Water Papers Water Papers March 2012 71748 REACHING ACROSS THE WATERS Facing the Risks of Cooperation in International Waters Ashok Subramanian, Bridget Brown, and Aaron Wolf Water Papers are published to communicate the results of The World Bank’s work to the development com- munity with the least possible delay. The typescript manuscript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formally edited texts. Some sources cited in the paper may be informal documents that are not readily available. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and do not nec- essarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522-2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org. REACHING ACROSS THE WATERS Facing the Risks of Cooperation in International Waters Ashok Subramanian, Bridget Brown, and Aaron Wolf © The World Bank, March 2012 photo credit: Leonard Abrams Table of Contents Foreword III Acknowledgments V Executive Summary VII 1. Introduction and Approach 1 1.1 Justification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Analytical Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.5 Cases and Tipping Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.6 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Application of Framework 9 2.1 Introduction of the Cases and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2 Analysis of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3 Eastern Nile, 1999–2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.4 Ganges, 1994–1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.5 Niger, 1998–2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.6 Syr Darya, 1996–2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.7 Zambezi, 2000–2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.8 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3. Understanding Risk 27 3.1 The Five Categories of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.2 Core versus Operational Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4. Enhancing Cooperation 31 4.1 Reducing Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2 Building Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.3 Various Paths to Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 I 5. Pointers For Partners 41 5.1 Specific Partner Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.2 Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5.3 Systematic, Iterative Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 6. Conclusion: Lessons Learned 49 6.1 On Risk and Risk Reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6.2 On Opportunity and Opportunity Enhancement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6.3 On Supporting Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 References 51 Annex 1. Global Streams of Influence 55 Figures Figure 1. Risks and Opportunities to Cooperation Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII Figure 2. Risks and Opportunities to Cooperation Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Figure 3. The Eastern Nile River basin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Figure 4. The Ganges River basin.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Figure 5. The Niger River basin.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Figure 6. The Syr Darya River basin.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Figure 7. The Zambezi River basin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Figure 8. Summary of Key Observations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Figure 9. Matching Risk Reduction Strategies to Risks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 10. Figure Paths to Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 11. Figure Timeline of Suggested Partner Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 12. Figure Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 A1. Timeline of Events along the Three Streams of Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Figure Tables Table 1. Basin Geographies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Table 2. Characteristics of Basin Water Use and Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Table 3. Selected Countries and Tipping Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Table 4. Illustrative Risk Reduction Strategies by Basin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Table 5. Illustrative Risk Reduction Support Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Table A1. Legal Influences and Associated Contributions, 1911–2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Table A2. Environmental Influences and Associated Contributions, 1965–2002. . . . . . . . . . 60 Table A3. IWRM Influences and Associated Contributions, 1991–2009.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 II Foreword W ater can be a source of conflict, ment in the Indus to Mekong, the Baltic Sea and but can also serve the goals of Danube, the Aral Sea, the Guarani Aquifer, and to cooperation. Indeed, in the past, the Senegal, Niger and the Nile. cooperation over shared waters has averted The economic benefits of river basin coopera- many approaching conflicts. But there is no tion are many. Yet, there have been constraints guarantee that the future will be an extension to countries seeking cooperation deals and chal- of the past. Indeed, recent analyses of global lenges facing development partners engaged in and regional security and conflicts have alerted shared river basins. Recent reviews have high- us to new and emerging threats to a coopera- lighted the need for a better understanding of tive future. the political economy of cooperation, both on the The World Bank and partners have recognized part of countries and partners. So, I am delighted the values of supporting countries’ desires for that a dedicated team of experienced staff, to- cooperative action in shared international waters, gether with expert advisors, has put together an beginning with the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. evidence-based and applications-oriented volume Interest and involvement in international waters on cooperation in international waters. I am cer- has only grown since. There were 123 Bank- tain that the perspectives on political risks and funded projects with activities related to inter- opportunities and the authors’ advice on various national waterways between 1997 and 2007, 40 risk reduction measures will benefit the leaders of which were financed by GEF grants. Close to and teams to vigorously promote cooperation 100 projects were ongoing in 2010. The amounts and prevent potential conflicts. committed to transboundary projects were $6.2 billion in mostly IDA and IBRD funding and Julia Bucknall $273.5 million in GEF grants. The tradition of sup- Manager port has extended over the years—from engage- Water Anchor III Acknowledgments A cknowledging our debt is like making Saltiel, Winston Yu, and Ivan Zavadsky. They of- the acceptance speech at the Oscars. fered advice, comments, and inputs via email, at The minutes are ticking by, and you the concept and final review meetings, and over are not sure if you have thanked everyone who phone, lunches and coffees. The final version is helped you get there. And then, the words never the better for it. Jeff Lecksell extended a thor- quite convey the depth of appreciation of the ough assessment of the maps to ensure compli- many contributions. But we will try. Please stop ance. The usual caveat applies: all of the above the music. are to be credited for the strengths, while the JB Collier in Washington participated at key authors have to account for the final product and points in the study with helpful advice and carried any gaps. the administrative burdens. Contributions, includ- We learned a lot from the many discussions and ing writing and discussions, from the case study debates with partners at various water events authors were invaluable to our analysis. For this across the globe, at Trust Fund meetings, and work, we would like to sincerely thank Barbara through one-on-one exchanges. Their commit- Miller, Eileen Burke and J.B. Collier (Eastern ment to collaboration over water and among ex- Nile); Claudia Sadoff and Brendan Galipeau ternal development partners was inspiring. (Ganges); Aminou Tassiou, Audace Ndayizeye, Julia Bucknall was a generous host as manager J.B. Collier, and Amal Talbi (Niger); Daryl Fields, of the Water Anchor where Ashok was located Simon Croxton, Martha Jarosewich-Holder, Alfred and she showed keen interest at each stage of Diebold, and Frank Schrader (Syr Darya); and development. The Water Anchor was a delight- Marcus Wishart, Thomas Bernauer, and Lucas ful setting to carry out the analysis and writing. Beck (Zambezi). Their interest in taking the The Bank’s Institutional Staff Resources Program study beyond analysis to operational action was enabled Ashok to spend a significant part of truly gratifying. his time during 2011 on the study and deserves Lada Turbina and Thembi Kumapley, in the much appreciation. Africa Region of the World Bank provided Funding support from the Water Partnership just the right support at the right time for the Program (WPP) made the study possible. teleconferences and contracts. Guy Alaerts, Diego Rodriguez, Matthijs Schuring, and Peggy Daryl Fields, Barbara Miller, Claudia Sadoff and Johnston of the WPP helped translate our inter- Susanne Schmeier served as peer reviewers and ests into action through carefully vetted proposals provided excellent feedback. Other colleagues and queries. and friends extended enormous support in their Inger Andersen, now Regional Vice President, own ways: Len Abrams, Herbert Acquay, Sameer Middle East and North Africa of the Bank, was an Ahmed, Vahid Alavian, Thomas Bernauer, Louise inspiration and mentor. Her interest and expertise Croneborg, Charles Di Leva, Ousmane Dione, in international waters brought the formative idea Inez Dombrowsky, Al Duda, Nina Eejima, Jakob to fruition, and for that she deserves special rec- Granit, David Grey, Nagarajarao Harshdeep, ognition. Her questions, based on rich experience Michael Jacobsen, Vijay Jagannathan, Saroj Jha, in regional cooperation and intellectual curiosity, Torkil Jonch Clausen, Jonathan Kamkwalala, Karin served to sharpen the analysis and writing. Kemper, Christina Leb, Stephen Lintner, Shelley To Uma, big thanks for unfailing support and McMillan, Halla Quaddumi, Jamal Saghir, Gustavo cheering from the sidelines all the way. V Executive Summary Introduction their knowledge and advancing their action with respect to regional cooperation. T his study reviews the experience of coop- eration in five international river basins, Perceived Risk focusing on the perceptions of risks and opportunities by decision makers in countries If a country cannot find a way to compensate for responding to a specific prospect of cooperation. or control risk, it may choose not to enter into a For each basin, the analysis centered on “tipping cooperative agreement. Hesitation, or even resis- points,� or periods in time when policymakers in tance, observed on the part of countries regard- the countries involved were faced with a critical ing cooperation with other riparian countries can decision concerning water cooperation. The use be better understood by evaluating perceived of historical events helped avoid the risk that the risks to their engagement. We define perceived analyses would impact current negotiations or risk for a given country as: the perception that controversies. River basins selected for the analy- an act of cooperation will expose the country to sis were: Eastern Nile, Ganges, Niger, Syr Darya, harm, will jeopardize something of value to the and Zambezi. country, or will threaten the political future of This study was inspired, in part, by the intensi- individual policymakers. fied involvement of the World Bank and develop- There appear to be five general categories of ment partners in shared international waters, re- risk perceived by decision makers (Box 1). These sulting in a growing interest to better understand risk categories were developed through a review the political economy surrounding regional co- of literature on international negotiation and operation deals over water. While the associated cooperation. In each of the cases, the analysis economic benefits and costs of cooperation are focused on risks associated with these five broad generally well analyzed, the perceptions of categories, examining how these risks influenced decision makers regarding political risks and decision makers and how the risks affected the opportunities have been much less explored. outcomes of negotiations. Responding to this knowledge gap, this study These risks indeed exerted an influence on co- looks at the political dimension of cooperation operation decisions. There were commonalities over international waters, beginning with per- among the countries, yet each case differed in ceived risks. Perceived risks are actually a core both the context surrounding the risks and also in consideration for decision makers in a country. the type of dominant risks. In some cases, co-ri- Figure 1 illustrates how countries considering parians perceived similar risks, and in other cases cooperation might incorporate risk, and opportu- the risks for each country were very different. In nity, into their decision making. In the upper right addition, sovereignty and equity appeared to be quadrant, countries see more opportunity than core risks, in that they were deep-seated, and risk and more benefit than cost. tended to resurface, even after deals were made This study is primarily aimed at external de- and benefits delivered. velopment partners. Countries and individuals ■■ In experiencing the Capacity and Knowledge engaged in international waters issues may also risk, countries feared that they would be at find this study and reflections helpful in enhancing a disadvantage. This risk manifested in two major ways: VII Figure 1. Risks and Opportunities to Cooperation Framework Countries may Countries consider a deal most likely to but likely Opportunity make a deal request more bene�ts Opportunity Enhancement Cost Bene�t Risk Reduction Countries Countries may may pursue consider a deal, unilateral but need to address development Risk risk & opportunity Notes: Countries considering cooperation assess their positions on the x-axis in terms of net ben- efits (benefits less costs) and on the y-axis in terms of “net opportunities� (opportunities less risks). Benefits and costs are economic, while opportunities and risks are political. Country “positions� in the framework may determine the likelihood of cooperation in that given situation, as described in the notes in the quadrant. Risk reduction and opportunity enhancement (gray arrows) will ideally shift country positions north in the framework. • Countries perceived they had less negoti- a decision maker sensing the danger of in- ating capacity than their co-riparians. trusion into the country’s authority to make • Countries perceived they did not have sovereign decisions. It refers to both of adequate or accurate information about the following: the basin. • The desire to have control over national ■■ Decision makers generally experienced the development goals and related develop- Accountability and Voice risk in regard to: ment of resources and infrastructure. • Fear that co-riparians, third parties, or • The right to make decsions independently. the regional institution may not deliv- ■■ Countries were acutely concerned with the er benefits. risk of Equity and Access. Namely: • Concern that his/her country’s interests • Fairness in any deal, regarding speci- would not be adequately considered in fied quantity (or quality) of water, benefit joint decision making processes. flows, or project costs. • Perception of a high probability that the • Entitlement to use the river. Some coun- regional institutional arrangement would tries viewed entitlement as the right to not result in the flow of benefits. continuing with historic uses; others as ■■ To a greater or lesser extent, all of the cases gaining access to a river running through reflected the significant risk of Sovereignty (or originating in) its territory; and yet and Autonomy. At its core, this risk is about others as attaining benefits in proportion VIII and even sign an agreement. The cases reflected BOX 1. FIVE CATEGORIES OF RISK seven broad categories of risk reduction (Box 2): Capacity and Knowledge Political opportunity was also a critical factor in Confidence in ability to negotiate a fair deal; having enhancing cooperation in many cases. At times, enough and the correct information and knowledge the perception of resulting national and regional to do so. political gains even trumped residual risk. In other words, with sufficient political opportunity, some Accountability and Voice countries were willing to cooperate even with Deliverability of benefits by the regional entity and some risks remaining. Examples of such opportu- co-riparians, often related to trust; having a say in nities from our case studies included: shifts in re- decision-making in the governing structures of the gional politics (favoring solidarity over unilateral- regional entity. ism); changes in national leadership that brought in champions willing to take new initiatives on Sovereignty and Autonomy cooperation; and the possibility that cooperation Ability to act in the best interest of the country with- over water between countries could signal or lead out constraints; making decisions independently. to cooperation on other issues in regional and Equity and Access global fora. Fairness of (relative) benefits to country, including Third parties, such as the Bank and develop- timing of benefits and costs and obtaining/ retaining ment partners, could play important roles in sup- fair access to river. porting countries with risk reduction. Examples of such assistance included: engaging with coun- Stability and Support tries at an appropriate scale (e.g. entire basin, Longevity potential of the agreement; in-country sup- sub-basin, country level); conducting detailed port of the agreement, including ratification likelihood. risk assessments; designing risk reduction strate- gies, including financing and guarantees to tar- get dominant risks, and periodically reassessing the risk situation, employing new strategies as to a country’s relative size in (or percent needed. The role of partners with respect to po- contribution to) the basin. litical opportunity is less clear, and is an area for ■■ The risk of Stability and Support had direct further research. Meanwhile, partners are encour- national and personal implications. It was an aged to (a) stay abreast of regional geopolitics in important consideration for all countries, but order to be ready if and when opportunities are particularly so in countries with diversified presented, and (b) continue to implement appro- and powerful stakeholders. It applied to both priate risk reduction strategies so that risks have of the following: already been dealt with to the extent possible, if • The implementability of an agreement and when opportunities are presented. due to the presence or absence of key stakeholder support. Key Messages • A decision-maker’s positive or nega- tive public image. We found this risk This study offers several key messages for those to be quite an important consideration engaged in work on cooperation in international for all countries, but particularly so in waters. In conclusion: countries with diversified and power- 1. Risks are less studied, but critical in deci- ful stakeholders. sion making. Several previous studies have focused on the economic benefits and costs Enhancing Cooperation to cooperation over water. Though some more recent work has explored expanded Measures to address these risks were critical in benefits that can result from cooperation, moving to cooperation. Risk reduction was an less attention has been paid to the role of important process in many cases before countries political economy in decision-making and would progress to negotiated outcomes. In some country perception of risks. Thus, this study cases, reduced risks provided sufficient motivation addresses an important gap in knowledge on for countries to reconsider the cooperation deal, the topic of international waters. IX BOX 2. SEVEN CATEGORIES OF RISK REDUCTION Knowledge and Skill Expansion Training and studies to meet gaps in capacity and knowledge, and support for developing new skills. Institutional Design Tailoring the institutional arrangement to be a “fit for purpose� cooperative arrangement for dialogue and action among riparians. Agreement Design Tailoring the agreement to the preferences of political leaders involved in terms of its formality, scope, goals, obligations, etc. Program Design Shaping the program to address country interests and goals—sectoral linkages, long- vs. short-term benefits, review and monitoring, etc. Financing and/or Guarantee Meeting financing needs and gaps identified by countries, including third party guarantee of financial obligations. Facilitation (Third Party) Unbiased, third party assistance in dialogues among riparians, including clarifications and interpretations. Decision Legitimacy Use of consultation and discussion forums and other avenues for ensuring widespread domestic and regional support of decisions. 2. Countries are not unitary actors. Instead, gional programs, institutional arrangements, several stakeholders are likely involved. and agreements that will ensure success. Sometimes, use of the term “country For partners, it is imperative to invest the decision-making� can imply that a country necessary time and resources to produce the is a unitary actor, thus losing the diversity of most appropriate solution possible for the interests within a country. It is important to situation at hand. Fit for purpose remedies recognize in studies and engagement in in- rather than “model� river basin solutions ternational waters that dynamics within each are needed. country influence the likelihood of coopera- 5. Risks will most likely require a diversity of tion. Stakeholder voices and the national dis- interventions. It will typically take more than course on cooperation are critical elements a single action to reduce a given risk. A cre- in the decision-making process. ative and diverse approach is recommended, 3. Individual decision makers matter. usually requiring a mix of interventions. This Champions are key. At times, it is the vision, need is a sound rationale for coordination of will, charisma, or personal politics of a cer- partner actions, since no one party can ex- tain decision maker in a country that deter- tend support in multiple fronts. mines whether or not a deal is made. Hence 6. Opportunities can outweigh residual risks. motives of individual decision makers matter. Even if risks remain, countries may cooperate By extension, the same can be said of part- if certain political opportunities or gains be- ners and teams as they set out to facilitate come apparent. Opportunity is, therefore, and support the cooperation process. a powerful factor in determining the out- 4. Solutions must be devised for situations. come of a cooperation offer. This is an area These solutions should match country for further study. needs. There is no blueprint or one-size- 7. Politics are difficult to predict, so anticipa- fits-all approach, especially in matters of re- tion is critical. Laying the foundation for X cooperation by reducing risks will prepare facilitation, and confidence building, often countries for deals. For partners engaging before formal negotiations even begin. countries in cooperation, staying abreast of 10. Deals are dynamic. Once a deal is reached, regional geopolitics is important, so when the situation does not become static. the time is ripe for cooperation, action can Deals can be fragile, and fall apart or be taken. evolve and grow into stronger and more 8. National, regional, and global events affect sustainable arrangements. Accordingly, opportunity. Changes at any scale can cre- periodic assessments are needed to reflect ate or change opportunity. a proper diagnosis of current realities, 9. Long-term time commitment is needed. and respond with appropriate “solutions Cooperation takes several years of planning, for situations�. XI 1. Introduction and Approach 1.1 Justification (and partner) engagement in international waters. The World Bank Group Implementation Progress T his study reviews the experience of co- Report of the Water Resources Sector Strategy operation in selected international river (commonly called the Mid Cycle Review) high- basins1 and during selected time periods lighted many of these constraints, and observed: in those basins. The review is from a country per- “Understanding the political economy dimensions spective and focuses on the countries’ perceived of transboundary engagement through upstream risks and opportunities in engaging in regional analytical work, and technical assistance are criti- cooperation deals in response to the prospects cal in reducing the risk profile of investment proj- for cooperation. It is primarily aimed at external ects (World Bank, 2010b: 20).