Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution Tajikistan Risk and Resilience Assessment APRIL 2017 1 1 © 2017 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not nec- essarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Wash- ington, D.C. 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Cover design and text layout: Duina Reyes-Bakovic Table of Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................5 Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................................................................7 I. Introduction........................................................................................................................9 II. Context and History...........................................................................................................12 A. Context – Demography, Economy, Development Trends ............................................................................................12 B. Tajikistan’s Civil War ....................................................................................................................................................13 C. Recent Violence and Instability in Tajikistan .............................................................................................................14 III. Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) - Priority Risks...........................................................15 A. Governance Risks – Cross-Cutting .............................................................................................................................15 B. Economic Risks ...........................................................................................................................................................16 C. Regionalism, Equity, and Inclusion Risks ...................................................................................................................21 D. Cross-Border and Global Risks ....................................................................................................................................25 IV. Potential triggers/scenarios...............................................................................................28 V. Sources of Resilience..........................................................................................................29 VI. Recommendations: World Bank Support through the Risk Mitigation Regime...................32 A. Background and Current World Bank Approach .........................................................................................................32 B. Tajikistan and The Risk Mitigation Regime..................................................................................................................33 Recommendations - New Programming ........................................................................................................................34 Recommendations Toward an ‘FCV Sensitive’ Portfolio ..................................................................................................36 Recommendations – Process Support.............................................................................................................................38 Annex 1 - References..............................................................................................................................................................41 List of Tables Table 1: Freedom House Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Score........................................................................17 Table 2: Remittances to Tajikistan - Net Inflow in USD (million) per month....................................................................20 Table 3. Social Group Membership and Percentage Who Attended a Meeting of theOrganization in the Past Year...........................................................................................................................................................................24 Table 4. Life in Transition III Key Findings........................................................................................................................29 Table 5: Considerations – Enhancing FCV Sensitivity In The WB Portfolio.......................................................................37 Table 6: Illustrative Indicators – Risk Monitoring System................................................................................................39 3 List of Boxes Box 1: RRA Sources..........................................................................................................................................................10 Box 2: Summary - Sub-Regions impacted by Conflict/At Risk.........................................................................................23 List of Figures Figure 1: Topographic Map of Tajikistan..........................................................................................................................12 Figure 2: GNI per capita, Atlas method ...........................................................................................................................12 Figure 3: RRA framework – Key risks................................................................................................................................16 Figure 4: New business density in Tajikistan ..................................................................................................................18 Figure 5: How Tajikistan and comparator economies rank on the ease of doing business (2016).................................18 Figure 6: How far has Tajikistan come in the areas measured by Doing Business?.........................................................19 Figure 7: Ratios of remittance inflows to GDP (for the “top ten” remittance-receiving countries)..................................20 Figure 8: Unemployment rate in Tajikistan (2000-2013)................................................................................................21 Figure 9: Locations – Conflict Events During Civil War (1992 – 1997)............................................................................22 Figure 10: Locations – Conflict Events in Post-War Period/Recent Violence (1998 – 2015).............................................22 Figure 11: Conflict Events (1998-2015) and Poverty Rates.............................................................................................22 Figure 12: Conflict Events (1998-2015) and Non-Monetary Poverty Measures..............................................................22 Figure 13: Youth Idleness................................................................................................................................................23 Figure 14: Suicide fighters by nationality ......................................................................................................................25 Figure 15: Life satisfaction: percentage of respondents who are satisfied with life, all things considered.....................29 Figure 16: Personal Life Satisfaction...............................................................................................................................30 Figure 17: Do Representatives on the Mahalla Committee Work for the Community or Do They Work for the State? ...................................................................................................................................................................30 Figure 18: New Programming Areas in Response to RRA-Identified Risks......................................................................34 Acknowledgements The Risk and Resilience Assessment was prepared by a team jointly led by the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience (GSURR) Global Practice and Fragility, Conflict and Violence Cross-Cutting Solutions Area (FCV CCSA), in close cooperation with the Tajikistan Country Management Unit (CMU) under the leader- ship of Patricia Veevers-Carter, Country Manager. The RRA core team was co-led by Holly Benner, Senior Social Development Specialist/GSURR and Radhika Srinivasan, Lead Operations Officer/FCV CCSA and included Julia Komagaeva, Country Operations Officer; Sobir Kurbanov, Consultant; Jennifer Murtazashvili, Consultant; Paul Quinn-Judge, Consultant; and Robert Wrobel, Senior Social Development Specialist. The team is grateful to the Tajikistan country team, in- cluding the CMU and task teams based in Dushanbe and Washington D.C., for their collaborative efforts on the RRA development process and their excellent support to the RRA mission in February-March 2017. A special thanks to Sarosh Sattar, Senior Economist and Kimberly Johns and the Governance Global Practice for their contributions in developing the RRA draft. 4 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACP Agriculture Commercialization Project EFCA Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Base EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative ADB Asian Development Bank EU European Union AF Additional Financing FCV Fragility, Conflict, and Violence AKF Aga Khan Foundation FSAP Financial System Assessment Program ALG Accountability in Local Government FY Fiscal Year (survey) GBAO Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast ASA Analytical and Advisory Services GDP Gross Domestic Product BEEPS Business Enterprise Survey GNI Gross National Income CA Central Asia GOT Government of Tajikistan CAEWDP Central Asia Energy and Water Development GPSA Global Partnership for Social Accountability Program GTD Global Terrorism Database CARS4 Central Asia Road Links HPP Hydropower Plant CASA1000 Central Asia South Asia Power Transmission Line IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development CAMP4ASB Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Program for Aral Sea Basin IFIs International Financial Institutions CCSA Cross-Cutting Solution Area IDA International Development Association CPF Country Partnership Framework ICG International Crisis Group CPS Country Partnership Strategy ICCT International Center for Counter-Terrorism CPI Consumers Price Inflation IFC International Finance Corporation CPIA Country Portfolio Instituional Assessment IED Identified Explosive Devise CSO Civil Society Organizations IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan CSP Community Suport Program IMF International Monetary Fund CE Citizens Engagement IOM International Organization for Migration CLD Community Led Development IRPT Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan CMU Country Management Unit IS Islamic State DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Levanta DCC Development Coordination Council IWMI International Water Management Institute DFID UK Department for International KWH Kilowatt Per Hour Development LDC Local Development Committee DRM Disaster Risk Management LGA Local Governance Assessment DPF Development Policy Financing LGP Local Governance Project EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and LITS Life in Transition Survey Development L2T Listening to Tajikistan Survey ECA Europe and Central Asia 5 MDI Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management MFI Microfinance Institutions PSD Private Sector Development MOF Ministry of Finance RRA Risk and Resilience Assessment MOEDT Ministry of Economic Development and Trade RMR Risk Mitigation Regime MOLEM Ministry of Labor, Employment and ROSC Report on Observance of Standards and Migration Codes MTDS Mid Term Development Strategy SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic MOEWR Ministry of Energy and Water Resources SMEs Small and Medium Size Enterprises NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization SOEs State Owned Enterprises NGO Non-governmental Organization TA Technical Assistance NBT National Bank of Tajikistan TF Trust Fund NDS National Development Strategy TJS Tajikistan Somoni NEET Neither Employed nor Looking for Work UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program NPLs Non Performing Loans UNDP United Nations Development Program OBOR One Belt One Road Initiative UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Development Refugees OMON Special Police Forces UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation USAID United States Agency for International in Europe Development PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial USD United States Dollar Accountability UTO United Tajik Opposition PER Public Expenditure Review WBG World Bank Group PFM Public Financial Management WDR World Development Report PPA Project Preparation Advance WGI World Governance Indicators PLR Performance and Learning Review VE Violent Extremism 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I n recognizing the changing nature and scope of fragili- ty, conflict and violence (FCV), the World Bank (WB) is taking a new and differentiated approach to addressing il war that took upwards of 60,000 lives and displaced many more. Pervasive governance challenges impact across sectors, including consolidation of political and economic power, the full spectrum of FCV situations. This includes action corruption, and the closing of political space. in fragile situations in middle-income countries, not just in the least-developed countries and considering regional con- Political and security challenges exacerbate, and are exac- flicts and spillovers, not just national-level fragility. This also erbated by, economic, social, and cross-border risks. Tajiki- includes tackling FCV risks and long-term drivers, not just stan remains the poorest of the former Soviet Republics, and the adverse development outcomes of conflict. By targeting as the most remittance dependence country in the world, is potential socio-economic fault lines in vulnerable countries, highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the Russian economy. the WB seeks to contribute to the avoidance of wide-scale Rampant and systemic corruption plagues Tajikistan along- crises and their significant human and economic costs. The side issues of tax practices, and administrative barriers that new International Development Association (IDA) 18 ‘Risk stymie private sector growth. Mitigation Regime (RMR)’ pilots development interventions Tajikistan also faces the growing specter of radicaliza- as a prevention tool—scaling up financial support that proac- tion and recruitment to violent extremism as well as de- tively targets FCV risks and reinforces sources of resilience. cades-long border tensions, disputes with its neighbors Tajikistan is included as one of four pilot countries (also over natural resource management and the ongoing threat Nepal, Guinea, and Niger) under the RMR. Countries eligi- of climatic and natural disaster shocks. Tajikistan’s more ble for support were identified on the basis of the following than 1,300-kilometer border with Afghanistan is of concern criteria: (i) evidence of significant FCV risks; (ii) evidence because of its length and relative insecurity. Decreased U.S. of government and donor commitment to address the risks; and NATO troop presence has resulted in expanded Taliban (iii) stable macroeconomic framework; and (iv) availability and Islamic State (IS) presence. The Tajik-Kyrgyz border is of financial resources. Under the RMR, a “Risk and Resilience also a source of regular, low-level friction over access to water Assessment (RRA)” is conducted and then an “Implementa- and pasturage and Tajikistan has experienced tensions with tion Note” is prepared to guide the allocation of increased neighboring Uzbekistan over the construction of the Rogun financing. Dam. This RRA Report identifies the multi-dimensional risks Many stakeholders within Tajikistan express concern that that increase Tajikistan’s vulnerability to violence and in- large and growing numbers of unemployed and idle youth stability, as well as sources of resilience, and makes recom- could be a future threat to stability. This includes the grow- mendations on potential areas of WB programming. The ing numbers of returning and, in particular, deported mi- assessment draws on a literature review and consultations, grants that might be more susceptible to recruitment to vi- including an RRA mission to Tajikistan in February-March olent extremism. The government estimates that more than 2017 in developing its analysis and recommendations. How- 1,000 Tajik citizens have fled to join IS. The return of even a ever, it was beyond the scope of the RRA to include new pri- few recruits intent on destabilizing the country through ter- mary data collection. rorist attacks could have significant repercussions. Since the end of its civil war in 1997, Tajikistan has made Despite challenges, there are several sources of resilience in impressive gains that are currently under threat in large Tajikistan that could help mitigate FCV risks and potential part due to an escalating governance crisis that impacts triggers of violence. These include the collective memory of across sectors. Most global indices that examine fragility and the severe costs of the civil war and popular interest in sta- conflict place Tajikistan in a category of elevated risk. The bility, the strength of local institutions, ‘up-skilling’ and mo- primary source of uncertainty surrounds the consolidation bility as a positive dynamic of labor migration, the potential of political power, which has undermined the power-sharing (alongside peril) of energy investments, and the opportunity principles of the 1997 peace accord that ended a five-year civ- for enhanced regional cooperation. 7 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution The goal of incremental financing support through the RMR development border Tajik-Afghan on thewould also address Tajik-Afghan the multi-vector border would also is to pilot preventive support to address FCV risks that con- water-food-irrigation-energy challenges faced by both address the multi-vector water-food-irrigation-energy strain development progress. Financing cannot be used for countries. challenges faced by both countries. ‘business-as-usual’ investment operations that are not linked to identified • • Agriculture Agriculture and and food food security: security: Recognizing Recognizing Tajikistan’s Tajikistan’s risks,even identified risks, these evenifif theseinterventions interventions may contribute may contrib- to broader development goals. RRA analysis points to three vulnerability to climate vulnerability climate shocks, shocks, natural natural disasters disasters and and re- resul- ute to broader development goals. RRA analysis points to categories of recommendations, including: 1) new areas of sultant tant foodfood insecurity insecurity challenges, challenges, additional additional financing financing to three categories of recommendations, including: 1) new areas programming; 2) 2) considerations for to assist the government to set up a contingency fund to of programming; considerations enhancing the forenhancing the ‘FCV ‘FCV assist the government to set up a contingency fund to sensitivity’ ensure a ensure a more structured approach more structured approach to agricultural risk to agricultural of the current WB sensitivity’ of the current WB portfolio; and 3) process and portfolio; and 3) process and risk capacity building support. support. management, tailored to the risks that threaten sustain- capacity building management, tailored to the risks that threaten sustain- able food security. able food security. Options 1) for new Options multi-sectoral for investments new multi-sectoral targeting investments prior- targeting ity FCV risks: RRA analysis points to potential pathways to increase the priority FCV risks: 2) RRA analysis points to potential pathways to increase sensitivity of the current World Bank portfolio to gover- the sensitivity of the current World Bank portfolio to gov- • • Employment Employment and inclusion initiative and inclusion targeting youth initiative targeting youth nance and FCV risks, with particular attention paid to ernance and addressing FCVFCV risks, and with particular governance attention challenges paid to in high-risk/ and returning migrants: Combination and returning migrants: Combination of supply side of supply side addressing FCV and governance challenges high-reward sectors such as extractives and energy. Ap- in high-risk/ (preparing (preparing for and connecting for and youth to connecting youth jobs) with to jobs) with de- de- high-reward proaches sectors include such as extractives benefit-sharing arrangementsand in energy. Ap- large-scale mand side mand (supporting entrepreneurship, side (supporting entrepreneurship, re-skilling, re-skilling, SME development) to spur job to spur job creation. creation. Also Also to proaches include benefit-sharing arrangements infrastructure investments as well as governance and over- in large-scale SME development) to include include infrastructure investments complementary youth engagement and inclusion activ- complementary youth engagement and inclusion activ- sight preconditions attachedas towell as governance mitigate governanceand risksover- and ities. sight preconditions increase transparency. attached to mitigate governance risks and ities. increase transparency. Local The RRA also suggests a series of process-related recom- • • development platforms: Local development Developing new platforms: Developing new mecha- mecha- nisms 3) The RRA mendations, also suggests focusing a series on capacity of process-related building to implement rec- nisms to enable the to enable GoT to the GoT to allocate allocate resources resources toto jamoat jamoat (sub-national/community) ommendations, RMR programming, risk on focusing capacity and monitoring building to implement promoting citizen level, including tailored (sub-national/community) level, including tailored sup- sup- port RMR programming, engagement. risk monitoring As a pre-condition and promoting for advancement of thecitizen Risk to high port to high risk risk sub-regions. sub-regions. Such an approach Such an approach would: would: (i) engagement. Mitigation Regime financing, the As a pre-condition World for Bank and advancement theGov- ofthe Risk promote equitable (i) promote equitable and transparent sub-national and transparent sub-national re-re- source allocation; (ii) facilitate participation in local local de- ernment Mitigation of Regime Tajikistan could commit financing, the Worldto a Bank and monitor- joint risk the Gov- source allocation; (ii) facilitate participation in de- cision-making; (iii) build build trust trust between ing system ernment offor the RMR. Tajikistan Joint monitoring would commit to woulda jointinclude risk moni-two cision-making; (iii) the citizen between the citizen and and state; and (iv) stimulate local economic activity. categories toring systemof indicators. for the RMR. First, a set Joint of contextual monitoring would indicators include state; and (iv) stimulate local economic activity. to twomonitor whether categories FCV risks of indicators. are a First, increasing or whether set of contextual the indica- • • Cross-border development Cross-border developmentprogramming: programming: Encouraging Encourag- country is on a more positive and stable path. tors to monitor whether FCV risks are increasing or wheth- This would joint action on shared development challenges, ing joint action on shared development challenges, includ- in- include a priority er the country list is on a of governance-related more positive and stable indicators path. This to ing: exploration of reinvestment in the ‘Friendship cluding: exploration of reinvestment in the ‘Friendship Line’, track reform progress. Second, a collection of programmatic/ will include a priority list of governance-related indicators a power Line’ transmission , a power line between transmission Tajikistan line between and/or Tajikistan anda outcome indicators to track reform to assess progress. whether Second, investments a collection through of program- regionally-focused Ferghana Valley development Uzbekistan; regional cooperation on disaster prevention pro- the Risk Mitigation Regime are effectively matic/outcome indicators to assess whether investmentstackling identified gram. River basin and riparian zone development on the risks. through the Risk Mitigation Regime are effectively tackling and response; and/or a regionally-focused Ferghana Val- ley development program. River basin and riparian zone identified risks. RRA Identified Risks Possible Areas – New Programming Governance reform and joint Governance challenges monitoring Youth/Migrant Employment and Economic risks - Unemployment/idleness, youth bulge, Inclusion Initiative migrants, barriers to PSD Local development platforms Regionalism and Inclusion Disparities in sub-regional development; ‘hot spots’ – FCV risks Agriculture and food security Cross-border and global risks Cross-border development programming 8 8 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution I. INTRODUCTION I. INTRODUCTION 1. 