by the Senegalese government in 2006, will provide oversight and coordination. OvErviEw Moreover, the Economic Governance Project will use an innovative approach by making CEDAF a model of excellence in public administration. CEDAF will not only improve its performance coordination functions, but also leverage additional financing from other development partners to finance the implementation of the Justice Sector Reform Program and close the existing funding gap. xviii Overview different organizations. Nevertheless, ROL projects can be successful when integrated into larger development projects (see box on PSCAP in Ethiopia under Institutional Strengthening below), because they are seen as part of a larger development strategy with clear goals. Projects need not be stand-alone, but there is an important balance to be struck between strategic integration into larger programs and the concern that ROL may "get lost" in more complicated efforts. Over the last decade, the Bank's Africa Region has increased its support to strengthening the administration of justice. In particular, from 2003 to 2008, the Bank financed nearly US$309.2 million for rule of law activities in Africa across a number of networks and departments. Within this sphere of support, the Bank has provided US$14.7 million in grants related to the justice sector and has also invested over US$111.0 million in project components. In fact, based on the number of components of credits, loans and grants, the Bank's Africa Region currently finances the most justice sector activities (note: the reference is to activities, not projects or amounts of financing; other regions may have larger lending and/or stand-alone projects). These activities vary and include improving state capacity to investigate and sanction corruption, court administration, case management, ADR such as mediation centers, support to paralegals working in poor, rural communities, legal literacy, gender and law, etc.) The overall results of Bank-financed operations containing ROL components or activities, including grants and analytical studies, have been rather modest despite some positive implementation ratings. For example, the Mozambique Public Sector Reform (PSR) Project (which closed in 2009) revealed the need to ensure that both government Project Implementing Units (PIUs) and Bank task teams alike include the necessary expertise to oversee ROL activities. In the Mozambique PSR Project, a legal/judicial (LJR) component was added to an already complicated public sector governance program; the component had first been designed as a stand-alone LIL (Learning and Innovation Loan). Rather than maintaining separate execution of the LIL and IDA Credit for PSR, the 2 projects were merged, with the result that the LJR component did not benefit from specialized expertise and lagged not only in execution but in achieving its development objective. Another lesson deals with the use of basket funding in the justice sector and the role of development partners in approving disbursements. In several cases, the impact of Bank-financed activities (including co-financing from bilateral donors) has been limited due to excessively complicated procedures and multiple donors with varying areas of interest (e.g. projects in Tanzania and Kenya). This scenario, coupled with low execution capacity among justice sector institutions, has posed a significant obstacle to achieving project objectives and sector-wide reforms. In order to enhance development effectiveness, some donors have suggested dividing up areas of interest among agencies and government entities in order to facilitate the approval process and work directly one-to-one, OvErviEw yet within the framework of basket funding. Finally, a general lesson has been the need to strengthen justice institutions' capacity in public sector management, including procurement and financial management, not only to manage Bank-financed projects but as part of the overall reform of country systems. xix Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned To date, many Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in SSA continue to identify the lack of judicial independence from political interference, the lack of access to the judicial system for the poor, the low performance of the judicial system, and high levels of corruption as issues requiring more attention. This situation is further aggravated by the AIDS epidemic, which deeply impacts African societies and poses particular legal challenges (e.g. gender equality issues and the rights of children). The focus on improving governance as a prerequisite for debt relief under the HIPC initiative triggered the development of governance strategies in countries such as Chad and Cameroon, which subsequently emphasized the need for substantial judicial reforms and developed action plans that included specific measures for donors and the government to support. Current realities For the preparation of this Note, the Task Team conducted a series of workshops held in 2008­2009, which brought together African stakeholders to identify their priorities related to the rule of law. Generally, four broad, inter-connected themes which spanned various sector institutions were identified as important areas of interest to strengthen the rule of law in Africa. These included: Access to Justice, the Business Climate and Commercial Justice, Criminal Justice, and Institutional Strengthening, including service delivery. Access to justice As noted previously, the justice sector in Africa is spread extraordinarily thin: there are very few lawyers or judges relative to the population, and most services are concentrated in urban areas, out of reach to millions of Africans. Most citizens, even those who do not face additional social and cultural barriers because of their gender or other vulnerable status, face geographic, linguistic, financial, and procedural barriers to accessing the formal judicial system. In the stakeholder workshops, participants identified several types of projects (both Bank and non-Bank financed) that have been successful in making justice more accessible. These included: home grown legal aid services, the introduction of traditional and western-type alternative dispute resolution procedures (e.g. mediation and arbitration), and educating communities about their rights and how to use the formal judicial system to exercise those rights. There has been a major effort in several countries to train paralegals to work with the judiciary, prisons, police, and traditional leaders (the Paralegal Advisory Service Institute in Malawi and TIMAP for Justice in Sierra Leone are just two examples). Civil society organizations, working together with the state agencies of the justice sector, have been helping to meet the demand for legal assistance (particularly on OvErviEw family issues, sureties, land disputes, and criminal cases) from poor, rural-based populations. The Bank's Gender and Law (G&L) Program has done important work to improve women's access to justice in thirteen SSA countries. Women in Africa generally live in acute insecurity xx Overview Gender & law ­ Niger The project in Niger was typical in that it worked with both government and civil society and took both a wide and a narrow approach to reform--the project helped the Ministry of Social Development conduct a policy dialogue on women and law, but also worked directly with civil society to increase its capacity and trained almost 3,000 women in communities across the country to be paralegals. This training equipped them with basic skills in legal information and legal counseling, thus enabling them to provide legal services to others and run legal literacy campaigns. However, the project also had to adapt to local conditions, abandoning plans to work closely with traditional leaders to run a public campaign on harmful traditional practices erroneously attributed to Islam and to push for the enactment of a new family code. It was thought that promoting these efforts would undermine the growing consensus among government and traditional/religious leaders on options for personal and family law reform. because of economic disempowerment, inequality of access to rights and education, lack of health infrastructure, and limited participation in government and public affairs. The goal of G&L work is to empower women to use the legal system to enforce their rights, through institutional strengthening (capacity/partnership building with women's and justice ministries), legal literacy (strengthening women's knowledge/awareness of rights), and enhancing access to legal and judicial services (legal aid). These strategies represent an important lesson about rule of law reform; namely, that efforts at reform are most effective when they involve both the state and civil society directly working to empower the poor and vulnerable to use the judicial sector to protect and secure their rights. Business climate & commercial justice The Bank's initial rule of law work was accomplished in conjunction with projects to improve the climate for business and investors. These reform programs were based upon an assumption that the rule of law was an essential prerequisite for growth and development, because when disputes can be settled by a fair and efficient judicial system, it lowers the risk involved in investing for local and international businesses alike. The rule of law means that a country provides a much more favorable climate for investment: contracts can be enforced, private property is protected, and business can be conducted according to a predictable set of rules. Many states have already taken steps to improve their business climate and commercial justice systems. Originally, the Bank focused on helping countries reform their commercial laws, but recognized that legal reform alone was sorely lacking in impact without institutional reform. As a result, some countries, such as Tanzania, have set up specialized commercial and OvErviEw tax courts. Others have introduced mechanisms to make their existing courts more efficient, such as Nigeria's Multi-Door Courthouses (see box below) and Ghana's specialized land and commercial courts. Mediation has also been used to strengthen the business climate and commercial justice. xxi Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Nigeria Multi-Door Courthouses Nigeria has established a series of "multi-door courthouses" (MDCs), which are court-annexed programs that provide alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services. The Lagos MDC was the first dispute resolution center in Africa when it opened in 2002. Types of ADR available include neutral case evaluation, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation for commercial, employment, banking, maritime, energy, family and business disputes. Among other benefits, ADR processes provide the opportunity to resolve cases without resorting to litigation, which can be slow and expensive; reduce the number of cases pending before the courts; and improve access to justice. Source: UNODC Progress Report 2 on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity in Nigeria At the stakeholder workshops, participants highlighted two issues that they felt were especially important to the design and implementation of commercial justice activities: a need for greater cooperation between development partners (by creating or strengthening sector-wide programs, SWAPs) and improved monitoring and evaluation systems for ROL projects. While a fair amount of work has already been done to create a better climate for business by reforming commercial justice, ongoing and future projects could be more effective if these two issues are addressed. Criminal justice An effective criminal justice sector, which generally consists of police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, courts (formal and traditional), and prisons, should protect the safety of individual citizens and resolve cases in a just and timely manner in accordance with the law. Criminal justice reform can take many different forms, reflecting the large number of potential institutional entry points for work in the Gender-based Violence in liberia sector and the diversity of the problems that stakeholders may need addressed. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) represent a pervasive problem in post-conflict Liberia. One pillar Reform in criminal justice has increasingly of the Liberian government's Plan of Action, designed been seen as a development priority because and being implemented with assistance from the UN and international development partners, focuses on crime and violence lower investment and strengthening the criminal justice system to respond to economic growth, destroy community SGBV. Significant steps include the creation of a Women trust and unity, and divert resources away and Children Protection Section of the Liberian National from more economically valuable activities Police, with officers specially trained to manage these OvErviEw (e.g. health services for victims or stop-gap types of cases; the Judiciary established "Criminal Court policing efforts, instead of investment in E" to deal exclusively with SGBV cases; and building the capacity of the court officers, lawyers, and judges who infrastructure). The chance to live free from will work in the special court. fear is also a basic need, just as important xxii Overview to many of the world's poorest people as hunger, unemployment, and lack of access to safe drinking water.13 While the benefits of improving the criminal justice sector may be somewhat clearer than connections between commercial justice and economic development, this work may not necessarily be appropriate for Bank financing depending on the interpretation of Article IV, Section 10 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement which proscribe "interfere[nce] in the political affairs of any member." The Legal Vice-Presidency (LEG) has suggested two criteria which should be considered when evaluating the appropriateness of interventions in the area of criminal justice: (i) the degree to which the project is grounded in a reasonable economic rationale, and (ii) whether the project avoids interference in the political affairs of the country. The Bank's Board of Executive Directors has not yet had to consider the interpretation of this article regarding work in the criminal justice sector; instead, LEG is working together with project teams that are interested in including criminal justice financing on a case-by-case basis. PSCAP in Ethiopia The Public Sector Capacity Building Support Program (PSCAP) Support Project is typical of Bank-funded ROL projects in Africa. Most of the Bank's ROL work is integrated into or evolves out of larger programs, which recognize the importance of this work for the achievement of primary development goals, including economic development and the alleviation of poverty. PSCAP, implemented as part of a larger Justice System Reform Program with the Ethiopian government and bilateral donors, aims to: enhance the effectiveness of law-making organizations and affiliated bodies, improve the effective delivery of justice by judicial organizations, advance efficient law enforcement, train legal professionals and researchers, and put in place an efficient system of justice. PSCAP has worked with the judiciary, the House of People's Representatives, the House of Federation, prosecutors, and other federal and regional judicial organs to achieve these goals. The Project's outcomes have been notable. Since implementation, the annual clearance rate of cases has topped 80 percent per year, new systems have been developed to allow judgment and sentencing to take place on the same day for petty crimes, an automated phone system has been set up to provide information on pending cases, and the use of ADR mechanisms has increased. The broader Program has also helped the legislature develop a more efficient system for passing new legislation, created "one stop shops" where law enforcement agencies work together, introduced community policing, and conducted trainings to improve conditions in prisons. OvErviEw 13 See, generally, "Voices of the Poor" at: www.worldbank.org/poverty/voices/index.htm, and, specifi- cally, Deepa Narayan, Robert Chambers, Meera K. Shah, and Patti Petesch, Voices of the Poor: Crying out for Change at Chapter 8: "Anxiety, Fear and Insecurities" (Oxford University Press, 2000). Voices of the Poor was prepared by the World Bank in anticipation of the World Development Report 2000/1; the research involved consultation with over 60,000 people from 60 countries. xxiii Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Institutional strengthening Institutional strengthening lies at the heart of rule of law reform. When the institutions tasked with ensuring the appropriate application of the law are unable to perform their task, whether as the result of inadequate or poorly trained staff, corruption, unmet infrastructure needs, or some other concern, it presents a significant obstacle to the rule of law. Each country's justice sector is made up of different agencies interacting in various ways. However, it will usually include formal, state-run institutions (e.g. courts, police, ministry of justice or attorney general's office, legislature or parliament, etc.); civil society actors (e.g. human rights NGOs, private sector businesses, bar associations); and traditional and/or alternative dispute resolution forums. All of these stakeholders, including users of their services, are interconnected and each has a specific role to play in ensuring that the rule of law is respected. Traditional and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms relieve pressure from the formal justice sector and have often developed as a result of calls from civil society to make justice more accessible for businesses and individuals alike. Formal institutions have the responsibility to ensure that the laws are implemented in a just manner in coordination with traditional and alternative forums and under the watchful eye of civil society. Civil society organizations advocate for the rights of business and (often poor) individuals, and work directly with clients to empower them to exercise their rights. Given the importance of institutional strengthening, it is essential that ROL projects be carried out in a way that is both appropriate and tailored to local needs; a failure to perform the necessary analysis can lead to results that are of little consequence to the local community. For example, donors have financed much in the way of ICT equipment, invested in infrastructure, and the hiring of outside experts to conduct trainings, but none of these will, on their own, transform a struggling institution into one that is able to uphold the rule of law. building links with Traditional Justice in Ghana Ghana's traditional courts were abolished in the years after independence, but chiefs and traditional councils continue to be consulted for dispute resolution purposes on a number of issues, particularly in rural areas, because they are inexpensive, efficient, and geographically accessible. Ghana's formal Judicial Service is working with the Traditional House of Chiefs in Kumasi to bridge these two worlds. A recent Bank-financed grant provided funding to assess traditional dispute resolution mechanisms which could identify capacity needs and develop learning OvErviEw modules on modern dispute resolution practices for both traditional leaders and staff working in the formal judicial sector. The goal of these training programs is to promote consistency between the formal and informal justice systems. xxiv Overview Lessons Learned One of the primary reasons for the preparation of this Note is the need to provide task teams with some "lessons learned" and guidance for rule of law reform work in the Africa Region. Until now, ROL projects have been prepared on a fairly ad hoc basis without any background review or analysis which could contribute to a region-wide approach. This section of the Note will focus on three areas: (i) enhancing the effectiveness of Bank support; (ii) potential areas for Bank support, and (iii) suggested guidelines for programming. Enhancing the effectiveness of Bank support · Continue to draw on the Bank's institutional knowledge. In the course of preparing this Note, the Task Team made extensive use of Bank documents, analyzing descriptions and evaluations of previous projects and setting up a Working Group to ensure that the diversity and experience of Bank personnel were reflected in the Note. However, it would be wrong to think that the need to identify and discuss major issues and plans for future ROL analytical work ends with this Note--our knowledge about conducting rule of law reform should continue to develop and be shared as a dynamic process, particularly in collaboration with our country clients and project counterparts. · Build institutional capacity to design, advise on, and manage ROL projects. Bank staff leading ROL programs should ideally have some hands-on experience working with the institutions they will advise. They also need to understand the change process and management issues with regard to a variety of situations in the justice sector. As the Bank moves into new areas, and reflects on traditional areas of support, it will need to ensure that staff have the appropriate skills set by creating opportunities, as needed, for staff to obtain on-the-job training · Improve communication with internal and external clients. In the past, ROL reform may have been "oversold" as a goal which could accomplish more than it actually can, leading to considerable disappointment when projects delivered fewer results or impact than expected. Proponents of justice reform should learn to effectively communicate the reasons for supporting ROL reforms in a manner that is understandable to individuals from different disciplines. It is particularly important to be specific about the problems that can be resolved, and refrain from setting unrealistic objectives or indicators for their measurement. Teams will also need to be more forthcoming about the real problems faced by justice sector representatives (and users) as well as the obstacles to their solution (e.g. vested interests) and in identifying the means most likely to combat them. OvErviEw Potential areas of Bank support · Strengthen capacity of formal sector institutions. Formal institutions in many SSA countries are characterized by inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and often struggle with xxv Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned corruption, political intervention, and lack of public trust. There is clearly room for programs to support capacity building in these institutions, although this will require the Bank to increase its expertise beyond its current heavy focus on the courts, court management, and civil justice. It will also be important to ensure that the provision of inputs (buildings, equipment, training) is closely linked to specific performance and service improvements (e.g. through a "problem-solving" approach that encompasses planning, programming, execution and oversight). · Help countries learn more about their own systems of traditional dispute resolution, strengthen ties to the formal sector, and foster mutual respect. Given the limited reach of formal institutions, traditional mechanisms will continue to be an important part of the justice sector in Africa. Although the Bank (and development partners) generally lacks expertise in working with these systems, it has supported relevant studies as part of the Justice for the Poor program. Such studies can contribute to designing appropriate rule of law reform projects by expanding the knowledge base that strengthens the Bank's and country's capacity to work with traditional authorities. Another line of support should focus on reviewing mechanisms for linking traditional systems to state institutions, and attempting to identify and disseminate some of the potentially most effective means of dispute resolution, including sharing information between formal and informal actors to enhance understanding and respect for decision making authority. · Develop mechanisms to increase access to justice for the poor, minority groups, and women. Many types of donor support can help improve access to justice, including citizen education programs through the expansion of state services, and the development and financing of legal assistance programs. Project designers should take care to identify ways to improve access to every type of justice sector institution--formal, traditional, religious, and courts based on traditional practices, but under the control of national or sub-national governments, such as Ethiopia's social courts and Kenya's Khadi courts. These projects may be especially effective when combined with efforts to directly empower vulnerable groups (e.g. working with women's organizations to increase demand for recognition in all aspects of traditional affairs). (see the Bank's Gender and Law activities/grants in Annex II for specific experiences). · Build demand for reform among stakeholders, including creating incentives to reduce corruption in the judicial sector and promote judicial independence. Consolidating demands for change has been particularly problematic in Africa since the justice sector is fragmented into traditional, religious and state systems, with the populations being served by each system having its own concerns and priorities. The Bank and development partners could play an important role in helping those interested in reform to discover and build on their common interests and thus coordinate OvErviEw constituencies for change. This would require a slightly different approach from that taken to date; namely, working with stakeholders to help advance their particular interests, and emphasizing common, sector-wide problems and potential solutions together with development partners. xxvi Overview · Engage in limited law reform. The Bank began working in the justice arena with law reform before it considered improving ROL systems more broadly. Experience suggests that the impact of legal reform will be limited to change "on the books" unless there are corresponding changes in the institutions that apply and enforce the law (Gupta et. al, 2002). Consequently, experts in ROL emphasize the importance of targeted reforms aimed at eliminating institutional bottlenecks as opposed to redrafting entire legal codes (Hewko, 2002). · Assist with building the rule of law in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS). Chapter Two provides a detailed discussion about conducting rule of law reform in post- conflict and fragile situations. Programs for these countries, in which the formal structures may be completely dismantled or, if present, persist in a dysfunctional and largely discredited state, should be especially selective and carefully planned. Further complicating ROL promotion in fragile and conflict-prone situations is the presence of multiple donors, all working simultaneously on a wide-variety of projects. For example, in Liberia, while the Bank sought to assist in rebuilding the justice sector's capacity, other development partners were working on security sector reform, setting up transitional justice mechanisms, and rebuilding basic infrastructure. In this regard, justice donor groups can be extremely useful (both for FCS and non-FCS). Finally, the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security, and Development notes that the lack of a functioning justice sector is both a cause and result of conflict, and as a consequence, the Bank's work on conflict-prevention should generally consider including a ROL component. · Sponsor regional exchanges on common problems and potential solutions. In other regions, most notably LCR and ECA, a series of regional organizations (CEJA, OECD and various professional organizations) have helped to formalize ROL activities and assisted in advancing reforms and promoting the adoption of new practices among member countries. Worldwide meetings, while useful for some thematic areas, are generally of limited value because circumstances differ so much among regions. In contrast, regional meetings can provide important support to institutions facing political obstacles in their own countries and help enhance donor coordination at the same time. Suggested guidelines for programming This section highlights a few considerations to keep in mind when contemplating and designing rule of law reform projects. It is important that any rule of law reform project begin with a clear picture of what the country's justice sector will look like when the particular objective is achieved. Identifying OvErviEw the end goal is the first step to designing projects that will eventually make ROL objectives achievable. Task teams should work to build consensus among other donors and country counterparts as to short, medium, and long term goals, paying special attention to local priorities. xxvii Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Project design should proceed on the basis of several basic premises. First, rule of law reform is about institutional change, and institutional change is a lengthy process. Successful rule of law projects promote incremental change and a gradual, targeted response to problems, rather than trying to resolve a number of issues at once. However, even small steps toward the rule of law can be extremely beneficial, so teams should focus (and communicate) on the progress that has already been made, rather than only on how much remains to be done. Monitoring and evaluation are an extremely important part of any development project and rule of law projects are no exception. Each project should be designed with clear, reasonable objectives and indicators to track progress. Projects should be evaluated using these indicators at regular intervals during implementation, and the extent to which objectives have been achieved should be rigorously assessed at the conclusion of the project. Results should be monitored and tracked to allow for adjustments and correction where appropriate. Periodic evaluation allows the task team and local stakeholders to see if the project is having the desired impact and to make changes as necessary. It is also important to plan to have a joint exit strategy with stakeholders if results are not forthcoming. Finally, rule of law reform is meant to foster permanent change that will improve the functioning of the justice sector. It is essential to consider how reforms will be sustained or replicated when designing a project. Clearly identifying sources of continuing support for ROL reforms can help promote sustainability. As such, close cooperation with other sector programs, CAS/PRSPs, and other development partners is particularly important. Chapter Summaries The following chapters reflect not only the interests of stakeholders consulted during the preparation of this Note, but the areas where Bank staff themselves have been most active or interested to pursue justice sector activities in response to client needs, and as found in analytical work and other Bank documents--ISNs/CASs/PRSPs. Each chapter seeks to share not only examples from the Africa region, but seeks to reference Bank-financed operations where relevant. Chapter One: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations This chapter focuses on the main area of Bank and donor support thus far in ROL promotion in Africa. It provides an overview of the design challenges, macro and micro methodologies and various inputs tied to performance improvement under the umbrella approaches of OvErviEw "institutional strengthening" and "capacity building." Focus areas include court and case management, human resources/personnel management, budget and management systems, infrastructure, mobile courts or justice units, training, law reform and the publication and distribution of legal texts. xxviii Overview Chapter Two: Fragile Situations Twenty-one African states are currently classified as facing a fragile situation or as being "post- conflict." Many of the continent's ROL projects will therefore be conducted under these more difficult circumstances, and this chapter seeks to provide information on the characteristics of a typical fragile situation, a discussion of the different kinds of ROL work in these states, and suggested guidelines for working in the justice sector in fragile and post-conflict situations. Chapter Three: Access Programs The term "access" is broadly defined in this chapter to include not only a variety of sector services which may be impeded due to cost, language, physical presence, discrimination, or a particular social status, but recognizes that delay and corruption also constitute obstacles to access. As a result, the chapter includes discussion on traditional justice, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), commercial justice and legal assistance/aid. Chapter Four: Criminal Justice The chapter includes the Bank's particular historical context and evolving practice with regard to financing criminal justice activities. It further explains the functioning of what is understood as the "criminal justice chain", the objectives of criminal justice reform and the implications of working with various institutional actors such as the police, judiciary, prosecution, public defender, prisons and civil society. Chapter Five: Corruption in African Justice Systems The chapter begins with a review of the consequences of a corrupt justice sector, and then defines and analyzes specific entry points for corruption. It goes on to discuss the political economy of corruption and offer methods for combating corruption in African justice systems. Chapter Six: Indicators This chapter seeks to support task teams in a complex area for the monitoring and evaluation of interventions to promote the ROL. It includes definitions of ROL indicators and how to overcome the challenge of designing project-specific indicators and conduct cross-country comparisons. Finally, Annex I provides an actual results chain analysis which may be applied in a ROL project (prepared jointly with AFTQK). Annex I: Results Chain Analysis for a ROL Project The annex accompanies chapter Six on Indicators. Annex II: Bank-funded Justice Sector Projects in Africa OvErviEw The annex provides an updated list and description of ROL activities in the Bank's portfolio in Africa. Annex III: List of Participants of Stakeholder Consultations xxix CHAPTEr 1 institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations Background and issues This is the area in which the World Bank and development partners have the most experience in promoting ROL, both in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and in other regions. The Bank has worked mainly with the judicial branch (with a focus on courts), although many of the lessons learned and methodologies developed are applicable to other institutions--prosecutors' office, public defense, and even the police and prisons. As discussed in the Overview, the majority of Africa's population uses the non-state or customary norms to resolve disputes. One "advantage" of the smaller size and reach of Africa's formal judicial sector is that institutional strengthening and capacity building programs can be more focused with targeted investments than elsewhere. Most of these organizations manage to provide basic services with very limited budgets and weak organizational capacity. Thus, small innovations can make a big difference; for example, in Ethiopia, a basic and inexpensive program to use color-coded covers for physical case files has made an important dent in corruption by making intentional misplacement of the files extremely easy to detect (see Annex II, Ethiopia PSCAP). Many of the proposed actions suggested in this chapter reflect lessons from Bank-financed operations in SSA as well as discussions held with stakeholders during consultations in 2008­09 (East and West Africa workshops). Some Basic definitions The terms "institutional strengthening" and "capacity building" have been used nearly interchangeably in Bank programs in Africa, but they have rarely been defined. Generally, in the context of ROL operations, they have been equated with one of the following: 1. Assistance in resolving specific problems (e.g. programs to reduce delay, increase access, or eliminate certain bottlenecks in case processing); 2. Assistance to justice sector organizations in developing their abilities to detect and resolve these and other problems and to generally strengthen their oversight, planning, and programming capabilities; and, 1 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned 3. Provision of inputs (buildings, equipment, IT) aimed to allow an organization to perform better. The above definitions are not mutually exclusive, although, as a general rule, the provision on inputs (e.g. installing computer equipment and constructing new buildings) is not considered sufficient on its own to create reform. Instead, it can be incorporated into either of the other types of institutional strengthening, the purpose of which is assist organizations improve services to users, enhance their contribution to overall development goals, and eliminate long- standing vices. In fact, rather than the broad category of institutional strengthening, assistance should be aimed at performance and service delivery by resolving a particular, concrete problem. This involves addressing organizational, procedural, management practices and infrastructure issues. Overview of Challenges A diagnostic of institutional capacity and performance in Africa, from sector representatives as well as the users of state agencies, usually focuses on one or more of the following challenges: · Excessive delays in handling cases. In criminal matters, delays at pre-judicial stages relating to the investigation of crime by police and prosecutors; · Political interference and high-profile corruption; · Petty corruption involving lower level administrative staff whose actions can determine when and whether a case goes forward, including the abuse of court fees which is often a source of corruption and revenue leakage for the courts; · Limited access to all sector services for much of the population, particularly legal assistance; · Lack of appropriate remedies for handling common disputes; · Poor quality and inaccessibility of judgments; and · Lack of enforcement of court decisions.14 Reasons for these shortcomings are usually attributed to: · A shortage of judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and police and their particular lack of presence outside of urban centers; · Poor training of judges, clerical staff and lack of coordination with other sector actors, as well as inadequate compensation for all; CHAPTEr 1 · Shortage of lawyers--in both the public and private sectors; 14 For a review of judicial statistics or analytical data, including baselines information on the uses of court systems, see Uses and Users of Justice in Africa: The Case of Ghana's Specialised Courts (2010). 2 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations · Inadequate equipment and infrastructure, and lack of basic materials (paper, ink, and other basic materials); · Inadequate and often inconsistent legal frameworks (including failure to define the jurisdictions in countries with plural legal systems); · Judges' lack of access to information on laws and higher court decisions and their incomplete understanding of alternative systems (whether traditional/customary norms or modern alternative dispute resolution such as arbitration and mediation); · Lack of strategic planning and overall public sector management capacity, including civil service reforms affecting the justice sector; and · Complex court proceedings, whether written or oral, and their conduct in languages not understood by many African citizens. The budgets of most African nations are comparatively small, even though the wage bill for civil servants may represent a notable percentage of the overall national budget. Given these limitations, justice sector organizations need to use resources more efficiently by putting greater emphasis on outputs, and by indentifying ways to eliminate entrenched obstacles. This is the fundamental challenge of institutional strengthening in Africa: how to help organizations resolve service deficiencies without substantial increases in their budgetary base and sustaining reform efforts. Stakeholders consulted during the preparation of this Note summarized these needs as requiring core public sector reforms within formal justice institutions. These include introducing performance or results-based budgeting including the monitoring of funds, human resources reform (e.g. selection and promotion of personnel) and automation of court administration and case management (which may often include IT systems and training). Indeed, institutional strengthening is a multi-dimensional undertaking, and it is important to consider how different activities will relate to one another. It is often difficult to find that only one activity (e.g. training, automation, or legal change) will have significant impact on a country's institutional capacity on its own. Projects that have worked only on one dimension usually have very limited sustainable impact, even when they have some immediate success on their own terms. The goal of capacity building is not simply to provide tools, but to ensure that they are used to improve outputs, requiring attention to the broader institutional context. The following sections examine two multi-dimensional approaches to capacity building, as well as the role of frequently financed activities and inputs in conjunction with each. Court management: The "macro" Approach to CHAPTEr 1 Capacity Building Court management represents a macro-approach to capacity building, focusing on developing an institutional ability to oversee, plan, and guide internal operations and manage relationships 3 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned with external actors. Court management also refers to the running of the entire judicial system and the role of judicial administrative and governance bodies in doing so. Court management is not the same as courtroom or case management. These terms may be considered a part of court management, but will be treated separately below. Judiciaries everywhere tend to have problems with system management for a variety of reasons, many of which are also factors in the mismanagement of other institutions in the justice sector. First, judges (and lawyers) are neither managers by training nor are they recruited for those skills. Second, judges and lawyers may be reluctant to spend funds on attracting good administrators and managers, when those same resources could be spent on personnel who will support the actual judicial work of the court. Third, when recruitment is done for staff with administrative skills, they often look for candidates such as accountants or clerical staff who can manage money, rather than those who have project planning and implementation experience. This is demonstrated by the frequent lack of attention to creating and using management information systems (MIS), which can provide statistics on performance, productivity, and other aspects of court operations. Programs which focus on a "macro" approach to reform should include strengthening the central governance body, usually the supreme court, or in civil law countries (e.g. Francophone Africa), a judicial council. They are the ultimate users of the enhanced systems and the ones who need to ensure that the improvements in internal operations are linked to positive changes in institutional output. This generally means that, in addition to implanting concrete reforms in internal systems, organizational leaders should be educated in their content and use. If the reform process fails to include their participation, they may well become opponents of the reform efforts. While the macro approach addresses systemic issues, its impact on system output (e.g. cases resolved, new or improved services) may not be visible for some time. This is because reform will not be introduced rapidly and their effects--greater efficiency in resource use, rationalized personnel systems, better information management will only translate into service improvements that the public can see if these are defined as the end goals. For this reason, many donors have supported the "micro" approach by focusing on the work unit or courtroom and caseload management. In sum, both micro and macro reforms need to be undertaken: micro change without macro improvements quickly becomes a "ship without a rudder", while macro changes without attention to work unit performance may create improvements that users will not appreciate. Doing Court Management Reform: Based on experience in the Africa region, work on judicial CHAPTEr 1 management and administration requires the following steps: 1. Hold initial discussions with groups of local stakeholders to determine their goals, complaints, and ideas about solutions. The focus here should be on highlighting service 4 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations deficiencies, not on systemic weaknesses (e.g. delay or lack of access, rather than poor budgetary or personnel management). The results of these preliminary meetings can both guide the next steps and indicate the most promising areas for work, even though future consultations may raise additional concerns. 