Document of The World Bank Report No: 32408 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-30060 PPFI-P8310 PPFI-P8311) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR55.2MILLION (US$75 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOR AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM June 28, 2005 Water and Urban II Country Department AFC14 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective May 20, 2005) Currency Unit = CFA Francs (FCFA) FCFA 1,000 = US$ 1.92 US$ 1.0 = FCFA 520.19 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) AGETIP Agence de Gestion de Travaux d'Intérêt Public pour l'Emploi (Public Works Executing Agency AMS Association des Maires du Sénégal (Association of Mayors of Senegal) APL Adaptable Program Loan CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCC Compte de crédit communal CMA Contract Management Agency DCL Direction des Collectivités Locales (Department of Local Governments) EIA Environmental Impact Assessment FECL Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivités Locales ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Association GoS Government of Senegal MAP Municipal Adjustment Program MC Municipal Contract MDA Municipal Development Agency MDG Millenium Development Goals MoF Ministry of Finance NCB National Competitive Bidding NGO Non-governmental Organization PAC Programme d'Appui aux Communes (Urban Development and Decentralization Program) PIC Plans d'Investissements Communaux (Plan for Municipal Investment) PIP Priority Investment Program PMP Priority Maintenance Program PPF Project Preparation Fund UDDP Urban Development and Decentralization Project SA Special Account SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDE Sénégalaise des Eaux SONELEC Société Nationale d'Eau et d'Electricité SONATEL Société Nationale de Téléphone Vice President: Gobind T. Nankani Country Director Madani M. Tall Sector Manager Eustache Ouayoro Task Team Leader: Catherine Farvacque-Vitkovic REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 7 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 13 6. Sustainability 14 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 16 8. Lessons Learned 18 9. Partner Comments 20 10. Additional Information 20 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 29 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 31 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 35 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 37 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 38 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 39 Annex 8. Borrower's Summary Report on Project Completion 40 Map IBRD 28026 Project ID: P002365 Project Name: URB DEVT & DECEN PRO Team Leader: Catherine D. Farvacque TL Unit: AFTU2 ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 28, 2005 1. Project Data Name: URB DEVT & DECEN PRO L/C/TF Number: IDA-30060; PPFI-P8310; PPFI-P8311 Country/Department: SENEGAL Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: General public administration sector (36%); Other social services (16%); Health (16%); General water, sanitation and flood protection sector (16%); General transportation sector (16%) Theme: Municipal finance (P); Other urban development (P); Decentralization (P); Rural services and infrastructure (S); Pollution management and environmental health (S) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 09/01/1995 Effective: 03/29/1998 05/28/1998 Appraisal: 03/25/1997 MTR: 12/31/2000 12/21/2000 Approval: 11/20/1997 Closing: 06/30/2003 12/31/2004 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/MINISTRY OF PLAN Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Gobind T. Nankani Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Director: Madani M. Tall Mahmood A. Ayub Sector Manager: Eustache Ouayoro Letitia A. Obeng Team Leader at ICR: Catherine D. Farvacque Catherine D. Farvacque ICR Primary Author: Ekaterina K. Massey; Catherine D. Farvacque 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: HS Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: HS Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: HS Project at Risk at Any Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The project had four development objectives: (a) improve the financial and organizational management of municipalities; (b) improve the programming of priority urban investments; (c) rationalize and simplify the financing of urban investments, and (d) upgrade basic infrastructure in urban and some rural communities. The project objectives focused on addressing the major issues of the Senegalese municipal sector through building the four strategic pillars for its sustainable development. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) recognizes the difficult macroeconomic climate, specifically the fragile public finances due to low tax revenues, and high dependency on donor support. High speed of urbanization, resulting mostly from rural to urban migration, strained the government resources even further, in an attempt to catch up with infrastructure provision to spontaneous, inhabitable and underserved urban neighborhoods. The financial volume of the urban municipalities (including Dakar) at the time represented 6% of the national budget, excluding external contributions. The Urban Development and Decentralization Project (UDDP) objectives were also in line with the IDA's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Senegal (Report No. 13900, January 26, 1995), which focused on the need to improve resource mobilization and allocation and reduce domestic financial imbalances. Advancing decentralization (including fiscal decentralization) and addressing the issue of local resource mobilization was at the core of UDDP. The project was clearly a timely and a highly appropriate response, supported by the donor community, to fill in the gap between the capacity of local governments and the expectations of the new regulatory and institutional framework. The relevance of the objectives is indeed underlined by the regulatory changes which occurred at the time of project preparation with the introduction of the Local Governments Charter ( Code des Collectivités Locales) and the accompanying six bills passed on February 5, 1996: (a) amending the Code des Collectivités Locales; (b) transferring power to regions, urban and rural municipalities; (c) amending the Electoral Code; (d) setting up the administrative and financial structures of the communes d'arrondissements; (e) amending the administrative and territorial structure; and (f) amending the powers of heads of administrative, districts and village chiefs. In addition, more then 20 executive decrees had been signed to allow for the implementation of the decentralization laws. At the project outset, the financial and organizational management of the Senegalese municipalities was known to be weak but little information existed about the situation in each municipality. No investment programming had been done by the municipalities to reflect their priority needs and effective financial capacity to finance them. Municipal projects could be financed from many sources, or "guichets", without a consistent regime of municipal finance model, namely: (a) intergovernmental transfers; (b) credit to municipalities; (c) local revenues; and (d) donor funding to urban centers. The project recognized that funding was not being allocated in a transparent, fair, and efficient way. The Senegalese government was also short of financing for developing the basic urban and rural infrastructure under the pressures of rapid urbanization. Hence, despite being four, no development objective is found redundant. The project was not complex or risky in terms of institutional and policy improvements. It was rather prudently comprehensive to sustainably advance the municipal sector reform. 3.2 Revised Objective: The original objectives were not revised. - 2 - 3.3 Original Components: The project had two main components : Component 1: Institutional development of central and local governments - estimated cost: US$10 million (FCFA 6 billion) or 9% of the total estimated project cost. This component included capacity building of central and local governments through (a) the implementation of a Municipal Adjustment Program (MAP) based on a municipal contract (MC), a binding agreement between the government represented by the Municipal Development Agency (MDA), and municipalities; and (b) support activities aimed at providing an enabling environment for these municipal adjustment programs to take place (fiscal reforms, studies, training). Sub-component 1.1. Municipal Adjustment Programs of local governments under the framework of Municipal Contracts. The activities under this sub-component included: (1) formulation of a MAP for each participating municipality as part of the municipalities contractual agreement with the government to access financing under the project. The MAP was formulated based on the results of an urban audit, and a financial and organizational audit (for more details see section 3.5); (2) specific activities carried out by municipalities under the MAP. Based on the conclusions of the audits and on the individual needs of each municipality, a set of MAP activities was agreed at the time of the signature of the MC along four main clusters of measures: (a) improvement of local resources mobilization (including payment of monthly contributions for investment financing and fiscal and non-fiscal revenues); (b) improvement of human resources management (including reducing overstaffing and hiring critical missing staff); (c) improvement of financial health, particularly clearing of arrears towards SONELEC (electricity), SDE (water) and SONATEL (telephone) utilities; and (d) improvement of financial management and budgeting. Sub-component 1.2. Transversal support activities to establish an enabling sector framework The activities under this sub-component included: (1) technical assistance to optimization of budget controls, reform of FECL and local taxation; (2) street addressing, establishing of urban databases and observatories; (3) support to Municipal Development Agency budget and operations, for municipal contract preparation, implementation and monitoring; (4) training activities; and (5) communication and dissemination activities, in order to ensure participatory process and learning of procedures and tools. Component 2: Construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of public infrastructure, facilities and services under the responsibility of local governments - estimated cost: US$100.6 million (FCFA 66.4 billion) or 91% of the total estimated project cost. This component involved physical investments for construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of public - 3 - infrastructure, facilities and services under the responsibility of local governments including (a) roads, drainage and street lighting; (b) education and health facilities; (c) socio-collective facilities; (d) administrative buildings; (e) revenue-generating facilities (markets, bus stations); (f) environmental sub-projects; and (h) rehabilitation of historic buildings. A catalogue of investments had been elaborated during project preparation and provided a menu of eligible sub-projects with sample plans and estimates on unit costs to facilitate participatory process of prioritizing the selection of projects in each municipality. 3.4 Revised Components: The original components were not revised. An extension of the credit closing date was granted on February 25, 2003 for 18 months to allow for completion of physical and institutional activities and resulted in the subsequent amendment in Credit agreement. Reallocations were made between the activities within the original spending categories. 3.5 Quality at Entry: Overall, the quality at entry at the ICR stage is rated highly satisfactory. The rating is given based on the (a) excellent articulation between the set objectives and the sector issues and policy agenda; (b) appropriate design and implementation arrangements, minimizing risk and complexity; (c) establishment of sustainable financial envelope and strict criteria of disbursement; and (d) compliance with Bank safeguard policies. (a) Excellent articulation between development objectives and the sector issues and policy agenda. The SAR effectively articulated the relevance of chosen development objectives to the macroeconomic, urban and governance issues, facing Senegal at the time of appraisal. The DO were stated realistically given the state of decentralization reform in Senegal, and the degree of policy dialogue achieved by the Bank, other partners in the donor community and the GoS. Since 1972, Senegal had benefited from three urban projects and two public works and employment projects, or "AGETIP projects". The first three urban projects focused primarily on Dakar and the two AGETIP projects contributed to delivering some urban services in a large number of municipalities. The design recognized the timeliness of a project covering universally all 60 (at the time of appraisal) urban municipalities and some rural ones. It also seized the opportunity to (a) clarify the role and responsibilities of all institutions involved in local government development; (b) make local governments more responsible and accountable in determining priorities; and (c) streamline the funding mechanisms of municipal programs (i.e. credit to municipalities, intergovernmental transfers (FECL) and own resources). The project realism in procurement planning benefited extensively from the lessons learned through delegated contract management by AGETIP. (b) Appropriate design and solid implementation arrangements, minimizing risk and complexity. Overall, the design of the components fully supported achievement of the project development objectives. UDDP seized an opportunity to provide a timely support to the decentralization reforms of GoS, and at the same time clarify the role and responsibility of all institutions involved in local government development. The design of the activities was cognizant of the needs and the capacity of the municipalities, the readiness of the national institutional framework and the opportunities of the decentralization process. The project clearly separated those activities that could and should be implemented by the municipalities themselves, from those that called for implementation at the national level. MDA was well positioned to coordinate assistance to what could at first appear as an ambitious list of oversight agencies. Nevertheless, such approach is found sound as it allowed the project to associate critical agencies and was in line with the objective of universal coverage of the urban municipalities. In this respect, three achievements of project design could be considered best practices and essential contributions to high quality at entry. They have been, in fact, replicated in later projects in the region, namely: (a) modalities of the creation of a new project executing agency; (b) choice of the Municipal - 4 - Contract model and degree of technical preparedness of the project for execution; and (c) attention to building operational baseline information and data bases for use by the beneficiaries. First, a new institution was created to execute the project on behalf of the Borrower: the Municipal Development Agency (MDA). The 60 municipalities existing at entry (67 at project end) were still fledgling institutions, though luckily not as numerous as in other countries, and had recently undergone transformation. The Department of Local Governments (DCL) of the Ministry of Interior traditionally had not been a strong oversight authority. Creation of MDA was therefore highly relevant. Its operational processes and institutional role was very well defined from the outset. It was prudently designed to report directly to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) for better accountability of project financing, and to increase the visibility of the fiscal decentralization objectives of the project. A new executing agency represented a risk to the project, but the risk that was well mitigated by design. MDA was mandated to ensure that both the central and the local governments honor their commitments under the project. To overcome the negative experience of the previous urban project, annual transfers in the amount of FCFA 1 billion (FECL) were included in the Credit Agreement to ensure timely availability of the central government funds. On one hand, MoF direct oversight allowed MDA to assure the disbursement of the counterpart funds through the mechanism of the transfer fund (Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivités Locales, FECL) and ex-Municipal Credit Account, (Compte de crédit communal, CCC). On the other hand, MDA's independence and "proximity" to the local governments, facilitated by the strong presence of the Association of Mayors of Senegal (AMS) on its Board, helped to collect local governments contributions according to agreed monthly installments schedule. MDA's mandate, as designed, went well beyond the life of the project and it was set to establish itself in the future as a financial intermediary institution. The roles of other parties were similarly clearly stated. Agreements and operational manuals were elaborated for MDA and AGETIP, the latter being called upon as an experienced delegated contract manager for physical works. Close technical assistance from the Bank and periodic quality review of products and outputs by international consultants ( mission d'appui) were planned for to further mitigate the risk of introducing a new executing agency. Second, the Municipal Contract (contrat de ville) represented another critical innovation introduced under the project and replicated in many other countries of the region. The municipal contract (MC) formalized the level and type of financing of municipal services and facilities, the choice and degree of construction, rehabilitation or maintenance on the ground that can be sustainably financed with that amount and the adjustment measures of each municipal government. It directly supported the achievement of four development objectives of the project. Each MC included a Municipal Adjustment Program (MAP), a Priority Investment Program (PIP), and a Priority Maintenance Program (PMP). Based on the review of a sample of MCs, their structure is found coherent and well articulated, and the activities they stipulated do not appear too ambitious or too numerous. The UDDP adherence to strict Municipal Contracts was only possible as a result of thorough