1. Tajikistan was Tajikistan was ill-equipped ill-equipped for for independence independence in 1991,in after that, in perhaps significance against thethe backdrop most significant security event of announcements in in late and slipped 1991, and slippedalmost immediately almost immediatelyinto violence. into violence. In the The collapse recent years, 2014 that thea IMU top Tajik had special forces commander sworn allegiance defected to the Islamic State of the of words Sovieta prominent Union gave Tajikthehistorian, country the options,endured fewcountry a senior to IS.32 Soon after that, in perhaps the most significant security (IS). “one of the most painful state building politician and religious figure later recalled. In 1991 attempts of modern few peo- event in recent years, a top Tajik special forces commander Central Asian 3. to IS.3and security challenges exacerbate, and are Political ple were even history”, thinking 1 slipping almost immediately about independence, let alone into vi- draw- defected olence. The civil war that erupted in 1992 took more than exacerbated by, economic, social, and cross-border risks. ing up plans. As a result, in the words of a prominent Tajik 60,000 lives, Tajikistan 3. remains Political andthe of the post-Soviet poorestchallenges security exacerbate,states, andde-are historian thedisplaced many more country endured “one andof further the most damaged the painful state country’s fragile infrastructure. It also brought to 1the fore pendent exacerbatedlargely oneconomic, by, migrant worker social, remittances, which have and cross-border risks. building attempts of modern Central Asian history”, slipping the continuing power of regionalism: fluctuated Tajikistan sharply remains the past in the few years poorest of the in response tostates, post-Soviet Russia’sde- almost immediately into violence. Thewhile the belligerents civil war that erupted economic problems. sector development Private worker has been claimed to espouse varying political and religious aims, they pendent largely on migrant remittances, which have in 1992 took more than 60,000 lives, displaced many more hindered poor governance bysharply practices, and were largely organized, politically and militarily, along re-It fluctuated in the past few years in the country response to has Rus- and further damaged the country’s fragile infrastructure. recently experienced a series of banking gional lines. The civil war also pushed many of the country’s sia’s economic problems. Private sectorcrises. The country development is has been also brought to the fore the continuing power of regionalism: also facing by a significant youth bulge with high rates of youth best educated academics, cultural figures and administrators hindered poor governance practices, and the country has while the belligerents claimed to espouse varying political unemployment and idleness. out of the country. recently experienced a seriesWith its unique of banking geography, crisis. The countryTa- is and religious aims, they were largely organized, politically jikistan is also subject to regional tensions also facing a significant youth bulge witharound border high rates se- of youth and militarily, 2. The civilalong regional war ended lines.with in 1997 The a civil war peace also pushed accord that, curity and natural resource sharing, particularly over water unemployment and idleness. With its unique geography, Ta- many of the country’s best educated thanks to a power sharing agreement, was able for a fewacademics, cultural fig- and riparian zones. jikistan is also subject to regional tensions around border se- ures and administrators out of the country. years to ensure a degree of peaceful political competition. curityIndeed, 4. and natural most resource sharing, global indices examine over particularly that water fragility In recent years, the potential for increased fragility has grown and riparian zones. The civil 2. Tajikistan, in aswar haveended in 1997challenges. governance with a peace accord Over that, the past and conflict place Tajikistan in a category of elevated risk.4 thanks to a power sharing agreement, decade, violence in the country has not been characterized was able for a few Although Tajikistan has made substantial progress in certain 4. Indeed, most global indices that examine fragility and years to ensure a degree of peaceful political by widespread social or political unrest. Much of it has taken competition . In areas over the past decade, trends over the past two years conflict place Tajikistan in a category of elevated risk.4 Al- recent years, political instability and the place in two eastern regions, Gharm and Gorno-Badakhshan, potential for violence indicate the potential for an increase in fragility, vulnerabil- though Tajikistan has made substantial progress in certain ar- in Tajikistan that were the have grown, backbone ofas have pervasive opposition forcesgovernance in the civil chal- war ity, and overall instability that could threaten development eas over the past decade, trends over the past two years indi- and which have been traditionally suspicious of theand lenges, including extreme consolidation of political eco- central progress. For this reason, as part of the World Bank’s IDA 18 nomic power, Meanwhile government. corruption, in the closing andnorthern of political Tajikistan, space. Islamic Over the past decade, fighters—described violence as the Islamic in Movement the country ofhas not been Uzbekistan 2 Russia’s RIA Novosti reported the event in October 2015. https://ria. ru/world/20141006/1027067431.html. Other reports date the swearing of (IMU) or an off-shoot—claimed characterized by widespread social responsibility for fatal or political unrest. at- Much allegiance to late July 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/. tacks. The of it has magnitude taken place in these oftwo attacks eastern was smaller regions, Gharm thanand those Gor- 3 3 Commander Commander elite of of Tajik elite police Tajik policeforce defects force to Islamic defects to Islamic State State- in the east, but the attacks http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-tajikistan-idUSKB- no-Badakhshan, that werehave taken on greater the backbone significance of opposition forces http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-tajikistan-idUSKB- N0OD1AP20150528. against the backdrop in the civil war and which of announcements in late 2014 have been traditionally that the suspicious 4 N0OD1AP20150528. The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index assessed Tajikistan as IMU had sworn allegiance to the Islamic 4 The Fund for Peace ofFragile States against Index assessed Tajikistan as “High of any central government. Meanwhile inState (IS).2 Tajiki- northern Soon “High Warning. Warning. ” As ” As a result a result oppression ofReport oppression religious against religious groups, the groups, the U.S. De- U.S. Department of State on International Religious Freedom for stan, Islamic fighters—described as the Islamic Movement of State Report partmentdesignated Tajikistan on International Tajikistan as a “country Religious Freedom of particular for Tajikistan concern” a of Uzbekistan (IMU) or an off-shoot—claimed responsibility designated Tajikistan deterioration as a “country from its previous rank asofa particular country on concern”—a the “watch deteriora- list.” https:// from its previous rank as a country on the “watch list. tion uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tajikistan%202015.pdf. www. ” https://www. Over the past for fatal attacks. The magnitude of these attacks were smaller 1 http://kamolkhon.com/conflict-resolution-in-tajikistan. uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tajikistan%202015.pdf. decade, Freedom House Democracy Scores for Tajikistan Over the fell past from decade, 5.96 to than Russia’s 2 those RIA in the east, Novosti but the reported the attacks have taken event in October on greater 2015. https://ria. Freedom 6.54 House (on a scale Democracy from Scoresit 1 to 7), making for Tajikistan one felldemocratic from 5.96 to of the least 6.54 (on former ru/world/20141006/1027067431.html. Other reports date the swearing of Soviet a scalerepublics. from 1 to In 2016, 7), the OECD making it one ofclassified the leastTajikistan democraticas a fragileSoviet state former allegiance to late July 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/. for the first time republics. since In 2016, the2011. OECD classified Tajikistan as a fragile state for the 1 http://kamolkhon.com/conflict-resolution-in-tajikistan. first time since 2011. 9 9 scale up in support to countries facing FCV challenges, Tajik- jikistan’s four regions in February-March, 2017, to identify a istan was included as one of four pilot countries (also Nepal, subset of risks that are analyzed in detail in Chapter 3 of this Guinea, and Niger) in a new ‘Risk Mitigation Regime.’ The report. It was beyond the scope of the assessment to collect Risk Mitigation Regime provides incremental World Bank fi- primary data. Thus data gaps limit the depth of analysis for nancing to undertake preventive programming to target FCV certain themes. risks before they result in widespread violence. Countries el- igible for support are identified on the basis of the following 6. Structure of the report. Chapter 2 of the Report pro- criteria: (i) evidence of significant FCV risks; (ii) evidence vides an overview of Tajikistan’s geography, demography, and of government commitment to address the identified risks; economy and discusses the historical context that has led to (iii) stable macroeconomic framework; and (iv) availability Tajikistan’s current challenges. Chapter 3 then provides an of financial resources. Under the Risk Mitigation Regime, a overview of the priority risks—governance and security, eco- “Risk and Resilience Assessment” is conducted and then an nomic, inclusion/regionalism, and cross-border/global that “Implementation Note is prepared to guide the allocation of increase Tajikistan’s vulnerability to violence and instability. increased financing. Chapter 4 goes on to discuss the specific triggers or scenarios that could destabilize the status quo or lead to widespread un- 5. This Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) is in- rest. Chapter 5 identifies sources of resilience the WBG may tended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the wish to consider and build upon. In Chapter 6, the Report FCV stresses facing Tajikistan and the potential role of the concludes with suggested recommendations to the World Bank in helping to address these risks. The RRA identifies Bank on the way forward. The analysis of this report draws the multi-dimensional risks that worsen Tajikistan’s vulner- on the Systematic Country Diagnostic for Tajikistan that is abilities to economic, political, governance and social break- under development, the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) down and propensity for organized violence. It gives greatest for Tajikistan FY 2014-2018 and the draft Performance and priority to fragility risks and fault lines that are actively pre- Learning Review (PLR) of the CPS, as well as key fragility venting development pathways from taking root. The assess- frameworks such as the World Development Report 2011 and ment utilized a literature review, and a series of consultations, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuild- including consultations carried out in-country in three of Ta- ing (see box 1 for an overview of RRA sources). BOX 1: RRA SOURCES This report relies on several sources of information, including Government Tracking Impact of Tajikistan Land Reform Across Multiple Projects, Donors strategic documents and statistics, WBG assessments and reports, other and Districts from 2006-2016 Using a Common Core of Survey Questions partner assessments, public opinion and surveys, and RRA mission con- and Field Method, Paper prepared for presentationat the 2017 World sultations. Below is the short summary of each category: Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, The WorldBank - Washington DC, March 20-24, 2017 Government information: Real Estate Registration Project, Social Assessment Report, March2016 Tajikistan National Development Strategy, 2015-2030 Water Management in Central Asia: Problems, Causes and Consequenc- Tajikistan, Mid Term Development Strategy, 2016-2020 es,a social assessment based on water user perceptions, January 2014, Tajikistan, Demographic Statistics, State Statistical Committee Social Development Unit of the Sustainable Development, Europe and Central Asia Department (ECSSO). Tajikistan, Concept on Local Government Development till 2030, Decree of the President of RT, #522, July 2015 Poverty Diagnostic and Social Impact Assessment of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Tajikistan, Concept Note, June 2015 Tajikistan Finan- World Bank Analysis: cial Sector Assessment (FSAP), 2016, World Bank,IMF The note on Fragility, Conflict & Disaster Nexus: Focus on Tajikistan and Tajikistan: Jobs diagnostic, Strategic framework for jobs, January 2017, ECA region. Jobs CCSA Improving service delivery through governance reform, is decentraliza- Assessment of Household Energy Deprivation in Tajikistan, June 2014, tionan answer for Tajikistan, World Bank Policy Note,March 2013. Social Development Unit of the Sustainable Development, Europe and Central Asia Department (ECSSO). Mid-term Report on Youth Entrepreneurship in Tajikistan, Tajikistan Youth Entrepreneurship project LLI, November 2016 Tajikistan Agriculture Policy Update, August 8, 2014 10 BOX 1: RRA SOURCES (CONT.) Other partner assessments: Public opinion and surveys: Life in Transition (LITS): EBRD: The survey seeks to analyze and understand Sociological survey: The causes of radicalization of young people and mea- how transition has affected the lives of people in regions, and what their sures on its prevention, Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia (EFCA) project, views are on issues such as democracy, the role of the state, and prospects as was conducted in five districts of the Republic of Tajikistan for the future. LITS sampled 1,500 men and women in Tajikistan to achieve Inter-governmental fiscal relations analysis, European Union, (ongoing) a nationally representative sample. Assessment of service delivery in the pilot districts through decentraliza- Listening to Tajikistan (L2T): World Bank, UNICEF, a survey to monitor the tion, USAID local governance project impact of emerging trends in poverty throughout the country at high fre- Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Rasht Valley, Shurabad District quency. It tracks the wellbeing and deprivations of a nationally representa- and GBAO, Tajikistan, Aga Khan, GIZ, 2004 tive random sample of 800 households in Tajikistan. Assessing Increased Awareness and Use of Land Restructuring and Land Doing Business in Tajikistan: The data in this report are current as of June Use Rights and Their Impacts on Farming, Crop Diversification and House- 1, 2015 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period from hold Food, and Gender in 12 Project Rayons of Khatlon Region, Tajikistan, January to December 2014).a Eric A. Abbott, International Consultant August, 2016, USAID Tajikistan Food Security Monitoring, World Food Program, 2015-2016 a For more see: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/109111468186539 635/pdf/100861-WP-Box393248B-PUBLIC-DB2016-TJK.pdf 11 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution II. CONTEXT II. CONTEXT AND AND HISTORY HISTORY CONTEXT– A. CONTEXT – DEMOGRAPHY, DEMOGRAPHY, FIGURE 1: TOPOGRAPHIC MAP OF TAJIKISTAN A. CONTEXT ECONOMY, – DEMOGRAPHY, DEVELOPMENT TRENDS FIGURE 1: TOPOGRAPHIC MAP OF TAJIKISTAN ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT TRENDS 7. ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT TRENDS Landlocked and largely mountainous, with a popula- 7. Landlocked and largely mountainous, with a popula- tion 7. of about 8 million Landlocked and a GNI and largely per capita with mountainous, of US$1,240 a popula- in tion of about 8 million and a GNI per capita of US$1,240 in 2015 tion (Atlas of about methodology), 8 million and Tajikistan a GNI per is the poorest capita of country US$1,240 in 2015 (Atlas methodology), Tajikistan is the poorest country in 2015Europe (Atlas and Central Asia methodology), (ECA). Bordering Tajikistan Afghanistan is the poorest country in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Bordering Afghanistan to in the south, Europe andChina to the Central east, Asia Kyrgyz (ECA). Republic to Bordering the north, Afghanistan to the south, China to the east, Kyrgyzstan to the north, and and to theUzbekistan south, to theto west, barely 7 percent of the country’s Uzbekistan toChina the west, the east, barely 7 Kyrgyzstan percent of the to the north, country’s and land land area isto Uzbekistan arable, the due barely west, to its elevation 7 percent and of topography; the country’s the land area is arable, due to its elevation and topography; the rest rest area consists is arable,of glaciers, due to mountains, its elevation and and pastureland topography; or steppe the rest consists of glaciers, mountains, and pastureland or steppe that support consists livestock of glaciers, grazing. Endowed mountains, with abundant and pastureland or steppewa- that support livestock grazing. Endowed with abundant wa- ter that resources, support Tajikistan’s livestock hydropower grazing. Endowed potential, with includingwa- abundant for ter resources, Tajikistan’s hydropower potential, including for export, ter is substantial. resources, Coal, Tajikistan’s silver, and hydropower gold, areincluding potential, present and for export, is substantial. Coal, silver, and gold, are present and possibly export, significant is substantial.reserves Coal, of hydrocarbons silver, and gold, were are discovered present and possibly significant reserves of hydrocarbons were discovered in mid-2012. possibly significant reserves of hydrocarbons were discovered in mid-2012. in mid-2012. 8. The population of Tajikistan is ethnically diverse, al 8. The population of Tajikistan is ethnically diverse, al- though 8. Thethe vast majority population of the population of Tajikistan is ethnicallyarediverse, ethnically al- FIGURE 2: GNI PER CAPITA, ATLAS METHOD though Tajik. though the vast majority According to the vast majority2010 of the population estimates, 84 percent of the population are ethnically of are the popu- FIGURE 2: GNI (CURRENT US$)PER CAPITA, ATLAS METHOD Tajik. According to 2010 estimates, 84 percent of ethnically the popu- lation Tajik. are ethnic Tajiks, According to 2010 14 percent are 84Uzbeks, and 2 percent (CURRENT US$) lation are ethnic Tajiks, 14estimates, percent are percentand Uzbeks, of the popu- 2 percent consist lation are of other groups (including Pamiri, and 2Russian, Kyrgyz, consist of ethnic Tajiks, 14 other groups percent are (including Uzbeks, Pamiri, Kyrgyz, percent Russian, Turkmen, Tatar, other and consist of Tatar, and groupsArabs). 5 The population 5 (including remains Pamiri, Kyrgyz, largely Russian, Turkmen, Arabs). The population remains largely rural Turkmen,(73 percent). Tatar, and With the Arabs). exception 5 of The population Dushanbe remains (popula- largely rural (73 percent). With the exception of Dushanbe (popula- tion of rural (73about 800,000), percent). Withmost of Tajikistan’s the exception cities (as(popula- of Dushanbe defined tion of about 800,000), most of Tajikistan’s cities (as defined by the tion ofgovernment) about 800,000), are small of with fewer than 50,000 inhabi- by the government) are most small with Tajikistan’s fewer than cities (as defined 50,000 inhabi- tants. About 40 by theAbout government) percent of are of all small urban residents with fewer live thanlive in 50,000 Dushan- inhabi- tants. 40 percent all urban residents in Dushan- be. Over tants. the past About 15 years, 40 percent of the level of all urban urbanization residents live inhas grown Dushan- be. Over the past 15 years, the level of urbanization has grown only by be. Over 0.21 percentage the percentage past 15 years, points, with the level oflimited mobility urbanization hasfor rural grown only by 0.21 points, with limited mobility for rural populations. only by 0.21 percentage points, with limited mobility for rural populations. populations. 9. Tajikistan is Central Asia’s least accessible, most iso- 9. Tajikistan is Central Asia’s least accessible, most iso- lated 9. country, Tajikistan with only limited is Central Asia’sregional and international least accessible, most iso- lated country, with only limited regional and international lated country, with only limited regional and international 5 CIA World Factbook, Tajikistan Country Profile, https://www.cia. 5 5 CIAWorld CIA Factbook, Tajikistan WorldFactbook, Country Profile, Tajikistan Country Profile, https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html Source: World Bank Development Indicators gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html Source: World Bank Development Indicators 12 12 12 connectivity. This is partly a function of the country’s geog- gions pushing hard for greater self-determination and other raphy and topography: internal and regional communication regions embracing opposition political parties. These ten- and transportation are problematic, especially in winter. Ta- sions were based on an unequal distribution of power and jikistan’s relations with its neighbors are encumbered by at resources during the Soviet period. least three concerns: (a) the management of shared energy and water resources—exemplified by Uzbekistan’s opposition 13. The debate also saw the re-emergence of regional to the proposed Rogun Hydropower Plant6; (b) the flow of animosities. Tajikistan, which had hoped to remain part of illicit drugs across Tajikistan’s territory from South Asia to a loosely federated single successor state to the Soviet Union Eastern Europe; and (c) uncertainties stemming from the and thus continue receiving the vital economic subsidies situation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of most in- from Moscow that kept the country going, had no choice but ternational forces.7 to opt for independence. A contest for power, economic re- sources and increased regional rights ensued. The civil war 10. The return of stability after the conclusion of the civil featured fighting between factions representing four regions war and initial reforms led to growth averaging 8 percent of the country. annually from 2000-16, with significant poverty reduction. Poverty declined 81 percent in 1999 to 47 percent in 2009 and 14. Regional rivalries that manifested during the Tajik- down to about 31 percent in 2015. Extreme poverty dropped istan civil war were a product of long-simmering tensions even faster—from 73 percent to 14 percent during the same that began to emerge after World War II. Elites from Khu- period. Labor earnings accounted for half the decline and re- jand dominated both the government and the Communist mittances for about one-third. The benefits of growth were Party in Soviet Tajikistan during the postwar era. Khujandis also widely shared: consumption by the bottom 40 percent seemed to have a monopoly on the most lucrative govern- grew faster than that of the population at large. However, ment portfolios. Sitting in the agriculturally fertile Ferghana economic mobility was volatile and higher in rural compared Valley and located on rail lines that connected to Moscow, to urban areas. Moreover, poverty reduction for women was Khujand was also the center of economic production. Elites lower than for men and the gender wage gap widened.8 from Khujand used their position to “distribute patronage and manage networks based on resources distributed from 11. Tajikistan has been unable to create enough jobs the national level.”10 By the 1970s, Kulobi elites emerged as for its growing labor force. Since 2006, the population has the second most powerful group in the country, managing increased by 17 percent, while formal employment rose by patronage networks and partnering with Khujandis to con- only 10 percent. Employment growth in industry has been trol most of the country’s industrial base. Individuals from minimal and only modest in agriculture and services, the two these two regions represented the bulk of communist party largest sectors. The relatively small construction sector expe- membership in the country. rienced the highest growth rates (8 percent), driven mainly by remittances. This low growth in overall employment, as 15. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided an oppor- well as limited internal labor mobility, explain the relative- tunity for regions who had fewer ties to Moscow and lim- ly small contribution of employment to poverty reduction, ited access to control of industry and patronage networks, compared to migration.9 to forge a realignment of regional powers in the nascent democracy. Groups from Gharm and Badakhshan, who long B. TAJIKISTAN’S CIVIL WAR felt excluded from the most important government and eco- nomic institutions, began to agitate for democracy, cultural 12. The civil war grew out of the ferment of the last few rights, and other issues that would allow them a more prom- years of perestroika. The country was drawn into the pas- inent seat at the table. Rivalries among these regional groups sionate debates across the Soviet Union on multiparty de- first emerged over control of government positions, at both mocracy, sovereignty and self-determination. The debate in the national and sub-national levels, in the late-Soviet pe- Tajikistan often had a strong regional tinge, with certain re- riod at a time when Soviet authorities in Moscow had little ability to manage these regional conflicts.11 Long festering re- sentment of Khujandi/Kulobi domination led to an alliance forged among groups from Gharm and Badakhshan under the umbrella of the United Tajik Opposition. After the civ- 6 Note: At the time of writing the Uzbek opposition to the hydropower plant appears to be abating with a new President in Uzbekistan. 7 The World Bank, “World Bank Group Country Partnership Strategy for Tajikistan for the Period FY15-18” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, May 2014), 3, http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/294261468339630573/pdf/863720CAS0P146010Box- 10 Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and 385211B00OUO090.pdf. Social History (ANU E Press, 2013), 141. 8 The World Bank, “World Bank Group Country Partnership Strategy 11 Lawrence P. Markowitz, State Erosion: Unlootable Resources and for the Period FY15-18” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, May 2014), 4. Unruly Elites in Central Asia, First edition (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 9 Ibid., 8. University Press, 2013). 13 il war, the Kulobi faction displaced Khujandis as the group to about 70 percent below its 1991 level.14 Following the war, dominating of state organizations of power. the country remained sharply divided between regions that had fought on the losing side and a new ruling elite. 16. Most of the fighting was concentrated in the south of the country. The war was largely deadlocked by 1993, and ne- C. RECENT VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN TAJIKISTAN gotiations began tentatively the following year. The UN spon- sored a ceasefire between opposition and the government in 1996. A peace accord followed in 1997. This accord included 18. Most violence involving significantly sized armed an extensive power sharing between the government and the group events in Tajikistan since the end of the civil war in opposition. In 1998, the government pardoned all opposition 1997 has stemmed from confrontations between govern- leaders, even those in exile, and appointed Akbar Turajonzo- ment forces and former members of the opposition. Violent da, a prominent UTO leader, as first deputy prime minister. events have mainly taken place in civil war opposition strong- The power sharing compromise was strongly criticized by holds. In each case the dominant aim of the opposition has UTO hardliners, while pro-government politicians expressed been to push back and deter efforts by the central government deep reluctance at another part of the agreement, the legal- to control their regions. ization of the IRPT. 19. Much of the violence has been geographically limit- 17. The civil war left a terrible legacy that affects the coun- ed, characterized by struggles between the central elite and try to this day: the war killed over 60,000 people, displaced local leaders for the control of state resources. Recent vio- more than a half a million12, and left the poorest republic of lence has come from Gorno-Badakhshan and Gharm, two the former Soviet Union in shambles – “a ruined economy, eastern regions that have lost much of their political and eco- a destroyed administration and a highly fragmented soci- nomic clout. ety.”13 By the end of the war, the country’s GDP had dropped 12 At the height of the Tajik civil war, there were approximately 600,000 internally displaced people inside of Tajikistan and over 100,000 who had fled the country. By 2016, this number was down significantly. According to the UNHCR, there were 19,469 refugees and internally displaced persons living in Tajikistan in 2015. 