2. Perform a diagnostic of the existing management system to identify practices, weaknesses, and areas where improvement could enhance output quality. The purpose of a diagnostic assessment is to identify changes that are needed to improve services to the user. This type of diagnostic lends itself easily to being participatory, but should also consult experts in judicial management such as higher level court administrators who have responsibilities that extend beyond the management of a single courtroom. The diagnostic's analysis should include problem-related deficiencies in the budget; personnel management for both judges and administrative staff; the existence and quality of MIS; the use of MIS and analysis of the information collected; management of materials, equipment, and infrastructure; planning capacity; and links to the governance body. It is also important to discuss any efforts at decentralizing administration and management functions and how effective these efforts have been at meeting local needs. 3. Discuss the findings with higher level judges, ministry of justice officials (where they have a part in administering the courts), and existing administrative staff to reach agreement on priorities. While donor support is important to ensuring the success of a project on system management and oversight, the most critical factor is the interest shown and support provided by judicial leaders. While the diagnostic study can help focus discussions on critical issues, as can broader discussions with the legal community and NGOs, asking the judiciary's leadership to help prioritize reforms is an important way to ensure that they are invested in the work. At this point, it may also be useful to draw external comparisons to emphasize that performance can be done differently (and better) in similar settings. For this step, African sector institutions are increasingly interested in learning from examples in the region or even within a sub-region (e.g. ECOWAS, East African Community). In finalizing priorities, a strategy for improving management, which includes staffing needs and identifies financing sources, should also be prepared. 4. Finalize the plan and implementation arrangements. During stakeholder workshops, many participants raised the point that implementation is often the most difficult part of promoting the ROL because counterparts lack the capacity to plan, execute, and oversee activities. This is largely because they have a difficult time recruiting staff for implementation units and struggle with donors' complex and diverse reporting requirements. In response to this issue, stakeholders in East and West Africa in particular recommended that donors make programming less prescriptive and less bureaucratic, including streamlining procurement processing. CHAPTEr 1 Participants called on donors (including the Bank) to increase their own coordination, particularly in Sector-wide Programs (SWAPs). They urged the Bank to continue with consultative processes to give ownership to programs. While this recommendation may 5 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned seem obvious, it reflects a number of supply (rather than demand) side projects in the Bank's Africa region ROL portfolio. The Bank was also called on to minimize bureaucracy in project design and implementation. For example, even after the approval of projects, follow-up clearance of work plans, terms of reference and procurement actions take "too long", often defeating the purpose of investment lending by requiring state agencies to use their own recurrent budgets. Courtroom and Case management: The "micro" Approach to Capacity Building Donors have focused extensively in this area in Africa, beginning with minor changes to courtroom procedures. However, introducing even a small change such as an automated case tracking system involves much more than automation itself, and when management issues are overlooked or disregarded, sustainable improvements in performance are likely to be limited. Automation is, in fact, the last stage in a process and, in some cases, may be neither necessary nor recommended to improve case and courtroom management. Following a process of assessment, when information technology equipment is introduced, it can save courtroom staff time and help keep track of heavy caseloads. It may address specific sources of delay and even petty corruption, but many other issues, such as including frequent adjournments, unnecessary requests for interlocutory motions, judges' failure to take action when parties and witnesses do not appear in court or ignore deadlines, and bribes to "buy" final decisions, will not be impacted by automation. Automation can help create MIS, but only if care is taken with data entry and organization. Too often, data entry is left to the lowest level court employee with little experience or training who performs it haphazardly (or not at all)--this will not only minimize the impact of automation, but produce little in the way of data that can help improve performance. Ethiopia provides an interesting example of donor programs that have aimed at supporting the development of IT management systems in the courts, particularly systems that seek to improve the reliability and utility of court records. There are many factors that make introducing IT systems difficult in developing countries, particularly common deficiencies in infrastructure, public funding and access to technical expertise. The Canadian-CIDA financed Court Administration Reform (CAR II) Project in Ethiopia, between 2001­05, set out to achieve direct and enduring improvements in managerial systems so as to impact case outcomes, faster adjudication and enhanced access to justice. CAR II's objectives were also aimed at successfully securing local CHAPTEr 1 participation in project management and placed a heavy emphasis on the development of local competencies using new management systems and technologies. These achievements included the introduction and sustained use of color-coding in paper records management, audio recording of court proceedings, computerized case tracking, interactive voice response 6 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations telephone technology, electronic information kiosks, electronic document filing and video links between courts situated in different regions. The experience of CAR II offers lessons in project design and implementation that are relevant to other countries that may pursue similar programs, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to CIDA, the Bank's support in Ethiopia (Public Sector Capacity Building Support Program--PSCAP, see Annex II) has also been well evaluated for using automation to enhance performance. Doing Courtroom and Case Management: A courtroom and case management program includes many other steps, most of which need to begin long before the first machine arrives or any software is designed, if at all. The steps outlined below are similar to those for the court management "macro" work (with necessary differences in the details). These include: 1. Hold preliminary discussions with judicial authorities as to their own perceptions of system problems and their ideas for addressing them. When organizational leaders are already focused on goals beyond getting equipment or infrastructure, it is much easier to discuss assistance programs. When they are not, the next steps will be especially essential. 2. Diagnose existing practices and staff capacity to determine where problems exist in court performance to manage and resolve cases. Typical problems include delay, cases getting off track due to lack of attention, petty corruption, and poor responses to users' demands. However, the diagnostic should try to balance the positive and the negative--the positive may include innovative practices by certain judges and staff that could be replicated, and suggestions from both as to new ways of working that might be adopted. Insofar as the negative, consultations (including one-on-one interviews) should help identify areas in need of change. Particularly in rule-bound, overly formalistic systems, some staff members may be thoroughly frustrated and already have useful ideas as to what could be done (even without sidestepping the rules). Introducing changes in procedures and reorganizing (as well as new training for existing staff ) is easiest if done within an existing legal/regulatory framework; however, if new practices require legal authorization, then legal reform even of the institution's internal regulations will be needed. 3. Identify services which could be pooled such as in multi-courtroom buildings and focus on how services which are already shared might be improved. Notifications or process serving, for example, are a frequent source of delays and corruption (parties may pay the server to not do his/her job or do it more quickly or slowly). Some of these services may also benefit from automation (electronic process serving, use of bar codes to identify files in large archives, or computerized registries to help locate them). 4. Identify the practices of lawyers and other court users that create problems (typically CHAPTEr 1 delay and corruption) and the steps that might be taken to discourage them. If "party-caused" delay is a concern, automation can be used to help track it, but it can only be discouraged if judicial actors use this information to express their concern and take proactive measures (such as imposing fines, etc.). 7 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned 5. Identify recurrent costs (operations, maintenance/repairs), sources of financing, and alternative scenarios as part of Bank support so as to enhance sustainability. It is easy to overlook the need to develop organizational capacity for maintaining systems once they are installed. This includes how to operate new software, repairing equipment, training staff and users over time (depending on the system), and providing assistance for various types of problems. Turning this responsibility over to the software or equipment vendor is a frequently used alternative, but it does not develop internal capacity (even to oversee the work of vendors and thus lessen dependency on them). For example, some of Africa's courts are still suffering the consequences of poorly conceived contracts with software designers (which included low front-end fees, but significant costs for additional licenses as well as the reinstallation of the software in crashed servers). 6. Implementing pilot programs: even with a gradual approach, implementing and then evaluating pilot programs is generally recommended for courtroom or case management reforms. Attempting a national roll-out without ample piloting is risky. Even a successful pilot may run into unimagined setbacks in new settings. Pilot programs should be gradually rolled out, their progress monitored, with mid-term and final evaluations already included at the design stage. From a desk review of projects in Africa which included ROL activities, projects which used the "all at once" approach often encountered delays and found such an approach created new problems. The test of the micro approach is not whether new practices and systems (automated and/or manual) were put in place, but whether they had a positive impact on performance. In fact, immediately after introducing a pilot, productivity levels may decrease and the time it takes to resolve a case may increase as staff try to adjust to the new practices. Thus, it may be worth incorporating a few very short-term indicators, just to show that the project is achieving results in what will be a long term process (i.e. most likely beyond the lifetime of the project). Elements of a Capacity Building Program As noted, ROL projects have tended to focus on reforming a certain aspect of a justice sector institution, rather than following either the macro or micro strategies listed above. In the short run, this may have some benefits but donors should be careful to not see specific areas of support as equivalent to financing a reform movement. They are, instead, goals in and of themselves--this is particularly concerning with financing for training, automation, law reform, and infrastructure improvements. These areas (which donors tend to fund) are frequently CHAPTEr 1 requested by counterparts but they may actually have limited impact on efficiency and service delivery. Ideally, each element discussed below should be thought of as the "tools" by which the plans (developed according to both the "macro" and "micro" strategies detailed above), should be implemented. 8 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations Human resources or personnel management During stakeholder consultations, participants recognized the need for improved human resources management, which ranged from such basic needs as knowing how many staff worked in sector institutions (e.g. particularly an issue in fragile and conflict-affected states) to what their backgrounds were (educational levels, criminal records, etc.). Also identified was a need to develop adequate and transparent mechanisms for promotion and training opportunities. In some countries (e.g. Liberia), many judges or magistrates do not fulfill requirements of domestic legislation to practice as lawyers, as a result, non-lawyers are often found acting as judges/ magistrates despite clear requirements in the law. Personnel management is an important element of any institutional change program and one on which the success of other elements often hinges. Development partners have done some work with systemic improvements to personnel management in other regions, but have generally not made this a major focus of their efforts in Africa. One reason is that existing personnel management systems are often highly politicized and thus very resistant to change. Moreover, fundamental changes to current procedures may require amendments to the law, or be seen as interfering with judicial independence, or be hampered by rules on job stability for administrative staff. It may also be difficult to recruit new staff, given the limited size of the pool of potential applicants and limits on the judiciary's ability to raise salaries or improve working conditions. While these are more structural issues, other areas of personnel management are still important to include in ROL projects. In some areas, fairly simple assistance could make a significant difference in improving the deployment, incentives, and performance of existing staff and finding ways to attract still more qualified personnel: · Conduct a personnel inventory to determine staffing and skill levels, recruitment patterns, and career paths (where they exist). Following such an inventory, create a simple personnel database, which includes information on: education levels, job profiles, job history (within and outside the sector), special skills, and any disciplinary actions. Given the small size of the sector (except for police), setting up an automated central registry should not be difficult, and would be highly preferable to relying on written files. · Diagnose current and future personnel needs--these should include an assessment of the need for courtroom and administrative staff. The issue of qualified staff or assigning staff with particular skills to those areas where they will be most useful may seem obvious but is all too often overlooked in reform programs. This exercise will contribute to developing job descriptions and specific systems for monitoring performance. · Develop salary policies and create additional incentive systems (which may include access CHAPTEr 1 to training opportunities). · Design separate career paths for professional staff, administrative staff, and other positions within the sector. Based on specific career objectives, develop selection criteria and mechanisms for all staff, focusing on increasing transparency by eliminating political ties, 9 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned nepotism, and other forms of non-merit based selection as means by which job candidates are selected. · Develop systems to allow user evaluation not only of services, but also of personnel, including quality of treatment by judicial staff. · Develop strategic planning, which includes building personnel and other capacity through a more strategic perspective. Budgetary and other management systems Most justice sector institutions in Africa consider "independence" to be equivalent to financial independence or economic autonomy. In this regard, Africa is no different from other regions in the developing (and even developed) world. However, given the number of fragile and conflict-affected situations in Africa (see Chapter Two), judicial independence is considered particularly important (e.g. post-conflict contexts such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and even Mozambique), where the need to restore confidence in the rule of law goes hand in hand with the perception of independence. Tensions remain between countries' ministries of finance and judiciaries, particularly regarding increases in the budget for the latter. Judiciaries claim they do not have the necessary budgets to effectively implement their important role in providing checks and balances within a democratic state; while the ministries of finance often find judiciaries to be inefficient, ineffective and lacking in accountability. Apart from the lack of sufficient resources (both economic and human), there is a need to improve the efficiency of judicial services with the budgets that sector agencies (not only judiciaries) budget reforms in the Judicial Sector: currently have. One important means to reach Public Financial Management this end is performance-based budgeting. Performance-based budgeting not only In many regions, judicial sector needs and activities encourages more effective and efficient use of are financed primarily by the central government resources, but would increase transparency and budget, or through a combination of central (or federal) accountability to users through the publication and local budgets. Implementing effective judicial of budgets, as well as the undertaking and reforms therefore involves directly confronting the requirements--and, in many cases, the limitations--of publishing caseload statistics and analysis for government financial management systems. Learning improvements in case management. to work more effectively within the constraints of government budget rules and procedures is often Since these topics appear far removed from the a frustrating, but necessary, experience of those basic activities of sector organizations, they are managing and reform judicial systems. CHAPTEr 1 generally overlooked even more frequently Source: Webber, D. Good Budgeting, Better Justice: Modern than human resources management. Budget Practices for the Judicial Sector, Law & Development Improving these systems may not have an Working Paper Series (no. 3), Legal Vice Presidency, The World Bank (2006). obvious and immediate impact on service 10 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations quality, but it can free up resources to be used for such purposes. The process of introducing reforms to budgetary, procurement, control, planning and other systems are no different for the justice sector than they are for other public sector agencies. Development partners such as the European Commission (EC) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) have gained some experience in this area. The EC and AfDB provided substantial assistance to Cameroon for the establishment of the Chambre des Comptes (audit body) in the supreme court to strengthen the transparency of public accounts. This included the adoption of a new procurement law as well as an anti-corruption commission (CONAC). While the institutional changes faced many delays, the implementation of the laws specifying the responsibilities, organization and functioning of the Chamber of Accounts began in 2004­05. Some twenty-two magistrates were then recruited in late 2005 to work for the Chambre des Comptes, which became operational in January 2006. Infrastructure Despite the variations in economic and financial contexts of the countries represented during stakeholder consultations, participants from all of the countries recognized that there was a need for increased and strengthened infrastructure for justice sector institutions. This included the need for more courthouses, mediation/arbitration centers, legal libraries (virtual and traditional), and computers, including IT systems with shared networks (e.g. so the prosecutors and courts could share information). However, infrastructure investments should be viewed as a means to an end, and financing is not recommended as a stand-alone activity but should be linked to a larger, overall plan for the sector (or specific institutional capacity, depending on circumstances). The process of planning for modernization of infrastructure follows the steps detailed above for court and case management reforms, though there are a few additional areas to be considered when including justice sector infrastructure, be it in the design of a stand-alone ROL project or broader economic development program in which ROL is a component. Infrastructure development may well be one of the least cost-effective means for improving services, largely because of the amounts of financing involved. Its use should be carefully justified: without accompanying reforms in management, the most that can be expected is an increase in physical accessibility or improved conditions for staff and users (arguably, not a minor objective). However, the challenge for project designers comes in answering several related questions to justifying infrastructure financing: · What are the weaknesses of the existing system, and how are they best addressed? · How does infrastructure fit into the resulting list of priorities and to what extent is it an independent need? And, where (and why) are new or remodeled installations most needed? CHAPTEr 1 · Assuming other challenges exist, how can a justice sector infrastructure component be used to solve them (either as an incentive or to enhance the impact of programs designed to address them)? · What kinds of installations are most appropriate? 11 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned The answers to the above will not come from an assessment of infrastructure requirements alone, but rather from a global diagnostic in which infrastructure needs are one section. However, those conducting diagnostics should consider the possibility that infrastructure may not emerge as a priority (which leaves open its potential use to leverage other change). In Nigeria, for instance, the Bank supported the creation of mediation centers which included financing for infrastructure as part of a change process to introduce mediation services (see box below). While the connection to broader development objectives seems obvious, there are a number of common pitfalls in developing an infrastructure component. Most of these "lessons learned" derive from a failure to address the questions above, and include some of the following: · Infrastructure often occurs where it is least needed. Rather than building ministry, defender, prosecution or other offices (or courthouses) in areas that are under, or not at all, served, funds have been used to build new "palaces of justice" for supreme courts or other installations in an attempt to give the appearance of serious commitment to ROL through a massive physical structure. This is usually a response to counterparts' desires for more grandiose settings based on the idea of "dignifying justice." Nigeria · Once completed, infrastructure is inadequate or not staffed. In countries with staffing and Strengthening Citizens' Mediation budget shortages, this is a frequent problem Centers (CMCs) and the Office of the and is compounded when installations are Public Defender component under the placed in areas where no judge, prosecutor, lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project (lMDGP): The CMCs defender or other justice sector civil servant component under LMDGP aims at expanding the wants to work/live. Without administrative CMCs to cover approximately all citizens of Lagos supervision, it may also be impossible to State. The CMCs provide free mediation services determine whether staff actually go to the for the poor in disputes related to employment office, particularly in remote rural areas.15 issues, rent issues, family matters, and monetary · There exists an almost automatic preference claims The CMCs are run by Lagos State Ministry of Justice and have an excellent track record in for court-owned facilities, which overlooks the number of cases mediated daily and the time the potential advantages of renting space: an it takes to conclude the mediations; thousands ability to move later when new demands or of Lagos residents use the CMCs annually. procedures make the existing building less The Bank has been supporting the opening of useful, the ability to experiment with design, new centers and training for the mediators (for and savings on maintenance costs. more information, see Chapter Three on Access CHAPTEr 1 15 A recent World Bank report refers to this as "quiet corruption," as it and several related practices are normally not picked up in the usual anti-corruption surveys. Absenteeism has long been recognized as a major problem in the health and education sectors, but it (or the related use of office time to 12 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations Mobile justice units (including mobile courts) Another means for improving institutional access without necessarily adding more installations is through the use of mobile courts. These are alternatives or complements to increasing the number of fixed structures and may be an excellent way to increase physical access to various justice sector services. It is not uncommon, even in Africa, for observers to comment that installations in far removed areas do not seem to attract enough work to justify their presence. One partial answer to such situations has been the adoption of mobile units (including justice sector personnel such as judges, prosecutors and defenders). With the mobile unit, an entire office or courtroom can move around a prescribed circuit over a particular time period. Depending on distances, three or more sites could be visited. For example, in 2003, the Bank financed two mobile courts in Guatemala under the Judicial Reform Project. Specially equipped buses, including mediation centers, provided free mediation, dispute resolution, and information services to poor urban neighborhoods of Guatemala City and Quetzaltenango. The service benefited over 6,000 people in its first year of operation, of which 63 percent were women. The shortcoming of this approach is that when a mobile unit or court is not present, there may be no way to treat urgent cases. For example, the American Bar Association (ABA)'s Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI) has been implementing a mobile court program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The incidence of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in eastern DRC is among the highest in the world. The United Nations conservatively estimates that there have been more than 500,000 cases of rape and sexual violence in eastern DRC since 1996, when the conflict erupted. In response to the DRC's worsening rape crisis and the increased incidence of SGBV generally, the government passed a national law in 2006 on sexual violence that clearly defines rape and provides expedited judicial proceedings for rape cases and greater protection for survivors. The ABA/ROLI program assisted in the establishment and management of a base office in Bukavu as well as the implementation of a gender justice mobile court in South Kivu, which specializes in gender issues, but has the ability to hear other cases at the judges' discretion. As part of the functioning of the mobile courts, workshops have been conducted and training materials prepared on gender-based violence and sexual crimes for local police, judges, magistrates, lawyers and traditional leaders. In such circumstances, mobile courts have also necessitated security protocols and close coordination with the UN authorities. Donors have been fairly supportive of mobile units to respond to crisis in justice administration. The ABA/ROLI's mobile court program received support from the Open Society Institute as well as a recent grant from the Dutch government. The programs partner with Congolese police, CHAPTEr 1 do other work) is also a problem in the justice sector. The report, Africa Development Indicators 2010, has an online data visualization tool that can be used to build charts and graphs using the indicators available (www.worldbank.org/adi). 13 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned lawyers, judges and psychologists and are committed to bringing perpetrators to justice and to rehabilitating survivors. The increasing number of successful prosecutions has defied the predictions of skeptics, who claimed that rampant corruption within the justice sector or plain indifference about the crime of rape would prevent successful prosecutions. According to the ABA, this success is attributable to the ability of committed Congolese professionals, from a variety of disciplines, to work together to address the crisis. Another alternative to infrastructure is the growing use in Africa of video conferencing to hold hearings, take witness testimony, and even conduct trials. None of the alternative approaches is necessarily perfect, but they do offer solutions, which may be more effective than an all too quick investment in infrastructure. They also are not mutually exclusive and all could readily be used in the same country, depending on security considerations. They all offer ways of reducing costs both in staffing and infrastructure and can help stretch the judicial budget beyond conventional solutions. As with any sector reform, they should be introduced gradually so as to be able to identify and make necessary modifications or to decide whether they are worth the investment at all. Here, project designers may simply want to identify an amount to be spent on increasing access via infrastructure investment-- which may be used to build courthouses, finance mobile units, install video equipment, or a mix of all. Training Training is another area where donors have traditionally focused in Africa, but have frequently seen disappointing results. This may be in part because training, like infrastructure and automation, is too often considered as a stand-alone activity without connecting it to performance improvements. And, like infrastructure, automation, and legal reform (see below), it is often high on the list of counterpart requests when they are first asked to identify priorities. However, training can be an important, if not fundamental, ingredient to improving performance. It should to be targeted to the specific improvements being sought and complemented by other reforms. This implies that a "training diagnostic" should start by diagnosing performance weaknesses that need to be addressed and then (and only then), one should ask what role training can play in resolving them. Once it is determined that training may contribute to performance, task teams should focus on what needs to be done to ensure that the knowledge gained through training is put to use. This CHAPTEr 1 implies both looking at who is receiving the training and how they can be encouraged to apply it. There are a number of examples where neither has happened--judges or prosecutors given courses on topics that they are unlikely to use in their day-to-day work. Another area of concern is that trainees who have mastered new skills may immediately seek jobs in other agencies, in the 14 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations private sector, or even with donor agencies. There may be no way to avoid this entirely, Defining Who Conducts Training but it may help to develop incentives for staying (better working conditions and The Institute for Judicial Administration (Nyalali Institute) in Tanzania is among the most well-regarded in the salaries, faster promotions, accreditation African region. In fact, several other countries' justice in specific areas) and/or disincentives for sector agencies have visited Tanzania with an interest leaving (placing and enforcing conditions on to replicate such a model in their own countries. The trainees' post-training service). issue, however, in many African jurisdictions (e.g. Kenya, Liberia) is which justice sector agency should `own' or administer training--the judiciary, ministry of Donors should also be careful to not hire justice, law association, or law faculty (or a sector wide, local staff away from their own training independent organization)? Government financing for programs, or those of others, no matter recurrent costs, more than initial donor support, seems how strong the temptation. When issues to define the issue. like these are not considered, a potentially valuable training effort can easily have very little impact. The Bank has financed a number of training activities in its ROL portfolio in Africa, including business law and contract enforcement in Tanzania, case management in Liberia, anti-corruption investigations in Malawi and Mozambique, gender equality and women's rights in Niger, Burundi and Togo, and paralegal services in Cape Verde and Sierra Leone, to name a few (see Annex II for project-specific detail). Finally, it should also be recognized that training is never "free" since it inevitably involves staff time away from their sector duties/services and other local resources (for logistics). Again, training should be thought of as part of a service improvement effort and organized from that standpoint. It is rarely, if ever, a source of improvements on its own. And of course, the measure of training's success is clearly not the number of courses delivered or participants trained, but the impact that it has on performance. Law reform As noted in the Overview, the World Bank's legal and judicial programs began with law reform (legal technical assistance-LTA), and it remains an important component in most ROL work today. As a result, based on project experience, there are several lessons which can be identified. Perhaps the first "rule" of law reform is that while it may be linked to improving performance, it is almost never a sole or sufficient condition for doing so. The second lesson is that model laws or codes, copied from other countries, rarely work in CHAPTEr 1 the adopting jurisdiction. They should be modified to local conditions and values and their implementation, generally speaking, should be connected to other types of reform projects. Although many earlier donor programs focused on reforming entire codes, experts are now concluding that a less holistic approach may be better. Wholesale code reform inevitably takes a 15 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned long time, often produces new problems, and rarely results in the new code being implemented as intended. It may be better to examine a legal framework against real performance, determine where certain provisions or interpretations seem to produce major problems and work on those. For example, if the law defining judicial organization and internal operations stipulates paper files or personal notification but the use of technology permits something more efficient, then that section could be revised or changed without attempting to change the entire law. And, if changes can be made through regulations, this should be done instead of seeking more substantive legal change requiring the legislature's approval. An interesting example of law reform that has involved a significant number of African countries is the Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) or OHADA, as it is known by its French acronym. The treaty was signed in October 1993 by fourteen countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Later on, Guinea (Conakry) and Guinea Bissau joined the agreement, which became binding on signatory states from September 1995. Since then Cape Verde, São Tomé & Príncipe, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have indicated formal interest in joining OHADA. So far, nearly a quarter of sub-Saharan African countries have joined OHADA with considerable potential for others to follow. OHADA works as a regional organization to develop a single modern legal framework for signatory states to govern their economic activities and to promote arbitration as a means of settling commercial disputes. The Bank supported OHADA through an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant (see Annex II). Successful law reform, whether partial or whole, requires an initial review of what the law requires, what practices are actually applied, how the two interact to achieve desirable outcomes. It also ideally requires knowledge of how common problems are treated elsewhere. In Africa, this may be less a problem because of a tendency in both in common and civil law countries to keep abreast of European trends. For example, in Ghana and other common law countries, legal experts are not only aware of recent changes in Commonwealth countries, but have also championed their adoption. Publication and distribution of legal texts Institutional resources affect the supply of services in a direct way. It is especially important to consider the publication and distribution of legal texts when laws are being revised, but it is also an issue when they are not. In Africa, basic legal texts, including statutory law and judgments CHAPTEr 1 from higher courts, are generally unavailable as a result of financial constraints which, in turn causes problems for judges, prosecutors, police and public and private counsel. Public budgets for this purpose are often wholly inadequate, as are those for distributing hard copies, even to sector employees. 