preparation and finalization of reference documents before project start. The project was launched with the implementation "roadmap" available to the implementing agencies and the stakeholders. The "roadmap" consisted of high quality reference documents, such as a blueprint of the audits, a blueprint of the municipal contract, Operations Manual for the MDA, conventions between the central government and MDA, between MDA and AGETIP, between AGETIP and local governments, a blueprint of the Guide des ratios financiers, a catalogue of eligible prototype sub-projects (Catalogue d'Equipements Communaux). The finalization of these documents, all of them innovative, during project preparation and through a participatory process has certainly had a very positive impact on the quality at entry. The fact that signing a MC was on a strictly voluntary basis while access to financing was conditioned on the acceptance to implement the reform component, structured under the MAP, introduced municipalities to - 5 - the concept of free technical assistance while clearly stating the reciprocal expectation of financial discipline. The municipalities, assisted for free by the local consultants (intensively trained by a "mission d'appui" international team of experts) were to complete a financial and an organizational audit according to a standardized reference model which had been finalized during project preparation). The model was well designed, and bound to generate important sector knowledge, previously not available at any level of government. The financial and organizational audits (a) reviewed the financial situation of the municipality; (b) determined the financial capacity of the municipality and the sustainable level of its participation in the UDDP; and (c) identified a priority MAP, commensurate with the reform capacity of each municipality. The urban audits, carried out concomitantly with the financial and organizational audits (a) provided a snapshot/diagnosis of the city in terms of levels of services and infrastructure and (b) identified a list of priority investments. The main challenge was to respond to the financing needs of all urban municipalities in Senegal while tailoring the programs to their absorptive capacity and preventing dispersed small scale investments ("saupoudrage des investissements"). Through this set of innovative tools, the project design achieved (a) a highly participatory and technically solid identification of urban investment needs and priorities, (b) comparability of data for various municipalities, and (c) systematic documentation to allow establishing a coherent database of urban spatial and financial information. The municipalities at the outset were equipped to review projects with the help of prototype projects catalogue and inventories, prepare project facts sheets, and evaluate projects' environmental impact. The design was further strengthened by attention to maintenance needs. The requirement of at least 3 % of current municipal revenues to be allocated to maintenance was imposed. (c) Sustainable financial envelope and strict criteria of disbursement. Given the past history of counterpart funding difficulties; the expectation of "free" money by the mayors; and the existence of multiple financing windows on often inconsistent terms, the project financing model was carefully crafted to reverse the local attitudes. It provided incentives to mobilize local resources, and to co-finance projects, including through responsible borrowing. While financing was kept open to all municipalities of Senegal that signed the MCs, the financing windows were harmonized to respond to three types of municipalities: 1) PAC I window, that made financing available on favorable terms (90% transfer and 10% local contribution based on population, on average 3 550 FCFA per capita and no less than 75 million FCFA to allow for a reasonable investment program); 2) PAC II window, that still provided financing on favorable terms, but was more demanding on municipalities that could qualify for such terms (70% transfer, 20% credit, and 10% local counterpart funding, and no more than 6% of monthly revenues not to compete with maintenance expenditure). The credit was offered on the following terms: 4.25% over 12 years and reimbursable on a monthly basis; 3) PAC III window, that provided financing exclusively for rural municipalities, at the same favorable terms as PAC I for urban municipalities. The risks of nonpayment of municipalities on their commitments and introduction of competitive financing on less stringent terms were correctly identified and mitigated by careful simulations of absorptive capacity of the municipalities, monthly installment payment schedules starting at time of municipal contract signature, and provision of technical support to local resource mobilization. The high levels of visibility and local participation in preparing priority investment programs were also instrumental to boost the accountability and discipline of local governments. (d) Compliance with Safeguard policies. The project was category B. UDDP, being one of the first programmatic projects before the introduction of APLs, a traditional environmental impact study was not recommended. Instead operationally relevant tools were developed to provide maximum capacity benefit to the Borrower. Environmental impact assessment (EIA) was included in the sub-project data sheet (fiche de projet), and the potential environmental impact of each sub-project was scored to determine if it would pass - 6 - or not pass the screening process, leading to the inclusion of the sub-project in the final PIP. Also, during implementation, project officers from MDA and AGETIP were to be trained on environmental issues. No resettlement was anticipated. Though priority projects were selected in the most underserved neighborhoods and screened on the basis of a poverty impact, a social assessment of the municipality could have been instrumental in increasing the project's impact on local social cohesion and accountability of local governments. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The outcome of the project is rated as highly satisfactory. The high rating for the outcome of the project is justified by the fact that all four development objectives (out of which, three institutional DOs) were fully achieved in cost-efficient and sustainable manner, despite some implementation delays at the start of the project. With only one extension, the total project amount was fully disbursed. Globally, 67 municipalities received 46 452 608 615 F CFA in financing, of which 88% of transfer, 8% of credit and 4% of contribution from local resources paid in monthly installments over 36 months. 19 municipalities benefited only from PAC I, among them 7 municipalities created in 2002. The other 48 municipalities, or an impressive 72% of all urban municipalities, tapped into PAC I and PAC II, as they showed enough financial capacity to access funds requiring 20% credit share in the financing plan. This figure and close to 100% credit and local contributions repayment rates are among the most telling outcomes of the project. (a) Improve the financial and organizational management of municipalities. This was achieved through the high level of implementation of the MAPs by the municipalities themselves and within their regular budgets. The programs were based on the findings of the financial and organizational audits conducted for each municipality by local consultants within the framework of municipal contracts; (b) Improve the programming of priority urban investments. This was achieved through the implementation of the PIPs within allocated budget and according to original financing terms. The programs were based on the findings of the urban audits conducted for each municipality by local consultants within the framework of municipal contracts; (c) Rationalize and simplify the financing of urban investments. This was achieved by streamlining the many existing "guichets": (a) intergovernmental transfers; (b) credit to municipalities; (c) local revenues; and (d) donor funding to urban centers. On intergovernmental transfers, the project was able to (a) capture 1 billion FCFA per year and demonstrate that these funds could be used in a transparent and selective way. On credit, the project was able to close down the dysfunctional Compte de Crédit Communal and open a line of credit for a selected number of creditworthy municipalities. On local revenues, the project was successful to ensure a substantial counterpart funding from municipalities. On donor funding, the project was able to create an attractive platform for donor investment in the urban sector such as AfD, the main bilateral partner involved in urban development in Senegal. (d) Upgrade basic infrastructure in urban and rural communities. This was achieved through the actual implementation of priority 421 sub-projects in 67 municipalities and 310 sub-projects in 212 rural districts, thereby enhancing access to basic services and infrastructure to an overwhelming number of urban and rural poor. The PIP was implemented based on an inventory of basic infrastructure and services (Inventaire pour la Programmation des Infrastructures and Equipements/IPIE), a tool that assessed and identified gaps in the level of neighborhood services. Each sub-project was screened on the basis of a poverty impact evaluation. - 7 - Table 1. Priority projects of basic services and infrastructure implemented in urban municipalities Type Total Projects Total cost Share in Share in total of projects dropped (million total cost (%) project completed FCFA) projects (%) Basic 81 3 15,271 19.2 41.2 infrastructure Schools and 58 6 3,792 13.8 10.2 health centers Administrative 72 5 3,819 17.1 10.3 facilities Socio-economic 82 4 3,849 19.5 10.4 facilities Commercial 114 8 8,903 27.1 24.0 facilities Environmental 11 6 1,002 2.6 2.7 projects Heritage projects 3 435 0.7 1.2 421 32 37,071 100 100 The preparation of the follow-up project, multi-donor operation of estimated US$140 million, demonstrates the satisfaction of the stakeholders with the outcome of the UDDP, the success of the methodology, the clear appropriation by the Mayors of the MCs and the MAPs, as well as the willingness of donors to keep up the commitment to decentralization reforms (e.g. AfD is expected to double its contribution). The project covered all Senegalese municipalities which made it a single most important operation in the Senegalese municipal sector and a backbone of the country's decentralization reform. It also succeeded in disbursing the entire credit amount (disbursed amount: US$81.3 million) and the total project costs (US$110 million) in a coherent and transparent manner. The project gave each municipality a chance to learn to play by the new "rules of the game" and to see their benefits. The most important outcomes of the project for the capacity of the municipal sector can be summarized as follows: · The project succeeded in reaching all 67 urban municipalities. Since 1998 the number of small municipalities with population under 10,000 has increased from 8 to 19. About 85% of the urban (or about 50% of total) population lives in municipalities of 50,000 inhabitants and more. By working with all municipalities, the project succeeded not to leave any municipality outside of the coherent framework of assistance for the whole municipal sector. · The project increased financing capacity of the municipalities by 20%. The revenues of the municipal sector (without the project) represented, in 2003, 4.6% of the national current revenues (without donor support). Given this low level of funding available for municipal projects, the operation was, therefore, a very noticeable intervention to allow municipalities finance their priority investments projects. 97% out of 421 implemented priority investment projects dispersed all over the country, are completed largely within budget (except some case where costs overruns were caused by the need to make land improvements, but those cases were compensated on average by cost savings, as in the example of major municipal market in Thiès, Annex 3) and are fully operational (streets, schools and health centers, - 8 - administrative, socio-economic, commercial facilities, environmental and heritage projects). · Since 1998, current revenues grew at a rate of more than 3% above the cumulative effect of inflation and demographic growth in the municipalities. They account for over 90% of the municipal total revenues and their growth is owed in part to a sustained increase in tax revenues of about 7% per year on average. The project made an important contribution to raising awareness of the local authorities about their ability and best ways to mobilize own revenue. · The project's efforts improved significantly the process of mobilization of municipal resources. It was achieved through broadening the tax base and local taxes collection in the large cities such as Dakar, Rufisque, Thiès, Kaolack, Saint-Louisand Louga, as well as the development of commercial facilities in nearly every municipality. The updating of the local tax base in all other cities where street addressing has been implemented by the program, in the wake of the central government's decision to implement tax reform in 2004, will make it possible to further strengthen municipal finances under the follow-up program. · The project contributed to rationalization of municipal expenditures. Realistic revenue projections in MAPs that were consistent with potential municipal revenues, in addition to justified expenditure levels, usually made it possible to bring the payroll down to levels that did not exceed 40% of current revenues down from rates exceeding 100% in some cases prior to the project. The payroll share in real administrative costs fell to 28% in 2003 from 37% in 2001 (to 23% from 32% if Dakar excluded). Municipalities were able to consistently free up the financial resources needed to take part in financing the investments stipulated under the program for internal cash generation and loan repayments (close to 100% repayments rates) using no more than 6% of their own resources, and still devote at least 3% to maintaining their asset base (an average of 7.62% of current revenue was devoted to maintenance). At the same time many of them started working (assisted by the central government) on clearing the arrears to the utility companies. The ratio of capital expenditures to current revenue (effort d'equipement) has increased from 10% in 2001, to 12% in 2002 and to 17% in 2003 (or 15%, 16%, 24% respectively if Dakar excluded). This ratio does not include the capital investments financed under PAC. The saving capacity (total current revenue without administrative expenditures over current revenue) represented 15% in 1996 and amounted to 26% in 2002 and 18% in 2003. · The policy dialogue, that continued under the project led to enacting (though with some delay) the law of February 6, 2004 reforming the local taxation system. The local taxation reforms introduced under this law, which embody the main points delineated in the PAC's sector policy letter, are starting to affect the revenue collection process in 2005, though no data are available yet. The reforms focused on increasing local revenues from taxes on property and businesses. A major growth is expected in property taxes, that prior to the reform were producing marginal contribution to local revenues (7% of current revenues nationally and 18% in Dakar) due to numerous exemptions. The changes introduced under the new law include i) reduction of the exemption threshold on improved property from 1,500,000 to 500,000 CFAF, reduction of the temporary 10- and 15-year exemptions to five years throughout the country, elimination of the 40% and 50% deductions, and establishment of a 5% tax rate on non-factory buildings and a 7.5% rate on factories; ii) retention of the rental value as the determinant for the property tax basis, priority being given to the cadastral method of assessment. As for business tax collection, growth in local resources is also expected as a result of the establishment of a new business tax schedule, elimination of the fixed-rate business tax in favor of requiring businesses to pay a Single Aggregate Tax (CGU), which is a newly created general tax. Currently, the resources brought in by the business tax (patente) vary between 17% of current revenue nationally and 57% in Dakar (where most of business activity is concentrated). - 9 - · The project allowed for the comprehensive analysis of the Local Govenments Fund (FECL) and building consensus on improving its operating procedures. The follow up project under preparation will assist the authorities to implement the new procedures: 1) indexing FECL to the VAT, as provided under Law 96-06 of 19996 setting forth the Local Authorities Code; 2) maintaining procedural transparency for grant allocations; and 3) establishing procedures for monitoring the local governments' use of grants. The project clearly demonstrated that important changes took place in the behavior of municipalities, namely: (a) they abided by credit and auto financing discipline; (b) they complied with reciprocal contractual obligations with the central government through municipal contracts and agreements; (c) they mastered and made use of new tools for programming municipal investments; and (d) they bought into improving municipal management practices, including taking difficult staffing decisions. Municipal Adjustment Program (MAP), a term that was not well accepted at the beginning, is now part of the Mayors' vocabulary, unaffected by the change in the municipal teams after the local elections of 2002. During the life of the project, all municipalities for the first time ever underwent assessments of their finances and organizational capacity. On the basis of extensive diagnostic the municipal capacity building effort found concretization in sets of case specific recommendations for each and every municipality to be implemented by the municipalities themselves. To varying degrees, those sets of actions were implemented­ a major behavioral change at the level of each municipality. The actions helped (a) find the optimum level of current revenue for the municipality; (b) rationalize current expenditures; (c) consequently increase savings; and (d) introduce efficient management tools. Municipalities which have used the new urban management tools and implemented the process of municipal adjustment are progressively harvesting benefits in terms of improved financial and administrative management and increased revenues (as