� This study, focused development partners who promote regional on international rivers, responds to this concern, public goods (river basin institutions and agree- by drawing on the lessons of international waters ments) and support cooperative activities and in- from the perspectives of countries facing risks in vestments in international waters. We also believe engaging in cooperation and attempts to identify that countries and individuals engaged in interna- potential risk reduction strategies. tional waters issues will find this study and reflec- tions helpful in enhancing their knowledge and 1.2 Background advancing their action with respect to regional cooperation. The specific purpose of the study is 1.2.1 Water Conflict and Cooperation to alert teams engaged in promoting cooperation Water management is, by definition, conflict man- in international waters to the need for a careful agement. Water, unlike other scarce, consumable risk analysis and for the formulation of a risk re- resources, is used to fuel all parts of society, from duction strategy to help countries move toward biologies to economies to aesthetics and spiri- cooperation in international waters. tual practice. Moreover, it fluctuates—sometimes The World Bank has a keen interest in this topic. wildly—in space and time, its management is usu- Together with partners, the Bank has been active ally fragmented, and it is often subject to strongly in international waters for decades, since its in- held beliefs and values and vaguely defined and/ volvement in the Indus Waters Treaty (1960). This or varying legal principles. It stands to reason engagement has intensified since the 1993 Water then that often water cannot be managed for a Resources Management Policy (World Bank, single purpose. Water management has multiple 1993) that advocated a basin approach to water objectives, and is based on reconciling co-existing management and the Water Resources Sector and competing interests. Within a nation, these Strategy (World Bank, 2003) that emphasized a interests include domestic and industrial users, revitalization of water resources development 1. According to the 1997 UN Convention on the Non- along with improved management. The Bank’s navigable Uses of International Watercourse, an international support has been extended to international riv- watercourse is a water system that flows to a common ter- ers, lakes, aquifers, and regional seas. Teams have minus, various parts of which are situated in different States. In this study, we use a variety of terms interchangeably with gained valuable experience from such work in en- international watercourse, such as international river basin, gaging countries and partners. transboundary waters, shared waters and international waters. Notwithstanding the benefits of river basin co- All of these terms, for the purposes of this study, refer to rivers (surface water). operation, there are several constraints to Bank 1 agriculturalists, hydropower generators, tourism six of the world’s 276 international basins have and recreation beneficiaries, and environmental- no treaty provisions covering them whatsoever ists—any two of which may be regularly at odds. (TFDD, 2011). Moreover, many multilateral basins The complexity of finding mutually acceptable are governed by bilateral treaties­ —only one- solutions increases as more stakeholders are third of multilateral basins are entirely covered by involved. Add international boundaries, and the treaty provisions, and most of those are bilateral difficulty grows substantially yet again. (TFDD, 2011)—precluding the integrated basin This situation has led some to proclaim that wa- management advocated by water policy experts. ter, not oil, is the next battleground.2 Such state- ments distort the current reality in which small- 1.2.2 Country Drivers scale disputes persist but widespread conflicts over It is clear why cooperation is seen as beneficial in water have rarely occurred, if ever. Experience and the abstract, as it can lead to the highly desirable research have found that where institutional capac- goals of sustainable development and integrated ity for dialogue and the management of disputes water resources management at the level of the is present, conflict is less likely.3 Additionally, joint river basin. But the critical question is: what drives development of a shared river has been shown to countries to enter into a deal? increase the sustainability of the resource and help Internal Drivers. Developing countries face a the needs and interests of all countries involved. set of critical development challenges, opportuni- Cooperation over international waters is thus seen ties and constraints. In response, they formulate as an important step in both securing regional plans to achieve their broad development goals peace and enhancing sustainable development. such as poverty alleviation and increased compet- Cooperation over shared waters also promises itiveness. In turn, these goals call for strategies of other substantial benefits, such as: (i) access to increasing incomes, improving access, expanding external markets, leading to economies of scale markets and building human and social capital.5 (e.g., lower marginal cost of unit power produc- A central means of accomplishing these goals tion in the case of hydropower); (ii) possibility and strategies is achieving food, water and en- of building on the comparative advantage of ergy security. countries, (e.g. in irrigation, hydropower); (iii) im- The pressing need for achieving food, water proved management and coordinated operation and energy security goals drives countries to of water infrastructure to accommodate multipur- search for solutions through water development. pose uses of water; (iv) possibility of jointly fac- Countries typically begin with national plans, at ing common external threats, (e.g., climate risks, times relying on knowledge and financing as- malaria); and (v) optimal location of infrastructure, sistance from development partners, and may (e.g. leading to potential savings in evaporation then follow with regional plans and partnerships. losses). A growing literature documents the many Regional production centers of food and energy benefits of cooperative action, despite the sub- as well as regional markets are seen as attractive stantial costs that often accompany the benefits.4 means of meeting national goals, and are often a Yet, countries are slow to cooperate. If ben- lower cost option for countries. Regional power efits to cooperation are so attractive, as many pools are projected to reduce electricity costs by studies and the economic analyses seem to sug- $2 billion a year by tapping into cost-effective gest, substantial regional cooperation over water sources of energy in Africa (World Bank, 2010a: should be expected. But that is not the current reality, at least not in terms of formal (e.g. with an 5 For example, see: 1) Asia Times. June 23, 2011: “Laos wants to pull itself out of least-developed country status by agreement in place) cooperation. We find basins 2020;� and 2) AUCME, November 5, 2010: Ministers reaf- all over the world where formal cooperation be- firm “the need for Africa to foster sub-regional, regional and tween co-riparians is lacking or even obstructed continental cooperation with a view to achieving sustainable development and efficient use of energy resources for the by one party or another. One hundred and sixty- benefit of our peoples,� urge “multilateral and bilateral financ- ing institutions to create special counters and new financing 2 See for example Bulloch & Darwish (1993) and De Villiers mechanisms for regional dimension projects,� decide to “sign (1999). a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation between the Conference of African Ministers in charge of Energy, the 3 Giordano et al., 2005 found that the presence of an institu- Conference of Ministers responsible for Water Resources and tional mechanism for dialogue and cooperation dampens the the Conference of Ministers of the Environment with a view to escalation of a dispute into a full-blown conflict. promoting cross-border river basins development and regional 4 See for example Alam et al., 2009; Yu, 2008 electric energy production and exchange networks.� 2 143). Many of the studies on regional integration Management (IWRM) in West Africa in the 1990 and cooperation present these options as invalu- and 2000 decades. On the other hand, the South able ways of responding to pressing domestic de- Asian Association for Regional Cooperation mands. In particular, hydropower, agriculture and (SAARC) has probably had less of an influence in tourism are seen as optimal means to boost the the area of shared waters on South Asian political economy. Pursuing such ambitious development and water leaders. goals often requires countries to harness shared Global trends may also exert influence, resulting water resources, with possible upstream and in a rich virtual library of ideas and experience in downstream implications for co-riparians. international waters that countries and their part- A sense of a nation’s rights also pervades the ners contemplating cooperation can draw from. thinking on water management and cooperation Annex 1 provides a detailed discussion of such in international waters. As a result, countries stake global influences. claims on shared waters based on their respective Regional and global geopolitics provide similar sense of rights. A number of factors come into stimulus for (or against) cooperation. The “Iron play in a country’s sense of its rights. Commonly Curtain� was a deterrent against earlier coopera- held beliefs about the river flowing through one’s tive action between Western and Eastern Europe country shape how people perceive rights, as do on the Danube. The dissolution of the Soviet legacies of use and management under legal and Union and the rapidly unfolding regional and glob- constitutional instruments. Centuries of culture and al events presented unique challenges to newly in- tradition related to water also often instill values dependent Aral Sea countries with implications for that then influence the perception of rights. The cooperation on several fronts, including in interna- use or non-use of water could raise many ques- tional waters. Good neighborliness added weight tions about rights. In this context, the debate has to the agreements over water eventually signed moved away from a “unilateralist� view of water by the U.S. with Mexico and Canada respectively. use, exemplified by the Harmon Doctrine (i.e. “ab- Climate risks could pose opportunities and chal- solute sovereignty�) of 1895 to a shared view of lenges for countries and nudge them towards water use and cooperative management of water, cooperation. But the evidence for the climate risk- illustrated by the 1997 International Watercourse cooperation linkage is not so forthright. In a re- Convention’s principles of “reasonable and equi- cent study, De Stefano et al. (2010) looked at the table use� and “no significant harm.�6 relationship between basins likely to experience External drivers. Externally, both regional and change in variability due to climate change and global influences may offer guidance and in- the robustness of the basin institutions’ capacity sights. Regional influences may include regional for dealing with variability. The study found sig- institutions, shared culture and ethnicity, regional nificant gaps in institutional capacities to deal with geopolitics, and regional thinking on norms, con- variability, especially in South America and Asia, cepts, and best practices in sustainable develop- gaps that will only grow through increased vari- ment. These influences will vary from basin to ba- ability projected due to climate change. sin. For example, southern African countries have drawn on the regional dialogue promoted by the 1.2.3 Critical Country Considerations: Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Risks and Opportunities and the series of regional protocols, including Individual policymakers in a country making deci- on Shared Watercourses. The SADC Protocol on sions about cooperation operate within the his- Shared Watercourses (2000) has been used as a torical context of their countries, fed by a set of framework for specific basin level cooperation external and internal drivers of decision-making, agreements within the Southern Africa region. as described in the previous section. Before them In turn, the SADC Protocol drew inspiration is a possibility of a deal for cooperation with a from the International Watercourses Convention set of benefits. At this point, these policy makers (1997). Similarly, the Economic Community of must choose, on behalf of their countries, wheth- West African States (ECOWAS) has provided re- er or not to cooperate. How do they make this gional leadership on Integrated Water Resources decision? They do not consider benefits alone, as there are many cases of countries not joining 6 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigable other riparians in negotiating a basin agreement Uses of International Watercourses, UN (1997) (e.g. Nile) or only selectively participating as an 3 observer (e.g. Mekong). It appears that objective ing cooperation can be better understood by or “paper� benefits (as projected in the many evaluating perceived risks to engagement. We studies on regional cooperation or integration) define perceived risk for a given country as: the are only the starting point. In other words, ben- perception that an act of cooperation will expose efits are necessary, but they are not sufficient to the country to harm, will jeopardize something of induce cooperative action. value to the country, or will threaten the political A plausible explanation for the lapse in cooper- future of individual policymakers. Throughout this ation is that countries are thinking not only about paper, when we refer to “risk,� we are referring accessing benefits, but also about exposure to to “perceived risk� as defined here. In assessing risk. Bilder (1981: 11) writes, “[the] decision to en- such risk, country representatives ask rational ter into an international agreement… will involve questions, often a series of “what if� reflections. considerations of risk…� Countries may therefore We propose five general categories of risk discount benefits, based on perceived risks of en- perceived by decision makers, identified through gagement in cooperative solutions. The level and literature review.7 The five risk types are briefly type of risks will likely vary depending on both defined in Box 3. For each of our case studies, we the scope of the agreement and the hydropoliti- explored if and how each of these five risks influ- cal context of the basin in question. One can also enced the decision makers’ engagement or non- exaggerate a real risk or even perceive a risk that engagement in cooperation. Thus, our first objec- does not exist, as perception is influenced by tive for this study was to determine the presence many confounding factors, including political en- and importance of perceived risks as they influ- vironment, historical experiences, personal goals, ence cooperation over shared waters. and salience of the issue at hand. In addition each policymaker may differ not only in how they 1.3.2 Reducing Risk and Building perceive risks but also in how readily they will dis- Opportunity count those risks (Bilder, 1981). Regardless, per- If a country cannot find a way to compensate ceived risks appear to lie at the core of decisions for or control these risks, it may choose not to by countries to cooperate or not to cooperate on enter into a cooperative agreement, and instead issues of shared waters. either retain the status quo or pursue its own In addition to reduced risk, policymakers may interests to the extent possible without an agree- also need to see positive political gains from ment (LeMarquand, 1977). On the other hand, cooperation, referred to here as “political oppor- if the risk is reduced or removed, the potential tunity.� Even if risk is reduced to close to zero, it for cooperation may increase (Bilder, 1981). Risk does not follow that policymakers will choose to reduction is therefore of particular interest, espe- cooperate, just as investments do not necessarily cially for partners engaged with countries in the make sense as costs approach zero. One actually process of considering basin cooperation. wants to see positive gains—both economic and Policymakers may also need to see political op- political. In the mid 1980s, when the riparians of portunity before making the decision to cooper- the Danube River came together, there was the ate. We define perceived political opportunity for possibility of improved water quality monitoring a given country as: the perception that an act of (and subsequent improvement), but also the op- cooperation will enhance the country’s wellbeing, portunity for the long sequestered western and will augment something of value to the country, eastern European countries to intensify exchange or will improve the political future of individu- at least at the technical level. Likewise, the co- al policymakers. operative stance of Aral Sea riparians in the early For each of our case studies, we analyzed the 1990s has been attributed to seizing political actions of countries and third parties that led to opportunities for investments in environmental reduced risk and, consequently, enhanced coop- remediation (Weinthal, 2002). eration. We also identified solutions when deci- sion makers moved toward cooperation based on 1.3 Analytical Framework 7 See for example, Alam et al., 2009; Bernauer and Kalb- 1.3.1 Assessing Risk henn, 2010; Birch et al., 2006; Browder, 2000; Elhance, 1999; Fischhendler and Feitelson, 2003; Henwood and Funke, 2002; In this study, we suggest that the hesitation, or Linnerooth, 1990; Lowi, 1993; Trevin and Day, 1990; and Tur- even resistance, observed of countries regard- ton, 2003. 4 BOX 3. FIVE CATEGORIES OF RISK Capacity and Knowledge Confidence in ability to negotiate a fair deal; having enough and the correct information and knowledge to do so. Accountability and Voice Deliverability of benefits by the regional entity and co-riparians, often related to trust; having a say in decision- making in the governing structures of the regional entity. Sovereignty and Autonomy Ability to act in the best interest of the country without constraints; making decisions independently. Equity and Access Fairness of (relative) benefits to country, including timing of benefits and costs and obtaining/ retaining fair access to river. Stability and Support Longevity potential of agreement; in-country support of agreement, including ratification likelihood. political opportunity. The second objective of this the benefits and opportunities relative to costs study was thus to identify actions and strategies and risks, the greater the likelihood of sustained that serve to reduce risks and/or build opportu- cooperation. Figure 2 illustrates how perceptions nity (both serving to enhance cooperation). of political risks and opportunities (y-axis) might influence country decisions over cooperation, and 1.3.3 Role of Third Parties how risk reduction and opportunity enhancement The World Bank has been involved in coopera- (gray arrows) might change those perceptions tion over international waters since the 1960 over time. The northeast quadrant depicts the Indus Treaty. The Bank, various UN agencies, and balance of costs/benefits and risks/opportunities other development partners have played pivotal most conducive to cooperation. Ideally, reducing roles in IW cooperation globally over the past risks and seizing opportunities when presented several decades. Demand for their involvement will move countries from their initial positions into has intensified recently, in the wake of the 1997 the northeast quadrant. Watercourse Convention and global discussions around Integrated Water Resources Management. 1.4 Assumptions A central point of interest in this study is therefore the question of how third parties can help foster Net Economic Benefits and Costs. We assume cooperation. Gaining a better understanding of in this study that countries enter into a given suitable partner interventions will help ensure dialogue/action with at least a preliminary un- effective means of external support for coopera- derstanding of the potential net benefits. In any tion. The third and final objective of this study case, the prospect of cooperation is accompanied was therefore to determine appropriate roles for by an inventory of potential net economic ben- third parties in assessing risk, reducing risk, and efits (x-axis). Our analysis begins at this time, building opportunity. when dialogue has begun and countries know what net benefits to expect. Behind this may lie 1.3.4 A New Way of Looking at several years of foundation building, including a Cooperation Decisions range of basin and country analyses and consul- We hypothesize that, for each country, the pos- tations. Eventually, countries have a glimpse of sibilities of cooperation and the discussion of benefits to be gained. Costs are less mentioned, benefits trigger an analysis of benefits and costs but countries appear to enter into negotiations as well as a consideration of risks and opportuni- with a general calculation of how costs will reduce ties. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the higher their net benefits. 5 There is considerable literature on the econom- set of events for each case for which documenta- ic and development benefits of regional collabo- tion and policy actors were readily accessible. We ration, such that the arguments in favor are practi- refer to the events as “tipping points,� because cally self-evident. Benefits to cooperation (x axis) they represent periods in time when policymak- have been emphasized in studies and discussions ers in the countries involved were faced with a related to IWRM, regional integration, regional critical decision concerning water cooperation. public goods, and the like. The point of this We focused on tipping points in the recent past, paper is not to add to this well-documented rather than the present, largely because there was aspect, but rather to focus on other areas that a greater likelihood of documentation available are less documented. We thus focus on the compared to an ongoing cooperation deal. The (y) axis in Figure 2—perceived political risks use of historical events also helped avoid the risk and opportunities. that our analyses would impact current negotia- tions or controversies. Even though we did not 1.5 Cases and Tipping Points use current events as case studies, our hope was that teams engaging with countries at the pres- Our starting premise is that policy leaders make ent time would use the approach proposed in this specific decisions (to cooperate or not over water) report for the design of effective strategies for at specific points in time. Thus, our focus is on a their current challenges. Figure 2. Risks and Opportunities to Cooperation Framework Countries may Countries consider a deal most likely to but likely Opportunity make a deal request more bene�ts Opportunity Enhancement Cost Bene�t Risk Reduction Countries Countries may may pursue consider a deal, unilateral but need to address development Risk risk & opportunity Notes: Countries considering cooperation assess their positions on the x-axis in terms of net benefits (benefits less costs) and on the y-axis in terms of “net opportunities� (opportunities less risks). Benefits and costs are economic, while opportunities and risks are political. These “positions� in the framework may determine the likelihood of cooperation in that given situ- ation, as described in the colored text. Risk reduction and opportunity enhancement (gray ar- rows) will ideally shift country positions north in the framework. (Likewise, reducing economic costs and/or increasing economic benefits will shift countries east, not the focus of this particu- lar analysis). 6 Five case studies were used for this analysis. out for each country in line with the overall objec- For each case, we reviewed a range of docu- tives of the study. ments, including available academic publications and grey literature, and scanned relevant media 1.6 Objectives websites for press releases. We also conducted interviews with key decision-makers wherever To recap, this paper addresses the following ob- possible. Each case study involved an assessment jectives through the analysis of five case studies: of the context of the tipping point, as well as an 1. Determine the presence and importance of analysis of risks and opportunities (described be- perceived risks as they influence cooperation low) perceived by two or three countries in each over shared waters. basin. For the purpose of this study, we focused 2. Identify actions and strategies that serve to on a subset of the riparians, rather than all of the reduce risks and/or build opportunity. countries involved in a river basin, in order to pro- 3. Determine appropriate roles for third parties vide a detailed assessment of country perspec- in assessing risk, reducing risk, and build- tives. The analysis of risk perceptions was carried ing opportunity. 7 2. Application of Framework 2.1 Introduction of the Cases range of cases to develop our understanding and Context of cooperation. Table 1 provides an overview of some basic T he five river basins selected for this study geographic characteristics of each basin. It is clear are: Eastern Nile, Ganges, Niger, Syr that these river basins cover a substantial drain- Darya and Zambezi. Cooperation mecha- age area in the aggregate, and the rivers travel nisms in these river basins are at varying stages extensive distances through many countries. of evolution. Some basins have basin-wide and Each case study basin has faced (and still rather formalized regional governance institu- faces) formidable challenges related to develop- tions (Niger, Syr Darya); others have more limited ment, politics, the environment, and climate. or informal basin-wide governance institutions Cooperation has been seen as one of the means (Eastern Nile, Ganges, Zambezi). The number of by which countries could take to help them meet riparian countries in the case study basins ranges their respective challenges. Table 2 highlights from four to ten. For the countries involved, some of these challenges of, and opportunities these rivers are a source of actual or potential arising from, cooperation. livelihood, growth and wellbeing. They are also Each of the basins under review has also expe- a source of destruction through periodic floods rienced a unique trajectory of movement toward and droughts. Thus the basins offer a broad cooperation. In each basin, either an agreement Table 1. Basin Geographies Basin Riparian Countries Area (km2) Average Flow Length Pop. Eastern Nile Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 2, 695, 300 84 BCM (at 1450 km 152 million South Sudan, Sudan Aswan) Ganges Bangladesh, China, India, 1, 080, 000 500 BCM (at 2500 km 400 million Nepal Hardinge Bridge) Niger Benin, Burkina Faso, 1, 500, 000 27 BCM (at 4100 km 100 million Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Niamey) Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria Syr Darya Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 400, 000 37 BCM 3019 km 20 million Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Zambezi Angola, Botswana, Malawi, 1, 370, 000 130 BCM (at 2700 km 30 million Mozambique, Namibia, outlet) Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe Source: World Bank internal reports; Food and Agriculture Organization Notes: Average flow data are estimates and are meant to give an idea of the volume of water involved. Of course, the average flow estimate masks seasonal differences within the year. There may be differences among the countries on estimates for average flow and these are to be expected in any international waters context. 9 Table 2. Characteristics of Basin Water Use and Development Development Basin Water Issues Major Uses Opportunities Challenges Eastern Population growth, Sustainable development Hydropower, irrigation, Hydropower, irrigation, Nile poverty, watershed deg- municipal, industrial, evaporation manage- radation, infrastructure tourism ment, sediment control needs, environmental and climate management (e.g. floods) Ganges Population growth, Floods, environmental Municipal, industrial, irri- Irrigation, flood man- unemployment, manage- degradation, water pollu- gation, social/cultural agement, hydropower, ment of low flow seasons, tion, declining fisheries navigation surface/groundwater management Niger Poverty, population Scarcity, climate variabil- Agriculture (irrigation Irrigation, hydropower, growth, urbanization and ity, floods and droughts and livestock), navigation navigation other land-use changes, low level technical capacity Syr Darya Institutional difficulties Reduced flows due to Irrigation, hydropower, Hydropower, environ- (collapse of USSR) heavy development, municipal, industrial mental flows flooding, Zambezi Poverty, low capacity Floods, droughts Municipal, industrial, irri- Irrigation, hydropower, gation, hydropower wetlands, tourism, transport Source: World Bank internal reports. has been signed (bilateral or multilateral), or some here as a “tipping point,� when the policymakers or all of the countries have participated in a basin involved were faced with the decision on regional (or sub-basin) institution or program.8 cooperation over water. Table 3 shows the cases Our interest in this study is to better understand and associated tipping points. factors that advance or retard basin cooperation. However, we need to first learn why policymakers 2.2 Analysis of Cases in basin countries decide to cooperate or not co- operate. Thus each of our cases focuses on a spe- The following five sections present our analysis cific period of time in the recent past, referred to of risk perceptions and risk reduction strate- gies based on the Risks and Opportunities to 8 The most up-to date agreements pertaining to coopera- Cooperation Framework. For each case we tion for the study basins can be found by searching the TFDD (2011) Treaty Database @ http://www.transboundarywaters. provide a brief background, which includes a orst.edu/database/interfreshtreatdata.html Table 3. Selected Countries and Tipping Points Basin Selected Countries Time Period Tipping Point(s) Eastern Nile Egypt and Ethiopia 1999–2004 Launch of the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) Ganges Bangladesh and India 1994–1998 Signing of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty Niger Mali, Niger, and Nigeria 1998–2004 Revitalization of the Niger Basin Authority (NBA), originally established in 1980 Syr Darya Kyrgyz Republic and 1996–2002 Signing of the Framework Agreement on Water and Energy Tajikistan Zambezi Botswana, Zambia, and 2000–2004 Signing of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission Agreement Zimbabwe (ZAMCOM) 10 description of historical context and the tipping Nile basin. The Hydromet (1961), Undugu (1983) point, followed by a discussion of the risks, op- and the Tecconile (1993) initiatives were the most portunities, and strategies employed to move the prominent. Some, but not all of the riparians par- countries toward cooperation. We focus on the ticipated in these initiatives. In 1997, the Council perspectives of two or three of the basin coun- of Ministers of Water Affairs of nine of the ten tries in the context of the cooperation offer. riparian countries began to explore the possibility In these cases, perceptions of risks were not ex- of a regional strategic plan. The minutes estab- plicitly recorded by the participating countries at lishing the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) were signed the time of decision making. We have inferred the by the nine countries in 1999 to advance such perceptions from documents and discussions that a plan. 11 A major component of the NBI was its we were able to access. Thus we had to rely on Subsidiary Action Programs, of which one was es- our professional judgment to interpret a statement tablished for the Eastern Nile, and another for the or decision in a particular way. Wherever possible, Nile Equatorial Lakes region. we have tried to confirm our judgment with opin- The launch of the Eastern Nile Subsidiary ions in available documents. We also consulted Action Program (ENSAP) was a major step for- with the decision makers themselves where they ward for the Eastern Nile in the cooperation over were accessible and with experts familiar with the water. Involving Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan (pre- situation around the tipping points studied. 