16 Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in State Organizations It is notable how the use of the Internet, distributing texts on CD-ROM and other innovative knowledge sharing has helped resolve this issue (albeit partially). For example, "a conspicuous achiever in this area--of both paper and online publishing of legal information...is the National Council of Law Reporting of Kenya (NCLR)."16 It benefits from a discrete budget allocated by the government of Kenya that allows for the employment of an editor, deputy editor and administrative staff. Although established in the mid-90s, the NCLR was initially poorly resourced and could not start substantive operations until 2001. By that time there was a 20 year backlog of cases that had not been officially reported in paper volumes (1981 to 2001). By 2009, this gap in law reporting had been significantly reduced through the publication of bound volume reports for the years ranging 1981 to 1994 and 2000 to 2007, leaving a gap of only five years from 1995 to 1999. In that period the NCLR was also able to produce online versions of published reports from 1992 onwards. The achievements of the NCLR were not limited purely to publishing back copies of the authorized law reports. In addition to the mainstream publishing function, which is funded from the state budget, the NCLR also attracted donor funding to further its work (Bank support to the NCLR was provided under the Kenya Financial & Legal Sector Technical Assistance Project--FLSTAP, see Annex II for details). Donor funding was used to pursue more cost effective ways of carrying out the NCLR's work, such as by the use of new computer software systems. It was also used to undertake additional activities that were aimed at extending the range of legal information available to the judiciary, the legal profession and the general public. NClr of Kenya Publications include: · Grey Book, a companion handbook for judges, magistrates and legal practitioners comprising a selection of statutes that govern the substance and procedure that commonly arises in criminal and civil litigation; · Kenya Law Review, an official annual law journal that features research papers and peer-reviewed articles from legal scholars, judicial officers, legal practitioners, students, law and society scholars as well as articles on finance and economics; · Bench Bulletin, a definitive monthly digest of recent developments in law for judicial officers, law practitioners, managers and other business people; · Laws of Kenya and Law Reports Online, which from 2004 has produced free of charge online versions, not only of searchable case law, but also: · Complete collections of the statutes of Kenya (the first collection of its kind in Africa); · Bills pending before the Kenyan parliament; · Legal and Gazette Notices issued by the government printer; · Bench Update reports and Case of the Week reports--presentations on particular court rulings that attract public interest and; CHAPTEr 1 · Practice Notes and Practice Directions issued under court rules. 16 See Walsh, B. In Search of Success: Case Studies in Justice Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (2010). 17 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Conclusions Projects which focus on institutional strengthening and capacity building in state institutions of the justice sector should begin by focusing on performance-related problems. Counterpart commitment to overall performance objectives is essential and should not be confused with commitment to getting inputs (e.g. new courthouses or computers). This requires that objectives should be well-defined, either by following the macro or micro strategy (or both), and progress monitored through appropriate indicators and benchmarks (see Chapter Six on Indicators). While inputs alone have their limitations, programs can use requests for inputs as leverage to attain more fundamental goals. While counterpart commitment is fundamental, the details of infrastructure or system design, courtroom, case or system management, or law revision require technical expertise to define specific requirements and to guide the selection among those offering to implement such activities. Thus, an incremental approach is recommended, and where possible, testing of any prototype before it is rolled out. Piloting projects is an important part of the institutional strengthening process and can have a significant effect on the success of a particular reform when gradually introduced on a larger scale. CHAPTEr 1 18 CHAPTEr 2 Fragile Situations introduction Fragile states represent many different situations and characteristics, but they include conflict-vulnerable, or post conflict countries with fragile institutions; countries with weak or dysfunctional institutions and policies. These characteristics together pose a risk of affecting neighboring countries and severely constrain poverty reduction programs and service delivery. Strengthening assistance to fragile countries remains a priority for the Bank since its inception following World War II as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). There has been an emerging recognition that without a basic level of justice, security, and respect for the rule of law, citizens, communities, and the private sector cannot pursue personal or community goals or participate in economic development. Rebuilding justice sector institutions is essential to helping states and citizens rebuild after a period of conflict or fragility. Learning to work in fragile or conflict-affected situations (FCS) is a particularly important skill when undertaking efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Africa because so many states in the region fall into one or both of the FCS categories. Fragile Situations The World Bank defines "fragile situations", as having either: a) a harmonized average CPIA rating of 3.2 or less; or b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission (e.g. AU, EU, OAS, NATO), with the exclusion of border monitoring operations, during the past three years. African countries and territories currently facing fragile situations include: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Western Sahara, and Zimbabwe. States currently considered to be "post-conflict" are Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, and Liberia. Source: http://intranet.worldbank.org/WBSITE/INTRANET/UNITS/INTOPCS/0,,contentMDK:22260228~menuPK:6386756~pagePK: 51455324~piPK:51455326~theSitePK:380832,00.html 19 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned TTLs should also be aware of the areas in which the Bank has a comparative advantage in conducting ROL reform in FCS. Conversely, there are very important and prominent areas of post-conflict ROL work in which the Bank may be ill-equipped to intervene. Characteristics of Fragile or Conflict-Affected States All the fragile and conflict-affected states named above face difficult conditions that have contributed to their past and current political situations. Some have per capita incomes above the regional average, but unequal access to resources and the resulting benefits can be a source of conflict. Ethnic diversity, if not necessarily a source of conflict, is often used to that end by political leaders. Most have young populations and high youth unemployment, increasingly concentrated in large urban centers, where conflict emerges between extremely poor migrants from rural areas, a small middle class fearful of its own downward mobility but also aspiring to modern jobs and lifestyles, and a rich political and economic elite. While much of Africa is rural and many conflicts occur there, urban violence is more visible to outsiders, has often significant negative impact on the formal economy and is seen as more threatening to political leaders who may consequently take measures to contain it that contradict human rights norms and undermine longer term developmental aims.17 In every FCS, a different set of circumstances and events will have led to its current situation. However, there are many characteristics which they share. For example, the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security & Development draws a link between weak judicial and security sector institutions and conflict. In other words, when citizens have no reason to expect that the state will protect them from lawlessness or punish those who break the law, a situation is created where vigilantism or organized crime often step in to offer protection where the state has failed to do so. This helps to explain why most FCSs experience high levels of endemic, communal violence and certain regional and global actors often exploit government weaknesses to operate in the country (e.g. traffickers and drug smugglers). It is also a cyclical problem: weak state institutions are often both the cause and result of conflict and fragile situations. The weaknesses in the justice sector usually reflect one of two familiar patterns: it will either be corrupt and dysfunctional or devastated and non-functional. In either situation, the formal justice sector is usually small since traditional justice mechanisms may play a significant role in the settlement of disputes. Capacity is severely undermined and may be unevenly distributed--it is common to find that in the civil service of a fragile and conflicted-affected state, the professional "middle" or technical class will have left the country during the conflict, CHAPTEr 2 17 Urban violence is more directly threatening to those in power and often elicits either an overly hard hand or efforts to placate urban dissidents with policies that negatively impact the rural popu- lations (e.g. controlled prices for agricultural products). 20 Fragile Situations leaving only low level and top-level managerial staff in place. In the justice sector, this may mean that a country has clerks and court reporters and supreme court judges, but no one in between. Justice sector institutions in FCSs have often suffered damage, lack independence, and urgently require a strong civil society to represent a constituency for access to justice. As public sector institutions, the judicial sector may also lack the capacity to establish and maintain adequate wages, a contributing factor to corruption. Finally, internal elites and international donors may find themselves able to influence the justice sector in inappropriate ways, because the government is too weak to resist them. Although these descriptions reflect a general pattern in fragile and conflict-affected states, the situation in and history of each individual state will be unique. Of course, engagements in the area of ROL should only ever be undertaken after a thorough analysis of the state's history and current circumstances to ensure that the principle of "do no harm" is applied. Strengthening the rOL in Peace and State Building Operations Undertaking a ROL project requires that donors and counterparts prioritize needs and carefully target their efforts, leading to gradual change and progress. However, in FCSs, there is a much greater need for reform, both because rebuilding is required and because the need to establish a functional justice sector is so much more important for the long-term stability of the country and welfare of its citizens. As a result, work in FCSs is likely to be undertaken by many different donors working simultaneously, on a variety of different aspects of reform. In general, these include work to rebuild the formal justice sector, security sector reform, implementing transitional justice, and strengthening traditional justice. It is important that donors coordinate these efforts and that TTLs choose to work in the areas best suited to Bank intervention--efforts to rebuild and reform the formal and traditional justice sectors. Rebuilding the justice sector Donors are now putting more effort into rebuilding the formal justice sector to deal with ordinary disputes and there is a growing literature on this experience, both within Africa and in other regions. This increased attention to the sector makes the establishment of effective partnerships essential to ensure that engagements in the sector are coherent and mutually supportive. It suggests that, depending on country context, the Bank is particularly well placed to undertake certain kinds of activities, including land reform, decentralization challenges, support for CHAPTEr 2 traditional systems and their interaction with the formal sector, regulatory frameworks that support economic development (with a particular focus on natural resource management), anti-corruption and oversight measures, and Analytical and Advisory Activities (AAA) that are relevant to the sector. 21 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned A first step to developing an engagement strategy in the sector is to determine what remains of the formal system (personnel, infrastructure, laws), how much of it can be used, what current leadership (within and outside the sector) is proposing as a reform program and what resources can a country apply to maintaining the systems that might be introduced or strengthened. A similar mapping of informal structures and of the connections, if any, between the two is also essential. The next priority is to develop and implement a program for recreating a basic formal structure to handle common disputes and, over time, to expand its capacity, legitimacy, and reach. Staffing decisions are particularly important, including how to vet those already in place, where and how to recruit new staff, and how staff should be trained and deployed. The training process is key to preparing new judicial sector staff, especially judges and prosecutors, to exercise their authority independently. Decisions about personnel are important and will influence the decisions on planning for legal change, training, infrastructure, and organizational restructuring. Ultimately, the commitment of those working in the justice sector will have a huge impact on the success of any reform effort. However, planning in all of these areas may need to happen simultaneously. While staffing questions ultimately form the core around which all other decisions are made, a comprehensive approach to support across these other areas will determine whether our assistance either enhances or obstructs the performance of personnel and no type of reform. A particular dilemma when working in this sector is balancing investments in the sector, against absorptive capacity. Probably more so than in most other sectors, the interdependencies of the various elements in the justice sector require comprehensive assessment. Support for policing may result in increases in case load for prosecutors and defenders and result in an expanding remand population and case load for the court system. Improved court processing can increase the flow of people into custody or result in greater demand for alternative sentencing options. Failure to work to consider the impact of our engagement along the justice continuum can have serious consequences--nothing we do can be thought of as happening in isolation. While recognizing these interdependencies, we should also acknowledge that working on strengthening the ROL in the context of fragile, conflicted affected states requires an ability to prioritize and sequence in a fashion that is far more critical than in other settings. While a frequent error is to assume that everything can and must be done in five years or less, what is done within that period of time is far more important as these foundations can make or break the future success of reform or threaten the very survival of a ROL program. CHAPTEr 2 Security sector reform Security Sector Reform (SSR) is probably the area of ROL-related reform in FCSs that is currently receiving the most attention from the international community, given that it is seen as a way 22 Fragile Situations of ensuring regional security, preventing the emergence or reemergence of human or drug trafficking, and minimizing the threat of terrorism. ROL components in SSR are distinctive with an enormous initial emphasis on reinstating security and order (often by establishing an army and police forces) and demobilizing the majority of former combatants (through a process called Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration or DDR). Organizations such as the UN, OECD DAC, US Institute of Peace, Open Society Institute (OSI) and the Bank itself are paying increased attention to SSR issues and their impact on development. For example, in the concept note for the 2011 World Development Report, rule of law reform in post-conflict situations is discussed in the context of "maintain[ing] pace with growing capacity in the security forces," so that it is possible to prosecute and punish those detained by the newly effective security sector. Certainly, the Bank can play an important role in criminal justice reform, but TTLs should note that the judicial sector actually needs to develop the capacity to deal with a wide variety of disputes, not only criminal prosecutions. Transitional justice Transitional justice generally refers to a range of approaches that states may use to address past human rights violations and includes both judicial and non-judicial approaches such as truth and reconciliation commissions. They are often initiated in post-conflict situations as a means of preventing acts of pure vengeance and for reestablishing a respect for due process and the rule of law. These are not activities in which the Bank is directly involved. Areas such as reconciliation and restorative justice have been the subject of research and analysis by the Bank but have not received operational or financial support. Other donors such as the UN have been more active in the establishment of special international tribunals or extensive assistance to those working for reconciliation within the affected country. Traditional/customary justice Recent literature has found that in many FCSs, traditional authorities provide the primary or sole dispute resolution forum for the majority of the population. They are also likely to have survived the conflict or period of fragility with a capacity that greatly outstrips that of the formal justice sector. Given that the goal of programs to strengthen the ROL in FCSs is to create the capacity to adjudicate disputes and punish wrongdoing, it would be a mistake to ignore the role that traditional systems can play in filling this role in their communities. As such, Isser suggests this important rule: traditional systems should be recognized as a central part of the judicial landscape, not as a side issue or a problem to be overcome.18 CHAPTEr 2 18 Paper from World Bank seminar on Rule of Law in Fragile and Conflict-affected States, "Informal and Formal Systems of Rule of Law." See also Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences with and Percep- tions of Local Justice Options, United States Institute of Peace (November 2009). 23 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned In considering the role of traditional/customary justice as an intrinsic and important element of the framework for rule of law, it is important to remain aware of its advantages and disadvantages. Traditional/customary mechanisms often have high levels of legitimacy within the community and generally provide greater access at lower cost than the formal system. However, as with formal systems, they can be politically compromised/captured, the justice they dispense often does not conform to international standards of human rights (ethnic and gender discrimination can be particularly prevalent) and they are often unable to mediate disputes between litigants who do not have a common ethnic, religious or geographic heritage. Similarly, it is important to acknowledge the often high degree of heterogeneity exacerbated by low levels of legal and process codification. Failure to understand and accommodate that heterogeneity in engagement strategies can seriously undermine effectiveness and, at worst, do damage. Traditional mechanisms may also have a role to play in transitional justice programs and can play an important role in relieving strain on a nascent formal justice sector, as the gacaca courts did in Rwanda. These courts were based on the traditional justice model where village elders sat to adjudicate disputes. Although the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by a UN Security Council resolution to deal with the highest level participants in the genocide, the gacaca courts played an important role in both ensuring that perpetrators were held accountable for their actions and in preventing the formal justice sector from being completely overwhelmed with these prosecutions. As Walsh notes, "over 9,000 of these courts were established and presided over by some 169,000 judges sitting in groups in each village in the open air. Few of the judges had legal qualifications and many were illiterate, though elected from the affected communities. These courts disposed of 1.1 million cases between 2005 and 2007, effectively clearing the backlog of genocide offences." While many have raised concerns over the relaxing of due process rights, "...the sentencing powers of gacaca courts, not available in the conventional courts, offered significant incentives to accused persons to admit their offence and gain substantially reduced sentences, often resulting in immediate release from detention. Vast numbers of accused genocide offenders were processed and released in this way."19 One of the strengths of traditional mechanisms, also reflected by the gacaca, is that they can follow both restorative and retributive models of justice, ensuring a flexibility that may not be possible in the formal sector. Although this may also mean that the due process rights of defendants are less protected, ROL projects can simultaneously work to improve the procedural protections in the traditional forum and work to gradually increase the capacity of the formal sector. For more information on working with traditional justice mechanisms, please see Chapter CHAPTEr 2 Three on Access Programs. 19 B. Walsh. In Search of Success: Case Studies in Justice Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (2010). 24 Fragile Situations Case Study: rebuilding the rOl in liberia Liberia's fourteen year civil war ended with a peace treaty in 2003. However, it is estimated that 200,000 Liberians died and more than 1 million people were displaced in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The economy has also been devastated and today, 80 percent of the population lives on less than a dollar a day. The public sector was destroyed with hundreds of "missing" technical staff and under-qualified workers. For the justice sector, this meant that there was little investigative capacity to combat corruption or punish those who perpetrated crimes or human rights violations. The country only has about 300 lawyers, many of whom are poorly trained, for a population of 3.4 million people. Gender-based violence (GBV), including rape, represents the greatest increase in prosecutions, and consequently increasing criminal caseload in the courts. After the peace treaty was signed, work began almost immediately on the different kinds of reform. The Bank has been particularly involved in building capacity by training judges, magistrates, and public defenders; introducing ADR and anti-corruptions efforts; and supporting outreach efforts to educate the public about the legal system and how to exercise their rights. The main goal of these efforts, funded by a LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress) grant, is to build the capacity of the judiciary to function in a responsive manner to provide services, particularly outside Monrovia, after a long history of corruption and control by the executive. The Bank also supported a Senior Executive Service (SES) program in partnership with other aid agencies in its first experience at recruiting and funding members of the Diaspora to work in key positions in the public sector and, in particular, in the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Training Institute. Donors and multilateral efforts have focused on other aspects of justice sector reform, providing concrete examples of different ROL goals being pursued simultaneously. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) focuses on security sector reform with the Liberian National Police and military. The Carter Center has been working with civil society groups to support community legal aid and paralegal support; the Danish Government assisted the Judiciary in establishing a specialized GBV court (Criminal Court "E"); and OSI is working with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Finally, a Special Court for Sierra Leone was established, where Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, is currently facing trial for war crimes. Sequencing One of the difficulties and opportunities presented by working in fragile and conflict-affected states is that many different types of work happen simultaneously. Humanitarian action, peace- making, peace-keeping, peace-building, state-building and development often require actions in parallel, not sequentially. This necessitates a comprehensive approach that looks at linkages among different aspects of international assistance, to ensure that different donors are not working at cross-purposes or duplicating each other's efforts and that assistance recognizes the interdependencies across the justice agency continuum mentioned previously. Here, a CHAPTEr 2 country's Interim Strategy Note (ISN) or Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) will represent an important instrument for working with counterparts and internal Bank units, particularly to identify priorities and articulate the outcomes sought. 25 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned At the same time, it is very important to ensure that reform work does not try to do too much, too quickly. The 2011 WDR Concept Note calls this "premature overloading." There is a very real risk that newly established or revitalized institutions will be overwhelmed if they are asked to try and act in too many reform efforts at one time. Similarly the design of assistance should take account of the capacity of the country to maintain an enhanced justice system. The failure to take account of these realities can undermine any newly established public confidence in justice institutions and make future efforts even more difficult. Finally, ROL practitioners need to ensure that they do not sacrifice long-term goals to short- term needs, particularly by compromising state-building through the development of justice mechanisms that run parallel to, and not as part of, government services. As has been noted elsewhere in this chapter, ROL reform in FCSs is necessarily an incremental process, which should be planned for over many years and always with a particular end goal in mind. guidelines 1. Understand and adapt goals to the political setting in which ROL reform will take place. Many projects have been less successful than originally hoped because reformers failed to understand the political setting in which they were working. Justice institutions, including the police, prosecutors, courts, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, and even prisons, all exercise and distribute political power. Attempting to change their structures, functions, and operations in the name of reform can threaten the status and interests of individuals and groups. These same institutions are also the product of a local culture and reflect the ordinary citizens' perceptions of how things work and ought to work. It is difficult to change culturally and politically embedded institutions, but it can be done with local leadership that is committed to change and which envisions and can communicate a long term vision and plan. Engagements require sensitive and effective communication, close and continual monitoring and a capacity to quickly adapt and respond to changing circumstances. 2. ROL programs in FCS never start with a blank slate. In designing a ROL reform project, it is important to avoid the approach that no justice system exists, since a dysfunctional one can often give the same impression. Practitioners should consider established practices, culture and expectations, as well as functioning informal and traditional institutions on which people continue to rely for the resolution of most disputes. Thus, it is essential to understand local CHAPTEr 2 practices at various levels and how they will interact with change efforts. 3. Recognize that this is a long term undertaking and that donors should focus on setting the basis for future independent efforts. Donor timetables, and especially those for peace-keeping 26 Fragile Situations missions, are often unrealistic, not only "Naming, blaming, claiming" explains a methodology as regards ROL reforms, but as regards used by sociologists to investigate why some disputes end many broader governance goals. This up in court and some do not. In "naming," certain events are "quick-fix" approach emphasizes crisis recognized as injuries. In "blaming," something or someone security, law and order measures, and is identified as the cause of the injury. And in "claiming," the transitional justice at the expense of injured person confronts the blamed one with their complaint. longer term planning and capacity It can be useful to apply this system to local conditions, with particular emphasis on the many different reasons why people building (Samuels, 2006). do not "claim" for their injuries or why they may choose not to do so through formal judicial mechanisms. 4. Build a better understanding of people's basic dispute-resolution needs, how and how well they are currently met, and how existing formal and informal institutions can be used to cover major gaps. Institutional and case type mapping are critical elements to developing and understanding dispute-resolution needs and are arguably more effective than undertaking lengthy studies or sector diagnostics. Mapping may involve a variety of methodologies, including surveys, focus groups, observation, court records or individual interviews. Although some countries (e.g. Kenya) have conducted massive and costly surveys based on the naming-claiming-blaming methodology introduced by Hazel Genn,20 less thorough and less sophisticated techniques may also be productive.21 Surveys should determine where disputes are usually handled and how well, as well as identifying conflicts which are not taken to a dispute-resolution forum and why this is the case. Project designers will want to explore whether any existing administrative, traditional, or judicial forums can be improved to handle these unresolved conflicts or whether new mechanisms are needed. This allows ROL programs to identify and help prevent or resolve disputes that could lead to a resurgence of conflicts. There is a slight tendency on the part of ROL reformers to assume that unresolved conflicts will disappear if the capacity of the country's courts can be improved. This approach is problematic because the formal institutions, most probably understaffed and in short supply, will not be able to handle the burden. In states with fragile formal institutions, courts will probably not be well- functioning, trusted, or able to keep up with the new burdens. If they are asked to adjudicate cases in excess of their capacity, the resulting delays and potential for injustice are likely to undermine the courts' reputation for dispute-settlement and respect for state institutions generally. Besides, the judicialization of disputes is generally seen as the tactic of last resort, even in well-functioning systems, so reform of the formal institutions should occur alongside projects CHAPTEr 2 20 Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think about Going to the Law (Oxford: Hart Pub- lishing, 1999). 21 For those not familiar with the methodology, it attempts to determine why people decide to recognize conflicts and what actions they then take to resolve them. Both Genn and Grossman et al (1982) whose model she used were most interested in why people go to court, but the same meth- odology can be used to identify alternative mechanisms as well. 27 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned to improve or develop alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (see Chapter Three on Access Programs). 5. Encourage, do not force, bridges between formal and informal institutions. The growing literature on traditional dispute resolution often makes this recommendation, but usually without much guidance as to how it should be attempted. In fragile and conflict-affected situations, the recommended approach is to use windows of opportunity but not to force them open. Eventually, it will be important to develop links between the two sets of justice institutions, but over the short to medium-term, there are arguably more important priorities and forcing what does not come naturally may only exacerbate conflicts. Even in non-FCS countries, the Bank's experience has been positive when formal and informal representatives come together out of a mutual interest. For example, in Ghana the Bank facilitated the support of an Institutional Development Fund grant to support training for the Regional House of Chiefs and the Judicial Service so as to strengthen knowledge about each other's systems as well as ensure due process and principles of equity were understood along the same lines. 6. Be cautious about the use of training, new infrastructure or technology as quick solutions for engaging in ROL reform. Ineffectual training or unnecessarily sophisticated infrastructure rarely do great harm, but they do waste resources, and in a situation where resources are scare, this is harm enough which can also divert attention from real reform efforts. This is not meant to say that training and infrastructure are not real needs, but many programs seem to have gone too far in defining and meeting them. Automation in FCS countries should be even more cautiously considered than in the rest of Africa. Skills levels, basic infrastructure (electricity), maintenance, and the security of the equipment will all be more problematic in these situations. The overview literature, while recognizing the role that all of these provisions can play, has generally criticized donors for their overreliance on these inputs and still more for using them to determine whether an operation was successful. Training, infrastructure, and technology are tools that can be useful in the reform of a justice sector, but should not be seen as evidence of reform in and of themselves. Conclusion In the context of what used to be called "post-conflict" countries, ROL programs may be still more important than elsewhere because of their potential for defusing situations that could lead to relapse. However, here even more than elsewhere, just any improvement will not do. This is less because of a more urgent need to have a real impact--not quick fixes, but rather addressing CHAPTEr 2 chronic problems. To operate in this situation, donors need to: (i) design and apply sound technical approaches; (ii) develop a real understanding of the political context; (iii) realistically coordinate with other donors by working in parallel with them; and (iv) learn which conflicts are most important to ordinary citizens and most likely to escalate if not addressed more effectively. 28 Fragile Situations Finally, it is worth recognizing that the landscape of intervention and assistance grows increasingly complex as greater numbers of bilateral agencies and non-government bodies engage in the fragile and conflict-affected end of the development spectrum. The growth in the number of players with different mandates, and driven by different objectives, will challenge our ability to ensure that our actions and those of our partners remain coherent, complementary and based on comparative advantage. This is particularly the case with international military involvement in ROL reform.22 The rationale for this is clear--that during conflict and in its immediate aftermath, the engagement of security forces is a critical tool for creating a peaceful space within which to start rebuilding the state and establishing the foundations for long-term development. Some, however, fear that the growing engagement of security sector agencies may result in the over-militarization of the security/ justice sector, crowding out the civilian state. These groups generally do not take the long term approach to their engagement, and development agencies need to focus on the institutional strengthening and establishing the foundations for an effective and legitimate rule of law in seeking permanent solutions to the challenges faced by fragile and conflict affected states. CHAPTEr 2 22 See Rule of Law Handbook for Practitioners of the US Army's Judge Advocates Legal Centre and School, Centre for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). The Handbook aims to help Judge Advo- cates working in the field of rule of law projects to understand the complex matter and to inform them about all the agencies and entities involved. 29 CHAPTEr 3 Access Programs In promoting the rule of law, whether as a tool to promote economic development or to ensure that individuals are able to protect their rights against violations, the lack of access to justice is one of Africa's most serious development challenges. Although there are notable examples of excellence in providing access on the continent, the justice sector in Africa is far too small to serve the diverse needs of its population. There are very few lawyers or judges relative to the population, and most services are located in urban areas, inaccessible to the millions of people who live in rural areas. When attempting to access or seek justice, individuals and commercial actors alike may face geographic, financial, temporal, and procedural barriers, not to mention corruption related to the provision of justice services. Despite the obstacles, it is essential that donors work with governments to improve access to justice, which most often includes delay as well as lack of due process. For firms, improving the capacity of courts to enforce contracts in an efficient and transparent manner is an important signal to foreign companies that a country provides a favorable climate for investment. For individuals, giving them the tools and venues they need to find redress for injuries improves satisfaction with government and protects them from human rights abuses. At the same time, there are important human rights concerns that are alleviated by ensuring that defendants have access to legal representation, or are at least knowledgeable about their rights. The fundamental goals of ROL reform to improve access to justice are: providing ways to resolve conflicts fairly and peacefully, protecting citizens from a variety of abuses, and ensuring a transparent set of rules to guide behavior. Access-based ROL reform can be broadly divided into two categories: access for individuals and access for businesses. These two groups often start from different positions in relation to the system as it currently stands: many businesses are, in fact, able to access the courts, but may find that justice moves at a snail's pace or are otherwise unhappy with the experience. Many (if not most) individuals, especially the rural poor, are unable to access the formal justice system at all. This chapter will discuss the preparatory work that donors should undertake before attempting to design an access project. Many projects, relevant for both firms and individuals in the Africa region, have focused on introducing Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). As far as individuals are concerned, traditional justice mechanisms are especially important as ADR forums in Africa--their role in the ROL movement will be explored in greater detail. Finally, this chapter also considers some of the projects that have focused specifically on improving access to commercial justice. 31 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Analyzing the Problem Any access to justice project, perhaps even more so than with other kinds of ROL reform, should start with a thorough "needs analysis." It is common knowledge that certain factors play a role in limiting access, including a shortage of lawyers, limited numbers of courts that tend to be clustered in urban areas, gender discrimination, and poverty or other vulnerable status (e.g. HIV/ AIDS). However, each factor will have a different effect in different contexts on the choices that individuals and businesses make regarding the justice sector. Knowledge gaps are a primary reason why access projects fail or are less successful than expected. As a result, surveys are an important first step in designing these types of projects or activities (if a component of a broader project). Although the answers will be different when analyzing the needs of individuals and businesses, the procedures followed should be similar. Useful information can be gathered by asking potential users or community stakeholders what kind of justice they would like to obtain and where they go when they are seeking to resolve disputes. Analysis of these answers, plus follow-up questions about satisfaction and their reasons for making certain choices, should help to answer the question: "Where do existing mechanisms fail to serve the needs of the population, including businesses?" When conducting these surveys, it is important to seek out a wide range of opinions. Women will face different obstacles and have different needs than men. "Elites" will have very different perceptions of the justice system and want to see different kinds of disputes redressed, so it is important to talk to both the multinational corporation and the owner of the local small shop, as well as to people representing all levels of the socio-economic spectrum. Finally, a task team should not only consider lawyers as the subject-matter experts on access to justice: other social sector workers will almost certainly have a better understanding of the kinds of disputes that exists and the reasons for why people may not choose to or be able to access the justice system. When conducting the needs-analysis survey, TTLs should not be surprised to find that traditional justice mechanisms play a huge part in the dispute settlement process in Africa. The percentage of individuals using the traditional system may be as high as 80­90 percent in some countries. As such, pre-project surveys should ensure that information is gathered about traditional mechanisms or authorities at the community-based level. Project designers should try to understand the relationship between the formal and traditional sectors and whether the traditional system is governed or authorized by statutory law (many African states have hybrid systems that mix indigenous and state-based mechanisms which often have their origins in the colonial administrative structures). This is particularly important because it is highly likely that CHAPTEr 3 the government officials or counterparts working with the team may themselves have a limited understanding of traditional justice, especially where a number of different ethnic groups or tribes have their own systems. 