described above and in Annex 1). In addition, the project has made important progress in introducing participatory practices in municipal management. It has provided evidence that such practices spur the activism of the final beneficiaries and involvement of the municipal teams into project selection and execution, while increasing accountability and transparence of local governance. The project achieved improvements in the operational capacity of the critical municipal agencies. The MDA, as an intermediary actor in the new institutional framework, non-existent prior to the project, has succeeded in achieving by the end a reputation of a technically competent financial municipal institution. This was done despite some problems with strengthening the leadership of the institution in the last year of the project. The municipalities perceive the MDA as an advisor and not an instance of control, despite its role in monitoring the compliance with the strict contractual engagements of municipal contracts. As MDA, AGETIP as well continued to build its efficiency as a project management institution with clearly delineated responsibilities. Another significant institutional outcome of the project consists in the fact that the respective operational processes of the MDA and AGETIP were defined clearly first in the operational manuals, and then tested and improved upon during project implementation. That helped streamline and speed up the cycle of audits-municipal contract- implementation on the ground and implements the project within budget (see Annex 1, 95% of works contracts executed within estimated budget). The project succeeded in involving the local private consulting industry and building its capacity to produce quality studies for the municipal clients. Prior to effectiveness, in December 1997 and in February 1998, two training modules took place for the local consultants working on preparing the first municipal contracts (Thies, Ziguinchor and Kaolack) by the technical mission d'appui. These sessions were followed by more - 10 - training for the total of 23 consulting firms. The firms were trained on the mechanisms of conducting urban, financial and organizational audits. The training proved to strengthen the local expertise that allowed ensuring high standards of quality of audits and completing the preparation of the MCs for all 67 municipalities within the timeframe of the project. As part of the MC preparation activity, each urban municipality in Senegal ended up being audited by local technical experts and, for the first time, a rich exhaustive database of urban, financial and organizational locally produced data was made available to local and central decision-making bodies. These databases are in the process of being updated and improved upon for the next generation of the municipal contracts with the help of many of the same consultants. Overall, the experience of the project shows that while the sector reform is on the right track, and a lot has been achieved, the challenges at the local level are immense. A lot of patience and assistance is needed for all municipalities to achieve consistently positive results, even when a high level of buy-in and reform ownership is forthcoming from the local level. It is also clear that street addressing, fiscal registries, office equipment, and guidance on revenue-generating projects management are highly effective activities that need to be scaled up further in the follow-up operation. A significant milestone in local fiscal reform was achieved towards the very end of the project in 2004 and was in itself a very positive outcome that will bring benefits in the near future. 4.2 Outputs by components: Details on the outputs by component are summarized in Annex 1 and extensive explanation of outputs is documented in the last supervision mission aide-mémoire of January 2005. Component 1: Institutional Development of central and local governments. Overall this component was well managed by all involved parties and to the expected level of quality. The implementation of sub-component 1.1 (MAPs under the framework of MCs) was fully completed as far as elaboration, contractualization, and internalization of the programs. The degree of effort and success varies from municipality to municipality and has been monitored by MDA and the Bank on a regular basis. The results of this monitoring and detailed data analyses have been reported in aide-memoires (including the last aide-memoire of January 2005). The implementation of sub-component 1.2 (transversal support activities to establish an enabling sector framework) was effectively implemented by the MDA. Most of the activities had an innovative character, and therefore, were implemented on a pilot basis in selected municipalities in coordination with the responsible oversight agencies (See annex). There were no particular implementation difficulties, and these activities will continue under the follow-up operation. Street addressing and fiscal registries have been under implementation in other countries in Africa and lessons are being exchanged to scale up the implementation of this invaluable management tool. In summary, the UDDP was the first project to introduce in the region the concept of municipal contracts in support of the Senegalese Decentralization policy. All 67 municipalities have signed a Municipal Contract, representing a volume of FCFA 46 billion. More importantly, the program was able to introduce to municipalities the concept of borrowing and the loans have been reimbursed by municipalities. UDDP I has also introduced, as part of the Municipal Contracts, the concept of municipal adjustment programs which have led to tangible results such as (i) improvement in municipal savings of 12% over the life of the project; (ii) increase in municipal current revenues of 22% from FCFA 20 billion in 1997 to FCFA 32 billion in 2003; (iii) percentage of current revenues for maintenance programs (PEP) of 3 to 9 %; (iv) the implementation of street addressing in 15 major municipalities; (v) the compilation and dissemination of municipal financial data (Guide des ratios financiers) as well as a "Manual for municipal budget preparation"; (vi) the training of over 1600 municipal agents on technical and financial matters; and (vii) - 11 - the FECL study. The program has also been instrumental in the recent reforms to simplify local taxation. Component 2: Construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of public infrastructure, facilities and services under the responsibility of local governments The program carried out 421 investment programs in urban areas under the PIP of municipal contracts and an additional 310 projects in 212 rural districts. These investments have included city halls, markets, bus stations, schools, healthcare centers, roads, drainage, street lighting, sanitation and environmental investments. The range of sub-projects has been as varied as drainage in Tambacounda, integrated land development in Ngor, to the rehabilitation of historic sites in Gorée. As for the PMP (Priority Maintenance Programs) under the municipal contracts, by project closing, 50 municipalities out of 67 (75%) have provided information of the provisions for maintenance in their 2004 budget year. Total amount of current revenue estimated to be received in 2004 was FCFA 47.916 billion, the amount budgeted for PEP was 3. 653 billion F CFA, that is an average ratio of 7.62%, which surpassed the mandated 3%. (See section 4. 1 above and Annex 1 for detailed description of outputs under this component). 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: The ex-ante ERR assessment, demonstrated on a sample of projects in the SAR, was carried out under implementation according to the following principles: for all projects of more than 200 million F CFA a complete cost-benefit analysis was conducted. For the rest of the projects, depending on their nature, cost-effectiveness (for social, educational or environmental projects, small street projects), and for commercial projects cost-benefit analysis required starting with 10 million F CFA). Economic analysis framework was applied to all eligible sub-projects and was one of the screening criteria for their inclusion into the PIP. At the ICR stage, post-construction evaluation of the economic benefits of the project investments was carried out and reported by the AGETIP for a number of representative projects. The annex 3 details the ex-post economic analysis of the central market in the city of Thiès, rehabilitated and in operation for 2 years. The economic analysis shows that the sub-project was a cost-efficient operation that brought many benefits to the merchants and shoppers, namely: doubling of occupancy capacity and rationalization of space use; improved circulation inside and outside the market; improved electricity supply and reduction of mortality risk from accidents and fires; environmental improvements inside and outside of the market, reduction of the public health risks; reductions of fire and other accidents risks and compliance with the legislation texts, setting norms for safety of markets and public spaces ( Decree # 5945, and Decree # 00231). The cost-benefit analysis showed the ex-post ERR of 14% that is a good achievement ( relative to 10-11% average ERRs for these type of investments). As a general rule, it has been established in the literature on similar projects that the "effectiveness" of a sub-project is correlated to the ranking of the "economy" and "efficacy" of the local government. That is, the outcome of economic analysis (specifically value for money approach) repeatedly shows the effectiveness of a sub-project to be highly dependent on the mastery of execution of planning, procurement, implementation, financial management, and handover to the operators. Such studies confirm that the local governments with adequate capacity or adequate support will select and implement sub-projects that are economically viable. Based on the outcomes and the implementation arrangements of the project and the ERRs of a sample of projects, it could be inferred that the projects implemented respond to the economic effectiveness criteria. 4.4 Financial rate of return: - 12 - Financial rates of return were calculated for revenue-earning facilities. 4.5 Institutional development impact: Institutional development impact is rated as substantial. The project laid the foundations of a coherent institutional (tools, policy, organizations) framework for implementing the decentralization reform in Senegal. (a) The project introduced, tested, improved, and implemented the contractual model of central-local interaction with an increasing participation of municipalities and population in definition and financing of the projects. (b) The project established clear distribution of roles between the central government, local governments and technical agency (MDA), and procurement agency. Reinforcing of each group of institutions and clarification of their respective roles and strengths were achieved through development and use of operational procedures, mastering of programming, urban and financial tools, and targeted capacity building and particularly municipal adjustment programs in the case of municipalities. (c) The project contributed to strengthening of financial discipline of local governments, as evidenced from good record of contributions to sub-project financing, credit financing, and maintenance budgeting. (d) The project developed a rich set of basic databases and tools for monitoring and evaluating the municipal sector performance: local budget preparation guide, financial ratios guide, urban, administrative and financial databases (through process of audits) and spatial management tools (through street addressing), operational manuals for technical agency (MDA), delegated contract management (AGETIP), analysis of structure of FECL and local taxation system simplification, models of legal documents and agreements. The project contributed to building the human capital of staff of municipal sector institutions and developed skills in the local consulting industry. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: · The Parliament delayed approving the project (limited negative impact) · The donor community was supportive of the principles and objectives of the UDDP (substantial positive impact) 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: · The Government, the Ministry of Finance in particular, while generally very supportive of the project, took a long time to implement some of the commitments stated in the sector policy letter, most notably, the local fiscal reform and FECL restructuring. This led to an unsatisfactory rating for the institutional component in 2001 and less than desirable impact of the project on municipal financial aggregates (substantial negative impact). · On the other hand, both local and national governments fulfilled their commitments to enforcing the central-local contractual model of municipal contracts and to supporting the unified financial model for financing municipal projects, as well as lived up to their commitments on FECL allocations and local governments credit and contributions payments (substantial positive impact). · While all administrative support was in place for creation and operation of the MDA, the Government could have done more to ensure continuous quality leadership of MDA (limited negative impact). 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: · MDA succeeded to assume the role of technical advisor to municipalities and assure high level of - 13 - coordination and compliance between parties of the municipal contracts (substantial positive impact). · MDA ensured municipal buy-in and adherence to the principles of UDDP despite change of the municipal governments during elections in 2002 (substantial positive impact). · MDA could have shown more proactivity to assure that the PIPs are fully implementable at entry (land is available) and that municipalities are ready to operate completed projects without delay (limited negative impact). · AGETIP assured speedy quality procurement as a delegated Contract Management Agency (CMA), and took further steps (introduced performance qualification of contractors and consulting firms) to improve the quality of studies and works (significant positive impact). 5.4 Costs and financing: The project carried out all project activities budgeted for at appraisal. The total extension of the estimated closing date by 18 months allowed the project to complete all its activities and to achieve 100% disbursement rate for IDA Credit (total amount disbursed: US$81.3 million) (See Annex 2 on Project Costs). Disbursement rate deviated from projections as the municipal contracts were prepared and implemented on a rolling basis, with some start-up delays in municipal contracts preparation due to the learning curve of the local consulting industry and municipal elections in 2002. The careful financial simulations for each municipality, elaboration of investment project catalogue, and the selection of an experienced delegated procurement agency, allowed to come up with a good estimate of absorptive capacity for each municipality. After the mid-term review (December 2000), 18 municipalities were identified that could benefit from receiving additional financing (based on the progress of commitments), and 4 billion FCFA were used to finance amendments to municipal contracts for those municipalities that showed good prospects of completing their base MCs, were in good standing for monthly payments and mobilized the 3% of current revenue for maintenance. As some projects could not be realized because of land availability problems, some adjustment was made within the PIPs to add financing to upgrading street networks. The project was financed by the combination of funds, namely, the IDA Credit (68.2% of total project cost, the AfD grant (7.5% of total project cost), GoS counterpart funds and local governments contributions (23.3% of total project cost). Counterpart funding was made available in a timely manner. At the end, 19 urban municipalities benefited from PAC I, 48 municipalities benefited from both PAC I and PAC II. The overall repayments rates by municipalities amounted at closing to 97.78% of credit and contributions (96.41% if promises of payments are excluded). As far as the Credit only, the recovery rate is at 95.07% (90.37% for the portion under the ex-municipal credit account). 18 municipalities are experiencing arrears of 4 to 18 months. For the contributions part, the recovery rate is at 99.52% and arrears of 1 to 4 months are experienced by only 4 communes. Based on CCC and FECL availability from the central government and timely contributions and credit reimbursement on the part of the beneficiary municipalities, the project is evaluated as very successful from the fiduciary point of view. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Sustainability of the project achievements is rated as likely. The information and knowledge base at municipal level has been significantly strengthened. A large set of tools was developed, piloted, and scaled up to establish a baseline and to ensure that it is updated regularly. The critical municipal data now exist on the actual level of infrastructure and services, patterns of urbanization, pockets of poverty, municipal budgets, municipal organization and practices. Importantly for sustainability, the data are collected and processed entirely by local consultants --its updating is accepted as a prerequisite to accessing financing and is widely disclosed as the whole process is highly - 14 - participative. The physical and financial information databases are linked which fosters development of municipal sector analysis for identifying sustainability bottlenecks. Through urban audits, each urban municipality has been equipped with a diagnosis of the city's needs in terms of infrastructure, identified and quantified the gaps, and defined a coherent set of priority projects and maintenance works, the value of which corresponds to the budget envelop determined by the financial audits. A menu of adjustment measures and tools to support their implementation has been provided as well. Mechanisms for identifying local priority needs and establishing sustainable targets have been put in place. Eligible categories of investments have been established and made available to local governments in the form of catalogues. The main categories are basic infrastructure, social facilities, administrative facilities, commercial facilities, and environmental projects. The catalogues proved very instrumental as they assist the local decision-makers and stakeholders to make the most informed and cost efficient choices. They affect sustainability of investments in two major ways: a) they help curtail at times excessive and costly creativity of local engineers and architects; and b) they give an upfront sense of the likely financial envelop of each project, that increasing transparency and accountability. All eligible investments must be accompanied by social and environmental assessments, proper management and maintenance arrangements; and coherence with national sectoral programs and trunk infrastructure. The project has built awareness of importance to rigorously screen and justify priority investments. Municipal contracts have been internalized as a working model of central-local reciprocal interaction at this stage of decentralization reform. All municipalities went through the contractual process and have showed good compliance, while the central government was strict in enforcing the contractual agreements and implementing their part (making funds available and creating enabling environment for municipalities to perform). The local governments (two generations, following the local elections of 2002) and communities have been actively participating in the process of municipal contract preparation, and have embraced the concepts and the discipline of compliance. Technical skills necessary to produce quality enforceable municipal contracts have been acquired by the local consulting industry. Two critical sector institutions (MDA and AGETIP) have firmly established themselves in providing quality technical assistance to municipalities in the areas of their current weaknesses: programming, negotiating, budgeting, contracting and supervising works and studies, asset management. Their mandates and operational practices vis-à-vis their clients and the central authorities have been defined in operational manuals, documented in agreements (conventions), tested in actual output delivery, and supported by all stakeholders. Importantly, the AGETIP role was confined to delegated contract management only, while MDA assumed the roles of a financial intermediary and a key decision-maker in the selection of the projects. Therefore the transparency and fairness of the implementation model has improved. Improving sustainability of MDA and AGETIP financing and human resources will be tackled under the follow-up operation, that will build on the results of the current project and further strengthen the sustainability of the overall model chosen for gradually shifting the responsibility and accountability to municipalities. Providing local counterpart funding has been accepted as fair, and many municipalities have demonstrated improvements in local resource mobilization. The financial audits showed that there is room for sustainable contributions from local resources, including in some cases through borrowing. During the course of the project, two major bottlenecks to local revenue growth have been tackled by municipalities: tax identification and non-fiscal resource mobilization from revenue-earning facilities (such as markets and bus stations). At the national level, there are also good prospects for sustainability of the chosen municipal finance model, if the recommendations on how to improve the FECL and the provisions of the 2004 local tax reform are implemented by the government. - 15 - The ranking is also explained by the extent of technical knowledge transfer and rich operational documentation that have been made available to the Senegalese municipal and national decision-makers, such as model terms of reference, checklists, sample agreement documents and operational manuals. The municipal tools developed under the project have been replicated in other countries such as Cameroon, Guinea, Mauritania, Rwanda and Niger. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: Most of the activities are mainstreamed into the operations of local governments and the oversight authorities. The financial and contractual models will be continued under UDDP II. The municipal sub-projects, once completed were transferred to municipalities for operation. The financing of MDA's operating costs is still dependent on donor funding, and the issue of its future mission and financial autonomy will be addressed under UDDP II. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Bank performance at lending is rated highly satisfactory. The Bank team provided critical expert input and recommendations to the Borrower and collaborated closely on all aspects of project preparation. The team emphasized setting the "rules of the game" from the very outset and elaborated all the tools to "structure" project implementation. The project both built on lessons learned and introduced major innovations. An executing agency (MDA) was carefully crafted and the prerogatives of the experienced delegated contract managent agency (AGETIP) were carefully redefined. 7.2 Supervision: Bank performance at supervision is rated satisfactory. The project benefited from team and TTL continuity. The supervision missions were regular, with some extra follow-up missions particularly on procurement issues and continuous supervision by correspondence in between missions. The Bank team effected extensive transfer of knowledge and close follow-up on issues critical to project's success (quality of audits of municipalities, meetings with Mayors and Municipal Councils, representatives of the beneficiaries, MDA, AGETIP, local consultants and contractors). In addition to regular supervision, 4 technical audits were carried out by the Bank local consultant and focused on contract management and works implementation on the ground. Despite many procedural requirements and a large number of new tools introduced by the project, the Bank team was proactive to focus the attention of the Borrower on products and facilitate the linkage between the process and comprehensive quality product After the mid-term review, confirming that the project was fully on track and all innovations were valid, a stock-taking workshop was held in Dakar to share lessons and views with various partners and stakeholders (about 100 participants). For closing date extension, the team insisted on submissions of time bound actions plans and full use of project resources. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Overall Bank performance is rated highly satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Borrower performance is rated satisfactory. The Borrower fully owned the design of the project and supported introducing the implementation arrangements that departed from the experience of the previous urban projects financed by the Bank, prior to project effectiveness. The Borrower fully engaged into a participatory process of sub-project design and definition of municipal priority investment programs. The Borrower assured that the implementation arrangements are fully in place by end of project preparation. - 16 - MDA was created on July 8, 1997, or three months prior to negotiations (September 22-October 1, 1997). Operational Manuals for MDA and AGETIP were approved, the three first municipal contracts were signed, by the end of December 1997, one month after the Board approval and signature of the Credit Agreement (November 29, 1997). The Borrower also closed the CCC and transferred the balance to the MDA, thus taking an important step toward creation of a platform for harmonizing the various financing windows for municipal investments and legitimizing the MDA. The IDA Credit became effective on May 28, 1998, six months after ITS signature. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Government implementation performance is rated highly satisfactory. The project enjoyed the continuous support of Ministry of Finance that assured timely administrative decisions and availability of counterpart funding through the FECL. The Government showed commitment to its letter of sector policy, particularly during the second part of the project with reforms on local taxation FECL restructuring. These activities gained momentum only toward the end of the project. 7.6 Implementing Agency: Performance of MDA (implementing agency for project overall and for municipalities financed out of PAC1 and PAC2) and AGETIP (delegated contract management role and implementing agency for rural municipalities under PAC3) is rated satisfactory. MDA has evolved from its embryonic stage at the start of the project to a solid institution, capable to handle the increasing work load, respect its obligations and gain respect from municipal clients. The staff has shown motivation and is technically highly qualified. The institution has, however, in the last twelve months of the project suffered from insufficient leadership. During project execution, MDA had 3 General Directors, including one acting. This, however, had limited impact on MDA's overall performance because of the quality of the core technical team and the very intensive technical assistance MDA received from the World Bank project team (see section on project outputs). Slow initial speed of completion of municipal contracts (2 years after effectiveness, only 16 municipalities signed municipal contracts for 20 billion FCFA and 31 other municipal contracts were still under completion) reflected first and foremost the enormous challenge of achieving acceptable level of quality of the first round of financial and organizational audits by the local consulting industry and reflects the sector learning curve more than the implementing agency performance. The MC of Dakar was a big challenge and took a lot of effort to complete, as the capital city is a political `heavy weight" and center of many problems. Project reporting, however, could have been done better. Implementation of the maintenance program was reported only towards the end and is still incomplete. This needs to be improved and will be tackled under PAC II. MDA benefited from the technical support of the Mission d'Appui and the Bank team who provided timely review of documents and clear work programs and action plans. The following performance indicators were achieved by AGETIP: 80% of projects for which studies were completed on time, 70% of contracts implemented in time (target 75%), 95% percent of contracts implemented within budget; 205 bids and RFPs launched annually, 80% of projects awarded according to the planning in the implementation plan (target 75%), 7 days average lag in payments for contracts below the threshold (target 30 days), 40 day lag between the approval of studies and contract award, 39 billion FCFA volume of contracts signed, disbursement rate of 99%, 420 projects implemented and 150 enterprises benefited from the project. AGETIP, therefore showed a very good performance. Areas of improvement for joint MDA and AGETIP performance (with progressive involvement of the municipalities) could include increased coordination on project selection, involvement of MDA in studies beyond conceptual design, documenting formal approval process for design studies, choice and contractors - 17 - performance record as well as improved record keeping of the works implementation process. These will be addressed under UDDP II. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Overall Borrower Performance is rated satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned Lesson 1: Targeting a large number of municipalities is possible and doable if sound mechanisms are in place. Urban projects have often shied away from embracing a large number of municipalities because of the risk of spreading too thin and the complexity of supervision on a large territory. In the case of UDDP, the project showed that it is possible to succeed in assisting municipalities to program and execute urban investments and in aspiring to universal and consistent coverage of all urban municipalities in a given country. By providing well crafted programming tools and clear rules of the game, UDDP was able to bring incrementally and progressively all municipalities on board and entice all local governments to adhere to the discipline and culture of municipal contracts. Lesson 2: Clear implementation arrangements and well defined contractual distribution of roles is essential for a successful municipal development program. The "partnership" implementation formula with clear distribution of responsibilities among sector institutions proved effective to empower all stakeholders in all steps of the municipal development process. The Ministry of Finance, because of the heavy emphasis of UDDP on reforms of financing mechanisms to municipalities, was the obvious choice for a "ministère de tutelle". MDA was given all the tools crafted by the World Bank team and became a viable agency in the institutional landscape with clear programming function. AGETIP has seen its role successfully redirected to what it does best, i. e. contract management and supervision of public works. Finally, local governments and community groups have found a platform to voice their wishes and commit themselves to specific goals. It is essential to have well crafted contractual agreements (i.e. municipal contracts and conventions) to foster participatory process and facilitate speedy implementation. Lesson 3: Municipal Contracts do work. Senegal was the first country in sub-Sahara Africa to experiment with the concept of municipal contracts. The key to success was the introduction of municipal audits which for the first time provided baseline information on the spatial, organizational and financial attributes of Senegalese municipalities and helped shape municipal programs which were not politically based but based on priority needs set in local realities and expressed at the local level. In a sector which critically and historically lacks data, the municipal audits became a tool to gather in a short period of time, at low cost and using the local consulting firms targeted information to support important decision-making. The municipal contract model has been since replicated in a number of neighboring countries such as Guinea, Mauritania, Rwanda, Niger and Cameroon. Lesson 4: Capacity building works better if it is integrated in a contractual arrangement and linked to investments than if it is a free-standing component: The praise of municipal adjustment programs. Many "traditional" urban projects have not yielded the expected results on capacity building and - 18 - institutional strengthening because (a) they are too far removed from local needs and realities; and (b) they are not linked to the investments incentives. In the case of the municipal contracts, the municipal adjustments programs derive from the conclusions of the financial and organizational audits and are therefore tied to local needs and targeted to specific goals and commitments. The eventuality that these commitments may not be met has an impact on the implementation of the investment program (PIP). Lesson 5: There are lessons to be learned for the future generation of municipal contracts. Nothing is perfect and the project has learned the hard way some important operational lessons. These lessons are: (1) although the screening process of sub-projects included in the PIP is rigorous, site availability has proved in a few cases to be a problem and mechanisms should be refined to reduce the occurrence of this issue; (2) in the second generation of municipal contracts, the maintenance program will be more demanding. It will not be enough for municipalities to show that they have allocated and disbursed at least 3% of their current revenues, they will have to show real improvements at the city level; and (3) more attention should be paid to the urban fabric and, especially in the case of the metropolitan region of Dakar, to infrastructure which have an inter-municipality impact rather than a neighborhood impact. Lesson 6: Seeking harmonization of financing windows (guichets) is a challenge which has to be addressed at the country level. The issue here is to prevent as much as possible to have several windows of financing with several rules of the game accessible to local governments. It is not feasible to have a program such as UDDP involving large amounts of money but many "constraints" and in parallel to also have "free money" with no strings attached. Everybody is guilty of this: the GOS when it injects sporadic off-budget large scale improvements schemes which have no correlation with the financial reality; the World Bank when within the same country portfolio, projects do not have the same demanding rules of the game; the donor community when bilateral agencies insist on putting their flags on regions or sectoral issues rather than adhere to a common platform. The beauty of UDDP is that it created a platform away from political considerations, measured the absorptive capacity of municipalities and catered the investment program and the maintenance program to the financial and managerial capacity of each municipality. In doing so, UDDP empowered the local governments and set the grounds for no defaults on local counterpart funding and no defaults on repayment of loans, an amazing record in a continent which is riveted with problems of delays in counterpart funding and defaults on loan repayments. Lesson 7: Revisiting the issue of sustainability: Some insight on the future. The long term impact of UDDP is in pivotal situation at this time as is MDA. It can thrive or it can shrink. The next few years will tell. UDDP II is under preparation and is ready to capitalize on lessons learned. It has all the ingredients to reinforce the municipal contract approach and the role of MDA in a very sustainable way. The risk is however to change the nature of the project which is essentially a municipal development program and to transform it into an infrastructure program yielding to the presidential demands. Similarly, the role and future of MDA is on the balance, depending very much on how long and if it is allowed to continue to play the role of an autonomous agency in support of local governments or if it will be swallowed by the political system. Ultimately the role that could be devolved to it is a role of financial intermediary, managing on behalf of the government part of transfer funds (FECL) to local governments in a transparent and efficient manner. 