9 independence of South Sudan), its purpose was to foster development in the sub-basin, with an 2.3 Eastern Nile, 1999–200410 emphasis on investments. In 2000, the Ministers of Water Affairs approved a strategy paper. This 2.3.1 Background Strategy emphasized action with a focus on in- The Eastern Nile is a sub-basin of the Nile, and vestment projects that incorporated “equitable includes the five riparians of Egypt, Eritrea, use, no significant harm and win-win solutions.� Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan (see Figure Indeed, the Strategy emphasized that “moving 3). Our analysis here focuses on the perspec- from planning to action� was key to cooperation� tives of Egypt and Ethiopia during the launch and “the challenge of today.� and first round of investments of the Eastern Nile The final portfolio for the first round of the Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) during 1999 Eastern Nile investment program, called the and 2004. “Integrated Development of the Eastern Nile,� Recent differences among countries in the included a set of projects in irrigation, power Eastern Nile basin date back several decades, interconnection, watershed management, model- when Egypt and Sudan, then under the rule of a ing, flood preparedness, and some sub-regional British-Egyptian Condominium, began to irrigate studies.12 Expected benefits to each country dif- cotton crops. In 1929, the two countries signed the Nile Waters Agreement regarding allocation 11 The 10 original riparians were: Burundi, Democratic of flows. Sudan erected the Sennar Dam in 1956, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Eritrea opted to participate in after which Egypt, eager to proceed with its plans the NBI as an Observer. Today, there are 11 riparian countries for the Aswan High Dam, advanced the Nile in the Nile Basin with the inauguration of South Sudan as a new country in July 2011. Waters Treaty with Sudan in 1959. A formula for 12 The investment program included seven sub-projects: sharing the waters at Aswan was agreed by the Eastern Nile Planning Model; Baro-Akobo and Multi-Purpose two countries and they set up a bilateral mecha- Water Resources Development; Flood Preparedness and Early nism for dialogue and monitoring. Meanwhile, Warning; Irrigation and Drainage Development; Watershed Management; and Hydropower Development & Regional Ethiopia, not party to this agreement, asserted its Power Trade, including: i) Ethiopia-Sudan Transmission Inter- right to develop the Nile waters within its territory connection; ii) Eastern Nile Regional Power Trade Study. Of (Wolf and Newton, 2008). these, the Eastern Nile Planning Model; Flood Preparedness and Early Warning; the first round of irrigation investments; Several attempts were made by the countries Ethiopia-Sudan Transmission Interconnection; and Watershed and by third parties in the recent past to facilitate Management projects were to be fast-tracked. The Ministers agreed that the fast track projects were to be included for dialogue among all the riparians of the greater presentation to donors for immediate support, while the other three projects, largely of a study and program identification 9 Attribution is difficult given the political sensitivities nature were to be considered for longer term development: around the issues of cooperation decisions. Regional Power Trade; Regional Irrigation and Drainage; the 10 The Eastern Nile section was prepared in collaboration Baro-Akobo sub-basin and Multi-Purpose Water Resources with Barbara Miller, Eileen Burke and J.B. Collier. Development. 11 Figure 3. The Eastern Nile River basin. Source: the World Bank, 2012. 12 fered, but were both economic and political in ments for the sub-basin first time through ENSAP. nature. Overall economic benefits included the The projects it had promoted emphasized such potential to increase food production, energy investments in irrigation hydropower, and water- production and access, flood and sediment man- shed management. Egypt hoped for improved agement, water augmentation, and access to cooperative planning and possibilities for aug- information/data. Overall political gains centered menting water supply—hence its championing of on the potential for establishing a platform for planning models and specific river system stud- exchange and communication and a better mu- ies in the sub-basin. The additional knowledge tual understanding of national development plans would allow Egypt to plan accordingly for its and their regional implications. Once agreed future. It was also an opportunity to demonstrate upon, the three countries together presented the “good neighborliness.� initial portfolio of investments to donor partners When the NBI was launched in 1999 as a tran- in June 2001. The package included activities in a sitory mechanism, it was essentially an interim mix of water and other sectors and linked through framework of cooperation. ENSAP was to be the integrated program. Specific water allocations the forum through which the on-the-ground ac- were not discussed, nor were they a part of this tion occurred. Both countries approached the round of investments. As the projects reflected a launch of ENSAP with some trepidation. Despite reconciliation of the interests of the three coun- political opportunities associated with coopera- tries, negotiations spanned a significant period of tion, several risks remained. The promise of gains time and were quite stressful. from cooperation was uncertain for Egypt, yet To advance the implementation of the ENSAP this was a new cooperative opportunity that, agenda, the Eastern Nile Ministers of Water for the first time, included Ethiopia. For its part, Affairs jointly established the Eastern Nile Ethiopia looked forward to significant economic Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) in 2002. A benefits. Yet, political risks—opening up its de- number of difficulties arose in defining the roles velopment plans for outsider scrutiny—remained and responsibilities of this Office, and in agreeing high for Ethiopia, causing it to approach ENSAP on its governance, staffing and rules of proce- with caution. dure. For example, country delegates to ENTRO The national discourse in the countries (in- in 2002 were unsure of how to represent their cluding views of the diaspora) was oriented to countries’ best interests while also making deci- maintaining the staus quo with respect to water sions beneficial to the regional organization that rights.14 This made it difficult to generate options was to prepare and deliver projects. This severely for cooperative management of the river and to constrained action and the achievement of the debate these options in public. The end of the se- key ENSAP objective of “moving from planning ries of Nile 2002 conferences did not help; the an- to action.� The Ministers took decisive action by nual events had provided a platform for civil soci- closely monitoring ENSAP projects and restruc- ety organizations for candid debates on the future turing ENTRO. By 2004, the initial difficulties were of the Nile. Moreover, both Egypt and Ethiopia addressed and ENTRO was transformed into a also had to contend with official in-countrty stake- fully professional institution.13 holders—Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Water and Energy—whose views had to be reconciled by the 2.3.2 Analysis highest authorities in the respective countries. Prior to 1999, both Egypt and Ethiopia saw high The absence of vigorous public debates and the risks and high costs to cooperating regionally. The many actors involved in national policy making initial NBI process and the Eastern Nile Program were a challenge to those engaged in the coop- offered the chance to plan together and approach erative endeavors. global partners for funding. With mounting need Both Egypt and Ethiopia appear to have moved for economic and social development, Ethiopia towards cooperation in part through risk reduc- saw the possibility of accessing significant invest- tion measures. To start with, the NBI was more of a platform than a formal agreement, such as 13 A competitively recruited Chief Executive from the region a Treaty. Joining the NBI did not prejudice the in 2004 was evidence of the move to professionalization. countries’ long-held positions with respect to wa- Political interests were, of course, critical but were managed by the respective Ministers and Heads of State alongside the renewal of ENTRO. 14 Various media reports. 13 ter rights and water sharing. Though perceived tices in procurement, and financial and human risks differed between the countries, many of the resource management were an assurance that the risk reduction measures were able to target a va- expectations from ENSAP were likely to be met.16 riety of risks. The risk reduction measures helped Egypt and Egypt’s view was that it held water rights based Ethiopia in pursuing ENSAP for the first round of on historic use. Meanwhile, Ethiopia envisioned investments. But key risks remained. Ultimately, access to its share of Nile waters through Nile the countries perceived political opportuni- basin development. Provisions in ENSAP’s first ties leading to agreed decisions on ENSAP and investment portfolio provided some assurance to ENTRO. Egypt had the chance to obtain a com- both countries with regard to these risks: short prehensive picture of potential Nile development and medium term projects were selected and and project a “regional good neighbor� profile. prioritized by both countries through extensive This was in line with its other moves to integrate discussions and negotiations, and were included better with Africa to expand trade, as for instance in the first round of the investment package. with COMESA. For Ethiopia, the NBI offered the The ambiguity of ENTRO’s role was a point of chance to present its case to the other countries contention for the Eastern Nile countries. Both and the world, in addition to the potential to ac- Egypt and Ethiopia struggled with uncertainties cess much needed capital and economic benefits. about the regional entity and worried about yield- ing sovereign national decision making powers. 2.3.2 Postscript Ethiopia, in particular, persistently sought clarity The Eastern Nile program was envisioned to on the respective roles of national agencies and foster sustainable development in the basin, and of ENTRO. In addition, at the start, the countries to create a regional platform for cooperative were skeptical about ENTRO being responsive dialogue and planning. ENTRO evolved into a to their national priorities and interests. These unique and professional regional project office opinions took some time (two years) to work out, and was key to the successful delivery of the first but eventually an elaborate system of governance round of investments. The development of flood was established at ENTRO, with specified rules of early warning systems, with potential for re- procedure. A step-by-step decision making pro- duced flood damage to the riparians, held much cess under the auspices of the Ministers of Water promise. It was hoped that the success of the was agreed. A good line of communication had first round of largely sectoral investments would been established between the political and tech- create momentum needed to move forward nical leadership of the Eastern Nile countries with on the second round of multi-sectoral invest- periodic meetings and dialogue. The Ministers ments. However, these additional investments also agreed that “balance� would be maintained have reached an impasse due to parallel politi- in ENTRO’s staffing to prevent dominance by any cal developments with regard to a formal Nile one country. Basin treaty. The latter is still an ongoing process While the above actions resulted from with clear differences among the countries. For Ministerial action, partners also had a role in ame- partners, staying abreast of the morphing politics liorating the situation. For example, a basin-wide in eastern Africa will help them to recognize new program supported by donors offered capacity political opportunities. A question also remains building and specific training to improve skills in a as to whether there are stronger risk reduction variety of fields related to water management and measures to advance cooperation. cooperation.15 Partners worked closely with the Eastern Nile Ministers by preparing “just in time� 2.4 Ganges, 1994–199817 briefs on request and facilitated access to lessons from experiences from international river basins 2.4.1 Background on request. Their commitment to extend coordi- The Ganges basin is shared among Bangladesh, nated financing for institution building, capacity China, India and Nepal (see Figure 4). This case development and investments and their support study focuses specifically on the interactions for the countries’ objective of using good prac- 16 The first round of ENSAP-related investments of about 15 The basin-wide Shared Vision Program of the NBI was a $300M came about in 2006-7. $130M initiative covering key water-related sectors to build 17 The Ganges section was prepared in collaboration with capacity and confidence. Claudia Sadoff, Brendan Galipeau and Aaron Wolf. 14 Figure 4. The Ganges River basin. Source: The World Bank, 2012. between Bangladesh and India that led to the 1982 and 1985 they signed memoranda that ex- bilateral Treaty between India and Bangladesh tended the arrangements in the agreement until on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka 1988. (Wolf and Newton, 2008). (“Ganges Water Sharing Treaty�) in 1996. In the mid 1990s, following elections in both The tensions between India and Bangladesh countries, new governments assumed power and over the Ganges addressed in this treaty date dialogue resumed. In 1996, the Ganges Treaty back as far as 1951, when Bangladesh (still part was signed, which served as a tipping point in of Pakistan until 1971) learned of India’s plans to the management and conflict over the Ganges construct a barrage at Farakka to divert around for several reasons. One of the primary factors is 80% of the Ganges dry season flow to the that it was the first and only long term agreement Hooghly River (Wolf and Newton, 2008). The pur- for the basin between India and Bangladesh, and pose of the barrage was to improve navigation also the first “treaty� (Salman and Uprety 2002: in the port of Calcutta and to combat saltwater 170). Also important is that the new governments intrusion during the spring dry season. Though in both countries seemed to welcome reopening the two countries engaged in dialogue several negotiations in 1996 to find a conclusive outcome times over the next two decades, no agreement (Khan, 1996). Until this time, both countries had was reached even as construction at Farakka be- persisted with their national agendas, applying a gan. While negotiations broke down, construction “rights-based� approach, but by 1996 both coun- continued, and in 1975 Farakka became opera- tries had begun to look for mutually agreeable so- tional. Bangladesh lodged a formal complaint lutions. Though the call for cooperation was mutu- against India with the United Nations a year later, al, Bangladesh’s new Prime Minister exerted an all which urged the parties came to a quick settle- out effort to resolve the dispute with India (Salman ment at the ministerial level. In 1977, India and and Uprety 2002: 170).18 Also at this time, the Bangladesh signed their first bilateral Ganges 18 76% of Bangladesh’s population resides in the Ganges agreement, valid for a period of five years. In basin. 15 state in India most reliant on the waters withdrawn this risk was somewhat reduced, but the Indian at Farakka—West Bengal—expressed interest in Prime Minister continued to face criticism from becoming involved in the process (Hossain, 1998). his constituents in-country, who accused him of The deal under discussion included physical giving into Bangladesh’s demands. Similar criti- benefits as well as political and institutional bene- cism faced the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. The fits. Physically, it would restrict India’s withdrawals stability of the agreement and support for it were at Farakka during the dry season, January to May, in doubt. Despite these uncertainties, the political thus guaranteeing a minimum flow to Bangladesh leadership took a forward-looking stand in favor during this time. Flows for a variety of climatic of cooperation. conditions were specified in the agreement, as As Bangladesh’s inherent priority was secur- well as a stipulation that if conditions became ing dry season flows, it tried to reduce this risk drastic during the dry season and flows fell below itself by proposing a trilateral agreement with a threshold level, the two countries must come to Nepal as well, that could set the stage for stor- a new agreement. Politically, it aimed to improve age further upstream on the river. India preferred overall relations between India and Bangladesh a bilateral arrangement at the time and so the (Rahaman, 2009; Salman and Uprety, 2002). It scope of the agreement was limited to India and also included an agreement to cooperate over all Bangladesh. The agreement, when drafted, did shared river basins between the two countries, provide reassurance to Bangladesh regarding its thus broadening the scope of cooperation over priority—it included provisions of guaranteed water beyond the Ganges River. dry season flows, which was not the case in pri- or agreements. 2.4.2 Analysis Because of India’s commitment to dry season Prior to 1996, India and Bangladesh perceived flows, Bangladesh’s expectations for economic varying cost and benefits from cooperation, and benefits grew. India’s gains were also significant also risks associated with regional cooperation. since prolonging the dispute with Bangladesh For India, risks were rather high, especially when would have led to the matter being raised at in- compared with the benefits it expected from ternational fora with unpredictable pressures and cooperation. A primary concern of India was results. By early 1996, with a new government in preserving its historic use of the Ganges River; power, India also began to see greater opportuni- signing an agreement guaranteeing flows to ty in regional cooperation; in fact, it had recently Bangladesh would lock the country into a long- deemed it a national priority. The agreement with term commitment. To some degree, this would Bangladesh provided a chance to enhance its po- mean a loss of authority over the water running litical image in the regional setting. Bangladesh through its territory. Equally, for Bangladesh, the began to view the agreement similarly, and like- risk was one of ensuring accountability for de- wise was aware of the political opportunities that livering benefits in terms of reliable flows in the could be derived from cooperating with India. downstream reaches of the river. Its focus was Extremely important for India was political sup- on equitable share. The country hoped to secure port within the country, thus the involvement of guaranteed minimum flows in winter, for which West Bengal in the process reduced the political it had repeatedly renegotiated every few years risk. Finally, the agreement offered some predict- prior to the 1996 offer. Thus, for Bangladesh, the ability to India, as the process of renegotiating call for cooperation was largely motivated by its every few years was rather onerous. The involve- desire for water security. However, Bangladesh ment at the highest level by Bangladesh’s Prime was unsure about negotiating an optimal deal Minister also offered assurance that the agree- with India and sustaining its implementation. In ment would in fact be stable and predictable. For sum, the risks for Bangladesh and India were Bangladesh, risk reduction helped increase its quite high at the start of the negotiations. confidence to sign the 1996 agreement. These Eventually, both national governments were measures centered primarily on the agreement open to discussions, though neither received itself, with the guarantee of dry season flows for domestic political support at the start. In India, a thirty-year period. The risk of not having do- prior to 1996, the state of West Bengal in particu- mestic support was not appreciably reduced prior lar was unsupportive. When West Bengal came to signing—the national government moved for- forward with a desire to reach an agreement, ward regardless. 16 Opportunity enhancement measures were two- During colonial times, European powers used fold. First, at the national level in both countries, the river primarily for navigation and commerce. regional cooperation was emphasized, thus an Following independence, in the mid 20th century, agreement over the Ganges provided an opportu- Mali and Nigeria met to define parameters for nity to further this new national goal for India and shared development of the basin, and by 1961 all Bangladesh. Second, at the regional institutional countries were involved in discussions. In 1963, level, the agreement itself enhanced opportunity the nine basin states signed an agreement on by building in a provision to cooperate with one navigation and commerce that also included another in the future over other basins as well as principles on cooperation of the basin (Andersen other segments of the Ganges, where relevant. et al., 2005). Both countries therefore viewed the agreement as In 1964, the Niger Basin Commission was estab- strategic for future engagement with one another. lished to coordinate national development among In early 1996, with some of the risks reduced the basin states and execute a plan for integrated and opportunity apparent, Bangladesh was ready development. However, given several competing to cooperate, seeing both high opportunities post-independence priorities, the Commission and high benefits. India, seeing many risks, also could not accomplish much on the ground. The saw great political opportunities. Thus India and Commission was converted into the Niger Basin Bangladesh both signed the agreement in 1996. Authority (NBA) in 1980 with the intent of be- stowing on it stronger powers to advance the 2.4.3 Postscript development of the shared Niger River. Yet again, While the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty did pro- a combination of a focus on nation building and vide a framework for future cooperation between a series of internal political and financial crises in India and Bangladesh, the agreed upon flows the countries thwarted the countries’ intentions in to Bangladesh did not fully materialize. Several regional cooperation. Though basin wide coop- factors may be at play. For one, the agreement eration lagged, sub-basin agreements were final- was not comprehensive, dealing with all sources ized, among them: Agreement between Niger and uses. It also does not factor in impacts of and Mali for cooperation in the utilization of the long-term climate change and many claim the Niger River (1988); and Agreement on the shared data consulted in drafting the agreement were management of border rivers between Niger and outdated. While the agreement still stands, dis- Nigeria (1990). satisfaction with the treaty has been expressed By 1998, the Heads of State of the Niger Basin periodically in both countries, and pressures on and the Ministers of Water realized the urgent the Ganges basin continue to increase. Water need for rapid development and the fact that sharing agreements with quantitative alloca- NBA lacked the institutional capacity to accom- tions are inherently subject to difficulties arising plish its mission. It was clear to them that signifi- from flow variations over time. Yet engagement cant reforms were needed. At a special session of between the parties has continued over the years, the NBA Council of Ministers, it was agreed that regularly building on the successes of 1996. the Council would meet regularly to discuss how to address the NBA’s institutional problems while 2.5 Niger, 1998–200419 also collectively developing a plan for improving the degraded environment and water resources 2.5.1 Background of the basin. At the NBA’s 17th Ministerial session The nine Niger River riparians are Benin, Burkina in 1998 that the Ministers kicked off the reform Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, agenda and NBA entered its revitalization era, a Mali, Niger and Nigeria (see Figure 5). For this critical turning point in cooperation in internation- case study, we focus on the perspectives of the al waters in the Niger basin. Some have observed latter three in the context of the revitalization of that periodic meetings of leaders and Heads of the Niger Basin Authority during 1998–2004. State of countries belonging to the Economic The Niger basin was not a site of major histori- Community of the West Africa States (ECOWAS) cal conflict over water unlike the Nile or Ganges. reiterating the importance of the principles of Integrated Water Resources Management and 19 The Niger section was prepared in collaboration with Ami- mandating member countries to implement such nou Tassiou, Audace Ndayizeye, J.B. Collier, and Amal Talbi. 17 principles at a shared basin level had an influence ried out, substantial reforms were implemented on the move to revive the NBA in 1998. and a new management structure was put in In April 2004, the Heads of States of the ri- place. The NBA then launched the preparation of parian countries signed the Paris Declaration, the Sustainable Development Action Plan (SDAP) through which they committed to sustainable 21 and Investment Plan (IP) of the NBA. The development and enhanced coordination and SDAP was to define a strategy for the integrated information sharing on shared waterways. The and shared development process among NBA meeting in Paris was convened jointly by the then countries, while the IP was to detail the financial Chair of the Heads of State of the basin countries means. Ultimately, the SDAP and IP reflected mul- and France’s President, and included a number of tiple interests and were negotiated outcomes of partners. The partners, in turn, signed a coopera- technical and political discussions. tion framework to coordinate their efforts on the Expected benefits to countries varied, but Niger and align their support with NBA priorities. among them were: irrigation; hydropower; en- The NBA subsequently pursued a fast paced vironmental management, including silt control; program to respond to its member needs and in- and access to information on impacts of national terests. The renewal of regional cooperation was activities on others. Capacity building was an reflected in a new Shared Vision that the countries integral part of the program. However, as the shaped together. 