32 Access Programs Traditional Justice Traditional justice is not unique to Africa, but it takes on a particular importance in the region for two main reasons: the majority of the population is, either by choice or necessity, outside the reach of the formal system and depends on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve most conflicts. It has been estimated that 80­90 percent of the region's peoples resort to traditional justice to address conflicts and, even if this number is an upper limit (and numbers are significantly lower in some countries), the fact remains that it is unlikely to change any time soon. Traditional justice may often be spoken of in terms of "filling a gap", but in fact many people choose traditional mechanisms over the formal judicial system, even when given the choice. A preference for local systems is not only a matter of physical accessibility. People may have various reasons for choosing traditional systems, including: maintenance of good relations within the community, social pressures, lower costs, faster resolution, better understanding of procedures, and greater congruence with their own cultural values. The Kenya studies on the Arid Lands peoples23, for example, noted that victims of crimes sometimes withdrew their complaints because they found formal justice an unacceptable means of resolving problems. They preferred compensation for damages from as opposed to a jail sentence for the alleged perpetrator. Traditional mechanisms have also been used as a method by which to relieve pressure from the formal system in desperate situations; in Rwanda, the traditional gacaca courts were used to deal with cases arising out of the 1994 genocide. Had an alternative mechanism not been used, the thousands of cases would have completely crippled the court system, overwhelmed prisons, and forced the accused to spend many years in pre-trial detention with little or no hope of timely trial. However, most agree that traditional justice systems are not perfect. Although donors can play an important role in building the capacity of these systems and help countries build links with the formal justice sector, projects should not be undertaken without a basic understanding of some of the challenges of working with traditional justice. To begin with, traditional mechanisms may or may not meet international (or even domestic) human rights standards: usually, they are lacking in due process guarantees to defendants or they may discriminate against women, both by limiting their ability to bring cases or by making decisions that treat women unequally (note: this may be the case even in the formal system, depending on certain types of laws governing inheritance, marriage, child custody, etc.). In addition, the jurisdiction of any particular justice mechanism may be narrowly limited. In many countries, different cultural groups or regions will have their own mechanisms (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria). While this may be extremely useful for resolving internal disputes, they do not provide an appropriate forum for resolving disputes CHAPTEr 3 between individuals from different places or cultural groups. Finally, there are individuals who 23 Reconciling Society and the Judiciary in Northern Kenya, Research Report by Tanja Chopra, Decem- ber 2008 33 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned simply will not want to use a traditional forum, but believe (and hope) that they have a better chance of securing a fair judgment in the courts or simply value having a formal legal document or judgment. These individuals should continue to have a choice: no reform mechanism should force anyone into using the traditional system. There are two key problems facing donors who wish to work with traditional mechanisms to promote access to justice: donors (and sometimes even client countries) know very little about traditional justice mechanisms functioning in a country, nor have most of them ever worked in the sector. There is very little institutional experience to draw upon in this field, whether from inside the Bank or in general, although some international organizations have begun a stronger focus in this area (e.g. United States Institute of Peace, The Carter Center, and the Open Society Institute). Another factor which complicates working with traditional authorities is that there is not one traditional system, but rather a variety of mechanisms, each linked to distinctive ethnic and linguistic communities. This may be a dangerous combination, especially given the delicate nature of such ROL projects: there is a significant potential for backlash if a community perceives that their mechanisms, deeply rooted in the cultural history and values of the group, are under assault from outsiders. Even civil servants may be seen as outsiders, especially in countries where there are many different cultural groups. The Bank is well positioned to close some of the knowledge gaps relating to traditional justice in Africa. Studies might include legal anthropological surveys, research which looks at the interactions between the traditional and formal systems, and focus group consultations with communities to understand where and how people prefer to resolve their disputes. The Bank can also encourage countries to exchange information on a regional and/or sub-regional level on local initiatives and successes. This is an area where state entities such as ministries of justice or judiciaries already share information about reform efforts. Adr Alternative Dispute Resolution is a "blanket" term applied to any mechanism, other than adjudication by a judge (or jury) in court, by which conflicts are settled. ADR has been part of African justice for centuries because traditional procedures fit well into this definition. However, mediation and arbitration are the two types of ADR that have been given the most attention in recent years and both have been the subject of donor activity on the continent (e.g. European Union, DFID, NORAD, among others). ADR (excluding the pre-existing traditional mechanisms) is increasingly seen as an important tool in improving access to justice, both for individuals and CHAPTEr 3 businesses in Africa. First, a few definitions: Mediation is a process during which a neutral person (the mediator) facilitates discussions between the disputing parties and tries to help them reach an agreement 34 Access Programs Citizens' Mediation Centre in lagos State, Nigeria In Nigeria's Lagos State, the Citizens' Mediation Centre (CMC) represents an initiative first proposed by the Directorate of Citizens' Rights (also proposed was a consumer protection unit and the Multi-Door Courthouse, which provides court-annexed mediation services). The CMC concept entailed the establishment of a public complaints office and associated publicity aimed at receiving complaints. The attraction for potential complainants is that the service was developed specifically for the benefit of people who could not afford to go to court and is provided completely without charge. Each complaint is first assessed as suitable for mediation and then referred to a mediator employed at the CMC. A complaint is ordinarily processed after one or two mediation sessions, the aim being to complete all mediation activity in each case within three months of receipt of the complaint. The service provided by CMC was expanded to a wider range of citizens by the gradual establishment of four more branch offices of the CMC across Lagos State. The CMCs represent a "home grown" idea, which was created in an urban centre. Their focus is largely on resolving disputes between such individuals as landlords and tenants. Source: Walsh. In Search of Success: Case Studies in Justice Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, June 2010. or amicable settlement. In arbitration, the neutral person (the arbitrator) actually decides how the case will be settled, after listening to each party's arguments and examining all of the evidence. Arbitration has more in common with a regular court proceeding, but both of these mechanisms allow for settlements that are far more creative than those a court could impose. Arbitration, for instance, may be binding or non-binding, depending on the prior agreement of the parties (businesses tend to favor arbitration). Both processes and their outcomes are usually confidential. The benefits of ADR can be numerous. ADR assists not only the parties in obtaining a faster resolution but it takes cases out of the formal system, thereby relieving some of the burden on courts. Often, disputes settled by ADR will be resolved much more quickly than in the formal justice sector and parties are often far more satisfied by the outcome of an ADR procedure. In court, there is generally a winning and a losing party, while in ADR, both parties may feel that they have "won," because they are much more likely to find a settlement which benefits all Ghana's Commercial Court The Commercial Division of the High Court of Ghana was opened in March 2005 to hear disputes of a commercial nature, including banking and finance issues, intellectual property, and the restructuring of commercial debt. The CHAPTEr 3 main goal of the court is to provide a forum where business disputes can be resolved quickly and efficiently, and the rules of the court were designed with this purpose in mind. Judges actively manage cases and follow strict deadlines; adjournments cannot take longer than 72 hours. In addition, the parties must participate in mandatory pre-trial conferences within 30 days of written arguments. Between March 2005 and July 2006, more than one in every five cases was settled in conference. 35 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned parties. ADR processes are also less adversarial and allow disputing parties to preserve existing relationships and reduce the potential for conflict, an important consideration in closely-knit communities and among business partners. Finally, ADR usually costs less: it means not having to pay filing and court fees and for those who are using lawyers, a faster resolution to the case means paying for fewer hours of the lawyers' time (for times when a party cannot afford a lawyer or when there are simply not enough lawyers to serve the community's legal needs, ADR is generally thought of as a more attractive option). ADR is also well-suited to address conflicts which are complicated, costly or involve parties who might not otherwise resolve a dispute peacefully (or at all), thus making it a more reliable means of expanding access to poorer citizens, in particular. There are also several types of ADR, which have been adopted as part of a formal court's proceedings. Following earlier English reforms, some common law countries in Africa have made efforts at pre-trial settlement mandatory in civil cases; such is the case for Ghana in its Commercial Courts. Domestic and international arbitration as an alternative to courts for commercial cases is also making advancement in Africa. Commercial Justice The rule of law is an essential element in creating an environment that is welcoming to foreign investors and supportive of local entrepreneurs. This includes amending laws and regulations so they are transparent Doing business: rwanda's reforms and efficient and ensuring that their implementation is done in a way that is seen as In 2010, Rwanda led the world in undertaking fair. A good business climate is one in which a "Doing Business reforms," the first time a SSA state business operates within the law and benefits had "won" the title. One measurement is how long from the opportunities and protections that and how many procedures it requires to start a new the law provides. The annual Doing Business business. Between 2008 and 2009, Rwanda reduced the time required to start a business from 14 days to report serves as a snapshot of legal reform three and simplified the process so that it now only efforts to promote a healthy climate for takes two procedures, rather than eight. All in all, businesses based on specific indicators. The Rwanda was the top reformer on three of the ten report ranks countries according to how Doing Business indicators: employing workers, getting easy or difficult it is to: start a business, deal credit, and protecting investors. No other country with construction permits, employ workers, appears more than once on this list. In promoting such reforms, Rwanda has established that commercial register property, get credit, protect investors, CHAPTEr 3 justice reforms are an important part of a program to pay taxes, trade across borders, enforce a increase the country's competitiveness. contract, and close a business.24 24 Doing Business Project, World Bank, see http://www.doingbusiness.org for additional information. 36 Access Programs Table 1: Doing business 2010 ­ Enforcing Contracts ranking ranking (out of the 46 economies in SSA) Country (out of 183 economies worldwide) 1 Tanzania 31 2 Cape Verde 38 3 Rwanda 40 4 Namibia 41 5 Ghana 47 6 Eritrea 48 7 Ethiopia 57 8 Mauritius 66 9 Gambia, the 67 10 Seychelles 70 11 Equatorial Guinea 72 12 Zimbabwe 78 13 Botswana 79 14 Mauritania 83 15 South Africa 85 16 Zambia 87 17 Nigeria 94 18 Lesotho 105 19 Burkina Faso 110 20 Uganda 116 21 Kenya 126 22 Côte d'Ivoire 127 23 Mozambique 129 24 Swaziland 130 25 Guinea 131 26 Mali 135 27 Niger 138 28 Malawi 142 29 Guinea-Bissau 143 30 Sierra Leone 144 CHAPTEr 3 31 Sudan 146 32 Gabon 150 33 Senegal 151 (continued on next page) 37 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Table 1: Doing business 2010 ­ Enforcing Contracts (continued) ranking ranking (out of the 46 economies in SSA) Country (out of 183 economies worldwide) 34 Comoros 153 35 Togo 154 36 Madagascar 155 37 Congo, Rep. 159 38 Liberia 166 39 Chad 170 40 Central African 171 Republic 41 Burundi 172 42 Congo, Dem. Rep. 172 43 Cameroon 174 44 Benin 177 45 São Tomé and 179 Príncipe 46 Angola 181 The Bank has been involved, for many years, in helping states amend their laws in order to make them more business-friendly. However, the best laws in the world are meaningless unless businesses are able to seek the protection of the law. In other words, access to justice is an essential part of establishing a well-functioning system of commercial justice. In Doing Business terms, the enforceability of contracts indicator is usually seen as a measurement of the accessibility, efficiency, and fairness of a court system (see Table 1 below). This measurement also has consequences for economic development: according to recent research (2010 Doing Business Report), countries with good contract enforcement tend to produce and export more products than those with poor enforcement, even among states with comparable economies. Commercial justice in particular is an area in which the Bank has a great deal of experience and where it is well suited to work. The Bank's work in this area has generally focused on private sector development projects or institutional strengthening projects focused on a specific entity. They do not differ significantly in their design from any other ROL project and may, in fact be CHAPTEr 3 easier to design and manage because economic development is usually a clear priority for government counterparts. It is also the case that, with the exception of establishing commercial or other specialized courts, efforts to improve commercial justice do not differ from efforts to improve justice for all residents. Mediations centers, multi-door courthouses, and fast track courts are all mechanisms that are helpful to both businesses and individuals. Also useful 38 Access Programs are projects that bring the different agencies of the justice sector together, including donors who can coordinate reform efforts as part of a sector-wide program (SWAP) or through basket funding. During the stakeholder workshops held as part of the preparation for this Note, the Uganda Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) project was cited as a good example of this kind of work, and participants encouraged donors to use SWAP mechanisms more often. The Uganda JLOS was adopted in 2001, and involves the administration of justice and maintenance of law and order in the country. The JLOS project aims to increase communication, coordination and cooperation among several stakeholders who collectively implement reforms that have been drawn from a single policy and expenditure plan, under the leadership of the Government of Uganda.25 Legal Assistance A fundamental approach to enhancing access to justice has been to focus on legal assistance through both state and non-state legal aid services. These programs help to offer access to justice, improve the quality of the justice served, and protect individuals from abuse by justice sector officials. However, it should be noted that legal assistance projects may struggle to find resources: while providing access to justice is the State's responsibility, when funding is limited, resources are much more likely to be spent on increasing the number of judges, police, and prosecutors, rather than on providing Paralegal Advisory Service institute legal assistance to either poor citizens for civil in Malawi cases or to accused persons in criminal cases. Among the most common forms of legal In many parts of Africa, lawyers are few and far assistance are services delivered by NGOs and between, so several innovative programs have trained pro bono or free legal counsel by the private paralegals to fill gaps in services. Malawi's Paralegal bar; regrettably, both are in short supply and Advisory Service Institute (PASI) is one such program, not only in developing countries. Perhaps which, in 2009, employed 39 paralegals, working in because of the limited supply of both funding all of the country's prisons and regularly attending and lawyers, several African countries have 18 police stations, eleven court locations and four child justice courts. PASI's wide range of activities is found alternative ways by which to improve aimed at offering solutions to address the problems peoples' access to legal assistance through of congestion in prisons, prosecution delays, the rights the development of paralegal services with of prisoners to receive advice and assistance, prison financial assistance of international and conditions and the protection of vulnerable groups. bilateral donors. Donors have also provided In part due to PASI's work, Malawi's rate of remand NGOs such as TIMAP for Justice in Sierra Leone prisoners (defendants awaiting trial) has stabilized CHAPTEr 3 around 17 percent, which is on par with the rate in and the Paralegal Advisory Service Institute several developed countries. (PASI) of Malawi (Walsh, 2010) with funding 25 For more details on the Uganda JLOS, see http://www.jlos.go.ug 39 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned to carry out legal education activities, many of which are focused particularly at empowering women with knowledge about their rights. World Bank gender & law program in Africa The Bank's Gender & Law (G&L) Program has done important work to improve women's access to justice in thirteen SSA countries. Women in Africa live in acute insecurity because of economic disempowerment, inequality of access to rights and education, lack of health infrastructure, and limited participation in government and public affairs. The goal of G&L is to empower women to use the legal system to enforce their rights, through institutional strengthening (capacity/ partnership building), legal literacy (strengthening women's knowledge/awareness of their rights), and access to legal and judicial services (strengthening women's ability to enforce their rights). For additional information on the Africa Region Gender & Law Program, see Annex II. Conclusion Access to justice issues take a different form in sub-Saharan Africa than they do in other regions. The limited reach of weak or small state institutions means that many of the benefits they usually provide are and will continue to be provided by traditional justice mechanisms. Reforms to both the formal sector and to improve traditional justice will require enormous creativity and flexibility on the part of governments and the donors who work with them. In the search for alternatives to enhance real access, it has been suggested that a focus on the benefits to users, rather than the means to access services is more practical and that these efforts should be pursued following a thorough analysis of a population's needs (that is, partially met and unmet needs). TTLs should determine where the lack of available dispute resolution mechanisms, legal guarantees, and protective services affects the citizens most in need and then go about identifying ways to meet those needs. Donor involvement in increasing access to justice may also differ greatly, depending on the part of the sector in which they are asked to support. Donors, including the Bank, have been working with governments on reforms to increase commercial justice for years. There is also an increasing capacity to help with other reform projects, including those that train paralegals and legal educators to work with communities. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that hardly any donors have experience working with traditional justice authorities and a great deal of preliminary work and research will need to be done before undertaking such ROL projects. In the end, the real goal of access projects is to provide the means for resolving conflicts fairly and peacefully, protecting citizens from a variety of abuses, and ensuring a transparent set of rules to guide behavior. This CHAPTEr 3 is work that will often require donors to consider unconventional solutions and, like any other goal of development effectiveness, work closely with state and non-state counterparts to ensure their sustainability. 40 CHAPTEr 4 Criminal Justice reform introduction The Bank has relatively little experience with criminal justice in Africa as compared to other areas of support (see Annex II). Much of this work has centered around anti-corruption efforts to strengthen prosecution offices. Some believe that the Bank should not enter the area of criminal justice for a variety of reasons: (i) a general lack of expertise; (ii) other donors are more experienced and have established a record of support in criminal justice in Africa; (iii) reputational risk when supporting agencies charged with ensuring due process but lacking in institutional capacity which could lead to human rights violations, particularly in fragile and conflicted-affected situations (FCS); and (iv) an interpretation of the Bank's Articles of Agreement suggesting criminal justice borders on interference in political affairs. Regardless of whether or not the Bank adopts a particular policy on criminal justice, such reforms are extremely important to Africa's ROL development, including continuing anti-corruption efforts, which require broader ROL support. The reform of criminal justice systems has increasingly also been seen as a development priority because crime and violence can lower investment and economic growth, destroy community trust and unity, and divert resources away from more economically valuable activities (e.g. health services for victims or stop-gap policing efforts, instead of investment in infrastructure and education). The chance to live free from fear is also a basic need, just as important to many of the world's poorest people as addressing hunger, unemployment, and lack of safe drinking water. While Bank teams may not decide to undertake all of the types of reforms discussed in this chapter, TTLs working on strengthening the ROL should have a basic understanding of the development challenges posed by Africa's criminal justice systems. Bank Activity & Criminal Justice As to whether a task team may finance criminal justice, much depends on the interpretation of article IV, Section 10 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement, which includes a prohibition against interference in the political affairs of any member of the Bank Group. The Legal Vice- Presidency (LEG) has suggested two criteria which should be considered when evaluating the appropriateness of such interventions: (i) the degree to which the project is grounded in a reasonable economic rationale, and (ii) whether the project avoids interference in the political 41 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned affairs of the country. The Bank's Board of Executive Directors has not yet had to consider the interpretation of this article regarding work in the criminal justice sector; instead, the LEG is working together with project teams that are interested in including criminal justice financing on a case-by-case basis. While the legal issue of the articles may remain pending, the Bank's policy environment has changed in recent years. The Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy, adopted in 2007, does suggest the need to promote improvements in the criminal justice sector because of its obvious relationship to anti-corruption programs and because of the increasing importance of citizen security. Current and future GAC activities to address both issues could continue to work around the margins, by focusing on ethics training, citizen awareness, and on community crime prevention programs, albeit with limited impact. The Criminal Justice Chain and its variations Criminal justice is often described as a "chain" because it involves a series of organizational actors, usually in a somewhat fixed sequence. The chain generally begins with the police in their preventive and investigative roles, proceeds to the prosecutors (or investigative judges in some Francophone or Lusophone African countries) and defense counsel (public or private), reaches the courts and ends with prisons or probation officers, depending on the case. In most cases, criminal justice reforms require attention to the entire chain and working with only one element is rarely effective. This is particularly true if the police are left out of the equation. Equal attention does not mean that every donor has to work with every institution, but The Tanzania Accountability, Transparency, and it does mean that a collective effort should integrity Project (ATiP) is a part of the country's broader justice, law and order sector program. ATIP include these relevant and interconnected supports strengthening of the legal and judicial system actors. In Tanzania, for example, the Bank is in the following ways: (a) through the establishment of supporting a sector-wide program which a harmonized national legal framework; (b) enhanced includes actors of the criminal justice system, access to justice for the poor and disadvantaged; (c) but it has coordinated with other donors to improved governance and administrative justice; (d) ensure that they take the lead with specific improved skills and knowledge of legal professionals; (e) improved service delivery capacity in key legal institutions; institutions where Bank financing may be a and (f) Legal Sector Reform Program (LSRP) management, more delicate issue (see box below). coordination and monitoring, and evaluation. In this project, the Bank has specifically stated in the financing The criminal justice chain is a general agreement that funds will not be used to finance police, CHAPTEr 4 model. There may be subtle differences prisons, prosecution, and human rights activities. The LSRP in the way the chain is constructed in is supported through a basket fund financed by several donors; thus, their support would include aspects of the individual countries or even communities. program that the Bank does not support. This may be due to the differences between 42 Criminal Justice Reform the continental European and the Anglo-American systems, although the two systems have increasingly adopted similar procedures. In their contemporary versions, both systems use oral hearings, involve some level of confidentiality in investigations and recognize due process rights. While both allow for adversarial proceedings, neither adequately "levels the playing field" for defendants who cannot provide their own attorneys. The debates over the relative merits of the continental and common law proceedings should not divert attention from a variety of other criminal justice systems which are important in Africa--these include Shari'a courts, traditional dispute resolution, and a number of hybrid mechanisms incorporating aspects of traditional and state practices (e.g. the "traditional courts" set up in some African countries such as Ethiopia's social courts). As described in greater detail in the Access Programs chapter, in Africa the majority of the population relies on traditional justice, where the distinction between crimes and civil disputes is not strictly applied. Dispute settlement in these alternative forums often imposes restorative measures instead of incarceration for the defendant (e.g. the defendant and/or his family may compensate the offended parties for any damages, rather than spending time in prison). Definitions of offenses and any additional sanctions may also differ from practices in the formal system, and as is often observed, may deviate from international human rights standards. Although the rest of this section will deal only with reforms to the formal state structures, clearly the treatment of criminal offenses by alternative mechanisms such as those administered by non-state authorities deserves further research if the Bank is to actively engage in this area. Objectives of Criminal Justice reforms A well-grounded assessment is a necessary first step for any reform, and reforms in criminal justice are no exception, especially because of the many political interests that may be involved. In analyzing vested interests, teams should recognize that ineffectual behavior may be the result of corruption, incompetence or even laziness. It is thus essential that a diagnostic study be as open as possible, focusing on problems and their causes. As other chapters discuss, it is also essential to identify the goals of any ROL reform or institutional strengthening project early on. Criminal justice reforms typically have a number of objectives: 1. Ensuring respect for due process rights for those under investigation or prosecution, as well as for victims and witnesses; 2. Eliminating abuses sometimes perpetrated by criminal justice agencies--corruption, harassment of citizens for political or other ends, excessive use of force26; CHAPTEr 4 26 While outside observers most often focus on politically-motivated abuses, other problems may re- sult from insufficient supervision, as when judges, prosecutors, or police officers decide to use their authority to punish someone against whom they have a grudge. 43 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned 3. Bringing those responsible for criminal violations (including state agents) to justice; 4. Preventing crime and increasing citizen security; and 5. Rehabilitating those found guilty of crimes and promoting their reentry into society. These goals are usually pursued through two types of projects: law reform and/or institutional strengthening. However, it is difficult to treat these as two separate types of programs because institutions may not function effectively if they are tasked with enforcing "bad" laws, and a "good" law on paper is useless if the enforcers are under-resourced and poorly trained. Improving the quality of law and its enforcement should be thought of as two sides of the same coin, not separate objectives. Law reform Many criminal justice projects begin with legal reform as a means of signaling the intent to improve services and replace inadequate or antiquated norms with more transparent, effective rules. Both reasons are legitimate but can run into problems because revisions may not be well thought out and the institutions charged with applying them may not have sufficient capacity. Another challenge of law reform, seen in both developing and developed nations, is a tendency to draft overly strong legislation to address a particular problem and disregard the negative consequences that may be provoked by the new rule. Three types of laws are relevant here--those defining crimes and sanctions; those setting out procedures; and those describing organizational structures and powers. All too frequently, one is changed without taking into account the implications for the others. In general, legal change has been less of a problem for Africa's criminal justice systems, and their major shortcomings are more attributable to institutional weaknesses. institutional reform Where criminal justice does not achieve the objectives outlined above, it is most often due to weak or even dysfunctional institutions (as in some FCS). Most reforms in Africa, in part because of donor choices, have focused on courts and public defender services. Police and prosecution often receive less attention, and prisons are excluded almost universally.27 A third lesson is that the interactions among institutions are nearly as important as the reforms to each one--while multi-donor programs can divide up the emphasis, they need to remain cognizant of need for inter-institutional coordination. For example, during the stakeholder workshops conducted in Africa in preparation for this Note, weak inter-institutional linkages were highlighted as obstacles CHAPTEr 4 to a more effective administration of justice. Participants noted a lack of coordination among the 27 One of the few donors involved in this area, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), has financed paralegal services in Malawi's prisons, but an exceptional case. 44 Criminal Justice Reform parliament, the judiciary, police, prosecution and prisons on justice issues. Uganda's "Chain-linked Initiative" attempts to combat this problem: agency representatives meet once a month to iron out differences and resolve pending problems. This kind of coordination also facilitates discussion of more politically complicated issues (e.g. budgetary allocations, response to social unrest) and allows agency heads to focus on forging policies to address public concerns with high crime rates. Police Criminal justice reform does require addressing attention to the police, depending on a donor's mandate or criteria. Typically, police forces in countries attempting criminal justice reforms suffer from one or more of the following problems: corruption, abusive behaviors (including entrance into criminal activities themselves) and low skills levels in general but particularly with regard to investigation. Other areas of concern include minimal citizen service orientation, politicization, unequal and inefficient patterns of deployment, and insufficient and inadequate equipment, partly due to low budgets but also inefficient usage. Corruption in police procurement and budgetary management is itself a frequent complaint, more so than in the other agencies of the justice sector. In some African countries (e.g. FCS), police forces have often remained "militarized" following periods of conflict within their own organization and, as in many countries, the military carries out police functions.28 Community policing has become a new goal by incorporating a respect for democratic values in service provision: police forces have been called on to respond to serving citizens, rather than functioning as an instrument by which citizens can be controlled. Assistance with this reform is often provided by those engaged in Security Sector Reform, rather than by ROL specialists (see Chapter Two on Fragile Situations). The first steps to designing criminal justice reform in Africa require building policy and/or planning capacity, vetting of existing staff and the selection of replacements, or drafting critical laws and rules. In most cases, it is hard to envision much improvement without a sustained, comprehensive reform of a number of organizations, but this is difficult in the face of various constraints--financial, political, and attitudinal (on the part of police, citizens, and political leaders). Police reform, like other types of institutional reform, is at its core about improving management, internal oversight, and external accountability. The urgency for reform and the form a project should take depend in large part on the types of behavior encountered. If police are extensively involved in abuse, this requires immediate attention; if this is not the case in general, then more emphasis could go to strengthening their investigative and preventive CHAPTEr 4 28 The issue of what to do with the military, often a major political player, is not covered here, but its predominant role and the persistence of military regimes in the region are another obstacle to improving governance. 45 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned functions. Over time, reforms would likely require replacing most personnel with better paid, better trained and better motivated recruits; modifying internal organization, control systems, and incentive structures; introducing modern approaches to policing; and, inevitably, larger and better managed budgets. More targeted activities such as community policing, crime mapping, strengthening of investigative units often appear ineffective because of weaknesses in the rest of the system, which simply overwhelm specific changes. In countries with resource limitations, mainly FCS, police reform remains a long-term goal, but without it, criminal justice reform, even in the narrowest sense, may be unachievable. The Judiciary Criminal justice reform often shows an exaggerated emphasis on the courts, even though they are rarely the most problematic part of the chain. This may be because donors feel more comfortable working with courts and with their needs (training, infrastructure and equipment, for the most part). Short and intermediate-term support to courts for criminal justice reform is also usually less costly than that needed for the rest of the criminal justice chain. Because the judiciary is often the most adequately financed of the sector institutions (albeit still low compared to other public institutions), it may need less external support, but cannot play its new role if the other actors are not able to play theirs as part of a larger reform effort. Prosecution Traditionally, and in line with English practices A learning Activity on Public Prosecution until relatively recently, police in common law in Malawi was jointly organized in November systems of Africa often double as prosecutors 2006 by the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the (e.g. Tanzania, Malawi), taking them away from World Bank Institute. The event also involved the their principal jobs and raising issues of due National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, the process in having police serve this function. International Criminal Court in The Hague, the Federal Criminal Court of Italy (Corte de Cazassione), and One of the main areas where Bank support was coordinated with USAID. The program sought to is requested from departments of public strengthen the Department of Public Prosecutions in prosecution is in the fight against corruption. its effort to prosecute high-profile cases of corruption. International experts from the Bank's INT Vice- A number of factors can combine to make the Presidency joined experts from Peru, South Africa, work of the law-enforcement agencies who and Nigeria to discuss domestic and international challenges to address generic or patterns found are dedicated to investigating and prosecuting CHAPTEr 4 in case reviews. The program was also in line with cases of corruption even more difficult. These the objectives of the Bank-financed Economic factors can include the secretive nature of acts of Governance Program and Malawi's Public Sector corruption, the lack of specific individual victims Governance Program, which was financed by the (often times the principal victim in high profile Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 46 Criminal Justice Reform cases of corruption is society at large), the complexity of the transactions perpetrated using national and international networks operating through sophisticated channels, and the involvement, in many cases, of prominent politicians, business men or other public figures in positions of power. While several actions and strategies can be implemented to counter this growing phenomenon, there appears to be a growing global consensus that international efforts at combating corruption should focus on three aspects: (i) developing the capacity of law-enforcement agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption; (ii) building and strengthening cooperation among national law enforcement agencies that may have complementary, and sometimes overlapping mandates; and (iii) improving international and regional cooperation to allow for more effective legal assistance. In order to better adapt to the region's realities, programs should first consider the needs of the selected countries' prosecution agencies based on a desk review, including how investigations are carried out (particularly in high profile cases). Such a review can help task teams address procedural issues and structural problems, as well as both prosecute cases of corruption and implement preventive measures. While donor assistance to prosecutorial agencies can be extremely useful, it has tended to put a premium on teaching investigative techniques. Other areas in need of support include institutional management reform and case processing (e.g. developing criteria on how to decide which cases to prioritize; use of alternative proceedings where applicable; and coordinating with other agencies, especially the police). Legal Assistance (Public defender) The overall scarcity of qualified attorneys in such FCS countries as Liberia and Sierra Leone is a near- universal constraint in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa appears to be an exception, with a Capacity building in Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique Like many other countries in the region, these countries have tried to implement reform measures to prevent and control corruption by enacting effective enforcement legislation and creating agencies with a clear mandate to prosecute cases of corruption. In 2009, the Bank's Africa Region and World Bank Institute coordinated a capacity building program with the Prosecutors' Offices of Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique to: CHAPTEr 4 · Design a practical framework for the investigation and prosecution of high profile cases of corruption based on hypothetical cases studies; · Create a space for dialogue and knowledge sharing among different National Prosecutorial Authorities; · Facilitate the analysis of international experiences and foster South-South cooperation among the participating countries and with other regions by establishing links with anti-corruption agencies in Peru and Brazil. 