9. Partner Comments - 19 - (a) Borrower/implementing agency: The Borrower has submitted a completion report that is included in Annex 8. The overall assessment of the project is consistent with the present ICR conclusions. The Borrower evaluates the project as a highly successful operation that allowed the decentralization reform to take a practical step forward. The project demonstrated to the local governments the challenges of operating in increasingly decentralized setting and the critical need for them to improve their capacity, with the help of enabling institutional, economic and financial frameworks. The Borrower acknowledges that "thanks to the mechanisms and tools put in place by the project, one is witnessing the true operations of local development, federating activities of many partners and resulting in a tangible improvement of urban life conditions through development of urban social cohesion and cooperation with the private operators". The Borrower gives credit to the project team for the meticulousness of project preparation and the degree of elaboration of innovative and highly useful municipal management tools, particularly the municipal contract model. The Borrower appreciates the remarkable level of mobilization of all stakeholders achieved by the project that was clearly a major factor in its success. Unlike previous projects, the UDDP succeeded in assuring continuous attention of the central government, as evidenced in timely and full disbursement of counterpart funds. The Bank team is commended by the Borrower on consistency of approach and devotion to the project. On the implementation arrangements side, the Borrower validates the efficiency of the MDA-AGETIP partnership, reinforced by joint supervision of works and continuous coordination of efforts. (b) Cofinanciers: (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): 10. Additional Information None. - 20 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix This annex provides a detailed description of outputs by component as well as a table of indicators showing estimate and actual data. Component 1: Institutional Development of central and local governments. Municipal Adjustment Programs (MAP) They are summarized below: (a) improvement of the mobilization of local resources (including payment of monthly contributions for investment financing, improvement of local tax rates setting, signing of commercial leases, etc); On average municipalities abided by their commitments in PAM that were directly under their control: monthly payments were on average regular, increase in tariffs and fees took place, survey of existing businesses conducted, management arrangements of revenue-generating projects improved, or such projects delivered through the PIP and started to bring in resources. There is evidence also of an increase in transparency of rental agreements with the real commercial agents conducting businesses on the ground, the measure having a positive impact on stability of payments and quality of services. The MDA has been instrumental in assisting municipalities to implement fiscal changes that required assistance of the deconcentrated. Treasury and Tax authorities, or were dependent on the completion of street addressing and fiscal registries and allowed to improve tax identification and tax collection. The State helped the municipalities to improve their overall financial situation by the following measures: a larger than usual contribution through FECL of 7, 5 billion FCFA in 2003 (vs. 3 billion FCFA in 2002); earlier production of tax roles by DGID (March vs. July/August); eventual adoption of Law on local finances N2004 on 02/06/2004, integration of municipal police into state police, and a one time allocation of 1.5 billion F CFA to contribute to paying for municipal lighting that relieved municipalities from some of their recurrent expenditures. However, as could be expected, reading through the individual evaluations shows that the progress is uneven and each municipality has its particular idiosyncrasy in trying to improve its fiscal situation. (b) improvement of human resources management (including reducing overstaffing and hiring critical missing staff); Since local revenues have improved, the ratio of administrative expenditures has fallen below the ceiling of 40% of current revenue. However, this does not mean that there was a significant improvement in the overstaffed and poorly qualified municipal teams. Some municipalities succeeding in filling professional vacancies (hiring financial specialists, coordinators, or resorting to contractual employees, rationalizing their organigrams to better assign available staff, hiring freeze), but overall, a lot remains to be done. MDA is working on individual reassignment plans with a number of municipalities (Pikine, Rufisque, Kaolack, Ziguinchor). (c) improvement of financial health, particularly clearing of arrears towards SONELEC (electricity), SDE (water) and SONATEL (telephone) concessionary utilities; Most municipalities still have difficulties paying their electricity, water and telephone bills, electricity bill being the most challenging one. The State continues to bailout the municipalities, and MDA is working - 21 - with DCL on improving the criteria of distribution of State subsidies (1,5 billion in 2004) to reward those municipalities who are making efforts to adjust in their consumption and payments. A general measure that was implemented by all municipalities is to stop assuming the cost of such services for religious institutions. (d) improvement of financial management, including budgeting and fiscal procedures, alternative models of managing revenue-generating projects. Progress has been achieved along three main categories of measures. Software (COMMAIR, comptabilité ordonnateur), has been installed in 3 pilot municipalities ( Dakar, Diourbel, and Fatick). Starting 2005 and based on the positive evaluation of the usage of this software in the three municipalities, its installation will be scaled up across the country. At the same time, test runs of COLLOC (postes comptables) are being done in RPM in Dakar and in Perception in Pikine. Its universal installation is also expected to be completed in 2005 by the Treasury Department. Upon completion of these operations, an evaluation would be carried out of the impact of this technical assistance measure on the quality of accounts production in municipalities (scheduled under the follow-up operation in 2006). MDA carried out three studies, assisting selected municipalities in optimizing the management of common revenue-generating projects: market in Louga, ice-factory in Kaffrine, and market/bus terminal in Ziguinchor. 5 other studies are in the advanced stages of completion (bus terminal and market in Saint-Louis, bus terminal in Tambacounda, central market in Thiès, bus terminal in Mbour, and bus terminal and poultry market in Kaolack). The recommendations of the studies are being implemented by the municipalities and demonstrate that each case might call for a different management arrangement (gestion en régie, affermage, régie autonome, régie directe). The roll-out of software "EASYMERCADO" is scheduled for the last trimester of 2005. Priority Maintenance Programs (PMP) By project closing, 50 municipalities out of 67 (75%) have provided information of the provisions for maintenance in their 2004 budget year. The total amount of current revenue estimated to be received in 2004 was 47, 916 billion FCFA, the amount budgeted for PEP was 3,653 billion F CFA, that is an average ratio of 7,62%. 21 municipalities out of these 50, or 31.3% of the total, have provided information on actual PEP executed in 2004. The total amount of current revenue spent on PEP in 2004 in 21 municipalities (Dakar is not among them), is 0.336 billion F CFA (Dakar only budgeted PEP amounted to 1.8 billion FCFA), that represents on average 5,65% of estimated current revenue. The MDA is working on improving the reporting and analyzing of PEP data. For all 50 municipalities that reported PEP 2004 data, detailed breakdown exist on each spending category of 3-year PEPs that were tailored to the PIP and investments needs of each municipality. The 2004 data, though incomplete, seem to suggest that the obligation of min 3% of PEP in current municipal revenues was generally respected, and in many cases surpassed. It appears that the municipalities respected the projections more for such PEP items as cleaning and garbage collection. While the achievements are impressive, given the prevalent lack of maintenance culture, more work is needed to better tailor the PEP programs design and monitoring to each individual case, based on the first few years of piloting this contractual tool. - 22 - Transversal support activities to establish an enabling sector framework This sub-component was effectively implemented by the MDA to promote the enabling institutional environment for the municipal development and to respond in the most pragmatic way to needs of the municipalities. Most of the activities had an innovative character, and therefore, were implemented on a pilot basis in selected municipalities in coordination with the responsible oversight agencies. There were no particular implementation difficulties, and these activities will continue under the follow-up operation. Street addressing and fiscal registries activities have been under implementation in other countries in Africa and lessons are being exchanged to scale up the implementation of this invaluable management tool. 1. Street addressing. Total of 15 municipalities (as estimated at appraisal) have benefited from the operation of street addressing. 5 municipalities (Diourbel, Kaolack, Louga, Thiès and Ziguinchor), financed out of IDA funds have been fully addressed for the total cost of 236 901 042 F CFA. The plans and street index have been delivered. The 3 municipalities (Saint-Louis, Tambacounda and Guédiawaye), financed by AfD, have also been fully addressed. The process of addressing of Dakar, Pikine, and Rufisque of the agglomeration of Dakar, has not been fully completed. Codification, mapping and street indexation was essentially completed under UDDP, the signage installation started in Dakar and Rufisque on December 25, 2004. The rest will be completed under the follow-up operation. The latest estimate of the cost of addressing the above municipalities (without the cost of installing signs) is 510, 079, 340 FCFA. The total cost for 11 municipalities amounts to 1, 177, 646, 395 FCFA, the costs per municipalities varying from about 400 million for Dakar, to about 40 million for Louga. 2. The evaluation of local financial base and development on tax registries was piloted in Thiès and Kaolack, by crossing the records or existing tax rolls and the data collected during the adressage surveys. The tax rolls have been updated and the evaluation of local tax collection rates, a pilot under this project, will be scaled up under the follow up operation. 3. IT financial management tools. Tax collection software (COLLOC and COMMAIR) has been piloted in Diourbel, Fatick and is being tested in Dakar. The MDA is working on the technical issue of resolving software compatibility issues to allow building a consolidated database of aggregated financial data nationally. 4. Urban Databases. Two types of databases have been established: 1) financial, through the Guide des ratios financiers (2 updates "Municipal Financial Indicators for 1999-2000 and for 2001-2003") and 2) general, an Atlas des villes du Sénegal (still under preparation). The atlas was not planned initially and will be produced under the next project. In addition, for the 15 municipalities which have been addressed, the following data have become available (a) aerial photography; (b) street map; (c) street index; and (d) data bank on occupants and occupations. 5. Training program for municipal staff and the staff of central agencies was carried in 2002 - 2003 and covered in total 1,741 staff for the total cost of F CFA 282,317,162. The training topics included the following modules: municipal services and human resource management, IT, financial management, procurement, municipal project management.MDA has published also training materials for financial management and local budgeting. - 23 - Source of financing Cost (FCFA) Number of staff trained IDA 231,910,150 1,540 AfD 50,407,012 201 Total 282,317,162 1,741 Average cost per staff trained 162,158 The generic municipal training had been already provided by other donors and the project designed training programs based on the specific needs during UDDP implementation. The project worked with the existing training centers such as ENAM (Ecole Nationale d'administration et de magistrature), the National School for Administration, and CFP/CUD, (Centre de formation et perfectionnement de la communauté urbaine de Dakar ), the Center for Training for the Urban Area of Dakar. Such approach proved efficient as it targeted training to specific needs of the project. 6. Office and IT equipment programmed for the original 60 municipalities was purchased and installed. Additional supplies, based on updated needs and equipment for the remaining 7 municipalities will be purchased in the first semester of 2005 and financed by the counterpart (FECL) funds. The total cost reported for 49 municipalities is reported at 140, 478, 812 (office) and 7, 350, 750 (IT equipment) FCFA. 7. Studies. "Manual for Budget Preparation" and "Municipal Financial Indicators for 1999-2000 and for 2001-2003" were completed and are being disseminated amongst municipalities, prefectures, and tax and treasury agents. Strategic study of FECL reform was completed in February 2004, and elaborated guidelines for FECL reform, focusing on (a) indexation of FECL on value added tax (VAT) as stipulated in the law 96-06 of 1996 on Local Governments Charter; (b) establishing transparency of distribution formula; and (c) implementation of oversight procedures over the use of central government transfers by the municipalities. Support to implementation of the FECL reform will be provided in the follow-up operation. The three studies on the management of revenue-generating facilities (markets), carried out by MDA are reported above. Component 2: Construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of public infrastructure, facilities and services under the responsibility of local governments. The identification and implementation of the priority projects under the contractual "partnership" model between the municipalities, MDA and AGETIP proved achievable. Under PAC 1 and PAC 2 financing, total number of 453 priority projects were identified as part PIP in all 67 urban municipalities of Senegal (additional 7 municipalities were created in 2002), that signed the municipal contracts (MCs) at different times throughout project implementation. By the end of 1999, 63.4% of the agreed financing was allocated to 15 municipalities. Based on this result, 37 MCs benefited from amendments (avenants) for the total amount of FCFA 5 billion to absorb funds not committed by mid-term and finance more of the priority projects. This is a very significant achievement of the projects in terms of poverty alleviation as projects were prioritized based, among other criteria on their location in the most underserved areas. 32 priority projects were dropped from PIPs, and 18 projects were being completed at the time of the credit closing, thus bringing the number of fully completed projects to 403 and projects expected to be completed shortly to 421 with total investment cost of 37,071 million FCFA (or 99.76% estimated cost). The main cause for dropped projects and a challenge to be addressed in the follow-up project was non-availability of suitable land, that in some cases caused budget overruns (due to the need to improve land suitability or accessibility). This occurrence reinforces the need to strengthen the spatial and strategic aspects of sub-project programming and possibly consider a more integrative "area" approach for - 24 - prioritizing interventions along with including resolution of relevant land management issues into the MAPs. (Refer to Section 4.1, Table 1 - Priority projects of basis services and infrastructure implemented in urban municipalities). Out of 421 projects, 97% are fully operational. Making all projects operational is a condition for access to financing under the follow-up operation and MDA is working together with the concerned mayors on addressing the issue on a case by case basis. Most of the non-operational projects are those that have been financed under the municipal contracts signed as late as 2003. The delegated CMA (AGETIP) has conducted an evaluation of all project managers and classified them into 4 categories based on past performance (excellent, good, mediocre and sub-standard). The practice of annual evaluations based on the past track record of performance with AGETIP will inform the establishment of quality short lists for future operations and fostering quality in the industry. The four technical audits carried out as part of the Bank supervision effort followed closely the problem projects and provided additional recommendations to AGETIP regarding improving the quality of work and increasing the readiness of municipalities for operating the completed projects upon transfer. Under PAC 3, destined to rural municipalities, two "banks of projects" have been realized for the total amount of 10.5 billion FCFA. 310 projects have been executed in 212 rural communities out of 320 (66.25% of rural communes). The number of beneficiaries is 3 million rural residents (67% of total rural population). The investment per capita is 3,000 FCFA. By the closing date, the project disbursed 10,4 billion FCFA or 99% of its PAC3 estimated envelope. PAC 3 financed the following range of rural municipal projects (share of total number of projects): administrative facilities (42%), social facilities, such as youth centers, women's centers, multipurpose spaces ( 11%), educational facilities ( 12%), commercial facilities, such as markets, souks and cafeterias ( 5%), public lighting (2%), sanitary facilities (1%). - 25 - Indicator/Matrix SAR Estimate/Target Actual/Latest Estimate A. Indicators for the MDA for the execution of municipal contracts. A. 1. Number of signed Full coverage (all urban 67 municipalities (full municipal contracts per year municipalities) coverage) A. 2. Volume of signed FCFA 46.6 billion FCFA 46.6 billion municipal contracts in FCFA billion. A. 3. Volume of signed priority Goals FCFA 30,000 FCFA 37,154 billion (2.46 in investment programs, in FCFA 5 billion in 1st year, 9 in 2nd 1st year, 7.85 in 2nd year, 13.2 billion year, 10 in 3rd year, 5 in 4th in 3rd year, 6.4 in 4th year, year, 1 in 5th year). 4.84 in 5th year, 2.4 in 6th year). A. 4. Recovery rate of 100% 97.78%, PAC I 95.07%, CCC municipal monthly payments. 