20 An Institutional Audit was car- river had remained relatively undeveloped to this point, there were also concerns for consequences 20 In May 2005, in the Extra-ordinary session of the NBA Council of Ministers held in Abuja, the Shared Vision was adopted and states the following “The Niger Basin, a com- mon space of sustainable development through an integrated 21 The SDAP sets-out the Basin’s regional priorities based on management of water resources and related eco-systems, for these priority domains: (i) conservation of the Basin’s ecosys- the enhancement of the living conditions and prosperity of the tems, (ii) development of socio-economic infrastructures, and populations by 2025.� (iii) capacity building for the stakeholders. Figure 5. The Niger River basin. Source: The World Bank, 2012. 18 of developments upstream and downstream, par- Niger (along with other countries in the basin), ticularly in Mali, Niger and Nigeria. were concerned for the inclusion of their priorities and voices within the NBA. 2.5.2 Analysis In sum, entering the revitalization era, all three Prior to 1998, Nigeria, Niger and Mali all per- countries saw many risks but slightly greater op- ceived risks associated with cooperating with one portunity in committing to the NBA. Mali and another. Because of the relatively non-turbulent Niger stood to benefit the most economically. history among the riparians, risks were more Nigeria could expect a mix of economic and centered on fears of another institutional collapse political gains. Its strategy was to emphasize than on trust in each other; therefore, though risk broader, regional economic benefits to its domes- was present it was not glaringly high. The three tic constituents. also saw great political opportunity in coopera- Risk reduction was important for all the tion, which is essentially why the NBA was creat- countries, especially given the previous lack of ed in the first place decades back. All had hopes substantive concrete action through the Niger that a successful agreement would strengthen Basin Commission and Authority. Most of the regional alliances, enhance political image and risk reduction efforts targeted shared concerns. increase capacity for harnessing the development For example, capacity building and knowledge potential in the basin. expansion efforts helped prepare the countries As stated, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria perceived in technical skills, negotiations, and institution risks associated with revitalizing the Niger Basin building. Modeling helped in understanding the Authority (NBA) and signing a basin-wide agree- complexities of the basin. Institutional reforms ment. Economic development needs were a strengthened confidence in NBA’s accountability. strong motivator for the countries. At the same The subsequent professionalization of the NBA time, they were apprehensive about negotiating organization contributed to the comfort of all of an acceptable program of action, given their dif- the countries. During the case study period (and fering needs and capacity levels. Here partner subsequently), the two Executive Secretaries from support for building capacity, technical studies, Nigeria were perceived to have acted in a neutral and dialogue among the countries was helpful to and unbiased manner, responding effectively to advance the negotiations. Nigeria had the most the broad spectrum of interests of all the ripar- developed infrastructure of the three, and had ians. The SDAP conveyed an understanding of a keen interest in maintaining its existing flows. the three countries’ priorities and it also proved Its major concern was regarding upstream de- to be an important communication tool for the velopments and their impacts on its water use. countries as they approached various stakehold- But Nigeria’s decision makers appear to have ac- ers with their programs. commodated this concern in favor of benefits to Opportunity enhancement was also an impor- the region. tant process in the NBA revitalization, especially The Niger basin countries were concerned for Nigeria. A significant opportunity enhance- about getting their share of benefits from coop- ment measure on Nigeria’s part was stepping into eration in relation to meeting their development its “regional leadership� role, in essence looking goals. There were uncertainties as to whether out for regional interests rather than focusing identified projects would be seen through to solely on national interests. All three countries fruition—in other words that the funding and also began to see the NBA as a conduit to learn construction of infrastructure would happen in a of all planned basin development—the treaty em- timely way—since the NBA had previously failed phasized coordination among the riparians and to deliver. Clarity was needed on the flow of the proposed Water Charter offered an effective benefits in terms of size, timing and sequence tool to make it happen on the ground. of benefits. The SDAP and IP, therefore, had to clarify the sequence of investments proposed and 2.5.3 Postscript estimates of funding required. In addition, the The NBA has come a long way since the ‘60s and promise of a Water Charter in the near future was ‘80s. Following the SDAP and IP, feasibility stud- an assurance that rules would be adopted for the ies began in the basin, and a robust investment implementation of water development plans with program is in place with substantial commitments significant regional impacts. In addition, Mali and from partners. National agencies in water have 19 enhanced their capacity in basin water manage- the focus was on irrigation rather than hydro- ment. The investment program, initially slow, has power. For instance, 75 percent of the water from now accelerated. The countries continue to work the Toktogul reservoir in the Kyrgyz Republic was together and consider cooperative development released during the growing season, from April to as an attractive option. A Water Charter has been September. This benefitted the downstream coun- ratified by 8 of the 9 countries. The level of con- tries, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, for their cotton flict has remained low. The challenge remains one cultivation. In turn, these countries were asked of fulfilling the major expectations of all of the to send coal and gas to the Kyrgyz Republic for member countries while ensuring the professional its heating needs. This exchange effectively took implementation of the recently agreed Water place without borders or any market mechanisms, Charter. In addition, new challenges from chang- for the primary purpose of growing cotton. ing demographics, water use, food and energy in- With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these securities, infrastructure development and climate institutional mechanisms broke down. Countries risks will emerge and could test the robustness of began searching for sustainable solutions to the cooperative arrangements. meet their now-conflicting energy and agriculture needs. As they emerged into independence, the 2.6 Syr Darya, 1996–200222 Syr Darya riparian states were also confronted with the end to Moscow’s funding of much of the 2.6.1 Background operation and maintenance of dikes, reservoirs The Syr Darya is a relatively new international and dams. Even in areas where they had technical basin, achieving this status in 1991 with the col- expertise, formulating a new system of water and lapse of the Soviet Union. There are four riparians energy management that reflected a state (rather on the Syr Darya River: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz than a regional) set of priorities was daunting. Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (see Figure Raising capital and even operating funds was a se- 6). The river originates in the Kyrgyz Republic, rious challenge. While the global concern over the flows through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan before fate of the Aral Sea brought access to donor fund- returning to Uzbekistan. Eventually, it passes ing in a number of areas, the aid did not usually through the Kazakh steppe flows into the Aral extend to maintaining and operating the existing Sea. This analysis focuses on the perspectives of, infrastructure, notably in the Kyrgyz Republic. and interactions between, the Kyrgyz Republic To address these issues, in early 1992, imme- and Uzbekistan during 1996–2002. diately after independence, the riparian states Historically, the river has been used for irrigation negotiated an agreement to maintain the Soviet and hydropower. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union water management system. But energy deliveries embarked on a vast land reclamation program to the Kyrgyz Republic during wintertime were involving massive irrigation schemes, and includ- not part of the agreement. In the absence of this ing dams and reservoirs, to increase the cotton commitment, the Kyrgyz Republic had to rely on harvest. This eventually resulted in environmental releases from Toktogul’s water for hydropower degradation—from pesticides, soil salinization and generation in winter. A constraint was that the industrial waste—and depleted river flows (Wolf Naryn-Syr Darya river systems included a cas- and Newton, 2008). Water used for cotton had cade of reservoirs dominated by Toktogul. There previously flowed into the Aral Sea, where it com- was little capacity for storage in the downstream pensated evaporation. When the flow into the sea countries, yet seasonal demands for irrigation had was cut to a small fraction, the sea lost 80 percent to be met. of its surface area and 90 percent of its volume. In 1998, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and In the 1980s, the Soviet government estab- Uzbekistan finally signed the Agreement on Water lished a centralized water management entity in and Energy, which Tajikistan also joined in 1999. Tashkent for the Syr Darya to operate and main- It was for a five-year period. USAID extended ex- tain large infrastructures and manage water al- tensive support to the countries in reaching the locations among the riparians. It coordinated the agreement. The 1998 agreement specified that release of water from the reservoirs. At the time, the Kyrgyz Republic would release a specified flow down the river each month from the Toktogul 22 The Syr Darya section has been prepared in collaboration with Daryl Fields, Simon Croxton, Martha Jarosewich-Holder, dam, as well as supply electricity to Kazakhstan Alfred Diebold, and Frank Schrader. and Uzbekistan during the growing season, in ex- 20 Figure 6. The Syr Darya River basin. Source: The World Bank, 2012. change for gas and coal during the winter months established and endorsed by the riparian coun- to meet increased demand at home. The ex- tries of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya River Basins changes were designed as a barter system mim- for coordinating their water management activi- icking the Soviet days, with the intention of sup- ties and mobilizing resources to fight the problem porting a water-energy management regime that of a much-depleted and receding Aral Sea. The would be mutually beneficial, balancing energy inventory of institutional mechanisms is long. The and agricultural needs. The Agreement provided Aral Sea countries seized several opportunities for “future joint activities concerning rational use to state their interest in regional cooperation of water, fuel and energy.� Thus a distinguishing and work together to solve common problems. feature was the linked multi-sectoral benefits to However, there were considerable differences be gained from managing the river cooperatively. among them on effective water resources man- Related agreements were signed on the opera- agement under the new circumstances they found tion of energy systems and cooperation on envi- themselves in the post-Soviet Union period. ronmental matters. Its implementation was to be facilitated through periodic meetings between 2.6.2 Analysis the countries and through the use of models to In 1998, all of the post- Soviet rule countries optimize reservoir operations. were still in a period of transition, having recently It was formulated against the backdrop of sig- regained independent statehood. Despite the nificant institutional development at the regional risks in a cooperative arrangement, the Kyrgyz scale in the Aral Sea basin. Since the early 1990s, Republic and Uzbekistan saw greater benefits a network of institutional mechanisms had been than costs in a regional perspective, even though 21 the alternative of unilateral action allowed Moreover, international agencies, desirous of the for greater autonomy in decision-making. For emergence of a strong and stable Central Asia, example, if the Kyrgyz Republic would oper- were willing to facilitate activities and agree- ate Toktogul reservoir in an irrigation mode, ments related to regional cooperation. The 1998 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would meet their Agreement was another step in that direction. In irrigation needs in the growing season. In return, addition, the countries were also conscious of en- if Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were to commit to hancing their political image and profile outside winter energy deliveries to the Kyrgyz Republic, the region, as they transitioned into statehood. all the parties would be better off. There would Demonstrating a willingness to respond to re- be gains for the Kyrgyz Republic despite the loss gional and not just national needs was seen as a of some autonomy in decisions regarding water favorable move. Such demonstrations also helped releases. The alternative would be for the Kyrgyz to raise much-needed external funding from inter- Republic to retain complete control of the Syr national financing institutions, the UN and bilat- Darya’s flows all year round. Then it would not eral donors (Weinthal, 2002). have to seek out alternative energy sources in To address issues of integrated planning and the winter or rely on its neighbors to supply the management of water and energy systems, the energy. On the other hand, in this situation, it USAID offered assistance for modeling of the ba- would have to bear all of the costs of operating sin and application of hydromet systems, which the hydroelectric infrastructure. Uzbekistan would helped the countries better understand both have to deal with decisions on water manage- hydrology and policy implications of various oper- ment in winter to deal with excess flows. ating rules. For some time, these models helped Hydropower generation in the winter posed to review and revise coordinated reservoir opera- concerns for Uzbekistan. In addressing this con- tions. However, an alternative to the barter sys- cern through the cooperative arrangement, the tem for water and energy was not agreed upon, Kyrgyz Republic was faced with yet another chal- so concerns over equity in benefits for the most lenge of funding the operation and maintenance part remained on both sides. The agreement did, of the substantial infrastructure of dams, canals however, include language on cost-sharing for and other equipment in the absence of the Soviet the Kyrgyz Republic for infrastructure operations. structure. There was no precedent of charging Both Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic (and downstream riparians for the operation and main- Kazakhstan) signed the agreement in 1998 with tenance of upstream infrastructure. the Kyrgyz many risks still present. Republic was not only concerned about relying The Agreement was meant to secure water and on other countries for its critical seasonal fuel energy to meet the needs of the four riparian needs. There was also the worry that the agree- states. Unfortunately, the Framework Agreement ment would mean a loss of autonomy to pursue was only temporarily successful in this regard. its own energy needs and priorities for the sake Changing politics, economic contexts, and the of other sectoral priorities downstream. On the re-emergence of risk perceptions played a major other hand, Uzbekistan was motivated by its own part in the signing of the Agreement and also to economic development, for which it depended its eventual collapse. There were difficulties in the on the cotton irrigation scheme in the Ferghana agreement: the energy-for-energy exchange as- valley, a major foreign exchange earner. Thus its sumed a level of pricing of hydro energy and fos- preference clearly was for adequate supply of irri- sil fuel energy, which did not work out in practice gation water in the spring/summer. Upstream de- given market fluctuations of prices (Bernauer and cisions on hydropower were seen as problematic Siegfried, 2006). The emergence of private sector for the autonomous development of the country’s players in the energy sector was a deterrent to commercial strengths. maintaining commitments on pricing, given at- One explanation for the forward momentum on tractive world prices. the 1998 agreement was perhaps the feeling that political opportunity would be enhanced, even 2.6.3 Postscript though critical risks remained. Cooperation in the Ultimately, both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan failed region after the fall of the Soviet Union was part to deliver the agreed upon water and energy of the national policy of many of the new states, flows for several years and the Kyrgyz Republic including the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. did not always release the agreed volumes of 22 water. Over time, Uzbekistan sought greater River Action Plan, but the process was stalled autonomy to manage its spring and summer along the way. However, discussions regarding needs through alternative sources. Meanwhile, some of the associated projects were success- political turbulence marked the 2000 decade ful in creating a multilateral forum. Through this in the Kyrgyz Republic. Relations between the forum, many of the riparians proposed develop- countries affected cooperative activities. Thus the ing a regional agreement to provide an enabling political opportunity available in the mid 1990s, environment for cooperative development on the namely better overall relations among the former Zambezi. In 2000, the revised Southern African Soviet states and a willingness to explore options Development Community (SADC)’s Protocol on for regional cooperation, no longer existed in Shared Watercourses provided a model for the 2002–03. Also, despite the risk reduction mea- Zambezi as well as other shared watercourses.24 sures deployed through the 1998 Agreement, the After the adoption of the SADC Protocol, dis- earlier risks resurfaced. Over time, the countries cussions in the Zambezi basin refocused on devel- did not see continuing political gains to keep the oping a basin-wide agreement. For several years Agreement alive. the Zambezi countries pursued an agreement, supported by a donor-funded program that in- 2.7 Zambezi, 2000–200423 cluded other capacity building activities and stud- ies. A Secretariat set up in Lusaka coordinated 2.7.1 Background these basin wide efforts, which eventually result- The Zambezi basin is shared among eight ripar- ed in the Agreement on the Establishment of the ians—Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM), Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see signed in 2004. All basin states except Zambia Figure 7). This particular assessment centers signed the Agreement. The riparian countries on the perspectives of Botswana, Mozambique were motivated by the recent economic recovery and Zambia. and were keen to pursue new development proj- Efforts at cooperative management in the ects. They also viewed a basin-wide agreement as Zambezi basin—that is, beyond the scope of navi- an instrument for strengthening political ties and gation—essentially began with interest in con- attracting investments and donor support. In ad- structing the Kariba dam. In 1955, a bilateral pow- dition, there was a growing sense that unilateral er board was established between Northern and development (the status quo) had its limitations in Southern Rhodesia, now Zambia and Zimbabwe, terms of managing the river’s many challenges. which in 1958 oversaw construction of the dam Though the benefits of cooperation were clearly on the main stem of the Zambezi River between articulated, they remained elusive in practice, be- Zambia and Zimbabwe. cause countries had varying expectations of and Shortly after Zambia and Zimbabwe gained likely perceived a range of differing risks and op- independence (1967 and 1980, respectively), portunities in signing the ZAMCOM Agreement. the two countries signed the Zambezi River On the one hand, some of the riparians saw the Authority Agreement, creating an institutional potential for a better understanding of other structure (replacing the former power board) to countries’ actions on the Zambezi, and also po- develop and utilize the Zambezi’s waters in ways tential for securing their water supply, improving that were beneficial to the two countries. At the flood management, developing hydropower and same time, UNEP launched a water management irrigation, and increasing water transport poten- program in Africa, selecting the Zambezi for one tial. They also expected access to new funding. of its projects—the Zambezi River Action Plan, At the same time, countries had concerns about which received initial support from environmental possible erosion of autonomy in making decisions agencies in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. at the national level. The concerns of the ripar- This plan was intended to coordinate sustainable ians reflected the different principled positions, development to prevent future conflicts, but did from those that favored unilateral development not advance after a period. There was another at- to those that desired a community of co-riparian tempt during the mid ‘80s to act on the Zambezi states. Perceived capacity and knowledge con- 24 The Orange –Senqu (2000) and Limpopo (2003) basin 23 The Zambezi section was prepared in collaboration with agreements followed on the heels of the SADC Protocol Marcus Wishart, Thomas Bernauer, and Lucas Beck. (2000) 23 Figure 7. The Zambezi River basin. Source: The World Bank, 2012. straints also held some countries back from con- and indeed risks in not engaging in cooperative cluding any basin-wide deals for fear of ending up efforts to access opportunities. This is partly due with an inequitable share of the benefits. to the varying dependencies of the countries on the basin for water supplies. The majority of the 2.7.2 Analysis Zambian population (90 percent) was located in The risk situation in the Zambezi highlighted the the basin, and its area was about 42 percent of concerns around autonomy (to undertake one’s the total basin area. In contrast, 16 percent of the development programs) and equity (to access Mozambican and 1 percent of the national popu- the expected share of benefits under cooperative lation of Botswana resided in the basin. Zambia river management). Countries had to contend contributed over 40 percent of the mean annual with internal discussions about these risks with run-off, compared to an estimated 1.2 percent by domestic stakeholders in a context where there Botswana and 11 percent by Mozambique. were no firm guarantees about projected ben- Zambia was driven by large scale economic de- efits. Moreover, other water cooperation deals velopment needs, and so was looking for capital in the basin were a mix of positive and negative to pursue such development.25 Thus, in theory, experiences. This legacy of past agreements col- a ZAMCOM-type Agreement could be benefi- ored the views towards the proposed ZAMCOM cial. However, the Agreement offered in 2004 Agreement and what it would entail for benefit was not accompanied by an investment program and cost flows. with financing commitments. In the absence of a To start with, Zambia saw high risks and low clear and well-sequenced investment program, benefits in committing to ZAMCOM, while 25 See The World Bank (2009), Zambia Country Water Re- Botswana and Mozambique saw high benefits sources Assistance Strategy 24 Zambia’s gains were uncertain in the short run. tries.26 Thus knowledge about basin development On the other hand, there could be several risks, and riparian activities was critical for its own de- including perceived roadblocks to the implemen- velopment plans as well as for action with respect tation of its development plans. to water and flood management.27 Botswana too There were several overt reasons presented by was heavily dependent on international rivers and Zambia: its view that it may be disadvantaged non-cooperation could impose a high cost to its because of relatively lower negotiation capacities; own development plans.28 an outdated water law from 1949 that included Mozambique’s concerns about basin wide de- specific provisions excluding parts of the Zambezi velopments would be addressed through the River; absence of a water policy that dealt with transboundary matters; inadequate internal con- 26 Mozambique is downstream of nine international rivers. sultation with civil society, etc. At the same time, 27 Floods were an annual occurrence costing about 1.5 % of concerns about autonomy and uncertainties national GDP. See World Bank (2009), Country Water Resourc- es Management Assistance Strategy. Also see World Bank about obtaining an equitable share of the ben- (2010), The Zambezi River Basin: A Multi Purpose Investment efits from cooperation were significant hurdles. Opportunities Analysis. Mozambique and Botswana also faced some 28 An excerpt from the State of the Nation address by the risks. Mozambique had some concerns related to President of Botswana, November 2011:�Government remains committed to drawing some 495 Million Cubic Meters of its significant dependence on shared international water per annum from the Chobe-Zambezi River system, for waters. The majority of Mozambique’s waters medium and long term development. In line with this require- originated in, and travelled through other coun- ment, final notes to SADC and Member States have been sent in accordance with the revised SADC Protocol on Shared Wa- tercourses.� Figure 8. Summary of Key Observations. Opportunity Enhancement Opportunity was employed -Countries created opportunity Countries seized Opportunities: -Role of third parties is unclear -Changes in political climate -Presence of champion leaders -Aid or development assistance Opportunity -Information about the basin Enhancement Cost Bene�t Risks were present Risk Reduction strategies were in all cases: Risk used by countries and partners Capacity/Knowledge Reduction -Risk reduction was effective Accountability/Voice in many cases Sovereignty/Autonomy -Some countries proceeded Equity/Access without reducing all risks Stability/Support -Others remained hesitant Risk despite risk reduction Notes: Key observations are from the five case studies as related to identifying risks; identifying risk reduction strate- gies (and the role of third parties); and identifying how to anticipate and seize opportunity. These four observations are expanded upon in the following chapters. 