47 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned well-organized and relatively adequately staffed legal defense service. However, even Ethiopia, with fewer private attorneys than judges and prosecutors, has managed to make some state-subsidized assistance available to defendants accused of major felonies. It is likely for many countries that this is the best that can be done within the confines of formal legal assistance, with some additional assistance from NGOs or a still more limited supply of lawyers willing to do pro bono work. Ensuring the availability of pro bono counsel is rarely enough; clients also need to be protected from the potential for abuse. Those requiring defense counsel should be made aware of the terms of service (so that illegal fees are not charged), and systems should exist for registering complaints. Managing a public defense system is relatively easy as compared to management of other sector institutions; small size and a simple organization are notable advantages. When service providers include NGOs and private lawyers, management may become more difficult. In fact, donors supporting NGO programs in Africa have had to protect their grantees against government interference. Two major initiatives to expand legal assistance are particularly noteworthy: (i) the use of paralegals and (ii) NGO or state-sponsored citizen education campaigns to ensure that citizens are aware of their rights. In Sierra Leone, a Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) grant, Developing a Model for Delivering Primary Justice Services, supported access to disadvantaged groups in rural areas, including working with criminal justice institutions to ensure accountability in criminal cases. The non-governmental recipient organization, TIMAP for Justice, is a community-based paralegal program which helps to train individuals to serve as paralegals in 13 offices throughout the country. Through thirteen offices in the country's Northern and Southern provinces and a headquarters office in Freetown, Timap's trained paralegals and two directors use a combination of mediation, negotiation, advocacy, and occasionally litigation to resolve disputes and promote community activism and legal education. Aside from assistance to actual defendants, these types of programs help to protect citizens from police, judicial, and/or prosecutorial abuse. Adequate legal assistance for citizens involved in or threatened with criminal or civil actions is fairly difficult to imagine in Africa, as in many developing regions, because of limited human and financial resources--donors may have to plan to provide support long beyond a normal project's lifespan. However, legal assistance is extremely important to protect individuals, especially the poor and otherwise disadvantaged, and donors should prioritize its support. This is an area where the Bank has already had extensive involvement (see Annex II), in part because legal assistance issues are also considered part of enhancing access to justice, rather than purely related to criminal justice reform. CHAPTEr 4 Prisons Donors have generally been reluctant to fund assistance to prisons in Africa, in part because infrastructure improvements are the most requested form of assistance without associated 48 Criminal Justice Reform reforms in the treatment of inmates. In In Madagascar, the Bank supported legal and judicial exceptional cases, Bank support has helped reforms through two main instruments: (i) the Poverty to refurbish such basic facilities as lavatories Reduction Support Credits, which mainly focused on and health clinics (see box below). private sector development, and governance; and (ii) the Governance and Institutional Development Project. There are, however, other activities which The major areas of support included: (a) improving donors can support that might improve professional and ethical standards, accountability, and operational efficiency of the judiciary; (b) building conditions, such as helping to set up systems capacity in the legal and judicial profession through for keeping track of inmates since most strengthening of legal education; and (c) facilitating correctional facilities in Africa do not have universal access to justice. The latter was accomplished an account of who is in detention, whether on two fronts: first, by reducing procedural, cultural, on pre-trial remand (awaiting trial) or geographic, and financial hurdles that block access to following sentencing, as well as support to the formal judiciary and second, by improving criminal justice and humanizing detention facilities. probation services Finally, the provision of legal assistance or paralegals to help inmates navigate the system, particularly the large numbers in pre-trial detention, have had some success. For example, the Paralegal Advisory Service Institute (PASI) of Malawi, which is among the most extensive paralegal programs thus far employed in Africa, has greatly assisted in reducing the proportion of the prison population on remand. Today, Malawi's remand population stands at below 20 percent, keeping with rates typically achieved in countries that have well-funded criminal justice systems.29 Prisons are clearly the bleakest spot in the region's criminal justice chain, but this is the case nearly everywhere in the world, and with existing resource constraints, there may be little donors can or wish to do beyond trying to discourage unnecessary pre-trial incarceration (e.g. Open Society Institute's Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice), providing legal assistance, and/or funding a few basic systems and repairs. Civil Society role Civil society groups are frequently active in criminal justice reforms and this is no less true in Africa. They often define a narrow focus, such as addressing the needs of women, children, ethnic minorities, or the physically challenged (e.g. HIV/AIDS patients). Donors might work to promote cooperation between public, private, and civil society organizations as a way of obtaining "economies of scale" to address broader ROL issues. CHAPTEr 4 29 See Walsh, B. In Search of Success: Case Studies Justice Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (2010). 49 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Conclusions Criminal justice reforms are essential to helping African states operate in accordance with the rule of law. However, there are important lessons that should guide this work, particularly for organizations like the Bank, whose involvement has thus far been somewhat limited. It requires a recognition that the "links" of the criminal justice chain are interrelated and may be affected when one agency functions inefficiently. As a result, criminal justice reform should address each component of the sector, even if individual donors only work in specific areas. This is most effectively done if countries develop their own plan and use it to coordinate external support, although donor support can also be extremely useful in helping to develop, flesh out, and track the progress of the plan. CHAPTEr 4 50 CHAPTEr 5 Corruption in African Justice Systems introduction Justice sector institutions in the Africa region have long struggled to overcome the perception of corruption. According to Transparency International polling, a majority of people in seven out of eight African countries believe that their legal system is corrupt, and one out of five respondents who had personal experience with a national court system admitted to having paid bribes.30 In some countries, such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe, corruption may manifest itself through undue political influence in justice sector institutions.31 Poor oversight and accountability mechanisms in other countries, like Burundi, give rise to high levels of opportunistic corruption. In these and many other countries across the region, citizens routinely contend with justice systems that function in an ad hoc and often predatory manner. It should be noted that traditional and religious justice mechanisms, although far from perfect, tend to be regarded by many citizens as less susceptible to extraneous pressures and biases. While these traditional mechanisms may not meet international standards with respect to the treatment of women, juveniles and minorities, they are generally perceived as more consistent in their rulings than many formal, state institutions. The following discussion, however, will focus on formal state institutions, though traditional justice mechanisms are covered in Chapter Three (Access Programs). This chapter will provide a basic framework for understanding the nature of corruption in the formal justice sector, how it is organized, and what types of interventions may be appropriate for Bank support. Although corruption in the justice sector generally may have lower direct economic costs than corruption in other sectors, the resulting harm is just as damaging. A few particularly noteworthy consequences of a corrupt justice sector include: 1. Inability to deter corruption in other sectors or fulfill an oversight role: The institutions that comprise the justice sector play a central role in identifying and sanctioning corruption as 30 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems, avail- able at http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/global_corruption_report/gcr2007 31 Justice sector institutions--including the courts, police, prosecutors, ministries of justice, ad- ministrative tribunals, NGOs, traditional authorities applying customary law--can play a key role in advancing or hindering a country's efforts in promoting economic growth, good governance (including combating corruption), and poverty reduction. 51 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned institutions of accountability. When justice sector institutions are themselves corrupt, their ability to deter and punish corruption in other sectors is severely compromised. 2. Poor service delivery for citizens: Few citizens will voluntarily engage with a justice system that is perceived to be corrupt. Those who utilize the system generally do so because: (i) they wish to benefit from the opportunities created by the corruption, or (ii) they have no other recourse. 3. Loss of normative reinforcement for the rule of law: Dispute resolution is a good provided by the justice sector that creates important positive externalities such as strengthening the normative framework guiding public and private actions (Shavell, 1997). Where justice sector institutions are regarded as corrupt, this rule strengthening function is largely absent. 4. Erosion of social and economic stability: The rule strengthening function also contributes to the creation of a predictable environment for public and private transactions (North, 1990). Corruption undermines this predictability and creates a situation where wealth and political clout, as opposed to the application of objective, transparent rules, determine the outcome of disputes. In order to develop effective anti-corruption interventions that are tailored to the justice sector, one needs to first understand how the relevant institutions and processes are susceptible to corruption. Table 2, which was developed as an exercise in an African country, identifies common entry points for corruption within the justice sector.32 Here, the "sector" is understood to include not only the courts, but also the police, prosecutors, public defenders, private attorneys and other officers of the court,33 and prisons. How Corruption is Organized Table 2 seeks to identify where corruption may occur in the justice sector, but it does not attempt to explain how this corruption is organized and controlled, or describe the factors contributing to its emergence in a specific country. In order to better understand the structural characteristics and political economy underlying corrupt practices in the justice sector, it is necessary to look beyond the entry points for corruption, and explore how specific instances of corruption are linked together. This in turn will provide insight into the types of interventions might be successful within the context of a particular country (e.g. opportunistic corruption can be addressed by 32 Table 2 includes many of the attributes of what the Bank has called "quiet corruption", which can be defined as the misuse of authority without an explicit exchange of money or other commodity CHAPTEr 5 (World Bank, 2010). 33 The "officer of the court" applies to agents licensed or recognized by the government to perform certain duties essential to the justice sector's operations. In addition to private attorneys, it may include notaries, officials handling execution of civil judgments (e.g. auctioneers and those charged with putting a value on seized assets), private bailiffs (the huissiers), those charged with receivership of companies in reorganization, expert witnesses, etc. 52 Corruption in African Justice Systems Table 2: Entry Points for Corruption in the Justice Sector1 System Officers of the Organization Public/Public Public/Private2 Court/Private Passage of laws Political actors collude to ensure shaping Sector rules increase their control over Operations personnel decisions and other internal operations Political actors collude to shape Bribes or other consid- rules to guarantee favorable erations to executive outcomes for selected groups and parliament to secure most favorable legal framework Political actors collude to increase their immunity from legal actions Development, Political and governmental actors Bribes to executive and passage of sector include earmarks for unnecessary parliament to insert budgets services and facilities for their own earmarks intended for benefit or that of protégés specific providers of goods and services Political trade-offs or favoritism to locate service units to favor certain groups Salaries for classes of actors (or even individuals) set on basis of favoritism, political trade-offs Human resource Selection of judges, prosecutors, Selection of judges, Management public defenders, police and their prosecutors, defend- staff--merit component reduced ers, police and their by directed selection; nepotism, staff--non-merit, based political contacts, or selection on bribes, exchange of group chooses to create own favors, or networks of internal networks influence Assignment of personnel to posi- External patron buys tions and promotions--based or otherwise influences on favoritism, political contacts, decisions political intervention, bribes or promises of future favors (continued on next page) CHAPTEr 5 1 Table 2 contains a separate column for officers of the court to account for the fact that their interests do not necessarily coincide with those of their clients (or with the public officials for whom they may also conduct some functions--e.g. enforcement of judgments) 2 Private here should be understood as private companies, individual citizens or NGOs. The role of private companies in the justice sector is not significantly different from that of other actors, and thus has not been singled out (the principal exception being contracts or procurement, which is not included here). 53 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Table 2: Entry Points for Corruption in the Justice Sector1 (continued) System Officers of the Organization Public/Public Public/Private2 Court/Private Disciplinary system--used to pun- External patron buys ish those resisting pressures and or otherwise influences bribes and to reward those who decisions acquiesce Where public sector Government accredited oversees private bar bar associations manage performance and licens- discipline of own members ing of these and other to favor colleagues, ignore officers of the court, their misbehavior bribes or favoritism influences decisions Execution of Slush funds, diversion of funds to Bribes, kickbacks and budget nonofficial uses sweetheart contracts Manipulation of salaries, other Private "contributions" benefits to either reward or punish to augment salaries, staff improve benefits Management of Theft of equipment and materials Bribes, kickbacks on Non-financial or diversion to private purposes maintenance contracts resources Equipment and other resources distributed on basis of political clout, favoritism Management of Funds not turned over in full; Agreement between Officers of the court funds collected employees pocket some or all private party and official charged with collecting by courts to falsely record what fees do not turn them over is paid and split the to the courts difference Officers of the Criminal Justice Public/Public Public/Private Court/Private Detection of Political authorities or higher level Police take regular pay- Lawyer, in collusion with alleged crime officers direct police to ignore ments from those run- private party uses threat of ­ police (or complaint or undertake investi- ning criminal activities criminal complaint to extort prosecutor/ other gation and/or arrest "suspect" or ordinary businesses money, or force other ac- government without probable cause to ignore infractions tions of "probable suspect" authority) Solicitation/offer of bribe or other consid- erations to process or CHAPTEr 5 ignore complaint Solicitation/offer of bribe or other consid- erations to arrest or release suspect (continued on next page) 54 Corruption in African Justice Systems Table 2: Entry Points for Corruption in the Justice Sector1 (continued) Officers of the Criminal Justice Public/Public Public/Private Court/Private investigation of Political authorities or higher level Police or prosecutor-- Lawyers, other court crime and pre- officers direct police to falsify or solicitation or offer of experts, falsify or retain evi- trial procedures ignore evidence bribe or other consid- dence to aid principal client (police/ eration to falsify/hide or as means of extorting prosecutor) evidence money from other party Political authorities or higher level Bribes or other consider- officers direct prosecutor to file or ation to prosecution to not file charges drop or reduce charges Political or agency Purchases of false testi- pressures on potential mony by civilian or expert witnesses to not come witnesses forward Assignment system manipulated Bribes or other consider- Multiple filing of cases--so to ensure the "right" judge (pros- ations to influence how that the most "favorable" ecutor or investigator) will handle cases are assigned judge is assigned the case Arraignment or equivalent--politi- Bribes or other consider- Lawyer asks client for mon- cal pressures on prosecutor/judge ation to affect decisions ey "to pay off the judge to request/require pretrial deten- on pre-trial detention or prosecutor" although tion, refuse bail, or set bail higher and bail pocketing the funds or lower than necessary Public defender solicits "Pro bono" defender solic- fees from defendant its fees from client Political instructions to judge, pros- Bribes or other consider- ecutor, defense lawyer to speed up ations re scheduling or slow down proceedings of events to rush, slow down Political or higher level pressures Bribes or other consider- on judge or others regarding deci- ations affecting motions sions on evidence, etc. to eliminate evidence, witnesses, dismiss parts of complaint Trial and appeal Political or higher judicial authori- Sale of judgment or Bribing of or threats to ties direct judge how to rule other preferential witnesses treatment Instructions to public defense law- Negotiation to delay Private defense attorney CHAPTEr 5 yers to purposely mishandle case or accelerate issuance accepts bribes to mishandle of written opinion (this case may be delayed for a good time). (continued on next page) 55 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Table 2: Entry Points for Corruption in the Justice Sector1 (continued) Officers of the Criminal Justice Public/Public Public/Private Court/Private Staff accepts bribe to Lawyer solicits money from show judgment to par- client to bribe any of actors, ties (or to offer to sell but keeps the funds an outcome, already determined by judge) Political authorities or higher level Negotiation (bribes, officers direct judges to accept or other offers, traffick- not accept appeal and/or direct ing of influence) over ruling license to appeal and appellate decision Enforcement of Political authorities or higher Bribes to arrange early Lawyers collect payment judgment judicial leaders direct whether and release or non-incarcer- from clients to obtain favor- how enforcement will be effected ation. Same with any able treatment, but pocket payment of damages the funds Officers of the Civil Justice Public/Public Public/Private Court/Private Filing of claim Any of the actions in Public/Private Bribes offered to or Lawyer accepts bribe from and pre-trial column directed by those higher in solicited by court staff other party to mishandle stages hierarchy or by political authorities or other consideration case; or lawyer accepts fees to accept and process from both parties claim Bribes offered to/ Lawyer solicits money from solicited by process client to bribe judge or staff, servers for non-service, and pockets the money faster service, false service, etc. Bribes offered to or Lawyer encourages client to solicited by court take a case to court he/she staff for faster/slower is bound to lose scheduling of events or for misplacement of case file Bribes offered to/ Lawyer adds unnecessary solicited by judge for motions, appeals to be able handling of pre-trial to charge more to client motions Bribes offered to/ CHAPTEr 5 solicited by court staff/ judges for losing case files or other documents (continued on next page) 56 Corruption in African Justice Systems Table 2: Entry Points for Corruption in the Justice Sector1 (continued) Officers of the Civil Justice Public/Public Public/Private Court/Private Bribes offered to/ solicited by court staff for access to judicial decisions Trial and Appeal Higher authorities or political elites Bribes offered to/ Lawyer accepts bribe from Stage direct judgment and/or license to solicited by judges for other party to mishandle appeal favorable judgment (or case to higher level judges on appeal) Enforcement Where judgment is against gov- Negotiations with Under or over-valuation of stage ernment agency, the latter ignores judge or bailiff or other assets by court appointed judicial orders to pay or take other parties so that enforce- experts. In case of public action ment does not occur auction, collusion among public agents to manipulate price, take over asset at reduced price, or arrange- ments with private party to sell for low bid. removing certain facilitating circumstances, while systemic corruption will likely require more substantial reforms). There are three key structural characteristics that are highlighted in the literature on corruption in justice sector institutions: (i) the level of institutionalization of corruption, (ii) its linkage to organized networks, and (iii) its response to vertical chains of command. Opportunistic corruption is usually characterized by having low levels of institutionalization, few linkages to organized networks, and little responsiveness to vertical chains of command. The opposite can be said of more entrenched forms of corruption. Highly corrupt systems often feature the characteristics listed in the right-hand column of Table 3, while less corrupt systems reflect the attributes in the left-hand column. The specific structural characteristics of corruption in a country are linked to a variety of factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to the justice system. For example, weak internal oversight mechanisms are often linked to high levels of opportunistic corruption. The Bank's CHAPTEr 5 Capacity Building for Judicial Services Project in Liberia is one example of a project aimed at strengthening the internal oversight capacity of the judiciary by providing technical assistance in monitoring, investigating, and sanctioning judicial corruption. 57 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Table 3: Structural Characteristics of Organizational Corruption Structural characteristics Low High level of Corruption is incidental to system workings-- Corruption is central to system institutionalization systems can function without corruption, and workings because of intentionally corruption instead becomes a way of tilting perverse design, intrusion of other the playing field in favor of those willing to values and agendas or as a way of pay. Case of many OECD countries, including compensating for rigid rules and an incident in the US state of Pennsylvania insufficient capacity (but at the same involving two judges who allegedly took time a disincentive to fixing these payments from owners of private detention structural constraints). Often occurs centers to assign juveniles to them. where budgets are inadequate, staff is severely underpaid, and work- loads are excessive to the point that bribes and other favors are seen as a "reasonable fee for services." level of organization Corruption is individualized--based on sus- Corruption is based on organiza- ceptibility of single officials to accept bribes tional networks often involving vari- or other considerations in return for favorable ous types of officials, although not treatment. necessarily controlled from the top. level of top-down Corruption does not involve vertical chains of Corruption is vertically controlled-- control command--whether organized or not, it is usually entails some level of internal based on individual willingness to partici- coordination (e.g. Montesinos pate and thus frequently occurs without the networks in Peru), but may simply knowledge of an immediate superior. involve intervention of higher official in work of a subordinate. Interference by political elites is a good example of an exogenous factor that can result in corrupt practices in the justice sector. In such a situation, it may be necessary to create an independent anti-corruption commission that can operate free of political influence. The Bank and other donors adopted this approach in Cameroon, where support was provided to create CONAC, an anti-corruption commission that monitored complaints of corruption and tracked government progress on implementing a national anti-corruption plan34. The Political Economy of Corruption Designing effective anti-corruption interventions requires not only an awareness of the structural characteristics of corruption, but also an understanding of why corruption manifests CHAPTEr 5 34 Despite some advances, CONAC's dependence on the President's Office and budgetary limita- tions posed serious obstacles on the transmission of cases, except for grave corruption cases (which were not clearly defined) and which CONAC could refer directly to the Ministry of Justice. However, CONAC could not refer cases to the judiciary directly. 58 Corruption in African Justice Systems itself in a variety of ways in different countries. To this end, task teams should engage in political economy analysis to examine the underlying causes of corruption within the context of a specific country. For example, the salaries and discretionary power of justice sector staff are often highlighted as potential drivers of corruption, and could provide entry points for anti- corruption interventions. Employees within the justice sector generally exercise considerable discretion in their daily work, ranging from policemen deciding whether to apprehend a suspect, to judges determining the appropriate sentence for a crime. Unsurprisingly, the broad discretionary authority enjoyed by many employees within the justice sector provides fertile ground for corruption. While there are mechanisms for checking the abuse of discretionary power, these need to be balanced against the countervailing harm of reducing the legitimate exercise of discretion (e.g. reviewing every decision by a judge or requiring prosecutors to always press charges can lead to tremendous inefficiency). Targeted reforms that enhance the transparency and accountability framework of the justice sector can help ensure the appropriate exercise of discretion and reduce the opportunity for corruption. Some possible reforms include: · Establishing effective performance monitoring systems; · Publicizing judgments and information on appointments of judges and staff, statistics on workloads and case processing, and budgets; · Creating an effective complaints system; · Fostering an active, independent private bar and other civil society associations that can monitor justice sector performance; and, · Establishing a transparent, predictable, merit-based process for recruiting, evaluating, transferring, promoting and disciplining personnel. Another factor that may contribute to corruption is the salaries of justice sector employees. Conventional wisdom suggests that if salaries are too low it will provide an incentive for corrupt activities. Although the inadequacy of salaries is a universal complaint among justice sector staff and professionals, the causal link to corruption is not as straightforward as one might think. In fact, the link between salaries and the prevalence of corruption is really only visible at the margins (i.e. in cases of very low or high salaries). For example, judges in both Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) during the 1990s were earning only US$15 a month, which forced many of them to find other jobs or engage in corrupt practices to supplement their income. However, a similar susceptibility to corruption may arise when judges are paid exceedingly high salaries since this may create a perception if not an actual sense of indebtedness (and expectation) by the government. CHAPTEr 5 Of particular importance to a political economy analysis of the justice sector is the relationship between the judiciary's role as a service provider, and its potential use as a vehicle for exercising political power. Table 4 summarizes this relationship and provides a framework for classifying 59 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned types of corruption based on the extent of political influence within the judiciary and the emphasis placed on judicial efficacy. Generally, the most corrupt systems are those with a low emphasis on efficacy (heavily shaded in Table 4). When there is also a direct interest by political elites in asserting control over the courts, it is likely that corruption will be systematically orchestrated from the top. In countries where there is both an emphasis on judicial efficacy and a high degree of political control over justice sector institutions, corruption will usually be limited to cases of "political interest". Where neither factor is emphasized, corruption may reach high levels, but will largely be opportunistic (as opposed to systematically orchestrated by political elites). Many countries in Africa (and elsewhere) can be placed in the low efficacy-high political control quadrant. The justice sector in these countries is seen by many as a means for harassing the opposition, protecting one's own interests, rewarding followers (with jobs, rent-seeking opportunities, and favorable judgments), lining one's own pockets, and financing political campaigns. In seeking to mediate the impact of corruption through the creation of an effective accountability system, some general statements appear relevant: · Where interest in judicial efficacy is low, accountability systems will not be of interest and corruption of one sort or another is likely to flourish. However, it is also likely to occur outside government control or even with direct knowledge of government. · Interest in efficacy is usually a strong motive among users, but occasionally governments may adopt it as their own cause--Singapore and Ethiopia are two examples, with Ethiopia also demonstrating its adoption by the judiciary itself. · Where interest in the judiciary's internal political control function is high, accountability systems are likely to be installed with an intent to "control" or at best be tolerated from the top. "Tolerating corruption" can be extremely useful to a government, as it provides a way to exercise pressure on both private and public actors. Table 4: Political Priorities vis-à-vis Justice Sector Outputs Judicial efficacy Political control low Medium High CHAPTEr 5 low Haiti Guatemala, Nigeria Cambodia, Kenya Medium Ghana, Tanzania Mexico, Argentina, Peru (under Fujimori Eastern Europe, Ethiopia regime) High Western Europe, US, Spain Singapore South Africa 60 Corruption in African Justice Systems · Where both efficacy and control are valued, corruption will be diminished and what occurs will usually be known to, and probably controlled from the top. · Countries can move from one quadrant to another depending on the overall political situation. Prior to (and possibly after) the Fujimori regime in Peru, political elites' interest in efficiency remained moderate, but their ability to assert political control was lower, meaning that corruption was of a different type (more spontaneous and less controlled from above). · The low-low countries arguably have the highest level of corruption, but one in which government involvement is not systematic. Corruption in these countries tends to arise in an ad hoc, opportunistic manner. methods for Combating Corruption in African Justice Systems By adopting the analytical approach discussed in this chapter (and illustrated in Tables 2­4), it is possible to begin to identify: (i) the potential entry points for corruption in the justice sector, (ii) the structural organization of corruption, and (iii) the political economy factors underlying corruption in a particular country. In doing so, we can categorize African countries based on the nature of corruption in their justice sectors and begin to develop appropriate interventions. Category 1: Countries with High Levels of Sporadic, unorganized Corruption due to Lack of Oversight mechanisms and general disorder These are countries where corruption is largely a function of a lack of oversight and accountability (often characteristics found in conflict prone and fragile states). The priority for this group of countries is to establish mechanisms to control for overall performance. Some measures to achieve this include: a. Establishing basic (manual or where possible, automated) case management systems capable of recording new cases, key events, and tracking case life cycles. Case assignment should also be based on explicit and transparent criteria. b. Improving systems for selecting judges, court staff, and other justice sector personnel (i.e. more transparent hiring processes with explicit criteria). c. Reducing discretion in the transfer, promotion, and punishment of justice sector personnel CHAPTEr 5 by implementing transparent criteria (this will help depoliticize employment in the justice sector). d. Creating systems for objectively evaluating individual performance (e.g. based on time and attendance; work performed; and complaints from staff or system users). 61 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned e. Increasing capacity of justice sector liberia institutions to understand performance statistics, develop and execute budgets, Like much of the country, the judicial system is in and manage human resources. dire need of reconstruction. Liberia's Constitution f. Enhancing training and oversight of provides for an Anglo-American legal system with a courtroom staff to minimize opportunities formal separation of powers. Also, there exists only a for corruption. Even basic measures like limited understanding of the principles of transparency improving filing systems (e.g. Ethiopia's and accountability in Liberian society, with little adoption of a "color-coded" filing system), knowledge of contemporary notions of human rights or due process. The judicial system suffers from limited assigning case numbers, and maintaining access to legal aid or public defender services, and a record of possession for case files unconscionable delays, often attributable to corruption. can significantly reduce opportunistic The former regime of Charles Taylor withheld salaries corruption. from judges, prosecutors, court staff, and other justice g. Careful monitoring of procedural sector officials for a number of years. Judgments, like mechanisms that can be used to freedom from arbitrary detention, are often sold to the highest bidder, and judicial corruption is still seen as a frivolously delay judicial processes, such significant obstacle to accessing justice. The LICUS grant as adjournments and appeals. for capacity building is working with several justice h. Strengthening cooperation with the sector actors to fulfil their oversight role, including the private bar (e.g. establishing standards of Judiciary (judges and lower level magistrates), the Louis performance). Arthur Grimes School of Law and a younger generation of lawyers, and the Bar Association, representing the interests of a growing (and increasingly demanding) Category 2: Countries private sector for efficient and transparent dispute resolution, particularly in commercial cases. with High Levels of Corruption Based on the government's use of the Courts to maintain Power Many African countries fall within this category, and the challenge is to design remedies in the face of political elites who have a vested interest in maintaining control by resisting reform. Reducing petty corruption (e.g. solicitation of bribes by court staff to "lose" files) may be easier to accomplish since such corruption is rarely central to elite control. Donor interventions in Category 2 countries could include: a. Strengthening judicial independence (e.g. guaranteed tenure; transparent, merit-based criteria for selection, transfers, and promotion; use of public consultations to assess candidates; elimination of "provisional" appointees). CHAPTEr 5 b. Strengthening legal framework regarding prohibition of certain activities (e.g. ex parte conversations, party affiliations and activities, payments to appointing party, nepotism, sitting on a case where one has a financial or other interest, etc). c. Establishing a system to randomly assign cases. 62 Corruption in African Justice Systems d. Creating an independent investigative Kenya body to hear complaints on judicial behavior. While a number of African countries have established e. Publicizing judgments, performance anti-corruption agencies or have bolstered offices within statistics, budgets, and information on existing ministries in response to the UN Convention appointments, transfers and promotions Against Corruption (UNCAC), the value of transparency (including, where applicable, a ranking of and associated operational accountability has too candidates). often remained a low priority. In 2004, the Kenya Anti- f. Extending similar reform measures to Corruption Commission (KACC) was established as a single-agency model but which lacked the power police, public prosecution, and public to prosecute cases. Although it can litigate to recover defense. assets through the civil courts, it is required to refer its g. Supporting independent bar associations criminal investigation reports to the Attorney General with the ability to hear complaints about who has sole power to initiate high-level prosecutions members and publicize the results of in Kenya. Nonetheless, the KACC compares quite investigations. favorable by international standards insofar its public reporting activities in terms of detail, timeliness and accuracy. The type of information that the KACC reports Most of these measures are not inherently on include the following: (i) annual report; (ii) cases costly in financial terms, but getting a country under investigation; (iii) recovery of public assets; (iv) to commit to them can be extremely difficult. corruption surveys; and (v) quarterly litigation reports. Dialogue with younger judges, reform- The KACC was originally headed by a former justice minded political authorities, and donors can and helped to establish a high level of operational transparency despite practical obstacles. help prioritize reforms and rally support. Category 3: Countries with Lower Levels of Corruption or a mixture of Corruption and inefficiency Countries in Category 3 are characterized by corruption that is generally the result of an absence of adequate oversight by judicial authorities. The incidence of corruption in Category 3 countries is also usually lower than in Category 1 and 2 countries35. Since many problems attributed to corruption could also be a result of incompetence or inefficiency, the following measures are aimed at both increasing oversight and enhancing efficiency: a. Using existing performance statistics to track adjournments, appeals, and other potentially dilatory practices. b. Setting quotas for courtroom/judge productivity. CHAPTEr 5 35 The steps outlined above should be regarded as cumulative--that is to say by the time a coun- try can be classified as a Category 3 country, it should have already adopted the steps outlined for Category 1 and 2 countries. 