13 Iskandar Asadullaev, Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan peace 14 Challenges of Transition economies: economic reforms, immigration process”, Conciliation resources http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/tajiki- and employment in Tajikistan Omair Amir and Albert Berry, UNDPSP- stan-government. G&E_ch4_tajikistan-1.pdf 14 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution III. FRAGILITY, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE (FCV) - PRIORITY RISKS 20. PriorityFCV 21. Priority risksfor FCVrisks Tajikistan can for Tajikistan can be divided into be divided into political and economic relations are based on highly-person- political and economic relations are based on highly-person- four four categories: 1) political and governance risks;risks; categories: 1) governance risks; 2) economic 3) 2) eco- alized relationships, which in the long run diminish chances alized relationships, which in the long run diminish chances inclusion, equity and regionalism risks; and nomic risks; 3) inclusion, equity and regionalism risks; and4) cross-border for economic expansion or political stability.17 The limited ac- for economic expansion or political stability.17 A closed circle and global risks. 4) cross-border While and globalthere are a risks. variety While of challenges there with- are a variety of cess order emerges from an elite bargain that provides access of elites run the state and the economy. The limited access in each category (see figure 3), the RRA analysis challenges within each category (see figure 3), the RRA anal- highlights to political power and rents from key economic sectors in ex- order emerges from an elite bargain that provides access to priority risks that ysis highlights are most priority risks likely that areto most interrupt likely development to interrupt change for stability and a commitment to maintain the status political power and rents from key economic sectors in ex- progress and where development interventions development progress and where development interventions could play a quo. Such a system can be stable in a context of economic change for stability and a commitment to maintain the status key could role. playRisks role. internal include a key and external Risks include stresses, internal institu- and external growth, but is highly unstable in the face of economic shocks, quo. Such a system can be stable in a context of economic tional challenges, and issues around agency stresses, institutional challenges, and issues around agency and incentives, contractions, or structural changes. Furthermore, limited ac- growth, but is highly unstable in the face of economic shocks, and sources of and and incentives, resilience, sources based on a variety of resilience, based of on FCV-related a variety of cess orders inherently stifle economic growth and dynamism, contractions, or structural changes that cause sources of rents analytic frameworks, including the 2011 World FCV-related analytic frameworks, including the 2011 World Development as business interests of the closed circle of elites are protected to dry up. Furthermore, limited access orders inherently sti- Report (WDR): Development Conflict, Report (WDR): Security Development, and Security Conflict, OECD and Develop- from international and domestic competition, and new busi- fle economic nesses growth or sources dynamism, and are of rents seized by as business elites interests of in power. States of Fragility Report, International Dialogue ment, OECD States of Fragility Report, International Dialogue on Peace- the closed circle of elites are protected from international and on Peacebuilding and Recovery, 2017 WDR: GovernanceLaw, building and Recovery, 2017 WDR: Governance and the and domestic 22. Thecompetition, space for civiland new businesses society or sources in Tajikistan, of rents long restrict- and andanalysis relevant the Law, relevantby North,by analysis Wallis, North,Webb, and Wallis, Weingast Webb, and are seized ed, by elites has become evenin power. more limited. The civil society groups on limited Weingast onaccess limitedorder access governance systems.15 order governance Governance systems. 15 Po- risks are viewed by RRA analysis as a cross-cutting and fun- that remain active are those that are engaged in service deliv- litical and governance risks are viewed by RRA analysis as The space for civil society damental constraint to development progress, 23. activities ery and social welfarein Tajikistan, provision. long The restricted, government a cross-cutting and fundamental constraint to with impacts development has become even more limited. The civil society groups that across sectors. has employed rigid registration requirements and increas- progress, with impacts across sectors. remain active are those that are engaged in “non-political” ingly strenuous financial reporting requirements. Similarly, A. GOVERNANCE A. POLITICAL ANDRISKS – service the delivery activities government has also and worked to welfare social provision. limit foreign The funding GOVERNANCE government has employed rigid registration for NGOs by placing restrictions on the amount of foreign requirements CROSS-CUTTING and increasingly strenuous receive reporting financial requirements. RISKS – CROSS-CUTTING financing organizations can and on its use. A 2015 Similarly, the government has also worked law “On Public Associations” requires all non-governmen- to limit foreign 21. Governance in Tajikistan closely resembles what Bar- funding tal for NGOs organizations by placing operating restrictions in Tajikistan toon the amount declare of all grants Governance 22.Weingast, ry in Tajikistan Douglass North, andclosely Johnresembles Wallis deemwhat Bar- a “lim- foreign financing organizations can receive and on its use. they received from donors (both domestic and international) ry Weingast, ited Douglass access order” North, andpolitical society—where and deem John Wallis a “lim- economic re- A 2015 law “On Public Associations” requires all non-gov- with a registry within the Ministry of Justice. Organizations ited access lations order” comprise asociety—where whoand political small group of elites economic interact re- through ernmental organizations operating in Tajikistan to declare all lations personalized highly relationships. comprise a small group of elites 16 Inwho interact almost everythrough sector, highly personalized relationships.16 In almost every sector, Social lence andand Violence Orders: Social A Conceptual Orders: Framework A Conceptual for Interpreting Framework Recorded for Interpreting Human History Recorded Human (New York:(New Cambridge History University Press, York: Cambridge 2009). University Press, 2009). 15 15 See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/ states- See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/ 17 17 Greif,“Impersonal AvnerGreif, Avner “ImpersonalExchange Impartial Law: withoutImpartial Exchangewithout Law: The The states-of-fragility-report-series.htm; of-fragility-report-series.htm; http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fra- http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fra-gility- Community Responsibility System,” Chicago Journal of International Law gility-resilience/states-of-fragility-report-series.htm; resilience/states-of-fragility-report-series.htm; http://www.worldbank. http://www.worldbank. org/ 109; Avner 5 (2005 2004): 109; Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, Greif, Paul Milgrom, and and Barry Barry R. R. Weingast, Weingast, org/en/publication/wdr2017; en/publication/wdr2017; https://web.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/ https://web.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/ Enforcement: The “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: Caseof TheCase ofthe theMerchant Merchant cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Limited_Access_Orders_ cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Limited_Access_Orders_ (1994): 745–76; Guild,” Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 4 (1994): Avner Greif, 745–76;Avner Greif, in_DW_-II_-2011.0125.submission-version.pdf. Lessons from Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Medieval 16 16 Douglass DouglassC. North,John C.North, Joseph Wallis, JohnJoseph and Barry Wallis, and R. Weingast, Barry R. Weingast, Vio- York: Cambridge Trade (New York: University Press, Cambridge University 2006). Press, 2006). 17 15 FRAMEWORK – FIGURE 3: RRA FRAMEWORK KEYRISKS – KEY RISKS B. ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE RISKS • Erosion of power-sharing agreement – peace process 25. Tajikistan is the • Closing of political space poorest country in the • Security sector challenges former Soviet Union and has been hit by a series ECONOMIC EQUITY/INCLUSION REGIONAL/GLOBAL of economic shocks, some EQUITY AND INCLUSION exogenous and some • Remittance-dependency • Lagging/remote regions – • Recruitment to violent self-induced. Econom- • Poverty /size of pie vulnerability/FCV risks extremism ic decline has enormous • Corruption • Youth bulge – impacts on inclusion • Opiates trade • Small/fragile private and and employment • Border tensions- Water/riparian/ implications for the size financial sectors – ‘captured’ • Social impacts - migration energy issues of the economic pie with • Mining/hydropower potential • Agriculture and land rights • Climate and disaster risks broader implications for but also risk poverty reduction and shared prosperity. Governance as a cross cutting and fundamental constraint 26. The recent col- lapse of Tajikistan’s ma- must also report all projects they conduct with these funds. jor banks and insolvency underscores the fragility of the Local NGOs also report increased inspection of their orga- Tajik economy. Large systemic banks in Tajikistan—which nizations.18 account for 84 percent of total financial sector assets—are at high risk of insolvency and illiquidity. Microfinance institu- 23. Tajikistan’s international ratings for democracy have tions (MFIs) account for most of the remainder. The National declined. Over the past decade, the Freedom House Democ- Bank of Tajikistan has already revoked licenses of 17 MFIs racy Score for Tajikistan fell from 5.96 to 6.54 since 2007 (on since 2015 over their failure to meet the central bank’s mini- a scale from 1 to 7), making it one of the least democratic for- mum capital requirements. The banking sector faces vulnera- mer soviet republics (see Table 1 below). As Freedom House bilities in credit risk due to rapid credit growth (to the SOEs, put it, “Tajikistan increasingly resembles a one-party state… and directed lending to government interests), and funding Tajikistan’s post-independence elections have been marred by and liquidity risks related to the Russian financial crisis and corruption and the intimidation of opposition candidates… the pass through to remittances. These weaknesses are aggra- Security services arrested approximately 200 members of the vated by a high level of non-performing loans, low quality of IRPT from September 2015 onwards.19 financial sector enforcement mechanisms, and weak enforce- ment of prudential regulations. For the past two years, the 24. The narrowing of political space has been accompa- banking system has been heavily hit by economic and finan- nied by general repression of freedom of expression and re- cial crises linked to declining exports and remittances, which ligion. The U.S. Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom for Tajikistan designated Tajikistan as a have left many of the country’s businesses and individuals “country of particular concern” under the International Reli- unable to repay their loans.21 gious Freedom Act—a deterioration from its previous rank as 27. In response to escalating solvency and liquidity issues a country on the “watch-list”.20 in the banking sector, the National Bank of Tajikistan re- cently recapitalized and bailed out key banks. While this re- solved the immediate crisis, risks remain high since the Gov- ernment decision was not accompanied by reforms to address future vulnerabilities. The country remains on the brink of a financial sector crisis that could have large development im- pacts both in the short- and long-term. 18 World Organization Against Torture, “Tajikistan: Clampdown on Civil Society - Preliminary Findings of a Fact-Finding Mission on the 28. Systemic governance challenges hold back Tajiki- Situation of Human Rights Defenders and NGOs,” November 30, 2015, http://www.omct.org/human-rights-defenders/urgent-interventions/ stan’s socio-economic development, alongside issues of tax tajikistan/2015/11/d23494/. 19 Freedom House, “Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2016--Tajikistan” (Freedom House: Washington, DC), 2, accessed February - 2, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2016_Tajikistan. pdf. 21 Freedom House, “Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2016··Tajiki- 20 https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tajikistan%202015.pdf. stan.” 16 18 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution TABLE 1: TABLE FREEDOMHOUSE 1: FREEDOM HOUSENATIONS NATIONSIN INTRANSIT TRANSITRATINGS ANDAVERAGED RATINGSAND AVERAGEDSCORES 22 SCORES22 cial sector enforcement mechanisms, and weak enforcement “you would have to be crazy to do business in Tajikistan. No practices, and administrative barriers that stymie private highest rates in the region), only about 55 percent of those of prudential regulations. For the past two years, the banking companies with values can be competitive.” And as the director sector growth. Because of the threat of capture, there are very who attempt to start a business succeed, compared to almost system has been heavily hit by economic and financial crises of a micro-finance institution in Sughd province, noted, “do- limited incentives for firms to grow. As one senior 64 percent in ECA region as a whole. 24 linked to declining exports and remittances, whichrepresen- have left ing business in an environment of slowing demand and falling tative of a financial institution noted, many of the country’s businesses and individuals “ doing business unable in anto revenues is gettingtomore difficult due to increasing and highly environment of slowing 22 demand and falling revenues is getting 30. According the World Bank Doing 23 Business indica- repay their loans. uncertain tax and regulatory ” pressure. tors, Tajikistan ranks 128 out of 190 economies in terms of more difficult due to increasing and highly uncertain tax and regulatory pressure. ”23escalating solvency and liquidity issues the ease of doing business ( figure 5). One of the most sig- 29. In response to 31. Indeed, one of the most significant challenges to long nificant challenges of doing business in the country is ac- in the banking sector, the National Bank of Tajikistan re- term economic stability in Tajikistan is the business envi- 29. Indeed, one of most significant thebailed challenges to long cessing electricity, where Tajikistan stands at 173 out of 190 cently recapitalized and out key banks. While this re- ronment in the country. For 25 example, implementation of the term economies on this measure. Another obstacle for business economic stability in Tajikistan solved the immediate crisis, risks remain high since the envi- is the business Gov- new tax code appears at times arbitrary and driven by reve- ronment in the country. For example, implementation of the is access to credit. Tajikistan ranks 118 out of 190 economies ernment decision was not accompanied by necessary reforms nue quotas. This fosters lack 26 of transparency in the financial new tax code appears at times arbitrary and driven by reve- on the ease of getting credit. Not only do entrepreneurs in to address future vulnerabilities. The country remains on the management of local companies which in turn contributes to nue quotas. This fosters lack of transparency in the financial Tajikistan face challenges accessing credit, once borrowers do brink of a financial sector crisis that could have large devel- informality and corruption. The number and frequency of in- management of local have credit they have very limited legal rights compared to opment impacts bothcompanies in the short- which in turn contributes and long-term. The GoT’s to teractions with authorities increases the potential for abuse informality and corruption. The number and frequency of other former Soviet republics (Tajikistan ranks 1 on a scale resolution of the banking crisis also went against IFI recom- and informal payments. The 2013 Business Environment and interactions with authorities increases the potential for abuse of 1 to 12 in terms of strength of legal rights of borrowers and mendations to implement systemic corporate governance Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) shows 19 percent of and informal payments. In the 2013practices, Business and Environment lenders).27 reforms to limit fraudulent lending was part respondents said bribery was frequent in dealing with taxes. and of Enterprise the reason for Performance continued delay Survey in (BEEPS), negotiation 19on percent an IMF of The same respondents report dealing with public officials or respondents program said bribery (alongside was frequent fundamental in dealing concerns regarding taxes. with Tajik- public Globally, 31. Tajikistan services regarding ranks taxes 140 out takes of 190 up 27 countries percent on of their The same istan’s respondents report macroeconomic dealing framework). Awith seriespublic officials of budget or sup- the ease of paying taxes. This means that firms time, compared to the ECA average of 17 percent. Much of in the country public port services regarding operations (World Bank, taxes takesEU), ADB, up 27 and percent a large of their EBRD are thissubject time is to arbitrariness dealing as they deal with inspections. withis There government offi- very little space loan time,and technical compared toassistance program, the ECA average ofhave been putMuch 17 percent. on hold of cials, making long term investments riskier than or freedom to operate private companies, ensure competition they would due be ifsecure paying taxes were easier Lawandandthus more predictablere-to this to concerns time is dealingregarding the country’s with inspections. Lawfinancial sector, and and contract en- and property rights. contract enforcement firm owners.28 In addition to an unpredictable and challeng- adequacy forcementof the macro-economic remains extremely weak framework. and discretionary. As a re- mains extremely weak and discretionary. Relatively successful ing tax environment, firms that wish to trade across borders sult of the predatory business environment, the entry of new medium and large SMEs are typically controlled by a small face significant challenges, as Tajikistan ranks 144 out of 190 firms Rampant 30. is very low and systemic corruption in Tajikistan to otherTajikistan compared plagues countries circle of elite economies onwhich prevents the ease competition of trading and magnifies across borders. 29 risks alongside issues of tax practices, and administrative in the region (figure 4). Despite a significant entrepreneur- bar- for new entrants (see Annex 2 – ownership of State-Owned riers that stymie private sector growth. With the financial Enterprises). As a result of the predatory business environ- ial potential in Tajikistan with almost 40 percent of the labor crisis, the government is increasingly utilizing private sec- ment, the entry of new firms is very low in Tajikistan com- force having a preference for self-employment (one of the tor resources to cover its expenses. Because of the threat of pared to other countries in the region (figure 4). Despite a capture, there are very limited incentives for firms to grow. significant entrepreneurial potential in Tajikistan with almost As the head of one of the largest firms in Tajikistan noted, 24 Tajikistan Jobs Diagnostics and Strategy, January 2017; 40 percent of the labor force having a preference for self-em- 25 Ibid., 44. 22 Freedom House, “Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2016··Tajiki- 26 Ibid., 62. stan.” 27 Ibid., 63. 23 Quotes 22 from Freedom World House, Bank consultations “Freedom in Transit–2016··Tajiki- in Tajikistan House: Nations Feb-March 28 23 Ibid., 77.from World Bank consultations in Tajikistan – Feb-March Quotes 2017. stan.” 29 2017. Ibid., 83 17 19 Confidential – Not Confidential – for Release Not for or Distribution Release or Distribution FIGURE 4: NEW BUSINESS DENSITY IN TAJIKISTAN24 30 24 32. ployment ployment With(one (onelimits of of the private rates on highest the highest sector rates in ingrowth the and investment, the region), region), only about only about FIGURE 5: HOW TAJIKISTAN AND COMPARATOR migration 55 percent 55 percent of those who attempt to start a business succeed, and of remittances those who have attempt been to start the a backbone business of the succeed, Tajik economy, making it vulnerable 26 ECONOMIES RANK ON THE EASE OF DOING compared compared to to almost almost 64 percent 64 percent in ECA in ECA to economic region region as as a fluctua- a whole. whole. 26 (2016)34 BUSINESS (2016) BUSINESS 31 31 24 25 24 tions in receiving countries. According to World Bank and 25 32. According 32. According International to the to Monetary the World World Fund data,Bank Doing Business Doing BankTajikistan Business is the mostindica- indica- re- tors, Tajikistan tors, Tajikistan ranks mittance-dependent ranks 128 128 out country out inof of 190 190 the economies economies world, meaning in in terms terms that theof of the the ease ratio ease doing business of doing of of remittance flows to (figure business GDP has (figure 5). One of One 5). been the most the higher of than sig- most any sig- nificant other nificant challenges country. challenges of of doing In addition, doingmore business than 90 business in in the the country percent is is ac- of the remit- country ac- cessing tance cessing electricity, inflows comewhere electricity, where Tajikistan Tajikistan stands from Russia—Tajikistan stands at atis173 173veryout out of of 190 vulnera- 190 28 economies ble to economic economies on this on this measure. conditions measure. in28 Another 27 27 Russia. Another 31 obstacle for business obstacle for business is access is access to credit. Tajikistan to credit. Tajikistan ranks ranks 118 out of 118 out 190 economies of 190 economies 33. the Poverty and unemployment aredo drivers of Tajiki- 29 on the on ease of ease of getting getting credit. credit.29 NotNot only only do entrepreneurs entrepreneurs in in stan’s massive Tajikistan Tajikistan face face challenges wave of labor challenges migration. accessing accessing credit, once credit, According once borrowers borrowers to the do do 2009 have theyLiving Tajikistan have credit credit they have have very Standards very limited limited measurement legal rights legal rights compared survey, nine compared to to percent of the population worked abroad resulting ranks (Tajikistan republics other other former Soviet republics (Tajikistan ranks 1 on a scale of former Soviet 1 on in a 28 per- scale of cent 1 of to 1 to to 12 12 in tal in terms termshouseholds of of strengthhaving strength at least of legal of legal rights rightsoneoflabor of migrant. borrowers borrowers and and 32 The THPS lenders). lenders). 30 survey in 2011 showed that more than half (51 30 percent) of all households in Tajikistan had been involved in 33. labor Globally, Globally, Tajikistan 33. migration (with one ranks Tajikistan family ranks 140 140 out of out member 190 190 countries of currently on or pre- countries on the ease the easeliving viously of paying of paying taxes. abroad) taxes. This since means ThisTajikistan means thatthat firms became firms in in the country independent the country are in are subject 1991. 33 to arbitrariness as they deal with government offi- subject This survey revealed to arbitrariness as theythat Tajikistan deal not only has with government a offi- cials, making cials, making long long term term investments investments riskier than they riskier than they would would be if be paying taxes if paying taxes were were easier easier and thus more and thus predictable to more predictable to 30 Doing business entrepreneurship database, World Bank Group 24 24 Doing business entrepreneurship Doing business database, World entrepreneurship database, World Bank Bank Group. Group. 31 Ibid. 25 25 Ibid., Ibid., 8. 8. 32 Alexander M. Danzer, Barbara Dietz, and Kseniia Gatskova, “Migra- high dependence on remittances, but that it was poor house- 26 Tajikistan Jobs 3 1 26 and tion Tajikistan Jobs Diagnostics Remittances Diagnostics and and in Tajikistan: Strategy, Strategy, Survey January January Technical 2017; 2017; Report,” IOM Working 3 3 1 27 27 Papers Ibid., Ibid., 10. 10. Ludwig-Maximillians University, Institute for East and (Munich: 28 28 Ibid., Ibid., Southeast 44. 44. European Studies, February 2013), 1, http://www.dokumente. ios- 29 Ibid., 62. Ibid., regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_ios_327.pdf. 29 62. 30 33 Ibid., 30 Ibid., 63. Ibid.,11. 63. 31 31 Ibid., 8. Ibid., 8. 