25 information sharing provisions of the Agreement of new political alignments. The question will be and the platform it offered for sharing plans and whether the emerging political scenario will open programs. The Zambezi Commission would also up new opportunities for cooperation in interna- provide a potential forum to motivate coop- tional waters. erative action on recurring flood problems and for forcefully presenting its case to the outside 2.8 Summary world for environmental flows so as to maintain a healthy delta. A few observations are worth highlighting at this point. First, though each case was unique, many 2.7.3 Postscript showed similarities in perceived risks. An in-depth To date, Zambia remains the only country in the discussion of the risks as they emerged in our Zambezi basin that has not signed the agree- analysis follows in Chapter 3. Second, it is clear ment. Seven others have signed, and six have from our five case studies that risk reduction was ratified. The Agreement has entered into force important in moving countries toward coopera- in June 2011. Meanwhile, it is likely that the tion. As for many countries, some risks either Zambezi countries will want to accelerate imple- remain or have reemerged, resulting in stagnancy mentation of their ambitious development plans or regression. A discussion and grouping of risk making regional cooperation even more criti- reduction strategies that were effective in our cal. Climate change impacts would also bring case studies is presented in Chapter 4. Third, additional challenges to a fragile situation. As the role of partners varied greatly among our an observer of ZAMCOM, Zambia would have cases—some countries took the initiative for risk access to basin wide information. In the end, reduction, while others benefited from outside Zambia would have to see a clear flow of ben- assistance. Chapter 5 offers pointers for partners efits, including a sequence of investments. Its based on these cases, including ways of using perceived risks to autonomous development risk-appropriate intervention strategies for reduc- would have to be reduced. The Niger Basin’s ing risk, and laying the groundwork for seizing Sustainable Development Action Plan and the political opportunity. Finally, the cases present related Investment Program might provide some varying degrees of “successful� cooperation. It useful pointers in this direction. Much also de- appears agreements are rather dynamic, which pends on evolving regional politics in southern raises several important questions for partners, Africa, with the end of major civil conflicts and also discussed in the chapters that follow. Figure accelerated economic growth and the emergence 8 illustrates some of these notable observations. 26 3. Understanding Risk T he analysis in Chapter 2 leads us to a crises and need- discussion about political risks involved ed to upgrade Opportunity in international cooperation (or not) over their skills and ca- water, which according to our analytical frame- pacities in IWRM, Opportunity Enhancement work, factor into countries’ and leaders’ decisions including in the Cost Bene�t to cooperate or not over water. In this chapter, management of we discuss how the five categories of risk—the (y) international wa- Risk axis in the analytical framework—weigh into the ters, in line with Reduction cooperation decision. their national policies. Zambia Risk 3.1 The Five Categories of Risk had always ex- pressed concern This chapter begins with a discussion of how per- about its capacity in transboundary matters, and ceived risks were identified among the case stud- had requested assistance with building skills in ies. Recall the five categories of risk introduced in international waters and negotiations. Chapter 1: Capacity/Knowledge; Accountability/ There could also be a significant gap in knowl- Voice; Sovereignty/Autonomy; Equity/Access; edge and information about basin hydrology, and Stability/Support. These risks are discussed in ecology, markets and economics. For example, if detail below, using several examples from the five available master plans do not reflect current reali- case studies. ties in terms of basin water supply and demand, or if likely effects of climate variability and change 3.1.1 Capacity and Knowledge have not been investigated, countries may feel This risk refers to a country’s confidence in its ca- they are not entering negotiations well equipped pacity—skills, expertise—to negotiate an agree- to make a deal. Going to the negotiating table ment, and also having enough knowledge (for ex- with dated information could be a challenge for ample, of basin hydrology) to do so. Policymakers the riparian countries.30 Countries may not then in countries may feel that they do not have as be able to raise pertinent questions about projec- much capacity as their negotiating partners, and tions of costs and benefits. Such a situation may so may have apprehensions about coming out of hinder the understanding of the various unilateral the talks with a good deal. Ethiopia and several and cooperative development options avail- of the Equatorial Nile countries have consistently able, leaving countries uncertain as to whether requested help to upgrade their transboundary they had all the options in front of them. All of departments and basin analysis skills, for exam- the basins studied faced this challenge. In the ple, in modeling.29 In the Niger basin, preparation Ganges basin, the countries depended on old of the SDAP provided the countries the chance to data to shape their final agreement. Likewise, the access up-to-date development scenarios so as Eastern Nile countries had apprehensions about to plan their water program. Many of the Niger the adequacy of their knowledge of Eastern Nile Basin countries had faced decades of internal river systems. Egypt, for its part wanted a better 29 In the basin-wide Applied Training Project in the Nile, 30 The development of master plans and updates took a some of the countries specifically asked for additional access backseat in the ‘90s in view of the preoccupation with com- to training benefits in order to “level the playing field.� peting priorities for management and development. 27 understanding of upstream hydrology. Ethiopia this concern was acute in the early years of the wanted a rapid update of the dated basin stud- Eastern Nile program. Also, countries expected ies. Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, still in to play “equal� roles in any regional mechanism the early stages of state building, were unsure and did not want to be overwhelmed by the more of devising appropriate and effective economic powerful among them. In addition, countries saw schemes for water and energy management in the regional forum as a platform for presenting the 1990s to replace the Soviet system and mak- their particular case and context (needs, rights) to ing them work. In the absence of reliable and ac- other riparians and obtain responsive solutions. curate information, some long held myths about In short, country concerns related to gover- water availability and water control may persist. In nance, decision-making structures and processes turn, such myths may reinforce the perceived risks and rules of engagement. Agreed approval pro- of cooperation and the benefits of unilateralism. cesses, decision making steps, and operating pro- The Capacity and Knowledge risk is linked to cedures were critical elements of a regional coop- the Sovereignty and Autonomy risk. “Without erative organization to build confidence among knowledge, riparian states are extremely nervous participating countries. In some cases there were about threats to sovereignty, especially when an- concerns about balance among countries in the other riparian is deemed to have that knowledge staffing and leadership of the regional entity. In and is therefore ‘powerful’ (GFID, 1998).� It also a joint institution, dominance by any one country affects a country’s concerns for equity, as it may was not acceptable. Finding qualified personnel lead a country to fear that it would not be ca- from all participating countries was highly valued. pable of negotiating a “fair� deal. Both in the Eastern Nile and the Niger basins, there was a strong sentiment to ensure the pres- 3.1.2 Accountability and Voice ence of participating country professionals in the This risk refers to a country’s concerns about the regional office and projects. The professionaliza- answerability of other parties regarding delivery of tion occurred over time, and was preceded by a benefits as offered in a deal. The concerns usu- time when staff played “representational� roles, ally stem from a lack of confidence in the intent or carrying with them the burden of their respective ability of co-riparians or third parties to deliver on country’s formal positions on water development commitments. The concern extends also to skepti- and management, even as they made decisions in cism about the ability of regional mechanisms such the regional office—decisions demanding a “re- as river basin entities established by the participat- gional� rather than a “national� hat. ing countries. In the Syr Darya, countries did not Countries also saw participation in regional seem confident that the commitments of water forums as a way of presenting their views to the and energy exchange would be met. The forma- outside world, thus gaining appreciation and tion of the Eastern Nile Office was beset by anxiet- recognition of their predicaments. The Syr Darya ies in the participating countries that it would not Basin countries were successful in this regard, us- deliver what each one of them wanted and that ing regional forums to present their post Soviet it would not adequately respond to their priori- context and environmental challenges, and at- ties. Likewise in the Niger River basin, the ripar- tracting attention and funding to their many de- ians worried about the accountability of the Niger velopment needs. Many felt that the Nile 2002 Basin Authority to deliver the fruits of cooperation. conferences (1992–2002) provided a platform for The risk type also includes a country’s percep- a variety of governmental and nongovernmental tion that it may not be adequately heard and voices from the riparian countries to be heard and included in the decision-making processes at the allowed for the articulation of views that both de- regional level. Countries in our case samples were fended and criticized the status quo. In the case concerned that the governance arrangements of of Ganges, India felt it had the chance to refur- the regional entity would not allow for adequate bish its overall foreign relations image by reach- and inclusive levels and systems of decision mak- ing out to Bangladesh (Rahaman 2009; Salman ing, approval, monitoring, dispute settlement, and and Uprety 2002). enforcement of commitments. These concerns related to political (Ministerial level) decision-mak- 3.1.3 Sovereignty and Autonomy ing, technical advisory arrangements and technical This risk refers to a country’s desire to have con- review and monitoring mechanisms. For instance, trol over resources and infrastructure, and also to 28 make decisions independently. At its core, tinue to engage one another carrying this deep- this risk is about countries sensing the danger seated worry.32 of intrusive external management of its sover- eign decision making prerogatives. To a greater 3.1.4 Equity and Access or lesser extent, all of the cases reflect this risk This risk refers to a country’s concern for fairness perception. In the Zambezi, Zambia has been in the agreement, whether it is in specified quan- worried about ceding control over decisions on tity (or quality) of water or benefit flows or project much-needed national development decisions. costs, as well as its sense of entitlement to use its During the early years of the Eastern Nile Office, fair share of the river. Who gets benefits now and there were long and persistent debates on “na- who has not received benefits so far are critical tional� and “regional� responsibilities following questions. Ethiopia was very concerned about countries’ concern that the long hand of regional unlocking the potential for Nile basin develop- institutions would extend into decisions of na- ment at the earliest. Zambia was worried about its tional agencies. development plans being retarded with Zambezi Globally, the paradigm shift from a unilateral cooperation, despite occupying a major part of “absolute sovereignty� approach to accom- basin. Niger and Mali sought investments to ad- modating the principles of “reasonable and dress major poverty and growth constraints, and equitable utilization and avoidance of significant regional cooperation was partly a means to that harm�31 has been a slow and gradual process. end. Thus there was a push for accessing eco- Similarly, countries may start with fairly narrow nomic and physical benefits from cooperation. mandates for the regional organization at the There was also the larger question of equitable basin level when trust is low and sovereignty rights. The many debates around legal and envi- concerns are acute. With increased confidence ronmental principles in the mid-’90s have not yet and trust, they may widen these mandates and specified the bases for estimating such rights.33 related powers permitting a broader scope of ac- Countries define “equitable rights� as they see it, tion by the regional entity. The cases reflect this in the absence of a precise, agreed-upon set of dilemma facing the countries—they participated criteria. For some, it is maintaining what they per- in regional arrangements to pursue develop- ceive as an existing right. India and Egypt both ment goals through cooperation as opportunities saw equity as continuing with their historic uses opened up, yet resisted any perceived attempt to of the rivers. Likewise, Uzbekistan’s insistence to direct decision-making or supervise implementa- maintain flows for cotton irrigation related to its tion at the national level. The political leadership notion of equity. On the other hand, Bangladesh periodically reviewed the mandates and powers wanted to secure dry season flows. Ethiopia was of cooperative regional entities they had set up keen to develop Nile waters to address serious to ensure that the boundaries of responsibilities food and energy security challenges. the Kyrgyz and accountabilities clearly reflected principles of Republic was keen to serve its winter energy sovereignty and subsidiarity. interests. Likewise, Niger felt a great sense of The “sovereignty risk� comes across as one urgency to use the Niger River for immediate of the two (the other being the “equity risk�) development needs. Zambia considered Zambezi deeply felt concerns for a country contemplating cooperation as fair only if it could pursue its much cooperation. At its core is a mix of cultural, politi- needed development goals. cal and values-based perception of the need to The notion of “equity� in our cases extend- own, manage, and control one’s future. “Selling ed beyond sharing water to sharing benefits the country up (or down) the river� is a particu- as well as the timing of benefits. The Kyrgyz larly apt phrase that defines the country’s fears Republic needed energy resources only in winter; in cooperative deals. Countries in our case mix Uzbekistan needed river flows during the spring had to periodically deal with this risk perception and summer growing seasons. Inequities were throughout the period of the study. The percep- tion may be temporarily abated through risk 32 See The Economist, One Dam Thing After Another, reduction measures, but the countries might con- November 13, 2011: “The Mekong River Commission, like ASEAN itself, is about consultation, process and consensus. No member is prepared to cede its national sovereignty, even 31 As per the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navi- on an issue as patently transnational as the Mekong.� gational Uses of International Watercourses, 33 See, for instance Wouters (2000). 29 thus seen not only in terms of the quantity of Sometimes multiple interests are evident at the benefits but also in the timing of their delivery. national level. In many of the countries studied, India and Bangladesh debated at length as to Ministries of Water and the Ministries of Foreign the quantity and timing of Ganges water to be Affairs had to align their views. The former fo- shared. In all of these cases, countries paid con- cused on water infrastructure and hydrology while siderable attention to analyzing expected benefit the latter emphasized rights and equity. Similar flows and assessing related risks. As mentioned, differences also existed between Ministries of given the lack of precise criteria for equity, deci- Water and Ministries of Energy, with the latter be- sions regarding water and benefit sharing appear ing more concerned with power pools and inter- to be negotiated based on both economic and connections rather than with water agreements.36 political criteria. Often, the variables that impact this category of risk may have nothing at all to do with water or 3.1.5 Stability and Support with the offer on the table, but rather with the This risk refers to a country’s concern that an broader swath of issues that make up local and agreement would not be welcomed by its own regional politics. citizens nor widely supported politically within the country. It applies not only to the implementabil- ity of an agreement, but also to a decision-mak- 3.2 Core versus er’s positive or negative public image and re- Operational Risks election potential. The leaders of both India and Bangladesh were criticized by their constituents The five types of risks that we have identified can for deciding on an agreement. Part of Zambia’s be grouped into two broader categories of risks: stated reluctance to sign the Zambezi agreement (i) Core or strategic risks; and (ii) Operational was lack of domestic support. Zambia also stated risks. Sovereignty and Equity are core risks that that its current water legislation did not support are more difficult to eliminate completely. They regional agreements. The evolution of coopera- are deeply embedded in the economy and culture tion on the Danube River between the ‘80s and of the countries. Sovereignty and Equity risks may ‘90s vividly illustrated perceptions regarding become more acute as more countries become stability and support on the part of those leading involved in a cooperation deal, but these risks the cooperation dialogue.34 are apparent even in bilateral relationships. They Multiple interests within a country may thwart tend to resurface even after agreements have movement towards a deal.35 Sometimes, espe- been sealed and delivered. Reflecting the visceral cially in federal states, it may be one region or nature of these risks. In three of the five cases, the province of a country that has a major stake in return of concerns related to sovereignty and eq- the sharing of the basin, thus their support may uity posed repeated implementation challenges be critical in ratifying or implementing the agree- for the agreement signed or for the agreed co- ment. This was the case in India with the signing operative arrangement. In other words, it seems of the Ganges agreement with Bangladesh—sup- safe to assume that an agreement or a deal allows port from the state of West Bengal was critical to for breathing space to address the next round moving forward. A similar situation was present of sovereignty/equity concerns. The other three in the Columbia basin, where British Columbia risk categories—Capacity, Accountability and voted against the agreement until some of its in- Stability—pose similar challenges, but seem to terests were attended to. be more susceptible to operational interventions, discussed in the following two chapters. They also often feed into and influence the sovereignty and 34 See the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (2006); personal communications with Al Duda equity risks. and Ivan Zavadsky of the Global Environmental Facility. 35 See Waterbury (2002) for a detailed discussion of national 36 The “power basins� often differed from “water basins� interests. bringing a new set of stakeholders into play. 30 4. Enhancing Cooperation W hen risks are perceived as too high, ap- from the cases, propriate risk reduction or opportunity which, like the Opportunity enhancing actions may move countries risks themselves, to a point where they decide to cooperate. Action we have broadly Opportunity Enhancement by countries or third parties moves countries categorized. Cost Bene�t north on the (y) axis of the analytical framework. Overall, we have identified the 4.1 Reducing Risk Risk following seven Reduction Risk Reduction Risk reduction factors into cooperation decisions strategies. Each Risk over water in that country or third party actions risk reduction reduce the level of perceived risk, which increases strategy address- the attractiveness of the cooperation offer at es one or more of our five broad perceived risks. hand. We have identified specific interventions Box 4 provides an overview of the strategies. BOX 4. SEVEN CATEGORIES OF RISK REDUCTION Knowledge and Skill Expansion Training and studies to meet gaps in capacity and knowledge, and support for developing new skills. Institutional Design Tailoring the institutional arrangement to be a “fit for purpose� cooperative arrangement for dialogue and action among riparians. Agreement Design Tailoring the agreement to the preferences of political leaders involved in terms of its formality, scope, goals, obligations, etc. Program Design Shaping the program to address country interests and goals—sectoral linkages, long- vs. short-term benefits, review and monitoring, etc. Financing and/or Guarantee Meeting financing needs and gaps identified by countries, including third party guarantee of financial obligations. Facilitation (Third Party) Unbiased, third party assistance in dialogues among riparians, including clarifications and interpretations. Decision Legitimacy Use of consultation and discussion forums and other avenues for ensuring widespread domestic and regional support of decisions. 31 A detailed discussion of the seven broad strate- include: specific tailor made training and study gies how they manifested in the cases follows. tours; technical studies and fact vs. fiction ex- This inventory of is not meant to be exhaustive, ercises; just-in-time notes for the technical and but is rather illustrative. Figure 9 illustrates the political leadership; and targeted briefs. It is connections we have found between a perceived usually the case that a river basin is not well risk and effective strategies for reducing that risk. understood by the countries themselves and The point here is that when countries or partners by third parties. Even where there are detailed are designing risk reduction strategies, linking studies, they may be outdated or new models them to the risks present will help ensure that and tools (e.g., GIS-based methodologies) may the strategy is devised appropriately. A specific be used to obtain a much richer and more ac- strategy may address more than one risk. A set curate picture of the hydrologic, economic, social of strategies may be needed to effectively deal and environmental dimensions of the basin. Such with a specific risk. It is also clear from the analysis new studies may persuade countries to discard that often a mix of risk reduction strategies will some of their perceived risks, both in terms of the be needed for every country, sometimes even the size of the problem and the countries’ exposure entire range discussed above. In complex situ- to it. Don Blackmore (2011) advocates the use ations, a substantial portfolio of risk reduction of studies that challenge prevalent myths with strategies will be needed. evidence-based analysis as countries engage in regional dialogue. Distinguishing between facts 4.1.1 Knowledge and Skill Expansion and misconceptions is critical to boost countries’ The objective is to meet gaps in capacity and true knowledge of their river basins. Herein lies knowledge within the countries. Key elements an opportunity for third parties to engage with Figure 9. Matching Risk Reduction Strategies to Risks. Strategy Reduces Perceived Risk CAPACITY Knowledge & Skills KNOWLEDGE Institution ACCOUNTABILITY VOICE Agreement SOVEREIGNTY Financing & Guarantees AUTONOMY Program EQUITY ACCESS Legitimacy STABILITY Facilitation SUPPORT Notes: Risk Reduction (left) categories as they correspond to the risks (right) they can reduce. While some of the major linkages between the two are highlighted, keep in mind that many additional linkages can likely be identified. 32 decision makers to both identify myths and com- monitoring, information sharing, and dispute municate facts. Because long held beliefs are not settlement. Decisions about the mandate easily dispelled, time and active involvement of and scope of work seem to depend on the the countries in the process will be key. comfort level of the political leadership to Just-in-time notes can serve to inform entrust certain functions to the coopera- Ministerial decision-making. In one of the cases, tive arrangement. a review of global experience in river basin insti- ii. Consequently, the degree of formality/infor- tutions helped to advance their understanding mality of the organizational arrangement is of the Ministers’ next steps. Much care must be an important element. The political leader- taken to ensure just-in-time notes are not per- ship in the cases studied did not follow a ceived as leading to a process dominated by third “model� or blueprint for all occasions. For parties; in other words, the notes are a useful instance, the Niger Basin governments as- guidance tool, but the actual decisions are made signed a coordinating and cooperative plan- by ministries, not third parties. There may also be ning role to the Niger Basin Authority unlike specific questions that need targeted research the stronger powers of the neighboring and output to aid decision-making. Examples of Senegal River Basin Authority. The Nile Basin these in the cases included: selection of the Chief Initiative was a transitional mechanism and Executive; sequencing of investments; and oper- did not have powers for joint management ating rules for water infrastructure. Study tours of the river. also served as useful forums for free exchanges iii. Governance and decision making set-up of outside one’s own river basin when they were the cooperative mechanism. The Ganges well-structured and organized as study seminars. Treaty included an elaborate structure of Support for developing new skills in advancing layered decision-making levels during its the knowledge agenda (e.g., in modeling; hydrol- implementation. The NBI included technical ogy) or for needed action (e.g., stakeholder con- and political layers of decision making for its sultation; project planning; project finance) could governance, together with several consulta- be equally critical.37 Given skepticism about analy- tive mechanisms for advisory inputs. The sis carried out by “outsiders� to the basin, it is im- Niger Basin Authority’s governance included portant to identify, motivate and strengthen insti- these, in addition to periodic Heads of States tutions and individuals within the respective river meetings for strategic decisions. basin in the use of modern tools and techniques. iv. Rules of engagement. These were crucial for trust building and perception of “bal- 4.1.2 Institutional Design ance� among the countries. Decision-making The overarching objective of the set of interven- process was often consultative and a one- tions incorporating institutional design principles country one-vote system was followed irre- is to design a cooperative arrangement for dia- spective logue and action among riparian countries in line of the size of the country or share of the with the preferences of the political leadership. basin. Rules conveyed confirmation of In other words, it is best not to rely on blueprints cooperation in action and contributed to but rather search for “solutions for the situation�. confidence building.38 Achievement of this objective will depend on sev- eral elements of institutional design, inter alia: 4.1.3 Agreement Design i. Mandate and scope of work of the coopera- The objective with this set of interventions is to tive mechanism. This has to do with ques- design a “fit for purpose� agreement related to tions as to whether there is a role for the the purposes of inter-country cooperation, given regional cooperative mechanism with respect the preferences of political leadership. Key ele- to water resources management, water de- ments include, inter alia: the principles espoused velopment, other sectors, basin planning, by the Agreement, its degree of formality or investment preparation and implementa- informality, its scope and content, including its tion, coordination, financial management, references to overall goals of the agreement; 37 Countries, as well as the Bank and development partners, have many existing decision support tools, including regional 38 See the discussion on the Accountability Risk earlier in this hydrologic models. chapter. 