63 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned c. Emphasizing evaluation of judicial Ghana performance by an independent body (within the judiciary or outside) and the One innovative approach to reducing bribery has been publication of the results. to establish a functioning commercial bank on the d. Developing user committees to work premises of the Judicial Service of Ghana. The bank was with individual courts in improving installed after negotiations with the Central Bank of performance (see Walsh, 2010). Ghana to receive user fees and court revenues; thus, no e. Supporting public education on judicial judicial officer has a need to touch money, cutting down corruption (e.g. why it is important, how drastically on bribes. This initiative was entirely funded by the Government of Ghana itself. to present complaints, etc.). f. Improving complaints offices (e.g. Judiciary and Elections: Her Ladyship the Chief decentralizing complaint intake Justice of Ghana established Electoral Courts for the mechanism; ensuring adequate staffing December 2008 elections (she declared certain courts and standard hours; providing assistance as electoral courts; cleared backlog and had them in filing complaints and following-up up and running by the elections since the Judiciary had been traditionally accused of "dragging its feet" on complaints; and creating automated to resolve election disputes or even colluding with databases to register cases and results). political parties). g. Training bar associations and CSOs to monitor judicial performance. h. Supporting bar associations in cooperating with users and CSOs to monitor the performance of members. Conclusions Despite the anti-corruption themes incorporated in the GAC Strategy, Bank legal and justice work has for the most part placed little emphasis on anti-corruption efforts in the justice sector. This omission is particularly noteworthy given the negative public perceptions of the justice sector in most African countries. Adding anti-corruption elements is a delicate task, but it can be done by stressing either the need to alter possibly erroneous public impressions or to use performance improvement mechanisms that will also reduce corruption (e.g. better filing systems, merit-based human resource management, improved monitoring and evaluation, etc.). Especially in the criminal justice area, where multiple organizations are involved, using one agency to convince others is also a tactic to consider; for example, public defenders or judges can, through their own actions, help to counter inappropriate behavior by prosecutors and police by challenging the results in court. In sum, the Bank and other development partners should be aware of the manifestations of corruption within the justice sector, the forms they take, their causes, and their CHAPTEr 5 effects. 64 CHAPTEr 6 indicators introduction Indicators have become an increasingly important component of rule of law (ROL) projects over the past decade. Their usefulness lies in the fact that, broadly speaking, indicators make it possible to measure performance and track changes as programs are implemented. Tracking indicators allows client countries and development partners to demonstrate achievement and refine project objectives and operations in response to the data collected. Some countries have begun to develop their own indicators, as have various regional and international organizations and NGOs. While the use of indicators is growing, there is still a good deal of confusion about what an indicator is, how it is developed, and what distinguishes a useful indicator from a poor one. This chapter will start by exploring some basic concepts, including a further discussion on the importance of developing and using indicators. It will then give practical advice on how to design indicators, challenges to consider when doing so, and how to use indicators in an actual ROL project. what is an indicator? An indicator is an observation used to measure the presence of or changes in some larger, more abstract concept. Indicators stand in for things that we cannot actually observe or quantify (i.e. whether or not a country operates according to the rule of law). An indicator does not need to be quantitative, but it should be measurable in some way since it is designed to represent something that it is not. At the same time, not all quantitative measures (i.e. statistics) are indicators--a number is just a number until it is assessed in the context of the larger concept. Since rule of law is not itself observable, program and partner staff look for things that they can observe or measure, which may help to indicate how well the rule of law is respected, such as the number of judges, how many crimes are reported to the police, conviction and acquittal rates, and how often the government loses cases. "Diagnosing" the presence or deficiencies in the rule of law is not like diagnosing a disease-- there are no microbes to look for under the microscope. Instead, this diagnosis requires creativity and a clear understanding about what it would look like if the rule of law was perfectly observed. 65 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned This may mean that there are a certain number of judges per inhabitant, conviction rates reach a certain level, or that most cases are resolved within 18 months of being filed. Although none of these can actually tell us whether or not the rule of law exists, they are useful indicators of its presence. All indicators (and indices) are in this sense "proxies" or representations that we substitute for a concept we cannot measure directly. Using an index The most interesting concepts can rarely be adequately reflected with one indicator (thus, using the number of judges/100,000 inhabitants would strike few people as an adequate representation of access to justice). This has led to the development of indices, or indicators grouped together and statistically manipulated to develop a single measure. Well-known examples used in governance and rule of law activities include the corruption perception index of Transparency International, Global Integrity's various indices of governance, and the WBI governance indicators. In all three cases, single indicators have been combined to develop composite measures. In the case of Global Integrity, the scores assigned to each indicator are averaged. In November 2009, the World Justice Project (WJP) of the American Bar Association released a preliminary Rule of Law Index Report, which measures 35 countries against 16 factors and 68 sub- factors. The compilers suggest that it is the first index to treat ROL as a comprehensive subject, rather than focusing (as in the case of the indexes mentioned above) on particular aspects of the ROL. The index may be particularly useful as a starting point for developing indicators and indices to measure the effectiveness of any ROL project, as well as serve as a useful tool for pinpointing the types of areas in need of reform. The WJP plans to expand the index to cover 100 countries by the end of 2011. The data used is collected in two ways: general population polls taken in at least three cities (which may skew results where there are particularly large non-urban populations, as in most places in SSA) and surveys completed by in-country practitioners and academics. It is available from the World Justice Project's website: http://www.worldjusticeproject. org/rule-of-law-index/. Also participating in the WJP are the Vera Institute (http://www.vera.org/ project/un-rule-law) and the United Nations (see UN Rule of Law Unit). For indicators specific to ROL in fragile and post-conflict situations, the US Institute of Peace offers another source of support, as do private foundations such as the Open Society Institute (OSI) working in countries such as Sierra Leone, Kenya and Liberia. While several donors financing ROL projects in SSA have developed indicators specific to the CHAPTEr 6 projects, many of these are based on the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) indicators more broadly. Composed of experts from all of the member States of the Council of Europe, CEPEJ's tasks include identifying difficulties facing judicial systems in general, defining concrete ways of improving the functions of judicial systems, and evaluating their results 66 Indicators Example: indices of Judicial independence Indices are most often used because the concept that is being measured is too complex to be evaluated with just a single measure or because doing so is not feasible. Judicial independence is an example from the first category. Although there are many different definitions of judicial independence, most observers would agree that two essential elements include judges who make decisions in accord with the law and without any other pressures or influences. However, these two characteristics do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis and are difficult to measure, so those interested in judicial independence have come up with a series of indicators or proxies for the underlying concept. These include: · Judicial salaries are sufficient to attract and retain qualified judges · Judges are appointed for fixed terms or for life · Cases are assigned to judges by an objective method (e.g. lottery) and judges may only recuse themselves for good cause · Judicial decisions are based only on the law and facts and are made without undue influence from senior judges, private actors, or other branches of government. (Source: American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative, Judicial Reform Index) Some organizations have developed entire checklists to evaluate judicial independence, but thus far, no one has designed indicators or indices that have been broadly adopted. The longer the checklist, the more problems it poses in creating a composite score, but shorter lists often bring the criticism that they have overlooked important dimensions. When creating an index, it is important to balance these two considerations: collecting the data should be a manageable task, but the index should be comprehensive enough to be truly useful as an evaluation tool. for general consumption (www.coe.int/cepej). Finally, the Bank's Law and Institutions website also has information on indicators as well as references to specific resources on monitoring and evaluation in the ROL sector. As noted below, in designing indicators task teams should work with counterparts to facilitate their utility, be they specific to a development objective (which promoting the ROL would support), or a component and/or activity. At the end of the day, a project's evaluation will rest not only on how well the indicators were designed to measure the activities, but also on how realistic they were with regard to the capacity of justice sector institutions to be able to achieve them. designing indicators CHAPTEr 6 Criteria Any proposed indicator or list of indicators should be evaluated according to three criteria: reliability, validity, and costs. 67 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Reliability refers to the likelihood that similar events or circumstances will receive the same scores, over time or across countries. Qualitative indicators (often used to measure levels of corruption, delay, and citizen security), requiring subjective assessments often face problems here because different evaluators may assess them differently depending on their own biases, experience, or interpretation of the question. For example, experts more attuned to business interests frequently rank countries quite differently than those more interested in human rights, and local experts may assess conditions differently than foreign evaluators. However, quantitative indicators face comparable problems--data sets may be compiled differently in different countries (i.e. what counts as a "case" or a "judge" in one country may not count the same as in another), and even in the same country over time. Validity refers to whether an indicator actually measures what it was designed to illustrate. An initial problem here may lie in differences among experts as to the definition of the underlying concept and which aspects of a multi-dimensional definition merit most emphasis. Many concepts central to justice reform programs may be ideologically inclined and definitions may depend on where one sits on the political spectrum, a factor which will require a delicate balance when designing indicators. However, even among those agreeing on a definition, the choice of indicators and the data collected can be fraught with problems. The data collected may be tarnished: for example, public opinion polls used to assess the "quality of justice" are easily swayed by recent events and can reflect a crisis, rather than the situation over the long-term. Sometimes it is unclear whether the data actually represents a positive or a negative situation: a high conviction rate may indicate the efficiency of a criminal justice system or simply its susceptibility to political pressures and corruption. Or, the data may not represent reality: evaluating the way a judicial system is established in law or on paper may have little bearing on how the courts actually Project indicator Design Process ­ a Snapshot 1. Decide, in consultation with local stakeholders, what will be assessed, usually as part of a larger discussion about the goals of the project or of ROL reform in a country. 2. Decide what the assessed criteria will look like when it is achieved. 3. Create a list of indicators that will allow project participants to measure progress toward these outcomes. 4. Evaluate proposed indicators according to criteria: reliability, validity, and cost and availability. 5. Revise indicators. CHAPTEr 6 6. Train data collectors 7. Collect data, with constant monitoring to assure reliability, validity, practicality and take corrective action, if necessary. 8. Evaluate results, always asking whether there are alternative explanations for the data collected and asking whether these results comply with common sense. 68 Indicators function. Most debates relating to indicators tend to center on the question of whether they provide an accurate measure at all. Finally, cost and availability are practical considerations, but ones that are often overlooked. Project designers may develop what appears to be a reasonable set of indicators only to discover that the data are not available. Efforts to develop indices for cross-national comparison often face similar obstacles. While those developing indices may be working on countries where the data are easily obtained, others are not. When the cost of tracking indicators begins to rise considerably, it may be necessary to settle for some less perfect alternatives. Overcoming challenges in designing indicators Several challenges can be overcome when developing indicators for projects or for cross-country comparisons: · Make indicators as specific as possible and narrowly define their application. By ensuring that an indicator and the data that is to be collected are defined in detail, the validity and reliability of the indicator will be increased. For example, "compliance" with various international conventions is often used as an indicator. But the degree of "compliance" is a usually a subjective assessment, especially given that conventions are often vague and may not be applicable or relevant in a specific context, or contain circular definitions that do not provide guidance to develop assessable indicators (e.g. "an independent judiciary is one that does not suffer interference with judicial decisions"). In other words, it becomes difficult to determine whether compliance is occurring without narrowly defined indicators. · Alternative interpretations should always be considered for any data collected. Given any set of data, analysts need to be sensitive to the idea that its interpretation may be more complex than at first glance. Alternative explanations should be considered for any data set. For example, experts tend to agree that a good legal appeals system should have a low number of appeals, with a 50 percent (or below) rate of overturning the lower courts. But, even in a country that appears to achieve this standard, it is easy to imagine less positive explanations for the pattern (e.g. the appeals courts are understaffed, which severely limits the number of cases they can hear, or cases are overturned because the appeals court always rules in favor of the government, regardless of the merits of the case). Data should also be "fact-checked" to see whether it appears to have some impact in reality. Using the size of judicial budgets or salaries as an indicator of judicial independence is a common example, even though a review quickly dispels the idea that the best paid judges, or the best financed courts, are automatically less likely to be swayed by outside influences. Thus in using data, CHAPTEr 6 analysts need to be sensitive to alternative interpretations and problems that may not be apparent at first glance. · Consider how indicators will be combined. If a project is using several different indicators, it is worth considering whether or not they will be combined into an index. Doing so may 69 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned make it easier to draw comparisons between various implementation areas (e.g. different courts or different cities), but indexes are not strictly required. They may not be any more useful than comparing the results for individual indicators, particularly as the more specific measurements can be much more useful in highlighting particularly areas of strength or weakness. Still, if indexes are going to be used, then a clear methodology needs to be established for the process of combining the results from each individual indicator. · Setting up a data collection system is an essential element in project design. Although it may be easy to create a list of indicators to measure a particular ROL impact, collecting the data may be nearly impossible, unless project designers consider the evaluation process in their initial project design and take the time to create data collection mechanisms. For example, new records management programs might be programmed to collect certain data in ways that would be almost impossible to do so after implementation. Or, a useful measurement might be public perception of the judicial sector, but this is only useful if a baseline rating is established before the project begins. Data collection should not wait until it is time to submit a report, but rather be planned and put in place as soon as the project is established. Types of indicators by use Indicators can be used for a variety of different purposes. In this section, three different types will be explored: · Indicators as a means of tracking progress in projects; · Indicators as a means of ranking the quality of countries' justice systems; · Indicators as a means of setting goals for individual country programs. Different indicators will be best suited to serving different purposes, so it is important that measurements are designed with the most relevant type of purpose in mind. The two user studies conducted in conjunction with this Note both found that most reforms, whether donor supported or country executed, lacked adequate indicators of their performance and in many cases did not track those that were first proposed. Projects should define the improvements they propose to achieve within their "lifetime" and the indicators to be used to measure them. They should also link those improvements to longer-term changes at the country level over time. Thus, at the project and country levels, developing and using indicators is essential. Project Level Indicators: ROL project-specific indicators, like all development projects, should CHAPTEr 6 start with clear objectives and have a defined means of measuring their progress with linkages to the long term. However, good project-linked indicators are likely to vary considerably, depending on the nature of the project; stakeholders involved; and local conditions. Most project-specific indicators only last for the life of a project and are inherently short-term in vision. There are a few 70 Indicators critical lessons as regards project-specific indicators, aside from the already discussed need for clear assessment (reliability), which should be linked as directly as possible to the objective that they are supposed to represent (validity). · When project-linked, indicators should also be tied to some longer term change, which may require different measures, or a different interpretation of the final objective. · Teams designing indicators should be aware that what appears as an improvement in one context may not be one in another. · Indicators should measure changes attainable within the life of a project--this may be the most difficult goal at times, particular for external evaluators to appreciate. One way of developing project indicators is to look at examples that have been used in other projects or "best practice" models and to tailor these to the specific needs of the project. The Developing Project indicators ­ Comparative Examples in Africa 1. indicators must reflect local conditions. The conviction rate for criminal cases in Ethiopia's federal courts is currently 30­33 percent. This is notably low, and the federal prosecutors are working on raising it to 50 percent, which would still be below a "usual" recommended rate of at least 75 percent. In contrast, both Japan and some Mexican states have conviction rates of 95 percent, although for different reasons. In Japan, this is believed to be because prosecutors only take to trial cases they are sure they can win. In Mexico, at least until recently, local observers believed it was because most cases are "negotiated" with the police or prosecutors and only those who cannot pay bribes (and probably don't even have a lawyer) are tried. Thus, while achieving a rate of 75 percent or better might be a recommended long-term goal, the very different situations of the three countries suggest both different immediate objectives and different means of getting there. For Ethiopia, 50 percent might be a reasonable five-year goal--with an emphasis on improving police investigation and prosecutors' handling of cases (since the low rate can be attributed to errors and inefficiency, with the possibility of some corruption). For Japan and Mexico, improvements to case handling would require other measures (and a probably lowering of rates over the short to medium run). Japanese prosecutors might be encouraged to be a little more daring, while in Mexico, the immediate goal would be to address police and prosecutorial corruption, with an unknown (though likely negative) impact on the rate of convictions. Developing indicators for these two situations would clearly be far more difficult than in Ethiopia and would probably involve more qualitative measures. 2. improving indicator-based performance should not add to the problem. In many African countries with a common law tradition, delays are enormous because of frequent and lengthy adjournments. Ethiopia has attacked this problem by having judges close cases after four adjournments and tracking (and evaluating judges on) the length of time allowed in each. However, this judicial practice is also partly responsible for the low conviction rates--and it has produced another perverse result. Defendants and their lawyers, knowing this judicial policy, try to augment CHAPTEr 6 adjournments so that the case is provisionally closed. Counting on the prosecutors' probable disinclination to reopen it, this has proved to be a good tactic for ending the criminal action. It may also stop some civil cases, where the party seeking remedy may simply not have the patience or energy to start all over. Ethiopia may consider relaxing the rule and focus on bringing more cases to judgment. However, a comparable if less strict policy on adjournments might be a good short term goal for countries like Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. 71 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Africa region (AFTRL) of the World Bank, for example, has developed a results-chain analysis framework which provides a concrete starting point for developing indicators and understanding how specific ROL reforms can contribute to the overall ROL goals. A copy of this chart is included in Annex I, although potential users should be aware that it is far more comprehensive than any particular project may be. It currently focuses on formal justice institutions and leaves out traditional mechanisms, not all indicators are developed to the same extent, data may or may not be available to measure some of the indicators. Also, the framework cannot reflect the sequencing choices that a task team may make with counterparts. The framework is not intended as a template for all projects, but rather as an example of how a project might be constructed, with proposed activities and inputs, and with proposed indicators of each. Country System Indicators are a useful tool for analyzing the effects of a program, but should be undertaken based on a longer time scale as compared to project indicators. When using a country system indicator, the research looks at aspects of the ROL on a national level, rather than how the ROL is affected in a particular community by a particular project. In some ways, it can be seen as the "total" of all the individual projects indicators. Since the effects of any one program will be diluted when the national "snapshot" is taken, progress on country system indicators will almost certainly be slow and gradual. Still, this is exactly the kind of trend that should appear when progress is sustainable. For a Bank TTL, the necessary first step to this process would involve discussion among those doing justice work, their local counterparts, and the overall Bank country team. These conversations should include a discussion of what the ROL "looks like" and seek to reach some agreement on the improvements to be sought. Since the process would have impacts on the Bank's country strategy, discussions with the Country Team about starting such a project would be a first priority. Depending on the level of other donor involvement, and especially when there are ongoing efforts at improving donor coordination, other donors would logically be involved. So far, this model has not been put into practice, but coordinating committees involving both donors and local officials have been organized in a number of countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Liberia). The use of country indicators is virtually untested in the justice sector. Still, such indicators could be extremely useful, especially given an emerging donor (and country) preference for SWAPs. Such indicators could help focus individual donor inputs and also ensure that multi-donor contributions were leading to some longer term improvements in service delivery. The obstacles, apart from counterpart resistance, are the difficulties in developing (and operationalizing) such indicators when baseline data are nearly absent and the procedures for collecting data CHAPTEr 6 are not easily established. Finally, it is worth clarifying that these indicators are not particularly appropriate to analyze the effectiveness and impact of quick dispersing loans, simply because significant and sustainable changes, the kind best measured with country indicators, are not achievable in a year or two. 72 Indicators Some Suggested Goals and indicators Might include the Following: · Reduction of delays in disposition of cases (or for police and prosecutors in the investigation and preparation of the case)--a decrease in X percent in the average disposition times, or X percent of cases disposed in 6 months or less. · Increases in number of cases processed by judges, prosecutors of police--increase of X percentage in average dispositions. · Increased access for poor clients--increase in percentage or number of poor defendants with legal representation; increase in number of cases among those likely to be filed by poor clients (e.g. unfair dismissal, child support, nonpayment of pensions) resolved by courts. · Decrease in sector corruption--increase or decreases (depending on situation of country) in number of complaints filed against allegedly corrupt sector actors. · Increase in judicial independence--average duration of a judge on the bench increases; more judges appointed using transparent selection criteria; more anti-government decisions made without judge subsequently resigning or being dismissed. · Reductions in number of adjournments and of time allowed for each one. · Reduction of appeals rates and movement toward a 50 percent rate for reversals on appeal. Indicators for Cross-Country Comparisons: Global and regional comparative indicators are the most difficult to develop, and experience shows that their use may not be accepted. Some of the concerns raised earlier are applicable here: for example, data collection and definitions of terms may differ significantly even between neighboring countries, undermining the accuracy of the comparisons. The biggest obstacle to developing cross-country indicators is the difficulty of reaching agreement on what a good justice system looks like or deciding on which values it should prioritize on a regional or global scale. Again, this is particularly difficult when there is significant disagreement on these questions even within countries, much less among countries. Over the last decade, producing a consensus on these issues has become more difficult. The Western model of justice is increasingly questioned and countries are beginning to propose their own answers for how systems should operate. Even with a substantial amount of implicit agreement on the major values--efficiency, access, and fairness--the means for measuring them are both underdeveloped and subject to debate. Cross country indicators, once developed and despite criticism, can have enormous utility as incentives to countries falling behind in the comparison. The use of the World Bank Institute's Governance Indicators by the US Government's Millennium Challenge Account (MCC) as a means of determining country eligibility for different grant programs has already convinced some countries to make improvements. It is also seen in the Ethiopian government's recent CHAPTEr 6 request to the World Bank for a multi-sector assessment of corruption as a means of contesting that country's low scores on many international indices. However, other low-ranking states have had the opposite reaction and have begun to protest that the measurement systems are either inaccurate or biased against them. These skeptics are often protesting the fact that they need to 73 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned know how to improve their systems (and not just the rankings) and existing frameworks are very helpful in that regard. Conclusions Although indicators may be explained in complex sociological terms, at their core, indicators are simply a way of being able to tell whether or not a project is accomplishing the goals that it is meant to achieve. Knowing whether or not a project is having a positive effect while in progress is extraordinarily useful because it allows TTLs and stakeholders to make adjustments as necessary rather than wishing they could have done something differently after the project is finished. Unfortunately, the use of indicators has not been consistent, largely because there is a great deal of confusion about how to create and use them effectively. The Bank has placed an increasing emphasis on the Results Chain Analysis as a method for developing indicators and, in combination with the World Justice Project's new Rule of Law Index, they both should provide a useful point for discussions for task teams with counterpart agencies. Finally, it is important that indicators be developed with a critical eye so that they are developed to be reliable, valid, and cost-effective, as well as tailored to local conditions. Annex I includes a sample Results Chain Analysis framework for a ROL project. CHAPTEr 6 74 Annexes 75 ANNExES Results Chain Analysis Framework for a ROL project Long Term Examples of Activities/ Outputs Short-Term Outcomes/Indicators Medium-Term Outcomes/Indicators Outcomes (Sector Goal) ANNEx i: 1.1.1 Construction of new courtrooms · # of new courtrooms constructed. 1.1.2 Creation of mobile or circuit courts · # of mobile or circuit courts created, by area 1.1.3 Creation of small claims 1.1 Improved Physical Access to Courts and other types of courts · # of small claims courts, etc. created. · Average distance to nearest court facility · Number of users of new courtrooms, mobile 76 1.1.4 Rehabilitation of court facilities for or circuit courts, small claims courts, etc. use by physically challenged individuals · # of courtrooms with facilities for physically challenged individuals. Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned 1.2.1 Establish legal framework to create new services · Draft and adopt law to create new services 1.2 Improved ability of the poor to use 1.2.2 Legal education of general public 1. Expanded Access to Justice judicial services · # of legal education public events held. · # of poor using judicial · Use of courts by targeted marginalized · # of people who participated in legal services (to be defined) groups education events. · Incidence of certain types of cases known to affect these groups: child support, unfair dismissals, small claims, 1.2.3 Strengthen Capacity etc. · % of targeted population who says · # of judges and staff recruited. they use or would use the courts · # of judges and staff trained. · # of interpreters/translators trained. · # of interpreters/translators hired. · # of public defenders, paralegals and legal educators hired 1.3.1 Establish mechanisms for Alternative Dispute Resolution · ADR mechanisms established. 1.3.2 Train staff in Mediation/Arbitration · # of staff trained in Mediation/Arbitration 1.3.3 Outreach & awareness-raising 1.3 Development of Alternative Dispute Improved Resolution mechanism Public Service · # people reached with awareness-raising events · # staff providing alternative dispute Delivery · # women trained in their legal rights resolution services (measured by · % of cases presented for ADR that are citizens 1.3.4 Establish strategic alliances with satisfactorily resolved scorecards, Bar & Bench (lawyers, judges, Traditional service delivery leaders), etc.) surveys...) · # strategic alliances established 1.3.5 Develop policies for incorporation of traditional justice · Policies implemented. 2.1.1 Develop Court Reporting Capacity 2.1 Speed and accuracy of oral hearings records production improved 77 · # of court reporters trained · % Court proceedings recorded. · % Summary judgments recorded. 2. Increasing Courts' Efficiency · % or number of courts with recording equipment installed and in use · Productivity (annual number of cases 2.2.1 Develop system for generating disposed per judge) management statistics at courtroom and · Time to dispose of cases court system level · Number of pending cases (carried over · System to oversee productivity created. from prior year) · Productivity benchmarks set. 2.2 Improved Courtroom Management · Clearance rate (per court or for system) · Aggregate statistics produced and analyzed by higher level management. · # of courts producing statistics on workload and workflow 2.2.3 Develop Courtroom Management Capacity · # of courtroom staff/judges/higher level managers trained in use of courtroom management system · % of courtroom staff/judges/higher level managers applying training to on-going work Annexes (continued on next page) ANNExES ANNExES Results Chain Analysis Framework for a ROL project (continued) Long Term Examples of Activities/ Outputs Short-Term Outcomes/Indicators Medium-Term Outcomes/Indicators Outcomes (Sector Goal) 3.1.1 Introduce assets declarations by judges. · % of judges submitting. 3.1.2 Create/strengthen judicial inspection unit or nonjudicial investigative body to review complaints. · # of complaints received and investigated. 3.1.3 Introduce random case assignment 3.1 Elimination of any common types of system. corruption. 78 · % of cases assigned by random mechanism. · Ratings on public opinion polls. · International ranking on indices of corruption. 3.1.4 Improve filing system to eliminate "lost" files. · System introduced. Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned · Time to locate files. · # of "misplaced" files. 3.1.5 Strengthen legal framework on corrupt activities · Ethics code/law developed. Or · Existing framework clarified to prohibit corrupt actions and increase sanctions. 3.2.1 Publish Judgments (on Internet or on paper). · Judgments are published. 3.2.2 Establish program to provide judges 3.2 Increased uniformity in judgments 3. Improved quality of judicial with laws, jurisprudence, outcomes of (i.e. like cases get like responses). outputs leading cases · Variation in outcomes based on review of random · Ratings in public opinion polls on · % (#) of judges who received documents on sample of common cases (debt collection, child confidence in judicial integrity. line or on paper (how to measure?). · support, damage awards in traffic accidents). Rate of overturns on appeals. 3.2.3 Establish judicial commissions to review areas of inconsistent judgments. · Commissions set up and functioning. 3.2.4 Train judges in areas of inconsistent application of laws. · % (#) of judges trained. 3.3.1 Develop merit-based selection criteria · Criteria developed, published and implemented. 3.3.2 Develop procedures to publicize selections and names of candidates. · % of new openings (including for promotions) advertised. 3.3.3 Develop system to receive citizen 3.3 Merit-based, transparent personnel feedback on candidates. policies introduced · System introduced and functioning. · % of new judges hired and of promotions made based on transparent ranking system. 3.3.4 Strengthen security of judicial tenure. · % of provisional appointments 79 · Turnover on the bench · Legal framework strengthened to guarantee permanence in office (and in position) during good behavior Annexes ANNExES Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned ANNEx ii: Justice Sector Projects in the Africa region36 The World Bank began to address the problems facing justice systems within the Africa region beginning in the early 1980s. The region's justice sector first received Bank assistance with law reforms which then led to more comprehensive approach targeting financial and public sector management systems. Many of these Bank-financed reform programs entailed significant adjustments to legal and regulatory frameworks to facilitate economic development. One such example was a Bank grant to support regional integration of commercial and business laws under the auspices of Francophone Africa's OHADA (Organization for Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) Treaty. Legal and judicial reform has also played an important role in Poverty Reduction Support Credits in the region, and in anti-corruption initiatives. Throughout the Africa Region, grants have focused on the role of justice as a means of improving the lives of the poor and vulnerable, with activities to increase access to legal services, legal literacy, and to support the legal advancement of women. World Bank assistance included major components in investment and adjustment operations as well as grants. From 2003 to 2008, the World Bank financed US$309.2 million for rule of law activities in this region.37 Within this sphere of lending, the Bank has provided US$14.7 million in grants related to the justice sector and has also invested over US$111.0 million in project components. Benin Institutional Development Fund to Support the Empowerment of Women in Benin IDF Grant (TF No. 27574) for US$217,000; Approved: July 1997; Closed: December 1999 This IDF Grant was aimed at supporting Government and civil society efforts to promote greater women's participation in the debates and decision-making of the legal and judicial reform process. In particular, it sought to assist the Ministry for the Promotion of Women (Direction pour la Condition Féminine-DCF) to play an important role in the defining policies for mainstreaming gender in development programs. Some of the achievements under the Project include: (i) clarification of DCF's institutional role and mandate; (ii) increased capacity of DCF to collect, process and use data that affect the legal, economic, and societal status of women; (iii) progress in DCF's ability to coordinate its strategy and action plans for gender mainstreaming and women's advancement with key line Ministries; and (iv) increased outreach capacity of the Women Lawyers Association of Benin (Association des Femmes Juristes du Bénin ­ AFJB) to promote legal literacy. ANNExES 36 Annex II includes inputs from Task Team Leaders of justice sector projects in the Africa Region, compiled in the context of the Capacity Development Management Action Plan (CDMAP) Initiative from 2008 until 2010 and from Initiatives in Justice Reform, Legal Vice Presidency, World Bank, 2009. 37 World Bank, 2008. The World Bank Annual Report 2008: Year in Review, pg. 33. 80 Annexes Benin Judicial and Legal Reform Project PHRD Grant (TF No. 25939) for US$278,600; Approved: August 1999; Closed: July 2001 The Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) Grant was designed to provide technical assistance to the Republic of Benin in order to prepare a Legal and Judicial Reform Project to strengthen and modernize Benin's legal and judicial systems. The grant helped finance the completion of the Government's Strategic Plan for the development and modernization of its legal and judicial systems and with the preparation of an action plan to implement the strategic plan. Furthermore, the grant financed monitoring and supervision mechanisms, including the establishment of procedures to ensure effective aid coordination and productive working relationships between central Government institutions and departments and local government. Benin Poverty Reduction Support Credits Credit No. 3873-BJ for US$20.0 million (equivalent); Approved: March 2004; Closed: June 2005 Credit No. 4079-BJ for US$30.0 million (equivalent); Approved: June 2005; Closed: June 2006 Credit No.4214-BJ for US$30.0 million (equivalent); Approved: Nov. 2006; Closed: Dec. 2007 Credit No. 4339-BJ for US$40.0 million (equivalent); Approved: June 2007; Closed: June 2008 By 2003, the Government of Benin had been successful in sustaining steady economic growth while building a pluralist democracy for over a decade. Benin achieved remarkable progress in sustaining robust growth, which continued for many years after the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. It is in that context that the Government, together with its main development partners, decided to pursue and sustain a more poverty-focused growth strategy. The Bank approved three Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) during the 2004­2006 period. PRSC-1 incorporated actions designed to improve governance and public sector management, with a focus on budgeting and financial management. PRSC-2 included a component on civil service reform, decentralization, and strengthening of the legal and judiciary framework. The third component of PRSC-3 incorporated measures designed to ensure good governance and further enhance public sector management. These actions included moving forward with reforms to improve budget execution, accounting and procurement; strengthening the legal and judicial sector; deconcentration and decentralization; improving public administration; strengthening the capacity to monitor and evaluate poverty reduction; and promoting transparency and anti-corruption. PRSC-4 sought to put into place the pre-requisites for reform, including an information system ANNExES to generate data on the justice sector's principal indicators, carrying out an institutional audit of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and implementation of a monitoring and evaluation system in the Ministry. The credit also sought to improve the operational efficiency of the Judiciary and MoJ 81 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned by providing equipment for the MoJ and the courts and building capacity in the legal profession through strengthening of legal education. 