20 20 18 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution FIGURE 6: HOW FAR HAS TAJIKISTAN COME IN THE all households in Tajikistan had been involved in labor mi- 37 gration (with one family member currently or previously liv- AREAS MEASURED BY DOING BUSINESS?35 35. Remittances ing abroad) are not utilized since Tajikistan became for investment independent in back 1991.in 38 Thiseconomy the and thus survey revealed do Tajikistan that not contribute not only to national has a high devel- de- opment pendence andon social safety but remittances, nets. Migrants that it was prefer to provide poor households assistance channels upon through depends whose livelihoods where they the them can most. use established Similarly, relations with family labor migrants members are generally and already-established low-skilled and work in one sec- so- cial networks, tor (87 percent such as the that indicated mahalla. they38 Households work spend most in the construction of the remittances sector). This implies on immediate that migration cash will consumptions not significantly needs, alter or diversifyhealth, education, the human and home capital repair rather of capabilities than to promote migrants, cre- income generation ating barriers activities, for future to investwhen employment in businesses, migrants and/or return to contribute home. 39 The clearto social protection majority systems. of migrants are39 Over men thepercent) (95 last de- cade, nearly all Government the of them migrate has done to improve little with to Russia, systems most ending that up in would Moscow (59to help 40 absorb remittances by the national effectively percent). economy and provide avenues for migrants and their families The economic 36.contribute to to broader slowdown economic growthhas in Russia anddrastically development. re- duced the amount of remittances to Tajikistan. Table 3 below 36. According illustrates the amount to theofWorld Development remittances Indicators, into Tajikistan over Ta- the jikistan course of theconsistently has past ten years. maintained Remittances the highest hit a peakofficial at $4.3 un- bil- employment lion in 2013. By rates 2015,among the had this level formerfallen Soviet to $2.6 Central billion—a Asian60 republics. Unemployment rates have hovered percent reduction, although remittance rates have increased around 11 per- cent for the past decade. High unemployment is an outcome in 2016-2017. of a growth model which is based on remittance-driven con- 33 sumption and neglects 37. Remittances the importance utilized for of are not domestic job investment back cre- in firm holds owners. In addition whose livelihoods to an unpredictable depends upon them the and challeng- most. Simi- ation through formal the economy and thusprivate sector and to do not contribute SMEs. Employment national develop- 32 ing tax environment, firms that wish to trade across borders growth industry in social minimal wasnets. and only modest larly, labor migrants are generally low-skilled and work in one ment and safety Tajik migrants prefer into agricul- provide face sectorsignificant challenges, (87 percent indicated asthat Tajikistan they work in144 ranks theout of 190 construc- ture and services, the two largest sectors. 34 assistance through channels where they can use established economies on the ease of trading across borders. tion sector). This implies that migration will not significantly relations 37. Thewithyouthfamily members labor inactivityand already-established rate is particularlysocial high alter or diversify the human capital capabilities of migrants, networks, such as the mahalla. 41 Tajik households spend most 34. With limits on private sector growth and investment, and growing. The working-age population (15–64 year olds) creating barriers for future employment when migrants re- of the remittances on immediate consumptions cashmillion migration 36 and remittances have been the backbone of the turn home. The clear majority of migrants are men (95 per- rose from 3.31 million in 2000 to 5.23 in 2015. needs, While Tajik economy, making it vulnerable to economic fluctua- education, health, and home repair the potential workforce is growing, only 43 percent rather than to promote of them cent) nearly all of them migrate to Russia, with most ending income generation activities, to invest age in businesses, and/or tions in receiving countries. According to World Bank and are in the labor force. Many working youth are neither up in Moscow (59 percent).37 to contribute to social protection systems. 42 Over the last de- International Monetary Fund data, Tajikistan is the most re- employed nor looking for work (NEET), representing 40 per- cade, the Government has done little to improve systems that mittance-dependent 34. The economiccountry slowdown in world, in the Russia meaning that the has drastically cent of the total, which is high by international standards. ratio of remittance flows to GDP has been higher than any would help Between 2003 effectively to and absorbrates 2013, NEET remittances among youth by the national increased reduced the amount of remittances to Tajikistan. Table 2 other country. In addition, more than 90 percent of the remit- economy and provide avenues for migrants from 37 to 41 percent. Almost a third of employed young and their families peo- below illustrates the amount of remittances into Tajikistan tance inflows come from to contribute to broader economic growth and development. over the course of the pastRussia—Tajikistan ten years. Remittances 36 is very vulnera- hit a peak at ple are in unpaid (informal) jobs compared to 15 percent of ble to economic conditions in Russia. $4.3 billion in 2013. By 2015, this level had fallen to $2.6 bil- adults. The informal sector is particularly large in rural areas 38. in According the World to where Development Indicators, Ta- 35 lion—a 60 percent reduction, although remittance rates have and agriculture, unpaid family workers, including 35. Poverty and unemployment are drivers of Tajikistan’s jikistan has consistently youth, are very common. maintained 40 the highest official un- increased in 2016-2017. employment rates among the former Soviet Central Asian massive wave of labor migration. According to the 2009 Ta- jikistan Living Standards measurement survey, nine percent republics. Unemployment rates have hovered around 11 of the population worked abroad resulting in 28 percent of to- percent for the past decade. High unemployment is an out- tal households having at least one labor migrant.37 The THPS come of a growth model which is based on remittance-driven survey in 2011 showed that more than half (51 percent) of consumption and neglects the importance of domestic job creation through formal private sector and SMEs. Employ- ment growth in industry was minimal and only modest in 32 Ibid., 10. agriculture and services, the two largest sectors. Lack of 43 33 Ibid., 77. commercialization and development of value chains limit the 34 Ibid., 83. 35 Ibid. 36 UNDP, “Labor Migration, Remittances, and Human Development in Central Asia” (United Nations Development Programme, 2015), 12, 38 Ibid., 11. file:///C:/Users/jmurtaz/Downloads/CAM&RHDpaperFINAL.pdf. 34 Ibid., 8. 39 Ibid., 2. 37 Alexander 35 UNDP, M. Danzer, “Labor Barbara Migration, Dietz, and Remittances, Kseniia and Human Gatskova, “Migra- Development 40 Ibid., 21. tion and Remittances in Central in Tajikistan: Asia” (United Survey Technical Nations Development Report,” Programme, IOM Working 2015), 12, 41 38 Mukomel,Vladimir, Mukomel, Partner Diaspora––Partner Vladimir,Diaspora in in the the Developmentof Development of Papers (Munich: Ludwig-Maximillians University, Institute for East and file:///C:/Users/jmurtaz/Downloads/CAM&RHDpaperFINAL.pdf. Tajikistan, Dushanbe: Tajikistan, Dushanbe: IOM Mission in IOM Mission Tajikistan,2014, in Tajikistan, 2014,p.5. p.5. Southeast 36 IbidEuropean ., 2. Studies, February 2013), 1, http://www.dokumente. 42 39 World Bank Source: World Source: Bank ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_ios_327.pdf. 37 Ibid., 21. 43 Source: World Bank 40 Ibid. 21 19 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution FIGURE7: FIGURE 7:RATIOS OFREMITTANCE RATIOSOF INFLOWSTO REMITTANCEINFLOWS GDP(FOR TOGDP THE“TOP “TOPTEN” (FORTHE REMITTANCE-RECEIVINGCOUNTRIES) TEN”REMITTANCE-RECEIVING COUNTRIES)41 44 Source: UNDP calculations, based on World Bank and IMF data TABLE 2: TABLE 2: REMITTANCES TO TAJIKISTAN REMITTANCES TO NET INFLOW TAJIKISTAN -- NET INFLOW IN USD (MILLION) (MILLION) PER IN USD MONTH42 PER MONTH 45 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Jan 45 77 122 96 102 136 175 221 216.6 125.7 Feb 40 68 129 83 103 150 185 228 203.3 126.0 Mar 55 81 145 99 125 185 215 245 239.7 162.8 Apr 53 91 181 111 153 196 239 288 274.6 201.8 May 75 123 220 134 171 255 305 344 352.5 244.5 Jun 96 150 261 172 216 321 332 402 423.2 301.6 Jul 114 189 328 203 259 357 414 493 496.7 306.5 Aug 141 217 319 202 284 392 445 492 448.6 279.9 Sep 129 184 310 203 253 326 382 438 437.3 252.8 Oct 140 225 266 194 262 312 428 439 365.8 237.8 Nov 117 192 194 166 218 274 318 347 253.5 196.4 Dec 118 177 195 169 218 270 326 363 227.0 190.0 TOTAL 1,123 1,774 2,670 1,834 2,363 3,174 3,764 4,298 3,939 2,626 potential of returns to agriculture. Agriculture generates 70 compared to migration.46 percent of employment in-country, but many of these jobs are informal, and less attractive for the rural population due to 39. The youth labor inactivity rate is particularly high and low productivity.44 45This low growth in overall employment, growing. The working-age population (15–64 year olds) rose as well as limited internal labor mobility, explain the relative- from 3.31 million in 2000 to 5.23 million in 2015. While the ly small contribution of employment to poverty reduction, potential workforce is growing, only 43 percent of them are in the labor force. Many working age youth are neither em- 44 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 45 World Bank Source: World 42 Source: Bank 46 Tajikistan Jobs Diagnostics and Strategy, January 2017 22 20 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution FIGURE 8: UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENTRATE RATE IN TAJIKISTAN (2000-2013) 39. promoting There the statusappears quo in- to be IN TAJIKISTAN (2000-PRESENT) strong correlations between those cluded groups from Sughd province, which had been the civil sub-national areas where war violence industrial base was strongest in the north and as well as had those wheremost benefited recent violent in- substan- cidents tially from taken subsidies, haveSoviet place. Recent violent and factions from have incidents Kulob.been Themost United Tajik prevalent Opposition in those areas thatwas wit- characterized nessed the most groups with by extreme violence ideological during the differences civil war (see with the 9 Figures central and 10), government—seeking especially the Rasht Val- cultural, ley, religious, several districts and inpoliti- Southern cal reforms. Khatlon, and These GBAO. ideological Violence in areas also differences these mapped has been onto by triggered distinct regional differences. intraelite conflicts that, in some The UTO cases, has consisted spilled over of groups into street Source: World Development Indicators from GBAO and Gharm. The protests and larger scale violence. eminent scholar of the Per- sianate world, Olivier Roy characterized 40. Although not touched by civil war the Tajik civil political violence, war C. REGIONALISM, AND Between EQUITY,standards. ployed nor looking for work (NEET), representing 40 percent 49 of the total, which is high by international the “Warhas as violence of the Kolkhoz [collective farms]. ” emerged recently in the more deeply impover- According to INCLUSION RISKS 2003 and 2013, NEET rates among youth increased from 37 to 41 percent. Almost a third of employed young people are Roy, the roots of the civil conflict were in forced ished parts of Sughd Province in northern Tajikistan in the gration denselyby the Soviets Ferghana populated of whole populations valley. Although internal from one therepart mi- hasofbeen in unpaid (informal) jobs compared to 15 percent Tajikistan to another. The Soviets resettled populations into 38. As the experience in the Tajik civil war of adults. illustrates, limited violence, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and as- new collective farms in the recently irrigated land in the south The informal sector is particularly fragility and violence has been driven by leaders andlarge in rural areas within re- sociated groups appear to be responsible for targeted killings where they retained their local identities. Rather than reduc- agriculture, gional power bases where unpaid family fighting for workers, greater including autonomy youth, and re- of police officers as well as a suicide bombing. Sughd prov- are very from common. 47 ing tensions between groups, these forced population trans- sources the central government. The civil war was char- ince, most of which is located in the fertile and densely popu- fers fomented the divisions that would serve as the basis for acterized by fighting between groups defending the status lated Ferghana Valley, has been a prime recruiting ground for C. REGIONALISM, EQUITY, AND the Tajik civil war. quo and the IRPT that sought political and religious reforms, both violent and non-violent Islamist extremist groups. INCLUSION RISKS including greater regional autonomy—it was a conflict root- ed in ideological and regional rather than ethnic differences. 41. There appears to be strong correlations between those 41. Another sub-national areas source whereof violence civil that does war violence was appear con- notstrongest Those promoting the status quo included groups from Sughd as well as those where recent violent incidents have borders nected to the civil war are skirmishes along the taken of 40. As the experience in the Tajik civil war illustrates, fra- the country. include skirmishes Theseincidents province, place. Recent violent have been in mostsouthern prevalent Tajikistan in which had been the industrial gility and violence has been driven by leaders with the base in north region- along Afghan thethat border, which and had benefited most substantially from Soviet subsidies, those areas witnessed the most are typically extreme associated violence during with al power bases fighting for greater autonomy and resources the drug and the civil wartrade. There 9 (see Figures areand also 10), conflicts especially overtheland Rasht and Val- water fromfactions the central from Kulob. The government. The United civil warTajik wasOpposition characterized was characterized by groups with ideological differences with the the Ferghana inseveral ley, districtsValley in northern in Southern Tajikistan. Khatlon, and GBAO. These very lo- Vio- by fighting between groups defending the status quo and the central government—seeking calized lence conflicts in these areas typically involve conflict has been triggered over land by intra-elite resulting conflicts IRPT that sought political and cultural, religious religious, and politi- reforms, including cal reforms. These ideologicalwas differences also mapped onto from that, in unresolved some cases, border has spilled demarcation over into issues. street protests and greater regional autonomy—it a conflict rooted in ideo- distinct regional differences. The UTOdifferences. consisted 48 groups ofThose larger scale violence. Conflicts follow a similar pattern in that logical and regional rather than ethnic haveThe 42. they civilafter erupted warthe has left an ouster orimportant legacy of forced resignation of contin- an from GBAO and Gharm. The eminent scholar of the Persi- ued violence where fighting was most intense, but it also left important local political leader who had previously recon- anate world, Olivier Roy characterized the Tajik civil war as a legacy of poverty, poor service delivery and stunted devel- ciled with the central government. 47 “War the Ibid. of the Kolkhoz [collective farms].” According to 43 opment. There appears to be some correlation between FCV Roy, the roots of the civil conflict were in forced 48 Edward W. Walker, “Ethnic War, Holy War, War O’ War:internal Does the mi- 42.riskAlthough areas and not touched poverty (see byFigure civil war11),violence, and an even political stronger Adjective Matter in Explaining Collective Political Violence?,” Berke- gration by the Soviets of whole populations from one part of ley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies, February 1, 2006, violence has emerged correlation betweenrecently non-monetaryin the more poverty deeply impov- and measures Tajikistan to another. The Soviets http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6dd333r5. resettled either to individual into populations with respect erished previousparts of Sughd violence (see Figure in Province 12).northern Non-monetaryTajikistan in measures new collective conflicts or globally?farms in the The author recently argues irrigated land that distinguishing among in types the south of the densely populated Ferghana valley. Although include indicators such as access to services, education levels, there has internal conflict is more difficult than is often assumed and that theories where they retained their local identities. Rather than reduc- been and limited employmentviolence, the This rates. Islamic Movement true is particularly of Uzbekistan of several dis- of ethnic conflict typically explain not ethnic conflict as distinct category ing tensions but sustained between internal violencegroups, these in general, forced including population religious conflict. trans- and associated groups appear to be tricts in the Region of Republican Subordination responsible for targeted (Tavildara, fers fomented Further, while these the divisions theories that typically would attempt serve to explain why asconflict the basis breaksfor killings Rasht, ofTojikobod, police officers and asNurobod) well as a suicide and GBAO bombing. thatSughd have high out in the multiethnic somecivil Tajik war. regions but not others, they do not attempt to explain why conflict when it occurs is ethnic rather than something else, levels in non-monetary measures of poverty and violence why the nature of individual conflicts changes over time, or why certain (both civil war violence and more recent conflict). kinds of internal conflict are characteristic of particular periods in history given”:”Edward W.”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2006”,2,1]]},”accessed”:{“date and not others. The paper investigates these questions by looking at three ”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-lan- -parts”:[[“2017”,3,14]]}}}], 43. Regionalism is exacerbated by Tajikistan’s system of cases: Afghanistan since 1978, Tajikistan from 1992-1997, and Chechnya guage/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} since 1994.”,”URL”:”http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6dd333r5”,”shortTi- 49 intergovernmental relations, in whichand Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics the Birth government national of Na- tle”:”Ethnic War, Holy War, War O’ War”,”author”:[{“family”:”Walker”,”- agencies tions 2007), on decide (NYU Press, 94. resource allocation to sub-national ad- 43 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of ministrative units, which are responsible for public service Nations (NYU Press, 2007), 94. 23 21 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution FIGURE 9: FIGURE LOCATIONS – 9: LOCATIONS – CONFLICT CONFLICT EVENTS EVENTS DURING DURING FIGURE 10: FIGURE 10: LOCATIONS LOCATIONS – CONFLICT EVENTS – CONFLICT IN POST- EVENTS IN POST- CIVIL WAR (1992 – 1997)* CIVIL WAR (1992 – 1997)* WAR PERIOD/RECENT VIOLENCE (1998 – 2015)* WAR PERIOD/RECENT VIOLENCE (1998 – 2015)* FIGURE 11: CONFLICT EVENTS (1998-2015) AND FIGURE 12: CONFLICT EVENTS (1998-2015) AND NON- POVERTY RATES** MONETARY POVERTY MEASURES** *Figures 9&10 illustrate conflict event data recorded between 1992 and 2015 by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)—reviewed province, most of expert consultants by which is located as part of RRA in the analysis. fertile and dense- conflicts typically involve conflict over land resulting from ly populated Ferghana Valley, has been a prime recruiting ** Poverty and non-monetary poverty measures derived from WB ‘Poverty Mapping unresolved border in Tajikistan” Report,demarcation issues with April, 2016. Non-monetary communities poverty indicators in ground for both violent measure “deprivations” and non-violent or “vulnerabilities” to provideIslamist informationextremist Kyrgyzstan. on living standards and the quality of life, including on issues such as education, employ- ment, services, and infrastructure. groups. 44. The civil war has left an important legacy of continued 43. deliveryAnother but aresource of violence that not accountable does not for doing appear so down to con- citi- violence framework where fighting includes the was 1994most Lawintense, but it also left in on “Self-Government a nected to the zens. This civil creates system war are skirmishes regional along in inequities theresource borders al- of Towns of legacy andpoverty, Townships,poor ” service delivery and which attempted stunted devel- to decentralize au- the country. location, These as well as include challenges skirmishes in southernefficient for the transparent, Tajiki- opment. There thorities and appears to be some responsibilities to thecorrelation between FCV local administrations in stan use ofalong the funds. public Afghan 44 border, which are typically associated This state of affairs persists despite a risk areas villages and and poverty towns Figure (see areas in rural 11), and 45 (jamoats). anAneven stronger amendment with legal the drug trade. framework thatThere allows foralso are conflicts over sub-national land in the administrations to this law was correlation made in between 2009, which aimed non-monetary at enabling poverty measures greater and and local Valley Ferghana in northern communities to playTajikistan. active rolesThese very localized in decision-mak- citizen participation previous violence (see inFigure local administration 12). Non-monetary and facilitating measures ing over resource allocations and service delivery. The legal local social and economic problem-solving. The amend- *Figures 9&10 illustrate conflict event data recorded between 1992 and 2015 by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro- gram (UCDP)—reviewed by expert consultants as part of RRA analysis. ** Poverty and non-monetary poverty measures derived from WB ‘Poverty Mapping in Tajikistan” Report, April, 2016. Non-monetary poverty indicators measure “deprivations” or “vulnerabilities” to provide information on living standards and the quality of life, including on issues such as education, employ- 44 “Improving Service Delivery through Governance Reforms: Is 45 For an overview of the sub-national administrative structure in ment, services, and Decentralization infrastructure. the Answer for Tajikistan?” World Bank (2013), p. 6-7. Tajikistan, see Cieslewska (2015) pps. 102-104. 24 22 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution BOX 3: SUMMARY - SUB-REGIONS IMPACTED BY CONFLICT/AT RISK BOX 2: SUMMARY - SUB-REGIONS IMPACTED BY CONFLICT/AT RISK Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO): This is the poorest, most sparsely popu- in Rasht. In almost every case, the violence was intra-elite as it featured lated, and most geographically Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO): remote This isprovince the poorest,of Tajikistan that suffered most sparsely popu- former District IRPT commandersSubordination of Republican who had since integrated into the Tajik (Rasht, Tavildara govern- districts): significantly lated, and most during the civil war. geographically In recent remote years,of province has witnessed it Tajikistan several that suffered ment. Several The high Government profile violent of events Tajikistan has have blamed taken placeIslamic over the extremists past decade for outbreaks of intra-elite significantly during the violence, civil war. based on cleavages In recent years, it hasthat emerged several witnessed during recent in Rasht.episodes, In almost every independent without case, the violencemedia wasit is difficult as intra-elite verify to it gov- featured the civil war, outbreaks of that have spilled intra-elite violence,over into on mass based protests cleavages and that street violence. emerged during ernment former IRPT claims. The root causes commanders who had of violence districts in these into since integrated appear the Tajik to be govern- These isolated the civil events war, that have have mobilized spilled over into some mass citizens protests inand remote this street region violence. the ment.same Theregional Governmentrivalries that triggered of Tajikistan the Tajik has blamed civil war. Islamic With frequent extremists for re- These and isolated have reopenedevents have mobilized grievances towards some central in thecitizens this remote Unlike government. region episodes of violence cent episodes. in this The root region causes and increasing of violence in these antagonism towards districts appear to the be and have other regionsreopened grievances of Tajikistan, towards the Pamiri the central population thatgovernment. constitutes the Unlike ma- central government, this region appears to be the same regional rivalries that triggered the Tajik civil war. at greatest risk for future otherof jority regions residentsof Tajikistan, in GBAO has thea Pamiri distinctpopulation ethnic and that constitutes religious the ma- identity. conflict. jority of residents in GBAO has a distinct ethnic and religious identity. Southern Khatlon (Shorobod, Hamadoni, Nosiri Hisrav, Sharitus Sughd (Isfara, (Isfara, Kohistoni Soghd Mastchoh): Sughd Kohistoni Mastchoh): Soghd province province in in northern northern Tajikistan was Tajikistan historically the was historically wealthiest, most the wealthiest, industrialized, and most industrialized, and main- main- Southern These districts): Khatlon were areas of heavy (Shorobod, fighting during Nosiri the Hamadoni, Tajik Sharitus Hisrav, civil war. the closest tained the tained closest ties to Moscow. ties to Moscow. Since the collapse Since the collapse of of the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, These districts also share a border with the increasingly districts): These were areas of heavy fighting during the Tajik civil volatile Kunduz war. districts have several districts have experienced provinces in Afghanistan. several experienced high poverty rates high poverty rates and have emerged and have emerged These districts also share In years, recent with a border several the violent incidents increasingly along volatile Kunduz as fertile fertilerecruiting as groundfor recruitingground for violent violent extremist extremist groups, groups, suchsuch as the as the IslamIs-- the borderin provinces have involved drug Afghanistan. smuggling In recent and kidnapping years, several of locals. violent incidents Al- along lamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as non-violent religious extremists ic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as non-violent religious extremists though the borderthere havehave been some involved drugremnants smuggling of civil and war fissures, of kidnapping the primary locals. Al- as Hezb-e such as Tahrir. There Hezb-e Tahrir. such was almost There was no violence almost no violence in in northern northern Tajikistan Tajikistan violence in this though there region have been has some been criminalof remnants activity civil warrelated to cross-border fissures, the primary during the civil war. The violent during the civil war. The violent events that have occurredin events that have occurred recentyears, inrecent years violence inand smuggling thisthe trade drughas region with been Afghanistan. criminal activity related to cross-border such as suicide bombings, represent a new kind of violent extremism that represent a new kind of violent extremism—including suicide bombings smuggling and the drug trade with Afghanistan. has not been previously present in the country. District of Republican Subordination (Rasht, Tavildara districts): and targeted assassinations of government officials—that has not been Several high profile violent events have taken place over the past decade previously present in the country. ment included such asto changes provide administrations jamoat education include with indicators budgets, and introduce access a to services, system for direct levels, election of FIGURE 13: FIGURE 13: YOUTH YOUTH IDLENESS IDLENESS and employment rates. This is particularly true of several dis- jamaot councilors (rather than appointment tricts in the Region of Republican Subordination (Tavildara, by district (ray- on) governments). Rasht, Tojikobod, and 1994 and 2009 The Nurobod) and lawsGBAO werethatonly partial- have high ly implemented, however, due to concerns levels in non-monetary measures of poverty and violence over inadequate capacity (both civil jamoat ofwar administrations violence and more recent to manage conflict).resources au- tonomously.46Fiscal decentralization has not taken place, and 45. system the for direct Regionalism iselection exacerbatedof jamoat councilors system by Tajikistan’s has yet of to be enacted. However, intergovernmental in 2015,in relations, the Local which Development national Com- government mittee agencies (LDC) decidewas onestablished under the to resource allocation President’s sub-national Office to ad- promote ministrative units, which development socio-economic are responsible thepublic in for regions, and service build capacity delivery but are of not accountable administration the sub-national for doing so down to plan and to citi- implement programs. zens. This system createsTheregional establishment of the inequities in LDC resourcesignals al- the government’s location, as well as interest in revisiting challenges for thethe agenda of efficient transparent, reform- of public funds.50 relations. ing intergovernmental use This state of affairs persists despite a legal framework that allows for sub-national administrations In addition 44. local and communities to regionalism to play active rolesTajikistan risks, faces a in decision-mak- significant youth bulge, with high rates of ing over resource allocations and service delivery. The legal youth unemploy- ment and idleness framework includes that 1994 Lawboth the represent a threat and oppor- on “Self-Government in Source: World Bank Jobs Diagnostic 2017 tunity for future stability. Towns and Townships,” which attempted According to UNICEF, 33 percent to decentralize au- of the population thorities is less than 14 and responsibilities years to the and young people old,administrations local in and the old councilors age dependency (rather bybe ratio will than appointment quite (low. district rayonAn im- ) gov- aged 14-30 make up 35 percent of the villages and towns in rural areas (jamoats). An amendmenttotal51 population. Just this1994 plication ofThe ernments). is that andthe government 2009 laws wereshould invest heavily only partially imple- five percent to this law was the population of made in 2009, whichis over 60 years aimed old. Each at enabling year greater into education mented, however, challenge – adue compounded to concerns by the brain over inadequate drain capacity of 130,000 enter the citizen participation in working age population, with local administration and facilitating 50 percent associated jamoat with externalto administrations migration and the fact manage resources that nearly 75 autonomously. 