90.07% (Paid monthly payments / estimated monthly payments) A. 5. Average monthly payment no target stated 2.77 months delays A. 6. Annual evaluation of the The amount budgeted for PEP 50 municipalities (85%) execution of the Priority no less than 3% on average for provided information on 2004 Maintenance Program (PMP). participating municipalities. budget provisions. The amount budgeted for PEP was on average 7.62% of current revenue. A. 7. Number of staff who have no target stated 1, 741 staff benefited from training. - 26 - Indicator/Matrix SAR Estimate/Target Actual/Latest Estimate B. Indicators for the CMA for the execution of PIP and PAC3 B.1. Percentage of projects for 75% 80% which the studies were achieved in the allocated time period. B. 2. Percentage of public 78% 70% works contracts achieved in the estimated time period. B. 3. Percentage of contracts 90% 95% executed with in the budget estimated in the study B. 4. Number of bidding According to procurement plan 205 bids and RFPs launched documents initiated yearly annually (volume) B. 5. Annual percentage of 75% 80% projects executed compared to the number of planned projects. B. 6. Average payment delays. 30 days 7 days (in days) B. 7. Days between studies and 75 days 40 days contract award B. 8. Number of activity reports 100% n/a produced not including expected delays B. 9. Disbursement rates (for No target 99% the CMA) B. 10. Annual total of signed No target FCFA 10 billion contracts B. 11. Investment by No target n/a beneficiary B.12. Investment by project No target 421 type B. 13. Number of benefiting No target 150 enterprises B. 14. Number of benefiting No target n/a consulting firms. - 27 - Indicator/Matrix SAR Estimate/Target Actual/Latest Estimate C. Indicators of local governments performance C.1. Number of municipalities If individual MAP requested 4 municipalities having adopted regularisation such a measure plans with concessionaire societies (SDE, SONATEL and SENELEC). C.2 Number of municipalities If individual MAP requested 3 municipalities (some others that adopted alternative such a measure under study) management methods for their revenue generating facilities. C. 3. Number of municipalities If individual MAP requested 7 municipalities (others are in that improved the quality of such a measure process) their human resources without altering their financial situation. C. 4. Rate of increase of n/a 2003/2002 10.9%, nearly 3 current revenues times the level of 1996 C. 5. Savings rate n/a 15% in 1996, 26% in 2002, 18% in 2003 C. 6. Rate of increase of the n/a 5% local direct taxes C. 7. Quality of budget n/a 102%, 88% preparation (projected/realized revenue and projected/realized expenditures). C.8. Progress with the local Law 2004 06/02/2004 tax reforms C.9. Reform of FECL Funds made available as agreed. Study completed in February 2004. Recommendations to be implemented in the follow up operation. - 28 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million 1. Institutional Development Component 16.20 16.70 103 2. Physical Investments Component 94.40 97.79 104 Total Baseline Cost 110.60 114.49 Total Project Costs 110.60 114.49 Total Financing Required 110.60 114.49 Note: Total project costs include $10 million financing from AFD. Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 11.36 44.44 1.00 5.52 62.32 (10.00) (38.70) (0.90) (0.00) (49.60) 2. Goods 7.40 1.70 0.50 0.08 9.68 (7.40) (1.50) (0.40) (0.00) (9.30) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 9.50 0.00 9.50 (0.00) (0.00) (9.50) (0.00) (9.50) 4. Training 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.00 2.50 (0.00) (0.00) (2.50) (0.00) (2.50) 5. Operating expenses 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.70 4.20 (0.00) (0.00) (3.50) (0.00) (3.50) 6. Management fees 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.20 0.80 (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.60) Total 18.76 46.14 17.60 6.50 89.00 (17.40) (40.20) (17.40) (0.00) (75.00) - 29 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 7.16 42.50 31.92 0.00 81.58 (4.39) (31.23) (24.90) (0.00) (60.52) 2. Goods 1.08 1.11 1.05 0.00 3.24 (1.08) (0.97) (1.05) (0.00) (3.10) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 13.97 0.00 13.97 (0.00) (0.00) (12.07) (0.00) (12.07) 4. Training 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.76 (0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00) (0.76) 5. Operating expenses 0.00 0.00 4.04 0.00 4.04 (0.00) (0.00) (4.04) (0.00) (4.04) 6. Management fees 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.90 (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.00) (0.90) Total 8.24 43.61 52.64 0.00 104.49 (5.47) (32.20) (43.72) (0.00) (81.39) 1/Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies. 2/Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Institutional Development 10.20 2.50 3.50 11.70 1.90 3.10 114.7 76.0 88.6 Physical Investments 64.80 23.10 6.50 69.69 21.20 6.90 107.5 91.8 106.2 - 30 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits EX-POST ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CENTRAL MARKET IN THE CITY OF THIÈS The central market in Thiès was rehabilitated under the project and at the time of the present analysis has been in operation for two years. The ex-post economic analysis for this commercial project is representative of the ex-post economic analysis conducted by the CMA (AGETIP) for projects that required cost-benefit analysis, as stipulated in the SAR. Brief Project Description The central market of the city of Thiès is located on the avenue Générale de Gaule. It extends on 1.5 hectares, is structured in 4 sections consisting of concrete structures and warehouses, and has the occupancy capacity of about 5724 m2. Before the rehabilitation, the structure suffered from anarchic additions and constructions that blocked the main arteries of the market and severely inhabited internal circulation. Because of this situation the market "expanded" outside of the existing structure and spilled out on the adjacent streets. The clogging of the main market arteries, the anarchic occupation, poor condition of the electric and water supply networks, lack of fireproofing ­ all this contributed to the precarious conditions of the facility (fires, robberies, dirt, public health issues). Given its importance in the economic life of the city and its prime location, the municipal council has chosen this market upgrading as one of the projects on the Priority Investments Program (PIP) to be implemented and financed under the Municipal Contract of Thiès. The main objectives of market rehabilitation were: identification of the merchants and organizing them in a structured framework of trading; sewage management and circulations improvements, upgrading of the service networks to satisfy the norms of hygiene and safety; increase in the market profitability for the benefit of all partners; overcoming anarchic constructions in favor of an architecturally solid structure. Summary of Overall Benefits for the Market Users The achievement of the objectives of this project are summarized in the table below: Indicator Situation before the Situation after the project Comments project Structure 5, 724 m2 of useful space 8, 591 m2 of useful space Doubling of occupancy on the floor area of 15, on the floor area of 11,672 capacity and 000 m2, that is the ratio of m2, that is 73.6% rationalization of space occupancy of 38, 16% occupancy ratio. use. Use of space and Anarchic constructions Opened up access lanes, Improved circulation accessibility and clogged circulation width of 9 m for the main inside and outside the lanes, and 2 m for internal market passages. Asphalting of 4 perimeter streets and thus creating the 4 market facades Electric network Degraded network Full upgrading of the Improved electricity condition, particularly for electric network, supply and reduction of the individual transformer made mortality risk from - 31 - connections, anarchic and accessible while fully safe, accidents and fires. illegal connections, elimination of anarchic inaccessible transformer, and illegal connections. basically non-existant public lighting system. Sewage network No flood and storm water Construction of a new Environmental network, causing seasonal network, by reconstruction improvements inside and flooding and closing of the existing channels and outside of the market, market, the drainage pits connecting to the reduction of the public were totally clogged and canalization system (Canal health risks. used as garbage dumps Bignona and Rue Joffre). Fire proofing Lack of any anti-fire Fireproofing and fire Reductions of fire and system and ensuing panics alarm system installation, other accidents risks and during fires including a fire alarm, a compliance with the network of emergency fire legislation texts, setting water reserves, 2 fire norms for safety of hydrants, 30 fire markets and public spaces extinguishers, safety ( Decree # 5945, and lighting system, a low Decree # 00231). tension network with 35 autonomous blocs for rescue operations, emergency signage on fixed poles In general, the project has achieved its goals within budget and delivered quality outputs. The slippage in works schedule in the first phase was due to the failing contractor. However, despite the works slippage of 8 months, the total actual cost of the project is 1.5% below budget, the economy that was achieved without jeopardizing the quality. Category Planned Actual Gap Duration of studies 5 months 5 months 0 Duration of works 16 months 24 months Delay of 8 months Cost of studies 100.000.000 FCFA 51 850 .000 FCFA 48% cost underrun Cost of works 1.000.000.000 1.031.954.000 3.2 % cost overrun Total costs 1.100.000.000 1.083.804.000 1.5% cost underrun Efficiency The existing market building was rehabilitated, the useful commercial surface was increased, the water, wastewater, and electric networks were upgraded, and fireproofing was brought up to established norms. Surface in M2 Cost in FCFA Ratio cost/m2 Built : 8591 1,083,804,000 126,155 Upgraded : 11672 1,083,804,000 92,855 Similar projects are realized with the average cost of 150.000 F CFA per m2, or 20% more. In addition to the market building, the roads and sidewalks around were also upgraded at FCFA 9, 2855 per m2, a reasonable cost by local standards. - 32 - Economic Rate of Return The cost-benefit analysis of the market project is based on the following assumptions regarding costs and benefits: (1) Financial costs consist of the costs of the studies and works, as recorded in the HIPTP database of the AGETIP, and of 3% of current revenue (from rent and taxes) for facility maintenance; (2) Economic costs consist of the opportunity cost of forgone revenue that could have been generated by the market without rehabilitation.These costs are obtained by multiplying the floor area before the rehabilitation (5,724 m2) by the going rent at the time ( 600 FCFA m2). The costs are in the table below: Costs Thousands FCFA) Operation and Year Studies Works Maintenance Opportunity Total cost Cost 1 4 744 4 744 1999 2 4 987 4 987 2000 3 11 422 11 422 2001 4 16 156 356 788 372 944 2002 5 12 541 84 450 96 992 2003 6 2 000 590 716 6 008 20 029 618 753 2004 7 12 312 41 048 53 360 2005 8 12 312 41 048 53 360 2006 9 - 12 361 41 213 53 574 2007 10 - 41 213 41 213 2008 Total 51 850 1 031 954 42 993 184 551 1 311 348 2009 The resulting ERR of 14% is a significant achievement in comparison to minimum acceptable ERR of 10 - 11% for this type of projects. - 33 - Discounted costs and benefits Discount rate of 9,5% Discount Year Costs Benefits coefficient Costs Benefits Net Present ° Present value Present value Value C B R C*R B*R B*R-C*R 1 4 744 - 1,0000 4 744 - - 4 744 2 4 987 - 0,9132 4 555 - - 4 555 3 11 422 - 0,8340 9 526 - - 9 526 4 372 944 - 0,7617 284 054 - - 284 054 5 96 992 - 0,6956 67 465 - - 67 465 6 618 753 200 254 0,6352 393 049 127 207 - 265 842 7 53 360 410 397 0,5801 30 955 238 078 207 123 8 53 360 410 397 0,5298 28 269 217 423 189 153 9 53 574 412 045 0,4838 25 920 199 357 173 437 10 41 213 1 224 898 0,4418 18 210 541 219 523 009 Total 1 311 348 2 657 989 866 747 1 323 283 456 536 Cost/Benefit rate 153% ROI = 53% ERR= 14% - 34 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 07/1996 9 Team Leader (1); Principal Operations Officer (1); Operations Officer (1); Economist (2); Research Assistant (1); Urban Development Specialist (1); Municipal Finance Specialist (2) Appraisal/Negotiation 03/25/1997 9 Team Leader (1); Principal Operations Officer (1); Operations Officer (1); Economist (2); Research Assistant (1); Urban Development Specialist (1); Municipal Finance Specialist (2) 09/30/1997 2 Team Leader (1); Consultant (1) Supervision 12/15/1998 5 Sr. Urban Planner (1); Financial S S Specialist (2); Urban Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1) 03/20/1999 2 Sr. Urban Planner (1); Urban S S Specialist (1); Financial Specialist (2) 05/16/1999 4 Team Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Financial Management Specialist (1); Sr. Operations O fficer (1) 10/29/1999 4 Team Leader (1) 12/21/2000 7 Urban Specialist (1); Public Finance Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Financial Management Specialist (1); Consultants (3) 07/13/2001 4 Team Leader (1); Urban S S Specialist (1); Sr. Procurement Specialist (1); Engineer consultant (1) 11/15/2001 4 Team Leader (1); Urban Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist; Engineer consultant (1) - 35 - 04/02/2002 5 Team Leader (1); Urban Specialist (1); Disbursement Analyst (1); Procurement Analyst (1) 06/28/2002 2 Engineer consultant (1); Environment Specialist (1) 10/24/2002 6 Team Leader (1); Urban S S Specialist (1); Financial Management Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Consultant (2) 05/16/2003 5 Team Leader (1); Urban Specialist (1); Program Assistant (1); Disbursement Analyst (1); Procurement Analyst (1) 07/05/2003 4 Team Leader (1); Urban S S Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Engineer consultant (1) 01/15/2004 6 Team Leader (1); Urban Specialist (1); Municipal Management Specialist (1); Public Finance Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1), Financial Management Specialist (1) 06/03/2004 6 Team Leader (1); Urban Specialist (1); Program Assistant (1); Municipal Finance Specialist (1); Procurement Analyst (1); Disbursement Officer (1) ICR 01/21/2005 7 Team Leader (1); Municipal S S Finance Specialist (1); Municipal Management Specialist (1); Financial Management Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Engineer Consultant (1). (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation Appraisal/Negotiation 142.0* 518,720* Supervision 177.3 647,548 ICR 10.4 27,328 Total 329.7 1,193,596 * Combined identification/preparation and appraisal/negotiation actual expenses - 36 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA - 37 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 38 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Bank's Back-to Office reports and aide-memoire Manuel de Procédures de l'ADM Catalogue des Equipements des Ouvrages Types des Communes Urbaines 1985/86-1995 Guide des Ratios Financiers des Communes Urbaines (ADM) - Edition Mai 1997 Guide des Ratios Financiers 2002-2003 Municipal Contract Model Trame de l'Audit Financier Trame de l'Audit Urbain Trame de Contrat de Ville Technical Audit Reports (December 2000, June 2002, June 2003, January 2005) Urban and Municipal Audits for the 67 municipalities Financial audits The future of African Cities Government's Completion Report dated May 12, 2005 - 39 - Additional Annex 8. Borrower's Summary Report on Project Completion INTRODUCTION A partir du 25 novembre 1990, le Sénégal passait à la deuxième phase de la réforme de son administration territoriale et locale par i) le transfert de pouvoirs accrus aux maires et aux présidents de conseil rural, ii) le retour des communes à statut spécial au droit commun et iii) la création de 11 nouvelles communes portant le nombre de ces dernières de 37 à 48. Avec cette réforme, était apparue la nécessité d'évaluer les besoins des communes en vue d'identifier les secteurs dans lesquels il était urgent de leur apporter une assistance C'est ainsi que le 27 mars 1991, le gouvernement saisissait la Banque Mondiale d'une esquisse de plan d'actions relatif à la préparation d'un nouveau projet urbain qui ciblait 18 communes, dont 9 chefs-lieux de régions et 9 chefs-lieux de département, toutes situées hors de la région du cap-vert. En touchant deux communes dans chacune des 9 régions ciblées (le Sénégal en comptait 10), le gouvernement visait l'impact, par effet d'entraînement, que le nouveau projet allait avoir sur les autres collectivités locales de même nature. Une telle proposition était en accord avec la décision qui avait été arrêtée et selon laquelle le prochain projet urbain devait intéresser d'autres villes que Dakar où l'essentiel des investissements était concentré. C'est donc, dans le cadre des objectifs ci-dessus visés, qu'une mission de l'IDA séjourna au Sénégal, du 22 au 26 avril 1991, pour procéder, avec les autorités, à l'identification de ce nouveau projet susceptible d'être financé par la Banque et axé sur le soutien au développement des centres urbains. Les modalités de préparation de ce projet furent étudiées lors de la mission de juin/juillet 1991.On peut donc dire que bien que les crédits de préparation de ce 4ème projet fussent inscrits depuis 1988 dans ceux du PGDU, les deux missions ci-dessus visées ainsi que le séminaire "Démocratie et développement" organisé par les maires du Sénégal et de France et financé par le crédit de préparation du 4ème projet urbain, lancèrent effectivement le processus de mise en place du nouveau projet, axé sur le soutien au développement de centres urbains et sur le renforcement de la décentralisation et dont les objectifs, sans qu'on pût, à l'époque, identifier les composantes avec précision, visaient en priorité i) l'efficacité économique des investissements ; ii) le renforcement du rôle et des responsabilités des collectivités locales ; iii) l'amélioration des gestions municipales et iv) les projets locaux de développement". Commencée donc effectivement en 1991, la préparation de ce nouveau projet s'est achevée en 1998 avec l'entrée en vigueur du crédit 3006-SE le 28 mai. A noter qu'on est passé de "projet d'Appui aux Collectivités Locales" à Projet d'Appui aux Communes" puis à "Programme d'Appui aux Communes". L'incubation, la maturation de ce programme a donc pris 7 ans. C'est l'actuel Chargé de projet qui, par les décisions qu'elle a prises, à son arrivée, au niveau de l'unité de préparation de