40 additional judges and 30 greffiers were recruited in 2005, 2006 and 2007, a new law establishing the legal status of the greffiers was adopted and approximately 200 judges, greffiers and ministry staff followed professional training in 2005 and 2006. Finally, the fourth credit included activities to empower citizens to participate more fully in the reform process and to hold public institutions accountable through the establishment of a Legal and Judicial Information Center, and supported efforts of NGOs to inform people of their legal rights. Base line indicators were also identified and calculated for the sector, the Ministry's internal inspection services (IGSAM) was reinforced and financial and technical support was given to selected NGOs in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Benin Reinforcement of the Anti-Corruption Unit in the Presidency IDF Grant (TF No. 27206) for US$126,000; Approved: July 1998; Closed: July 2001 Benin was one of the six pilot countries chosen initially by Transparency International and the Global Coalition for Africa to launch a renewed fight against corruption in Africa. Benin, along with the five other pilot countries--namely, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda-- invited the Bank to send multidisciplinary teams to assess their anti-corruption programs and institutional settings as well as to suggest ways in which the World Bank could assist with strengthening their national anti-corruption efforts. This grant was one of the Bank's first undertakings in support of an anti-corruption agency. Benin sought the Bank's support in strengthening the country's anti-corruption bureau [La Cellule pour la Moralisation de la vie Publique CMVP]. This was the overall objective of the IDF grant, which comprised the following components: (a) clarification of the CMVP's operational mandate through public consultations and workshops; (b) provision of technical assistance to the CMVP to define its operational systems, organization, procedures, and job descriptions for its personnel as well as development of a two-year work program; (c) an information, education, and communication component to provide outreach on anti-corruption issues; (d) training and related study tours of other existing Anti-Corruption Bureaus throughout Africa. Benin Support for the Law against Female Genital Mutilation IDF Grant (TF No. 55876) for US$450,000; Approved: November 2005; Closed: November 2008 In March 2003, Benin's Parliament passed three laws to improve women's health in general and ANNExES their reproductive health in particular. These laws focused on: (i) banning harmful traditional practices in villages and health centers [Loi contre les mutilations génitales feminines]; (ii) providing open and affordable access to reproductive health counseling and commodities [Loi sur la santé 82 Annexes de la reproduction]; and (iii) according equal status to women in a couple's decision-making process and the right to refuse a polygamous relationship [le Code de la famille]. The grant has four main components: (a) the creation of a national dissemination plan, including local dissemination plans and translation of laws into local languages (Fon, Mina, and Yoruba); (b) capacity enhancement for ministerial Focal Points and for The Women Lawyers Association of Benin [Association des Femme Juristes du Bénin]; (c) female genital mutilation/circumcision and HIV/AIDS prevention activities; and (d) joint monitoring and evaluation activities, to be undertaken in conjunction with UNICEF. Burkina Faso Gender/Legal Literacy for Women Project IDF Grant (TF No. 27378) for US$268,000; Approved: January 2001; Closed: November 2003 The purpose of this grant was to support the Ministry of Promotion of Women (MPF) in establishing mutual working relationships with other actors in the field in order to maximize and sustain initiatives that advance the socioeconomic and legal status of women. The grant supported three main activities: (a) strengthening the capacity of the MPF, including producing gender- and law-related information and developing staff communication and management skills; (b) developing the Ministry of Promotion of Women's outreach capacity by enhancing alliances with national institutions and those organizations active in the promotion of the empowerment of women at the regional and provincial levels; and (c) supporting the Association of Women Jurists of Burkina Faso (AFJBF) in developing outreach materials for the grant's legal literacy and legal aid initiatives. Burundi Capacity Building to Sustain Gender-Responsive Legal Reform Initiatives IDF Grant (TF No. 52438) for US$458,000; Approved: July 2003; Closed: July 2007 This grant was designed to support institutional and capacity-building efforts in Burundi to promote gender-responsive legal reform and to improve legal literacy and access to legal aid services for the poor and socially vulnerable, particularly with respect to issues such as protection of property, succession, inheritance, reparation or compensation to victims of sexual offenses, and transmission of HIV/AIDs. The grant was composed of three main activities: (a) training staff in the Ministry of Social Action and the Advancement of Women (MASPF); (b) building partnerships between MAS/PF and civil society organizations, creating a Legal Action Plan for the elimination of gender-discriminatory 4 legislation, designing legal literacy and education initiatives, and ANNExES promoting access to basic legal services for the poor and socially vulnerable; and (c) developing outreach initiatives in order to serve the needs of local communities and facilitate the interaction between formal legal mechanisms and traditional customary practices. The institutional analysis 83 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned for the reorganization of the MASPF was completed and training in gender issues was carried out for key Ministry staff and members of the National Assembly. Follow-up Gender and Law training was carried for MASPF staff in April 2005. In addition, training on project design and management techniques was conducted and field-training took place in Senegal and Mauritania for selected MASPF staff and members of the Women Lawyers Association of Burundi (both in 2006). The Legal Aid Center in the Province of Gitega was established and equipment was also procured to support the commencement of legal aid activities. In addition, a series of training tools, including a legal glossary, training manuals and modules, were developed and published for the benefit of the paralegals working in the various legal aid centers throughout the country. A network of women lawyers was established to provide legal aid to vulnerable groups in selected provinces. Burundi Economic Management Support Project (EMSP) Credit No. 3852-BI for US$26.0 million (equivalent); Approved: January 2004; Closing Date: July 2011 This project was designed to build upon the Government Transitional Strategy presented at the Paris Conference in December 2000. The project's objective was to increase the efficiency of the Borrower's macroeconomic, financial, and administrative management systems by strengthening system accountability and transparency. The project includes four components: (i) macroeconomic management, (ii) public finance and administrative management, (iii) public procurement and privatization of public enterprises, and (iv) legal and judicial reform and oversight strategy. The legal and judicial component was estimated at US$1.6 million equivalent. Specifically, the component supported: (i) the modernization of the private sector legal and regulatory framework, (ii) the design of a legal and judicial reform strategy and strengthening oversight structure capacity, (iii) technical assistance to arbitration centers (iv) the preparation of a diagnostic study of the justice sector, (iv) a review of the legal framework, and (vi) the provision of technical support to the Ministry of Justice, along with training to magistrates, notably in business law. Cape Verde Access to Legal Services for Vulnerable Groups including Women JSDF Grant (TF 54211) for US$909,160; Approved: April 2005; Closed: June 2009 The Bank has provided assistance to Cape Verde for various justice initiatives including: (a) ANNExES components of Poverty Reduction Support Credits; (b) an Institutional Development Fund Grant (IDF); and (c) a Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) Grant. These are all described below. 84 Annexes This JSDF grant provided direct support to the Ministry of Justice's Legal Centers [casas de direito] in an effort to increase access to justice by vulnerable groups, particularly women. More specifically, this assistance includes the creation and implementation of Legal Centers on the country's nine inhabited islands. The Legal Centers seek to provide legal information to vulnerable groups through one of the grant's main activities and, when appropriate, also provided legal representation in court. The Ministry of Justice has partnered with the Cape Verdean Bar Association to provide legal services. The grant assisted with: (a) the establishment and staffing of the Legal Center facilities; (b) the training of paralegals to independently carry out outreach legal literacy sessions for illiterate and semi-illiterate persons (particularly women); (c) the provision of regular visits by specialized attorneys on each island; (d) assistance in legal and social matters for vulnerable groups, including women, on all islands--if necessary legal/judicial representation requests will be processed through a pilot Legal Aid Fund; and (e) publication of legal literacy material in Portuguese and in Creole and implementation of Radio campaigns on the role and services provided by the Legal Centers. Cape Verde Poverty Reduction Support Credit(s) Credit No.4037-CV for US$15.0 million; Approved: February 2005; Closed: March 2006 Credit No. 4175-CV for US$10.0 million; Approved: June 2006; Closed: August 2006 Credit No. 4280-CV for US$10.0 million; Approved: March 2007; Closed: December 2007 Credit No. 4434-CV for US$10.0 million; Approved: July 2008; Closed: December 2008 Despite Cape Verde's small size (population 472,000) and remote location off the coast of Africa, continues to post strong gains in social and economic advancement; Cape Verde is now ranked in the group of lower-middle-income countries. Through the PRSC series, IDA has engaged in policy and technical dialogue in three of the five Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (GPRSP) pillars--specifically governance, human development, and social protection. This PRSC series complements work financed by grants from the Institutional Development Fund and Japanese Social Development Fund (described in the preceding and following and project summaries) in support of different legal and judicial reform activities, as well as the reform of the pension system envisaged under the Growth and Competitiveness Project. The PRSC Series (PRSC-1, PRSC-2, PRSC-3, and PRSC-4) focused on promoting good governance to reinforce effectiveness and guarantee equity through public expenditure management ANNExES reforms, as well as civil service, decentralization, and legal and judicial reform, to promote decentralized service delivery and strengthen municipalities, modernize civil service and public sector management, and facilitate access to justice for underprivileged citizens. 85 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned With resources from the PRSCs, Cape Verde approved a decree on mediation, and a law on arbitration. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice entered into an arrangement with the Cape Verdean Bar Association to pay lawyers assisting underprivileged clients on the basis of pre- arranged fees. PRSC resources also helped the Judicial Aid Fund, which became operational in 2007. The funds helped to empower citizens to participate more fully in the reform process and to hold justice sector institutions more accountable through dissemination of legal information. Cape Verde Strengthening the Rule of Law IDF Grant (TF No. 53035) for US$388,000; Approved: December 2003; Closed: December 2006 The objective of this grant was to provide support to Cape Verde's justice sector to strengthen the rule of law by providing legal training to justice sector officials, NGOs and mediators; promoting dissemination of legal information; monitoring current efforts to improve access to legal services to the poor; and launching gender-related capacity-building activities. The grant supported the Ministry of Justice in the implementation of three main activities: (a) strengthening the Ministry of Justice; (b) strengthening the Institute of Women Condition; and (c) development of a legal education program. This IDF Grant made important contributions in terms of overall monitoring of access to justice through the creation of a database for the Ministry of Justice's use in monitoring state-sponsored Legal Aid. The Grant also financed the creation of a multimedia campaign aimed at improving knowledge of legal rights and responsibilities throughout Cape Verde, with particular regard to domestic violence and women's rights. A sensitization campaign for justice sector officials on gender and domestic violence was piloted, and the National Institute for Gender and Equality helped train NGOs on domestic violence laws and women's legal rights. Under the Grant, 10 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence (1995­2005) was indexed and issued to justice personnel as a means of creating more cohesive national legal identity. With the passage of the laws on Arbitration in 2005, the Grant funded the initial, professional training of a cadre of mediators. Central African Republic Economic Management and Government Reform Grant IDA Grant No. H3920-CF for US$7.9 million; Approved: May 2008; Closed: May 2009 A one tranche development policy operation, the Economic Management and Governance Reform Grant supported the implementation of the Central African Republic's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The grant focused on two main policy areas: (i) strengthening public ANNExES finance management; and (ii) improving public sector and economic governance. This operation directly supported two pillars of the PRSP: (i) promoting good governance and the rule of law (pillar 2); and (ii) rebuilding and diversifying the economy (pillar 3). 86 Annexes Ethiopia Managing and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: Creating a Driver of Growth IDF Grant (TF No. 57338) for US$496,000; Approved: October 2006; Closing Date: November 2010 Improving Ethiopia's ability to protect its intellectual property internationally will enable the poor to connect to external markets and reap greater financial benefits. Ethiopia currently has a limited, but developing, legal framework for the protection of intellectual property rights, similar to many other African countries. The grant's objective is to strengthen the capacity of the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO) to manage, brand, and protect property rights. This grant provides financial assistance for a number of capacity-building activities. These are (a) intellectual property product valuation and branding assessments, evaluating the domestic and export income-generating potential of export products in concert with the government and private sector to receive extensive international expertise and capacity building support; (b) capacity building of Ethiopian Administrative and Justice Sector Teams through a series of tailored and sequenced activities to build the branding and licensing capacity of the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO) and other local stakeholders; and (c) empowering local intellectual property rights agencies through partnerships between the private sector, civil society, and local producers to develop their local Intellectual Property portfolios. Additional technical assistance will be provided to support the local ability to enforce their property rights internationally. The objective of the capacity-building and outreach activities is to improve access to services and empower local producers to develop their local intellectual product asset portfolios. Ethiopia Public Sector Capacity Building Program Support Project (PSCAP) Credit No. 3899-ET for US$100.0 million; Approved: May 2004; Closing Date: December 2012 The objectives of the Public Sector Capacity Building Program Support Project (PSCAP) are to improve the scale, efficiency, and responsiveness of public service delivery at the federal, regional, and local levels; empower citizens to participate more effectively in shaping their own development; and promote good governance and accountability. The program has six main components: (i) civil service reform; (ii) district-level decentralization; (iii) urban management capacity building; (iv) tax systems reform; (v) justice system reform; and (vi) information and communications technology. ANNExES Justice system reform activities under the project involve activities at both the national and local (district) levels. The project seeks to improve transparency and accountability through efforts to strengthen formal checks and balances as well as accountability mechanisms by means of 87 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned reform of the justice system, including the courts, law making and law enforcement institutions, and the legislative process. The court reform program aims to strengthen the judiciary and includes both basic (minimum requirements) and complex activities. Executing agencies are required to complete the basic mandatory activities before moving to more complex activities. The basic activities are now rolled out to over 600 courts thorough out the nation and include (i) provision of in-service training and professional development to judges, lawyers and court clerks; (ii) establishment of information desks in all district courts; (iii) installation of court case management and transcribing system; and (iv) installation of color-coded filing system. The complex activities are now being introduced at the federal Supreme Court and federal first instance courts and include activities such as e-litigation, implementing web site services, installing touch screen system, and implementing electronic filing system to provide access to multiple users, and establishing child / victim-friendly benches. As a result of the above interventions, there have been remarkable gains in court efficiency--clearance rates have increased and backlogs significantly reduced. The Gambia Capacity Building for Economic Management Project Credit No. 3555-GM for US$15.0 million (equivalent); Approved: July 2001; Closed: December 2008 The Capacity Building for Economic Management Project sought to build capacity to facilitate private sector development under its third component, valued at US$1.31 million equivalent. This component focused primarily on the legal, financial, and regulatory sectors and supported activities such as the: (i) training of judges, magistrates, court registrars, and court officials in the Judiciary; (ii) preparation of a judicial information strategy and establishment of a Court Case Administration System for the High Court of the Gambia; (iii) establishment of a pilot dispute resolution system; (iv) restructuring of the Registrar General, Curator of Interstate Estates, and the Registrar of companies and attachments to the appropriate institutions in small commonwealth countries; and (v) refinement of the legal/judicial sector strategy. Ghana Legal Reform and Legal Aid for the Advancement of Women IDF Grant (TF No. 52041) for US$400,000; Approved: April 2003; Closed: April 2006 The Government of Ghana sought to address the needs of the poor and socially disadvantaged in a country characterized by a significant number of female-headed households and HIV/AIDS orphans. Within this context, the legal status and rights of women were viewed as a crucial aspect of the larger development process. ANNExES The purpose of the grant was to enhance efforts by both the Government and civil society to launch a gender-responsive legal reform process. To that end, the grant supported three main 88 Annexes activities over the three years of implementation: (a) strengthening the capacity of the Attorney General's Office and the Ministry for Women and Children's Affairs, building its management capabilities, advocacy role, and ability to forge strategic alliances and partnerships at a central and regional government level; (b) strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Justice to enhance its leadership in identifying gender-discriminatory provisions and practices in the country's legal framework and jurisprudence and, where appropriate, drafting new gender-responsive legislation and carrying out legal literacy initiatives; and (c) developing a more comprehensive approach to legal aid by fostering partnerships between the Government and civil society in order to extend the outreach of legal and judicial aid programs through a more comprehensive and innovative approach to legal and judicial aid. Three project implementation workshops were carried out: on project design, management, and on procurement. Several workshops for training of trainers were also conducted. Despite implementation delays, all of the project beneficiaries were able to carry out a substantial portion of the activities under the approved work plans developed at inception of the project. The project was instrumental in mainstreaming gender aspects into the Bank's project portfolio. Analysis under the grant was used to increase access of women to land under the Land Administration Project. An important outcome of this project has been the strengthened collaboration and partnership developed between government and civil society. Ghana Strengthening the Adjudication Capacity of Traditional Leaders IDF Grant (TF No. 90812) for US$375,000; Approved: November 2007; Closing: November 2010 Like many African countries, Ghana has a dual legal system, which recognizes both customary and statutory law. Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are present in areas where the formal judicial service has not extended its reach and are generally deemed more accessible and credible by local communities. Nevertheless, the failure to reconcile traditional processes with a national modern judicial system has led to a lack of predictability in judicial decision making. The objective of this grant is to contribute to improvements throughout Ghana through more responsive dispute resolution by traditional authorities. Strengthening the capacity and role of traditional authorities and fostering reconciliation between customary law and the formal judicial system will increase access to justice to the many people living in remote rural areas. The grant components cover activities related to (a) assessing the existing dispute resolution mechanisms exercised by traditional authorities to better understand the traditional adjudication norms. In addition, this component will undertake an assessment of the Judicial Training Institute ANNExES in delivering training; (b) capacity building activities for the traditional authorities in the use of modern adjudication resolution mechanisms in three districts; and (c) a financial audit of the project. 89 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Guinea-Bissau Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project Credit No. 3622-GW for US$26.0 million; Approved: March 2002; Closed: September 2009 Armed conflict in 1998­99 critically weakened the social and economic fabric of the already deeply impoverished country of Guinea-Bissau, leading to accumulated costs equivalent to half of the country's GDP and stalling progress being made toward poverty reduction. In 2001, the newly inaugurated government relaunched the reform agenda and made the Private Sector Development Program (PSD) a top priority in addressing post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. Privatization strategies and legal reforms were implemented in order to encourage greater domestic and foreign participation in private sector economic activities and enhance the investment climate. The purpose of this project was to support Guinea-Bissau in its efforts to stimulate investment, competitiveness, and participation in the private sector by implementing the government's divestiture program. The project had three main components: (i) building partnerships and private participation through reforms aimed at the telecommunications, air transport, port, water and energy sectors; (ii) improving the investment climate by modernizing business laws and making fair and equitable justice accessible to individuals and private enterprises; and (iii) supporting implementation and capacity building to ensure that appropriate implementation capacity exists and development objectives are met. The cost of the justice sector component of this project was estimated at US$5.54 million. Kenya Capacity Building of the Legal Profession IDF Grant (TF No. 54290) for US$256,000; Approved: October 2004; Closed: October 2008 This project's main objective was to strengthen the capacity of the legal profession as a key component of the legal and judicial reform process in Kenya. The grant provided assistance to the legal profession through the Law Society of Kenya to fulfill its mandate to strengthen the skills and professional conduct of the members of the legal profession in the delivery of legal services to the government and the larger public in all matters relating to the administration of justice in Kenya. Activities covered by the grant included: (a) helping the legal profession to build skills and improve professional conduct to ensure quality, transparency, and accountability in the legal ANNExES profession; and (b) improving continuing education systems in this field. 90 Annexes Kenya Capacity Building to Support Gender-Responsive Legal Reform IDF Grant (TF No. 53703) for $489,000; Approved: October 2004; Closed: October 2008 The institutional strengthening and capacity building activities funded under the IDF Grant had their foundation in the roadmap for gender-responsive legal reform described in the Kenyan Government's Report of the Taskforce on Laws relating to Women (1998) and the policy framework described in the Expanded Legal Sector Reform Program (1999). The grant design reflected the need to support partnerships between Government and civil society in promoting gender-responsive legal reform and improved access to legal services by the poor and socially vulnerable. The purpose of this grant was to assist with institutional strengthening and capacity building in Kenya to contribute to a more gender-responsive implementation of the country's Expanded Legal Sector Reform Program. The activities included in the grant were: (a) enhancement of national dialogue and partnership on gender-responsive legal reform to strengthen national dialogue; (b) development of a national strategy for the promotion of access to legal services by the poor; (c) skills training for key actors involved in the gender-responsive legal and judicial reform process; (d) strengthening and expansion of the legal literacy/legal aid initiative; and (e) joint monitoring and evaluation. Kenya Financial and Legal Sector Technical Assistance Project Credit No. 3992-KE for US$18.0 million; Approved: October 2004; Closing Date: September 2011 The overall development objective of the project is to create a sound financial system and a strengthened legal framework and judicial capacity that will ensure broad access to financial and related legal services and optimal allocation of resources for sustained economic growth. Similar objectives in the justice sector are being provided through the Government's Medium- Term Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Programme (http://www.gjlos. go.ke).38 The project's Financial and Judicial Sector Strategy Development Component (US$0.36 million) supports the development of a strategy for the judiciary which includes the introduction of performance and service standards, a comprehensive training program, and the introduction of a credible system for the selection, appointment, and removal/discipline of judges and other judicial staff, as well as the strengthening of the Judicial Services Commission. The project assists ANNExES 38 While the majority of donors provide funding to GJLOS through basket funding, the Bank's as- sistance remains separate. 91 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned relevant agencies to develop a framework for monitoring and evaluating progress in financial sector development and judicial and legal reforms. Liberia Capacity Building for Justice Services LICUS Grant (TF No. 91831) for US$750,000; Approved: May 2008; Closing Date: December 2010 The objective of the Grant is to focus on several short-to-medium term and practical activities that are designed to support the Liberian judicial system to meet their most immediate needs and deliver basic services, through: (i) strengthening court management; (ii) capacity building for human resources; (iii) assessing the needs of the judicial sector, including case management and the potential use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and anti-corruption mechanisms; and (iv) public outreach initiatives. Since its effectiveness in May 2008, the Project has supported a wide variety of activities, but more importantly, it has helped re-establish the Bank's credibility with the Judiciary, as well as play an active role in rule of law reform in Liberia. The Project has been supporting the Judiciary of Liberia and the Louis Arthur Grimes Law School with the procurement of basic legal texts and resource materials and with the design of a website for the Judiciary of Liberia. The Bank supported the Supreme Court of Liberia in the preparation for its first post-conflict National Judicial Conference, which took place in March of this year. The Conference served as a forum for internal stocktaking and re-evaluation where critical problems confronting the Judiciary were highlighted, discussed and solutions for them found or strategies for follow up recommended. The grant is also supporting Public Defenders through the provision of basic IT training and equipment. Finally, the Task Team is working with the Judiciary and supporting its efforts to organize a public outreach campaign through a series of radio skits and interviews working in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice. Madagascar Governance and Institutional Development Project (PGDI) Credit No. 3829-MG for US$30.0 million; Approved: November 2003; Closed: June 2009 The Government of Madagascar developed the Poverty Reduction Support Program (PRSP) to institute reforms in both the public and private sectors to achieve greater transparency and accountability. The purpose of the Governance and Institutional Development Project was to assist the Government of Madagascar with implementation of the PRSP by: (i) rationalizing and ANNExES modernizing budget and public expenditure management; (ii) improving accountability and transparency of government operations; (iii) refining government strategy in the area of judicial reform and; (iv) strengthening the capacity of public institutions to cope with complex changes. 92 Annexes The project provided support to the Ministry of Justice through a US$2.2 million subcomponent to address justice reform, identified by the Government as a critical element to consolidation of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. In this context, the fight against corruption in the judiciary was a cornerstone for the Government of Madagascar's program to improve governance. The World Bank's support aimed to complement the activities of other development partners, in particular the European Union, and to consolidate the reforms initiated under the previous Public Sector Capacity Building Project (PAIGEP), which focused on the modernization of business law, publication of existing texts to the relevant stakeholders, and the enhancement of human resources through the creation of a National School for Magistrates and Clerks of the Court. Madagascar Governance and Institutional Development Project II (PGDI II)39 Credit No. 4411-MG for US$40.0 million; Approved: June 2008; Closing Date: August 2012 The objective of the second Governance and Institutional Development Project is to improve the efficiency and transparency of government and selected public services in Madagascar in line with the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP). There are five components to the project, the third and fourth of which deal specifically with the justice sector. Of particular interest, the third component, which concerns the rule of law and the fight against corruption (US$3.0 million equivalent), aims to help the Government promote transparency, accountability, and good governance, and in particular, reduce corruption. Project assistance will build on the activities initiated under the first PGDI and focus mainly on improving the operational efficiency of the judiciary, on supporting activities related to anti-corruption and conflicts of interest, and on strengthening oversight by the Auditor General and by Parliament over State affairs. Component 4 targets transparency and social accountability. The component aims to foster increased implication of civil society in State affairs and to enhance social accountability, which are key objectives of the MAP. Mali Legal Aid Services for the Poor JSDF Grant (TF No. 54741) for US$902,940; Approved: January 2005; Closed: January 2009 The development objective of the Legal Aid Services for the Poor project was to achieve institutional strengthening and capacity building of civil society organizations to promote access ANNExES 39 Activities under PGDI II have come to a halt as the time of writing due to the political situation in Madagascar. The project may need to be restructured and extended when activities resume. 93 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned to justice for the poor and socially vulnerable by establishing a network of trainers and training paralegals to provide legal aid services to the poor. Specific indicators included: (i) increased legal literacy of women, the poor, and the most vulnerable in target communes and villages; (ii) increased access of women, the poor, and the most vulnerable to legal aid services in target communes and villages; (iii) an increase in the number of villages and communes that deliver legal aid services to women, the poor, and the most vulnerable; and (iv) greater awareness of the judiciary, bar, bench, elders in villages and communes, and recipients of legal aid services to promote the need for equal access to justice by the poor and vulnerable. Mauritania Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism Strategy IDF Grant (TF No. 90544) for US$356,000; Approved: November 2007; Closing: November 2010 The objective of this project is to assist Mauritania with the set-up of a Financial Intelligence Unit and establishment of its internal procedures, including budget management, promotion of effective bank supervisory systems in anti-money-laundering processes, dissemination of Anti- Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) practices in banks and in non-financial professions, and training of the judiciary. The project will also support Mauritania's efforts to better fight corruption, helping the country to meet its international commitments as set forth in the UN convention on terrorist financing and transnational crime. Ultimately, by helping the country to create an operational AML/CFT system consistent with international standards, the project will prevent abuse of the financial sector by criminals and, at the same time, reinforce the importance of corporate governance and transparency and the secure management of oil revenues. Mauritania Legal Aid Services to the Poor JSDF Grant (TF No. 54743) for US$863,520; Approved: January 2005; Closing date: December 2010 The development objective of this grant is to achieve institutional strengthening and capacity building of civil society organizations to promote access to justice for the poor and socially vulnerable. ANNExES Specific indicators include: (i) increased legal literacy of women, the poor, and the most vulnerable; (ii) increased access by women, the poor, and the most vulnerable to legal aid and judicial services; (iii) an increase in the number of villages and communes that deliver legal aid 94 Annexes services to the poor and most vulnerable, and (iv) increase the awareness of judiciary, the bar, the court, and leaders in villages and communes, and recipients of legal aid services to promote the need for equal access by the vulnerable to justice. The implementation of this Grant was delayed due to the 2008 coup in Mauritania, which resulted in a halt to Bank-funded activities in Mauritania. Implementation resumed in late 2009. Mauritania Legal Reform and Private Sector Capacity Building IDF Grant (TF No. 51455) for US$448,000; Approved: September 2002; Closed: September 2005 The purpose of this grant was to support law reform initiatives that facilitate private sector growth in Mauritania. The grant supported four main activities: (a) strengthening of the capacity of the judicial system and the Ministry of Justice by improving the Inspection Judiciaire, enhancing the Legal Information Center of the Official Gazette, and supporting the commercial legal reform process; (b) strengthening of the institutional capacity of key agencies in charge of private sector development, including the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture and the National Committee for Public Sector­Private Sector Dialogue; (c) holding of national workshops intended to foster legal reform and private sector growth; and (d) monitoring of the implementation of grant initiatives. Mozambique Capacity Building: Public Sector and Legal Institutions Development Project Credit No. 2437-MZ for US$15.5 million (equivalent); Approved: November 1992; Closed: June 2000 Preparation work for the Legal and Public Sector Capacity Building Project began in 1990, a time when civil war was still raging in Mozambique. The project was approved the same year Peace Accords were signed. Subsequently, the Legal and Public Sector Capacity Building Project's main objective was to build and maintain capacity in key public institutions and skill areas by expanding the supply of well-trained senior planners, policy analysts, managers, and technicians, and by enhancing pay and other incentives and conditions of employment for senior civil servants. Specific objectives included: (a) strengthening legal institutions and professional capabilities; and (b) developing public administration and management skills and enhancing civil service personnel systems. The Strengthening Legal Institutions and Training component (US$7.2 million) was implemented under the auspices of a Legal Working Group comprising representatives of each of the five major legal institutions. These were the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Administrative ANNExES Tribunal, the Attorney General's Office, and the Faculty of Law at Eduardo Mondlane University. Key activities under this component included: (i) the design and implementation of a long-term strategy and action plan to strengthen the legal profession and the judiciary; (ii) improvements 95 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned in the quality and efficiency of legal services, as well as training for the lawyers and judiciary; (iii) facilitation of the dissemination of the law and the administration of justice through the design of modern automated legal information systems; (iv) upgrading of resources and operations of law libraries; (v) assisting with the legal reform process by providing consulting services, conducting seminars, and preparing legal materials; (vi) assisting with the development of legal institutions, such as the Administrative Tribunal, the Center for Judicial Studies, the Bar Association and the women's law association, MULEIDE; and (vii) strengthening the institutions responsible for project implementation and funding for the Component Management Unit. Mozambique Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project Credit No. 4132-MZ for US$10.5 million; Approved: December 2005; Closing Date: June 2011 Recognizing the important role that the financial sector plays in facilitating overall growth, development, and poverty reduction, the Government of Mozambique developed comprehensive institutional, legal, and policy reforms aimed at removing constraints that may affect the efficiency of the sector. Weaknesses in the banking sector--such as limited access to financial services for individuals/private enterprises, high interest rates/transaction costs and limitations in the non-banking financial institutions--were major flaws that needed to be addressed. The Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project was created in conjunction with funding from IDA and other donors to provide support to Mozambique in resolving these issues, thus ultimately maintaining economic growth and channeling the benefits to the poor. The purpose of the Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project is to bring about effective and