52 youth unemployment. local social and economic 47 The majority of returning problem-solving. econom- The amendment percent Fiscal of the population decentralization hasremains in rural not taken areas. place, 48 and the system ic migrants are also male youth. This included changes to provide jamoat administrations with creates a situation in which the young age dependency ratio will be relatively high, for direct election of jamoat councilors has yet to be enacted. budgets, and introduce a system for direct election of jamaot 45. Lack of opportunities for youth may well be the key However, in 2015, the Local Development Committee (LDC) long term challenge for Tajikistan. Youth participation in was established under the President’s Office to promote so- the labor market declined rapidly from 2003, and those look- 50 “Improving Service Delivery through Governance Reforms: Is Decen- tralization 46 the Answer “Improving for Tajikistan?” Service World Delivery through Bank (2013), Governance p. 6-7. Is De- Reforms: 51 For an overview centralization the Answerof the sub-nationalWorld for Tajikistan?” administrative structure p. 4. in Bank (2013), 52 “Improving Service Delivery through Governance Reforms: Is De- Tajikistan, 47 Statesee Cieslewska Statistics (2015) pps. Committee; 102-104. quoted by the GoT - Deputy Minister for centralization the Answer for Tajikistan?” World Bank (2013), p. 4. Labor and Migration 48 https://www.unicef.org/tajikistan/overview.html. 25 23 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution THE ORGANIZATIONIN TABLE 3. SOCIAL GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND PERCENTAGE WHO ATTENDED A MEETING OF THEORGANIZATION IN THE PAST YEAR 2013 2% 95% 1% 66% 32% Women’s association 2016 8% 88% 0% 75% 25% 2013 2% 96% 1% 64% 27% Youth group 2016 4% 90% 0% 79% 21% 2013 8% 90% 1% 72% 22% Farmers’ association 2016 14% 84% 0% 63% 36% 2013 2% 96% 1% 69% 31% Credit or savings group 2016 6% 92% 0% 13% 85% 2013 6% 92% 1% 89% 8% Trade union 2016 13% 86% 0% 93% 8% 2013 6% 91% 1% 88% 11% School management committee 2016 13% 84% 0% 93% 7% 2013 3% 94% 2% 87% 13% Community housing committee 2016 10% 89% 0% 84% 16% 2013 7% 90% 1% 92% 7% Gashtak/gap 2016 7% 91% 1% 77% 22% cio-economic ing for work now development are likely toin be the regions, more poorlyand build capaci- educated than the labor market communities declined by non-IS rapidly from militants– 2003, local and Salafis those look- calling for a ty of the their predecessors and few will have received any implement sub-national administration to plan and vocational ing for work now are likely stricter and more exclusive form of Islam. to more poorly 53 educated than programs. training. 49 The establishment of the LDC signals the govern- One 2012 study of youth in the Ferghana valley their predecessors and few will have received any vocational 55 ment’s interest noted a sense of in alienation revisiting theand agenda exclusion of reforming that wentintergov- well be- training. 46. Women’sOne dominant 2012 study of youth presence inin thethe Ferghana informal valley economy ernmental relations. yond unemployment. Those interviewed “feel largely exclud- noted also a sense makes them of susceptible alienation and exclusion to economic that went shocks; andwell migra-be- ed yond tion unemployment. has had significant Those interviewed impacts on gender “feel largely roles andexcluded family 46.from Inpolitics, addition the to economy, regionalism therisks, system, protection legal Tajikistan faces a sig-by from politics, structure, the economy, including the legal system, the emergence of a largeprotection number by oflawde law enforcement, quality public services and nificant youth bulge, with high rates of youth unemployment decision making processes at local, family and even personal level,” it noted. enforcement, facto women-headedquality public servicesTajikistan households. and decisionhasmaking a sound pro- le- and idleness that represent both a threat and opportunity for cesses gal at local, family framework and even that supports personal gender level,”but it noted. equality, has not Many im- Many young people interviewed in future stability. According to UNICEF, 33 percent the report were the“feel- ofleft pop- ing that isthey young people plemented many interviewed of the laws in and the report were left international “feeling that agreements to ulation thanno lesshave 14legal yearsor non-violent old, and young means people live digni- toaged 14-30 they have which it is no legal party. or non-violent From an economic means to live dignified perspective, lives educational fied lives in their home countries. ” 50 Another make up 35 percent of the total population. Just five study notes that percent in areas adjoining the border with Afghanistan, unemployed in their home differences betweencountries. men ”56 Another and women study mean notes that in that there areareas sig- of the population is over 60 years old. Each year 130,000 en- adjoining nificant the border income withbetween disparities Afghanistan,men and unemployed women. Femaleyouth ter thegravitate youth working towards withwhich smuggling, age population, brings oftenyouth 50 percent them unem- into contact gravitate towards enrollment smuggling, in tertiary education which often brings is among them the lowest in into the 53 with warlords and, by extension, radical Islam. 51 ployment. The majority of returning economic migrants are contact world. 54 with Women warlords and, in are active bytheextension, informal radical Islam. economy, 57 which This is This report also male stressed youth. This that that a creates the key to radicalization situation in which the young is not poverty per se, but the absence of “social lift” – the opportu- report’s lead typically author,with associated Parviz Mullojanov, lower stressedof salaries, absence that that social the ben- age dependency ratio will be relatively high, and the old age key to efits, andradicalization fewer opportunitiesis not poverty for skillper se, but theWomen’s absence development. nity to find better dependency work, ratio will beidentity and quite low. Ana better lifestyle. implication 52 This of this is can of “socialin presence lift” the the opportunity – informal economy to makes find better theirwork, identity employment that lead not only increase the government should the attraction invest heavily ofinto IS, but can also education – and a better situation quite lifestyle. 58 susceptibleThis tocan lead not economic only increase shocks, makingthe wom- at- make people more open youngcompounded a challenge by the radicalization tobrain in their own drain associated with traction en more of IS, but can also economically make young dependent people and prone tomore open to insecurity. 55 external migration and the fact that nearly 75 percent of the country isin radicalization The their own plagued communities by unofficial by non-IS marriages as wellmilitants as ear- population remains in rural areas.54 ly marriages and polygamous relationships that often leave 47. Lack of opportunities for youth may well be the key 49 55 Drivers of Change in Tajikistan, DFID November 2011 p38. term of long Drivers Tajikistan, Change in for challenge DFID November Tajikistan. 2011 p38. Youth participation in 50 http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/640-nobody- 56 http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/640-nobody- hasaever-asked-about-young-peoples-opinions. hasaever-asked-about-young-peoples-opinions. 51 Проект Фонда Евразии в Центральной Азии (ФЕЦА) «Снижение 57 Проект Фонда Евразии в Центральной Азии (ФЕЦА) «Снижение 53 Ibid. уровня 53 радикализации State молодежи Statistics Committee; в Таджикистане» quoted Автор Minister by the GoT - Deputy отчета: for уровня 54 радикализации World молодежи Bank, “Tajikistan: в Таджикистане» Country отчета: Автор(Washington, Gender Assessment” Labor and Парвиз Migration. . Муллоджанов TheМуллоджанов Парвиз DC: . 2013), .3. World Bank, June 54 Parviz 52 Mullojanov, interview with WB delegation, March 2017. https://www.unicef.org/tajikistan/overview.html. 55 bid., 5. Mullojanov, interview with WB delegation, March 2017. 58 IParviz 26 24 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution – local salafis women without calling legalfor a stricter rights. and more exclusive Representation of women form of in the FIGURE 14: SUICIDE FIGHTERS BY NATIONALITY Islam.59 realm also lags behind the government’s goal of 30 political percent representation of women in public bodies, as men 48. Women’s continue dominant to dominate andpresence lead most in political the informal economy organizations also makes them 56 susceptible to economic shocks; and migra- in the country. Finally, violence against women is a pro- tion has had nounced threatsignificant in Tajikistan.impacts In on gender a 2005 rolesin survey and family Khatlon, structure, including the emergence nearly sixty percent of women between 17 and 47 reported of a large number of de facto women-headed households. Tajikistan to have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by their has a sound le- gal framework that supports husband at least once during their lives. gender quality, 57 but has not im- plemented many of the laws and international agreements to which it 47. Data also From is party. showsan economic very perspective, low participation educational rates in civic differences between men and life more broadly, highlighting further challenges ofare women mean that there sig- inclu- nificant income disparities between men sion and citizen engagement. To get a sense of associational and women. Female enrollment life in tertiary education in the community, the Assessment is among the lowest of Local Governancein the 60 world. Women are active Survey in Tajikistan asked whether respondents belonged 58 in the informal economy, which is typically associated with lower salaries, to any mostly formal organizations that are known to exist absence of social ben- efits, and fewer throughout opportunities Tajikistan. The surveyfor skill development. shows very low Women’s partici- presence in the informal economy pation in civic life. The most common social organizationsmakes their employment situation in the sampledquite susceptible jamoats are economic to farmers’ shocks, making wom- associations—and only 8 percent of those surveyed in 2013 said prone en more economically dependent and that they insecuri- to belonged to 61 ty. Thean such country organization,is plagued while by14 percent marriages unofficial in 2016 said as they well as early marriages and polygamous belonged to this type of group. The second most common relationships that often leave form of social without women organization legal in rights. Representation Tajikistan were gashtak of or women gaps, in the political realm also lags behind a form of microcredit and self-help that predominates with- the government’s goal of 30 percent representation of women in Tajik and Uzbek communities in Central Asia. Of those in public bodies, 59 as men continue to dominate and lead surveyed, 7 percent said they participate in gashtak or gap most political organiza- tions in the country.62 Finally, violence against women is a activities. pronounced threat in Tajikistan. In a 2005 survey in Khatlon, D. CROSS-BORDER AND GLOBAL RISKS 65 nearly sixty percent of women between 17 and 47 reported in Tajik stan, and Uzbek Tajikistan, communities Turkmenistan, and Central Asia. in Uzbekistan OfSyrian are in those to have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by their surveyed, 7 percent said they participate in gashtak and Iraq with IS—an estimated 380 from Tajikistan. Radioor 62gap ac- 48. husband Tajikistan at least once faces the increasing during their lives. 63 specter of radicaliza- tivities. Free Europe recently listed Tajikistan as the highest contrib- tion and recruitment to global violent extremism, but the utor of suicide fighters recruited from around the world (see 49. Data scope of thealso life more broadly, challengeshowsis very low participation debated. highlighting Most reportsrates further challenges indicatein civic that of Russia inclu- D. CROSS-BORDER AND GLOBAL RISKS figure 14). recruitment is mostly done among migrant workers in sionperhaps and and citizen engagement. Kazakhstan. To get are Few figures a sense of associational available for recruit- 49. In late 2014 50. Tajikistan and faces theearly 2015 two increasing eventsof specter happened radical- and community, life in the ment, those that are Assessment theavailable are of Local Governance unreliable. President that may ization change and the nature recruitment to of the Islamist global threat to Tajik- violent extremism, but Rahmon Tajikistan64 Survey inannounced early whether inasked 2016 thatrespondents that more than belonged 1,000 istan. In late the scope 2014 of the a faction challenge iswithin debated.the Most IMU,reports which has long indicate to any Tajik mostlywere citizens formal organizations fighting that are for the Islamic known State (IS) toin exist Iraq been closely linked that recruitment to Al-Qaeda is mostly done and among the migrant Taliban, workers reportedly in throughout and Syria.60 A Tajikistan. few months The survey before this, shows Vladimir very low claimed Putin partici- pledged Russia andits allegiance to IS.63 Then in perhaps Kazakhstan. FewMay 2015, Colonel figures Gul- are available pation that in civic 5-7,000 life. The Russian most common or citizens of former social Soviet organizations states were murad Halimov, and for recruitment, commander those that of are the available Tajik OMON, the Inte- are unreliable. in the sampled fighting for IS.61 jamoats The Soufan Group associations—and are farmers’ estimates that a com- only rior Ministry’s President Rahmon Special Forces, defected announced in early to IS. Halimov 2016 that that wasmore a 8 percent bined total of of 2,000surveyed those young people in 2013 fromsaid that they belonged Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz- rising star in than 1,000 Tajikistan’s Tajik citizens security establishment were fighting who had for the Islamic re- State to such an organization, while 14 percent in 2016 said they (IS) in Special ceived Iraq and Forces Syria.66 A fewfrom training months both the US before and this, Russia. Vladimir belonged to this type of group. The second most common Halimov is now Putin claimed believed that 5-7,000 be one of toRussian or the highest-ranking citizens of former So- IS form of social organization in Tajikistan were gashtak or gaps, commanders. viet states were fighting for IS.67 The Soufan Group estimates a form of microcredit and self-help that predominates with- that a combined total of 2,000 young people from Kazakh- 56 Ibid, 1–2. 50. Halimov’s defection and partial IMU switch of pa- 57 Ibid., 3. stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 58 Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Assessment of Local Governance in Tajik- trons means that the bulk of Tajik militants inside and istan” (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Develop- outside the country report to single command and have a ment, October 2016). 59 Ibid. For more oncharismatic high-ranking, 65 gashtak/gap, seeleader. Victoria Reports Koroteyeva in andlate 2016 Ma- Ekaterina and 59 For more on gashtak/gap, see Victoria Koroteyeva and Ekaterina Ma- 60 World Bank, “Tajikistan: Country Gender Assessment” (Washington, karova. 1998. “Money and Social Connections in the Soviet and post-Soviet karova. 1998. “Money and Social Connections in the Soviet and post-Soviet DC: The Uzbek World City. Bank, ” Central June Survey Asian 2013), .3. 17(4):579. Uzbek City.” Central Asian Survey 17(4):579. 61 Ibid., 5. 60 Uran Botobekov, “ISIS and Central Asia: A Shifting Recruiting 66 Uran Botobekov, “ISIS and Central Asia: A Shifting Recruiting 62 Ibid, Strategy,” The 1–2. Diplomat, accessed February 1 2017, http://thediplomat. Strategy,” The Diplomat, accessed February 1 2017, http://thediplomat. 63 Ibid., 3. com/2016/05/isis-and-central-asia-a-shifting-recruiting-strategy/; Foreign Fighters: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/up- http://rus. com/2016/05/isis-and-central-asia-a-shifting-recruiting-strategy/; 62 64 Jennifer http://rus. Murtazashvili, “Assessment of Local Governance in Tajik- azattyk.org/a/tajikistan-more-than-thousand-fighters-syria- azattyk.org/a/tajikistan-more-than-thousand-fighters-syria-iraq/27508035. loads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL.pdf. istan” (Washington, iraq/27508035. DC: United States Agency for International Develop- html. html. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/former-imu-cleric- 63 October 2016). ment, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50515. 61 67 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50515. denounces-islamic-state.php. 27 25 early 2017 refer to a ‘Tajik battalion’ operating around Mosul. export of opiates it produces in Afghanistan, A significant At least two Tajik fighters were involved in an attack on a Ka- percentage of opiates produced in Afghanistan are trafficked bul military hospital in March 2017. And a report produced through the Tajik-Afghan border for further distribution to in February 2017 by the International Center for Count- Eastern Europe, Russia and China. According to the Bureau er-Terrorism (ICCT) reported that 27 Tajiks had carried out of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in suicide operations in Iraq and Syria from December 2015 to 2016 Tajikistan was located at one of the “highest volume il- November 2016.64 There is no indication yet that Halimov licit drug trafficking routes in the world, between Afghani- and IS have turned their attention to their homeland. Howev- stan’s opium harvests on its southern border and the illicit er, IS flags have been seen in various parts of the country, and drug markets of the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe the impacts of the fall of Mosul and possible return of Tajik IS to the north.”69 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNO- fighters could lead to a change in approach. DC) believes that Tajik authorities seize only a very small percentage of the more than 75 metric tons of Afghan heroin 51. Some scholars of Tajikistan argue that the threat of and 35 metric tons of opium that flow out of Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Tajikistan remains overblown. Edward into Tajikistan. The border has become an important source Lemon argues that the closing of space for political and reli- of livelihood for those who live and work along the border, gious expression—not radicalization— is the primary driving including local populations, particularly youth, who lack al- force of violence in Tajikistan society. He and others have ar- ternatives, and military and police officials who are rumored gued that the Tajik population has been relatively immune to to take bribes as they turn a blind eye to or even facilitate drug messaging from IS and other Islamist groups.65 smuggling from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. 52. Many stakeholders within Tajikistan express concern that disenfranchised youth, including the growing numbers 55. With its unique geography, Tajikistan is also sub- of returning and, in particular, deported migrants, might ject to regional tensions around natural resource sharing, be susceptible to radicalization and recruitment to violent particularly over water and riparian zones. Tajikistan has extremism. experienced tension with neighboring Uzbekistan over the construction of the Rogun Dam. 53. Tajikistan’s more than 1,300 kilometer border with Afghanistan is of concern to countries in the region because 56. The historically complicated and largely un-delimit- of its length and relative insecurity. The border between Af- ed 970-kilometer-long Tajik-Kyrgyz border, in the Ferghana ghanistan and Tajikistan is neatly separated by the Panj Riv- Valley, with its multiple enclaves is also a source of regular, er that sits between the two countries.66 The long border is low-level friction over access to water and pasturage. This porous, with security checkpoints that dot this lengthy span. affects about 160,000 residents of some of Sughd’s most dense- Concerns over the situation on the border have become more ly populated jamoats. The construction of national borders acute in recent years as the US and NATO forces decreased in the Ferghana Valley has exacerbated conflict over natural their presence in Afghanistan. The decreased troop presence resources, in particular water and land, because Soviet-era has resulted in expanded Taliban and IS presence throughout infrastructure to support agriculture and other industries was Afghanistan, especially in northern parts of Afghanistan.67 In not designed to suit republic borders. As a result, a collective 2015, the head of Tajikistan’s strategic studies center declared action dilemma has emerged whereby residents in both coun- that IS also has a presence along the border, but estimated tries have no incentive to maintain infrastructure because it that only 8,000 “terrorists” were gathered in the area.68 It is does not serve their own citizens, but instead serves those difficult to establish with any clarity the extent of the threat across the border.70 Efforts to separate communities from one emanating from Afghanistan. another across borders have interrupted commerce, trade, and traditional herding arrangements. 54. Potential insurgent activity cannot be separated from drug smuggling and other for-profit criminality that 57. Tajikistan is also the country in the ECA region most takes place on the border. The Taliban is heavily reliant on vulnerable to climate shocks and natural disasters. In the last year, extreme weather and record snows resulted in 55 cases of disasters and 50 deaths. The Government is seeking new ways to develop early warning systems and 64 https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Winter-War-by- Suicide-Feb2017.pdf 65 Lemon, “Violence in Tajikistan Emerges from within the State,” 73. 66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Tajikistan. http://mfa.tj/en/ border-issues/tajik-afghan-state-border.html. 69 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 67 Asia-Plus, “More than 10,000 Militants Concentrated along Afghan- “Tajikistan: 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report” (Wash- Tajik Border, Says Tajik Minister,” January 20, 2017, http://news.tj/ en/ ington, DC: US Department of State, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/ news/tajikistan/security/20170120/235773. nrcrpt/2016/vol1/253311.htm. 68 ATN News, “Around 8,000 Terrorists Gather along Afghan-Tajikistan 70 Madeleine Reeves, “Locating Danger: Konfliktologiia and the Search Border,” Ariana News, accessed January 25, 2017, http://ariananews. af/ for Fixity in the Ferghana Valley Borderlands.,” Central Asian Survey 24, no. latest-news/around-8000-terrorists-gather-along-afghan-tajikistan-bor-der/. 1 (March 2005): 67–81. 26 build community resilience to protect households assets potential impact on fiscal sustainability could be significant and vital source of rural livelihoods, prevent and respond to in case of natural disasters since the country has very limited the avalanches, land and mud slides, and flooding that have fiscal reserves for quick and effective response. posed significant stress on infrastructure, agriculture and food security, and livelihoods, particularly in remote regions. 