ce programme, qui a donné le coup décisif à la préparation. Prévu pour n'intéresser que 18 communes, le programme devait finalement être ouvert à toutes les communes du Sénégal et aux communautés rurales. Ces modifications montrent combien les négociations ont été ardues avec une participation permanente et active des responsables des collectivités locales. Les négociations du crédit afférent à ce PDU4 eurent lieu à Washington du 22 septembre au 01 octobre 1997. Elles étaient conditionnées par i) la production, par l'Etat sénégalais, de 03 projets de contrats de ville issus d'audits urbain, organisationnel et financier établi sur la base d'un canevas type, devait déboucher sur un rapport bref (quelques pages) documenté par différents plans et tableaux qui, à terme, devaient, progressivement, constituer une base de données urbaines et financières pour l'ensemble des communes du Sénégal, ii) l'adoption de la déclaration de politique sectorielle et iii) la création de l'Agence de Développement Municipal. La délégation sénégalaise à ces négociations était conduite par le Directeur de la Coopération Economique et Financière (DCEF) et comprenait des représentants du Ministère chargé des Collectivités Locales, de l'Association des Maires du Sénégal (AMS), de l'Unité de Préparation du Programme (UPPAC) et le Directeur Général pressenti pour l'ADM. Les projets de contrats de ville examinés lors de ces négociations furent ceux de Diourbel, Louga et Kaffrine qui y furent finalisés. L'ADM fut créée le 08 juillet 1997. Après la réalisation, par l'emprunteur, des conditions y relatives (adoption des manuels de procédures de l'ADM et de L'AGETIP, signature des accords subsidiaires de l'ADM et de l'AGETIP le 29 décembre 1997, signature de la - 40 - convention ADM/AGETIP le 27 novembre 1997, dépôt initial de 400 millions de francs CFA au compte de l'ADM par prélèvement sur le milliard de francs CFA affecté à la première année du PAC le 11 décembre 1997, signature, le 26 décembre 1997, du décret n° 97.1270 portant fermeture du compte de crédit communal et affectation/transfert du reliquat à l'ADM, Signature des 3 contrats de ville de Diourbel, Kaffrine et Louga, respectivement le 25 novembre 1997, le 28 novembre 1997 et le 01 décembre 1997, établissement d'un système de gestion financière pour les opérations du projet, signature d'un contrat pluriannuel pour l'audit des comptes du projet), l'Accord de Crédit relatif à ce programme qui a été présenté au conseil d'administration de la Banque Mondiale le 19 novembre 1997, fut signé le 29 décembre 1997. Le crédit, quant à lui, fut mis en vigueur le 28 mai 1998. OBJECTIFS DU PAC Tel que signé, ce programme avait pour objectifs i) d'améliorer la gestion financière et l'administration des communes, ii) d'améliorer la programmation des investissements urbains prioritaires, iii) de rationaliser et de simplifier le financement des investissements urbains, et iv) d'améliorer les équipements de base de quelques communautés rurales. Finalement il devait appuyer la politique de décentralisation et viser à transférer progressivement aux communes les fonctions et la responsabilité de la mise en place et de l'entretien des services urbains et des infrastructures. Par le concept et le contenu, le « contrat de ville », introduit par ce programme, était une innovation majeure dans l'environnement urbain .Il en était de même des divers instruments (canevas des audits urbains, canevas de l'audit organisationnel et financier, modèle de contrat de ville, statuts, organigramme et manuel de procédures clarifiant les missions de l'agence et du maître d'ouvrage délégué, le catalogue des actions d'appui institutionnel, la convention type d'appui institutionnel, le catalogue des investissements, le guide des ratios financiers des communes, la convention de maîtrise d'ouvrage déléguée, etc...) utilisés et qui ont été imaginés et finalisés dans la période de sa préparation. COMPOSANTES DU PAC On distingue deux (2) composantes : 1°- La composante « Développement Institutionnel » des autorités centrales et locales comprenant i) un programme d'ajustement municipal (PAM), ii) des mesures d'accompagnement aux contrats de ville et visant à faciliter la mise en oeuvre des PAM, iii) des mesures d'appui institutionnel aux directions centrales (Direction de l'Urbanisme et de l'Architecture, Direction des Travaux Géographiques et Cartographiques, Direction du Trésor et de la Comptabilité Publique, Direction des Collectivités Locales, Direction Générale des Impôts et Domaines, etc...). 2°- La composante « Investissements Physiques » comprenant le financement de la construction, de la réhabilitation et de l'entretien des infrastructures urbaines suivantes : voirie, drainage, éclairage public, infrastructures sanitaires et scolaires, équipements communaux, équipements marchands, sous-projets environnementaux, restauration du patrimoine historique. FINANCEMENT DU PAC Le programme est financé par l'Etat du Sénégal grâce à l'appui de ses partenaires au développement. Ce financement d'environ 110 millions de dollars US est ainsi réparti : i) un crédit de l'IDA de 55,2 millions de DTS (75 millions de dollars US, soit 45 milliards de francs CFA) sur 40 ans dont 10 ans de différé, objet de l'accord de crédit 3006-SE signé le 29 décembre 1997. La première échéance semestrielle de ce crédit, entré en vigueur le 28 mai 1998, sera payée le 01 mai 2008 et la dernière le 01 novembre 20 ; ii) une subvention non remboursable de l'Agence Française de Développement de 50 millions de francs français (5 milliards de francs CFA) objet de la convention n° CSN 1143.02B du 09 juillet 1999 ; iii) une dotation de 5 milliards de l'Etat sénégalais sur 5 ans, à raison de 1 milliard, par an, tiré sur le FECl ; iii) le reliquat de 4,457 milliards de l'ex crédit communal rétrocédé à l'ADM après fermeture du crédit communal par décret n° 97-1270 du 26 décembre 1997 portant fermeture et transfert du reliquat à l'ADM ; iv) les 2,063 milliards prévus pour l'Autofinancement des communes et dont l'état de versement est analysé plus loin. - 41 - EXECUTION DU PAC A) LES OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTUELLES ET LEURS APPLICATIONS 1°- L'AGENCE DE DEVELOPPEMENT MUNICIPAL Structure créée pour gérer le programme, elle est une association à but non lucratif et à statut privé régie par la loi n° 68.08 du 26 mars portant code des obligations civiles et commerciales du Sénégal. Sa création était une des conditions de mise en vigueur du crédit. Ses membres fondateurs sont l'Etat du Sénégal, l'Association des Maires du Sénégal et le Directeur Général. Une Assemblée Générale, un Comité Technique et une Direction Générale en constituent les organes. La présidence de l'Assemblée générale a toujours été assurée par le Président de l'Association des Maires du Sénégal et son comité technique par le directeur des collectivités locales. L'Assemblée a tenu 13 séances. Les réunions du comité technique ont été moins régulières bien que ses membres, en cas de besoin, aient apporté tout leur appui à l'Agence. Trois directeurs généraux (dont un intérimaire) se sont succédés à la tête de l'ADM pendant la période d'exécution du PAC. Ces changements successifs n'eurent aucune influence sur le déroulement correct de l'exécution du programme du fait de l'expertise accumulé par le personnel dont une partie était issue du troisième projet urbain. Les missions de l'ADM, dont l'état de réalisation est décliné dans le bilan d'exécution des différentes composantes, sont définies par l'article 2 de ses statuts. 2°- LE MAÏTRE D'OUVRAGE DELEGUE (MOD) Seule l'AGETIP, qui a eu aussi en charge l'exécution du volet PAC3 destiné aux communautés rurales, en a joué le rôle au cours de l'exécution. Le MOD, lié à l'ADM par une convention, a, en charge, l'exécution et la supervision des programmes d'investissements prioritaires définis dans les contrats de ville. Ses compétences s'étendent aux procédures de passations de marchés et à l'exécution des travaux. Ce MOD a accumulé une longue expérience dans le domaine. Les audits techniques réalisés au cours de l'exécution du programme, ont permis d'identifier les problèmes et de permettre une excellente collaboration des deux agences matérialisée par des supervisions conjointes des travaux et des réunions de coordination régulières. 3°- L'ASSOCIATION DES MAIRES DU SENEGAL (AMS) A travers la convention ADM/ETAT/AMS, cette association s `était engagée à prendre des dispositions appropriées de sensibilisation et d'information de ses membres sur la nécessité de prendre certaines mesures de redressement et d'assainissement administratif et financier, à diffuser une information régulière et à bonne date à l'ensemble des maires et autres partenaires sur l'état d'avancement des contrats de ville en fonction des informations, à elle, fournies par l'ADM, à promouvoir une coopération entre ses membres afin de les aider à tenir leurs engagements vis-à vis de l'agence et des autres partenaires et à diligenter l'exécution des opérations envisagées dans le cadre des contrats de ville. Comme souligné plus haut, cette association, à travers ses représentants, a activement participé à la préparation de ce programme alors confiée à la direction de la planification du ministère de l'économie et des finances. Le haut niveau de représentation des maires du Sénégal à la préparation et aux négociations de ce programme par les maires de Dakar et président de l'AMS, de Kaffrine, de Louga et de Rufisque, des pionniers du processus de décentralisation au Sénégal, traduisait l'intérêt que ces derniers lui accordaient. Le gouvernement et la Banque avaient en face d'eux des interlocuteurs avisés. Ceci explique, du reste, les mutations intervenues dans les orientations initiales du programme. De plus, l'établissement des programmes d'investissements prioritaires a fait l'objet d'une concertation très étendue faisant intervenir tous les partenaires impliqués dans le processus et au nombre desquels i) le privé, à travers les consultants chargés de réaliser les audits, ii) les autorités municipales : maires et conseillers municipaux, iii) les populations bénéficiaires dont l'aval de la majorité était requis pour tout projet devant être inscrit dans un PIP, et qui, à travers leur créativité et leur enthousiasme, ont été mises à contribution pour leur permettre de participer activement aux différentes phases du processus et d'appréhender les enjeux de la politique de décentralisation et l'opportunité que représentait le programme pour la réalisation de leurs objectifs, et iv) les services centraux et déconcentrés de l'Etat) impliqués de près ou de loin dans la chose locale. - 42 - A l'évidence, ce programme minutieusement préparé, a permis aux équipes municipales d'avoir une parfaite conscience des enjeux de la décentralisation qui, comme elles l'ont comprise, n'est pas un fait acquis, mais bien un processus complexe et progressif dont l'accélération dépend largement des résultats et de la crédibilité des élus . Il a donné aux élus locaux souhaitant gagner le pari du développement local l'occasion de comprendre que le renforcement de leurs pouvoirs dans la gestion des affaires ne saurait être efficace sans un environnement institutionnel, économique et financier propice et de démontrer leur détermination à améliorer leurs performances en matière de gestion. Sans exagération, grâce aux mécanismes développés par ce programme, on assiste présentement à l'émergence de véritables opérations locales de développement fédérant l'action des différents partenaires et débouchant sur une amélioration concrète des conditions de vie urbaine par le développement des solidarités locales et la collaboration des opérateurs privés. En application des dispositions de la convention la liant à l'Etat et à l'ADM, cette association a apporté un soutien appréciable à l'ADM en véhiculant, au niveau de ses membres, toutes les informations relatives à une bonne exécution du programme (séminaires d'informations sur le PAC, mises en demeure relatives aux paiements des échéances de remboursement etc...). Son président a régulièrement reçu, souvent en présence de son staff, attentivement écouté et aidé, en liaison avec ses collègues du gouvernement, le Chargé de projet à résoudre les problèmes soulevés au cours de ses missions de supervision. Il reste cependant qu'une plus grande implication de l'AMS est souhaité dans le suivi de l'exécution des contrats de ville pour lequel son assistance est plus que nécessaire. L'Association des maires du Sénégal qui a reçu, pour observation, le projet de rapport d'achèvement, a i) émis le voeu de voir le taux du prêt ramené à 2,5 % et sa première échéance payée dans un délai de 2 ans après « la mise en exploitation des investissements et ii) estimé que « l'équipe actuelle de l'ADM, Président et Directeur Général compris, travaillent pour offrir aux communes les infrastructures et équipements dont elles ont besoin ». En conséquence, « il importe que cette équipe soit conservée et confortée ; tout changement inopportun entraînerait des retards indésirables pour la satisfaction de la demande sociale des citoyens ». 4°- LE GOUVERNEMENT l'ADM a bénéficié de l'appui de tous les membres du gouvernement impliqués de près ou de loin à l'exécution du PAC. En contrepartie leurs services ont bénéficié d'un appui conséquent de sa part. Une telle collaboration a permis d'instaurer un climat favorable au déroulement des programmes d'ajustement municipal et ayant permis l'atteinte des objectifs visés ( paiement des mensualités, conduite des études, mise à jour des données comptables des communes etc). Les apports des responsables de la Direction Générale du Trésor et de la Direction de la Coopération Economique et Financière ont été particulièrement appréciables. D'autre part, le Gouvernement a régulièrement versé sa contrepartie au projet dans les délais impartis, ce qui n'avait pas été le cas dans le programme précédent. De plus la réforme amorcée en 1996 fut renforcée par i) le décret n° 2002-171 du 21 février 2002 créant 7 nouvelles communes : Diamniadio, Mboro, Cayar, Ranérou, Rosso, Diawara et Niandane portant ainsi à 67 le nombre de communes urbaines, ii) la réforme, par la loi du 6 février 2004, de la fiscalité locale, inscrite comme engagement de l'Etat dans la lettre de politique sectorielle et dont la maturation a été longue pour la bonne et simple raison que tout système fiscal est conditionné par l'économie du pays, le degré de son développement, sa démographie et le tempérament de son peuple ; c'est pourquoi le rôle qui lui est dévolu est primordial et, selon qu'elle se révélera bien pensée ou au contraire mal orientée, donc paralysante, elle sera l'un des facteurs déterminants de l'avenir des communes dont elle sera grandement responsable, et iii) les deux décrets du 4 août 2004 portant création de deux structures intercommunales sur l'agglomération de Dakar : la CADAK (Communauté des Agglomérations de Dakar comprenant les villes de Dakar, Pikine, Guédiawaye) et la CAR (Communauté des Agglomérations de Rufisque comprenant la ville de Rufisque, les communes de Bargny, Sébikhotane, Diamniadio, ainsi que les communautés rurales de Sangalkam et de Yenne). Pour permettre la réalisation de tous les projets inscrits dans les PIP des 67 communes, le Gouvernement introduisait, le 1er juillet 2002, auprès de la Banque Mondiale comme chef de file, une requête (lettre n °05221/MEF/DCEF) pour l'extension du crédit 3006-SE jusqu'au 30 juin 2004. 5°- LA BANQUE MONDIALE L'implication conjointe de la Banque Mondiale et du Gouvernement sénégalais dans l'étude des projets urbains a commencé en 1972 par un premier projet « Parcelles Assainies ». Elle s'est poursuivie, en 1980, par une étude sur - 43 - le secteur urbain pour en identifier les principaux désordres, puis en 1983 par le Projet d'Assistance Technique pour la Réhabilitation et la Gestion Urbaine (PATRGU) clôturé en 1989. Le Projet de Gestion et de Développement Urbains (PGDU) mis en vigueur en 1988 et clôturé en 1997, devait prendre le relais. Les bons résultats de ces différentes interventions qui sont venus renforcer les efforts durables et importants déployés par le gouvernement sénégalais pour accompagner sa politique de décentralisation ont justifié la poursuite de cette expérience à travers le Programme d'Appui aux Communes ( PAC ) qui fait l'objet du présent rapport d'achèvement. La préparation et l'exécution de ce programme ont été supervisés par trois chargés de projet de la Banque Mondiale. C'est le dernier qui paracheva la préparation et conduisit, de façon très satisfaisante, la mise en oeuvre jusqu'à l'achèvement. 18 missions de supervision ont été effectuées au cours de l'exécution de ce programme, y compris l'atelier de lancement, pour 12 missions prévues, dont 5 à Washington et 4 en France. Les supervisions hors du Sénégal, et surtout à Washington, ont permis chaque fois aux responsables de l'ADM de prendre directement contact avec les services de la Banque Mondiale et de traiter sur place des dossiers importants. Au Sénégal, la mission, l'ADM et l'AGETIP ont, chaque fois, fait des visites de chantiers, évalué les résultats et mesuré les performances à travers des aide-mémoire faisant l'objet d'une large diffusion. 