efficient improvements to all areas of the financial sector that were affecting or had the potential to hinder economic growth and development in Mozambique, and also to assist with poverty reduction. The project has two main components: (i) achieving financial sector development and enhancement of financial sector intermediation, by improving oversight and meeting international standards, improving monetary and foreign exchange management through enhanced transparency, strengthening public debt management, and developing regulations and standards for the non-bank institutions; (ii) improving the lending environment and legal framework by adopting a commercial code and revising the civil code of procedures, simplifying judicial procedures, enhancing the scope and reliability of the credit registry, training judges in commercial dispute resolution, reform of the land registry, and market development of public securities. Mozambique Public Sector Reform Project IDA Grant No. H0240-MZ for US$28.0 million; Approved: March 2003; Closed: December 2009 ANNExES The Public Sector Reform Project, part of a multi-donor support program to Mozambique to improve governance and to reform the public service, was approved by the Board in 2003. In 96 Annexes December 2006, this project was restructured to include a US$6.0 million justice component. The project development objective was revised to include improvements in legal and judicial service delivery in selected provinces. Within the restructured project, the Legal Sector Capacity Building component focused on improving the performance of the sector and the operational efficiency of the court system through targeted interventions in court administration at the appellate and provincial levels to include training, capacity building, and institutional development. The component helped train the newly created positions of court and prosecutorial administrators (administradores judiciais and chefes de serviço, respectively), and pilot these new positions in Mozambique's provincial courts and prosecutorial offices. The component also included the modernization of the national Judicial Training Center (CFJJ). Additional support was provided through Access to Justice sub- grants for civil society organizations to pilot activities which improve citizens' access to the justice system, as well as to raise awareness of their rights and responsibilities. These sub-grants were approved in 2009 and implemented during the same year. Niger Promoting the Advancement of the Legal Status of Women IDF Grant (TF No. 27337) for US$390,000; Approved: May 2000; Closed: May 2003 The focus of this IDF grant was to promote the advancement of the legal status of women in Niger by: (a) supporting the Directorate for the Advancement of Women (DGPF) of the Ministry of Social Development, Advancement of Women and Child Protection (MDSPPFPE) through systematic staff skills training for both national and departmental level staff; and (b) supporting the expansion of the outreach of the existing activities of three NGOs, all key actors in legal literacy, and the training of paralegals. Achievements under the grant include the improvement of the relationship between the DGPF and the NGOs, as well as the successful training of over a thousand paralegals (femmes relais). Nigeria Capacity Building for the Prevention of Corruption IDF Grant (TF No. 51680) for US$246,000; Approved: October 2002; Closed: December 2005 This grant sought to provide technical assistance to the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), a critical agency in Nigeria's efforts to restore the rule of law and fiduciary accountability, so that it could develop a clear strategic focus and gain adequate operational capacity and confidence to lead the fight against corruption in Nigeria. ANNExES The World Bank contributed to this joint effort through the proposed IDF grant, the central purpose of which was to assist the ICPC with development of a robust anti-corruption strategy. It acted in cooperation with civil society stakeholders and other public watchdog agencies to convey 97 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned lessons learned from the experiences of countries that had established similar anti-corruption agencies, along with the difficulties they encountered ensuring effective management of the relevant institutions. Nigeria Economic Management Capacity Building Project Credit No. 3345-NI for US$40.0 million (equivalent); Approved: May 2000; Closed: December 2007 In 1999, the Bank resumed its lending program to Nigeria. In the wake of the country's transition from military dictatorship to civilian rule, the Nigerian Government requested assistance from the Bank for the legal sector. In response to this request, a legal and judicial reform (LJR) component was included in the Economic Management Capacity Building Project (EMCAP). The legal and judicial reform component was placed under the leadership and overall supervision of the Chief Justice of Nigeria, with the Administrator of the National Judicial Institute directing the project. A comprehensive legal and judicial reform program for Nigeria was formulated in a participatory manner through stakeholder consultation workshops across the country, with active involvement from a full range of individuals and officials representing a cross-section of Nigeria's polity. Other donors, including the Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided additional support for initiatives under the LJR component. Nigeria Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project Credit No. 4219-NI for US$200.0 million; Approved: June 2006; Closing Date: August 2013 The Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project for Nigeria aims to increase sustainable access to basic urban services through investments in critical infrastructure. There are three project components. Component 2, Public Governance and Capacity Building, supports public finance and budget reforms, and the institutionalization of the use of information systems for policy making and performance management. With the transition to civilian rule in 1999, a significant reform agenda was undertaken by the Lagos State Government, transforming the de facto ministry of law and order to a ministry of justice. As such, the Lagos State Government aimed to provide an effective system of legal services for the very poor. It established a Directorate for Citizen's Rights (CRD), the first of its kind ANNExES in Nigeria. Conceived as a department to collaborate with civil society, the private bar, and other interested parties, it implements policies designed to provide greater access to justice for the financially and otherwise disadvantaged and vulnerable groups of society. The project's Urban 98 Annexes Policy and Project Coordination component (US$12.13 million) finances conflict resolution and strengthening of the capacity of Citizens' Mediation Centers (CMC) and the Office of the Public Defender (OPD), among other activities. The CRD is now the focal point for free and quick access to resolution of grievances. Nigeria Legal Education Capacity Building Project IDF Grant (TF No. 90219) US$500,000; Approved: June 2007; Closing Date: June 2011 This IDF grant supports the Nigeria Legal Education Council in its efforts to reform its curriculum and teaching methods by introducing new subjects as well as distance learning technologies. More specifically, the objective of the project is to contribute to efforts in enhancing Nigeria's legal environment by strengthening the training program for legal professionals at the Nigerian Law School (NLS). The project consists of the following parts: (a) enhancement of NLS' teaching and management capacity, strengthening of teaching and management capacity by providing support to NLS's efforts to update its curriculum, strengthening of faculty skills and teaching methods, enhancement of the faculty's professional advocacy skills, and improvements to the professional attachment program; (b) enhancement of the management capacity of senior NLS staff; (c) carrying out of a capacity gap assessment of the four NLS campuses; (d) support for the law library; and (e) carrying out of a study on the needs of the legal profession in Nigeria. The project's second component aims to enhance NLS' training and learning environment, by carrying out an information and communication technology (ICT) assessment of the four NLS campuses, and subsequently equipping the four NLS campuses with ICT equipment for video- conferencing, web-casting, and wireless connectivity, as well as training selected personnel in their use, in addition to the acquisition of legal research software. The final component covers the project's financial audit. Nigeria Legal Reform and Legal Aid for the Advancement of Women IDF Grant (TF No. 51431) for US$400,000; Approved: March 2002; Closed: January 2006 This initiative was modeled on projects launched in 13 other African countries, such as the one implemented in Ghana outlined above. As in many other countries in the region, the number of female-headed households and of HIV/AIDS orphans means that the legal status and rights of women need to be actively promoted in any program aimed at providing legal assistance to the poor and socially vulnerable. The objective of the project was to support efforts, from both the Government and civil society, ANNExES to launch a legal reform process that would improve gender equality and establish a supportive intuitional environment by reforming institutions to establish equal rights and opportunities for women and men, fostering incentives for more equal resources and participation, and addressing 99 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned disparities in access to resources. The grant supported three main activities: (a) strengthening the capacity of the National Centre for Women's Development; (b) strengthening the capacity of the Legal Affairs Division of the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Youth Development to support their leadership; and (c) developing a more comprehensive approach to legal aid. Nigeria State Government and Capacity Building Project Credit No. 4084-NI for US$18.1 million (equivalent); Approved: June 2005; Closing Date: March 2011 In 2003, elections held in Nigeria marked the first time in over forty years that a transition between two civilian governments occurred through a fair election process. Following these elections, the Government of Nigeria announced ambitious and comprehensive reforms aimed at stimulating economic growth, creating employment opportunities, reducing poverty, and becoming more transparent and accountable in the management of public resources. The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was established in order to meet these objectives by: (i) promoting macroeconomic stability; (ii) accelerating privatization and liberalization of the economy; (iii) reforming the public service, including reforming public expenditure, budget and civil service; (iv) fighting corruption, improving government transparency and accountability; and (v) strengthening basic service delivery. The purpose of this project is to support NEEDS at the state level in order for the many states of Nigeria to overcome serious institutional capacity constraints. It was developed in response to state governments that desired improvements in governance and inter-governmental relations. The project has two main components: (i) the Core Reform Program (CRP) aimed at improving the development and implementation of public policies and programs; and (ii) state-specific reform programs, which support reforms not included in CRP but which promote improvements in governance and service delivery. Under the state-specific reform programs, Cross River State has selected activities for project financing to improve judicial service delivery through: (i) revision of the rules of civil procedure applicable in Magistrate courts and High Courts in CRS; (ii) a comprehensive skills development program for judicial and administrative officers of the High Courts and Magistrate Courts; and (iii) implementation of a model court administration system in two pilot courts (one Magistrate Court and one High Court). Rwanda Institutional Strengthening Initiative for the Legal Advancement of Women IDF Grant (TF No. 50066) for US$400,000; Approved: June 2001; Closed: October 2005 ANNExES In response to the legal inequities that women face in Rwanda, the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development (MIGEPROFE) developed a Plan for the Elimination of All Forms of 100 Annexes Discrimination against Women. The Government has also developed a Legal Action Reform Plan--a roadmap for gender-responsive legal reform. The purpose of this grant was to support the efforts of the Government and civil society of Rwanda to launch the gender-responsive legal reform process as defined in the Legal Action Reform Plan. The grant supported four main activities: (a) institutional strengthening and capacity building for the MIGEPROFE; (b) training for MIGEPROFE staff and selected non-governmental organizations at the central and regional levels; (c) the development of training materials and dissemination of legal information through literacy and communication campaigns; and (d) coordination, monitoring and evaluation of grant-assisted activities. São Tomé and Príncipe Capacity Building for the Justice Sector IDF Grant (TF No. 54648) for US$326,000; Approved: January 2005; Closed: January 2008 Since 1991, São Tomé and Príncipe has enjoyed a democratic political system, albeit one that has been marked by instability and administrative deadlock. The country is currently at the cusp of a major economic change, with prospective offshore oil production. The project's objective was to work with the three sector institutions--the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General's Office--to build capacity for strategic planning, to better coordinate reforms and manage information within the sector, and to leverage the country's resources to create a consensus for those reforms that can be undertaken in three years. The grant financed a diagnostic study of the sector and its main problems, and also provided technical assistance in the first round of judicial inspections for sitting first instance judges and prosecutors. Senegal Economic Governance Project Credit No. 47030-SN for US$ 7.8 million (equivalent) Approved: April 2010; Closing: June 2015 Until recently, the Africa region had not approved a stand-alone justice sector loan, and justice activities have been included as a component in other types of lending, usually public or private sector operations. However, on April 8, 2010, the Senegal Economic Governance Project was approved by the Bank's Board of Directors. The project seeks to promote the rule of law through increased contract enforcement and institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Justice. As the Project Appraisal Document noted, in Senegal supporting justice reform and improving access to justice is one of the four components, which focuses on improving ANNExES institutional capacity for the effective implementation of the Justice Sector Program of the country. Senegal's justice sector faces severe resource constraints (material, financial, and human) and the project will analyze data on the justice sector's performance and perform 101 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned periodic and timely monitoring that could result in adopting corrective measures when required. The World Bank is using this project to help the authorities implement justice sector reform through a programmatic approach based on the Justice Sector Reform Program. To that end, the new project will be implemented using existing country systems. As a result, no dedicated Project Implementation Unit or project specific Steering Committee will be set up. Instead, the Project will strengthen the capacity of CEDAF, the Unit responsible for the implementation of the Justice Sector Reform Program, and the Justice Sector Project Evaluation and Coordination Committee, established by the Senegalese government in 2006, will provide oversight and coordination. Moreover, the Economic Governance Project will use an innovative approach by making CEDAF a model of excellence in public administration. CEDAF will not only improve its performance coordination functions, but also leverage additional financing from other development partners to finance the implementation of the Justice Sector Reform Program and close the existing funding gap. Sierra Leone Developing a Model for Delivering Justice Services Project JSDF Grant (TF No. 57251) for US$879,436; Approved: October 2006; Closing: October 2010 This grant seeks to establish a model for the provision of various justice services by: (i) improving the ability of Sierra Leone's poor to access institutions of law and government (both customary and formal); (ii) increasing the accountability of institutions of customary and formal law and government to their constituents; (iii) decreasing impunity of those who violate basic rights and freedoms; and (iv) provide practical, concrete and creative solutions and remedies to injustices to which poor Sierra Leoneans face. The project is successfully being implemented by the non- governmental organization TIMAP for Justice. South Africa University of Pretoria Faculty of Law IDF Grant (TF No. 90558) for US$498,000; Approved: April 2008; Closing Date: April 2011 Improving access to information is a central strategy of the World Bank's Africa Action Plan (AAP) and the Bank's implementation framework under the Capacity Development Management Plan (CDMAP). As the Plans note, drivers of growth in Africa are impeded by difficult access to information. As a result, the Bank has sought to increase assistance to Africa to improve access ANNExES to information by providing support to Parliaments, audit institutions, NGOs, local governments, and community organizations. 102 Annexes The grant's two objectives are to: (i) expand the University of Pretoria's Faculty of Law's Regional Comparative Law Knowledge Network; and (ii) enhance the capacity of the University of Pretoria's Faculty of Law to develop a comprehensive, contemporary and internationally accessible collection of primary African legal information. The project's activities include: (a) support for the University of Pretoria Faculty of Law's efforts to strengthen its regional legal research, training programs, and information dissemination capacity (b) enhancement of the Africa Legal Information Collection to establish within the University of Pretoria Faculty of Law the capacity to develop and expand an internationally accessible collection of legal information specific to Africa; (c) development of a comprehensive strategy to build a regional legal information collection, including Internet-accessible tools through a legal information database. To that end, capacity needs assessments will be carried out and twinning agreements will be signed with other national law faculties throughout Africa, allowing for comparative law research and regional workshops. Sudan Capacity Building of the National Judiciary Multi-Donor TF No. 56393 for US$13.0 million; Approved: August 2006; Closed: June 2009 With the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC), Sudan entered an important transitional phase in which legal and judicial reform play a critical role in promoting sustainable peace, translating the principles and promises of the Peace Agreement and Interim National Constitution into tangible realities in post-conflict Sudan. In order to implement the CPA and effectuate the mandate of the INC--including the establishment of the National Judicial Service Commission (NJSC)--significant work must be done to embolden the judiciary's legal, technical, and operational competence. To that end, the objective of this project was to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary to enhance its independence; build the knowledge base of judges; and, empower the judiciary to effectively and fairly apply the law and deliver justice. The project's components included (a) support to the National Judicial Service Commission (NJSC) to build capacity in order to manage an independent and decentralized judicial system; (b) judicial training at the central and state levels; (c) establishment of the National Legal Training and Resource Center and rehabilitation of the judiciary's existing training facility; and (d) rehabilitation of court facilities in selected areas. Some achievements include the following: a study tour was carried out in the context of support ANNExES to the NJSC and refurbishment to NJSC facilities was carried out; and a training strategy has been developed based on a training needs assessment. Fifty judges were trained in Effective 103 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Dispute Resolution ­ A Course in Legal Analysis for Judges. Eight judges were trained as trainers in English Legal Terminology and Internet Assisted Legal Research, among others. Sudan Southern Sudan Justice Support Project Multi-Donor TF No. 57732 for US$5.3 million; Approved: March 2007; Closing Date: December 2010 The Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan delegated the lion's share of policing responsibilities in Southern Sudan to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). To meet its constitutional obligation, the Government of Southern Sudan faced the challenge of rebuilding from the ground up the entire police and prison system, which had virtually ceased to function during the 22-year conflict. The former network of police stations, prisons, and infrastructure covering its territory was neglected and in many parts destroyed. This weakness in law enforcement created a liability for the future of peace and development in Southern Sudan as the disarmament of a highly militarized society and the demobilization of ex-combatants and militias are unlikely to take place in the absence of strict rule of law. To complement the efforts by the international community to upgrade the professional skills of Southern Sudan police and prisons personnel, the project's objective is to substantially increase the capacity of the Police and Prison Services to deliver professional services across Southern Sudan. It seeks to complement the Government of Southern Sudan and other international efforts to upgrade the professional skills of the Police and Prisons Services. The project's main activities include: (a) building and equipping a sizable portion of the future network of police stations and state central prisons; (b) organizing and codifying the professional workplace by developing Books of Rules and Codes of Conduct; (c) building and equipping decentralized training facilities across Southern Sudan; (d) developing a long-term strategy for training, including preparation for Training Academies; and (e) promoting inmate care and treatment programs. Tanzania Accountability, Transparency and Integrity Program (ATIP) Loan 4171-TZ for US$40.0 million (equivalent); Approved: May 2006; Closing Date: December 2011 This project aims to build on the outcomes realized through the Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project (see below) and address some of the key issues identified as bottlenecks to enhanced growth of the economy of Tanzania. The project is built on findings from a comprehensive anti-corruption mission undertaken by the Bank in February 1998, at the ANNExES request of the Tanzanian Government. The mission highlighted the need for more effective and sustainable systems of governance. 104 Annexes The objective of the Accountability, Transparency and Integrity Program is to support the implementation of Tanzania's strategic framework of good governance. The program aims to improve the impact of development programs on the poor by enhancing the quality of governance. The project has four main components: (a) strengthening the legal and judicial system by modernizing the legal and regulatory framework, strengthening judicial independence, improving management and coordination of legal sector institutions, building competence, motivation and integrity of personnel, improving pre-service training of legal professionals, enabling access to justice for the poor and the disadvantaged, and improving the work environment for legal and judicial officers; (b) enhancing public financial accountability by developing an effective and transparent public procurement system, undertaking an internal audit system, establishing an independent Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, enhancing professional standards, and strengthening records management and information dissemination systems; (c) strengthening oversight and watchdog institutions (OWIs); and (d) improving program management and coordination by providing technical assistance to the project implementation unit, and improving monitoring and evaluation. Under the reforms, new staff were recruited in 2006/07 to expand legal and judicial services including 150 attorneys, 2 justices of the court of appeal and 21 judges of the high court. Several studies were conducted to harmonize the national legal framework including a review of the Business Names (Registration) Act, Industrial Property Act, and Industrial Licensing Act. Tanzania Legal Sector Building IDF Grant (TF No. 24906) for US$373,000; Approved: September 2000; Closed: May 2002 The purpose of this grant was to support the capacity-building efforts of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MJCA) and to provide assistance with the management and implementation of its legal sector reform program. The grant supported four main activities: (a) strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Justice by improving program management and coordination, enhancing education and communication, and strengthening the management and coordination of reforms; (b) implementing change management training for local staff and study tours for the project Steering Committee in countries where major changes in legal systems have been successfully introduced; (c) running consultative workshops for stakeholders in the legal reform process; and (d) designing public awareness activities as a means of stimulating the reform process and educating the public on the changes taking place in the legal sector. Under the project's public awareness component, training for designing and producing print and audio-visual materials was provided and initial costs for the production ANNExES and broadcasting of radio and television programs on key topics in legal sector reform were covered. 105 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Tanzania Private Sector Competitiveness Project Credit No. 4136-TA for US$95.0 million; Approved: December 2005; Closing Date: June 2012 The Business Environment Strengthening in Tanzania (BEST) Program is implemented under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of Tanzania, the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation, DANIDA, DFID, Government of Netherlands, SIDA and the World Bank. BEST is a cross cutting reform program which is designed to reduce the burden on, and improve service to, the private sector through carefully targeted interventions within the government and to the Judiciary. The Commercial Law and Justice Reform component entails: (a) review, modernization and dissemination of selected commercial laws and regulations, (b) development and carrying out of commercial law and dispute resolution training programs for legal professionals in private, public and judicial practice, (c) support to priority court system reform measures, including review and revision of the Civil Procedure Code and other related legislation, establishment and operation of on-line legal and databases, development of information technologies, upgrading the skills of law librarians, streamlining of case law reporting, training magistrates and court staff, and improvement of court registry systems, and (d) training private companies in corporate governance standards and conduct. The activities relating to revision of Civil Procedure Code and other related legislation, as well as the Commercial Dispute Resolution (CDR) sub-component are now under implementation. The objective of the CDR to reduce the complexity, cost and time taken to process and resolve commercial disputes. The intended beneficiaries are small and medium sized enterprises although, in reality, all users of the civil courts will benefit from the proposed reforms. The CDR component is divided into seven broad outcomes with specific outputs and activities to be carried out over an implementation period of six years (2006­2012). These outcomes include: (a) enhance access to the commercial court, (b) more effective civil procedure and enforcement measures through reforms to the civil procedure framework, (c) support for civil procedure reforms in the Judiciary, (d) enhance alternative dispute resolution, (e) establish a commercial law continuing legal education program, (e) enhance corporate governance, and (f ) enhance the country's commercial legal framework. Togo Institutional Strengthening of the Directorate for the Advancement of Women to Support Empowerment of Women in Togo IDF Grant (TF No. 27253) for $264,000; Approved: February 1999; Closing Date: July 2002 The IDF Grant aimed to provide technical and financial support for: (i) institutional ANNExES strengthening to the Directorate for the Advancement of Women in order to strengthen its capacity to carry out the initiatives outlines in the National Policy Document for the Advancement of Women (1997) and the National Action Plan for the period 1997­2001; 106 Annexes (ii) revitalization of the institutional capacity of the Directorate for the Advancement of Women particularly regarding its role in the coordination of government initiatives and the facilitation of the civil society aimed at advancing the legal status of women, which the Directorate considered a key activity to fulfill its mandate; (iii) strengthening the capacity of four local NGOs by strengthening by expanding their coverage of certain activities such as legal assistance and legal literacy. Uganda Anti-Corruption Capacity Building IDF Grant (TF No. 27397) for US$221,000; Approved: January 2001; Closed: January 2004 The grant was developed based on Uganda's Department of Ethics and Integrity (DEI)'s three year action plan; the overall objective of the grant was to sharpen DEI officers' skills and widen their experience through specialist training and learning from similar well established organizations. The activities financed under the grant included: (a) specialized training in ethics, integrity and skills ethical decision-making and combating and preventing corruption; (b) study tours of well established anti-corruption agencies; (c) an analysis of the existing ethics system in Uganda; (d) capacity building in the information management division of the DEI to improve its overall interaction with the public; and (e) public awareness campaigns on anti-corruption. Uganda Second Private Sector Competitiveness Project Credit No. 3975-UG for US$70.0 million; Approved: September 2004; Closing Date: January 2012 Given increasing levels of income poverty, and the limited scope of support to the private sector, the Government of Uganda and private sector stakeholders requested the World Bank's assistance in implementing its reform agenda. The overall objective of the project is to create sustainable conditions for enterprise creation and growth that responds to local and export markets. The project, which aims to reduce the cost of doing business and encourage investment, seeks to enable the private sector to be better positioned to respond to opportunities in specific categories of the market. The US$26.0 million (equivalent) component for improving the business environment is indicated to support, among other things, activities for: (a) strengthening business registration process, and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Law Reform Commission for implementing commercial legal reform process. Toward that end, specific support to the Law Reform Commission includes: (a) revision and drafting ANNExES of laws relating to business, financial services, and exports, and intellectual property law. The component is also supporting coordination of commercial law reform activities. 107 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned Regional Activities Justice for the Poor Initiative BNPP Grant (TF No. 56558) for US$450,000; Approved: April 2006; Closed: December 2009 The Justice for the Poor grant aimed to help inform and then evaluate new and innovative approaches to local justice system reform in sub-Saharan Africa by (a) building an empirically based understanding of the dynamics of local and/or customary law systems and how the poor navigate (and/or are excluded from) these systems; (b) creating a knowledge base about the effects that multiple systems have on the nature and accessibility of local justice and how incompatibilities between state and non-state justice systems have been addressed; (c) assessing the effects of local justice initiatives on the dynamics of local claims, disputes, and decision- making processes and on the interaction between local and state systems; (d) developing innovative initiatives that can improve the quality and accountability of local justice systems, enhance compatibility between state and non-state systems, and improve people's access to these systems. The grant also aimed to enhance local research capacity and encourage evidence-based policy reform, as well as strengthen community participation and engagement in reform initiatives. In the global and regional contexts it is envisaged that the grant will inform a comparative knowledge base about the dynamics of local-level justice and the interaction between state and non-state systems that will inform new and innovative approaches to justice sector reform more generally. Field work in both Sierra Leone and Kenya was undertaken in partnership with two NGOs--the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) of Sierra Leone and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) of Kenya. More findings can be found on the Justice for the Poor website at (www.worldbank.org/justiceforthepoor). OHADA Institutional Capacity Building Project IDF Grant (TF No. 53695) for US$483,000; Approved: July 2004; Closed: July 2007 In October 2003, the OHADA Treaty was signed by 16 West African countries40, and the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Labor Organization (ILO) joined in supporting implementation of the adoption of the OHADA Uniform Laws. The Bank designed a grant to assist OHADA member states with the: (i) identification of issues, roadblocks, and bottlenecks that hinder the implementation of OHADA's Uniform Laws; (ii) identification of specific actions for implementation of the laws; and (iii) identification of key ANNExES 40 The OHADA ("Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa") Treaty was signed in October 2003 in Port Louis, Mauritius. The signatories to this treaty are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cam- eroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 108 Annexes activities for institutional strengthening to ensure sustainable capacity building of OHADA's Permanent Secretariat, located in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The grant also financed the hiring of a legal advisor to the OHADA Permanent Secretariat. Two regional workshops were to be held, presenting the findings of a survey of needs amongst the OHADA signatory states. The findings of this survey were used in the creation of a number of technical working papers to address capacity gaps in member states. ANNExES 109 Africa Regional Justice Note: A Review and Lessons Learned ANNEx iii: List of Participants to the Stakeholder Consultations: "demand Side of Justice workshops" · Ms. Sandra Thompson, Director, Judicial Reforms, Project Development and Implementation, Judicial Service of Ghana · Professor Irene K. Odotei, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Member of the Judicial Council of Ghana, Women in Leadership and Development (WILAD), The Presidential Commission on Chieftaincy Affairs and the National Peace Council of Ghana · Dr. Raymond Atuguba, Associate Director, Legal Resources Centre, Accra, Ghana and Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, Legon · Cllr. Tiawan S. Gongloe, Former Solicitor General of Liberia · Judge Evelina Z. Quaqua, Circuit Court Judge, Criminal Division, Judiciary of Liberia · Cllr. J. Augustine Toe, National Director, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission · Professor Bolaji Owasanoye, Director of Research, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos · Dr. Tahir Mamman, Director General, Council of Legal Education, Abuja · Mrs. Laetitia Nwaka Akinlami, Director General/Chief Executive, Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, Abuja · Mr. Akinola Ola Akinsanya, Director of International Operations, Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, Abuja · Dr. Uju Agomoh, Executive Director, Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action (PRAWA) · Mr. Kenny Aina, Founding Partner, Aina, Blankson & Co., Lagos · Barrister Olumuyiwa Akinboro, Chairman, Nigerian Bar Association Abuja Branch · Mr. Chukwudi Odili, Investment Climate Specialist, Project Management Unit, MSME Project, Abuja · Dr. Thomas A. Timberg, Sr. Adviser, Access to Finance Specialist, MSME Project, Abuja · Mr. Emmanuel Ojukwu, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Nigeria Police Service · Mr. Cyriaque Sobtafo Nguefack, Officer in Charge, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Abuja · Ms. Ugonna Ezekwem, National Project Officer ­ Judicial Reform (UNODC), Nigeria · Mr. Innocent Chukwuma, Executive Director, CLEEN Foundation (Center for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria), Lagos · Mr. Olawale Fapohunda, Managing Partner, Legal Resources Consortium, Lagos · Mrs. Chinelo Iriele, Chairperson, FIDA, Abuja · Ms. Patricia N. Ojeme, Member, FIDA, Abuja, FCT High Court of Justice · Ms. Annabel Gerry, Senior Governance Adviser, Department for International Development (DFID), Abuja · Professor Yemi Akinseye-George, Former Special Assistant to the AG, Abuja · Mrs. Kehinde F. Ajoni Executive Secretary, National Human Rights Commission, Abuja ANNExES · Mr. Danladi Plang, Project Officer, Good Governance and Human Rights, Delegation of the European Commission to Nigeria · Mrs. Oyebiola O. Oyewumi, Deputy Director, Abuja Multi-Door Court House (AMDC) 110 Annexes · Ms. Emiola Oyefuga, Senior State Programme Officer, Security Justice and Growth (SJG) Programme, British Council, Ikeja · Felicitas Aigbogun, Open Society Justice Initiative, Lagos · Olayinka Ogunfiditimi, Aina, Blankson & Co., Abuja · Emeka Ukadike, Aina, Blankson & Co., Abuja · Ms. Odinakaonye Lagi, Network of University Legal Aid Institutions (NULAI), Nigeria · Mr. Dele Peters, Esq., Deputy Director (Research), National Judicial Institute, Abuja · Ms. Nancy Sesay, Program Director, Timap for Justice · Mr. Simeon Koroma, Program Director, Timap for Justice · Mrs. Amie Bensouda, Legal Practitioner, Amie Bensouda & Co and President of The Gambia Bar Association · Mr. Gaye Sowe, Legal Officer, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, Banjul, The Gambia · Mr. Haruna Jaiteh, Ag. Judicial Secretary, Office of the Chief Justice, Judiciary of The Gambia · Mr. Emmanuel Fagbenle, Director of Public Prosecutions, Banjul, The Gambia · Mr. Jo'Rum Nelson Abuodha, Senior Editor, Kenya Law Reports and Secretary to the Judiciary, Rules Committee · Mr. Mandefrot Belay Fenta, Program Director, American Bar Association, Rule of Law Initiative, Ethiopia Program; Senior Lecturer, Addis Ababa University, Faculty of Law · Mrs. Mahdere Paulos, Executive Director, Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) · Mr. Mehrteab Leul, Founder and Manager, Mehrteab and Associates Law Office (Former Judge of the Federal High Court) · Mr. Allen Gichuhi, Advocate, Walker Kontos Law Firm, Kenya · Mr. George Kegoro, Executive Director, The Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) · Mr. John Oriri Onyango, Snr. Deputy Prosecution Counsel, Department of Public Prosecutions · Hon. Mr. Justice Isaac Lenaola, Judge, High Court of Kenya · Mr. Mabvuto Herbert Hara, Partner, Hara & Associates, President, SADC Lawyers Association · Mr. Clifford Msiska, National Director, Paralegal Advisory Service Institute · Mr. Wezi Kayira, Director of Public Prosecutions · Mr. Andrews Kananga, Coordinator to the Secretariat of the Legal Aid Forum, Rwanda · Mr. Mudakikwa John, Executive Secretary, The Youth Association for Human Rights Promotion and Development (AJPRODHO) · Maitre Karangwa Vincent, President of the Kigali Bar Association, Rwanda · Mrs. Jacqueline Bakamurera, Assistant Attorney General in charge of Community Programs, Human Rights and Legal Aid Services · Mrs. Bernadette Uwicyeza, Project Manager Assistant in charge of the Legal Component Competitiveness and Enterprise Development/World Bank ANNExES · Mrs. Alphonsina Mirembe, Justice Sector Coordination Officer · Mr. Kayijuka Ngabo, Military Prosecutor General 111 · Mr. Rajab H. Rajab, Commercial Dispute Resolution Component Manager, Business Environment Strengthening in Tanzania (BEST) · Ms. Emilia Siwingwa, Head of Projects, Tanganyika Law Society · Mr. Clement J. Mashamba, Executive Director, National Organization for Legal Assistance (NOLA) · Hon. Mr. Justice Steven Bwana, Judge, Court of Appeal of Tanzania · Ms. Genoveva Kato, Executive Director, Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA) · Mr. Reginald Martin, Public Engagement Officer (Legal Officer), Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Tanzania · Ms. Haika Mawalla, Personal Assistant to the CEO, Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in Tanzania (CCBRT) · Ms. Mary Massay, Acting Executive Secretary, Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) · Ms. Leticia Mutaki, Senior State Attorney, Office of the Director of Public Prosecution · Mr. Geoffrey Sikira, Director for Continuing Legal Education, Tanganyika Law Society · Hon. 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