59. Given low level of preparedness, poor awareness and weak social cohesion at the community level, natural 58. Tajikistan is not well prepared to address the conse- disasters may potentially exacerbate existing inequalities, quences of climate change and natural disasters. There are trigger loss of already scarce economic assets by the farms number of factors that exacerbate disaster impact in the coun- and households such as land, livestock, and housing. Thus try, including poverty, a vulnerable economy, acute infrastruc- disaster risk magnifies socio-economic fragility of the rural ture needs and lack of financial capacities of the government population. The majority who suffer are the poorest house- and population to address the consequences of disasters. As holds, women and children. concluded by Tajikistan’s country diagnostic hazard note, the 27 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution IV. POTENTIAL TRIGGERS/ SCENARIOS 60. The 62. Thefollowing section briefly followingchapter briefly highlights trig- potential trig- highlights potential However, its neighbors.nearly one half Another of the area growing population no longer of concern has are natu- gers of heightened fragility or more wide-scale violence gers of heightened fragility or more wide-scale violence and and clear first hand memories of the period. These ral disasters, which are becoming more frequent as climate are the young instability in Tajikistan. These are sparks that could turn instability in Tajikistan. These are sparks that could turn the people change’s who are having impact increasing is increasingly felt.difficulty finding work and risks described in Chapter 3 into more explosive drivers the risks described in Chapter 3 into more explosive drivers of who express alienation and a sense of exclusion from society conflict that would interrupt development progress. The of conflict that would interrupt development progress. The like- at large. 63. TheThey may have young fewer reservations population of Tajikistan about does resorting not have to lihood possible andand likelihood scenarios possible for future scenarios forms for future of FCV forms are also of FCV are violence. They may be drawn to IS, but may the memory of the Civil War—the value of stability may no equally be attract- included. also included. ed by the longer as deeply of be teachings home-grown held. The argument Salafithat evangelists, whose the population rigorously disciplined version of Islam is now is still so traumatized by the horrors of the civil war that itunder intense 61. Risks 63. Risksof regionalismremain ofregionalism remainacute. acute.A number of vio- Subnational im- pressure would do from the government. anything to avoid more violence has long been a portant political forces are watching carefully for lence is a continuing risk, over power-sharing, access to re- signs that convincing source of resilience. However, nearly one half of unity at the sources, top linked and/or is fracturing. to risksTwo regions, of violent Gharm and Gor- extremism. 66. The IS threat. the population While no longer hasthe Taliban clear has not first hand tried to of memories inter- the no-Badakhshan, have been completely squeezed out of the vene in its Central Asian neighbors’ affairs period. These are the young people who are having increas- the IS has a dif- 62. Tajikistan political is alsospace and economic vulnerable broadA to ayears. in recent array third,ofKhu- eco- ferent view offinding ing difficulty its mission. workTheandchances who express intervention of IS alienation andarea nomic jand and has climatic seen shocks that its traditional could role result leadership in widespread sharply reduced. slim, but the consequences would sense of exclusion from society at large. be grave. The presence in instability. Groups A banking in Gharm crisis is and GBAO already have underway, in recent its impact years resorted to its highest ranks of a former senior security officer from Du- lessened armed byrepel so far to violence the small proportion perceived attempts ofby Tajiks who have government to shanbe 64. The has ISput Tajikistan threat. Whileonthe jihadisthas theTaliban map notand may tried towell in- bank accounts. curtail Further extension of the crisis, however, could their activities. be in itsTajik boosting tervene Centralrecruitment to the IS Asian neighbors’ cause. affairs the The Rahmon IS has a dif- affect both public and private sector, resulting in the collapse regime would ferent view not of its be able The mission. to handle chances a major IS armed chal- of IS intervention are 64. Tajikistan of payment system is for alsopublic vulnerable sector to a broad array employees, of eco- for example, lenge andthe slim, but would have to call consequences on Russia would andThe perhaps be grave. China. presence in nomic and climatic shocks that could result in and the suspension of the vast majority of banking transac- widespread The former its highest is worried ranks possible at the senior of a former spreadofficer security of radical from Islam Du- instability. A banking tions. The impact crisis is of Russia’s already underway, economic its impact problems underlines to its Central shanbe has put Asia back yard; Tajikistan China on the is deeply jihadist mapaware and may that Xinji- well be lessened so far by the small proportion of Tajiks another major potential threat: Tajikistan’s deep dependence who have ang shares boosting a border Tajik with Badakhshan. recruitment to the IS cause. IS would probably not bank accounts. Further extension of the crisis, (through migration) for any degree of financial stabilityhowever, could on be deterred from fighting either Russian or Chinese troops, affect both public and private sector, resulting in the collapse and has shown a lack of interest in civilian collateral deaths. of payment system for public sector employees, for example, and the suspension of the vast majority of banking transac- 67. While the most likely may be a “muddle through” sce- tions. The impact of Russia’s economic problems underlines nario, this outcome perpetuates vulnerability and risk and another major potential threat: Tajikistan’s deep dependence continues to threaten development progress and share pros- (through migration) for any degree of financial stability on perity. The government may well receive enough money from its neighbors. Another growing area of concern are natu- foreign donors to allow the president to achieve his longtime ral disasters, which are becoming more frequent as climate dream of opening the world’s highest dam at Rogun. This will change’s impact is increasingly felt. allow him to provide his nation with a steady source of elec- tricity for the first time in years, and to present himself to the 65. Young Tajiks do not have the memory of the Civil outside world as the only option for stability. Such a scenario War—the value of stability may no longer be as deeply held. is unlikely to produce any real change, however, unless the The argument that the population is still so traumatized by president and his family are willing to abandon their gover- the horrors of the civil war that it would do anything to avoid nance model, which is largely aimed at increasing the wealth more violence has long been a convincing source of resilience. of the ruling elite at the expense of the population. 30 28 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution V. SOURCES V. SOURCES OFOF RESILIENCE RESILIENCE 68. This Chapter details potential sources of resilience that 68. This Chapter details potential sources of resilience that could to mitigate help Chapter risks and FCVpotential potential triggers of vi- TABLE 4. TABLE LIFE IN 4. LIFE IN TRANSITION TRANSITION III III KEY KEY FINDINGS FINDINGS 79 65. This 68. details sources of resilience that (SOURCE: EBRD LIFE IN TRANSITION (SOURCE: EBRD LIFE IN TRANSITION FINDINGS TABLE 4. LIFE IN TRANSITION III KEY III SURVEY) III could Thisto help mitigate Chapter FCV risks details and potential potential sources triggers of of resilience vi- olence. could These help to include the mitigate FCV public’s and risks risksaversion to a return potential triggers to of massvi- SURVEY)79 olence. that could violence, olence. These These help include to mitigate formal the localinclude the public’s FCV informal andpublic’s aversion aversion andto a return potential social institutions, to a return to mass triggers toaccess mass (SOURCE: EBRD LIFE IN TRANSITION III SURVEY)79 violence, of violence. local Theseformal includeand informal the public’s social institutions, aversion to a returnaccess to to the Russian violence, local laborformal market, women, and informal hydropower social and miner- institutions, access to mass Russian theviolence, local market, labor formal women, and informalhydropower and miner- social institutions, al to wealth, the Russian and a shared labor physical market, women, and cultural hydropower heritage and with miner- its al wealth, access to the and a shared Russian physical labor market, andwomen,culturalhydropower heritage with andits neighbors al wealth, as part and a of thephysical shared ancient “Silk and Road.” heritage with its cultural neighbors mineral wealth, as part of the and ancient a shared “Silk Road. physical and ” cultural heritage neighbors as part of asthe ancient the “Silk Road. ” Road.” with 69. its neighbors With the memory part ofofa brutal ancient civil war “Silk and its far-reach- 69. With the memory of a brutal civil war and its far-reach- ing impact, With mass mobilization to violence andbe may itsunlikely— 69. ing 66. impact,Withthe mass thememory mobilization memory of a ofbrutalto a violence civil war brutal may civil be war far-reach- unlikely— and its stability ing impact, is deeply mass valued. mobilization Despite to significant violence may cracks be in the unlikely— stability is deeply valued. far-reaching impact, mass mobilization to violenceinmay Despite significant cracks the social stability contract is deeply between valued. the people Despite and the significant state, cracksthe older in the social contract between the people be unlikely— stability is deeply valued. Despite significant and the state, the older Source: EBRD Life In Transition III Survey generation social contract in Tajikistan between are people well aware the and of the the opportunity state, the older of the economic and security devastation in Tajikistan in the generation in Tajikistan are well cracks in the social contract between the people and the state, aware of the opportunity of the economic and security devastation in Tajikistan in the costs of violence. Increased authoritarianism inside of Tajiki- aftermath is of better of the than the economic civil and four it was war, years securityit is not ago,surprising 57 percentthat small said mar- there is generation costs of in violence. Tajikistan Increased are well authoritarianism the older generation in Tajikistan are well aware of the op- aware of the opportunity inside of Tajiki- aftermath of the civil war, it isdevastation not in Tajikistan surprising that small in the mar- stan costs has made of violence. assessing public opinion particularly challeng- ginal less corruption aftermath changes of in the one’s than civil foureconomic war, years it is ago, notsituation while 63produce surprising percent that increased said small they mar- stan 77has portunity made of Increased costsassessing violence. publicauthoritarianism In opinionmost general, inside challeng- of Tajiki- particularly longitudinal sur- ginal changes in one’s economic situation produce increased individual satisfaction. On the other these positive hand,produce as- ing. However, in general, most longitudinal opinion surveys are satisfied with their personal financial stan 77has made assessing public opinion particularly challeng- ginal changes in one’s economic hand, situation situation (see Ta- increased 78 ing. veys. 78 However, in general, most longitudinal In general, most longitudinal opinion surveys show an opinion surveys individual satisfaction. On the other these positive as- show ing. 77 an improvement in public perception—especially with However, in general, most longitudinal opinion surveys sessments individual ble 4). are at odds satisfaction. According to thewith Onsame other the cross-national other survey, hand, life these indices positive satisfaction that amongas- show improvement in public perception—especially with satisfac- 78 an improvement in public perception—especially with sessments are at odds with other cross-national indices that satisfaction showwith with an improvement individual economic in public and personal perception—especially situations with show sessments a Tajikistani deterioration are at odds respondents in human with otherrights, democracy, cross-national and indices eco- that satisfaction tion with individual individual economic economic and and personal personal situations situations than show a deterioration inincreased human rights, from 73 percent in democracy, 2010 and to eco- than in previous satisfaction with years. Given individual economicthe depth and personal situations show a deterioration in human rights, democracy, and eco- than in previous years. in previous years. Given the depth of the Given the depth than in previous economic and security years.devastation Given the depth in Ta- FIGURE FIGURE 15: LIFE SATISFACTION: 15: LIFE SATISFACTION: PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE OF OF RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS WHO WHO jikistan 77 in the aftermath In examining public opinion data that of the civil war, ARE FIGURE SATISFIED 15: LIFE WITH LIFE, SATISFACTION: ALL ARE SATISFIED WITH LIFE, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED THINGS PERCENTAGE CONSIDERED OF RESPONDENTS WHO it 77 is 77 with not In surprising examining In examining public deals with satisfaction of the national government, public that opinion opinion smalldata data marginal that that ARE SATISFIED WITH LIFE, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED deals changes president, satisfaction in one’s national of the economic institutions national situation or other government, assessmentspro- deals with president, satisfaction national of the institutions national or other government, assessments duce of of theis increased the country’s president, national country’s individual general general direction, institutions direction, satisfaction. or it is apparent other itsurveysassessments is apparent On that that there the othera great hand, deal of bias these in these positive making assessments of the there country’s is a great general deal of direction, bias in these is apparent itsurveys making that responses to most questions on these topic unreli- are there at is a responses odds able sources great to of with deal most of other bias inon questions assessment. cross-national these This these surveys topicin is evident making unreli- two in- dices responses able common that sources to of show most factors: questions assessment. largea deterioration on these This percentages topic is evident inin human unreli- of individuals two able commonsources of assessment. factors: This is evident in two rights, who respond thatlarge democracy, percentages and government economic of individuals performance freedom is “very common who respondfactors:that large percentages government of individuals performance is “very in the good” general as For incountry. who respond thatas well as government example, high numbers according performance of indi- is “very to good” viduals in general who respond well “do as nothigh numbers know” when of indi- asked. the good” in vidualsLITS survey, general as well “doas despitehigh a growing numbers of indi-eco- Both of whothese respond factors are not common know” inwhen survey asked. data nomic viduals Both whenof crisis who these individuals respondthat factors “do are are has asked to forced not know” common inwhen respond thousands survey to asked. data a sensitive Both when of of these individuals factors are are askedcommon to in respond survey to a data sensitive unemployed migrant laborers question. Although most survey data in Tajikistanto back when individuals question. Although are asked most to respond survey data into a sensitive Tajikistan Tajikistan (and all authoritarian question. (and from their Although all authoritarian environments) most workdata survey environments) abroad, must be must per- 75treat- in Tajikistan be ed carefully, it is apparent which questions aretreat- less cent (and ed of all authoritarian carefully,respondentsapparent said environments) it is generally which their economic must be aretreat- sensitive as they exhibitquestions more variation lessin ed carefully, situation it is is apparent better which than questions areyears less sensitive responses as aretheyfar generally fewer “do notit exhibit was more know” orfour variation “refused in sensitive as they generally responses ago. to Similarly, answer” responses are responses. are far exhibit more despite increased levels in fewer “do not know” far fewer “do not know” or “refused orvariation “refused of to 78 answer” responses. http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajiki- political to 78 answer” repression, 75 percent also said responses. http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajiki- stan/ Source: EBRD Life in Transition III Survey 89 that the 78 stan/ political situation in the country Source: EBRD Life In http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajiki- in Transition III Survey 89 stan/ Source: EBRD Life in Transition III Survey 89 31 31 31 29 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution FIGURE 68. Where the state has been absent or ineffective in its 16: PERSONAL FIGURE 16: LIFE SATISFACTION PERSONAL LIFE SATISFACTION 70. The Listening to Tajikistan Survey showed that most development focus, local institutions provide an important FIGURE 16: PERSONAL LIFE SATISFACTION 70. The Tajiks Listening are satisfied to Tajikistan with the quality Survey of their showed lives. The that most survey source Tajiks of resilience are satisfied to with FCV risks. quality of their the significant One such institution lives. The of par- survey data shows that there is not variation among indi- ticular data vidualsshowssignificance that there regarding in Tajikistan is not significant life satisfaction is among the mahalla. variation urban/rural Cieslewska among indi- dwellers defines viduals nor is their mahalla the variation regarding as “a self-governing life satisfaction among among the top urban/rural 60 percentsmallof community dwellers earners or regulated nor is their the bottom by rules variation 40 percent.based among On on athetraditional scaletop of60 topractices 1 percent 5, life and cus- earners ofsatisfaction or toms the deeply40 bottom in Tajikistan rooted percent. remained the On Central in largely a scale steady Asian of 1 to the over Islamic 5, life tradition” satisfaction two-year peri- thatofcontinue in od Tajikistan the survey to atbe remained observed around largely by local steady 3.4 (see over Figure communities theThe 3). two-year memory this toperi- of day od theof (2015:1). the survey brutal 1992-97While at civil historically around war 3.4 may (see informal Figure also play 3). in its Thenature, part, memory recent though as of legislation the brutal 1992-97 mentioned (the 2008 in Chapter “Law civil 4,war thisonmay mayPublic also Self-Initiative play its be fading nowpart, Bodies”) though that over 50 as suggests mentioned percent of an in theintention Chapter population to 4, incorporate this are 24 may orbe mahallas fading under. 7980 now asthat part of the over 50 formal state administrative percent of the population are 24 or under. structure. 7980 this ambiguity, Despite 71. evidence Where thathas the state suggests been absent mahallas continue or predatory, to play an local import- in- 71. Where stitutions ant role the state inprovide contemporary has socio-economic an important been absent source predatory, orof resilience life. local In a surveyto FCV in- of stitutions risks. nearly One 1,400 provide such an important institution households from particular of all source four regionsof resilience significance to of the countryin FCVTa- Source: Listening Source: to Tajikistan Listening to Tajikistan90 risks. jikistan carried Oneis the out such institution by mahalla. the USAID of particular Cieslewska Tajikistan Localsignificance defines the mahalla Governance in as Ta- Proj- “a Source: Listening to Tajikistan90 jikistan ect (LGP), themahalla. is the self-governing small Cieslewska community clear majority defines by regulated of respondents the mahalla rules (86 based percent) asin-“a on self-governing traditional small practices community and customs regulated deeply dicated that they have a mahalla committee. Individuals were by rooted rules in based the Cen- on FIGURE 17: DO REPRESENTATIVES ON THE MAHALLA traditional tral Asian practices Islamic and tradition” customs deeply that continue rooted to work—thein the Cen- be observed by FIGURE 17: DO COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVES WORK ON THE OR FOR THE COMMUNITY MAHALLA DO THEY asked tral local for whom Asian Islamic communities they to believe tradition” this day mahalla that continue (2015:1). officials Whileto be observed historically state by in- or the community (Figure 17). Three fourths of respondents COMMITTEE WORK FOR WORK FOR THE STATE? THE COMMUNITY OR DO THEY local formal communities in nature, to recent this day (2015:1). legislation (the said that mahalla officials work for the community, 17 percent While 2008 historically “Law on Public in- WORK FOR THE STATE? formal in work Self-Initiative said they nature, forrecent Bodies”) legislation both suggests the communityan(the 2008 intention and “Law the tostate,onwhile Public incorporate 5 Self-Initiative mahallas as partBodies”) of the suggests formal an state intention administrative percent said they work for the state exclusively. Mahalla lead- to incorporate structure. 80% 75% mahallas Despite ers had the ashighest this part oflevel ambiguity, the formal evidence of citizen state administrative suggests accountabilitythat mahallas structure. of any con- public 80% 75% Despite tinue to organization.this play ambiguity, an important evidence role insuggests that contemporary mahallas socio-eco- con- 70% tinue nomicto play life. Inan important a survey role in1,400 of nearly contemporary households socio-eco- from all 70% 60% 50% nomic four life. In 69. regions Labor of survey athe migrationcountry of can nearly carried 1,400 be viewed out by households as thea riskUSAIDbut from Tajik- also all a 50% 60% 50% four istan source regions Local of the country Governance of resilience, with Projectcarried a range (LGP), of out by thethe economic clearUSAID majority benefits, Tajik- skillof 50% 50% istan Local Governance respondents development (86  and percent) changing Project indicated gender(LGP), thatthe roles. they clear There have majority are mahal- a positive of 40% 36% 36% respondents la committee. (86  percent) Individuals indicated were asked benefits to migration, which include increased human capital thatfor they whom havethey a mahal- believe 40% 30% la forcommittee. mahalla migrant officialsIndividuals work—the populations inwere stateasked constructionor the whom forand community they (Figure industrial believe tech- 30% 20% 17% mahalla 17). Three officials fourths work—the of respondents state niques along with the remittances they provide. Migrant la-or saidthe community that mahalla (Figure officials 20% 10% 17% workThree 17). borers for thefourths represent community,of respondents a better 17 percent educated saidsaidthat population they mahalla work than officials for those both who 10% 5% 1% 1% 2% 3% 10% work the for community the community, and the 17 percent state, while have remained in the country. Three-quarters of migrants said 5 percentthey work said for they both work 10% 5% 0% 1% 1% 2% 3% the community for the have state exclusively. secondary and state, the Mahalla general or while 5 percent leaders secondary had thesaid vocational they highest work level general Refused Don't know Work for the state Work for both Work for the 0% state and community for of the citizen state exclusively. accountability Mahalla of any leaders public education. About 17 percent of migrants have degrees from had the organization. highest level Refused Don't know Work for the state Work for both Work for the community of citizen accountability of any public organization. state and community community higher 72. Labor educational migration establishments. can be viewed Many asmigrants a risk but in Russia also a 2013 2016 have expressed sourceLabor 72. a migration of resilience, desire with to can help the be viewed a range Tajik economy as a risk of economic but through benefits, also skilla 2013 2016 skills-transfer source development programs of resilience, and with changing and appear a range gender ofto be ready economic roles. There to contribute benefits, are skill positive nomic freedom in the country. For example, according to to the development development benefits and changing to migration, of Tajikistan, which genderdespite include roles. increased the human There fact are that they positive capital nomic the LITS freedom survey, in the country. despite a growing For example,crisis economic according that has to reside benefits for in migrant Russia. to migration, 71 populations which include increased in construction human capital and industrial tech- 75 the percent forcedLITS in 2016, survey, thousands of making despite unemployed Tajikistan a growing the laborers economic migrant crisis happiest second that backhas to for migrant niques along populations in construction with the remittances and industrial they provide. Migrant tech-la- country infrom the transition region, 70. Absence of men as a result of labor migration has forced Tajikistanthousands of work their abroad,despite unemployed migrant 75 itslaborers percent status asback one to of respondents of niques along with borers represent the remittances a better educated populationthey provide. than Migrant those who la- the poorest Tajikistan countries in from theirsituation terms work abroad, of GDP per 75 percentcapita. created opportunities for women. Women than taken have those on said their economic is better than it of wasrespondents four years borers represent have remained a better in educated the country. population Three-quarters of migrants who said their economic ago. Similarly, despite situation increased is better than levels of four years it wasrepression, political leadership have secondary remained positions in in rural the country. areas. The ALG dataof Three-quarters finds many migrants general or secondary vocational general ed- 67. The Listening to Tajikistan Survey showed that most female mahalla leaders have emerged since mass male mi- ago. Similarly, 75 percent alsodespite said that increased levels the political of political situation repression, in the country have ucation. About general secondary 17 percent or secondary of migrants vocational have degrees general fromed- of the population is satisfied with the quality of their lives. gration abroad 75 percent is better thanalso thatyears saidfour it was the political situation ago, 57 percent in the said country there is less ucation. About began higher educational to occur. 