6°- L'AGENCE FRANCAISE DE DEVELOPPEMENT C'est par la convention n° CSN 1143.02 B du 09 juillet 1999 que cet organisme mettait à la disposition du Sénégal une subvention de 7 622 450,86 euros pour financer les dépenses hors taxes, impôts et droits de toutes autres natures relatifs aux PIP et mesures d'accompagnement des contrats de ville des communes de Saint-Louis, Guédiawaye et Tambacounda. L'accord de rétrocession de ce concours à l'ADM fut signé le 04 janvier 2000. De plus les coûts afférents aux audits urbains organisationnels et financiers, non compris dans le financement, furent pris en charge par le Fonds d'Etudes et de Préparation de Projets n°5 du même organisme et objet de la convention CFD n° 58269.00.545/OP CSN 1148.01. Non seulement l'AFD a participé à la préparation et à la négociation du crédit, mais elle a aussi assuré un suivi rapproché de l'exécution des PIP des communes destinataires de son financement (missions de supervision des responsables locaux de l'Agence ainsi que de ceux du siége à Paris, mission de suivi, séances de travail avec l'ADM, le maître d'ouvrage délégué, les entreprises et les maîtres d'oeuvre, réalisation d'un bilan du PAC, etc...). Pour cette agence, qui a tout naturellement inscrit ses interventions en matière de développement local dans le cadre défini par la décentralisation et des responsabilités transférées aux collectivités territoriales, comme elle a eu l'occasion de le rappeler lors de la revue à mi-parcours, les acteurs locaux bénéficiaires de ses interventions doivent participer à la programmation et à la mise en oeuvre des projets de développement les concernant. Une telle implication qu'elle a trouvé dans le PAC est, selon elle, le préalable à la pertinence des projets et à leur bonne adaptation aux besoins spécifiques des bénéficiaires finaux. Le représentant de l'AFD à cette revue ne disait-il pas que « le PAC, programme national, nous paraît d'une importance majeure pour le Sénégal et ceci à un double titre i) tout d'abord il permet la remise à niveau des principales infrastructures, avec pour effet attendu, de meilleures conditions de vie des populations ainsi qu'une plus grande efficacité de l'économie urbaine, ii) mais il vise aussi le renforcement des ressources des communes et de leur capacité de gestion. Et c'est bien là la condition d'un développement urbain durable, car, dans la situation actuelle, force est de constater que les communes ne sont pas toujours en mesure d'entretenir les infrastructures existantes, ni d'assurer la programmation et la mise en oeuvre de leur indispensable extension. Il est important que des progrès significatifs soient réalisés d'ici la fin de la première phase du PAC en matière d'ajustement des ressources des communes. Il est clair qu'il sera difficile, pour l'AFD, de justifier de nouvelles phases de financement au profit des communes urbaines si leurs capacités financières, garantie d'un impact durable des financements alloués, n'ont pas bénéficié d'une nette amélioration des rentrées fiscales ». Le fait que l'AFD participe au financement du prochain programme d'appui aux communes montre bien que l'ADM a réalisé les objectifs que lui avait assignés ce bailleur, ce dont le Gouvernement se félicite. L'évolution des finances, sur la période d'exécution du PAC, des communes financées est indiquée en annexe 1. - 44 - B) BILAN DE L'EXECUTION DU PROGRAMME I°- PAC1 et PAC2 Grâce à l'assistance de l'Etat, toutes les communes furent éligibles, même celles qui avaient cumulé des arriérés par rapport à l'ex crédit communal. Ainsi l'ADM a pu signer avec les 67 maires des contrats de ville dont 3 en 1997, 9 en 1998, 3 en 1999, 11 en 2000, 23 en 2001 et 18 en 2003. 19 communes ont été subventionnées à 100%. Les 48 autres ont, en plus du PAC1, bénéficié du PAC2 (guichet dont le financement, fonction de la capacité financière de la commune, est ainsi décomposé : 70% de subvention, 20% de crédit et 10 % d'autofinancement. 3 communes ont été financées par l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD), 57 par l'IDA et 7 sur fonds de contrepartie, ce qui fait que, globalement, grâce au PAC, l'ADM a pu mobiliser, au profit des 67 communes du Sénégal, 46 452 608 615 FCFA dont i) 40 866 419 389 FCFA de subvention (88 %) dont 2 668 695 223 FCFA de l'Etat ii) 3 724 136 150 FCFA de crédit (8 %) sur 12 ans au taux de 4,25 % et iii) 1 862 053 076 FCFA (4 %) d'autofinancement représentant la contrepartie des communes mobilisée sur 36 mois. 1°) INVESTISSEMENTS PHYSIQUES Sur ces 46 452 608 615 FCFA de financement, 37 160 883 588 FCFA (80 %) ont été affectés aux programmes d'investissements prioritaires (PIP) des 67 communes arrêtés à la suite d'audits urbains, organisationnels et financiers confiés à des cabinets privés tenant leur expertise, dans le domaine, de la formation, financée par l'ADM, dont ils avaient bénéficié au moment du lancement du PAC. Le programme d'investissements prioritaires (PIP) de chaque commune a été défini par la commune, elle-même, avec l'appui de l'ADM, sur la base des conclusions d'un audit urbain passant en revue la situation du site urbain, l'organisation de la ville, l'économie urbaine, la démographie et les besoins en espaces, la desserte par les infrastructures et les équipements. Chaque PIP, qui ne comprend que les types de projets éligibles (tels que définis dans le catalogue des investissements), ou des projets dont l'intérêt pour la commune se justifie, est dimensionné en fonction de sa capacité financière et a pour objectif majeur de permettre aux populations les plus démunies, à la suite d'une identification des déséquilibres en matière d'infrastructures et d'équipements dans les différents quartiers, d'accéder aux services urbains les plus essentiels, donc d'améliorer durablement leurs conditions de vie et de travail. L'impact de tels investissements se passe de commentaire quant on voit aujourd'hui les excellentes conditions actuelles de travail avec ces hôtels d'arrondissement et de ville flambant neufs, ces centres socio-culturels investis par les jeunes, ces centres et postes de santé de proximité, ces équipements marchands autrement gérés et pourvoyeurs de recettes substantielles, ces voiries reconstruites ou construites à la satisfaction des populations comme celles de Ngor qui font la fierté de la région. Sans compter la rénovation à l'identique qui apparaissait comme une véritable gageure, du poste de santé, du centre socio-culturel et de l'hôtel de ville de ce sanctuaire de la conscience collective mondiale qu'est, et restera, l'île de Gorée (voir état d'exécution et niveau de réalisation en annexes 2 et 3). Outre le programme d'investissements prioritaires (PIP) et le programme d'ajustement municipal (PAM), le contrat de ville intègre une composante programme d'entretien prioritaire (PEP). Ce programme, défini par la commune avec l'appui de l'ADM, sur la base des conclusions des audits, comprend les priorités de la commune en matière d'entretien des équipements et infrastructures existantes ou à réaliser. En raison du caractère récurrent de l'entretien et de ses exigences en termes de pérennité, il est financé par la commune, sur ressources propres, pour un montant au moins égal à 3 % des recettes ordinaires. L'ADM et l'IDA ont accordé une importance particulière à cette composante qui fait l'objet d'un suivi régulier et dont le respect de l'exécution a même été érigé comme une des conditions d'accès au prochain programme. A titre d'exemple, pour l'année 2004, sur les 67 communes du Sénégal, 61 avaient fourni à l'ADM les informations relatives aux prévisions et à l'exécution de leurs PEP. Pour des recettes ordinaires globales de 37 537 892 873 FCFA prévues, 3 637 991 479 FCFA étaient inscrits au titre des PEP (9,69 %) et 2 779 117 039 FCFA réellement exécutés (7,40 %). Le PAC, de ce point de vue, a donc apporté une innovation majeure dans la gestion de nos collectivités locales (voir état d'exécution PEP 2004 et prévisions 2005 en annexe 4). De plus, 4 892 072 452 FCFA devaient être consacrés aux études, au suivi et au contrôle. Les investissements physiques devaient donc coûter globalement 42 062 956 040 FCFA. Au 31 décembre 2004, 421 projets étaient engagés au titre des PIP pour 37,071 milliards de francs CFA (99,76 %). 403 de ces projets étaient terminés et réceptionnés pour 35,43 milliards. Les 18 projets qui étaient en cours - 45 - d'exécution concernaient essentiellement les contrats de ville signés les derniers dont en particulier ceux des communes créées en 2002. A la même date, les décaissements relatifs aux PIP et à la maîtrise d'oeuvre avaient atteint 38,77 milliards dont 34,3 milliards (97,4 %) sur financement IDA. La liste des réalisations du PAC est décrite en annexes 2 et 3 du présent document. Cette exécution physique des projets ne s'est pas faite sans problèmes ; En effet le programme a souvent été confronté à des problèmes de disponibilité de sites devant accueillir les projets. C'est pourquoi, comme cela a été recommandé, une attention particulière sera désormais accordée à la disponibilité réelle, à l'accès, à l'emplacement et à la situation cadastrale des sites. De plus des insuffisances ont été notées dans la maîtrise d'oeuvre à propos de laquelle des mesures ont été prises : évaluation et classement des maîtres d'oeuvre en quatre catégories (excellent, bon, médiocre et insuffisant) de manière à préserver la qualité des travaux. Des problèmes de mise en service des équipements réalisés se sont aussi posés et sont en voie d `être solutionnés. 2°) DEVELOPPEMENT INSTITUTIONNEL a) Recouvrements L'ADM a bénéficié de l'appui sans réserve des différents ministres chargés des collectivités locales et de la décentralisation, des services compétents du Ministère des Finances (la Direction Générale du Trésor en particulier) et du Président de l'Association des Maires du Sénégal ; ce qui a permis le succès de cette opération étroitement suivie par les partenaires au développement. Les arriérés accumulés ne l'ont été, sauf pour quelques cas, que par le fait de la suspension des engagements en fin d'année. En règle générale, ils sont apurés dès le vote des budgets. Au 31 décembre 2004, date de la clôture du programme, la situation se présentait ainsi : i) au titre de l'autofinancement et du remboursement des prêts, sur 3 059 201 425 FCFA attendus, l'ADM a reçu 2 991 367 776 FCFA ; soit un taux de recouvrement de 97,78 % et des arriérés de 67 833 649 FCFA. Le montant recouvré inclut les anticipations de certaines communes (soit 42 120 549 FCFA). Les arriérés réels se montent donc à 109 954 198 FCFA (soit 3,59 %) et stricto-sensus, le taux de recouvrement est donc de 96,41 % sur le global ; ii) au titre du remboursement du crédit uniquement, sur 1 197 137 649 attendus, l'ADM a reçu, dans ses comptes, 1 138 166 998 FCFA , soit des arriérés de 58 970 651 FCFA et un taux de recouvrement de 95,07 %. Ces arriérés concernent 18 communes ; iii) au titre de l'autofinancement seulement, sur 1 862 063 776 FCFA attendus des communes, l'ADM a recouvré 1 853 200 778 FCFA ; soit des arriérés de 8 862 998 FCFA et un taux de recouvrement de 99,52 %. Les arriérés concernent quatre (4) communes seulement ayant de 1 à 4 mois de retard ; iv) au titre de l'ex-crédit communal, sur 803 045 754 FCFA attendus des communes concernées, l'ADM a recouvré 725 703 516 FCFA, soit 90 37 %. Les arriérés se montent à 77 342 238 FCFA (9,63 %). Si des communes ont eu, effectivement des difficultés à honorer leurs engagements en ce qui concerne le remboursement du crédit, ce taux de 97,78 % de remboursement indiqué ci-dessus montre bien que l'ADM a su gérer avec les maires et l'administration, certes non sans difficultés, cet objectif du programme visant à inscrire dans la gestion municipale celle d'un « service de la dette ». Le risque de ne pas voir les communes respecter leurs engagements, comme stipulé dans le rapport d'évaluation, ne s'est donc pas vérifié Le PAC aura donc permis aux communes de faire l'apprentissage du recours progressif à l'emprunt pour financer une partie de leurs investissements. Ce recours à l'emprunt constitue, à n'en pas douter, un outil indispensable au développement local, une des solutions pouvant permettre à nos collectivités locales de démultiplier leurs capacités financières et de réaliser des équipements générateurs de recettes b) Adressage Les communes de Diourbel, Kaolack, Louga, Thiès et Ziguinchor ont été entièrement adressées pour un montant global de 236 901 042 FCFA dont 198 490 488 FCFA pour le matériel et 38 410 554 FCFA pour la pose. Les plans d'adressage et index de voies de ces communes leur ont été livrés. Pour les communes de Saint-Louis, Tambacounda et Guédiawaye, les opérations d'adressage sont terminées. Les plans d'adressage et index de voies de ces communes ont été livrés. L'ADM a aussi engagé l'adressage des autres villes de l'agglomération de Dakar, à savoir Dakar, Pikine et Rufisque, dans lesquelles, seules les opérations de codification, la cartographie et l'index des voies sont prévus dans le présent PAC (le reste devant être réalisé dans le prochain PAC) pour un coût global, hors pose, qui démarrera avant la fin de l'année, de 510 079 340 FCFA dont 81 862 000 FCFA pour les opérations exécutées par - 46 - les consultants et 428 217 340 FCFA pour le matériel composé de 34270 plaques de rues et 444 poteaux (annexe 5). Cette opération, couplée avec l'étude sur la fiscalité locale, devrait contribuer à améliorer considérablement la mobilisation des ressources des communes concernées. c) Formation 1741 agents communaux ont été formés dans le cadre du PAC. Les modules et les coûts de formation sont indiqués en annexe 6. d) Appui logistique et informatique Il concerne un appui apporté aux communes et directions centrales en i) matériels informatiques et logiciels spécifiques et en ii) matériels et mobiliers de bureau dont le détail est donné en annexe 7. De plus, le PAC a contribué à i) l'aide à la programmation à travers les audits urbains, organisationnel et financier mis en oeuvre dans une étroite collaboration avec les autorités locales, les services déconcentrés, les organisations sociales, ii)au renforcement de la maîtrise d'ouvrage relative à l'exécution des investissements et à l'entretien, ceci par le biais de l'assistance apportée aux communes dans la prise en charge de ces fonctions au cours de l'exécution des contrats de ville iv), au renforcement de la maîtrise d'oeuvre institutionnelle au titre des équipements marchands pour leur mise en service effective sur des bases de gestion efficiente v), au diagnostic de la gestion du FECL et à la définition de procédures appropriées pour son fonctionnement. 3°) PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT MUNICIPAL (PAM) Il découle des constats et recommandations issus de l'audit organisationnel et financier. Grâce aux différentes mesures qu'il préconise et visant la mobilisation des ressources, l'amélioration de la gestion et l'assainissement des finances, les communes ont bien compris que le développement ne pourra se faire qu'avec la mobilisation de tous les partenaires et la définition précise d'un minimum d'organisation. La nécessité de procéder à un effort d'ajustement de leur gestion pour dégager le maximum de ressources pour démultiplier leurs capacités d'investissement et mettre à la disposition des populations plus de services sociaux de base a aussi été bien comprise. C'est ainsi que, sur la période d'exécution du PAC, les recettes totales des communes du Sénégal ont évolué de 18 milliards de FCFA en 1996 à 35 milliards en 2003, soit une évolution moyenne annuelle de près de 12 % sur la période. La capacité d'épargne des communes a été donc reconstituée et les communes ont présenté, entre 1998 et 2003, un excédent sur le fonctionnement de 18,8 % sur les trois dernières années. L'année 2003 a été marquée par une forte progression de l'effort d'investissement sur ressources propres des communes comme préconisé dans les programmes d'ajustement municipaux inclus dans les contrats de ville signés avec les communes. II°- PAC3 Le PAC3 destiné aux communautés rurales pour un financement de 15 millions de dollars (11 milliards de francs CFA) s'est exécuté suivant une approche de banque de projets regroupant l'ensemble des requêtes des communautés rurales éligibles et approuvés au préalable par le Gouvernement du Sénégal et l'IDA ; au total, deux banques de projets ont été réalisés pour un montant total de 10,5 milliards de francs CFA. Le PAC3 a permis de toucher une population de 3 500 000 habitants pour une population rurale estimée à 5 250 000 ; ce qui représente un taux de 67%. L'investissement per capita est de 3000 FCFA. 310 projets ont été exécutés dans 212 communautés rurales sur 320, soit un taux de couverture de 66,25 %. Le montant décaissé est de 10,4 milliards de FCFA (99 %) et la répartition par type de projets est la suivante : Equipements administratifs (hôtels communautaires) 42 %, Equipements socio-collectifs (foyers des jeunes, foyers de la femme, terrains multi-fonctionnels) 11 %, Equipements scolaires (écoles et cases des tout-petits) 12 %, Equipements marchands (marchés, souks et cantines) 5 %, Eclairage public 2 %, Equipements sanitaires (case de santé) 1 %. Les réalisations par région, département et communauté rurale sont listées en annexe 8. - 47 - III°- DECAISSEMENTS A) Sur crédit IDA L'ADM a décaissé 53 561 286,16 DTS sur un crédit IDA de 55 200 000 DTS, soit 97,03 %. Il faut y ajouter le montant des DRF non encore remboursés et qui se chiffre à 991 832 477 FCFA. (1 313 511.42 DTS si on considère le taux utilisé pour la DRF n° 100 du 22 décembre 2004). Cela ferait donc 54 874 797,58 DTS ou 99,41 %. Il est, du reste, probable qu'avec les régularisations en cours, le crédit soit entièrement décaissé. B) Sur subvention AFD Sur une subvention de 5 000 000 000 FCFA, l'ADM a déjà décaissé 3 944 372 907 FCFA, soit 78, 89%. Comme pour le crédit IDA, cette subvention sera entièrement décaissé d'ici juin 2005, date de clôture décidée. C) Sur fonds de contrepartie Sur 5 010 526 241 FCFA du FECL, 3 442 061 176 FCFA étaient décaissés au 31 décembre 2004. Toutefois, avec les engagements, le solde ne devrait être que de 160 840 118 FCFA ; ce qui induirait un taux de décaissement de 96,79 %. Les tableaux en annexe 9 donnent la situation détaillée de ces décaissements. (Les annexes mentionnées ci-dessus font part du rapport intégral de l'Emprunteur.) - 48 - Former 16° 15° 14° 13° 12° Spanish ALGERIA S E N E G A L Sahara M A U R I T A N I A S É N É G A L Ocean U R B A N D E V E L O P M E N T A N D MAURITANIA Podor Senegal D E C E N T R A L I Z AT I O N P R O G R A M Atlantic M A L I Dagana Ndioum P R O G R A M M E D ' A P P U I A U X Dakar R. SENEGAL Richard- NIGER C O M M U N E S THE Toll GAMBIA Gollere BURKINA NIGERIA SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS GUINEA- FASO Lac de GUINEA Guier CITES ET VILLES BISSAU BENIN GHANA TOGO DEPARTMENT CAPITALS CÔTE D'IVOIRE 16° CAPITALES DES DÉPARTEMENTS Saint-Louis Thilogne 17° Vallée NATIONAL CAPITAL CAPITALE D'ETAT d u Matam DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES Louga LIMITES DES DÉPARTEMENTS Ferlo Ourossogui INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES Kanel FRONTIERES INTERNATIONALES Kébémèr Dahra Linguère Waounde Semme Mékhé Vallée 15° 15° Guediawaye Tivaouane du Bakel Ferlo Thiès Pikine Pout Mbacké Khombole Bambey Vallée Sebikhotane d u M b o u n DAKAR Diourbel Senegal Rufisque Nguekhokh R. Bargny Thiadiaye Gossas Mbour Fatick S a l o u m Gandiaye Guinguenéo Dioffior Kaolack Kahone Joal-Fadiouth 14° Saloum Foundiougne Kaffrine 14° Passi Ndoffane Koungheul Sokone A t l a n t i c M A L I Nioro du Rip Tambacounda BANJUL R. R. O c e a n T H E Gambia Gambia G A M B I A Vélingara 13° 13° Kolda Marsassoum Bignona Sédhiou Thionk-Essyl Casamance Goudomp Kédougou Ziguinchor Oussouye G U I N E A - B I S S A U G U I N E A IBRD JUNE 12° This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. 12° 0 50 100 The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any 28026 1997 KILOMETERS judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 17° 16° 15° 14° 12°