33 rights and obligations of countries; its predict- i. Shaping the Program’s objectives, compo- ability; procedures for information sharing, nents, detailing of benefits and costs, mode dispute resolution, effecting changes; duration of design and delivery to address country of the Agreement; and modes of bringing the interests. This was exemplified by the Niger Agreement into operational status. Institutional Basin Authority, which launched a long-term design is also often a feature of Agreements program of development (the Sustainable though differentiated above for the sake Development Action Program and a related of analysis. Investment Program). This program speci- Agreements and institutions in the cases dem- fied the types of benefit flows that could onstrated a range of characteristics. They could be expected over a 20 year period, making be legally binding or non-binding. They could be clear the size, sequence, and timing (“who- very formal or non-formal (i.e. along a spectrum gets-what-when-and-how much�) question at of a signed treaty to a verbal understanding or the heart of many dissensions in international handshake). They could start as a non-formal co- waters programs. The protracted negotia- operative arrangement and could develop into a tions among the Eastern Nile riparians also more formal type over time as confidence is built ended with an identified set of projects and as and when the political leadership is ready. accommodating the interests of the three The Syr Darya Agreement was a Framework countries. Clarity in the program not only Agreement with the hope of further subsidiary demonstrated benefit flows to a county but agreements. The Niger Basin Agreement included also to other countries. It was thus possible measures for notification and review, but was later to get a sense of relative benefits. Some at- supplemented by a strong Water Charter that tribute the lack of such a program in the past specified how interventions by one country on as a disincentive in Zambezi cooperation; the Niger River could be pursued. The Ganges ii. Clarifying ways of making changes in the Treaty followed years of temporary MOUs in the Program and monitoring and reporting. At ‘70s and ‘80s. The NBI was based on the signed the time, the Ganges Treaty was considered minutes of Ministers of Water Affairs and subse- an improvement over what was prevalent quent decisions by these Ministers on its gover- in terms of monitoring and dispute settle- nance and decision making process. Two of the ment.39 In the other basins, annual reviews agreements dealt with sharing of water quantity. offered the chance to share a transparent In other words, cooperative arrangements have picture of benefit and cost flows; and to fit the context and riparian preferences. Bilder iii. Linking benefits within a sector, or between (1981) catalogues an impressive inventory of non- sectors, or with the national economy or formal to formal agreements and measures to politics. The Syr Darya Agreement extended make them work in the context of international to water and power and responded to fis- agreements. Similarly, Fischhendler (2008a) de- cal conditions, all critical in the post Soviet scribes how ambiguity in agreements can be use- period for the Central Asian economies. The ful, as well as counter-productive (2008b). Again, Eastern Nile Program extended to energy, as in the case of institutional design, agreements flood and watershed management. The may become more formalized as trust and con- Ganges Treaty carried the promise of future fidence grow or events and circumstances mo- agreements on other shared rivers between tivate the countries to make changes in existing India and Bangladesh. Thus dialogue on arrangements. The evolution of the Niger Basin’s cooperation on water could be linked to regional entity from a Commission in the ‘60s to benefits within the water sector or to other an Authority in later years is an apt illustration of sectors in the national economy.40 such evolution. 4.1.5 Financing, Including Guarantees 4.1.4 Program Design The objective here is to meet the financing Here the objective is to present a program re- needs and gaps identified in the institutional/ sponding to the interests of the countries in line 39 Complaints have arisen since then. with their goals for development/cooperation. 40 See Dombrowsky (2010) for an interesting perspective on Key interventions towards this objective include, intra- and inter-sectoral linkages in deal making in water; and inter alia: Grey and Sadoff (2002) on benefits beyond water. 34 program design and agreed to by the countries. investment plans. In particular, there must be Demonstration of funds flows provides a reassur- support for the many costs of development ance that the promised benefits that need capital teams, for leasing of venues for negotia- would, in fact, become a reality on the ground. tions, and for the time of ministerial staff This need was very pronounced in the Eastern and advisors. Nile and Niger where countries emphasized the The size of financing required in each of the need to move from plans to action. In the latter, cases points to the need for multiple sources and countries were moving into plans for concrete hence to the need for a coordinated approach action after over 30 years of existence and were among financiers. None of the cases indicated therefore impatient to see positive results from evidence of guarantee arrangements, though cooperation. Financing was not a key element some may be used in the future. of the Ganges Treaty, proof that risk reduction measures should not follow a blueprint and would 4.1.6 Third Party Facilitation have to target specific risks in a basin at a The objective is to assist in riparian dialogue as given time. Key elements in Financing include, an unbiased third party. Key elements include: inter alia: Facilitating inter-country exchanges; interpreting i. Addressing the challenge of financing each other’s interests; helping to clarify mutually the agreed program through a detailed beneficial cooperation opportunities; extending component-wise analysis of resource needs assurances regarding the flow of cooperation and gaps; benefits; ensuring effective implementation of ii. Identifying and locating sources of financing, institutional mechanisms, any Agreements, and mobilizing financing partners and obtaining the Program. Donor partners were associated with commitments. These could include the ripar- 4 of the 5 cases at the request of the countries. In ian countries themselves, other countries, the case of the Niger Basin, partners signed a dec- external bilateral and multilateral partners, laration of support in 2004 in parallel to the coun- private sector sponsors and financiers. The tries resolving to pursue cooperative management Sustainable Development Action Program of the river. Where necessary and invited, partners and the Investment Program of the Niger have stepped in to facilitate dialogue among Basin narrowed its focus to the first phase countries. In the case of the Eastern Nile, partners covering 8 years and costing $1.8B and the have responded to specific requests for facilita- NBA set about mobilizing support for that tive assistance, especially in the formative years. phase. The Eastern Nile investment program USAID took the lead in Syr Darya and the Nordic was presented to donors in 2001 and com- countries likewise took the lead in the Zambezi. mitments of support obtained; and It is important for the countries to see the third iii. A particular aspect of financing is the sup- party as truly neutral and possessing the capacity port for regional public goods, i.e. coopera- to convene stakeholders and mobilize resources. tive institutions. In view of the observations that the presence of cooperative mecha- 4.1.7 Decision Legitimacy nisms and their robustness served the ends The objective is to ensure widespread support of conflict prevention and resolution, it is in for decisions on cooperation. Key interventions the interest of the countries and their friends include: providing forums for discussion with to create and sustain such public goods. official and civil society at national and regional However, the costs of establishing and sus- levels; modifying strategies taking stakeholder taining these can be significant over time. In inputs into account; ensuring legitimacy at the the cases reviewed, a combination of country highest levels of political leadership (Ministerial, and bilateral and international donor part- Heads of State); and allowing for inter-sectoral ners financed them over substantial periods and inter-Ministerial consensus. Approvals for of time, often for a decade or two. next steps in the Nile and Niger were obtained at iv. An additional consideration is financing of the Ministerial level and at the level of the chief the process itself. These long-term pro- executive (President/Prime Minister). In the Niger, cesses can be extremely costly, and must be Heads of State met periodically to address stra- a consideration when drafting finance and tegic issues and approve decisions. The highest 35 levels of political leadership, at federal and State be possible in some countries. However, strategic government levels, were involved in India and communication of leaders to their domestic con- Bangladesh for the Ganges Treaty.41 stituents throughout the process can help them to Participants in the case situations referred to gain and retain internal support. the need for a healthy national and international An indicative set of key Risk Reduction strate- discourse to present country interests, discuss gies employed in each of the case studies is out- alternatives, and identify winners and losers in lined in Table 4 on the following page. cooperative deals. The Nile 2002 conferences referred to earlier did provide a regional platform 4.2 Building Opportunity for forceful exchange of country viewpoints by academics and civil society organizations. Such Our analysis suggests that political opportunity exchanges to generate options to the status quo is a critical factor at play in decisions to cooper- within the countries would also be needed for ate or not over shared water resources. In all of strengthening of legitimacy of the final decision. our cases there was some evidence of the role of It is likely that fostering national debates, with the opportunity in moving countries to cooperate, and participation of civil society organizations, on sen- in some, opportunity seemed to be the driving sitive and strategic issues around water may not force. Countries may see a political opportunity, seize it and move to risk reduction to finalize a 41 Some countries require parliamentary approvals for inter- cooperation agreement. Or, in the process of national treaties. Figure 10. Paths to Cooperation Opportunity Countries most likely to make a deal Cost Bene�t B ene�t Risk Notes: When countries consider costs, benefits, risks and opportunities, they are positioned in one of the four quadrants on the Risks and Opportunities to Cooperation framework. To move to the northeast quadrant, a combination of risk reduction, opportunity enhancement, and benefit expansion sends them along various trajectories. 36 understanding the risks and exploring risk reduc- sions. Nevertheless, risk reduction measures may tion measures, countries may see new political still be needed to convert the opportunity into a opportunities in engaging in cooperative deals. At cooperative deal. In all of the cases where politi- times we found that political opportunity trumped cal opportunity motivated regional cooperation, residual risk. For example, leaders in both India specific risk reduction measures were still essen- and Bangladesh moved forward with the Ganges tial for the shaping and adoption of practical— Water Sharing Treaty despite some domestic and sustainable—agreements. resistance. Egypt and Ethiopia entered into a deal despite remaining risks. the Kyrgyz Republic and 4.3 Various Paths Uzbekistan signed the Syr Darya agreement with almost no risks removed. In all of these cases, to Cooperation the decision makers saw new opportunity on the horizon, due to regional changes in geopolitics or The diversity of risk reduction strategies needed global paradigm shifts. in fostering cooperative deals is further exempli- Political opportunity is therefore an important fied by examining the diversity of “paths to co- consideration in cooperation in international wa- operation� taken by countries. For example, our ters. Through such opportunities, countries and analysis found some situations where risk reduc- political leaders may: tion is a primary step, and others where benefit or ■■ Seek or declare their alliance/solidarity with opportunity expansion preceded risk reduction. a country or a group of countries. The objec- Figure 10 illustrates the various paths toward tive is to demonstrate support and solidarity cooperation, using the Risks and Opportunities to with neighbors. Soon after independence, Cooperation Framework. the Niger Basin countries formed the Niger There are two major implications of the “differ- Basin Commission, partly as a declaration of ent paths�: (1) The variety of risk reduction strat- regional solidarity and independence. egies usually needed, in line with the variety of ■■ Raise their regional/global profile. The objec- paths to cooperation, provides a strong rationale tive is to change or strengthen the current for partners to coordinate or pool their assistance image of the country in regional or global efforts in international waters rather than extend- politics. India’s motivation in the Ganges ing support separately. The work on cooperation Treaty was triggered by its new foreign in international waters is too vast for single- policy and was aimed at enhancing region- handed support; and (2) Solutions will have to be al relations. customized for a specific situation, following care- ful assessments. Blueprint solutions from “model� In such situations, a political opportunity can be river basins are unlikely to work. seen as a “door opener� for cooperation deci- 37 38 Table 4. Illustrative Risk Reduction Strategies by Basin Risk Reduction Eastern Nile Ganges Niger Syr Darya Zambezi Knowledge and Skills Studies including modeling Detailed studies of water Specific capacity build- Studies (modeling), study Training offered in planning part of the basin. flows. Lack of updated infor- ing program through tours, and technical and negotiations at country mation led to concerns later bilateral and collective effort assistance. and regional levels. Capacity building through about use of old data. of partners. basin wide program as well as Studies on basin develop- at country level. Briefs and notes on insti- ment options. tutional development, Just in time notes. communication, modeling, Strengthening of national river basin organizations. level transboundary manage- ment functions. Institutional Design Interim organization in line Layered decision- making Revitalization needed and Reliance on an available Interim arrangement while with mandate of NBI. including technical and politi- done. Reform study done, mechanism—the Syr Darya treaty being crafted. cal leadership. approved by Heads of State. Basin Organization. Some permanence through HQ Agreement for the Balance assured. ENTRO. Designation as a “Technical Office� met all interests. Role of ENTRO in national and regional agendas addressed. Third Party Facilitation Partners committed to fund- Bilateral. Partners support through Partners help with technical Partners active. ing immediate program in facilitation, technical assis- assistance through stud- June 2001 on request by the tance, studies, and financing. ies (modeling) and capacity three countries. building. Financing Financing sought for all Partners helped with first Partners funding of TA and activities. phase of IP. training. Risk Reduction Eastern Nile Ganges Niger Syr Darya Zambezi Design of the Interim agreement Long term to convey Framework with protocols Framework Agreement. Interim arrangement while Agreement predictability. that would follow later. Treaty being crafted. Interim Mandate to only advance Water, energy and economy Secretariat. Minister- approved program. Formal Agreement. linked. Broad general objectives— A framework for future agree- an “agreement to agree� on ments for other rivers in the working together. basin. Program Design Responsive to interests of Specifies water- sharing The SDAP and IP include spe- Mostly studies and training. countries. formula. cific projects and timing and Some ongoing coordination Short-term results, long-term sequence of various activi- activities. promises, backed by studies. ties, thus specifying who gets Specific activities to satisfy what and when. each country. Decision Legitimacy Ministries of Foreign affairs Federal, State and civil soci- NGOs involved. Many opportunities for con- and Heads of State involved. ety discussions. Some dissent sultations and discussions t between federal and state national and regional levels. Inter-country exchange governments and within civil through various forums. Less society. debate within the country. Highest levels of political leadership engaged. 39 5. Pointers For Partners P artners are attracted to river basin coop- with countries Opportunity eration because of the desirability of the will alert partners principles of integrated water resources to the risks seen Opportunity management and goals of conflict prevention. by countries in Enhancement Regional cooperation is seen as a valuable public accessing those Cost Bene�t good42 and partners feel they could play an exter- benefits through nal facilitator and honest broker role. Accordingly, any deals for co- Risk Reduction they act individually or collectively to support operative action. riparian countries in advancing the cooperation We suggest that agenda. In Chapter 5, we discuss pointers for this assessment Risk partner action for facing risks and identifying op- be done in two portunities. The intention of this chapter is to pro- phases. During vide insight and ideas for use in conjunction with the first phase, a preliminary analysis (Quick tools already available and in use. With that in Assessment) would involve a stock taking of avail- mind, providing the most stable platform possible able literature and experience of the entire basin for countries to work through their own issues is on the perception of all of the countries. Such an paramount throughout third party involvement. assessment could highlight benefits, risks and op- Partners should therefore consider these pointers portunities, and thereby offer good guidance as while continuing to emphasize commitment to to the preferred scale of engagement of devel- long-term goals, reasonable expectations, steadi- opment partners. The Quick Assessment is not a ness, and flexibility. substitute for a thorough assessment, but instead a starting point to get the process moving. 5.1 Specific Partner Actions 5.1.2 Choosing the Scale Figure 11 shows a suggested chronology of of Engagement partner actions that are elaborated in this section. Global dialogue has promoted cooperation in in- Once again, the goal is for countries to do much ternational waters to the extent that it is often dif- of this work on their own. The diagram below ficult to discount the full basin as the appropriate illustrates where and how partners can play a role unit with which to engage. Nevertheless, partners in the process upon request by the countries. In should question whether basin level engagement addition, the various steps of partner action are would be a fruitful exercise in certain situations, discussed hereafter. despite its desirability from the viewpoint of principles of integrated water resources manage- 5.1.1 Quick Assessment ment. For instance: The starting point is a baseline assessment of A country may pursue its development goals, the benefits and risks of cooperation in interna- but could have access to its own sources or pri- tional waters. Discussions of projected benefits vate sources of financing for its development program. The country may not see cooperation 42 See Sweden MFA (2001). This consultant report calls for an as a means of accessing capital, and indeed may International Shared Waters Facility and for a broad range of only see substantial risks in cooperative activities. support, while advocating support for sustained institutional development. 41 Figure 11. Timeline of Suggested Partner Actions Conduct Conduct Quick Risk Detailed Risk Engage in Risk Assessment Assessment Reduction Scale of Select S Select Risk Engagement Reduction Measures Reassessment Reconsideration of Cooperation Development Goals & Consideration of Ongoing – Consideration Agreement No Agreement of Bene�ts, Opportunities, Low enough risk & Risk too high or Cooperation Risks and Internal/ High enough opportunity Opportunity too low Regional Dialogue Notes: succession of potential partner interventions in risk assessment and risk reduction are shown on the top half of the diagram, with ongoing country considerations and actions shown on the bottom half. This is not meant to imply countries cannot take these actions themselves—rather, it is a guide for partners wishing to engage with willing coun- tries. Note the periodic reassessments that must occur, making this an iterative process. The diagram also shows how much time and effort is needed in moving to a deal. Unilateral action for water development or man- tions for partners at a country or sub-basin level. agement may be its preferred route. In particular, “knowledge work� through analyti- Partners may also conclude their Quick cal studies and stimulating country exposure to Assessment and find that the degree of conflict successful experiences of cooperation would be among the countries is too intense due to various good background and preparation in case an op- geopolitical factors or that the level of mistrust portunity for cooperation arises. among countries is extremely high. There could Selecting the appropriate scale of engagement be a reproduction of various bilateral and sub- is an important decision since each level demands regional conflicts at the basin level. Thus, the po- different time horizons of commitment, levels of litical context may not offer a positive climate for complexity, amounts of resources, and types of engagement at the basin level. expertise. There is not necessarily one “correct� Issues around cooperation may be so strate- scale to target in each situation—in fact, some gic that there is no room for third party action. basins may benefit most from multi-scale engage- Countries may consider information and issues ment. The intensity of engagement at each level— around international waters as highly classified country; cluster of countries; sub-basin; basin— or falling entirely within the domain of sover- could vary depending on the situation in the basin. eign governments with no space for outside Even when there is intense activity at the sub-ba- parties such as partners (Earle, Jagerskog and sin level, other less intense activities, e.g. capacity Ojendal, 2010). building or climate risk studies, could be pursued. In these situations, engaging on a sub-basin The point is to determine which level(s) of engage- (cluster of countries) or country level, to build ment are optimal for the given situation—e.g. cooperation from below, may be more appropri- where receptiveness (of the countries) and effec- ate. For instance, several bilateral agreements tiveness (of support) are both relatively high. preceded the revitalization of the Niger Basin When (and whether) to move between scales Authority, thus much confidence building had oc- is also an important decision. As much of this will curred before the NBA was reformed. Efforts to depend on political opportunity, it is important demonstrate the benefits of cooperation and to for partners to remain in tune with regional geo- analyze perceived risks may still be worthwhile ac- politics. Also, as cooperation is itself an iterative 42 process, periodic reassessments will be crucial. 