17 establishments. percent This of migrants mayhave Many change migrants communi- degrees from in Russia The survey data shows that there is not significant variation ty dynamics in athe years is better than corruption it was than fourfour years years ago,ago, 57 percent while 63 percent said there said is less they are higher have educational expressed desire toto establishments. come. help Similarly, theMany Tajik migrants economytherein has also Russia through among corruptionindividuals than fourregarding years ago, life satisfaction while 63 percentamong urban/ saidTable they are been a substantial feminization of agriculture in the country satisfied with their personal financial situation (see 4). have expressed skills-transfer a desire and programs to helpappear the to Tajik economy be ready through to contribute rural satisfieddwellers with nor is their their variation personal financial among situation the 60 per- topTable (see 4). because so many skills-transfer men have programs and leftappearthe to country. be ready 82 Atorecent contributeFeed According to the same survey, life satisfaction among Tajik- cent istani earners ofrespondents According to the the or same bottom survey, increased 40 life from percent. On a scale satisfaction 73 percent among in of 1 2010 toto75 Tajik-5, life satisfaction istani percent respondents in in 2016, makingTajikistan increased remained from the Tajikistan largely 73 second steady in 2010 coun- percenthappiest over the to 75 two-year percent try in the inperiod 2016, of the making transition survey Tajikistan region, at around despite the (see 3.4 happiest second its status Figure as one coun- of 3). the 79 http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajikistan/ The memory of the brutal 1992-97 civil war may also play its 80 79 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/869151482470337678/Wellbe- http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajikistan/ try in the poorest transition countries region, in terms of despite GDP per its status as one of the capita. 71 IOM, “Diaspora: Partner in the Development of Tajikistan” (Dushan- ing-Eng-21-2.pdf 80 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/869151482470337678/Wellbe- part, though as mentioned, this poorest countries in terms of GDP per capita. may be fading now that over be: International Organization for Migration, 2015), 15. ing-Eng-21-2.pdf 50 percent of the population are 24 or under. 30 32 32 the Future survey showed that women in households with a Rogun could also mean a reduction in government spending family member working abroad had higher levels of women’s on the social sectors for several years. Based on the current decision making in households with no members working governance environment, there are also acute risks around abroad.72 The influx of women into the agricultural and local benefit sharing, oversight and transparency. government sectors creates possibilities that these areas can be platforms through which gradual transformations in the 72. Tajikistan also shares a rich physical and cultur- role of women can take shape. al heritage with its neighbors. Cities such as Penjikent and Khujand were important cities on the “Silk Route” connect- 71. Tajikistan’s hydropower potential and mineral ing China with South Asia, Iran, Anatolia, and the Mediter- wealth could be a significant source of economic growth but ranean world. Major investments and new efforts to place is also fraught with governance risks. The Rogun Dam, on Central Asia on the global map of trade, including the One the Vakhsh tributary of the Amu Darya River in Tajikistan, Belt One Road (OBOR), provide an opportunity for Tajiki- for example, is an important symbol of Tajikistan’s indepen- stan and its four Central Asian neighbors to revive and make dence and a cornerstone of the government’s plans for de- accessible a unique heritage. Improving connectivity and re- veloping the national economy. The mountainous state lacks ducing barriers to the movement of people and goods across the industry and natural riches that bless other former Soviet the countries that comprise the Fergana Valley, and between Central Asian republics but has more than 40 percent of Cen- Penjikent and the historically Tajik cities of Samarkand and tral Asia’s water, prompting the sentiment, “water is life”. For Bukhara in Uzbekistan are two examples of clusters with the this reason, the government has pinned Tajikistan’s economic potential to attract tourists from Europe, Russia, China, and hopes on its hydropower potential. However, investment in South Asia and the local job-creating services that they re- quire. 72 Ibid. 31 Confidential Confidential – Not – Not for Release for Release or Distribution or Distribution VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: WORLD BANK SUPPORT THROUGH THE RISK MITIGATION REGIME BACKGROUND AND A. BACKGROUND CURRENT AND CURRENT 75. The the improving Bank’s active portfolio investment climate andcurrently comprises strengthening com-22 operations, including petitiveness regional in key sectors; projects, totaling 2) supporting US$366.9 social inclusion by WORLD BANK WORLD APPROACH BANK APPROACH million. The increasing largest access the active share of social to improved portfolio services, is inedu- including the cation, health, water sector (23social assistance, percent), water followed bysupply energy and(14sanitation; percent), 76. Tajikistan’s independence, Since Tajikistan’s 73. Since independence, the World Bank’s the World Bank’s and 3) promoting transport regional (12 percent), connectivity governance (12 to increase percent), the coun- urban, and strategy and strategy and portfolio portfolio has evolved over has evolved over time time in response to in response to ruralaccess try’s to regional development and global marketseducation (9 present), (8information and percent), health changing development a changing a development context. context. Tajikistan Tajikistan joined joined the World the World knowledge. (7 percent), Mainstreaming climate change, agriculture (6 percent), improving environment gover- and natural Bank in Bank in 1993 1993 and and IDA IDA in 1994. Since in 1994. 1996, the Since 1996, the Bank Bank has has nance, resourcesand (5narrowing the gender percent), trade gap are cross cutting and competitiveness mea- (3 percent), US$1.11 billion provided US$1.11 provided billion in IDA grants, in IDA highlyconcessional grants, highly concession- sures. Tajikistan’s and social new National protection and labor (1 percent). Strategy Development (NDS) Three projects credits, al credits,and andtrust trust funds, funds, of of which which US$890 million US$890.61 has been million has 2016-2030 are currently also reflects being these objectives, prepared with ato and scheduled focus on ener- be delivered disbursed. In the late nineties, the World been disbursed. In the late nineties, the World Bank’s pro- Bank’s program fo- in independence gy FY17: i) Nurek and the efficient use Rehabilitation of energy; (US$170 connectivity; million, includ- cused on post conflict reconstruction gram focused on post conflict reconstruction projects and projects and providing food and expanding security;million ing US$100 Scale Up productive employment. Facility); ii) Strengthening emergency funding in providing emergency response funding in to food insecurity response and nat- to food insecurity Critical Infrastructure (US$20 mln), and iii) Zarafshon Irri- 78. The Bank’s active portfolio currently comprises 22 ural disasters. Beginning in and natural disasters. Beginning in 2000 following the agree- 2000 following the peace peace gation Rehabilitation and River Basin Management Project ment, the focus agreement, shifted the focus to economic shifted to economicand social and development social devel- operations, including regional projects, totaling USD 366.9 (US$16.6mln TF Grant funded by EU). Four projects are in through investments opment through aimed aimed investments at restoring productivity-led at restoring productivi- million. The largest share of the active portfolio is in the water preparation and scheduled to be delivered in FY18: i) Ta- growth ty-led and job growth and creation, betterbetter job creation, access to healthcare access and safe to healthcare and sector (23 percent), followed by energy (14 percent), transport jikistan Railways Project (US$30 mln); ii) Road Sector In- drinking safe drinkingwater, land water, rights, land diversification rights, diversification of agriculture of agriculture in (12 percent), governance (12 percent), urban, and rural devel- vestment Project (US$30 mln); iii) Rural Water Supply and in rural areas, opment (9 present), education (8 percent), health (7 percent), rural areas, andand an improved an improved business business environment. Ac- environment. Sanitation Project (US$25 mln) and iv) Additional financing cording to a country opinion survey undertaken in 2017, the agriculture (6 percent), environment and natural resources (US$15 mln) for Agriculture Commercialization Project. 74. Bank is The viewedWorld Bank Group positively in terms Country Program of its overall Strategy effectiveness, (5 percent), trade and competitiveness (3 percent), and so- The World Bank’s Trust Fund (TF) portfolio in Tajikistan (CPS) for 2015–18 supports efforts to staff preparedness and its development results. Perceptions reduce poverty and cial protection and labor (1 percent). Three projects are cur- includes 25 Bank-executed trust funds totaling US$12.7 mil- promote shared prosperity in Tajikistan. of its relevance and alignment with country priorities have The CPS includes rently being prepared and scheduled to be delivered in FY17: lion and 18 Recipient executed Trust Funds totaling US$92.9 three pillars: increased since advancing 1) the same survey private insector–led growth 2014. Relatively through lower rat- i) Nurek Rehabilitation (US$170 million, including US$100 million. Trustfund activities complement the Bank assistance improving the investment climate and ings are shared when respondents consider the Bank’s flexibil-strengthening com- million Scale Up Facility); ii) Strengthening Critical Infra- structure and program (US$ finance andrange a wide 20mln), of projects iii) Zarafshon in key strategic Irrigation Reha- petitiveness ity and the way in key sectors; in which it 2) supporting collaborates theinclusion social with private sec-by sectors, including education, energy, agriculture, food securi- increasing access to improved social services, tor and civil society in particular. As for the priorities for the including edu- bilitation and River Basin Management Project (US$16.6mln TFand ty, Grantthe social sectors. funded by EU). Four projects are in preparation and health, cation, Bank World tosocial focus, assistance, the survey water pointssupply and sanitation; to greater emphasis and on 3) promoting private regional connectivity sector development, followed to byincrease the coun- energy, jobs, gov- scheduled 76. Theto be also CPS delivered in puts a FY18: emphasis special onRailways i) Tajikistan Proj- collaboration try’s access ernance andto marketsthe regional Finally, education. and global Bank’s information support and to capacity ect (US$30 mln); ii) Road Sector Investment Project and policy dialogue with development partners through the (US$30 development in Tajikistan is knowledge. Mainstreaming considered climate change, high importance of improving gover- mln); regulariii) Rural Water platform of theSupply and Sanitation Development Project Council Coordination (US$25 to survey nance, and respondents. narrowing the gender gap are cross cutting mea- mln) and iv) Additional financing (US$15 mln) for Agricul- (DCC), which is chaired by the World Bank and compris- sures. Tajikistan’s new National Development Strategy (NDS) ture Commercialization Project. The World Bank’s TF portfo- es 28 international agencies active in Tajikistan. The DCC 77. The World 2016-2030 Bank these also reflects Group Countrywith objectives, Program a focus Strategy on en- lio in Tajikistan includes 25 Bank-executed trust funds total- plays an important role in fostering country ownership and (CPS) for 2015–18 supports efforts ergy independence and the efficient use of energy; connec-to reduce poverty and ing US$12.7 million and 18 Recipient executed Trust Funds mutual accountability through several sector-specific and promote shared prosperity in Tajikistan. tivity; food security; and expanding productive employment. The CPS includes totaling US$ 92.9 million. Trust fund activities complement thematic working groups: public administration and gov- three pillars: 1) advancing private sector–led growth through the Bank assistance program and finance a wide range of 32 35 ernance, private sector-led growth, development of human challenges that could constrain development progress. Find- potential, energy independence, food security, and transport ings of this Risk and Resilience Assessment will help inform connectivity. The Bank is working with a number of other the developing SCD scheduled to be delivered by September development partners in the implementation of key CPS pro- 2017. As part of its participation in the IDA 18 Risk Mitiga- gram areas, including with Asian Development Bank on en- tion Regime, Tajikistan is expected to see a substantial in- ergy reforms; the European Union on water policy and irriga- crease in its IDA allocations. tion; Japan on health and nutrition; DFID on public financial management and investment climate reforms; and EBRD on B. TAJIKISTAN AND THE RISK energy and financial sector reforms. In response to changes in the donor landscape, the Bank is actively exploring oppor- MITIGATION REGIME tunities to engage with new donors including the Islamic De- 80. The goal of incremental financing support through velopment Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Risk Mitigation Regime is for the World Bank to pilot the Eurasian Development Bank, China and Russia to in key preventive support to address FCV risks that constrain de- sectors including transport, energy and education. The Bank velopment progress. Funding is flexible to respond to coun- worked closely with other partners and the Government to try-specific risks and can be used, for example, for operations inform the preparation of the NDS (2016-2030), and MTDS targeted at tackling grievances surrounding economic mar- (2016-2020). ginalization and uneven development; reducing conflicts surrounding land use; addressing regional imbalances; cre- 77. The draft Performance and Learning Review (PLR) ating meaningful livelihood opportunities for youth at risk; for the FY15-18 CPS finds that the deteriorating domestic and increasing transparency in natural resource governance. economy and changes in IDA financing terms have had a However, financing cannot be used for ‘business-as-usual’ significant impact on delivery of the Bank’s program. The investment operations that are not linked to identified risks, banking crisis, a deteriorating macroeconomic environment, even if these interventions may contribute to broader devel- and pressures on the private sector has led to tightened fis- opment goals. cal space, reduced demand and fewer job opportunities. At the same time, a positive joint IMF-WB Debt Sustainability 81. In the case of Tajikistan, the RRA finds that the World Assessment and changes in the Bank’s CPIA led to the rapid Bank has a unique role to play in addressing FCV risks transition of IDA financing terms from full grants to mixed through the Risk Mitigation Regime due to its credibility, IDA grant/credit and then to full IDA credits in the first two convening power, neutrality, and capacity. Based on stake- years of the CPS implementation. The switch from grants to holder consultations and RRA analysis, the following princi- mixed grants/credits to full credits, and then back again to ples can help guide identification of priorities for Tajikistan grants/credit in the third year of IDA implementation, has under the Risk Mitigation Regime. made negotiations with GoT difficult. The changed terms had the effect of shifting government priorities towards in- • The Bank has a key role to play in continuing to push for frastructure investments, which resulted in the dropping of governance reforms and oversight, particularly on high some operations in social protection and services. risk/high reward investments (like hydropower, mining, and extractives) that are particularly vulnerable to cap- 78. The draft PLR underscores that CPS objectives re- ture. main valid but challenging due to limited GoT commitment • The Bank portfolio could more directly tackle FCV risks to reforms, and with increased risks to inclusive growth while maintaining its emphasis on areas of comparative and job creation in the private sector. Nevertheless, the PLR advantage and expertise on issues such as job creation finds that progress on the Tajikistan CPS indicators remains and labor markets, energy, agriculture and water invest- broadly satisfactory, given the conservatively set indicators. ments. The review also highlights the low capacity of implementing agencies, poor financial management and procurement ca- • The Bank could consider making its current portfolio pacity that have also slowed disbursement rates and affected and investments more ‘FCV sensitive’ alongside advanc- the country’s liquidity problems. ing new areas of work under the Risk Mitigation Regime. 79. Preparation of a new Systemic Country Diagnostic 82. Government stakeholders, in introductory conver- (SCD) has been launched and it will provide a robust ana- sations on the Risk Mitigation Regime, were particularly lytical foundation for a new Country Program Framework interested in programming related to job creation and pri- (CPF) for Tajikistan for 2019-2023—both these strategic vate sector development, promoting local development, the documents offer the opportunity for the World Bank pro- potential of cross-border development programming and gram to more directly address FCV risks and institutional on issues related to commercialization of the agriculture 33 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution NEW PROGRAMMING FIGURE 18: NEW PROGRAMMINGAREAS AREASIN INRESPONSE TORRA-IDENTIFIED RESPONSETO RISKS and RRA-IDENTIFIEDRISKS Employment 85. disaster and Inclu- risk management. sion Initiative However, consulted targeting youth Ministries and wanted returning additional migrants: time to map RRA Possible Areas – New Programming analysis risks and underscores consider the the most grow- ap- RRA Identified Risks ing risks of youth propriate mix of unemployment potential in- Governance reform and joint and idleness, vestments. Local including due to and provincial Governance challenges monitoring demographics government expressed and youth bulge interest Youth/Migrant Employment and and in in workinglight of with the therecent Bank reces- to Economic risks - Inclusion Initiative sion address in Russia specific and the need development to Unemployment/idleness, youth bulge, migrants, barriers to PSD provide needs basedopportunities on their local for devel- the Local development platforms increasing opment plans. number of returning Regionalism and Inclusion migrants (majority youth). The Disparities in sub-regional development; 87. initiative RRA wouldanalysis build on points to findings ‘hot spots’ – FCV risks Agriculture and food security three categories of from a recent Jobs Diagnostic recommen- including: 1) dations,completed Report fornew areas Tajikistan, Cross-border and global risks of programming pilot programming through the that directly Cross-border development programming address Youth identified risks; Empowerment and con- 2) Entre- siderations for enhancing preneurship initiative, a recently the ‘FCV sensitivity’ of launched study on Youth Inclu- the current WBGin sion Central and portfolio; Asia 3) andprocess global support. experience on youth programming in FCV environments. New programming in- Bank has a unique role to play in sector and disaster risk management. However, consulted addressing FCV risks cludes options for innovative and multi-sectoral operations through Ministries the Risk Mitigation wanted additional time Regime due risks to map to itsand credibility, consider that The the 86. address aim political, would be economic, to combine inclusion, supply and cross-bor- side interven- convening power, neutrality, and capacity. the most appropriate mix of potential investments. Local and Based on stake- der/global risks and potential sources tions (preparing for and connecting youth to jobs) of resilience identified with the holder consultations provincial government and RRA analysis, expressed interesttheinfollowing working with princi- the in the RRA. demand sideBased on sector (supporting analysis, suggestions entrepreneurship are also and, important- ples Bank canto help address guide identification specific development of priorities for Tajikistan needs based on their made ly, theon how to SME nascent makesector current andinvestments high potential morevalue sensitive to chains) under the Risk Mitigation local development plans. Regime. governance issues and underlying drivers to spur job creation. The program would also include com- of FCV. Finally, process plementary recommendations youth engagement are included and inclusionto tackle challeng- activities to in- 83. International • RRA analysis partners points rely on to the World three Bank, including categories of recom- es related to effective multi-sectoral project crease participation and voice. There may also becapacity design, scope to through its mendations, chairmanship including: 1) new of the areasDCC, in holding GoT of programming to that building, consider citizen engagement, the ‘up-skilling’ and ongoing of migrant laborers risk monitoring. as has been done account, for example, on the decision directly address identified risks; 2) considerations for en- Theto withhold bud- process recommendations are intended to recognize in the Philippines and Indonesia to increase earning power get support hancing the ‘FCV due to macro-economic sensitivity’ challenges of the current WBG and fiscal portfolio; that andwithout mobility. adjusting A particular way it the focus operates, would be on thethe Bank runsand profiling a and risks. 3) processHowever, support.withNew the departure programming of the Country includes Man- options reputational risk of not being able to deliver targeting of ‘at risk’ youth who may be most vulnerable to on the potential ager in April for innovative and2017, is now held the Chairoperations multi-sectoral KfW, and byaddress that the increased IDA recruitment violence andand/or tocommitment not being able close coordination to use with it private Deputy political, the EU. and cross-border/global risks effectively. Chair byinclusion, economic, sector development activities. Activities could include: potential and The • Bank has a key of sources role to play inidentified resilience continuing in tothe push RRA. for Based on sector reforms governance analysis,and suggestions oversight, are also madeon particularly how Recommendations onhigh • On the “supply side” - New Programming : profiling of potential beneficiaries to make current risk/high investments reward investments more sensitive (like to governance hydropower, mining, and providing tailored services (training and improved issues andand underlying extractives) drivers that of FCV. Finally, are particularly processto vulnerable recom- cap- 88. jobThe following matching for proposed wage employmentnew investments respond and entrepreneur- mendations ture. are included to tackle challenges related to effec- directly to priority areas identified ship training informed by best practices); in the RRA that height- tive multi-sectoral project design, capacity building, citizen en the potential for conflict and instability or that rein- • The Bank portfolio could more directly tackle FCV risks • force On the potential “demand sources side” of : a package resilience. of Figure training/business 16 summarizes engagement, and ongoing risk monitoring. while maintaining its emphasis on areas of comparative development RRA-identified risks services to start-ups and suggestions for and new existing targeted SMEs; pro- Recommendations - New Programming advantage and expertise on issues such as job creation and labor markets, energy, agriculture and water invest- comprehensive gramming. Nearly support all the to high-potential proposed engagements value chains would need toor besectors multi-sectoral 73 ; competitive matching in their approach, grant mechanisms recognizing theto 84. ments. The following proposed new investments respond multi-dimensionality increase expected of return of ratechallenges. of the The private following investment, section 74 directly • The to Bankpriority could areas consideridentified making in the RRA that its current height- details portfolio business the types incubators; of activities that may be considered within en the potential for conflict and instability and investments more ‘FCV sensitive’ alongside advanc- or that rein- each of these proposed new investments. force potential sources of resilience. Figure ing new areas of work under the Risk Mitigation Regime. 18 summarizes RRA-identified risks and suggestions for new targeted pro- 89. Employment and Inclusion Initiative targeting youth 86. Government gramming. Nearly stakeholders, all the proposed in introductory engagements would and returning migrants: RRA analysis underscores the conver- sations need to on the Risk Mitigation be multi-sectoral in their Regime, approach, were particularly recognizing the growing risks of youth unemployment and idleness, includ- 73 due ing See for to example Tunisia and demographics Productive youth Inclusion bulge and for Young Men in light and of the interested in programming multi-dimensionality related to job of the challenges. The creation following and pri- section Women (P158138) vate sector details development, the types of activities promoting that may local be development, considered within the recent recession in Russia and the need to provide opportu- 74 Through subsidies aimed at increasing job creation. See for example potential each of theseof cross-border proposed new development investments. programming and on designfor nities the increasing of Lebanon Subsidized number Temporary ofEmployment returning migrants Program (STEP)(ma- issues related to commercialization of the agriculture sector jority youth). and Capital The for Private initiative Jobs. would build on findings from a 37 34 • Promoting youth engagement, including for example basic services; and (iv) stimulating local economic activity through “soft” skills development, peer mentoring, through modest local development investments. Activities youth-led community engagement, dialogue and volun- could include investments across sectors (e.g., water supply teer opportunities. and sanitation, health, small infrastructure, education, sport and cultural facilities). Efforts could also be made to improve 87. For returning migrants,.some of whom would be eligi- transparency and effectiveness of service delivery, including ble for the support above, in addition activities may include: through the potential of one-stop-shop administrative service (i) Support/improvement in skills certification and expanded delivery centers at local level. The program would provide job matching/job search assistance; (ii) Retraining (vocation- capacity building on developing project proposals, gover- al skills) or business skills training linked to access to finance; nance and implementation and monitoring of small works (iii) Competitive matching grants for migrant-led start-ups; projects chosen by citizens. The proposed initiative would be (iv)Priority or referrals to services above. coordinated with other international partner investments in local governance and local development and could build on 88. Foundational analytic work would be required on a the CASA-1000 Community Support Program (CSP) under range of issues in order to design the program, including on preparation. Baseline diagnostics would be required to assess profiling ‘at-risk’ youth, assessing youth preferences and con- public financial management (PFM) systems at local level straints, jobs-focused value chain/sectoral assessments, and and to identify policy options that would provide scope for qualitative data collection on youth/migrant barriers to in- increased flow of resources, greater discretion in application clusion and integration. of funds and local level accountability. Preliminary analytic work would also be required to design the citizen service cen 89. Local Development Platforms: RRA analysis iden- ter approach, including the implementation of a Governance tifies that regionalism has featured prominently as a driver Diagnostic, a citizen experience survey on service delivery of FCV, including during the civil war and in characterizing and access to identify gaps in service access, and differences recent violence. The existing government system for sub-na- in access, cost and quality across gender and income levels. tional resource allocation also risks exacerbating regional tensions. There are also significant regional disparities in 91. Cross-Border Development Programming: RRA poverty and non-income poverty measures across Tajiki- Analysis points to Tajikistan’s unique geography, subject to stan—remote districts, border communities, and those that cross-border tensions around natural resource sharing, in- were impacted by violence are often most affected. Where the cluding between border communities and at the national lev- state has been absent, local institutions, however, have also el. However, Tajikistan also shares a rich physical and cultural been identified as a source of resilience in managing and mit- heritage with its neighbors, with the potential of develop- igating FCV risks and supporting community-based devel- ment progress, opening of markets, and new energy sources opment. The GoT has put in place a legal framework with the through regional cooperation. potential to introduce greater levels of transparency, equity, and accountability in intergovernmental relations. However, 92. The aim of proposed new programming is to encour- the framework has yet to be implemented due to concerns age joint action on shared development challenges in an over the capacity of local (jamoat) administrations to manage effort to enhance regional cooperation. This could include resources for local development investments. Recognizing further exploration of reinvestment in the ‘Friendship Line’, these challenges, the GoT recently created the Local Devel- a power transmission line between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan opment Committee to fill an important gap by mandating it to take advantage of a potential window for increasing coop- to, among other functions, build capacity at all levels of the eration between the two countries. The ‘Friendship Line’ of- sub-national administration. ficially the Central Asia Energy transmission line, dismantled in 2007, provided for interchange of electric power between 90. The proposed local development platforms would en- thermal power abundant downstream countries (Uzbekistan, able the GoT to allocate resources to the jamoat-level using Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan), and hydropower abundant a simple set of transparent criteria (such as population size Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic during the winter and and poverty levels as well as FCV risks) to finance invest- summer periods. CA countries lost up to an estimated 2 bln ments prioritized through participatory, inclusive local de- USD between them from dismantling this line. Additional fi- velopment planning. Local development investments would nancing may be considered by linking this component with be accompanied by a program of capacity-building for local the on-going regional connectivity project – Central Asia governments and community-based organizations. Such an Road Links (CARs-2) and planned CARs-4. approach would address drivers of fragility by: (i) equitable and transparent sub-national resource allocation; (ii) pro- 93. A regionally-focused Ferghana Valley Development viding avenues for participation, voice, and accountability in program involving Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Re- local decision-making and resource utilization; (iii) building public focused on job creation through increased connec- trust between the citizen and state by increasing provision of tivity, agricultural and horticultural development, tourism 35 and cultural heritage could also be considered. River basin 97. Particular attention needs to be paid to addressing and riparian zone development on the Tajik-Afghan border FCV and governance challenges in high-risk/high-reward would also build confidence and address the multi-vector sectors such as extractives and energy. The GoT is highlight- water-food-irrigation-energy challenges faced by both coun- ing the potential economic growth potential of mining and tries. Finally, further regional cooperation on disaster preven- of major hydropower projects. Indeed, the SCD and growth tion, management and response, could provide a non-polit- models for Tajikistan emphasize the need to capitalize on op- ical issue as a foundation for enhanced communication and portunities for investment. However, these are also the sectors to build trust. Additional financing for the on-going work most vulnerable to governance challenges that is highlighted under CAMP4ASB regional project and Central Asia Energy in the RRA analysis, and where reforms, community engage- and Water Development Program TF that aims to strengthen ment, and transparency/oversight will be critical to ensure in- cooperation among five Central Asia and Afghanistan in the vestments do not become triggers for violence and instability. area of water resource management may be considered. The potential of the mining industry to trigger social discon- tent and FCV has been widely studied. This is often driven by 94. Agriculture and food security: As highlighted in RRA a mismatch between expectations from local populations for analysis, Tajikistan is the country in the ECA region most vulnerable to climate shocks and natural disasters. The direct employment in mining activities and improved “local Government is seeking new ways to develop early warning content” in subsidiary businesses and the ability of the min- systems and build community resilience to protect house- ing companies to deliver on these expectations. A sound legal holds assets and vital source of rural livelihoods, prevent and framework that protects the rights to land use – when mining respond to the avalanches, land and mud slides, and flooding industries displace people’s access to land and livelihoods and that have posed significant stress on infrastructure, agricul- commitment to local economic development are critical to ture and food security, and livelihoods, particularly in remote ensuring that a limited focus onsector development does not regions. With only 7 percent arable land, the country’s food worsen disparities and generate tensions. security situation remains vulnerable to seasonal and external 98. Benefit-sharing arrangements in large-scale infra- shocks and may not be sustainable in the long run. The sea- structure investments can promote FCV-sensitive approach- sonal nature of poverty and its association with food security is also observed through the Listening to Tajikistan survey es. The MoEWR is piloting an innovative approach to shar- carried out by the poverty team. ing benefits with local communities from revenues generated through electricity exports from the CASA-1000 through the 95. Additional financing for the Agriculture Commer- Community Support Program (CSP). Other line agencies/ cialization Project (ACP) may be considered. The project sectors (mining, for example) may consider introducing development objective is to increase the commercialization similar mechanisms as part of existing and future large-scale of farm and agribusiness products by improving the perfor- investments. Alternatively, if the GoT decides to pursue the mance of selected value-chains and productive partnerships Local Development Platform recommendations, it could through increased and more affordable access to finance, and channel a portion of revenues from energy and mining reve- strengthened capacity of project beneficiaries to create more nues as a means to share benefits. A Sovereign Wealth Fund productive employment opportunities on rural farms. Fur- may be another way of managing governance risks if large ther financing could be targeted to assist the government to export earnings materialize. set up a contingency fund to ensure a more structured ap- proach to agricultural risk management, tailored to climatic 99. Governance and oversight pre-conditions attached to and disaster risks that threaten sustainable food security. large scale investment projects can also be effective in miti- gating the risk of elite capture and rent seeking. The Bank’s Recommendations Toward an ‘FCV Sensitive’ recent Nurek Hydropower Plant Rehabilitation Project and the accompanying threshold reform conditions as a pre-con- Portfolio dition for investment could serve as a model for future sup- 96. In addition to new areas of programming, RRA port. Under this operation the number of critical covenants analysis also points to potential pathways to increase the were included, which will serve as preconditions for Bank’s sensitivity of the current World Bank portfolio to gover- and other donors support, including in the areas of financial nance and FCV risks. Building on the Bank’s current strong management (restructuring of short term debt of a public en- portfolio across a variety of sectors, activities to more directly ergy utility, cost recovery tariff policy including mitigation tackle these risks could be undertaken as part of project su- of tariff increases for the most vulnerable), corporate gover- pervision, restructuring and additional financing efforts un- nance, financial transparency, increased efficiency of invento- der IDA 18. Table 5 provides a snapshot summary of some ry and asset management. of the key sectors, risks, and potential issues and objectives to consider. 36 TABLE 5: CONSIDERATIONS – ENHANCING FCV SENSITIVITY IN THE WB PORTFOLIO Sector Possible FCV Risks (Sector) WBG programming Possibilities for Enhancing FCV Sensitivity - Water most severe nonmonetary risk to poverty Poverty Diagnostics in Water - Promote decentralization and reform of vulnerable groups and Sanitation; governance of water sector - Highly centralized, inefficient, untransparent Rural Water Supply and - Community mobilization and citizen Water supply governance Sanitation Project; engagement for effective management of and sanitation - Poor water management systems and unfair Social Accountability in Water shared water resource processes for distribution contribute to water Sector scarcity and potential conflict Dushanbe water supply - ‘upstream/downstream’ tensions/potential conflict, including across borders - Series of reforms that have improved land rights Real Estate Registration Project; - Continue to expand land registration services/ but majority of poor rural households have Environmental Land implementation of land reform policies small land plots/poor quality Management and Rural - Aim to make land certificates tradeable to Land Reform - Social tension and potential conflict around Livelihoods project; increase the mobility of rural population allocation of scarce land Land Governance Assessment - Improve the governance and transaction - Lack of land market and tenure security stalls (proposed) system of property registration mobility – particularly for vulnerable groups - Remove barriers for vulnerable populations (women, poor) - Land capture by large farm managers and developers - Significant growth potential but subject to Private Sector Competitiveness - Tackle the sector’s challenges as part of the corruption and governance challenges – elite Project; reforms to promote more liberal investment capture and rent seeking EITI Technical Assistance; CASA climate and private sector environment Mining - Mining and extractive industry does not 1000 CSP - Promote community engagement and feature social corporate responsibility or citizen mobilization for oversight and to ensure engagement mechanisms protection of land and established livelihoods - Absent conditions for responsible mining including benefit sharing with the shareholders, employees and local communities - Access to energy is seen as one of the important Winter Energy Program (PPA); - Widen partnership with CSOs on transparency part of social contract in Tajikistan as electricity CASA1000; Nurek Hydropower and accountability of energy utility shortages in rural areas affect the quality of Rehabilitation project; - Broaden the engagement with CSOs/ social service delivery. Energy efficiency consumers on more socially responsible Energy - Rural households have fewer coping strategies energy tariff policy than urban ones to meet the basic needs - Promote energy efficiency and affordable for heating. Fuel form the bulk of energy technologies to at the rural level expenditures. - Economic and social empowerment of rural - Poor electricity governance and frequent rise communities along CASA1000 corridors with in electricity tariffs is an important source of close proximity to large energy facilities citizens grievance Escalating banking crisis could trigger payment Development Policy Operation; - Continue supporting for reforms to promote system collapse, economic shock, social unrest and Financial sector development greater stability, create framework for better instability. (TA and lending to the equity of corporate governance, and enforce critical Access to Government decision to recapitalize and bail out key key banks); regulatory framework of the banking system Finance banks was not accompanied by necessary reforms Consumers and deposit - Boost small banks and microfinance of corporate governance practices needed for future protection TA; institutions in order to enable them to fulfil stability. Financial literacy TA; Access to the function of a responsible and affordable High risk of bankruptcy among SMEs and borrowers Finance for rural finance provider to SMEs, rural farms, as a result of banking crisis, currency depreciation SMEs/farms through Agriculture communities and individual entrepreneurs and high interest rates. Commercialization Project AF - Technical assistance and capacity building activities aimed to strengthen consumer protection, mobile banking and other financial sector instruments which could make individual small borrowers more resilient to financial crisis 37 High disaster risk in Tajikistan and limited financial Strengthening Critical - Strengthen focus on building local reserves poses threat to fiscal sustainability. Infrastructure Against Natural DRM resilience through targeting local Both central and local Government lack capacity and Hazards communities with the combination of DRM mechanisms for emergency response. awareness raising, DRM planning, capacity More frequent natural disasters amid low building and investments to strengthen the preparedness further undermines socioeconomic resilience against various natural disasters, resilience of rural households especially in remote such as floods, mudflows, earthquakes, etc. mountainous areas Decline of remittance and fiscal pressures have Targeted Social Assistance, AF - Promote targeted social protection to eroded an already very limited social protection Social Safety Nets; Health compensate against major tariff increases for system in Tajikistan. Services Improvement Project water and electricity Social GoT is unable to protect vulnerable populations - Given Government’s indicated interest to Protection against rising prices and lack of assistance – could set up a system of social assistance and lead to widespread grievances. compensation for disaster response, consider Social protection mechanisms are virtually social cash transfer scheme for compensation nonexistent at the community level (except for - At the local level consider introduction of informal mobilization of resources) local and community based social protection and services as administered by local Government,jamoats, communities at cost effective way. indicators. First, a set of contextual indicators to monitor Recommendations – Process Support whether the overall situation is deteriorating and FCV risks 100. In order to support effective implementation of the are increasing or whether the country is on a more positive Risk Mitigation Regime in the challenging Tajikistan con- and stable path. This will also include a priority list of gov- text, a series of process-related recommendations are also ernance-related indicators to track reform progress. Second, included. These focus on ensuring necessary resources for a collection of programmatic/outcome indicators to assess capacity building, ongoing risk monitoring and promoting whether programming and investments through the Risk transparency and citizen engagement. It is envisioned that Mitigation Regime are contributing to positive progress. these activities could be supported through a combination These indicators will have to be further developed based on of financing from the enhanced Project Preparation Facility, the design of Risk Mitigation Regime programming. Table 6 trust fund, and Bank budget resources. below presents illustrative indicators in each category to be further developed as part of the Implementation Note and in 101. Risk monitoring system: As a pre-condition for ad- consultation with the GoT. vancement of the Risk Mitigation Regime financing, the World Bank and the Government of Tajikistan could commit 103. Supplementary project preparation/supervision/ca- to a joint risk monitoring system. Since the RRA represents a pacity building funds: In order to successfully implement snapshot assessment in time, the monitoring system would the RMR financing, additional support is also needed to pro- aim to provide for ongoing monitoring of risks to measure mote multi-sector project preparation, baseline analytics for- progress, allow for mid-course corrections under the risk mit- effective risk-sensitive design, hands-on supervision and to igation regime, and to anticipate crises. GoT commitment to address implementation capacity constraints. This could in- track progress on governance risks could be a pre-condition clude, for example, a centralized/cross-program PIU for the for eligibility for RMR financing. The risk monitoring system Risk Mitigation Regime financing that would also promote could also include capacity building initiatives for the GoT learning across RMR activities. Funding for these types of ac- in data collection. Financing could include support for joint tivities would be required from the enhanced for FCV Project monitoring on governance reform indicators, rapid and per- Preparation Facility, trust fund resources, and Bank budget. ception-based surveys, data on migrants and migration, and Funding (potentially through the GPSA) for enhanced sup- for poverty and non-poverty welfare measures sub-nationally. port to citizen engagement across programming should also be provided, including support to national NGOs, commu- 102. Given the complex context in Tajikistan, learn- nity based organizations, capacity building and civil society ing, monitoring and adaptive programming are critical. engagement in proposed multi-sectoral programming and in Through the proposed risk monitoring system, the Bank tracking governance indicators to enlarge the space for civil and Government will together monitor two categories of society. 38 TABLE 6: ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS – RISK MONITORING SYSTEM CONTEXTUAL INDICATORS – MONITORING EVOLVING FCV RISKS Type of Risk Illustrative indicators Possible Data Sources Political participation and voice - Freedom House ratings - Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Political and Social Integration, Political Participation, Stateness - Civil society surveys Rule of Law World Governance Indicators (WGI) Political and Public Financial Management: - Improved accountability of public expenditures measured by the governance risks quality of annual financial reports (PEFA25i and iii) - Key procurement information is made available to the public in a timely manner through appropriate means (PEFAI19iii) - Total value of contracts that were awarded through an open and competitive process (Percentage) Enforcement of regulatory framework for natural EITI resource management Corruption - Transparency International ratings - WGI Indicators - TI Global Corruption Barometer Percentage of Citizens reporting they paid a bribe to access key public services - World Economic Forum: Favoritism in Government Decisions - World Economic Forum: Diversion of Public Funds Private sector: Taxation, new business density, legal - Doing Business Surveys (paying taxes) Economic risks rights - WB EBRD Business Enterprise Survey (BEEPS) Financial sector stability: banking supervision IMF ROSC and FSAP, World Bank, IFC, EBRD, NBT banking supervision (Nonperforming loans; capital adequacy; deposits to capital; liquid assets to total assets; effective banking resolution framework in place) Remittance levels/migration trends Administrative data; NBT; IOM Tracking remittance flows/investment Administrative data; NBT; State Investment Committee; IOM Inequality in poverty/nonmonetary poverty measures GP Poverty/GoT State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat) at subnational level Regionalism, Perceptions of wellbeing, confidence, trust Listening to Tajikistan Survey; additional survey perception data exclusion risks disaggregated by regions Youth idleness/unemployment rates NEET data; perception surveys Figures/trends – recruitment to VE Soufan Group; Intl Center for Counter Terrorism; Global Terrorism Database (GTD); additional qualitative research Crossborder and Crossborder tensions and violence incidents Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Uppsala Conflict global risks Data Program (UCDP) Fluctuation in food prices/food shortages Administrative data, Goskomstat (CPI inflation data) - Tracking violent incident data subnationally - ACLED, UCDP, GTD FCV monitoring - Tajikistan rating on FCV indices - Fund for Peace Fragile State Index, OECD States of Fragility 39 PROGRAMMATIC/OUTCOME INDICATORS – RISK MITIGATION REGIME FINANCING Program Type Illustrative indicators Possible Data Sources - Annual citizen experience survey/governance diagnostic: Percentage increase in citizen access to administrative services (survey/governance Access to administrative services diagnostic) For example: percentage of citizens stating it was “easy” or “very easy” to access administrative services. - Annual citizen experience survey/governance diagnostic: Percentage Governance stating the cost of service is prohibitive. - Increase in Voluntary Compliance number of active taxpayers Inspections/Tax Administration - Improved taxpayer service – number of hours required for filing tax reporting OR BEEPS: Time Tax - BEEPS: Informal Payments for Tax Administrations - BEEPS: Number of Inspections (Tax) - Youth perceptions – economic opportunities and Survey to be developed; project data on employment rates/new businesses Employment and participation (disaggregated by regions, gender) sustained Inclusion – Youth/ - Employment rates; new business development – Migrants project beneficiaries - Subnational Government Share of revenue and To be developed as part of local development platforms expenditures Citizen Engagement indicators: Number of citizens attending local Local Development - Transfers to subnational government community planning meetings, number of CSOs participating, number of Platforms - Local perceptions – welfare and participation citizen proposals, etc. (participating localities) - Establishment of enhanced crossborder To be monitored through regional project data; Ministry of Economic Regional communication/cooperation on development Development and Trade; Goskomstat Development activities Programming - Cross border trade Agriculture and Food Improved strategy/capacity to manage disasters and To be developed based on baseline national/local level strategies + Security climatic shocks tracked in response to economic shocks 104. In advancing the Risk Mitigation Regime program the RMR, potential cooperation on advancing the risk mon- package, continued close cooperation with international itoring systems with partners with complementary expertise agencies under Development Coordination Council (DCC) (for example in judicial and security sector reform), as well will be essential: The DCC could serve a platform for discus- as exploring synergies in advancing a more ‘FCV sensitive’ sion and collaboration on proposed new programming under World Bank portfolio. 40 Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution ANNEX 11- -REFERENCES ANNEX REFERENCES ADB. “Sector Assessment (Summary): Energy, Country Part- Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. “Social Capital and nership Strategy: Tajikistan, 2016-2020.” Asian De- Community Governance.” The Economic Journal velopment Bank. Accessed February 3, 2017. https:// 112, no. 483 (2002): F419–36. www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/ cps-taj-2016-2020-ssa-02.pdf. 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