5.1.4 Providing Risk Reduction Support Partner strategy may change as driven by the to Countries results of the assessments. This is discussed fur- Third parties can actively engage countries in ther below. risk reduction. Table 5 on the following page provides examples from our cases for interven- 5.1.3 Detailed Assessment of Risks and tions related to each of the seven risk reduc- Risk Reduction Measures tion strategies. Following, we elaborate on Once the scale of engagement is determined, three of the measures—Knowledge and Skill a second phase analysis would include detailed Building, Financing, and Third Party Facilitation/ assessments of risks, followed by discussions with Guarantee—in greater detail. the concerned countries. A careful analysis here Knowledge and Skill Building. Partners can is critical in order to choose the most useful risk support the preparation of new or (updates of reduction strategies. The level of difficulty associ- old) studies that identify basin wide biophysical, ated with this process will vary. In some cases, a economic, environmental and social characteris- country may clearly articulate its perception and tics as well as water availability, current use and the risk may be fairly easy to identify. In other expected demand and supply. Modeling can cases, a country may speak about a particular examine a variety of scenarios of further avail- risk, but discussions with the country and careful ability, use and demand and changing features of “listening� may point to another concern that is the basin, including cumulative impacts of invest- pre-occupying the country. So dialogue and due ments and land use strategies and impacts of cli- diligence will be needed to fully understand all of mate variability and change. Frontier study areas the risks that the country is facing. This report has need funding and intellectual support. During hopefully offered guidance on the types of risks the period of dialogue among countries, there that are commonly found. will be many occasions when there will be need Once the set of risks is clearly identified, for just-in-time notes and analysis. Confidential the selection of a risk reduction strategy calls critiques may be required. GEF- supported for reviewing the menu of options and selecting Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis and Strategic the applicable package of interventions. Partners Action Plan have proven to be useful avenues for may choose from the seven risk reduction strate- advancing studies and dialogue in international gies presented in Chapter 4. Partners can find waters. These instruments have been effectively potential roles for themselves with respect to used in the Senegal, Niger, Mekong, and Aral Sea each type of risk reduction strategy. In the case basins. Donor support for advancing knowledge of complex multi-country settings, third party has been particularly useful in: long neglected facilitation is a particularly critical function and technical and engineering feasibility studies and partners are well-disposed to carry out or support in exploring new specialty areas (benefits sharing such a function. analysis; environmental flows; impacts of climate It will be important to seek validation from ex- variability and change; strategic environmental perts on the selected measures. The advice of a and social analysis; cumulative impacts analysis). selected number of regional specialists and politi- Similarly, partners have a long tradition of sup- cal leaders to review and validate—and revisit if porting a variety of capacity building activities in necessary—the detailed assessment for accuracy international rives. With reference to cooperation, is critical. Their knowledge of the basin situation the development of transboundary capacities and input on the risk analysis and risk reduction within the Water Ministries and incorporation of strategy will help a great deal. A way to access considerations of international waters in national such expertise is through the formation of an policies are areas in which partners could provide advisory group of two to three members who are support. Specific skill building in selected fields knowledgeable about the basin and the coun- such as negotiation, modeling, communication, re- tries involved. This group can be called upon to gional impact analysis, etc. has also been welcome validate the findings of the assessment and the areas for partners support to riparian countries. type of risk reduction measures identified. Partner Third Party Facilitation. In cases where third agencies may also have such regional specialists party facilitation is sought by riparian countries, on their rolls. partners could play a significant role. Cooperative 43 44 Table 5. Illustrative Risk Reduction Support Measures Strategy Specific Intervention Major Lesson Institutional NBI was a transitional arrangement, and was not mandated to manage Nile waters. The regional institution must Design respond to the desired inten- The revitalization of the NBA included a major institutional reform program and the infusion of the NBA’s formal structure with people and processes that made it work. sity of cooperation and needs of the political leadership at a given Interim secretariat set up for ZAMCOM in the absence of a formal agreement among Zambezi countries. time. Agreement NBI was a “light agreement� with few obligations and with ease of exit. The strength, duration and con- Design tent of an agreement must The 30-year duration of the bilateral deal between India and Bangladesh provided some predictability. respond to countries’ needs and The NBA Agreement provided for notification and review. the regional geopolitical climate. The Syr Darya agreement linked salient regional issues of water and energy. Program A package of investments organized for the Eastern Nile accommodated the interests of all the countries. Useful to demonstrate the types Design of benefits that will accrue and a NBA program clearly reflected the size, sequence and flow of benefits to the countries. transparent means for the coun- ZAMCOM’s program did not include a clear portfolio of investments. tries to understand relative gains. The Syr Darya program accommodated the needs of the upstream and downstream countries. Financing Multi- and bi-lateral funds for the NBI were mobilized through a Consultative Group and later through a multi-donor Trust Fund as well Demonstrating financial support and as regular investment channels. reassures benefits will accrue. Guarantees Financing plan makes transparent Commitments were obtained for the first phase of the ENSAP Investment Program. the details of funds flow. Financing of development needs not spelled out in the Zambezi program. Third Party The Bank and partners were present at the NBI table and offered facilitation services as requested. Partners can offer helpful third Facilitation party support, if countries The Bank and partners signed a parallel charter of support to the country led Niger Basin Program. request. Honest third party bro- Minimal direct third party involvement in the Ganges. kering can play a critical role. USAID provided facilitation, capacity building and some financing in the Syr Darya. Decision Approval for advancing the Eastern Nile program was obtained at the Ministerial level as well as at the highest political level, e.g., Prime Broad based support for coopera- Legitimacy Minister. tive deals helps with agreement Heads of State approved NBA’s revitalization strategy and the SDAP/IP. stability. National discourse and civil society participation are Highest levels of political leadership were involved in India and Bangladesh—both federal and provincial level endorsements allowed important in the long run. for a more stable agreement. Expanding Parallel Nile basin-wide programs were launched for capacity building and strengthening functions at the country level. Appropriate studies and “fact Knowledge Studies and modeling carried out in preparation for NBA’s SDAP demonstrated basin development scenarios and potential impacts on building� can help countries see and Skill the river. benefits and persuade them to Several studies identified strategies for IWRM in the Zambezi, but failed to level country capacities. discard some risks. management in river basins usually take time, 5.2 Additional Considerations often decades. Countries generally move in non- linear paths from unilateral to cooperative action. 5.2.1 Coordinating Support At various stages, third party facilitation can help Given the multiplicity of interventions that may in aiding interaction and communication across be needed to foster cooperation, especially in borders and across (national, thematic, sectoral) high-risk situations, there is much merit in under- boundaries within and across countries. A neu- taking a coordinated approach to partner sup- tral country, a development partner, or a private port. This is also desirable in view of the generally sector sponsor could facilitate dialogue. This will long time needed (10 to 20 years) for cooperation require the ability of the country/partner/sponsor endeavors to bear fruit and the need to build on to organize, convene and mediate various types the comparative strengths and capacities of the of interaction, at various levels, and at various various partners. times, complemented by studies and technical as- A helpful way forward for partners would be sistance. Listening skills on the part of third party to coordinate support to the countries. Without facilitators will be critical. being overly idealistic about “harmonization,�44 The line between facilitation and active diplo- coordination of support would help assist coun- macy is blurred. There may be tendencies (and tries with a whole range of interventions that temptations) to cross from one mode of engage- may be needed, especially in the case of high- ment to the other. It is recommended that the risk situations. An example is the Nile Basin Trust team periodically reflect on its work and generate Fund, a multi-donor resource pool aligned to the continuous feedback on style and substance of in- objectives and programs of the Nile countries, teraction between the partner and the countries. established by partners in 2003 and executed by Financing and Guarantees. Identifying, mo- the World Bank.45 The Cooperation Framework bilizing and delivering financing for the coop- signed by partners in April 2004 for the Niger erative program and related investments is an River Basin, following the declaration of commit- important risk reduction measure. Partners can ment by the Niger Basin countries to sustainable act as conveners and financiers in support of ri- and cooperative development of the shared parian programs. In all the cases studies for this river, is a slightly different, but equally workable report, except in the Ganges, partners extended example. Here, partners agreed on a set of prin- financial assistance ranging from grants to loans. ciples, then directed their financial and technical Elsewhere, guarantees have been an effective assistance directly to the Niger Basin Authority means of completing the financial support pack- rather than through a common pool, periodically age. Financing must be treated as an integral part engaging in dialogue with one another to maxi- of the support to riparians to complement other mize coordination of their efforts. Both the Nile risk reduction measures such as the preparation and Niger programs motivate partners to align of the agreement and program design and to their efforts with riparian priorities. signal assurances that the expected benefits from The coordinated approach also offers the cooperation will in fact flow as planned. chance to capitalize on mutual strengths. Some A great deal of support for the countries will be partners are better able to act as conveners, oth- needed in the early stages of river basin coopera- ers as project financiers, and yet others as knowl- tion. Such support is crucial for the start up of edge facilitators. All of these strengths/capacities such complex ventures. In the past, several UN are needed during the long road to cooperation agencies, in particular UNDP, have played stellar in international waters. It is cost-effective to co- roles in supporting countries through the nascent ordinate and tap comparative strengths in aiding stages of cooperation, especially after Rio 1992. countries moving in the direction of cooperation. Some of the bilateral and multilateral donor agencies have also invested heavily in invaluable 44 A political leader observed that he was excited that partners were willing to support the countries in international start-up efforts. GEF’s instruments in international waters and added that, in turn, countries may have to help waters are a helpful means of getting started.43 partners cooperate among themselves! 45 Of the 17 partners participating in the Trust Fund activi- ties, 10 contribute to the Fund and 7 do not. The latter di- rectly finance the Nile Basin initiative. Nevertheless, they par- 43 These have been used with very positive effects in the ticipate in Trust Fund meetings to ensure a reasonable level of Senegal and Niger river basins. coordinated action. 45 5.2.2 Dealing with Intra-Agency Issues policy-making. They can stand ready to extend Cooperation deals are desirable, yet the out- support should leaders move to strike a deal. In comes of efforts to foster cooperation are full addition, the types of questions partners might of uncertainties. So high-level champions within ask to enhance movement northward along the partner agencies will have to legitimize and com- opportunity-enhancement axis would include: mit the agencies for such activities, even while What makes a potential agreement politically facing the probability of failures and setbacks in palatable, or even desirable? How can institu- cooperation in international waters. Such a sce- tional design or any other risk reduction strategy nario also implies the need for selectivity since it enhance the political favorability and vice versa? is impossible to deal with several river basins and The nature of such opportunities in the context of countries at the same time. international waters, and options to enhance such The time needed and the uncertainties of opportunities, are areas for further investigation. results could be highly demotivating for work teams. Quick results are not realistic expectations, 5.2.4 Dealing with the Dynamic Nature given the perceived risks discussed earlier in this of Cooperation Deals paper.46 Accordingly, process outcomes (e.g., Our analysis indicates that cooperation is an itera- rules of engagement; institutional development; tive process in which benefits/costs and oppor- preparation of plans) may have to be legitimized tunities/risks are constantly changing and de- alongside of more concrete development out- manding of attention. At times when cooperation comes, especially in the early years of coopera- occurs, whether due to substantial risk reduction tion. Hence monitoring and evaluation should measures, or through a combination of risk reduc- receive a lot of attention at the planning stage of tion and political opportunity, it is not necessarily such work. Results frameworks may often need sustained far into the future. At other times, coop- to give special attention to “what success looks erative arrangements grow and evolve into robust like� in the work on international waters during institutions that not only “stand the test of time,� an evolving process of cooperation. Particularly in but also evolve with the times. Thus reassessments view of the length of time needed and uncertain- are key over the long term—as situations change, ties of outcomes, communication of outputs and identifying what is different will be an important outcomes is critical for teams engaged in interna- step in sustaining or strengthening cooperation. tional waters. Often, progress is followed or accompanied by regression. Countries may take one step forward 5.2.3 Anticipating Opportunity and two steps backward. Importantly, these back- Political opportunity is an important consider- ward steps can occur even after an agreement is ation in cooperation in international waters. The reached, highlighting the fragile nature of interna- dilemma is that political opportunity is unpredict- tional agreements. Furthermore, the flux in geo- able and often depends on issues outside of the politics and uncertainties of hydrology add a fur- water arena. For example, a change in regime can ther dimension of complexity to cooperation and shift a country’s position regarding a particular is a caution against seeking “permanent fixes� in agreement. Shift in trade patterns can influence cooperation deals. Accounting for the fragility and cooperation in water. As such, identifying and for the many uncertainties demands adaptability seizing political opportunities are activities that and flexibility in the cooperative arrangements. are largely in the domain of political leaders in the This seems to be particularly important for the riparian countries. cases of cooperative agreements that involved Are there actions that partners can take to ad- detailed quantitative water sharing formulae. vance opportunities? This is not clear to us from On the flip side, even brief periods of coopera- the cases. Surely, staying on top of geopolitics of tion can offer opportunities to implement projects the basin is important for those promoting coop- or institutions that “scale up� cooperation to have eration. Partners can track and monitor political lasting and long-term impacts. When hydropoliti- developments and analyze the expected effects cal relations are strained in a basin, evaluating of global and regional geopolitics on national potential interventions against political realities becomes imperative. Regardless of the current 46 A sage advice is that work on international waters is not relations, activities designed to be both sensitive good for those starting out on their water careers! to existing realities and help move countries to- 46 wards greater cooperation could be fruitful. Such international waters work is to translate this “cooperation-inducing interventions� will need advice into action.� further careful reflection. The cases demonstrated a laudable sensitiv- ity to the political economy dimension among 5.3 Systematic, partner teams working in international waters. Evidence of application of risk reduction mea- Iterative Action sures to knotty situations in the cases attests to this observation. What appears to be needed is a The Implementation Progress Report of the more systematic approach to analyzing the risks Bank’s Water Resources Sector Strategy noted and formulating a risk reduction strategy, includ- the constraints and challenges of coop- ing tapping expert advice. The approach should eration in international waters and observed: help teams identify appropriate rather than ideal, “Understanding the political economy dimensions and flexible rather than permanent cooperative of transboundary engagement through upstream arrangements. We also need a clear understand- analytical work, and technical assistance are ing that the risk analysis and support for risk critical in reducing the risk profile of investment reduction are iterative processes and thus need projects. The challenge for those engaging in continued and consistent action over time. 47 6. Conclusion: Lessons Learned T he Bank’s Operational Policy on study reviewed a slice of the experience, by ex- International Waterways calls for proactive ploring related risks and mechanisms for reduc- action to foster cooperation in international ing those risks to ultimately further cooperation waters: “The Bank recognizes that the coopera- based on a sample of cases. Chapter 2 exempli- tion and goodwill of riparians is essential for the fied the diversity of risks associated with engag- efficient use and protection of the waterway. ing in cooperation over international waters. Therefore, it attaches great importance to riparians Chapters 3 and 4 presented a possible inventory making appropriate agreements or arrangements of types of risks of cooperation perceived by for these purposes for the entire waterway or any countries and of related risk reduction strategies, part thereof. The Bank stands ready to assist ripar- and Chapter 5 outlined potential steps for part- ians in achieving this end (World Bank, 2001).�  ners in promoting cooperation and reducing risks. The Bank and partners have indeed shown a This chapter presents key “take-home� messages keen interest in supporting “riparians making from the study. A summary of these messages is appropriate agreements or arrangements.� This illustrated in Figure 12. Figure 12. Lessons Learned Opportunity On Opportunity and Opportunity Enhancement: 1. Opportunities can outweigh residual risks 2. Geopolitics are dif�cult to predict, so anticipation is critical 3. National, regional and global events affect opportunity Cost On Supporting Cooperation: Bene�t 1. Long term time commitment is likely 2. Deals are dynamic On Risk and Risk Reduction: 1. Risks are less studied, but critical in country decision making 2. Countries are not unitary actors; there are several stakeholders 3. Individual decision makers matter; champions are key 4. Solutions must be devised for situations and match needs 5. A diversity of interventions is needed Risk 49 Risks will most likely require a diversity of in- 6.1 On Risk and Risk terventions. It will typically take more than a sin- Reduction gle action to reduce a given risk. A creative and diverse approach is recommended, usually requir- Risks are less studied, but critical in decision ing a mix of interventions. This need is a sound making. Several previous studies have focused rationale for coordination of partner actions. on the economic benefits and costs to coopera- tion over water. Though some more recent work 6.2 On Opportunity and has explored expanded benefits that can result from cooperation, little attention has been Opportunity Enhancement paid to the role of political economy in decision making and country perception of risks, in Opportunities can outweigh residual risks. Even particular. Thus, this study addresses an if risks remain, countries may cooperate if certain important gap in knowledge on the topic of political opportunities or gains become appar- international waters. ent. Opportunity is therefore a powerful factor in Countries are not unitary actors. Instead, determining the outcome of a cooperation offer. several stakeholders are likely involved. This is an area for further study. Sometimes, use of the term “country decision- Politics is difficult to predict, so anticipation is making� can imply that a country is a unitary ac- critical. Laying the foundation for cooperation by tor, thus losing the diversity of interests within a reducing risks will prepare countries for deals. For country. It is important to recognize that dynamics partners engaging countries in cooperation, stay- within each country influence the likelihood of ing abreast of regional geopolitics is important, cooperation. Stakeholder voices and the national so when the time is ripe for cooperation, action discourse are critical elements in the decision can be taken. making process. National, regional, and global events all affect Individual decision makers matter. Champions opportunity. Changes at any scale can create or are key. At times, it is the vision, will, charisma, or change opportunity. personal politics of a certain decision maker in a country that determines whether or not a deal is made. Hence motives of individual decision mak- 6.3 On Supporting ers matter. By extension, the same can be said of Cooperation partners and teams as they set out to facilitate and support the cooperation process. Long-term time commitment is likely. Solutions must be devised for situations. Cooperation takes several years of planning and These solutions should match country needs. confidence building, often before negotiations There is no blueprint or one-size-fits-all approach even begin. that will ensure success. For partners, it is impera- Deals are dynamic. Once a deal is reached, tive to invest the necessary time and resources to the situation does not become static. Deals can produce the most appropriate solution possible be fragile, and fall apart or evolve and grow into for the situation at hand. Fit for purpose rem- stronger and more sustainable arrangements. edies rather than “model� river basin solutions Accordingly, periodic assessments are needed to are needed. reflect a proper diagnosis of current realities. 50 References African Union Conference of Ministers in charge Bilder R.B. 1981. Managing the Risks of of Energy (AUCME). November 5, 2010. International Agreement. Madison, WI: Maputo declaration. University of Wisconsin Press. Alam U., O. Dione and P. 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This attention is has been developed and promoted by the UN indeed warranted, given that there are over 260 and both affiliated and unaffiliated international international rivers (Wolf et al., 1999) and over legal organizations, with the goal of establishing 270 shared aquifers (UNESCO-IHP, 2008). The a common global “law� recognized and adopted topic has evolved following a shift in focus from by sovereign nations. These organizations have navigation to non-navigational uses of rivers. attempted, through efforts dating back to 1911, Concurrently, scientific understanding of the com- to set rules that balance state sovereignty with plexity of hydrological processes, including the regional interests and “good neighbor� responsi- interconnectedness of surface and ground water, bilities. The global environmental movement, the has deepened. Together, these factors have ne- “environment stream,� has contributed concepts cessitated a broader and more integrated ap- such as ecosystem health, the drainage basin and proach to water resources management, includ- integration. The UN has hosted global conferenc- ing where water intersects political boundaries. es to facilitate communication of these concepts Because of the inherent political difficulties as- and the drafting of plans for adopting them, sociated with IW, bilateral and multilateral agree- beginning at Stockholm in 1972. International ments among co-riparians are increasingly being environmental organizations have also asserted promoted to avert or mitigate conflict. These influence through this stream. For example, the agreements are typically supported by manage- Global Environment Facility has taken the lead ment frameworks that have been shaped by the in financing new IW initiatives through its sup- global discourse on IW. port for UNDP, UNEP and World Bank executed The salience of IW is currently demonstrated grants. Finally and most recently, IWRM has through targeted efforts by several countries emerged as the new paradigm for water manage- and organizations that include their bilateral ment at many scales, including the international partners as well as global institutions such as river basin level. People and institutions associ- the UN Agencies, the World Water Council, the ated with the “IWRM stream� have defined the Global Water Partnership and the multilateral concept of participatory basin level management development banks. Additionally, IW is now find- and are institutionalizing it in countries and in the ing a place in international events like the World regions with support from institutions such as the Water Forum and the Stockholm World Water Global Water Partnership. The current discourse Week. Three major sources, or “streams,� of in- on IW has been informed and influenced by the fluence have contributed to the growing global debates around these three streams. 47 Comments on an earlier version of this Note from Torkil Jonch Clausen, Charles di Leva, Al Duda, and Ivan Zavasky are 48 The IWRM stream was also inspired by Rio 1992 and the acknowledged with appreciation Johannesburg WSSD Plan of Implementation. 55 International Water Law—the of these principles take a national rather than regional standpoint. Legal Stream Beginning in 1911, a legal framework for in- ternational waters began to take form, due to Demand for non-navigational uses of rivers, such the collective efforts of three organizations—the as hydropower and irrigation, intensified in the International Institute of Law, the International first half of the 20th century (Elver, 2006). Because Law Association, and the International Law previously established international water law Commission. Collectively, these three organi- was designed to deal solely with river navigation zations have formulated the bulk of global IW (Elver, 2006; Salman, 2007), there was no formula policy over the past century (see Table A1). for addressing emerging competing uses. As The International law Commission is associated states attempted to reconcile their differences on with the United Nations, while the International a case-by-case basis, tensions became evident, Institute of Law and International Law Association particularly in regard to state sovereignty and (ILA) are well-respected scholarly organizations, riparian rights. In the early years, the only pub- with influence but no direct affiliation to sover- lic approach taken by states depended almost eign states. Rules and resolutions established by exclusively on their own economic interests. For these organizations are not legally binding unless example, in 1895 the U.S. endorsed the principle adopted and ratified by the relevant states. of absolute sovereignty when Attorney General While the International Law Commission has Harmon pronounced that the United States drafted many recent and formal proposed re- was not obligated to consider how its upstream gimes pertaining to international waters, earlier uses of the Rio Grande would impact Mexico and arguably equally influential work, including downstream (Salman, 2007). On the other hand, the Helskinki Rules, was undertaken by the ILA downstream riparians, who often preceded up- and the International Institute of Law. In 1911, stream states in riparian use (Beaumont, 2000), the International Institute of Law issued the tended to favor the principle of absolute territo- International Regulations Regarding the Use of rial integrity, in which upstream states must defer International Watercourses for the Purposes other to downstream users (Salman, 2007). Even though than Navigation, often referred to as the Madrid both principles apply to international waters, both Declaration (Beaumont, 2000). Through this dec- Table A1. Legal Influences and Associated Contributions, 1911–2008 Date Legal Influence Major Contribution(s) to IW 1911 Madrid Declaration Interdependency; “no significant harm�; no modifying “essential� river characteristics 1956 Dubrovnik Statement “Equitable and reasonable use� 1958 New York Resolution “Beneficial use� 1961 Salzburg Resolution N/A 1966 Helsinki Rules Surface water/groundwater connectivity; no priority of use; “no significant harm� not included as a separate provision 1982 Complementary Rules… Mitigation of impact; compensation for injury 1986 Rules on International Management of groundwater both connected and not connected to surface water Groundwater 1997 UN Watercourse Convention Participation; information sharing; revived “no significant harm� but placed it as infe- rior to “equitable and reasonable use� 2000 Campione Consolidation N/A 2004 Berlin Rules Stated “no significant harm� and “equitable and reasonable use� as equal; applicable to domestic basins 2008 UN Law on [IW] Aquifers… “Equitable and reasonable utilization� rather than “use� 56 laration, the interdependent nature of co-riparians was a stand-alone provision on no significant was established, as well as the earliest version of harm, though it was included as an element for the principle of no significant harm, described as determining which utilizations are reasonable and a state’s obligation to not unduly interfere with equitable (Salman, 2007). This principle—as ell as co-riparian uses of a shared river (Teclaff, 1996). its relationship to other principles and its appro- Thus the principle of absolute sovereignty, though priateness in general -- was continually debated never universally accepted, was at that time chal- over the next several decades. lenged in the global arena (Salman, 2007) and Following its adoption of the Helsinki Rules, a more conservative concept, limited territorial the International Law Association continued sovereignty, became the universally recognized to explore the topic of international waters, principle. The Madrid Declaration also set down a first augmenting then eventually consolidat- rule that essential characteristics of a shared river ing the Rules. In 1982, the ILA adopted the could not be seriously modified by use (Teclaff, Complementary Rules Applicable to International 1996), which may be regarded today as a refer- Water Resources, which added provisions such as ence to environmental sustainability. mitigation of harm and compensation for injury In 1956, the ILA issued the Dubrovnik (Salman, 2007). Then, in 1986, the ILA adopted Statement, which confirmed sovereign state con- the Rules on transboundary Groundwater, which trol over transboundary waters and at the same applied to all groundwaters, not just those con- time emphasized consideration of impacts on nected to surface waters, as was the case with co-riparians. This Statement marked the emer- the Helsinki Rules (Teclaff, 1996). The ILA then gence of the principle of equitable and reason- consolidated its work from the 1960s-1990s able use in international water policy (Salman, into a single set of rules. This document, the 2007). The principle originated from riparian Campione Consolidation of the International rights in England and Wales, and was already be- Law Association Rules on International Water ing applied to dispute resolution within the U.S. Resources, 1966–1999, was adopted in London in (Beaumont, 2000). Two years later, the ILA’s New 2000 (Salman, 2007). York Resolution refined the equitable and reason- Concurrently, at the request of the UN, the able use to pertain specifically to beneficial uses. International Law Commission drafted its own And in 1961, the International Institute of Law set of rules on shared waters. Over 25 years in adopted the Salzburg Resolution, which empha- the making, the UN Convention on the Non- sized conjunctively equitable and reasonable use navigational Uses of International Watercourses and no significant harm (Salman, 2007). Finally, in (“Watercourse Convention�) was finalized in 1966, the ILA attempted to incorporate many of 1997, though it has yet to be ratified or ac- these concepts into a concise set of rules when ceded by the required number of states to of- it formulated and adopted the Helsinki Rules ficially enter into force. Even so, the Watercourse on the Non-navigational Uses of International Convention has been used as a model for several Watercourses (“Helsinki Rules�). inter-state agreements since, including the 2000 The Helsinki Rules were accepted by a number Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses of of riparian states and served as the basis of sev- the SADC (Beaumont, 2000). The Watercourse eral bilateral agreements (Dellapenna and Gupta, Convention is generally regarded as the mod- 2008) and dispute settlements (Salman, 2007), ern template for managing international rivers; leading up to the 1990’s when the International however, the International Law Commission Law Commission drafted its own set of similar chose not to include groundwater (Beaumont, rules. The Helsinki Rules rearticulated the prin- 2000). The International Law Association viewed ciple of equitable and reasonable use (Dellapenna this omission as a major flaw in the Watercourse and Gupta, 2009; Salman, 2007; Teclaff, 1996). Convention and was subsequently motivated to It was also the first international legal framework draft yet another set of rules itself a few years to acknowledge the connection between surface later (Salman, 2007). water and groundwater (Salman, 2007; Teclaff, The Watercourse Convention includes principles 1996) and to address navigational and non-navi- of participation, cooperation, compensation for gational uses conjunctively, explicitly stating that harm, data and information sharing, and atten- no use takes inherent priority over another use tion to vital human needs (Beaumont, 2000). Most (Salman, 2007). Lacking from the Helsinki Rules significantly, it reiterates the principle of equitable 57 and reasonable use from the Helsinki Rules and ■■ It integrated domestic and international revives the principle of no significant harm from water law, so was not limited in scope to in- previous International Institute of Law and ILA ternational basins, but also applied to basins frameworks (Beaumont, 2000). Though both prin- within a state (Dellapenna and Gupta, 2008). ciples are set forth in the Convention, analysis by The most recent development in the legal legal experts suggests that the former takes pre- stream was the International Law Commission’s cedence over the latter (Salman, 2007). Indeed, adoption in 2008 of its separate formula- the International Court of Justice (ICJ) endorsed tion pertaining to groundwater—the Law of this prioritization of principles in 1997 when set- Transboundary Aquifers (ILC, 2008). The general tling a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia principles of the Law of Transboundary Aquifers over a dispute related to a dam on the Danube— mirror those in the Watercourse Convention, with the ICJ referred to equitable and reasonable use one minor, yet potentially significant, change in without referring to no significant harm. language: the principle of equitable and reason- Following the Watercourse Convention, it was able use from the Watercourse Convention has apparent that a few issues still required atten- been changed to equitable and reasonable uti- tion—the integration of groundwater into inter- lization (Eckstein, 2007). According to Eckstein national water law and the balance between the (2007), this alteration broadens the scope of the seemingly competing principles of equitable and principle in that “use� relates only to the purpose reasonable use and no significant harm. Thus, the for the water, while “utilization� also relates to ILA revisited its Helsinki and subsequent Rules, the mechanism and methodology of that purpose altering language to address gaps and shortcom- (Eckstein, 2007). In addition, though the principle ings (Salman, 2007). In 2004, the ILA adopted the of no significant harm is included, this was exten- Berlin Rules on Water Resources (Dellapenna and sivelydebated, because assessing harm to aqui- Gupta, 2008). The Berlin Rules made two contri- fers is exponentially more complex than assessing butions to global policy on international waters: harm to rivers (Eckstein, 2007). ■■ It presented the aforementioned principles as equal, by stating, “Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the wa- The Global Environmental ters of an international drainage basin in an Movement— equitable and reasonable manner having due regard for the obligation not to cause signifi- the Environment Stream cant harm to other basin States (ILA, 2004: The global environmental movement that began Article 12:1).� in the 1970s, primarily in developed countries, Table A2. Environmental Influences and Associated Contributions, 1965–2002 Date Environmental Influence Major contribution(s) to IW 1965 International Hydrological Decade Global water awareness; became IHP 1972 UN Stockholm—Human Environment Ecosystems approach to resource management 1977 UN Mar del Plata—Water Integrated planning for water management; systems approach 1991 GEF established. New instruments in 1994. Implementation mechanism for transboundary resource manage- ment, including water 1992 Dublin Conference on Water & Environment River basin as management unit; integrated planning and develop- ment of shared waters; joint management 1992 UN Rio de Janeiro—Environment & Devel. IWRM; holistic management; GWP envisioned 2001 Bonn Conf. on Freshwater Harmony with nature 2002 UN Johannesburg—Sustainable Devel. Promoted further implementation of Agenda 21, Chapter 18 Notes: the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 1981-90 focused primarily on a sector, rather than IW. 58 advanced a holistic approach to natural resources Included among these was the first reference to management, which included water. As it became integrated water resources management (IWRM) clear that water—particularly its degradation in a global setting: Section D49 calls for increased and scarcity—was a priority topic of concern, IW attention to integrated planning of water man- gained attention. It was already apparent that the agement (Falkenmark, 1977), building upon the past paradigm of water management emphasiz- integrated approach to general resource manage- ing economic growth and unilateral development ment advocated in the Stockholm Declaration, as was not a sustainable path forward (Elver, 2006). well as a systems approach. Probably the most The fragmented management of the past had relevant provisions are contained in Section H: proved environmentally damaging and unsustain- International Cooperation, where principles that able; thus new management regimes that target- closely resemble those highlighted above in the ed ecosystems and drainage basins were prof- discussion of the legal stream can be found. fered as alternatives. For IW this would eventually These include (adapted from Falkenmark, 1977; mean “joint management� and “integration� and Beaumont, 2000): among co-riparians. The UN took the initial lead ■■ Territorial sovereignty on this movement in the early 1970s, and others ■■ Equality carried the baton in the 1990s (see Table A2). ■■ The duality of both sovereign right to use The United Nations held its first global environ- resources and the duty to not cause harm mental conference in 1972—the Conference to neighbors on the Human Environment in Stockholm. ■■ Equitable utilization of resources to promote This was the beginning of a series of mega- solidarity and cooperation conferences hosted by the United Nations over the next two decades (Biswas, 2003). A major The growing interest in transboundary environ- output from this conference was the Stockholm mental issues led to the creation of the Global Declaration, a set of principles regarding the re- Environment Facility (GEF) by the global commu- lationship between humans and the environment. nity in 1991. The GEF was tasked with promoting The principles stress the importance of sustain- international cooperation around environmental able development that emphasizes environmental protection in six areas, one of which was interna- and social dimensions along with economic and tional waters (Gerlak, 2004) within the context of integrated regional planning. Additional consider- overall water resources management. By 1994, ations include impacts on neighboring states the GEF was serving as a funding mechanism for and retaining state sovereignty (see UNCHE, environmental projects and services, relying on 1972). Most notably, the Stockholm Declaration the World Bank, the United Nations Development advocates an ecosystems approach to natural re- Program (UNDP) and the United Nations source management (Teclaff, 1996), which Environmental Program (UNEP) for project consequently set a precedent for holistically implementation (Gerlak, 2004). managing water. In 1992, the UN held the Conference on the Around this time, the United Nation’s Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. International Hydrological Decade was com- Water scarcity was one of the four target issue ing to a close. The International Hydrological areas tackled at Rio (UNDPI, 1997). The confer- Programme (IHP) was born out of this period of 49 Mar del Plata Action Plan on the World’s Water Resources: awareness, officially established under UNESCO Recommendations: Section D. Policy Planning and Manage- in 1975 (Varady, Meehan and McGovern, 2009). ment, “Increased attention should be paid to the integrated planning of water management. Integrated policies and Though the decade did not in and of itself make legislative and administrative guidelines are needed so as to direct contributions to IW, today the IHP is in- ensure a good adaptation of resources to needs and reduce, volved in two relevant IW programs (UNESCO, if necessary, the risk of serious supply shortages and ecologi- cal damage, to ensure public acceptance of planned water 2011), discussed further below. schemes and to ensure their financing. Particular consideration In 1977, the UN hosted the Conference on should be given not only to the cost-effectiveness of planned water schemes, but also to ensuring optimal social benefits Water, in Mar del Plata..At the close of the con- of water resources use, as well as to the protection of human ference, the UN presented the Mar del Plata health and the environment as a whole. Attention should also Action Plan, which, though not entirely specific to be paid to the shift from single-purpose to multipurpose water resources development as the degree of development of international waters, contained several relevant water resources and water use in river basins increases… (from provisions in the “recommendations� section. Falkenmark, 1977, p. 223).� 59 ence stimulated the drafting of Agenda 21, a (2002). Bonn—like Dublin a decade earlier—was framework to guide global resource manage- a preparatory meeting for the upcoming UN ment. Chapter 18 outlines seven program areas mega-conference (Rahaman and Varis, 2005). The for freshwater, of which IWRM is the first. Section major output of Bonn was the Bonn Keys, a docu- A of Chapter 18 advocates holistic management ment that in essence summarizes conference’s and integrated management, including basin- Recommendations for Action. One of the five wide joint management of shared water resources Bonn Keys promotes cooperation and harmony (UNCED, 1992a). A complimentary document, with nature in water management, including the Rio Declaration, echoes the core resource transboundary basins (FMENCNS, 2001). management principles found in the Stockholm Johannesburg advocated IWRM at all scales, Declaration, the Mar del Plata Action Plan and in but did not speak directly to international wa- several international legal frameworks targeting ters (UN, 2002). One of Johannesburg’s most water, discussed above. These principles, 2 and significant contributions was the Johannesburg 3 in the Rio Declaration, refer to the concepts of Ministerial Declaration, in which delegates not state sovereignty, equitable use, and the obliga- only reaffirmed commitment to the Agenda 21 tion to not cause harm (UNCED, 1992b). but also encouraged the UN to further its imple- In preparation for Rio, four months prior, a large mentation (Giordano and Wolf, 2003). Another group of experts convened in Dublin to discuss was its call for IWRM plans at the country level. water and make appropriate recommendations to the Rio agenda. This meeting, the International The Inception and Conference of Water and the Environment (ICWE), produced the Dublin Statement on Water Institutionalization of IWRM— and the Environment (Dublin Statement). Like Agenda 21, the ICWE’s major contribution to the IWRM Stream global water policy was in promoting IWRM. The Dublin Statement advocates the river basin as the Immediately following Rio, international water unit of management as well as integrated plan- resources organizations and programs expanded ning and development of transboundary water (Giordano and Wolf, 2003). Concepts and ap- resources (ICWE, 1992). In addition, it specifically proaches to water management that had surfaced encourages fostering joint integrated water man- through the environmental stream were institu- agement institutions (Giordano and Wolf, 2003). tionalized, profoundly affecting the worldview of The “Dublin Principles� emphasizing manage- shared waters. These institutions constitute the ment at the lowest appropriate level, participa- third stream of influence (Table A3, next page). tion, and water as an economic good remain of Starting around the early-mid 1990s, pivotal in- interest to this day. ternational water organizations began to emerge, Clearly 1992 was a pivotal year for international including the Global Water Partnership (GWP)51 waters and in particular for development of the and the World Water Council (WWC) (Savinije IWRM concept. Dublin was the first international and Van der Zaag, 2008). Both the GWP and the event in 15 years to specifically address global WWC were established in 1996 and both are in- water concerns and to strongly promote IWRM. volved in advocacy and global implementation Rio was the first intergovernmental meeting of IWRM principles and practices (Savinije and where IWRM was formally discussed (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2008). Though the two organiza- Van der Zaag, 2008), and also where the idea for tions undoubtedly overlap, the WWC focuses at a a global water council to implement IWRM was higher level on raising political awareness, namely born50 (WWC, 2010). through the World Water Forums, while the GWP Two additional influential events in the envi- aids implementation at the regional and national ronmental stream took place a decade later— levels through its 13 Regional Water Partnerships the International Conference on Freshwater and 74 Country Water Partnerships (Varady et al, in Bonn (2001) and the UN World Summit on 2009; GWP, 2010). Sustainable Development in Johannesburg In 1997, the WWC hosted the first World Water Forum in Marrakech. These forums have con- 50 This was a motivation behind the establishment of the World Water Council four years later (WWC, 2010). 51 GWP was greatly influenced by the Dublin Principles. 60 tinued every three years since, with the topic of tainability, equity, stakeholder involvement and international waters demonstrating a general operational tools, among other related topics pattern of increasing importance at the forums. (WWC, 2010). The next forum is scheduled for To start, The Hague Forum in 2000 was guided 2012 in Marseille; one of the 12 priority action by the WWC’s 2000 Vision Report (WWC, 2000) areas is to “contribute to cooperation and peace which advocated IWRM, including attention to through water (WWC, 2011). Sub-themes include cooperation over international waters (Biswas, increasing the number of bilateral and multilateral 2003). In the section on international cooperation, agreements, fostering joint management institu- several key concepts are highlighted (adapted tions, training decision makers in transboundary from WWC, 2000): water management and conflict resolution, and ■■ Regional institutions (e.g. river ba- developing information sharing mechanisms sin organizations) (WWC, 2011). ■■ Trust building efforts The GWP’s primary influence has been to pro- ■■ Binding agreements mote IWRM, in particular its applicability at a vari- ■■ Dispute resolution mechanisms ety of scales. The GWP formulated a broad frame- work for implementing IWRM, which relies on The Ministerial Declaration following The policies, institutions and management instruments Hague stated “sharing waters� was one of seven for success (GWP, 2008). This is complemented challenges to achieving water security in the 21st by a well-received toolbox of IWRM practices. century (Giordano and Wolf, 2003), and follow- International waters is integrated throughout ing Kyoto in 2003 the Ministerial Declaration GWP’s approach to IWRM, in particular through declared cooperation over transboundary waters river basin organizations and conflict manage- one of 29 important policy areas (WWC, 2003). ment mechanisms. This emphasis has facilitated Following the forum in Mexico City in 2006, a re- appropriate river basin management practices port entitled “Implementing IWRM� emphasized at the country level. In addition, management of river basin organizations and regional decision international waters is specifically emphasized in making, while also advocating dispute resolu- the Regional Water Partnerships (GWP, 2010). tion mechanisms, data sharing, and integrating In addition to the GWP and WWC, the groundwater into regional plans (WWC, 2006). International Water Management Institute International waters became even more integrat- (IWMI)52 and the Stockholm International Water ed into the agenda at the next, and most recent, Institute (SIWI), both research organizations with forum. In Istanbul in 2009, Basin Management and Transboundary Cooperation was one of 23 sub-themes, which included dialogues over sus- IWMI transitioned from IIMI (the International Irrigation 52 Management Institute) at this time. Table A3. IWRM Influences and Associated Contributions, 1991–2009. Date IWRM (Institutional) Influence Major Contribution(s) to IW 1991 Global Environment Facility International Waters focal area; funds implementation of joint manage- ment and institutional reforms 1996 Global Water Partnership Ownership of IWRM; Regional Water Partnerships that emphasize joint management 1996 World Water Council Triennial World Water Forums, 1997-present 1996 International Water Management Research on transboundary waters, in particular in the developing world Institute 1997 Stockholm International Water Institute Annual World Water Weeks in Stockholm; shared waters as theme in 2009 2003 UN Water Open access forum for information exchange; Task Force on IW; imple- mentation of Agenda 21, Chapter 18 2003 World Water Assessment Program Triennial World Water Development Reports 2009 PCCP and ISARM programs (through IHP Capacity building in transboundary management; technical assessments and WWAP) of international aquifer basins 61 a freshwater focus, came about in the mid-1990s. building program that fosters cooperation and World Water Week, an annual conference for joint development of international waters, while decision-makers, collaborating organizations ISARM is a technical program currently develop- and academics, has been hosted by SIWI since ing a global inventory of international aquifer its inception in 199753 (SIWI, 2011). The purpose basins and guidance tools for their management of these meetings is to “provide an annual focal (UNESCO, 2011). IHP frequently coordinates point for solutions to the growing array of water with GEF’s international waters program and and development challenges facing the world was also a contributor to the International Law (SIWI, 2009).� In 2009, Transboundary Waters Commission’s Rules on Transboundary Aquifers was the “special focus� of World Water Week (UNESCO, 2011). (SIWI, 2009). The WWAP has also triennially published the The GEF has also played a major role in the World Water Development Report since 2003 (UN promotion of international waters, by funding Water, 2009). The most recent report, Water in a relevant projects and programs. Its primary pur- Changing World, addresses international waters pose is to provide a mechanism for implementing in the context of impending scarcity, degraded global environmental goals and since its inception water quality and potential basin closure, high- has grown into the largest multilateral source of lighting the importance of cooperation and data aid specifically targeting the global environment exchange to achieve a more sustainable future (Gerlak, 2004). In 1995, the GEF released its (WWAP, 2009). The fourth report is due out next Operational Strategy containing the long-term year—the overarching theme is “managing water goal for its International Waters focal area, which under uncertainty and risk (WWAP, 2011),� which was essentially to support joint management of resounds with the current resource management international waters (GEF, 2010). GEF’s interna- approaches of resilience and adaptability. tional waters program moved into full operational mode in support of institutional reforms, invest- Conclusion ments, and joint management of rivers, aquifers and oceans (GEF, 2010). The cause of international waters has developed In 2003, UN Water succeeded an existing through three interweaving streams of influence— network in response to a growing need for a the legal, environmental and IWRM streams. “coherent, coordinated approach� to address a Figure A1 on the following page illustrates a plethora of inter-related freshwater issues (UN comprehensive timeline of these events. While Water, 2009). In addition, UN Water is the of- it seemed to disappear altogether during the ficial UN mechanism for following up on water 1980s, it has since been emphasized rather con- related decisions that came out of the 2002 sistently through all three streams in the 1990s, World Summit in Johannesburg (UN Water, 2008). and does not appear to be losing momentum. Within UN Water, six task forces were initially cre- The fact that the upcoming World Water Forum ated, one of which is Transboundary Waters (UN in Marseille lists cooperation over international Water, 2009). UN Water serves as a platform for waters as one of 12 priority action areas cor- information exchange (UN Water, 2009), while roborates this notion, as does the GEF’s revised alternate UN organizations and programs target and augmented international waters strategy specific challenges or sectors. For example, the published in 2010.54 Also, SIWI’s Water Week has World Water Assessment Program (WWAP) and focused on international Waters in 2009; the Bonn the International Hydrological Programme (IHP) 2011 Conference emphasized the IWRM agenda are both involved in international waters—over through water energy linkages. In fact, these com- the past decade, WWAP and IHP have taken on ing years, 2012-13, should be a telling year for the PCCP (From Potential Conflict to Cooperation international waters—in addition to the upcoming Potential) and ISARM (International Shared World Water Forum, the Rio +20 Conference on Aquifer Resource Management) programs un- Sustainable Development as well as the annual der UNESCO. PCCP is a research and capacity World Water Weeks in Stockholm that are also expected to highlight International Waters. 53 World Water Week is the successor to the previous Stock- holm Water Symposiums, hosted by the municipal water and 54 The GEF published its Focal Area Strategies for its fifth re- wastewater provider in Stockhom since 1991, until SIWI took plenishment in 2010, which included a revised and augmented over in 1997 (SIWI, 2011). strategy for its international waters program (GEF, 2010). 62 Figure A1. Timeline of Events along the Three Streams of Influence Legal Madrid Declaration 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 Dubrovnik Statement D NY Resolution N S Salzburg Resolution 1960 Environment Helsinki Rules H International I Hydro Decade UNCHE Stockholm 1970 IHP I Complimentary Rules C U UNCE Mar del Plata 1980 R Rules on International GW IWRM 1990 Dublin D ICWE, UNCED Rio GEF G GWP, G WWC, IWMI+ UN Watercourse Convention U WWF1, SIWI W C Campione Consolidation W WWF2* 2000 B Bonn FW Conference U UNCSD Johannesburg W WWF3, WWAP, UNWater B Berlin Rules W WWF4* U UN Transboundary Aquifers W WWF5*, PCCP/ISARM 2010 R Rio + 20 W WWF6* Notes: + IWMI replaced IIMI (established in 1984). * World Water Forums that specifically targeted (or will target) IW. 63 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433